目录
1外文文献原文 (1)
2外文文献翻译 (2)
1外文文献原文
Safety of long railway tunnels
D. Diamantidis a,*, F. Zuccarelli b, A. Westha¨user c
a University of Applied Sciences, Regensburg, Prufeningerstr.58, D-93049, Regensburg,
Germany
b D’Appolonia S.p.A., Genova, Italy
c Brenner Eisenbahn GmbH, Innsbruck, Austria
Received 10 March 1999; accepted 6 September 1999
Abstract
Planning and designing railway tunnels with an explicit reference to safety issues is becoming of utmost importance since the combination of high speed, mixed goods–passenger traffic and extreme length of the new tunnels under design or concept evaluation, have sensitively modified the inherent safety of the railway tunnel. Although the probability of occurrence of accidental events may still be considered rather low, the possible consequences of such events in long tunnels can be catastrophic, therefore raising the overall risk to levels that may be no more acceptable. The scope of this paper is to illustrate the state-of-practice related to risk analysis of long railway tunnels. First, ambitious tunnel projects are briefly reviewed. The applicable risk-analysis procedures are then described and discussed. The problem of risk appraisal is addressed and quantitative target safety levels are proposed. Safety systems for risk reduction are outlined. q2000 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Railway tunnels; Risk acceptability; Safety systems; Passenger traffic
1. Introduction
The railway is now moving rapidly toward a modern service transportation industry. High Speed Rail (HSR) systems are already operating in many countries such as Japan, England, France, Italy and Germany. A further development of the whole European HSR network is planned. In order to achieve the design velocity up to 300 km/h, a considerable part of the routes is in tunnels with lengths greater than 10 km and in some cases of the order of 50 km. Table 1 illustrates a list of existing long tunnels worldwide. In this European context, the Commission of the European Communities (CEC) aimed at homogenizing the HSR projects also with respect to the safety issues. However, neither the CEC guidelines nor the existing railway regulations and codes directly address to the problem of quantitatively assessing the safety level for railway
systems. This is mostly due to the fact that railway transport is considered by railway operators and perceived by the public as a safe mean of transportation. This approach to safety might be applicable to traditional railway systems, which have proven throughout the years their performance; it is, however, not enough to guarantee the safety of railway systems where innovative and particular conditions are present, or of the existing lines that have to be upgraded to new exercise standards. For example, the combination of high-speed transit, high traffic intensity, combined transport of passengers and dangerous goods and extremely long tunnels, might lead to unacceptable safety levels. Therefore, the designer has to choose a railway system configuration together with the preventive and mitigative measures of accidents that minimize the risk and ultimately should verify by means of a risk analysis that the obtained safety level is below a predefined target level. The scope of this paper is to illustrate the state-of-practice related to safe tunnel design and associated risk-analysis aspects of long railway tunnels. First, ambitious tunnel projects are briefly reviewed from the safety point of view. The risk-analysis procedures are then described and discussed. The problem of risk appraisal is addressed and quantitative target safety levels are proposed. Finally, safety systems for risk reduction are illustrated.
2. Major tunnel projects and the associated risk
Basic design aspects in existing or under design and construction tunnels are briefly summarized in this section.
Table 1
List of existing long tunnels worldwide
Name Country Length (km) Underground Daischimisu Japan 22.2
Simplon II Italy/Switzerland 19.8
Appennino Italy 18.6
Rokko Japan 16.2
Haruna Japan 15.4
Gotthard Switzerland 15.0
Nakayama Japan 14.8
Lo¨tschberg Switzerland 14.5
Hokuriku Japan 13.9
Prato Tires Italy 13.5
Landru¨cken Germany 10.8 Underwater Seikan Japan 53.9
Eurotunnel UK/France 50.0
Shin Kanmon Japan 18.7
Great Belt Denmark 8.0
Severn UK 7.0
Mersey UK 4.9
Kanmon Japan 3.6 The following tunnels are included:
(a) the Channel tunnel between England and France;
(b) the Seikan tunnel in Japan;
(c) the Gotthard tunnel planned in Switzerland;
(d) the Brenner tunnel planned between Italy and Austria;
(e) the new Mont Cenis-tunnel planned between Franceand Italy;
(f) the tunnel under the Great Belt in Denmark.
2.1. The Channel tunnel
The tunnel serves rail traffic and links up the terminals near Folkestone in the south of England and Calais in northern France. The tunnel is some 50 km long and comprises of three parallel tubes, which are located some 25–45 m beneath the sea bed. The trains travel through the twosingle-track running tunnels, each of which has an internal diameter of 7.30 m. Both running tunnels have a continuous escape way in order to enable passengers and train staff to get out of the tunnel quickly in the event of an emergency (see Fig. 1). Two main cross-links connect the two running tunnels so that trains can switch from one tube to the other during maintenance work; these two main cross-links are located in the 37 km long section under the sea bed. Two
smaller cross-links are to be found in the vicinity of the tunnel portals. The running tunnels are connected at 250 m intervals by means of 2.00 m diameter pressure-relief tunnels. Through these cross-cuts the pressure that builds up in front of a speeding train can be reduced by diverting the air from one running tunnel into the other. A service tunnel with an internal diameter of 4.50 m is located between the two running tunnels. It is, first and foremost, intended as an escape and access facility in the event of an accident in one of the running tunnels. In addition, this service tunnel provides access to the technical centers, which are distributed along it. The service tunnel and the two running tunnels are connected to each other via a 3.30 m diameter cross-cuts set up at 375 m gaps as escape ways [1].
The tunnel is used for the following train services:
· the passenger shuttles for cars and buses;
· the freight shuttles for lorries as well as;
· express and goods trains belonging to the national railway companies.
The signaling system incorporating automatic train protection is designed to minimize the risk of any type of collision even during single-line operation when maintenance is being carried out. One of the main criteria for the design of the rolling stock was the requirement that, as far as practicable, in the event of fire, a shuttle is able to continue on its journey out of the tunnel so that fire could be tackled in the open. To achieve this a 30 min fire resistance has been specified for the wagons including the fire doors and shutters in the passenger shuttles. The fire accident that occurred in November 1996 showed that the emergency response procedures required further improvement.
Fig. 2. Investigated tunnel systems: A and B with service tunnel; D without service tunnel.
2.2. The Seikan tunnel
The Seikan tunnel was completed in 1988 and constitutesthe longest tunnel worldwide with a total length of 53.9 km.It is a double-track tunnel with a cross-sectional area of 64 m2. The average traffic is 50 trains per day. The tunnelhas two emergency stations and is thus divided into three sections[]2. The middle section is under water with a length of 23 km and has a service tunnel. By providing the emergency stations with fire fighting systems, fire can be coped within the same manner as conventional tunnel fires. In case of fire, the train must be brought to
a stop at the nearest emergency station or must be driven out of the tunnel.
2.3. The Gotthard Base tunnel
The 57 km long Gotthard Base tunnel is one of the main links for Bahn 2000, the Swiss passenger traffic for the next century, and for the rail corridor of European freight traffic through the Alps [3]. The tunnel route is a part of the Zurich–Lugano line and is intended to carry 150 intercity, passenger and freight trains per day in each direction. Two tracks are needed for these traffic levels and there is a multitude of different tunnel layouts, which can be considered.Possible normal tunnel profiles could consist of:
(a) a double-track tunnel with a parallel service tunnel;
(b) a pair of single-track tunnel with a service tunnel;
(c) three single-track tunnels;
(d) a pair of single-track tunnels without a service tunnel,but with frequent interconnections (see Fig. 2).
In addition to the traffic tunnels, there is a need for possibly two overtaking stations to allow passenger trains to pass slower freight ones. Natural longitudinal flow in the two tubes will be the basis for the ventilation of the tunnel, which has an overburden of 2000 m or greater, over more than 20 km of itslength.
Recently wide-ranging studies have been carried out on the different designs of the Gotthard tunnel. The main parameters that have been thereby investigated are:
(a) costs of construction;
(b) construction time and method;
(c) operational capacity and operability;
(d) maintenance;
(e) safety for the passengers and the personnel.
The performed safety study has shown that the three single-track tunnels and the pair of single-track tunnel with a service tunnel are associated to lower risk and higher operability compared to the double-track tunnel with service tunnel. However the associated costs are higher. Based on the evaluation of comprehensive studies the configuration D has been selected, i.e. a pair of single-track tunnels without service tunnel but with interconnections approximately every 325 m. Such interconnections can be used for maintenance purposes and evacuation purposes in case of accidents.
2.4. The Brenner tunnel
One of the most striking bottlenecks in passenger and goods transit between Northern Europe and Italy is the north–south connection from Munich via the Brenner Pass to Verona. At present, only one-third of the freight volume can be carried by rail, whilst two-third has to be carried by road over the Brenner Pass. Thus, it is of great importance that the modern railway networks, which either exist or are in the process of being created in the countries of the EuropeanCommunity with their high-speed sections, are welded together via long railway tunnels, which can overcome the Alps as a barrier. If one considers that each year until the turn-of-thecentury, an anticipated trans-goods volume of 150 million tonnes has to be carried over the Brenner Pass 800 m above sea-level, it is thus not surprising that the citizens of the surrounding states have called for the removal of this traffic bottleneck against the background of environmental considerations. The Brenner Base tunnel is urgently required. According to the feasibility study, it consists of a railway tunnel of approximately 55 km length, connecting Innsbruck, Austria and Fortezza, Italy. The rail traffic in the tunnel is similar to that in the Gotthard tunnel and will include approximately 340 trains per day, with 80% of goods trains, of which 10–15% contain dangerous substances. A final decision regarding the tunnel
configuration has not been taken since the project is in the feasibility study phase; however, it appears very likely that two single-track tunnels with frequent interconnections as proposed for the Gotthard tunnel would be selected. A safety study has shown that the risk of the tunnel during operation is acceptable if appropriate safety measures are applied [4].
Fig. 3. Configuration system of Mont Ce′nis tunnel.
2.5. The Mont Ce′nis tunnel
Improved transport links through the Alps are needed not only because of threatened capacity bottlenecks but also because of the insufficient quality of the existing railway lines through the mountains. The latter, regarded as a technical marvel in the last century, are circuitous with many curves and thus have little chance of competing with the fast Alpine motorways of the present day. In addition to the planned north–south main railway lines through the Alps, the delegates to the World congress for Railway Research in Florence discussed the project for a high-speed east–west rail link taking in Venice, Milan, Turin, Mont Ce′nis, Lyon and Paris. One section of this project is the line between Montme′lian and Turin, catering for mixed passenger and goods traffic, with a base tunnel of 54 km in length beneath Mont d’Ambin.
The possible traffic capacities are:
·30–40 high-speed trains with a velocity of 220 km/h,
·80 goods trains of classical design and combined with a velocity of 100–120 km/h,
·50–60 car trains with a velocity of 120–140 km/h.
Thus, two single-lane tunnels have been selected as the system configuration (see Fig. 3) with a clearance profile of 43 m2 each [5]. As a result of the topographical conditions and without exceeding a 1.2% gradient for the line, an intermediate point of attack and evacuation point is possible to the north of Modane. Consequently, the project could be executed in the form of two tunnels, each less than 30 km long.
2.6. Tunnel under the Great Belt
The tunnel under the Great Belt has a length of ca. 8 km and consists of two single-track tunnels (center distance 25 m) with 30 interconnections every 250 m which serve for evacuation and escape of people in case of an accident [6].
2.7. Concluding remarks
Based on the aforementioned brief review of existing or planned tunnels, the following conclusions with respect to their design and safety philosophy can be drawn:
(a) the design philosophy is somehow different in each of the aforementioned tunnel projects and depends on the national requirements, the tunnel configuration and geometry and the tunnel characteristics (see Table 2);
(b) in each case a package of special safety measures is recommended to reduce risk; cost–benefit considerations are usually implemented to define the optimum package of safety systems;
(c) geometries affecting the escape and rescue capabilities vary significantly from case to case (see Table 2).
The basic aspect affecting the tunnel safety is the tunnel configuration. The following tunnel systems are generally considered:
(a) one double-track tunnel;
(b) one double-track tunnel with service tunnel;
(c) two single-track tunnels;
(d) two single-track tunnels with service tunnel;
(e) three single-track tunnels.
Table 2 Comparison of relevant design parameters related to safety in tunnels (TSTT: two single track tunnels; ODTT: one double track tunnel)
Tunnel System Length (km) Distance interconnect. (m) Width of escape-way (m) Traffic (train/day) Freight trains (%) Velocity (km/h) Mont Ce′nis TSTT 54 250 1.20 160–180 44–50 220
Great Belt TSTT 8.0 250 1.20 240 40 100 Eurotunnel TSTT 50 375 1.10 110 45 160
Seikan ODTT 53.9 600–1000 0–0.6 40 50 240 Gotthard TSTT 57 325 0.75 300 80 200 Brenner TSTT 55 250 1.60 340 80 250
Fig. 4. Relative risk value for tunnel systems compared to the risk of the double track tunnel.
Fig. 4 illustrates the relative risk picture for the aforementioned tunnel systems. The values are based on results from several tunnel risk studies. The final choice of the tunnel system depends not only on safety aspects, but also on other criteria such as costs (construction and maintenance costs), geology and local topography conditions, and operability requirements, etc. In general for tunnels with a length greater than 5 km the configuration of two single-track tunnels is recommended because of the better safety and operability conditions.
3. Risk analysis basis
3.1. Evaluation of accident statistics
Accident statistics and safety in railway transportation have been discussed in the past and special problems such as the transportation of dangerous materials or fire propagation in tunnels have been analyzed [4,6,7]. The primary causes of accidents can be classified into: ·internal causes—mechanical or electrical failures concerning the control guide system as well as the logistic and in service systems;
·external causes—earthquakes, floods, avalanches, etc.;
·causes associated to human action—operating faults, errors during maintenance, sabotages, terroristic attacks.
Table 3 illustrates the major accidents in railway tunnels during the period 1970–1993. Based on a critical review of accidental statistics in railway operation, the dominating initiating events and the associated probabilities of occurrence as derived for the Brenner tunnel study are shown in Table 4 for the two basic tunnel configurations, i.e. one double-track tunnel and two single-track tunnels. The values are based on accident statistics of the Austrian, German and Italian Railways. No relevant accidents have been thereby excluded and approximate correction factors have been considered to account for the safety systems related to the new technology.
Table 3 Tunnel accidents in Western Europe with fatalities during the period 1970–1993
Date Location Fatalities Initiating event
22-7-1971 Simplon (CH) 5 Derailment
16-6-1972 Soissons (F) 108 Hit against an obstacle
22-8-1973 S. Sasso (I) 4 Collision
23-7-1976 Simplon (CH) 6 Derailment
….-4-1980 Sebadell (E) 5 fier
21-1-1981 Calabria (I) 5 Hit against an obstacle
9-1-1984 El Pais (E) 2 Collision
18-4-1984 Spiez (CH) 1 Collision
23-12-1984 Bologna (I) 15 Sabotage
26-7-1988 Castiglione (I) 1Fire
14-9-1990 Gurtnellen (CH) 1 Derailment
31-7-1993 Domodossola (I) 1Collision
3.2. Analysis procedure
The analysis of accidents in hazardous scenarios is performed by using event trees. The event tree approach represents a straightforward procedure for describing accidental scenarios and it can include different variables and the notation of time. The probabilities of events in the paths of the event trees are estimated based on the available data, on expert opinion and onengineering judgement. The complete risk-analysis procedure is shown in Fig. 5. On the basis of the tunnel design and with reference to historical railway accidents, the most important hazardous scenarios are identified. For each selected scenario a probabilisti event tree analysis is performed and the accidental scenario consequences in terms of damages to passengers, i.e. facilities are evaluated. The consequence analyses can be based on sophisticated tools that allow to model relevant accidental scenarios in a confined environment. The analysis of the safety measures consists of an evaluation of the actual safety performance of each one of them. Such an evaluation is based, in many cases, on sound engineering judgement due to the lack of experience with the new safety systems.
3.3. Case study
The aforementioned procedure has been applied to compute the societal risk in terms of expected fatalities based on the accidental probabilities given in Table 4. The obtained results are illustrated in terms of expected fatalities in Table 5. A typical application of the results is provided for a 10 km long tunnel in Table 6 for two tunnel systems, i.e. two single-track tunnels and one double-track tunnel. The first system is, as expected, much safer; however, in both cases the obtained societal risk is small. It is noted that the most significant contributor to risk is collision. The acceptability of the risk values is discussed in Section 4.
Table 4Input accidental frequencies per one million train kilometers (ODTT: one double track tunnel; TSTT: two single track tunnels)
Initiating event ODTT TSTT
Derailment 0.001 0.001
Collision 0.0003 0.0002
Hit against an obstacle 0.006 0.006
Fire 0.0009 0.0009
Table 5
Societal risk, i.e. expected fatalities per 1 million train kilometers (ODTT:one double track tunnel; TSTT: two single track tunnels)
Initiating event ODTT TSTT
Derailment 0.012 (23%) 0.005 (16%)
Collision 0.025 (46%) 0.017 (55%)
Hit against an obstacle 0.011 (20%) 0.003 (10%)
Fire 0.006 (11%) 0.006 (19%)
Total 0.054 (100%) 0.031 (100%)
Fig. 5. Iiustration of risk-analysis procedure. 4. Risk perception considerations
4.1. Background
Both individual risk and societal risk are considered. The acceptable individual risk is a function of the individual’s involvement; different acceptable levels should be defined for activities where the individual voluntarily exposes himself to the hazard with respect to an involuntary participation[8]. For voluntary risk, an upper limit of probability of death per year equal to 1022 has been defined; whereas for the involuntary risk, the following values have been suggested:
·P 410->—not acceptable;
·641010p --<<—tolerable;
·610p -<—acceptable.
Table 6
Societal risk for the example tunnel (100 trains per day; 10 km long) expressed in expected fatalities per year (ODTT: one double track tunnel; TSTT: two single track tunnels)
Initiating event ODTT TSTT
Derailment 0.0039 0.0017
Collision 0.0083 0.0056
Hit agaist an obstacle 0.0036 0.0010
Fire 0.0020 0.0020
Total 0.0178 0.0103
For societal risk, the acceptability criteria are based on the definition of an acceptable probability range for events of given consequences. Of course, the severest consequences are associated with the lowest values of the acceptable probability.
4.2. Safety standards for other industrial activities
A brief review of the acceptability risk criteria proposed or adopted by different industrial sectors is provided [9]. Table 7 summarizes the type of approach followed by these industries to define safety targets.
4.2.1. Road transport
Road accidents have been extensively analyzed and several statistical syntheses have been presented. Nevertheless, roadway regulations do no present any quantitative evaluation of the present risk level for the roadway system and do not propose acceptable limits on the occurrence of accidental events.
4.2.2. Air transport
Risk acceptability criteria have been defined for air transport by some rules and regulations, however, no unique criterion exists yet. At present, one can consider that the acceptable risk level is 1027 accidents with fatalities per hour of flight, corresponding to approximately 2 ￡ 10210 accidents per kilometer of flight.
Table 7
Risk acceptability criteria for various industrial activities
Industry Qualitative Semi quantitative
Quantitative
Road transport X X
Air transport X
Chemical X
Nuclear X
Offshore X
4.2.3. Chemical industry
Chemical industries are exposed to hazards that include fires, explosions, toxic releases; risk analyses in the chemical industry is therefore a strong tradition. Quantitative criteria for the definition of societal acceptable risk levels have been presented [10].
4.2.4. Nuclear power plants
Safety is obviously a major concern for nuclear power plants. During design, accidental events with an insignificant probability of occurrence are usually not taken into account. Several studies performed for some plants concluded that the probability of core melt is of the order of 1024–1025 occurrences per year [11].
4.2.
5. Offshore production platforms
Several studies have addressed the definition of target safety levels for societal risk for the offshore industry. In Canada, for example, safety criteria have been defined, based on cost–benefit considerations and comparison to other industrial risks [12], that indicate an annual probability of 1025 for catastrophic consequences, 1023 for severe consequences and 1021 for
minor consequences.
4.3. Methodological approach
The basic criterion for the definition of a target safet level for a railway system is to assume that the safety inherent in the traditional railways in the past two or three decades is acceptable. The safety target is, therefore derived by analyzing the recent risk history of the railways in terms of the frequency of occurrence of accidents and the extent of their consequences. The procedure generally used to estimate the risk associated
to railway transport is based on the analyses of the frequency of occurrence of given consequences for a given accident; the risk Ri for the i th type of accident is therefore given by: i i i R PC ≈ (1)
where pi is the probability of occurrence of the i th type of accident and Ci is the expected consequence of the i th type of accident.
Globally, the generic risk R t is defined as:
t i i i
R PC =∑ (2)
The consequences Ci are generally classified according to three levels of gravity: ―medium‖, ―severe‖ and ―catastrophic‖. To each of these classes it has been associated a mean number of victims:
·medium consequences: 3 victims;
·severe consequences: 30 victims; and
·
catastrophic consequences: 300 victims.
Fig. 6. Risk acceptance criterion for railway systems The evaluation of the probability pi can
be performed assuming that accidental events
occur according to a Poisson process; this
means that accidental events are independent
[13]. The probability of having n accidental
events of type i during the time T is given by:
(/)()/!uT n i P n T e uT n -= （3）
where m is the frequency of occurrence of the
accidental events; whereas the probability of having at
least one accidental event n 0 in the same time is given
by:
0(/)1uT i P n T e -=- （4）
For accidents associated to catastrophic
consequences only, a few events occurred and
therefore statistical data are not sufficient to provide
reliable estimates. For these events it is therefore
recommended to use a Bayesian approach.
The probability of having at least one accident during
the time T 0, having observed n events in a time interval
T , is given by:
1000(/)11/[1/]n P n T n T T T +=-+，， (5)
The aforementioned methodology has been applied on data of recorded accidents of the Italian, Austrian and German railways. The results are presented in Fig. 6 in a diagram where the consequences, in terms of expected victims, are plotted against the annual probability of having at least one accident that leads to these consequences. Results are considered valid for a first definition of an acceptable safety level for Western Europe railway systems and are comparable to the computed values for various tunnel projects.
The following can be observed in Fig. 6:
Fig. 7. Principle of risk classification matrix: classification of intolerable, undesirable, tolerable and negligible risk levels
·events of medium consequences are associated with an annual probability of 9
10-(per train-kilometer);
·events of severe consequences are associated with an annual probability of 10
10-(per train-kilometer); and
·events of catastrophic consequences are associated with a probability of 11
10-(per train-kilometer).
The curve of Fig. 6, therefore, defines the acceptability conditions for the studied railway systems, in particular, p–C conditions that fall below the curve are associated to acceptable safety levels.
Suppose, for example, that to a tunnel of approximately 50 km length is associated a daily traffic of 200 trains in both directions, the return periods associated with the accidental events are:
·medium consequences: 100 years;
·severe consequences: 1000 years; and
·catastrophic consequences: 10 000 years.
The return period for ―medium consequences‖ would then result in the same order of magnitude of the mean life of important infrastructures, such as, for example, a HSR line or a long alpine tunnel.
For catastrophic consequences, the return period results are of the same order of magnitude of that accepted, for example, for offshore production platforms and chemical plants (of the order of 10 000 years) while it results lower than the limit imposed for nuclear plants, which are, however, associated with consequences of significantly higher gravity. As a final remark, it should be noted that the p–C curve proposed in Fig. 6 represents the mean outcome of a probabilistic analysis where several random variables, associated to various uncertainties, have been considered. The acceptability of points falling close to the curve should therefore be critically evaluated also on the basis of cost considerations. Thus, further studies should be aimed at defining not just an acceptability curve, but a ―desired‖ region in the p–C diagram which also takes into account cost-benefit considerations.
4.4. Compatibility with rules
National guidelines regarding the safety of railway tunnels recommend the implementation of safety measuresin order to reduce risk. Quantitative risk acceptability criteria are not provided. However, the new EN standards [14] are based on the definition of an acceptable probability
range for events of given consequences; to the severest consequences are associated the lowest values of the acceptable probability. For that purpose, the qualitative hazard probability levels suitable for use within railway applications have been defined as:
Incredible—extremely unlikely to occur. It can be assumed that the hazard may not occur;
Improbable—unlikely to occur but possible. It can be assumed the hazard may exceptionally occur;
Remote—likely to occur at sometime in system lifetime. It can be reasonably expected for the hazard to occur;
Occasional—likely to occur several times;
Probable—will occur several times. The hazard can be expected to occur often; and
Frequent—likely to occur frequently. The hazard will be continually experienced. Qualitative hazard severity levels have been also defined as follows:
Catastrophic—Fatalities and/or multiple severe injuries;
Critical—Single fatality or severe injury and loss of major system;
Marginal—Minor injury and severe system damage; and
Insignificant—Possible single minor injury and system damage.
The hazard probability levels and the hazard severity levels can be combined to generate a risk-classification matrix. The principle of the risk-classification matrix is shown in Fig. 7. The railway authority is responsible for defining the tolerability of the risk combinations contained within the risk-classification matrix. By using the procedure shown in Fig. 7 the probability of the considered initiating accidental events has to be estimated together with the associated severity levels and compared to the acceptability criteria indicated in the same figure.
5. Recommendation of safety systems
5.1. Types of safety measures
The following four basic types of safety measures can be distinguished [4,7]:
·prevention measures;
·mitigation measures;
·self rescue measures; and
·assisted rescue measures.
5.2. Criteria for the selection of safety measures and recommendations
The assessment of collective risks and the evaluation of possible safety measures are accomplished based on the aforementioned quantitative criteria. The selection of safety measures is based on cost-benefit considerations [8]. Currently, a marginal cost criterion is defined by the amount of money that the operator is willing to spend in order to save one human
life. The following safety measures are in general recommended here in order to reduce the risk in tunnels. The measures listed herein have proved very efficient in riskanalys is studies [4,6,7].
5.2.1. Prevention measures
(a) Systematic recording and specific evaluation of irregularities: all accidents during operation of the railways are recorded, evaluated and documented systematically.
(b) Automatic train control: automatic, computer-based train control system, where data are transmitted to the tractive unit computer intermittently via coils and/or continuously via cables installed in the track.
(c) Combined brake lock-up and hot-box detector: to be installed ahead of the tunnel portals in such a location that the train in case of detectors reaction can stop before entering the tunnel.
(d) Fire detectors: to be installed in the tunnel or alternatively along the cable for the registration of the rise in temperature of the train surface. Eventually, the possibility of installing profile gauges and loading gauges should be considered.
5.2.2. Mitigation measures
(a) Emergency braking override in the tunnel: such a system allows the engine driver to override emergency braking initiated inside a tunnel, so the train, in case of a fire, can continue its journey with reduced speed until it reaches the portal; consequently, the evacuation of passengers becomes easier.
(b) Fire resistant rolling stock: the wagons, in case of fire, should be able to continue the journey outside the tunnel; a fire resistance of the order of 30 min is required; such requirement is verified through a real scale experiments.
(c) Fire detection system: portable fire extinguishers can be installed.
(d) Coaches compatible with fire protection regulations: they shall be gas-tight and divided into fire sections; consequently fire propagation is better controlled.
(e) Ventilation system: this system strongly depends on the tunnel configuration and on the type of traffic inside the tunnel (for example diesel trains); it can include vertical shafts, horizontal audits and ventilators in the tunnel; special attention must be given to the emergency procedures of the ventilation after an accident.
5.2.3. Self-rescue measures
(a) Escape ways with appropriate geometrical dimensions (b) Emergency telephones.
(c) Footway, railings and escape-way signs.
(d) Self-illuminating exit signs every 50 m.
(e) Tunnel emergency lighting.
(f) Preventive information of the passengers about correct behavior in case of accident.
(g) Side drifts or vertical emergency exit, utilization of existing opportunities and
(h) Sound training of train personnel related to the correct behavior in case of an accident.
5.2.4. Assisted rescue measures
(a) Helipads at the tunnel portals and the emergency exits;
(b) Access roads to the tunnel portals;
(c) Proper radio channel for rescue services;
(d) Definition of a rescue concept with strict time plans (arrival at the accident location within 30 min, evacuation procedure, etc.); and
(e) Rescue vehicles. One may conclude that the implementation of the aforementioned safety measures is an interdisciplinary processinvolving authorities, designers, rolling stock producers etc. In addition one should bear in mind that the risk reduction effect of some of the safety measures can be assessed only qualitatively because of the lack of experience.
6. Conclusions
The treatment of safety aspects in long railway tunnels is of significant importance. Risk analysis can be used as a decision tool for:
·Selection of tunnel configuration.
·Evaluation of overall risk of the railway system.
·Definition of an optimal package of safety measures.
·Improvement of the current safety criteria in railway standards.
The main objectives of the risk analysis are: (a) to identify and then analyze the most important hazard scenarios in order to determine which are the dominant contributors to risk; and (b) to validate the proposed solutions by computing the overall risk level and by comparing it to predefined target safety levels. The scope of this contribution is to illustrate the state-ofpractice
related to safe tunnel design and related riskanalysis aspects of long railway tunnels. Current tunnel projects have been briefly reviewed from the safety point of view. The risk-analysis procedure has been summarized and illustrated in case studies. The problem of risk perception has been addressed and quantitative target safety levels have been derived. Finally, safety systems for risk reduction have been briefly described.
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2 外文文献翻译
铁路隧道的安全
摘要
铁路隧道设计与明确提到的安全问题正在变得极为重要，因为高速、混装客运运输以及按照设计和概念评估下的超长新隧道已经严重地影响了铁路隧道的固有安全。虽然意外事故发生的可能性仍然被视作比较低，但是中长隧道等大型事件中产生的后果可能是灾难性的，这样整体风险水平提高到难以接受的水平。本文章的目的是为了描述关于大型铁路隧道风险分析的实践。第一，对雄心勃勃的隧道工程进行了简要回顾。然后适用的风险分析程序被介绍和讨论。确立了问题风险评估，提出了安全的定量指标。最终制定降低系统风险的大纲。Q2000由Elsevier出版
科技有限公司保留所有权利
关键词：铁路隧道;风险的接受程度，安全系统，客运系统
1.导言
铁路正在迅速迈向现代化交通运输服务业。高铁（高铁）系统已经在很多国家实施，如日本，英国，法国，意大利和德国。整个欧洲高铁网络发展计划正在进一步被设计。为了进一步将设计速度提高到300 km/h，有相当一部分的路线是在长度大于10公里隧道里，在某些情况下为50公里。表1说明了全世界现有的长名单隧道。在这方面，欧洲共同体委员会（CEC）的目的是在同化还涉及到安全问题的高铁项目。然而，无论是编委准则，还是现有的铁路规章和规范都不能直接解决定量评估的铁路系统安全水平的问题。这要是由于这一事实，铁路运输在铁路运营商和公众眼中，是一种安全运输方式。这种对安全的看法可能适于传统的铁路系统，这些年它们的变现已经被证明了。然而，目前由于新的变动和特殊条件的存在，还不能够完全保证铁路系统的安全，或现有生产线已被升级到新的工作标准。例如，高速、高强度交通混合运输，旅客和危险货物联运以及极长隧道，都可能导致不可接受的安全隐患。因此，设计者不得不选择一个铁路系统事故预防和减缓措施装置，尽量减少事故风险，最终使得核实的风险分析所得的安全水平低于预定目标水平。本文件的范围，是要说明国家有关安全隧道的设计的实践以及有关长铁路隧道方面的风险分析。大型的铁路隧道各个安全点首先被简要的检查，然后讨论和描述出相关的风险分析流程。对隐患作出安全评估，提出定量的安全目标计划。最终，制定降低风险的方案。2.主要隧道工程和相关的风险
本节简要的总结了现有的或正在设计的和在建隧道的基本设计方面。下面的隧道包括：
（一）英国和法国之间的海峡隧道
（二）日本的青函隧道;
（三）瑞士计划在圣哥达的隧道;
（四）预定在意大利和奥地利的布伦纳隧道;
（五）意大利、法国之间的新塞尼隧道隧道计划;
（六）丹麦大贝尔特隧道。
2.1 海峡隧道
该铁路隧道用于码头运输服务以及与英国南部福克斯和法国北部加莱终端建立联系。该隧道约50公里长，包括三个平行管，它们埋藏在位于海底25-45米的海床处。列车穿越两单轨运行的隧道，每个内部直径7.30米。这两种运行隧道应该有连续畅通的安全道，以使旅客和列车工作人员很快在出现紧急情况时走出隧道。（见图1）。两个主要的交叉轨道连接两个运行隧道，在维修过程中，使火车从一条线路可以切换到其他线路，并且这两个主要的交叉点设置在37公里长海床地下。二个小型交叉点应该设置在隧道入口附近，运行隧道在每隔250米处通过两米直径的减压隧道连接。通过交叉削减，积聚在超速行驶
的列车前的空气压力可以被降低从一条隧道疏导到另一条隧道中。一个4.50厘米内径的服务隧道位于两个运行隧道之间。首先，在某一条运行隧道发生意外事故时，它作为逃生和接入设施被利用。此外，这项服务隧道提供了技术访问中心，并且分布沿线。该服务隧道和两个运行隧道通过一个直径3.30米削弱点彼此连接，逃生方向定为375米[]1。
该隧道用于下列火车服务：
·汽车和公共汽车乘客往返;
·航天飞机以及货车货运;
·属于国家铁路公司的专列或货车
集成信号系统自动列车保护被设计是为了在维修时尽量减少任何类型的碰撞风险即使单线操作。其中的主要设计标准，涉及到实际操作时，是为了在发生火警时，航天飞机能继续走出隧道以至于火灾在发生后能迅速得到控制。为了达到30分钟的耐火要求，其已被指定为包括旅行车和百叶窗客运航天飞机防火门。
图一典型交叉隧道系统
需要进一步改进。
2.2 青函隧道青函隧道于1988年落成，并构成具备总长度
3.9
公里全球最长的隧道，这是一个双重的横截面面积为64㎡的
轨道隧道。平均流量为每天50列车。该隧道有两个紧急车站，
因而分为三个部分。中间部分位于水下有23km长，拥有一个
服务隧道。
图2隧道调查系统：A和B为服务隧道;?无隧道通过提供应
急灭火站，火灾可以当作普通的隧道火情得以控制。如果遇到
火灾，火车必须停到紧急处理站或者马上离开隧道。
2.3 圣哥达基地隧道
57公里长的圣哥达基地隧道是主要Bahn 2000之一，在今后几个世纪，为瑞士乘客和欧洲货运客车穿越阿尔卑斯山提供走廊[]3。该隧道的路线是苏黎世卢加诺线的一部分，目的是每天进行150趟长途客运和货运列车在双向往返。这种交通运输量需要两个轨道，并且可以考虑有很多众多不同的隧道布局。可能正常隧道状况包括：
（一）拥有平行服务地道的双轨隧道;
（二）一对无服务地道单线隧道;
（三）3单线隧道;
（四）一对无服务地道单线隧道，但隧道间频繁互联。（见图2）。
除了交通隧道外，可能需要两个超车站允许旅客列车超过速度慢的货车。自然纵向流
毕业设计（论文）外文参考文献及译文 英文题目Component-based Safety Computer of Railway Signal Interlocking System 中文题目模块化安全铁路信号计算机联锁系统 学院自动化与电气工程学院 专业自动控制 姓名葛彦宁 学号 200808746 指导教师贺清 2012年5月30日
Component-based Safety Computer of Railway Signal Interlocking System 1 Introduction Signal Interlocking System is the critical equipment which can guarantee traffic safety and enhance operational efficiency in railway transportation. For a long time, the core control computer adopts in interlocking system is the special customized high-grade safety computer, for example, the SIMIS of Siemens, the EI32 of Nippon Signal, and so on. Along with the rapid development of electronic technology, the customized safety computer is facing severe challenges, for instance, the high development costs, poor usability, weak expansibility and slow technology update. To overcome the flaws of the high-grade special customized computer, the U.S. Department of Defense has put forward the concept：we should adopt commercial standards to replace military norms and standards for meeting consumers’demand [1]. In the meantime, there are several explorations and practices about adopting open system architecture in avionics. The United Stated and Europe have do much research about utilizing cost-effective fault-tolerant computer to replace the dedicated computer in aerospace and other safety-critical fields. In recent years, it is gradually becoming a new trend that the utilization of standardized components in aerospace, industry, transportation and other safety-critical fields. 2 Railways signal interlocking system 2.1 Functions of signal interlocking system The basic function of signal interlocking system is to protect train safety by controlling signal equipments, such as switch points, signals and track units in a station, and it handles routes via a certain interlocking regulation. Since the birth of the railway transportation, signal interlocking system has gone through manual signal, mechanical signal, relay-based interlocking, and the modern computer-based Interlocking System. 2.2 Architecture of signal interlocking system Generally, the Interlocking System has a hierarchical structure. According to the function of equipments, the system can be divided to the function of equipments; the system
中等分辨率制备分离的 快速色谱技术 W. Clark Still,* Michael K a h n , and Abhijit Mitra Departm(7nt o/ Chemistry, Columbia Uniuersity,1Veu York, Neu; York 10027 ReceiLied January 26, 1978 我们希望找到一种简单的吸附色谱技术用于有机化合物的常规净化。这种技术是适于传统的有机物大规模制备分离，该技术需使用长柱色谱法。尽管这种技术得到的效果非常好，但是其需要消耗大量的时间，并且由于频带拖尾经常出现低复原率。当分离的样本剂量大于1或者2g时，这些问题显得更加突出。近年来，几种制备系统已经进行了改进，能将分离时间减少到1-3h，并允许各成分的分辨率ΔR f≥（使用薄层色谱分析进行分析）。在这些方法中，在我们的实验室中，媒介压力色谱法1和短柱色谱法2是最成功的。最近，我们发现一种可以将分离速度大幅度提升的技术，可用于反应产物的常规提纯，我们将这种技术称为急骤色谱法。虽然这种技术的分辨率只是中等（ΔR f≥），而且构建这个系统花费非常低，并且能在10-15min内分离重量在的样本。4 急骤色谱法是以空气压力驱动的混合介质压力以及短柱色谱法为基础，专门针对快速分离，介质压力以及短柱色谱已经进行了优化。优化实验是在一组标准条件5下进行的，优化实验使用苯甲醇作为样本，放在一个20mm*5in.的硅胶柱60内，使用Tracor 970紫外检测器监测圆柱的输出。分辨率通过持续时间（r）和峰宽（w,w/2）的比率进行测定的（Figure 1），结果如图2-4所示，图2-4分别放映分辨率随着硅胶颗粒大小、洗脱液流速和样本大小的变化。
文献翻译 原文 Combining JSP and Servlets The technology of JSP and Servlet is the most important technology which use Java technology to exploit request of server, and it is also the standard which exploit business application .Java developers prefer to use it for a variety of reasons, one of which is already familiar with the Java language for the development of this technology are easy to learn Java to the other is "a preparation, run everywhere" to bring the concept of Web applications, To achieve a "one-prepared everywhere realized." And more importantly, if followed some of the principles of good design, it can be said of separating and content to create high-quality, reusable, easy to maintain and modify the application. For example, if the document in HTML embedded Java code too much (script), will lead the developed application is extremely complex, difficult to read, it is not easy reuse, but also for future maintenance and modification will also cause difficulties. In fact, CSDN the JSP / Servlet forum, can often see some questions, the code is very long, can logic is not very clear, a large number of HTML and Java code mixed together. This is the random development of the defects. Early dynamic pages mainly CGI (Common Gateway Interface, public Gateway Interface) technology, you can use different languages of the CGI programs, such as VB, C / C + + or Delphi, and so on. Though the technology of CGI is developed and powerful, because of difficulties in programming, and low efficiency, modify complex shortcomings, it is gradually being replaced by the trend. Of all the new technology, JSP / Servlet with more efficient and easy to program, more powerful, more secure and has a good portability, they have been many people believe that the future is the most dynamic site of the future development of technology. Similar to CGI, Servlet support request / response model. When a customer submit a request to the server, the server presented the request Servlet, Servlet responsible for handling requests and generate a response, and then gave the server, and then from the server sent to
华北电力大学科技学院 毕业设计（论文）附件 外文文献翻译 学号：121912020115姓名：彭钰钊 所在系别：动力工程系专业班级：测控技术与仪器12K1指导教师：李冰 原文标题：Infrared Remote Control System Abstract 2016 年 4 月 19 日
红外遥控系统 摘要 红外数据通信技术是目前在世界范围内被广泛使用的一种无线连接技术，被众多的硬件和软件平台所支持。红外收发器产品具有成本低，小型化，传输速率快，点对点安全传输，不受电磁干扰等特点，可以实现信息在不同产品之间快速、方便、安全地交换与传送，在短距离无线传输方面拥有十分明显的优势。红外遥控收发系统的设计在具有很高的实用价值，目前红外收发器产品在可携式产品中的应用潜力很大。全世界约有1亿5千万台设备采用红外技术，在电子产品和工业设备、医疗设备等领域广泛使用。绝大多数笔记本电脑和手机都配置红外收发器接口。随着红外数据传输技术更加成熟、成本下降，红外收发器在短距离通讯领域必将得到更广泛的应用。 本系统的设计目的是用红外线作为传输媒质来传输用户的操作信息并由接收电路解调出原始信号，主要用到编码芯片和解码芯片对信号进行调制与解调，其中编码芯片用的是台湾生产的PT2262，解码芯片是PT2272。主要工作原理是：利用编码键盘可以为PT2262提供的输入信息，PT2262对输入的信息进行编码并加载到38KHZ的载波上并调制红外发射二极管并辐射到空间，然后再由接收系统接收到发射的信号并解调出原始信息，由PT2272对原信号进行解码以驱动相应的电路完成用户的操作要求。 关键字：红外线；编码；解码；LM386；红外收发器。 1 绪论
五分钟搞定5000字－外文文献翻译 在科研过程中阅读翻译外文文献是一个非常重要的环节，许多领域高水平的文献都是外文文献，借鉴一些外文文献翻译的经验是非常必要的。由于特殊原因我翻译外文文献的机会比较多，慢慢地就发现了外文文献翻译过程中的三大利器：Google“翻译”频道、金山词霸（完整版本）和CNKI“翻译助手"。 具体操作过程如下： 1.先打开金山词霸自动取词功能，然后阅读文献； 2.遇到无法理解的长句时，可以交给Google处理，处理后的结果猛一看，不堪入目，可是经过大脑的再处理后句子的意思基本就明了了； 3.如果通过Google仍然无法理解，感觉就是不同，那肯定是对其中某个“常用单词”理解有误，因为某些单词看似很简单，但是在文献中有特殊的意思，这时就可以通过CNKI的“翻译助手”来查询相关单词的意思，由于CNKI的单词意思都是来源与大量的文献，所以它的吻合率很高。 另外，在翻译过程中最好以“段落”或者“长句”作为翻译的基本单位，这样才不会造成“只见树木，不见森林”的误导。 注： 1、Google翻译：https://www.doczj.com/doc/d118234118.html,/language_tools google，众所周知，谷歌里面的英文文献和资料还算是比较详实的。我利用它是这样的。一方面可以用它查询英文论文，当然这方面的帖子很多，大家可以搜索，在此不赘述。回到我自己说的翻译上来。下面给大家举个例子来说明如何用吧 比如说“电磁感应透明效应”这个词汇你不知道他怎么翻译， 首先你可以在CNKI里查中文的，根据它们的关键词中英文对照来做，一般比较准确。
在此主要是说在google里怎么知道这个翻译意思。大家应该都有词典吧，按中国人的办法，把一个一个词分着查出来，敲到google里，你的这种翻译一般不太准，当然你需要验证是否准确了，这下看着吧，把你的那支离破碎的翻译在google里搜索，你能看到许多相关的文献或资料，大家都不是笨蛋，看看，也就能找到最精确的翻译了，纯西式的！我就是这么用的。 2、CNKI翻译：https://www.doczj.com/doc/d118234118.html, CNKI翻译助手，这个网站不需要介绍太多，可能有些人也知道的。主要说说它的有点，你进去看看就能发现：搜索的肯定是专业词汇，而且它翻译结果下面有文章与之对应（因为它是CNKI检索提供的，它的翻译是从文献里抽出来的），很实用的一个网站。估计别的写文章的人不是傻子吧，它们的东西我们可以直接拿来用，当然省事了。网址告诉大家，有兴趣的进去看看，你们就会发现其乐无穷！还是很值得用的。https://www.doczj.com/doc/d118234118.html, 3、网路版金山词霸（不到1M）：https://www.doczj.com/doc/d118234118.html,/6946901637944806 翻译时的速度： 这里我谈的是电子版和打印版的翻译速度，按个人翻译速度看，打印版的快些，因为看电子版本一是费眼睛，二是如果我们用电脑，可能还经常时不时玩点游戏，或者整点别的，导致最终SPPEED变慢，再之电脑上一些词典（金山词霸等）在专业翻译方面也不是特别好，所以翻译效果不佳。在此本人建议大家购买清华大学编写的好像是国防工业出版社的那本《英汉科学技术词典》，基本上挺好用。再加上网站如：google CNKI翻译助手，这样我们的翻译速度会提高不少。 具体翻译时的一些技巧（主要是写论文和看论文方面） 大家大概都应预先清楚明白自己专业方向的国内牛人，在这里我强烈建议大家仔
快速外文文献翻译 在科研过程中阅读翻译外文文献是一个非常重要的环节，许多领域高水平的文献都是外文文献，借鉴一些外文文献翻译的经验是非常必要的。由于特殊原因我翻译外文文献的机会比较多，慢慢地就发现了外文文献翻译过程中的三大利器：Google“翻译”频道、金山词霸（完整版本）和CNKI“翻译助手"。 具体操作过程如下： 1.先打开金山词霸自动取词功能，然后阅读文献； 2.遇到无法理解的长句时，可以交给Google处理，处理后的结果猛一看，不堪入目，可是经过大脑的再处理后句子的意思基本就明了了； 3.如果通过Google仍然无法理解，感觉就是不同，那肯定是对其中某个“常用单词”理解有误，因为某些单词看似很简单，但是在文献中有特殊的意思，这时就可以通过CNKI的“翻译助手”来查询相关单词的意思，由于CNKI的单词意思都是来源与大量的文献，所以它的吻合率很高。 另外，在翻译过程中最好以“段落”或者“长句”作为翻译的基本单位，这样才不会造成“只见树木，不见森林”的误导。 注： 1、Google翻译：https://www.doczj.com/doc/d118234118.html,/language_tools google，众所周知，谷歌里面的英文文献和资料还算是比较详实的。我利用它是这样的。一方面可以用它查询英文论文，当然这方面的帖子很多，大家可以搜索，在此不赘述。回到我自己说的翻译上来。下面给大家举个例子来说明如何用吧比如说“电磁感应透明效应”这个词汇你不知道他怎么翻译， 首先你可以在CNKI里查中文的，根据它们的关键词中英文对照来做，一般比较准确。 在此主要是说在google里怎么知道这个翻译意思。大家应该都有词典吧，按中国人的办法，把一个一个词分着查出来，敲到google里，你的这种翻译一般不太准，当然你需要验证是否准确了，这下看着吧，把你的那支离破碎的翻译在google里搜索，你能看到许多相关的文献或资料，大家都不是笨蛋，看看，也就能找到最精确的翻译了，纯西式的！我就是这么用的。 2、CNKI翻译：https://www.doczj.com/doc/d118234118.html, CNKI翻译助手，这个网站不需要介绍太多，可能有些人也知道的。主要说说它的有点，你进去看看就能发现：搜索的肯定是专业词汇，而且它翻译结果下面有文章与之对应（因为它是CNKI检索提供的，它的翻译是从文献里抽出来的），很实用的一个网站。估计别的写文章的人不是傻子吧，它们的东西我们可以直接拿来用，当然省事了。网址告诉大家，有兴趣的进去看看，你们就会发现其乐无穷！还是很值得用的。https://www.doczj.com/doc/d118234118.html, 3、网路版金山词霸（不到1M）：https://www.doczj.com/doc/d118234118.html,/6946901637944806 翻译时的速度： 这里我谈的是电子版和打印版的翻译速度，按个人翻译速度看，打印版的快些，因为看电子版本一是费眼睛，二是如果我们用电脑，可能还经常时不时玩点游戏，或者整点别的，导致最终SPPEED变慢，再之电脑上一些词典（金山词霸等）在专业翻译方面也不是特别好，所以翻译效果不佳。在此本人建议大家购买清华大
To connect SQL Server database First we introduce the basic knowledge of the database,be regarded as the warm-up exercise that study database weave distance front! 1.warm-up exercise Needing first avowal is relation database that database knowledge that we here introduce all point. The so-called relation database is to mean data as that the form gather, passing to establish simple form an a kind of database for of relation to defining construction. I ignore the watch at how saving way in physics in the document in database is,it can see to make an a line for with row, with electronics form is similar with the row.In relation database, the line were called the record, but the row then is called word segment. This form inside each an all in formations for is a record, it including particular customer, but each record then included the same type with the word segment of the quantity:Customer's number, name etc. Form is logic set that a kind of related information that press a line of arranging with row, similar in single form in work. Each row of the word a database form inside calls a word segment. Watch is from every kind of word a definition of its containment of, each word a data for describing its implying. While creating to set up a database, the beard assign for each word segment a the piece belongs to the sex with the other according to the type,biggest length.The word segment can include every kind of word sign,arithmetic figure even sketch. An information of relevant customer deposits in the line of the form, is called record.By any large, arbitrarily two records for database form to create set up can't be same. Key be a certain word segment( or several words segment) of the form inside, it() for fast inspect but drive index. The key can be unique, and also can then the right and wrong is unique, being decided by it() whether admission repetition. Unique key can specify for main key, using each one that come to unique marking form. The norm turns the database design of mission be method that the data of buildup,but the data of buildup, should can dissolve otiose repetition, and for have the necessary information offering to check to seek the path quickly. For attaining this kind of target but separate information to the process gone to in every kind of independent form, be called the norm turn. It is complicated process to use many appointed rules to proceed the norm with the type of the different Class that norm turn. That process studies and discuss already beyond the reach of textual scope.But,the norm of the simple database in majority turn and can use the simple experience in underneath rule completes: include the form of the information of repetition must be divided into independent a few forms dissolve repetition.
Inventory management Inventory Control On the so-called "inventory control", many people will interpret it as a "storage management", which is actually a big distortion. The traditional narrow view, mainly for warehouse inventory control of materials for inventory, data processing, storage, distribution, etc., through the implementation of anti-corrosion, temperature and humidity control means, to make the custody of the physical inventory to maintain optimum purposes. This is just a form of inventory control, or can be defined as the physical inventory control. How, then, from a broad perspective to understand inventory control? Inventory control should be related to the company's financial and operational objectives, in particular operating cash flow by optimizing the entire demand and supply chain management processes (DSCM), a reasonable set of ERP control strategy, and supported by appropriate information processing tools, tools to achieved in ensuring the timely delivery of the premise, as far as possible to reduce inventory levels, reducing inventory and obsolescence, the risk of devaluation. In this sense, the physical inventory control to achieve financial goals is just a means to control the entire inventory or just a necessary part; from the perspective of organizational functions, physical inventory control, warehouse management is mainly the responsibility of The broad inventory control is the demand and supply chain management, and the whole company's responsibility. Why until now many people's understanding of inventory control, limited physical inventory control? The following two reasons can not be ignored: First, our enterprises do not attach importance to inventory control. Especially those who benefit relatively good business, as long as there is money on the few people to consider the problem of inventory turnover. Inventory control is simply interpreted as warehouse management, unless the time to spend money, it may have been to see the inventory problem, and see the results are often very simple procurement to buy more, or did not do warehouse departments . Second, ERP misleading. Invoicing software is simple audacity to call it ERP, companies on their so-called ERP can reduce the number of inventory, inventory control, seems to rely on their small software can get. Even as SAP, BAAN ERP world, the field of
毕业设计说明书 英文文献及中文翻译 学院：专 2011年6月 电子与计算机科学技术软件工程
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估计技术和规模的希腊商业银行效率：信用风险、资产负债表的活动和 国际业务的影响1 1.介绍 希腊银行业经历了近几年重大的结构调整。重要的结构性、政策和环境的变化经常强调的学者和从业人员有欧盟单一市场的建立，欧元的介绍，国际化的竞争、利率自由化、放松管制和最近的兼并和收购浪潮。 希腊的银行业也经历了相当大的改善，通信和计算技术，因为银行有扩张和现代化其分销网络，其中除了传统的分支机构和自动取款机，现在包括网上银行等替代分销渠道。作为希腊银行（2004 年）的年度报告的重点，希腊银行亦在升级其信用风险测量与管理系统，通过引入信用评分和概率默认模型近年来采取的主要步骤。此外，他们扩展他们的产品/服务组合，包括保险、经纪业务和资产管理等活动，同时也增加了他们的资产负债表操作和非利息收入。 最后，专注于巴尔干地区（如阿尔巴尼亚、保加利亚、前南斯拉夫马其顿共和国、罗马尼亚、塞尔维亚）的更广泛市场的全球化增加的趋势已添加到希腊银行在塞浦路斯和美国以前有限的国际活动。在国外经营的子公司的业绩预计将有父的银行，从而对未来的决定为进一步国际化的尝试对性能的影响。 本研究的目的是要运用数据包络分析（DEA）和重新效率的希腊银行部门，同时考虑到几个以上讨论的问题进行调查。我们因此区分我们的论文从以前的希腊银行产业重点并在几个方面，下面讨论添加的见解。 首先，我们第一次对效率的希腊银行的信用风险的影响通过检查其中包括贷款损失准备金作为附加输入Charnes et al.(1990 年)、德雷克（2001 年）、德雷克和大厅(2003 年)，和德雷克等人（2006 年）。作为美斯特(1996) 点出"除非质量和风险控制的一个人也许会很容易误判一家银行的水平的低效；例如精打细算的银行信用评价或生产过高风险的贷款可能会被贴上标签一样高效，当相比银行花资源，以确保它们的贷款有较高的质量"(p.1026)。我们估计效率的银行和无此输入调整为不同的信用风险水平和对效率的影响。 第二，以往的研究中，希腊银行业，我们考虑资产负债表活动期间估计的效率得分。几个最近的研究审查效率的DEA 或随机前沿技术的银行，承认银行在非传统的活动中更多地参与，包括任何非利息（即费）收入（e.g. Lang和Welzel，1998年；德雷克，2001 年；托尔托萨Ausina，2003年）或资产负债表项目（例如阿尔通巴什等人，2001 年；阿尔通巴什和查克，2001年；架和Hassan，2003a、b ；Bos 和Colari，2005 年；饶， 1原文出处及作者：巴斯大学管理学院2007年硕士毕业论文，作者Fotios Pasiouras
广东工业大学华立学院 本科毕业设计（论文） 外文参考文献译文及原文 系部经济学部 专业经济学 年级 2007级 班级名称 07经济学6班 学号 16020706001 学生姓名张瑜琴 指导教师陈锶 2011 年05月
目录 1挑战：小额贷款中的进入和商业银行的长期承诺 (1) 2什么商业银行带给小额贷款和什么把他们留在外 (2) 3 商业银行的四个模型进入小额贷款之内 (4) 3.1内在的单位 (4) 3.2财务子公司 (5) 3.3策略的同盟 (5) 3.4服务公司模型 (6) 4 合法的形式和操作的结构比较 (8) 5 服务的个案研究公司模型：厄瓜多尔和Haiti5 (9)
1 挑战：小额贷款中的进入和商业银行的长期承诺 商业银行已经是逐渐重要的运动员在拉丁美洲中的小额贷款服务的发展2到小额贷款市场是小额贷款的好消息客户因为银行能提供他们一完整类型的财务的服务，包括信用，储蓄和以费用为基础的服务。整体而言，它也对小额贷款重要，因为与他们广泛的身体、财务的和人类。如果商业银行变成重的运动员在小额贷款，他们能提供非常强烈的竞争到传统的小额贷款机构。资源，银行能廉宜地发射而且扩张小额贷款服务rela tively。如果商业广告银行在小额贷款中成为严重的运动员，他们能提出非常强烈的竞争给传统的小额贷款机构。然而，小额贷款社区里面有知觉哪一商业银行进入进入小额贷款将会是短命或浅的。举例来说，有知觉哪一商业银行首先可能不搬进小额贷款因为时候建立小额贷款操作到一个有利润的水平超过银行的标准投资时间地平线。或，在进入小额贷款，银行之后可能移动在－上面藉由增加贷款数量销售取利润最大值－或者更坏的事，退出如果他们是不满意与小额贷款的收益性的水平。这些知觉已经被特性加燃料商业银行的情形进入小额贷款和后来的出口之内。在最极端的，一些开业者已经甚至宣布，”降低尺度死！”而且抛弃了与主意合作的商业银行。 在最 signific 看得到的地方，蚂蚁利益商业银行可能带给小额贷款，国际的ACCION 发展发射而且扩张的和一些商业银行的关系小额贷款操作。在这些情形的大部分方面， ACCION 和它的合伙人正在使用方法，已知的当做服务公司模型，表演早答应当做一个能工作的方法克服真正的。 商业银行的障碍进入和穿越建立长命的小额贷款操作一个商业银行 这论文描述如何服务公司模型、住址商业银行中的主要议题进入进小额贷款，监定成功建立的因素动作井小额贷款服务公司，和礼物结果和小额贷款的课servic e 公司用最长的经验，在海地和审判官席 del 的 SOGEBANK│ SOGESOL 初期结果指出那这服务公司模型表现一重要的突破在促成商业银行进入和留在小额贷款。在厄瓜多尔的 Pichincha│ CREDIFE。初期结果指出服务公司模型在促成商业广告中表现一次重要的突破银行进入而且留在小额贷款。
Research Article Mechanical Properties of Fiber Reinforced Lightweight Concrete Containing Surfactant Y oo-Jae Kim, Jiong Hu, Soon-Jae Lee, and Byung-Hee Y ou Department of Engineering Technology, Texas State University, San Marcos, TX 78666, USA Correspondence should be addressed to Y oo-Jae Kim, yk10@https://www.doczj.com/doc/d118234118.html, Received 21 June 2010; Accepted 24 November 2010 Academic Editor: Tarun Kant Copyright ? 2010 Y oo-Jae Kim et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Fiber reinforced aerated lightweight concrete (FALC) was developed to reduce concrete’s density and to improve its fire resistance, thermal conductivity, and energy absorption. Compression tests were performed to determine basic properties of FALC. The primary independent variables were the types and volume fraction of fibers, and the amount of air in the concrete. Polypropylene and carbon fibers were investigated at 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4% volume ratios. The lightweight aggregate used was made of expanded clay. A self-compaction agent was used to reduce the water-cement ratio and keep good workability. A surfactant was also added to introduce air into the concrete. This study provides basic information regarding the mechanical properties of FALC and compares FALC with fiber reinforced lightweight concrete. The properties investigated include the unit weight, uniaxial compressive strength, modulus of elasticity, and toughness index. Based on the properties, a stress-strain prediction model was proposed. It was demonstrated that the proposed model accurately predicts the stress-strain behavior of FALC. 1. Introduction In the last three decades, prefabrication has been applied to small housing and tall building construction, and precast concrete panels have become one of the widely used materials in construction system. Recently, much attention has been directed toward the use of lightweight concrete for precast concrete to improve the performances, such as dead load reduction, fire resistance, and thermal conductivity, of the buildings. Additionally, the structure of a precast building should be able to resist impact loading cases, particularly earthquakes, since resisting earthquakes of these buildings under the performances is becoming an important consideration [1, 2].Many efforts have been applied toward developing high performance concrete for building structures with enhanced performance and safety. V arious types of precast concrete products, such as autoclaved aerated lightweight concrete (AALC), fiber reinforced concrete (FRC), and lightweight concrete, have been developed and experimentally verified. A number of them have been applied in full-scale build-ing structures. AALC is well known and widely accepted, but its small size and weak strength limit its use instructural elements [3]. Lightweight aggregate concretes offer strength, deadload reduction, and thermal conductivity,