中国自由主义政治思潮的发端_严复的自由思想评介

庄子政治思想论证：道家思想的最高峰庄子思想经历了千年流变之后，在现代中国面临着新的挑战。

如果说古代庄子思想在理想人格培养方面贡献巨大，那么，进入现代之后，庄子思想在认识论、政治哲学方面，试图与西方的知识成果相衔接，小编在这里整理了相关资料，希望能帮助到您。

庄子：道家思想的最高峰道家是最早的个人主义者。

冯友兰先生说"道家者流盖出于隐者"。

这帮人大都离群索居，遁迹山林。

但也不是普通的隐者，他们退隐的同时，还提出了一个思想体系，为自己的退隐行为辩护，赋予其意义。

相当于说，老子不跟你们玩，那是有理由的。

道家最早的代表人物杨朱说，如果拔我一根汗毛就能救天下，我干不干?当然不干咯!就是这么屌。

杨朱被后世的人唾骂，说他自私，一毛不拔。

其实杨朱的意思是，要尊重个人，一切站在个人的角度。

杨朱的思想没有可考的记载，都散落在别人的著作里，可惜了。

老子继承了杨朱的思想，老子著《道德经》，说到底，还是一部政治哲学，是入世论。

老子说"道"，用今天的话说，"道"是"自然法"，或者是"事物发展的普遍规律"。

老子看透了先秦时期各国战乱的根源，所以警示统治者要无为而治，要尊重事物发展的普遍规律，别瞎折腾。

可是没什么用，除非大家达成一致意见喊一二三，一起停止折腾，否则谁先放手谁被灭。

道家理论发展到庄子这里，才达到最高峰。

《庄子》一书共33篇，有多少是他自己写的，不知道。

因为我们今天所读到的《庄子》，是郭象重编的，郭象也没告诉我们哪几篇是庄子本人所写。

不过没关系，谁写的不重要，把问题留给史学家，我们只谈庄子的思想。

庄子最牛逼的地方，在于他比杨朱和老子都超脱。

如果说杨朱和老子还在试图跟其它各家的思想作比较的话，那么庄子显然已经爬到更高的地方了。

这就好比杨朱和老子还在操场上跟其它的同学一起玩泥巴时，庄子已经坐在教学楼天台上了，他冷冷地看着操场上的人，内心充满了怜悯。

严复的自由观和法治观作者：冯国泉张洪来源：《理论与现代化》2009年第02期摘要：严复受西方自由观的影响，力倡以法律保障自由，促进民智、民德、民力，实现国家富强；受西方法治观的影响，反对极权专制，主张民权与君权分立、司法与行政分立。

严复的自由观和法治观对树立自由观念、建设法治社会仍然具有重要的借鉴意义。

关键词：严复；自由观；法治观中图分类号：D902文献标识码：A文章编号：1003－1502(2009)02－0107－05严复是近代中国启蒙思想家和著名翻译家，在对西方政治法律制度的实地考察和对达尔文、孟德斯鸠、卢梭等启蒙思想家学术著作的翻译和研究中，形成了他有别于传统的自由观和法治观，更加清楚地认识到中国政治法律制度的腐朽落后，从而积极投身于变法维新运动。

严复曾于1880－1900年寓居天津，译书立说，宣扬其思想。

一、严复的茸由观1.中西方之间的自由差异严复比较了中西方之间的自由概念，认为中国传统文化中“恕”和“絮矩”是与西方的自由概念最相似的，但究其实质，二者有很大的不同，原因在于：“中国恕与絮矩，专以待人及物而言；而西人自由，则于及物之中，而实寓所以存我也。

”按照严复的观点，中国人并不是不讲自由，中国人讲自由，讲“恕”和“絮矩”，主要是针对他人而言的，是以限制自己自由的方式来给予他人自由，所谓克己待人、克己待物都属于这类情形，结果是每一个人的克己待人、克己待物造成了每一个人的不自由。

而西人之自由是在他人的自由中实寓自我的自由，是以个体自由为本位的法律保障下的自由，结果是每一个人都享有自由，且每个人的自由都是均等的。

中西方之间的自由差异造成了其他许多方面的差异，“则如中国最重三纲，而西人首明平等；中国亲亲，而西人尚贤；中国以孝治天下，而西人以公治天下；中国尊主，而西人隆民；中国贵一道而同风，而西人喜党居而州处；中国多忌讳，而西人重讥评。

”其中涉及到身份社会与契约社会的差异，君本与民本的差异，统一性与多样性的差异。

在中国最早最大的社会自由主义代表人物是谁中国最早的最大的自由主义的代表是严复。

人物介绍严复1854.1.8—1921.10.27，原名宗光，字又陵，后改名复，字几道，汉族，福建侯官县人，近代著名的翻译家、教育家、新法家代表人。

先后毕业于福建船政学堂和英国皇家海军学院，曾担任过京师大学堂译局总办、上海复旦公学校长、安庆高等师范学堂校长，清朝学部名辞馆总编辑。

在李鸿章创办的北洋水师学堂任教期间，培养了中国近代第一批海军人才，并翻译了《天演论》、创办了《国闻报》，系统地介绍西方民主和科学，宣传维新变法思想，将西方的社会学、政治学、政治经济学、哲学和自然科学介绍到中国，提出的“信、达、雅”的翻译标准，对后世的翻译工作产生了深远影响，是清末极具影响的资产阶级启蒙思想家，翻译家和教育家，是中国近代史上向西方国家寻找真理的“先进的中国人”之一。

生平经历1854年1月8日咸丰三年十二月十日严复出生于今福建候官县盖山镇阳岐村一中医世家。

1866年同治五年严复父亲病逝，学馆中辍，严复放弃走科举“正途”。

1867年同治六年入福州船政学堂学习驾驶，改名宗光，字又陵。

1871年同治十年福州船政学堂毕业，为该学堂第一届毕业生，先后在“建威”、“扬武”两舰实习5年。

1872年同治十一年取得选用道员资格，改名复，字几道。

1877年3月光绪三年二月赴英国学习海军，与出使英国大臣郭嵩焘结为忘年交。

1879年6月光绪五年五月毕业于伦敦格林威治的皇家海军学院Royal Naval College，回国后，被聘为福州船政学堂后学堂教习。

1880年光绪六年到天津任北洋水师学堂所属驾驶学堂“洋文正教习”，学生中有后来因辛亥革命而出名的黎元洪。

18光绪十五年报捐同知衔，以知府选用，派为北洋水师学堂会办。

1890年光绪十六年升为北洋水师学堂总办，但因与李鸿章不合，有意退出海军界，另谋发展。

1891年10月8日光绪十六年严复获得候选道的官衔。

1895年光绪二十一年中日甲午战争后在天津《直报》发表《论世变之亟》、《原强》、《辟韩》、《救亡决论》等文，主张变法维新、武装抗击外来侵略。

Journal of Chinese Studies No. 49 - 2009Book Reviews519 The Meaning of Freedom: Yan Fu and the Origins of Chinese Liberalism. By Max Ko-wu Huang. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2008. Pp. xxviii + 408. $55.00.The most satisfying studies of individual thinkers reveal major conceptual themes of an entire era. A case in point is Huang Ko-wu’s study of Yan Fu (1854–1921), China’s premier translator and interpreter of Western social thought. The starting point is Yan’s apparent failure to grasp some of J. S. Mill’s central concepts in On Liberty (1859). Why did Yan’s translations fail to grasp some central Millian ideas about the essential role of liberty for human progress? Huang’s answers become the basis for a wide-ranging exploration of Chinese liberalism from Yan’s day to the present. The hinge connecting the book’s argumentation is a line-by-line analysis of Chapter 1 of Mill’s On Liberty, as translated by Yan. From it emerge three questions:(1) What were the sources of Yan’s intellectual difficulties with Mill’s thought?(2) What do these difficulties reveal about Chinese social thought around the turn of the twentieth century? Did Yan’s failure to pick up Mill’s subtle argumentation suggest broader features of Chinese culture, presuppositions that made Mill’s scepticism inaccessible or distasteful to Yan and perhaps to others of his time?(3) If there was (is) a distinctive “Chinese” liberalism, how is it related to Yan’s problems with Western doctrines of individualism and creative freedom?First, consider Yan’s translation of On Liberty:Translations notoriously betray. Perhaps the most fascinating cases of betrayal arise, not from incompetence or from intent to distort, but from failure to penetrate the target culture. Ironically, the more conscientious the translator, the more revealing the deviation. Such is the case of Yan Fu, as Huang shows him wrestling with the subtleties of Mill’s logic and with the European intellectual contexts in which Mill was writing.How well equipped was Yan Fu to mediate between Chinese and foreign cultures? Huang approaches this question from the bottom up: the deepest strata of social and philosophical awareness seem to have caused the most difficulty. However firm Yan’s command of English, Huang shows that it was not subtle enough to grasp the crucial links in Mill’s logical arguments or to render them into accurate Chinese equivalents. Yan was apparently unable to grasp Mill’s central rationale for free discussion of moral, political and philosophical ideas, unconstrained by society’s prejudices or taboos. Mill believed that in advanced societies, such as Victorian England, thought and hence human progress were more likely to be impeded by societal pressure than by state persecution. To protect original thinkers from “the tyranny of the majority” required a staunch determination to preserve “liberty” in the form of unfettered debate over social, political and moral issues, debate in which every man’s (or woman’s) opinion would be confronted by the opinion of others for verification or falsification. No opinion was, of itself, a reliable statement of “truth,” but rather a provisional reach for it, subject to rigorous challenges from the opin- ions of others. Mill believed that human progress depended upon such searching exami- nation of new ideas, put forward by innovative thinkers, undeterred by majority opinion.520Book ReviewsMill saw human reasoning as inherently fallible; hence the search for provisional truths required a resolute scepticism. This “epistemological pessimism,” deeply rooted in European thought, stemmed from “a widespread impression that moral norms lack any basis in objective knowledge.” Hence the need for endless testing of such norms through free discussion. Such was Mill’s “liberty”—to be limited only by the possibility of its doing actual harm to other people.In comparison, Huang believes (along with his mentor, Thomas A. Metzger, who wrote the Foreword for this book) that Chinese social, moral and political reasoning “remained epistemologically optimistic”—that is, inclined to believe that such truths were not only absolute but humanly accessible through reason or faith. This cultural constant, Huang suggests, prevented even as talented an intellectual as Yan Fu from understanding key points of Mill’s argumentation, to say nothing of rendering them accurately in Chinese. Completely overlooked by scholars of Yan’s translations, this fact is proven, to my satisfaction, by the author’s comparison of Mill’s argumentation with Yan’s translations. (Examples of these translations, with Mill’s original followed by Yan’s Chinese translation and its English equivalent, are offered in Chapter 3. The entirety of Mill’s Chapter 1 of On Liberty,along with Yan’s Chinese version, is provided in Appendix II. Readers can get the flavour of the discrepancies by careful attention to these passages, which are to my mind the most revealing sections of the book.)Yan’s difficulties can be illustrated, first, by his failure to understand Mill’s use of “opinion,” meaning a judgement not fully attested by evidence. Mill’s subtleties are lost, for example (emphasis added):Mill: “We may, and must, assume our opinion to be true for the guidance of our own conduct” [acting according to an idea we accept provisionally, even though its ultimate value is far from certain.]Yan: “But when [on the spot] decisions in human affairs have to be made, there are permanent standards” 則固有其常經[implies that we must select among well-attested and enduring moral formulae.] (p. 137)Yan had similar difficulties rendering Mill’s hypothetical treatment of how he might publicly oppose what he classed as anti-social ideas:Mill: “and it is assuming no more when we forbid bad men to pervert society by the propagation of opinions which we regard as false and pernicious.” [Here we see Mill falling back on his one exception to complete liberty of discourse—the case in which ideas do demonstrable harm to others—arguably not one of his finer moments.]Yan: “I do no more than attack perverse doctrines邪說 . . . so as to protect the world from falling into confusion.” 使不至於惑世誣民[here resorting to standard imperial terms for heresy (xieshuo)denoting a malign denial of a doctrinal absolute,a capital crime under the Qing regime and earlier.] (p. 137)Book Reviews521 Such examples may seem captious; nevertheless they are supplemented by many more in Huang’s passage-by-passage scrutiny of critical philosophical points in Mill’s argumentation. Yan consistently misses what Mill believes is the provisional and falsifiable nature of human understanding, and the relativity of human behaviour. Could such anti-scepticism (which could be labelled “naïve” rather than optimistic) really characterize the thought of an entire people? Did Yan purposely misrepresent Mill to appeal to what he believed a classically-educated Chinese readership could absorb? It is just as likely that Mill and his translator were negotiating such bumpy philosophical ground that, in the process, one party’s failure to penetrate the intellectual depths of the other was only to be expected. Yet Huang leaves us wondering whether or not Yan’s off-key translations could have been expressed in Chinese, in terms that did full justice to Mill’s thought. If Yan had found that they could not, because the appropriate expressions did not exist in the classical Chinese lexicon, then that would have said more about Chinese thought in general, than about Yan’s translations of them. This point Huang suggests but does not firmly establish.In another instance, however, Huang does point out how Yan clearly rejected or substantially modified certain of Mill’s basic ideas, evidently out of conviction that they were not consistent with Chinese values. Take Yan’s conscientious substitution (in a second version of “On Liberty”) of a homonym for the you of ziyou “liberty”(繇 for 由) which delivers a more generous, less selfish tone; and an alteration of the title itself to reflect the idea of a moral “boundary between self and group.” Huang explains that this latter alteration was a reference to Xunzi, who used “boundary” in the sense of preventing conflict. Clearly, Yan’s choice of words was bending Mill’s “liberty” in a more socially empathetic and unselfish direction (p. 95).With respect to the political implications of humans’ individuality, Mill’s meaning again evades Yan’s translation:Mill: “In proportion to the development of his individuality, each person becomes more valuable to himself, and is therefore capable of being more valuable to others.”Yan: “Therefore, one with a distinctive personal character and style can achieve the full realization of both himself and all other things, making virtue clear to all and renewing the people. Making myself good and so helping others become increasingly good thus depends on morally independent action, as opposed to becoming corrupted by convention.”Huang notes that Yan’s trite teli duxing(morally independent action) embedded in yi duxing er teli 以獨行而特立 did not fully realize Mill’s “the development of his individuality” which for Mill was the mainspring of progress. And Yan’s use of the classical tag mingde xinmin明德新民(making virtue clear to all and renewing the people) calls to mind “the Confucian way of synthesizing the worth of the self and the group,” diluting Mill’s primary focus on the unique individual (pp. 152–53).In sum, “Yan was influenced by the Confucian vision of the ideal person, that is,522Book Reviewsthe ideal of the sage or individual distinguished not by his originality but by his ability to embody eternal principles and overcome egotism” (p. 142). Yan also had trouble with the concept of “inherent rights,” which in some instances he simply declines to translate at all (pp. 155–57). The consistency of this Confucian bias makes it unlikely that language problems were the only underlying cause. Instead, Huang goes on to demonstrate how Yan consciously sought accommodation between Western and Chinese values; and most of the book proceeds toward that conclusion.Yan’s “accommodation,” as Huang describes it, was far from a mere variant of the “essence” and “function” paradigm (Chinese learning for the essence [ti體: Confucian morality and social structure], Western learning for the function [yong用: machine technology, industrial production]) that underlay nineteenth-century efforts to resist foreign aggression. “Accommodation” meant a deeper, more integral blending, by which the foreign element was tempered and enriched by Chinese values. In fact, argues Huang, a “harmonious juxtaposition of continuity and discontinuity can be found throughout Yan’s life” (p. 108). Yan saw Confucian morality as the social glue for a modern society; and an accommodationist version of modernization as the best hope for China’s survival (p. 244).In Huang’s enlightening historiographical account (Chapter 1), he takes issue with the work of the first Western historian to deal seriously with Yan: Benjamin I. Schwartz (unaccountably missing from the Index), whose influential book, In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West focussed on the “Faustian-Promethean” energy which fuelled European civilization through its all-powerful nation-states, as the primary value that Yan derived from reading Adam Smith, Mill, Spencer et al. Huang states accordingly that Schwartz“depicted Yan Fu as motivated primarily by nationalism” (pp. 28, 182). Despite Schwartz’s provocative title, this is an oversimplification of his findings. If one examines the decade beginning in 1895 (a crucial one for Yan’s thought) from a broad perspective, “national wealth and power” (while important) expresses only narrowly the range of urgent projects facing Chinese reformers. The main point was the survival of China as a civilization, which would require not only building a defensible modern state, but also “renovating the people” to a point where China’s inherited culture and institutions could be reshaped to serve the economic and social needs of a modern society.As an example of one such reshaping project in the 1900s, consider “local self-government” (difang zizhi地方自治) a movement in which élite activists were busily instituting provincial and town assemblies to mobilize resources and services, often in competition with the central government, to benefit their home regions and communities. Yan Fu knew about this movement and (encouraged by Mill and Montesquieu) approved of it as wholesome preparation for citizen participation in public affairs (p. 239). Competitive or not, local political and entrepreneurial self-help was not considered by its proponents as irrelevant to national strength, any more than Mill’s concept of individual self-enhancement was irrelevant to the larger interests of state and society. That does not, however, mean that the value of such projects was considered as significant mainly, let alone only, for “wealth and power of the nation-state” toward which the self-governmentBook Reviews523 crowd entertained considerable suspicion. Schwartz emphasizes Yan’s conviction that enlightened self-interest, liberty and democracy “are all part of one syndrome,” of which patriotism is but one beneficiary.1Rather than “nationalism,” I suggest that Schwartz (with respect to the On Liberty project) is rather close to Huang’s point of view, finding in Yan’s translations a more tenuous balance between individual and the larger society, canted more steeply in favour of the social group than Mill would have it, yet not primarily in favour of the ruling state. Though Yan’s balance sometimes tips toward the state (e.g. p. 154), his deviations from Mill are more often in the direction of a vaguely large-scale social group—guoqun國群(which is, wrongly I think, translated as “group and nation” [p. 206]. Grammatically guo, or country, modifies qun, society, meaning “a society within a country”—that is, more socially than nationally relevant). Yan uses the term guoqun even more vaguely to translate Mill’s “collective opinion” (perhaps in Yan’s view, though not Mill’s, the social component of a national entity) (p. 279). Consequently, I believe Schwartz’s view of Yan’s passion should not be represented as anything so simple as “nationalism,” though it properly stresses Yan’s primary concern with the claims of society alongside, or even supervening, the interests of the individual.Yan’s idea of “liberalism” owed part of its depth to his Western learning; but not all, or even the most important part. Huang’s treatment of this theme lasts throughout the book, being discussed under every major division. A summary would include a balanced relationship between individual and group, a fusion of Western and Chinese values underlying a modern worldview, a loathing for extremism (particularly as evinced in revolutionary movements), and a preference for gradual (evolutionary) progress. The “freedom” aspect was to be upheld by solid foundations in empirical as well as spiritual awareness, and the Chinese component of “Chinese liberalism” was an essential counterpart to Western scientific thought. In fact, “Chineseness” was best appreciated by having Western ideas around for comparison, for without the old learning, “the new learning will not be established on solid ground” (pp. 243, 245). The question of “freedom,” however, is not so optimistically framed in Yan’s thought. What Isaiah Berlin later termed “negative freedom” (immunities from pressure or persecution) and “positive freedom” (the encouragement to make the most of one’s abilities) are not well balanced in China, whether contemporary or earlier. “Positive freedom” facilitates (at worst) self-aggrandizement and (at best) powerful positions of social, economic or political leadership. No question, the positive variety has been stronger in modern China than the negative, which is perennially dismissed, by those in power, as culturally unsuitable. Yan Fu was able to finesse the issue by clinging to the possibility of conscientious, talented and learned élite leadership during China’s transitional journey to modern nationhood.1Benjamin I. Schwartz, In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1964), p. 169.524Book ReviewsWas Yan, by virtue of these qualities and convictions, an élitist? Certainly, if one adopts the usual measures. Yet his evaluation by later scholars is not so simple. He is praised as a scholar of the West who merged Western and Chinese ideas, a kind of intellectual middleman who saw the mutual relevance of the two cultures and strove to bring the best aspects of them together. He is celebrated as a gradualist who renounced revolution, and attacked as a conservative or “feudalist” for the same reason. Yet the academic Marxist Li Zehou李澤厚 believed that Yan was actually beyond conventional class categorization: though Yan was never a true progressive, he instead was an intellectual leader operating on a “totally new level” (zhanxin jieji 嶄新階級) who opened an authentic world of scientific and social thought to “generations of young Chinese patriots and revolutionaries.”2Finally, a word about the title of this rich and learned book: The Meaning of Freedom should be understood as the question of how “freedom” for the individual should be balanced against “freedom” for the collectivity—particularly but not exclusively the nation; this is presented repeatedly as the main axis of differentiation between Yan’s European sources and his own orientation toward a Confucian sense of social responsibility. And the subtitle, Yan Fu and the Origins of Chinese Liberalism refers to the ongoing debate within China, from Yan Fu’s day until the present, about how, and whether, Chinese moral values can be concerted with modernization to produce what might be called “liberalism with Chinese characteristics.”P hilip A. K uhnHarvard University2Li Zehou, “Lun Yan Fu 論嚴復” (On Yan Fu), in Li, Zhongguo jindai sixiang shilun 中國近代思想史論 (Historical Essays on Modern Chinese Thought) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe 人民出版社, 1982), p. 250.。

近代中国自由主义思潮研究综述作者：刘洋洋来源：《文存阅刊》2017年第18期摘要：近代中国自由主义是在输入西方自由主义的过程中逐渐建构起来的。

在20世纪上半叶的中国早期现代化进程中，曾造成了一定的声势和影响，它与激进主义、保守主义一起并成为近代中国三大文化思潮。

对近代中国自由主义的发展历程，基本观点和影响评析进行一个综述能够更好地帮助我们了解自由主义思潮，为我国社会主义民主政治建设、实现政治现代化以及当代中国的政治文明建设提供思路与借鉴意义。

关键词：近代中国；自由主义；思潮对于中国来讲，自由主义是从西方引入的，近代中国无论社会经济结构还是思想文化传统，都不具备自由主义自然而然产生的环境，因此，近代中国自由主义是在输入西方自由主义的过程中逐渐建构起来的。

虽然近代中国自由主义缺乏中国文化传统，并由于其自身理论的缺陷及受当时中国国情的限制，自由主义思潮在当时未取得主导地位，最后又归于沉寂，自由主义运动及其所践行的政治理想也终究宣告失败破产，但它对于中国思想界曾起过的重要启迪作用却是不能忽视的。

近代中国自由主义思潮丰富了中国的政治思想及政治文化，其自由主义知识分子给我们留下了丰富的思想遗产。

一、近代中国自由主义的发展历程中国学者对自由主义思潮的的开端持有两种说法：一种意见以胡伟希为代表。

他认为中国自由主义产生和兴起于戊戌维新时期，而严复则可以说是“中国自由主义之父”，“中国近代自由主义运动的真正开创者”。

二是五四新文化运动是中国近代自由主义高涨期，其突出表现是提倡个性解放的伦理、道德革命和白话文运动。

三是20世纪20年代末 30 年代初自由主义思潮从伦理、道德领域向政治领域渗透。

四是40 年代末中国自由主义者的政治活动空前活跃，他们提出“第三条道路”，力图超越国共两党和国际上美苏的对立。

[1]另一种意见认为中国自由主义思潮起源于五四新文化运动。

许纪霖认为：“如果追溯中国自由主义的起源，应该从五四算起。

在此之前，严复、梁启超也宣传介绍过西方的自由主义学理和思想，不过，自由主义对于他们而言，是一种救亡图存的权宜之计，而非终极性的价值追求。

作者： 卢兴
作者机构： 南开大学哲学院
出版物刊名： 哲学动态
页码： 23-30页
年卷期： 2015年 第3期
主题词： 严复;自由主义;自由;富强;国治主义
摘要：严复是中国近现代自由主义思想的先驱。

对于他的晚年，学界往往评判为“由激进转向保守”。

本文通过对严复的译介和著述的研究，将其自由主义思想归纳为“自由”、“富强”与“国治主义”三大主题。

严复自由主义思想是对英国古典自由主义的选择和消化，并具有强烈的民族情感和现实关切，其前后期思想虽有发展，但基本立场一以贯之。