AIAA-51218-591

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FeasibilityStudyofGlobal-Positioning-System-BasedAircraft-CarrierFlight-DeckPersistentMonitoringSystem

JeffreyS.Johnston∗andEricD.Swenson†AirForceInstituteofTechnology,Wright-PattersonAirForceBase,Ohio,45433

DOI:10.2514/1.C000220Thisresearchanalyzestheuseofmodernguidance,navigation,andcontrolconcepts,suchastheGlobalPositioningSystem,withthepotentialforimprovementsinthesafetyofaircraft,equipment,andpersonnelonboardaU.S.Navyaircraftcarrier.TheresultsofadetailedanalysisofU.S.Navysafetyrecordssince1980showthatmishapsthatcouldpotentiallybepreventedbyapersistentmonitoringsystemhaveresultedinthedeathsof13sailorsandaccountforover$90millionindamages,or5%ofthetotalcostofallflight-deck-andhangar-bay-relatedmishaps.ResearcheffortsincludedastudyofthemovementsofU.S.NavypersonnelandanFA-18CaircraftbeingtowedatNavalAirStationOceana,Virginia.Pseudospectralmotionplanningtechniquesareexploredtoprovideroutepredictionforaircraft,supportequipment,andpersonnel.Asystemtocontinuallymonitorflight-deckoperationsisproposed,withfoursuccessivelevelsofincreasingcapability.Theresearchshowsthatradionavigationcanprovidethenecessaryaccuracytoimproveflight-decksafety,butthatsubstantialcomputingpowerandaugmentationoftheGlobalPositioningSystemarenecessary.

I.IntroductionTHEflightdeckofaU.S.Navy(USN)aircraftcarrier(CV,CVN),depictedinFig.1,isaninherentlydangerousplacetowork.Anembarkedcarrierairwing(CVW),usuallycomposedofaround64aircraft,mustperformallofitsflight-deckoperationsusingonly4.5acresofflight-deckspace.Theseclosequarters,combinedwiththerapidpaceofflight-deckoperationsandthedangersfacedbyanyoceangoingvessel,createconditionsthatareamongthemostdangerousintheworld.TheofficialUSNrecordsofflight-deckmishaps[1]includemanyseriousinjuriesandfatalities,aswellasnumerousinstancesofdamagetoorlossofaircraft.Afterexamining29yearsofflight-deck-relatedmishaprecords,providedbytheNavalSafetyCenter,thisresearchdevelopsanewmishapclassificationsystem.Ratherthanclassifyingmishapsbycost,anewsystemisproposedtogroupmishapsbycause.Newmethodsandsystemstomitigatetherisksthatcontributetothesemishapsareproposed.ThisresearchwillfocusexclusivelyontheCV/CVNclassofaircraftcarrier,althoughmanyaspectsmaybeapplicabletothesmalleramphibiousassaultvessels.Afulldescriptionoftheoperationsonboardanaircraftcarrierisbeyondthescopeofthisdocument.Abriefintroductiontoflight-deckoperationsisprovidedin[2].Thissectionprovidesanexaminationofsafetyrecordsasproblemmotivationandintroducestheconceptofapersistentmonitoringsystemfortheflightdeckandhangarbayofaircraftcarriers.SectionIVexploresareasofpriorresearchrelatedtothisstudy.ThedatacollectionmethodsforthisresearcharediscussedinSec.V.ResultsarepresentedinSec.VI,withconclusionsinSec.VIII.II.SafetyRecordsThissectionexaminesthedataprovidedbytheNavalSafetyCenter,availableundertheFreedomofInformationAct,onallreportedmishapsinvolvinganaircraftcarrierfrom1980through2008.Thesedatainclude3228mishaps,bothairborneandonboardaship.Only1506ofthemishapsprovidedhaveanarrative,ordescription,ofthemishap.Thenarrativesarerequiredtodeterminetheappropriategroupingfortheevent.Themishapswithoutnarra-tivesrequireprivilegedaccess,whichcouldnotbeprovidedforthisstudy.Therefore,onlythe1506mishapswithnarrativeswereevalu-atedinthisstudy.Astheseverityofthe1722mishapswithoutnarrativesisunknown,thepotentialforbiasresultingfromtheirexclusioncannotbediscounted.

A.MishapClassificationBeforeexaminingthedatafurther,itisimportanttodiscusshowtheyarecollected.Foranyaviation-relatedmishapresultingininjurytopersonnelordamagetoequipment,thesquadronororganizationresponsiblemustsubmiteitherahazardreport(HAZREP)ormishapdatareport(MDR).ThepurposeoftheHAZREPorMDRistorecordobjectivedataforanalysisbytheNavalSafetyCenter,buttherearenumerousreasonswhythedatacontainedinthereportmaynotreflectthetotalityofreality.Becauseofthenaturaldesiretodownplaythesignificanceofamishapandtheamountofdamage,aswellastheinherentdifficultyincapturingthetruetotalcostofamishap,theestimatedcostistypicallymuchlowerthanonewouldexpect.TheNavalAviationSafetyProgram[3]classifiesmishapsbaseduponthenumberofworkdayslostduetoinjuryorthefinancialseverityofdamagetoequipment.Mishapsarealsocategorizedasflight,flight-related,oraviationgroundmishaps;but,forthepurposesofthisresearch,thesedistinctionsarenotsufficient.Accordingtotheinstructionsforthisprogram,amishapiscategorizedasflightorflight-relatediftheintentforflightexisted,notsimplyifitoccursintheair.Acollisionbetweenasailororparkedaircraftandanaircraftlaunchingfromacatapultisreportedasaflightmishap,butitisstillofinteresttothisresearch,becauseitispoten-tiallypreventable.Ontheotherhand,amishapcausedbysystemfailureontheaircraftduringlaunch,alsoreportedasaflightmishap,isoutsidethescopeofthisresearch.Theseverityofamishapisclassifiedbyassigningaletterdesignator,baseduponcost.Theprocessofdeterminingthecostofamishapisdetailedinsection314oftheNavalAviationSafety