攻击型巡飞弹引信安全系统设计说明书

填空题：1.引信的定义：引信是利用环境信息(如发射条件)，目标信息(如散射特点)或按照事先设定的条件(如时间，指令等)，在保证弹药平时和发射时安全的前提下，对弹药实施起爆控制，点火控制及姿态控制的装置。

2. 现代引信的主要功能有：（1）安全控制：保证引信在预定起爆时间之前不起作用，保证弹药在储存、运输、处理和发射中安全；（2）起爆控制：在相对目标最有利位置或时机完全地引爆或引燃战斗部装药；（3）命中点控制：修正无控弹药的飞行弹道或水下弹道，提高对目标的命中概率和毁伤概率；（4）发动机点火控制：控制带有两级发动机导弹的第二级发动机的点火，或控制火箭上浮水雷发动机点火。

3. 引信的组成：发火控制系统、安全系统、能源装置、爆炸序列。

4.引信的作用过程：引信的作用过程是指引信从发射开始到引爆战斗部主装药的全过程。

保险（目标信息或预定信息）、解除保险过程、发火控制过程、引爆过程。

5．引信获取目标方式：触感方式、近感方式、接受指令方式。

6.对引信的基本要求有：安全性、可靠性、使用性、引战配合性、环境适应性、抗干扰性、标准化经济性、长期储存稳定性。

7.引信设计一般程序包括：引信总体论证、引信方案设计、引信工程研制、引信设计定型、引信生产定型。

8.引信安全性设计的一般要求：勤务处理安全性、装填安全性、发射安全性（膛内安全性，炮口安全性）。

计算题：1.有一离心保险机构，其离心销质量m=0.32g，起始偏心距r0=8mm，今用于K1=1000，K2=5000cm-1炮系统，求该离心销所受的最大后坐力和最大离心力。

解：因为m=0.32g r0=8mm K1=8000 K2=5000cm-1∴该离心销所受的最大后坐力为：FSM=K1mg=8000*0.32*10-3*9.8=25.088N最大离心力为Fcm=K2mgr0=5000*0.35*10-3*9.8*0.8=12.544N2. 有一膛内针刺发火机构，已知弹簧预压变形量λ0=3.79mm~4.81mm，截击行程l1=2.491mm，截击抗力FR1=22N~25N，惯性体换算质量m1=1.25g取β=0.5，试求安全落高H？解：惯性体系统的储能表达式Ek=0.5*（m+mu/3）v02（1+β）2 v0=（2gH）0.5∴Ek=（m+mu/3）gH（1+β）2弹簧被压缩后表达式：En=（Fro+Fr1)l/2∴m2gH（1+β）2≤0.5（Fro+Fr1）l若取H≤（Fro+Fr1)l/2m1g（1+β）2则H≤Fr1l（l+2λ0）/2（l+λ0）m1g（1+β）2 =FR1l/2m1g（1+β）2×（l+2λ0)/（l+λ0）对于（l+2λ0)/（l+λ0）=2.491+2×3.79/（2.491+3.79）=10.071/6.281=1.603当λ0=4.81mm （l+2λ0)/（l+λ0）=1+λ0/（l+λ0）=1+4.81/（2.491+4.81）=1+4.81/7.301=1.66 H≤[Fr1l/2m1g（1+β）2×（l+2λ0）/2（l+λ0）]min=（22×2.491）×1.63/（2×1.25g×10-3×10×（1+0.5）2）=1562mm=1.562m3. 有一双行程保险机构，一直惯性筒质量m1=1.27g，上钢球质量m2=0.1g，解除保险行程l1=8mm，弹簧预压型变量λ0=4mm，上钢球脱落时弹簧抗力FR1=12.33N，令用于85mm榴弹上。

巡飞弹姿态约束条件下引战配合系统分析
李炜;王正杰;范宁军
【期刊名称】《宇航学报》
【年(卷),期】2008(029)001
【摘要】多模EFP弹药是各国正在努力发展的新型弹药,这种弹药的最大特点就是战斗部毁伤元素具有射束性,这就对引信系统的设计提出了新的要求.巡飞弹作为多模EFP战斗部应用的典型系统,其动态特性将会直接影响引战配合效率和引信的启动规律.为了能够更好地分析和解决巡飞弹姿态约束对于引战配合影响的问题,首先简要分析了巡飞弹的动态特性,引入目标命中函数的概念来分析巡飞弹姿态对于弹着点的影响.目标命中函数可以直观地表明姿态角对于EFP弹丸弹着点的影响.在评估目标毁伤概率的时候,需要考虑姿态角因素.
【总页数】4页(P188-191)
【作者】李炜;王正杰;范宁军
【作者单位】北京理工大学宇航科学技术学院,北京,100081;北京理工大学宇航科学技术学院,北京,100081;北京理工大学宇航科学技术学院,北京,100081
【正文语种】中文
【中图分类】TJ430
【相关文献】
1.巡飞弹空中自适应快速初始姿态估计 [J], 李增彦;李小民;刘秋生;周兆英
2.巡飞弹的气动特性分析与弹道姿态仿真 [J], 陶迎迎;张华;郝永平;乔磊;袁备;郭亚
超;李曙光
3.小型巡飞弹引战配合分析 [J], 柏席峰;范宁军;王正杰
4.近程巡飞弹姿态控制优化仿真研究 [J], 黄瑞;陈建辉;高敏;陶贵明
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机电引信安全执行机构设计摘要：介绍了机电引信安全系统设计的工作原理，分析了隔离机构受力及运动情况，论述了安全系统谐振设计的原理,给出了安全系统性能的主要参数.采用这种设计在导弹的实际使用中，取得了预期的效果。

XX关键词:机电; 引信安全; 设计XX引言导弹引信安全系统的主要作用是为导弹（战斗部) 的保险、解除保险和向战斗部输出引爆能量，它是导弹安全系统和引爆系统中的重要环节.目前国内比较流行的安全系统均为全机械错位式惯性隔离机构，国内大部分型号中使用的安全系统均属于这一类.虽然这类产品工艺比较成熟，但在满足新型号导弹使用要求时，其适应性受到很大的限制,如:钟延时机构和火药延时无法满足新型号导弹灵活多样的特性，在体积、质量和精度上更是无法满足要求.所以,采用机电安全系统的设计，以满足新型导弹武器系统的要求。

XX 机电安全系统设计机电安全系统的工作原理：(）利用导弹发射时的过载，使电路工作，同时也使系统处于工作状态；(2)当导弹二级发动机工作时,第一级机械保险解除,并在电路作用下解除第二道保险（远距离解除保险),系统隔离机构开始转换;(3）当光电检测单元检测到正常信号，则第三道保险解除并使系统处于待爆状态;（4）若光电检测单元检测到不正常信号,则电路产生信号使机构反向转换，传爆序列处于隔离状态，系统仍处于保险状态。

在新型导弹安全系统设计时，设计师们继承了传统设计理论，并采用一些。

该机构采用机、电、光设计,使保险零件、保险器、被保险零件均在隔离机构上实现.由于该隔离机构件集环境能源检测、非环境能源检测、保险机构、隔离、光电检测单元、传爆序列等功能于一身，因此该组件在结构和功能上十分复杂，结构精度要求也相当高。

但随着加工技术和能力的不断提高，对批量生产这样一个复杂结构体,已不存在任何困难。

．保险机构在安全执行机构设计中,要求不得少于两道相互的保险.为了既满足设计要求,又不增加体积和质量，所以设计了三道完全不同功能的保险，且不降低产品的可靠性.XXa。

Ξ中美子弹引信设计思想分析与对比赵玉清(红宇机械厂,河南南召　474675)摘　要:通过剖析中美炮用子母弹子弹引信,提炼总结出了中美子弹引信的设计思想,并进行了分析与对比。

中美炮用子弹引信总体技术水平相当。

美军子弹引信的设计思想是:设计必须简单,保证基本的安全特性,低成本,适合批量生产。

不强求符合《引信安全性设计准则》和对软目标的作用可靠性。

美军空——地子弹引信的设计思想是:高安全性,高作用可靠性。

中国子弹引信的设计思想是:追求高安全性,高作用可靠性,对目标作用的高效能和“三化”。

必须符合《引信安全性设计准则》。

通过设置自毁机构提高对目标作用的可靠性、减少瞎火子弹。

关键词:子弹引信;设计思想;分析中图分类号:TJ 43　文献标识码:A 文章编号:1008-1194(2001)04-0041-040　前言常规炮弹、火箭弹、航弹在对付人员、车辆等轻型目标时能量总量集中,趋于过毁伤。

子母弹既能充分发挥毁伤有生力量的效能,又能远距离攻击坦克防护的薄弱环节——顶装甲。

因此子母弹已成为野战火炮和野战火箭炮的主要弹种。

美国155mm 榴弹炮M 483A 1型子母弹,一发子母弹内装88发子弹,分成11层,每层8发,底下3层装24发M 46式多用途子弹,上面8层装64发M 42式多用途子弹,计13层,每层15发。

M 42、M 46多用途子弹配用M 223子弹引信,每发子弹重0.182kg ,直径38.9mm ,能穿透70mm 均质装甲板。

美国M 404式203mm 杀伤子母弹,内装104个M 43系列子弹,计13层,每层8发。

M 43A 1式子弹是一种反跳式杀伤子弹,装有球形杀伤战斗部。

美国M 449式155mm 杀伤子母弹内装60发M 43型子弹。

美国227mm 多管火箭系统(M L R S ),一发母弹装644发M 77子弹,分7层。

一次齐射发射7728发子弹,覆盖面积30000m 2。

在海湾战争中美军2881门6管火箭炮发射1100多万发子弹。

International Conference on Automation, Mechanical Control and Computational Engineering (AMCCE 2015) Analysis of Repair Level for Missile Based on Reliability CenteredMaintenanceMa Ning, Xiang YujunDepartment of Aviation Ammunition Engineering, The First Aeronautic Institute of the Air Force,Xinyang, 464000, China.Keywords: missile; RCMA; LORA; decision tree model.Abstract. A research of Level of Repair Analysis (LORA) for missile’s equipments to improve its maintainability is proposed. The preventive maintenance mode of a new missile system is determined via using RCMA (Reliability Centered Maintenance Analysis) and performed under the combination with its maintenance actuality. A decision tree model of LORA is established as a result of the analysis on the meaning, structure, non-economic influence factors and analytical procedure of LORA to modify the existing missile maintenance system, as well as reducing the maintenance cost and difficulities.IntroductionWith more new type missiles were fitted out in force gradually, the demand of missile maintenance is highly increased due to armament’s complexities and technologies. A whole normative and complete maintainability system and criterion of normality is not to be established because of lack of scientific and feasible maintenability analysis. Currently, daily servicing, management and fault detection are the major task for new type equipment. The weak ability of maintenance becomes the bottleneck for the improvement of maintainability and work efficiency. Consequently, it is necessary to set up a new reasonable repair level which is combined with comprehensive analysis on various related factorsLORA (level of repair analysis) is a process of analysis and planning for equipment support system [1]. It is normally used to derive a repair level that is feasible and cost-efficiency optimal for the equipment.RCMA on a certain type of missile in service in PLA was given in this paper, the failure mode and their criticality was determined, which laid a foundation and provided inputs for LORA. Furthermore, noneconomic LORA analysis on the equipment during the phase of use and support was done to derive the decision tree model.The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the analytic method which used in this paper is proposed, and some definitions and assumptions are given. Section 3 presents the reliability centered maintenance analysis procedures. In Section 4, the missile LORA model based on RCMA is discussed, and decision tree model of missile LORA is presented. Finally, the conclusion is given in section5.Level of repair analysisAccording to the definition in the session 'LORA' in GJB2961-97[2], LORA was defined as “the process of economic or noneconomic analysis for a product bound to have failures in its lifetime so as to get its proper level of repair or the decision of disposal”. LORA is an important part of can identify not only the repair sites or disposal location for the equipment and its components, but also the support equipment needed, spare parts storage, maintenance crew needed and their technical capabilities, and training and etc. for different levels of repair institutions.The aim for LORA is to decide whether or not the product needs repairing and in which level of repair institution the product should be repaired, i.e., to allocate maintenance tasks and maintenance resources and to decide the responsibilities of each repair level reasonably[3].Through economic and noneconomic analysis of LORA, the best level for repair action was determined for the defective components of the equipment. Regarding the different phases theequipment is in its life time, LORA can be divided into LORA in development phase and LORA in use and support phase [4]. In this paper, noneconomic LORA in use and support phase of one certain missile equipment was discussed.RCMA on missile equipmentRCMA is one system analysis method that is used to determine the necessity of preventive maintenance for the equipment and to optimize maintenance system. It is aimed to find out all possible failures that may occur in the equipment system and their reasons and causes by carrying out functional and failure analysis [5]. In RCMA, a systematic logic decision method will be used to identify preventive maintenance strategies for each failure. According to GJB1378A-2007[6], RCMA for weapon equipment includes RCMA for system and equipment, structure RCMA, regional inspection and analysis and RCMA results.As for a missile, its primary components include electro-optic, electromechanical electronic items and structural components including the projectile body, sections connectors and internal fastening device. Sections for missiles are sealed to avoid exposure of their internal structures. In most cases, it is not allowed to be opened in case of random failures. When missiles are delivered to flight squadrons, they are normally sealed in their packages and stored in warehouses. Therefore, the structure will rarely be affected by the environment. Structural RCMA for missiles mainly focuses on structural parts of the missile body while internal inspection for the missile is rarely required. So, missile’s RCMA mainly includes system and equipment RCMA.Aims for RCMA of missile system and equipment are as follows:1. Find items that need preventive maintenance and those needless or unimportant items.2. FMECA should be carried out for confirmed important items to identify the possible failures and their reasons, failure modes and their severity.3. When design modification is not feasible, standard logic decision methods should be used to determine preventive strategies. Procedure for missile system and equipment RCMA is shown as follows:Fig.1: RCMA procedure of missile equipment and systemSystem indenture categorization and important items determinationImportant items of missiles refer to subsystems and modules of the missile. For almost every part of a missile is detachable or replaceable, any failure occurring from any part would cause malfunction of the missile. So every missile (module) part can be regarded as important items for RCMA. The indenture categorization of a missile system and equipment should be analyzed follow the order of its assembly from top to end.Fig.2 shows the structure of missile system.Fig.2: Structure of missile systemFailure mode and effect analysis.FMECA（Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis，FMECA）is an analysis methodology by which all potential failure modes are found, the causes and effects of failure modes are analyzed, critical failure modes are selected and methods to mitigate or remove the effects of critical failure modes are provided[7]. It will be done for equipment of missile RCMA so as to identify failure modes, reasons and severity to lay a solid foundation for maintenance and support system planning. Table.1 shows the potential or normal failure modes and phenomenon of missile body[8].Table.1 Define failure mode of missile bodyFailure mode Phenomenon & explaindamage structural faultyqualitative change physical quality and chemical quality, wear, temperature is too high, temperature is too lowposition change vibration, unable keep normal position leakage internal or external leakage of gas,liquid,solidparameters overrun DC resistance, insulation resistance, test parameter overrun upper limit or lower limitabnormalindicationindicate error, indicate ambiguityabnormalelectricalpropertyshort circuit, open circuit, electrical leakageother other fault modesA criticality class can be determined for each failure mode. Table.2 shows the definition of criticality class for failure mode[9].Table.2 Define criticality class for failure modeCriticality class Criticality definitionCategoryI(catastrophic) A failure which may cause death or weapon system loss.Category II(critical) A failure which may cause severeinjury,major property damage, or majorsystem damage which will result inmission loss.Category III(marginal) A failure which may cause minor injury,minor property damage, or minor systemdamage which will result in delay or lossof availability or mission degradation. Category IV(minor) A failure not serious enough to causeinjury,property damage, or systenmdamage, but which will result inunscheduled maintenance or repair.Preventive maintenance type determination.Seven types of preventive maintenance tasks should be included [10]:i) Service. Service is performed in daily use or maintenance for missiles, including periodical inspections for depots environment and package air tightness.ii) Usage inspection. Inspections should be performed according to maintenance plans so as to find potential failures.iii) Monitoring. Normal monitoring for missiles in use should be used to detect potential failures of products. The contents of normal monitor include before use inspection or monitoring for instruments, i.e.iv) Function detection. Quantitative detection for missile technical parameters making sure that all parameters are within range for missions. v) Periodic overhaul. Restoration maintenance work can be performed on mechanical parts in missiles which have obvious wastage characteristics.vi) Periodic disposal. Type of work can be performed on non-repairable components and severely worn components that repair are not applicable, such as initiating devices for missiles. They will be used only once and will be disposed of once the time of storage is full.vii) Comprehensive work. Two or more the above mentioned work types combined together.Missile LORA modelsDetermination of missile repair level.Concerning the complexity of missiles and their maintenance level, two stage maintenance systems are used on missile system maintenance: operation-level maintenance and deport-level maintenance[11].Operation-level maintenance is normally carried out on the operation spot by the crew in operational and maintenance wing, including daily servicing, detection, examination; Several equipment for detection and repair equipment, maintenance spare parts are equipped on the operation-level maintenance institutions. Deport-level maintenance is carried out by the ordnance service depots and the manufacturing contractors. All maintenance tasks should be able to be accomplished in this level of maintenance institution, including major parts repair, spare parts manufacturing and supply, damaged parts repair and reproduction. Maintenance tasks can be done in the depots or at the flight line.Noneconomic factors.The following noneconomic factors should be considered in the LORA for missiles given use and maintenance features of missiles [12-13]:i) Safety. Safety must be considered for weapons like missiles that includes engines and warheads.ii) Present maintenance plan. The present maintenance plan and maintainability of different levels of military maintenance units should be considered.iii) Support equipment. Testing equipment and special tools for maintenance are equipped on the proposed level of repair or not.iv) Package, storage, loading/unloading, and transport. Special needs for package, transport, load/unload and storage. (temperature, moisture, climate, electrostatic proof and etc.) v) Maintenance crew specialty and technical capabilities. Maintenance crew specialty configuration and abilities satisfy a certain level of repair.vi) Facilities. Special facilities, repair craft for a certain repair level.vii) Maintenance complexity. Complex maintenance, craft requirements satisfy a certain repair level.viii) Confidentiality. Confidentiality occurs at specific levels of maintenance.LORA procedure.RCMA results should be consulted in LORA for missiles. Noneconomic analysis should be done respectively to determine maintenance task level for items at different indentures [14]. LORA procedure is shown in Fig.3.Fig.3: Procedure of missile LORASome maintenance tasks are affected by multiple noneconomic factors in analysis. Then, comprehensive evaluation should be done to determine a feasible maintenance level. If noneconomic analysis is not enough to determine the maintenance level, comprehensive analysis should be carried out.Missile LORA decision tree modelDecision tree analysis is a traditional methodology in LORA. Decision tree analysis can be used to reduce analysis work in practice [15]. The decision tree model is established as shown in Fig.4. Primary level of maintenance can be determined via LORA decision tree model.From Fig.4, there are three knots for decision making: the first knot will result in operation-level maintenance if the answer is “yes”. This level of maintenance includes only minor work for trouble shooting; the second knot will result in repair work as replacement, normally at operation-level; the third knot will result in deport-level maintenance which requires higher level of repair or complex repair equipment.Fig.4 Decision tree model of missile LORAConclusionsThe noneconomic LORA decision tree model in support phase based on the maintenance’s status quo of PLA's new missiles was established via RCMA on missile system. Scientific analysis on missile faulted-parts’ repair level was carried out to obtain maintenance plan or provide possible theoretic foundation and reference for decision formulating.References[1] Gutin G, Rafiey A&Yeo A. Level of repair analysis and minimum cost homomorphism ofgraphs.Discrete Applied Mathematics, 154(6),pp.881-889,2006.[2]GJB 2961-97,Level of repair analysis.[3] Basten R.J.I, Schutten J.M.J& Heijden M.C.V.D. An efficient model formulation for level ofrepair analysis. Annals of Operations Research, 172(1),pp.119-142,2009.[4] Haritha Saranga, Dinesh Kumar U. Optimization of aircraft maintenance/support infrastructureusing genetic algorithms—level of repair analysis. Annals of Operations Research, 143,pp.91-106,2006.[5] Lu Xiao-Hong, Jia Zhen-Yuan&Gao Sheng-Nan.Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis(FMECA) of Circular Tool Magazine and ATC. Anal and Preven, 13, pp.207-216,2013[6] GJB 1378A-2007，Equipment repair analysis based on RCM.[7] Xu K, Tang L C& Xie M. Fuzzy assessment of FMEA for engine systems. ReliabilityEngineering and System Safety,75(1),pp.17-29,2002.[8] Zhao Da-Lei, Huang Ding-Dong, Li Mu-Yi& Wang Zhe.LORA for Certain Missile-borneEquipments. Computer and Modernization,7,pp.65-68,2013.[9]J.H.KIM,H.Y.JEONG & J.S.PARK. Development of the FMECA process and analysismethodology for railroad systems. 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第31卷第1期2010年1月兵工学报ACT A ARMA MENTAR IIVo.l 31No .1Jan .2010弹体姿态调控引信系统设计与仿真刘松,范宁军(北京理工大学引信动态特性国防科技重点实验室,北京100081)摘要:为减小巡飞弹弹体姿态偏差对引战配合的不利影响,提出弹体姿态调控引信的概念。

在利用弹上信息的基础上,设计一种通过弹上加装微型脉冲推冲器产生的直接力快速调控弹体滚转角的引信;建立滚转角调控量计算模型,利用相平面分析法,设计微型脉冲推冲器的启动策略,保证弹体姿态在起爆时满足最佳引战配合要求。

仿真结果表明调控时间短,使用的微型脉冲推冲器数量少,利用引信进行姿态调控是可行的。

关键词:自动控制技术;巡飞弹;引信;姿态调控;脉冲推冲器 中图分类号:TP41011文献标志码:A文章编号:100021093(2010)0120018205The Desi gn and Si m ula ti on ofM un ition A ttitude C or rection Fuze Syste mLIU Song ,FAN N i n g 2jun(Key De f ence Sc i ence and Technology Laboratory for Fuze Dy na m ic Characteristics ,B eiji ng Institute of Technology ,Be ijing 100081,Ch i na)Abs tra c t :In order to reduce the adverse eff ects of body a ttitude deviation on f uz e 2warhead coordinati o n,the conception of attitude correcti o n f uze was proposed .Based on the gi v en i n f or mation of t h e muniti o ns a t the end of trajectory ,a f uze with so me i n sta lled m icro i m pu lse t h rusters f or roll angle rap i d regulati n gwas desi g ned ;the mode l of the regulati n g quantity of roll angle was set up ;t h e i n itia l strategy of m icr o i m pu lse thrusters was desi g ned by phase p lane analysis ,to m eet the opti m al f uze 2war head effic iency re 2qu ire ments on detonation .The si m ulated results sho w t h at the correction pr ocess takes shorter ti m e and f e wer m icro i m pu lse thrusters ,theref ore it is f easible to use f uze i n the body attitude correcti o n .Ke y w ords :auto matic con trol technology ;loitering munitions ;f uze ;attitude correction ;im pu lse thr uster收稿日期:2009-01-07作者简介:刘松(1979)),男,博士研究生。