外文翻译
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Searching for causes — underpinning structural change
寻找原因-基础设施的变化
The phenomenal growth of the 1980s and 1990s is commonly agreed to
have its genesis in the pronouncements of Deng Xiaoping in 1978, setting out
the concept of a ‘market economy with socialist characteristics’. The reforms of
1978 created a ‘household responsibility system’ that transformed the
collective production teams of between ten and one hundred families into
individual farmer–family based production organizations. Farmers were given
the right to use farmland for periods of ten to twenty years and were also
promised prolongation. In return they had to sell part of their output to the state
at an official price but after that they were free to sell the remainder at their
own price and profit freely. This freed up the process from bureaucratic control
and led to a process of decentralized industrialization based upon surpluses in
agriculture as farmers moved to supplement their income. The main
organizational vehicle for this transformation was the TVE. By this means a
‘secondary market’ was developed in rural areas, at first tolerated by the party
and then endorsed in the 1980s. The new ‘for profit’ enterprises grew and led
to the growth of contract working (i.e., not hired for life) and a very rapid growth
in rural worker incomes. Some writers argue that it is this move from initially
low productivity agriculture into alternative MSME development in the 1980s
and 1990s that explains the high growth achievement. Other writers dispute
this view in part or whole.
20世纪八九十年代的显著增长普遍认为是1978年邓小平同志发表的宣言书引起的,宣言书阐明了‘中国特色的社会主义市场经济’的概念。1978年改革建立了‘家庭联产承包责任制’,将10-100户家庭组成的生产队改造成了以生产组为单位的个体家庭自主经营。农民有权在10-20年内使用耕地,也可以按约定延期。反过来,他们必须将部分产量按照官方价格出售给国家,但是剩余部分他们可以按照自己的价格自行销售,自由盈利。这释放了官僚控制并导致了分散的工业化进程,这是以因农民要增补他们的收入而产生的农业剩余为基础的。这次改革的主要组织载体是TVE。通过这种手段,在农村地区发展了 ‘二级市场’,它在20世纪八十年代被党中央接受,然后认可。这种新兴‘盈利性’企业增长导致了承包工程(即非终身雇佣)的增长和农民收入的快速增长。一些作家认为正是因为从最初低产出的农业到交替的MSME的发展这种转变实现了高增长。其他作家对这种观点的全部或部分持怀疑态度。 The most important form of collective enterprise that emerged in this part
of the evolutionary process was not collectively owned by members of the
enterprise. Instead, it was owned by the local community and, de facto, by
local government. This ownership structure, post 1978, grew out of the gradual
decentralization of economic decision making and the liberalization of the
non-state owned economy embracing aspects of free pricing, deregulation,
enterprise restructuring, and the disbanding of agricultural communes [14].
The leases on land were tradable and this freed up markets for some
agricultural products. As a result, by the mid 1990s, only 5% of farmers’
production was set by state plans and only 5% of industrial goods outputs. [3]
The activities of collectives were not included in the central planning process
and are controlled by local, not central, government. The collectives have been
complemented by the growth of private enterprise defined as a ‘profit-making
economic entity which employs at least eight persons with assets owned by
private individuals’. Distribution channels for goods have become dominated
by supply and marketing cooperatives.
集体企业在改良过程中出现的最重要的形式不是归企业成员共同所有。相反,归本地社区,实际上,归当地政府所有。这种所有制结构,在1978年公布,由于经济决策的逐渐分散化和非国有经济的自由化(包括自由价格、放款管制、企业重组和农业公社的解散。)而产生。土地租赁可以交易,这开放了一些农产品市场。结果,截止20世纪90年代中期,只有5%的农户生产和5%的工业产品产量纳入国家计划。集体主义的活动不包括在中央计划程序中,受当地政府而非中央的控制。集体主义辅之以私有企业(企业资产属于私人所有,雇工达到8人以上的营利性经济实体。)的增长。货物的销售渠道变成受供应商和供销合作社控制。
There has been much debate as to whether what has happened in China
represents a process of gradual transition to a Western-type (capitalist)
economy or whether it constitutes a different development path altogether.
Much of the argument has ranged around distinctions to be made between
privatization and marketization. Putterman[15], for example, argues that there
are three ‘models’ of explanation: first, that privatization is the key to economic
reform and efficiency; second, that privatization is important but comes later in
the process; and third, that marketization and not privatization is the key.
Notwithstanding the ultimate destiny of social and political structures in China, it seems relatively clear it was not privatization that provided the platform for
the development of MSMEs and the phenomenally high growth rate, even
though the private sector currently grows apace. If the Chinese model is
transferable, it is issues other than privatization that must be understood. It is
argued below that the key issues relevant to the transferability of the Chinese
model are: the process of decentralization; the structure of ownership and
decision-making processes of non-state owned firms; and the emergence of