Retail Trade Area Analysis Using the Huff Model-CN

中国零售饱和度测评指标的探索性研究李飞苏小博（清华大学经济管理学院，北京，100084）摘要随着零售业竞争的激烈化和政府加大对新开店铺的管理力度，零售饱和度评价成为政府、企业和学者都十分关心的问题。

但是，目前还没有一个大家认可的评价体系。

本文将单一零售商利益视角的零售饱和度概念，修正为包括全社会、消费者、竞争者和零售商四个利益视角的定义，并建立了一个包含四个维度15个指标的评价指标体系，同时提出了相应的应用方法。

关键词零售饱和度商业规划店铺选址近几年，零售饱和度测评问题开始引起我国学者的关注，但是研究成果十分有限，大多是对西方测评方法的评价和议论（孙元欣，2004；董金才、宝贡敏，2005），仅有的零售设施饱和度测评体系（李飞等，2005）也过于简单，离实际应用还有不小的距离。

然而，实践对理论的要求总是快于理论本身完善的速度，常常有一些急迫的问题让理论在不完善的情况给予解决。

随着各地商业网点规划的制定和审议制度的实施，迫切需要一个零售网点合理布局的量化评价标准，否则规划就会成为一纸空文，审议就会流于形式。

这个量化的评价标准应该是零售饱和度指数。

但是，西方学者已有的研究成果大多是为零售企业选址服务，不能满足政府进行商业规划和管理需求，国内也没有一个大家接受且相对完善的饱和指数评价方法。

为此，本文对零售饱和度的测评体系进行更深层的研究，对已提出的评价指标体系进行完善，内容包括（1）什么是零售饱和度？（2）用什么指标评价零售饱和度？（3）如何应用零售饱和度评价体系？目标是构建一个科学的中国零售饱和度评价指标体系提供参考。

1 什么是零售饱和度1.1 传统的零售饱和度概念大多数人认为，零售饱和度反映的是零售空间的供给与消费者需求的关系，当零售空间供给超过消费需求时，市场饱和就会出现（董金才、宝贡敏，2005）。

具体可分为商店不足区、商店过多区和商店均衡区三种情况：商店不足区（understored trading area）是指销售某一种产品或服务的商店太少，以至于难以满足所有消费者的需求。

To make money from the expansion of the Chinese market, most oil companies will have to sell much more than gasoline. JONATHAN R. WOETZELThe McKinsey Quarterly, 2002 Number 3C C hina抯automotive market is predicted to be the third largest in the world by 2008. The accompanying growth in demand for gasoline and related car fuel products梒ombined with government plans to deregulate the sector and the need to address the chronic inefficiency of current distribution梥hould create a juicy opportunity for multinational oil companies as well as for China抯two domestic giants, PetroChina and Sinopec.Gasoline reaches the huge Chinese market through a fragmented retail and distribution network of about 90,000 stations, almost all state owned. Many are run more as sinecures than as businesses, often with a staff four to five times larger than the international norm but with less than a quarter of the average gasoline throughput of US stations. The Chinese government, which is well aware of the problem, has resolved not to allow the country抯energy infrastructure to burden the whole economy: it is fast deregulating the sector, which will be fully opened up to foreign companies in 2004 under the commitments attending the country抯membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Foreign oil companies have hitherto been restricted to one-off local deals in special economic zones or tied to investments in toll-road construction.Although the stage should thus be set for canny corporations to move into the market, it remains unclear how they will make money. Competition is already driving down retail margins on gasoline, while prices for the best station sites have soared as China抯large domestic oil companies have rushed to buy them. Oil companies in the West facing similar margin pressures know that most gasoline stations are viable only if they offer general-retail facilities at least as large as a convenience store, in addition to gasoline. This is true in China as well. The highest-volume sites might be made profitable on their fuel revenues alone, but the rest need substantial nonfuel revenues to make a profit.The strategic implications are clear. In China as elsewhere, the first decision for an oil company is whether to own and operate sites or merely to supply them with gasoline. If the company opts for ownership, it has a choice: to adopt a retail strategy and pursue nonfuel revenues from a portfolio of retail sites or to target only the highest-volume sites, using them to build a high-quality gasoline brand that can also be offered through independent retailers. At present, the Chinese oil majors are pursuing neither strategy; they have simply rushed to grab any available site, where they sell as much petroleum-based product as possible while ignoring the retail potential. The multinationals have been more judicious in selecting sites for their initial joint ventures, but they too have neglected the strategic choice. Unless all of these companies, domestic and international alike, change tack, their investments in expensive Chinese real estate may unravel.THE MARKET AND SITE ECONOMICSChina抯dominant oil companies are Sinopec, in the south and east, and PetroChina, which has the more comprehensive refinery and distribution network of the two, in the north and west (Exhibit 1). The two companies aim to capture, between them, 70 percent of China 抯gasoline sales volume by 2005. Since their IPOs, in 2000, they have invested heavily in petroleum-related infrastructure and in brand building. Having already raised their share of sales to more than 40 percent and secured most of the prime sites in the biggest cities, they are on track to meet this target.Until 2004, multinational companies will be allowed to own outright only the 300 or so sites they now possess through local deals struck before government deregulation of foreign investment in the sector, in the mid-1990s, but they can build up their holdings through joint ventures with Chinese companies. BP, ExxonMobil, and Royal Dutch/Shell are establishing joint ventures with PetroChina and Sinopec by contributing capital for the purchase of sites and by supplying higher-margin premium fuels; BP and PetroChina, for example, aim to boost their holdings to 950 stations by acquiring 670 stations from local companies in Fujian and Guangdong. Such joint ventures bind the partners only in specific provinces and have so far been formed in just 4 out of 27 of them. For the remainder, the options of both parties are still open.The 60 percent of sales not controlled by the two Chinese leaders is currently held by various quasi-governmental entities, including local and provincial authorities and state-owned enterprises. City governments, for example, have started their own retailing groups, often built around local highway-construction projects. Some private operators are also emerging: for example, China Resources Enterprise, a holding company based in Hong Kong, has 23 stations and is thinking about opening more. But in general, smaller companies, daunted by the bidding power of PetroChina and Sinopec, are holding back.Both of the majors hope that their spending will create a profitable structure for China抯gasoline-retailing industry after the market opens up in 2004. International experience shows that gasoline retailing tends to be relatively profitable wherever the top three participants control 80 percent of the market, growth is strong, and the supply of gasoline is short. China should meet these conditions. PetroChina and Sinopec are consolidating the market by buying out their independent rivals and, given their head start over themultinationals, should succeed in gaining a leading position in the market. Growth in demand is forecast to remain high, especially for high-quality gasoline. And although supply is currently in balance with demand at the national level, it runs short in the coastal regions, where both demand and growth are greatest.Retail margins are tightening fast, however. As in almost every deregulated Chinese industry, domestic price competition will probably be severe as the market opens up. PetroChina and Sinopec fought several damaging price wars from 1997 until they were restrained in 1999 by state-imposed price controls that are now being removed in tandem with China抯entry into the WTO. The resumed price competition will intensify when new foreign and domestic companies are permitted to purchase sites in 2004. Moreover, all companies in the market will gain greater access to gasoline as import tariffs for refined products fall to 5 percent, from 9. Where comparable reforms have taken place梚n Australia, France, Israel, Japan, and New Zealand梤etail margins have dropped by up to half.In anticipation of this fiercely competitive future environment, PetroChina, Sinopec, and new entrants willing to take them on are ratcheting up spending on locations, brands, and marketing. Good locations梩he 20 percent of urban gasoline stations that generate 60 percent of the revenues梐re scarce, and zoning regulations and the high cost of land limit new entrants. These prime sites, which move more than 1,500 tons in volume and generate over 900,000 renminbi ($108,700) in fuel-related gross margins a year, currently sell for up to 20,000,000 renminbi, three to six times the price of a station with equivalent turnover in the United States or Europe. The inflated costs at the high end of the market are also dragging up the price of smaller stations, to 5,000,000 to 10,000,000 renminbi. The cost of promotional campaigns, including television advertising, is about as steep as it is in developed markets.MAKING SITES PAYSelling gasoline and diesel fuel through retail outlets is a costly (and therefore risky) business. Unless PetroChina, Sinopec, and the foreign joint venture partners of both companies reconsider their indiscriminate buying of sites, they could find that their station portfolios hold more balance sheet liabilities than assets.It is vital to make the sites pay, but how? There is little scope to cut operating costs, which are already low by global standards; labor, for example, is relatively cheap if inefficient. Capital costs are largely fixed once a station has been bought. Wholesale margins, on which the Chinese majors have usually relied to subsidize their retail outlets, will probably dwindle to the cost of transport and storage as WTO commitments and other reforms take effect. The truth is that the economics of most sites won抰work unless there are significant nonfuel sales, for they improve site margins by lifting revenues without raising costs in a comparable way (Exhibit 2). Petroleum companies thus have three possibilities: they can focus on the retail opportunity of their sites, concentrate on a high-quality fuel service through the highest-volume sites, or ignore retail altogether and be wholesalers of commodity fuels.THE RETAIL STRATEGYElsewhere in the world, multinational oil companies have compensated for tight margins on gasoline by investing in additional revenue streams. This kind of strategic behavior takes place in the context of a global retail sector moving from ownership of product categories to ownership of retail "occasions"梩he way-to-work or weekend stop for gasoline and incidentals, routine Saturday shopping, the less frequent household stock-up. Gasoline stations are designed to attract customers who want more than just fuel for their cars, and in Europe and the United States these formats now generate as much revenue from extras as from gasoline.In developed economies, this model has been adopted slowly because it takes time to convert or dismantle the legacy assets of a long-established gasoline-only strategy. Chinese players have an opportunity to go straight from the basic gasoline model to integrated retailing. Yet so far, PetroChina, Sinopec, and even the multinationals have been reluctant to pursue nonfuel retail strategies on their current sites, for they have been persuaded that, in China, the ubiquity of local mom-and-pop stores means that convenience stores at gasoline stations are redundant and that margins on nonfuel items are too thin. The marketing efforts of these companies have thus been confined to gasoline, and their sites offer no more than a limited selection of low-cost additional goods and services such as cigarettes, snacks, and auto lubricants.Nonetheless, the integrated retail model for gasoline stations can succeed in China. As working hours and prosperity increase, the Chinese are more and more willing to pay for convenience and brands. Car drivers, who are generally among the most affluent people in the country, are beginning to demand offerings not available at mom-and-pop stores, such as foreign brands and technology-based services. And the economics should work, since even small nonfuel items often have profit margins of more than 50 percent. Owning a network of sites further improves margins for individual locations by delivering scale benefits for overhead costs such as marketing and administration as well as purchasing scale for both fuel and nonfuel items.The key is to start with an attractive retail site梡erhaps incorporated into an entertainment or commercial development that could also draw pedestrians梐s opposed to a pure gasoline stop. Chinese consumers are already familiar with retailing concepts such ashypermarket chains, specialty stores, and greatly improved supermarkets and department stores, which have all emerged over the past 10 to 15 years. Most of these formats have been successful, though convenience stores have fallen prey to oversupply and margin pressures. Given this rather mixed experience, profitability will depend on three factors.The first is early entry into the market. Only companies that have been quick to introduce innovative formats and to gain national scale have made their retail ventures pay. Carrefour led the pack with hypermarkets, thereby securing a leading market share and leaving local and foreign competitors with less attractive locations. Yet the need to build scale quickly shouldn抰persuade companies to overpay; instead they should look for opportunities in midsize cities, which represent up to 40 percent of national demand for gasoline and where retail demand is now growing fastest. Here there is still a chance to enter the market early and to establish a strong brand presence without overpaying for sites.Developing the right retail proposition is the second factor. China抯newly affluent consumers are driving change throughout the country抯retail sector by seeking convenience and branded quality. For a retail gambit to work, gasoline stations must appeal to prosperous consumers, such as people who drive their own private cars (accounting for upward of 40 percent of new-car purchases in 2000), as well as the young motorcycle riders, who still dominate station forecourts and are more likely to try out new and foreign brands. To appeal to these categories of consumers, gasoline retailers will need to offer not only high-quality goods梥uch as prepared and packaged foods, including a substantial number of foreign brands梑ut also services such as DVD rentals, photographic processing, a pick-up location for Internet orders, laundry, mail, and pharmacy counters. The precise mix and the design of the site will depend on the market segment the retailer aims to serve: affluent but more traditional car drivers or younger motorbike riders. But retailers must also bear in mind the needs of taxi drivers, who still account for most gasoline consumption in China and look mainly for high-quality gasoline and good service.The third ingredient is the development of retail skills beyond the usual level of basic expertise. Managing a network of retail sites involves the continual development of a portfolio of options from which each site can draw梐n undertaking that requires skills in concept design, partnering, and venture capital. The state-owned Chinese oil companies will need to develop these skills both organically and through joint ventures.THE GASOLINE SPECIALIST STRATEGYGiven the high cost of owning a large network of retail sites, and the accompanying pitfalls, oil companies might decide instead to become gasoline specialists. Pursuing this strategy would involve buying only those high-volume sites that have sufficient sales of gasoline and auto-related services to make a profit. Elsewhere, the company抯branded gasoline products would be sold through a network of retail partners.The rationale of the gasoline specialist route is that auto fuel is a technically differentiated product and that branded, quality products can command a premium. China, with its shortages in domestic supply and its increasingly discerning consumers, is thus promising ground for the gasoline specialist. In the case of auto lubricants, for example, the quality segment of the market accounts for only 7 percent of the volume but for more than 30 percent of the value; margins are up to three times those for the commodity lubes sold by local suppliers. The push to quality is already being promoted by government crackdowns on fake and counterfeit products and by WTO-inspired moves to encourage the use of high-quality gasoline with cleaner emissions. Since China抯refineries operate far below international benchmarks and domestically generated high-quality gasoline is scarce, multinational companies have a clear opportunity. About 20 percent of all gasoline sold in Guangdong, for instance, is imported, and industry forecasts suggest that this amount will rise slowly over the medium term.For multinationals not bound by joint ventures with the leading Chinese contenders, the gasoline specialization strategy makes particular sense, for foreign companies have access to good gasoline and a reputation for product quality and brand strength. A typical foreign-owned gasoline station in China sells as much as two times more premium gasoline than do locally owned stations, and its prices can be 5 to 10 percent higher than theirs even on basic products (Exhibit 3). Multinationals that haven抰spent heavily to acquire large numbers of low-volume stations can cherry-pick the best of the new sites and then focus on supplying high-quality gasoline to any independent retailers that emerge.The gasoline specialization strategy relies on three key elements. First, such a specialist should buy only high-traffic sites and perhaps divest sites with smaller volumes. Sites that sell more than 1,250 tons a year are not just the only ones that make a profit without significant nonfuel sales but also can create local brand preferences. Second, the specialist will need strong retail partners梖oreign and local梩o get the necessary scale for its products. Carrefour and Wal-Mart, which are building networks of retail sites in China, are obvious partners, but Jet, QuikTrip, Tesco, and even McDonald抯might also be suitable. Moreover, since the structure of China抯retail sector is strongly regional in character, multinationals will need to build relationships with a number of local retail partners. Finally, a gasoline specialist should differentiate itself on products and services, not price. In addition to high-quality gasoline, it must offer quick and friendly assistance, convenient layouts, links to company- or card-payment schemes, and services such as repairs and car washes. To reinforce the message that quality is paramount, prices shouldn抰be visible from the street.Can China抯oil companies realistically pursue the gasoline specialization strategy? There are certainly problems. Although these companies may decide to scale down their investment in retail sites, the quality of their gasoline and service is still relatively poor, and their brands, though well-known, are perceived as being of lower quality than those of the multinationals.STICKING TO WHOLESALELocal and Asia-Pacific producers and merchant refiners, such as the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation, that can抰invest in a substantial retail position could steer clear of retailing altogether and focus on supplying independent retailers. Once the industry has consolidated, the remaining ones will be looking for a secure source of local gasoline under their own or franchised brands. For Chinese companies that have already invested heavily in their own sites, this path might not be an acceptable choice. But for many regional refiners梐t least if the costs of distribution aren抰prohibitive梚t could prove a safe way to operate as competition intensifies.Chinese and multinational oil companies, building on their established supply positions and brands, are investing heavily to sell gasoline in the fast-growing Chinese market. But with falling margins, aggressive competition, and ever more demanding consumers, selling gasoline in China isn抰a simple game. The size of the country, the abundance of distinct regional markets, and the number of independent sites still available give all interested parties the ability to map out profitable strategies. But unless these companies get it right梐nd to do so, many of them will have to realize the full potential of retail operations梩he black gold of a billion consumers may become just another drop in the sea of Chinese red inkNotes:Jonathan Woetzel is a director in McKinsey抯Shanghai office.The author wishes to thank Carlo Wai-Keung Yu for his contributions to this article.See Paul Gao, "," The McKinsey Quarterly, 2002 Number 1, pp. 144?5. Only the United States and Japan will have larger markets for gasoline. China抯market for it is growing by 4 percent a year, about double the rate of the developed world.Convenience stores accounted for almost 2.5 percent of retail sales in 2001, and local and international chains plan to expand further. Yet Shanghai and some other cities already have five times more convenience stores per unit of GDP than Hong Kong; it has taken nine years for 7-Eleven to break even in Guangdong, where it has 72 stores; and Lawson抯桱apan抯largest convenience store operator梙as 87 stores in Shanghai but is still in the red after six years.In China抯downstream sector, the legacy of supply-driven planning is average utilization of less than 70 percent; high-cost, low-scale refineries; and extensive transport bottlenecks. PetroChina抯downstream sector lost more than $1 billion in 2000, while Sinopec has consistently missed its operating targets. In most cases, investing to improve refineries is impossible given their location, scale, and sources of crude oil. Gradual shutdowns are unavoidable.China抯oil companies are trying to make the quality of their products, channels, and marketing more consistent by building, for example, high-quality lubricant brands such as Great Wall (Sinopec) and Seven Star (PetroChina)。

引力模型在国际贸易研究中的应用内容自引力模型被引入国际贸易领域以来，由于其原理简单、数据适用、模型容易被用于计量研究而得到广泛的应用。

通过众多学者的努力，该模型被不断扩展，加入了被认为影响贸易流动的虚拟变量，如共同的语言、共同的边界和国家间的历史关系。

同时，由于服务贸易的崛起，将引力模型应用于服务贸易领域也开始成为学者研究的热点。

本文介绍了引力模型理论基础的争论以及其在国际贸易实证研究中的应用，试图在众多学者研究的基础上对引力模型的应用厘清略思路。

关键词：引力模型理论基础实证研究引力模型概述引力模型源自于牛顿万有引力定律，其将两个物体之间的引力与它们各自的质量和两者之间的距离联系起来。

20世纪40年代James Stewart首次将引力应用于社会科学。

而最早将其应用于国际贸易的是Tinbergen，引力模型预言两个国家的双边贸易流量是两国经济规模以及两国之间距离的函数。

经济规模用GDP、人口和人均收入来衡量。

距离一般是测量两个国家首都之间的距离，也有的研究测量两个贸易伙伴之间的距离与它们和其他贸易伙伴距离的比值，并有若干具体表述的统计形式(ITC，2000；Soloaga and Winters，2001)。

引力模型已经广泛应用于国际贸易研究，其大受欢迎应归因于以下几点：原理简单、数据适用、模型容易被用于计量研究。

通过学者的努力，模型被不断扩展，加入了被认为影响贸易流动的虚拟变量，如共同的语言、共同的边界和国家间的历史关系。

引力模型也被用于政策分析，例如对拥有共同货币的区域或优惠贸易协定的成员国之间的贸易流动估计。

贸易引力模型理论基础贸易引力模型不是首先从贸易理论中推演而来的，而是以对现实贸易关系的直观判断为依据建立起来的，因此，贸易引力模型的实证研究在先，理论研究在后。

但基于习惯，本文先介绍贸易引力模型的理论基础。

Anderson(1979)指出引力模型与世界贸易模型在某些方面是一致的，如假定来自不同地区的产品(进口品和国内产品)是不完全替代的。

南开经济研究２００９年第６期ＮＡＮＫＡＩＥＣｏＮｏＭＩＣＳＴＵＤＩＥＳＮｏ．６２００９异质性企业贸易模型对中国企业出口的适用性检验唐宜红林发勤４摘要：本文通过我国２００５年工业普查的企业数据，对Ｍｅｌｉｔｚ（２００３）的异质企业模型在我国的适用性问题进行了验证。

本研究主要检验企业要素生产率、企业所有制形式、企业所处区域和企业要素比率等因素对我国企业出口的影响。

实证研究结果表明，企业生产率越高越容易出口；外商投资企业和东部地区企业更容易出口。

关于企业要素比率的结论是，从整体来看，企业要素比率的作用不确定，这说明了我国出口不再仅仅依赖丰裕的劳动禀赋，出口结构也在不断升级。

分行业的检验结果显示，在一些资本密集性的企业，资本与劳动比率的提高，会显著促进企业的出口，表明我国部分资本密集型企业也具有出口竞争力。

关键词：异质企业模型；全要素生产率；所有制形式；要素比率一、引言与文献综述改革开放３０年来，中国对外贸易发展迅速，２００７年货物贸易出口额为１２１８０．１亿美元。

２００８年在世界金融危机影响下，我国货物出口仍然达到１４２８５．５亿美元。

究竟是什么样的企业完成了这些出口任务呢？这些企业是同质的还是异质的？事实上，企业与企业之间存在很大的差异性，生产率、所有制形式、所在行业和所在区域的不同，都会影响企业的出口水平。

有些企业出口能力很强，譬如２００７年前２０大出口企业出口额占当年我国出口总额的１１％，其中大多数出口企业是外商投资企业，他们集中在电子行业领域，而月．全部位于中国的东部沿海地区。

这就说明企业本身情况的不同，对企业的出口行为具有很大的影响。

近年来，Ｍｅｌｉｔｚ（２００３）异质企业贸易模型解释了国际贸易中企业的差异和ｍ口决策行为之间的关系，其理论不同于要素禀赋理论和规模经济贸易理论基于企业同质性假定所进行的分析。

企业异质模型最核心的结论就是贸易能够引发生产率较高的企业进人出口市场，而生产率较低的企业只能继续为本土市场生产产品，甚至退出市场，国际贸易进一步使得资源流向生产率较高的企业。