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1、_____ means a general increase in prices and fall in the purchasing value of money.AInflation BDeception CIntention DComposition答案解析正确答案：A解析：本句翻译为：_____意味着价格的普遍上涨和货币购买力的下跌。
A通货膨胀，B欺骗，骗局，C意图，意向，D作文，作曲，只有A符合题意。
2、Utilitarianism（实用主义） is a very broad, imprecise _____ that covers a multitude of underlying theoretical positions.Acomposition Bconcept Cconverse Dcurrency答案解析正确答案：B解析：本句翻译为：实用主义是一个涵盖了许多潜在理论立场的非常宽泛的，不精确的_____。
A作文，作曲，创作，B概念，观念，C（动词）交谈，（形容词）相反的、逆向的，D货币，通用，只有B符合题意。
3、‘I was _____ by this person, and I want my money back.’ Mr Khudier said.Adivided Bobtained Ctransferred Ddeceived答案解析正确答案：D解析：本句翻译为：“我被这个人_____，我想要回我的钱。
” Khudier先生说。
A分割，划分，B获得，取得，C转换，变化，D欺骗，骗局，只有D 符合题意。
4、The Government is openly encouraging the _____ of one of our greatest public buildings into private hands.Ainflate Bcounter Ctransfer Dnominate答案解析正确答案：C解析：本句翻译为：政府正公开鼓励将我们最大的公共建筑之一_____给私人手中。
高一经济现象英语阅读理解30题1<背景文章>The market economy is an economic system in which decisions regarding production, distribution, and consumption are guided by the interactions of supply and demand. In a market economy, businesses and individuals are free to make their own economic decisions.One of the key characteristics of a market economy is the role of competition. Competition among businesses leads to lower prices, better quality products, and greater efficiency. When businesses compete, they are forced to find ways to produce goods and services more efficiently in order to lower costs and offer better prices to consumers.Another important aspect of a market economy is the price mechanism. Prices play a crucial role in allocating resources. When the demand for a particular good or service increases, its price tends to rise. This signals to producers that there is a greater need for that product, and they respond by increasing production. Conversely, when the demand for a product falls, its price drops, and producers reduce production.The market economy also promotes innovation. Businesses are constantly looking for new ways to improve their products and processes in order to gain a competitive edge. This leads to the development of newtechnologies and better ways of doing things.In addition, a market economy allows for a wide range of choices for consumers. With many businesses competing for their business, consumers have the opportunity to choose from a variety of products and services at different prices and quality levels.1. One of the key characteristics of a market economy is _______.A. government controlB. lack of competitionC. the role of competitionD. fixed prices答案：C。
第十四章14.1 What assumptions are being made when VaR is calculated using the historical simulation approach and 500 days of data?14.2 Show that when _ approaches 1, the weighting scheme in Section 14.3 approaches the basic historical simulation approach.14.3 Suppose we estimate the one-day 95% VaR (in millions of dollars) from 1,000 observations as 5. By fitting a standard distribution to the observations, the probability density function of the loss distribution at the 95% point is estimated to be 0.01. What is the standard error of the VaR estimate?14.4 The one-day 99% VaR is calculated in Section 14.1 as $253,385. Look at the underlying spreadsheets on the author’s website and calculate (a) the one-day 95% VaR and (b) the one-day 97% VaR.14.5 Use the spreadsheets on the author’s website to calculate a one-day 99% VaR, using the basic methodology in Section 14.1, if the portfolio in Section 14.1 is equally divided between the four indices.14.6 The “weighting-of-observations” procedure in Section 14.3 gives the one-day 99% VaR equal to $282,204 for the example considered. Use the spreadsheets on the author’s website to calculate the one-day 99% VaR when the _ parameter in this procedure is changed from 0.995 to 0.99.14.7 The “volatility-updating” procedure in Section 14.3 gives the one-day 99% VaR equal to $602,968 for the example considered. Use the spreadsheets on the author’s website to calculate the one-day 99% VaR when the _ parameter in this procedure is changed from 0.94 to 0.96.14.8 In the application of EVT in Section 14.6, what is the probability that the losswill exceed $400,000?14.9 In the application of EVT in Section 14.6, what is the one-day VaR with a confidence level of 97%?14.10 Change u from 160 to 150 in the application of EVT in Section 14.6. How does this change the maximum likelihood estimates of _ and ? How does it change theone-day 99% VaR when the confidence limit is (a) 99% and (b) 99.9%.14.11 Carry out an extreme value theory analysis on the data from the volatility updating procedure in Table 14.7 and on the author’s website. Use u = 400. What are the best fit values of _ and ? Calculate the one-day VaR with a 99% and 99.9% confidence level. What is the probability of a loss greater than $600,000?14.12 Suppose that a one-day 97.5% VaR is estimated as $13 million from 2,000 observations. The one-day changes are approximately normal with mean zero and standard deviation $6 million. Estimate a 99% confidence interval for the VaR estimate.14.13 Suppose that the portfolio considered in Section 14.1 has (in $000s) 3,000 in DJIA, 3,000 in FTSE, 1,000 in CAC 40, and 3,000 in Nikkei 225. Use the spreadsheet on the author’s website to calculate what difference this makes to(a) The one-day 99% VaR that is calculated in Section 14.1.(b) The one-day 99% VaR that is calculated using the weighting-ofobservations procedure in Section 14.3.(c) The one-day 99% VaR that is calculated using the volatility-updating procedure in Section 14.3.(d) The one-day 99% VaR that is calculated using extreme value theory in Section14.6.14.14 Investigate the effect of applying extreme value theory to the volatility adjusted results in Section 14.3 with u = 350.14.15 The “weighting-of-observations” procedure in Section 14.3 gives the one-day 99% VaR equal to $282,204. Use the spreadsheets on the author’s website to calculate the one-day 99% VaR when the _ parameter in this procedure is changed from 0.995 to 0.985.14.16 The “volatility-updating” procedure in Section 14.3 gives the one-day 99% VaR equal to $602,968. Use the spreadsheets on the author’s website to calculate the one-day 99% VaR when the _ parameter in this procedure is changed from 0.94 to 0.92.14.17 Values for the NASDAQ composite index during the 1,500 days preceding March 10, 2006, can be downloaded from the author’s website. Calculate the one-day 99% VaR on March 10, 2006, for a $10 million portfolio invested in the index using(a) The basic historical simulation approach.(b) The exponential weighting scheme in Section 14.3 with _ = 0.995.(c) The volatility-updating procedure in Section 14.3 with _ = 0.94. (Assume that the volatility is initially equal to the standard deviation of daily returns calculated from the whole sample.)(d) Extreme value theory with u = 300.(e) A model where daily returns are assumed to be normally distributed. (Use both an equally weighted and the EWMA approach with _ = 0.94 to estimate the standard deviation of daily returns.) Discuss the reasons for the differences between the results you get.。
题目：信息不对称中超预期业绩的影响关键词：信息不对称超预期业绩投资者认知假说作者：Stephen Brown；Stephen A. Hillegeist；Kin Lo摘要：我们研究在信息不对称的情况下，改变超预期业绩的影响。
我们假设和发现了与那些迎合分析师预期收益的公司相比较，在信息不对称较低的情况下，将会出现正的超预期业绩（信息不对称的较高情况下，出现负的超预期业绩。
）当业绩预期的结果与资本市场上的投资者的预测相似时，超预期业绩与信息不对称有很强的关联性。
在估量这些变化的时候，我们发现减少的搜集信息活动是在正的超预期业绩时减少信息不对称最重要的因素；对于负的超预期业绩，减少不知情交易对于增加信息不对称起到重要作用。
一、引言：以前的研究认为，盈余标准，类似与分析师预期，在资本市场中起着重要的作用。
以前的研究认为，投资者认为通过操纵当期盈余预测的错误迎合或者超越预期盈利标准增加股票溢价。
与投资者关注的盈余水平一致，Graham et al的调查结果显示，80%的财务经理反映他们会通过减值行为去迎合或者超出市场预期。
除了盈余标准对投资者的重要性，很少的论证证明当超过他们的价格预期和短期交易行为反应时其（盈余标准）是怎么样影响投资者的决策。
特别是很少有研究超预期业绩影响资本市场投资行为和超出预测盈利的交易行为。
弄清楚超预期业绩如何影响投资者的长期投资是很重要的，因为其揭示了投资者如何选择股票和他们信息搜集中的主要关注点。
我们在信息不对称的情况下（了解情况的和不了解情况的投资者之间）研究超预期业绩的影响。
掌握信息的投资者有机会提供信息和利用他们掌握的信息与没有掌握信息的投资者进行交易。
（流动投资者，散户使用一般市场信息作为投资基础。
）我们主要使用的利用个人信息进行交易的风险主要变量是知情交易的可能性，PIN，通过使用Easley的模型进行描述。
我们使用买卖价差作为另外的信息不对称的变量。
我们用“Beat，Meat和Miss”分别表示与盈利预期超过，相符和不符的公司。
有效市场假说专业英语小作文The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) is a theory that suggests that financial markets are "informationally efficient," meaning that asset prices reflect all available information. This theory has significant implications for investors, as it suggests that it is impossible to consistently "beat the market" by exploiting mispricings in securities.There are three forms of the EMH: weak, semi-strong, and strong. The weak form asserts that all past market prices and data are already reflected in stock prices, making it impossible to predict future price movements based on historical data. The semi-strong form states that all publicly available information is already reflected in stock prices, making it impossible to achieve abnormal returns by trading on public information. The strong form suggests that all information, public and private, is reflected in stock prices, making it impossible to achieve abnormal returns even with insider information.The implications of the EMH are significant for both individual and institutional investors. If markets areindeed efficient, then it is impossible to consistently outperform the market through stock selection or market timing. This challenges the active management approach to investing, which relies on the belief that skilled managers can outperform the market through their stock-picking and market-timing abilities.Instead, the EMH suggests that investors should adopt a passive investment strategy, such as investing in index funds or exchange-traded funds (ETFs) that track the performance of a broad market index. This approach aims to replicate the market return rather than attempt to outperform it, and it often comes with lower fees and expenses compared to actively managed funds.Despite its theoretical appeal, the EMH has been subject to criticism and debate. Critics argue that the assumption of "informational efficiency" does not hold in the real world, as there are instances of market anomalies and bubbles that cannot be explained by the EMH. Additionally, the presence of behavioral biases and irrational investor behavior suggests that markets may not always be efficient in processing information.In conclusion, the Efficient Market Hypothesis is a fundamental concept in finance that has significant implications for investment strategy. While it suggeststhat it is difficult to consistently outperform the market, it has also sparked debate and criticism regarding its assumptions and real-world applicability.有效市场假说（EMH）是一种理论，它表明金融市场是“信息效率的”，这意味着资产价格反映了所有可用信息。
关于经济规律的重要论述英语1. The law of supply and demand determines price levels in an economy.供求关系决定了经济中的价格水平。
2. Competition is a necessary and beneficial aspect of free markets.竞争是自由市场的必要且有益的方面。
3. The law of diminishing returns states that as more resources are allocated to a particular activity, the marginal output decreases.递减收益法则指出，当更多资源被分配给特定活动时，边际产出会减少。
4. The law of comparative advantage suggests that countries should specialize in producing goods and services that they have a lower opportunity cost in producing.比较优势法则认为，国家应专注于生产其生产机会成本较低的商品和服务。
5. Inflation is caused by an increase in the money supply relative to the amount of goods and services available in an economy.通货膨胀是由货币供应相对于经济中可用的商品和服务量增加而引起的。
6. The law of diminishing marginal utility states that each additional unit of a good or service provides less satisfaction or utility to a consumer.边际效用递减法则指出，每增加一单位的商品或服务对消费者提供的满足感或效用减少。
政治经济学名词英文解释导论：1.Production of Material Goods：The production of material goods is the basis of the existence and development of human society.2.Productive Forces and Productive Relations：Productive relations are determined by productive forces. The development of productive relations is determined by the development of productive forces.第二章商品与货币modities:商品The products of labor used for exchanging.商品是用来交换的劳动产品。
e-Value: 使用价值A commodity is a thing that by its properties satisfies human wants of some sort or another.物品的这种能够满足人们某种需要的属性，（即物的有用性，就是物品的使用价值。
）The natural property of commodities.使用价值是商品的自然属性。
3.Exchange Value:交换价值Presents itself as a quantitative relation, as the proportion inwhich values in use（use-value）of one sort are exchanged for those of another sort.（交换价值首先）表现为一种量的关系，也表现为使用价值同另一种使用价值相交换的量的比例。
Chapter17Macroeconomic and industry Analysis1. A top down analysis of a firm starts with ____________.D. the global economy2. An example of a highly cyclical industry is ________.A. the automobile industry3. Demand-side economics is concerned with _______.A. government spending and tax levelsB. monetary policyC. fiscal policyE. A, B, and C4. The most widely used monetary tool is ___________.C. open market operations5. The "real", or inflation-adjusted, exchange rate, isC. the purchasing power ratio.6. The "normal" range of price-earnings ratios for the S&P 500 Index isD. between 12 and 257. Monetary policy is determined byC. the board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.8. A trough is ________.B. a transition from a contraction in the business cycle to the start of an expansion9. A peak is ________.A. a transition from an expansion in the business cycle to the start of a contraction10. If the economy is growing, firms with high operating leverage will experience __________.A. higher increases in profits than firms with low operating leverage.11. If the economy is shrinking, firms with high operating leverage will experience __________.A. higher decreases in profits than firms with low operating leverage.12. If the economy is growing, firms with low operating leverage will experience __________.C. smaller increases in profits than firms with high operating leverage.13. If the economy is shrinking, firms with low operating leverage will experience__________.C. smaller decreases in profits than firms with high operating leverage.14. Industrial production refers to _________.C. the total manufacturing output in the economy.15. GDP refers to _________.D. the total production of goods and services in the economy16. A rapidly growing GDP indicates a(n) ______ economy with ______ opportunity for a firm to increase sales.D. expanding; ample17. A declining GDP indicates a(n) ______ economy with ______ opportunity for a firm to increase sales.A. stagnant; little18. The average duration of unemployment and changes in the consumer price index for services are _________.C. lagging economic indicators19. A firm in an industry that is very sensitive to the business cycle will likely have a stock beta ___________.A. greater than 1.020. If the economy were going into a recession, an attractive industry to invest in would be the ________ industry.B. medical services21. The stock price index and contracts and new orders for nondefense capital goods areA. leading economic indicators.22. A firm in the early stages of the industry life cycle will likely have ________.B. high risk.C. rapid growthE. B and C23. Assume the U.S. government was to decide to increase the budget deficit. This action will most likely cause __________ to increaseA. interest ratesB. government borrowingD. both A and B24. Assume the U.S. government was to decide to decrease the budget deficit. This action will most likely cause __________ to decreaseA. interest ratesB. government borrowingD. both A and B25. Assume that the Federal Reserve decreases the money supply. This action will cause________ to decrease.C. investment in the economy26. If the currency of your country is depreciating, the result should be to ______ exports and to _______ imports.B. stimulate, discourage27. If the currency of your country is appreciating, the result should be to ______ exports and to _______ imports.C. discourage, stimulate28. Increases in the money supply will cause demand for investment and consumption goods to _______ in the short run and cause prices to ________ in the long run.A. increase, increase29. The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS)A. are for firms that operate in the NAFTA region.B. group firms by industry.D. A and B.30. If interest rates increase, business investment expenditures are likely to ______ and consumer durable expenditures are likely to _________.D. decrease, decrease31. Fiscal policy generally has a _______ direct impact than monetary policy on the economy, and the formulation and implementation of fiscal policy is ______ than that of monetary policy.B. more, slower32. Fiscal policy is difficult to implement quickly becauseA. it requires political negotiations.B. much of government spending is nondiscretionary and cannot be changed.D. A and B.33. InflationA. is the rate at which the general level of prices is increasing.B. rates are high when the economy is considered to be "overheated".D. A and B.Two firms, A and B, both produce widgets. The price of widgets is $1 each. Firm A has total fixed costs of $500,000 and variable costs of 50 cents per widget. Firm B has total fixed costs of $240,000 and variable costs of 75 cents per widget. The corporate tax rate is 40%. If the economy is strong, each firm will sell 1,200,000 widgets. If the economy enters a recession, each firm will sell 1,100,000 widgets.34. If the economy enters a recession, the after-tax profit of Firm A will be ________.C. $30,00035. If the economy enters a recession, the after-tax profit of Firm B will be _______.E. none of the above36. If the economy is strong, the after-tax profit of Firm A will be _______.D. $60,00037. If the economy is strong, the after-tax profit of Firm B will be __________.C. $36,00038. Calculate firm A's degree of operating leverage.A. 11.039. Calculate firm B's degree of operating leverage.C. 29.8640. Classifying firms into groups, such as _________ provides an alternative to the industry life cycle.A. slow-growersB. stalwartsD. A and B41. Supply-side economists wishing to stimulate the economy are most likely to recommendD. a decrease in the tax rate.42. Which of the following are not examples of defensive industries?B. durable goods producers.43. Which of the following are examples of defensive industries?A. food producers.C. pharmaceutical firms.D. public utilitiesE. A, C and D44. ________ is a proposition that a strong proponent of supply side economics would most likely stress.B. Higher marginal tax rates promote economic inefficiency and thereby retard aggregate output as they encourage investors to undertake low productivity projects with substantial tax shelter benefits45. The industry life cycle is described by which of the following stage(s)?A. start-up.B. consolidation.D. A and B.46. In the start-up stage of the industry life cycleA. it is difficult to predict which firms will succeed and which firms will fail.B. industry growth is very rapid.D. A and B.47. In the consolidation stage of the industry life-cycleC. the performance of firms will more closely track the performance of the overall industry.48. In the maturity stage of the industry life cycleA. the product has reached full potential.B. profit margins are narrower.C. producers are forced to compete on price to a greater extent.E. A, B, and C.49. In the decline stage of the industry life cycleA. the product may have reached obsolescence.B. the industry will grow at a rate less than the overall economy.C. the industry may experience negative growth.E. A, B, and C.50. A variety of factors relating to industry structure affect the performance of the firm, includingA. threat of entry.B. rivalry between existing competitors.E. A and B.51. The process of estimating the dividends and earnings that can be expected from the firm based on determinants of value is calledD. fundamental analysis.52. The emerging market exhibiting the highest growth in real GDP in 2007 wasA. China53. The emerging stock market exhibiting the highest U.S. dollar return in 2007 wasA. China54. The life cycle stage in which industry leaders are likely to emerge is theC. consolidation stage.55. Investment manager Peter Lynch refers to firms that are in bankruptcy or soon might be asE. turnarounds.56. A top-down analysis of a firm's prospects starts withD. an assessment of the broad economic environment.57. Over the period 1999-2006, which of the following countries had a change in its real exchange rate that was favorable for U.S. consumers who want to buy its goods?E. Japan58. Over the period 1999-2006, which of the following countries had a change in its real exchange rate that was most unfavorable for U.S. consumers who want to buy its goods?A. Canada59. In recent years, P/E multiples haveB. risen dramatically.60. In recent years, P/E multiples for S&P 500 companies haveD. ranged from 12 to 25.61. The industry with the highest ROE in 2007 wasD. iron/steel.62. The industry with the lowest ROE in 2007 wasE. airlines.63. The industry with the lowest return in 2007 wasA. home construction.64. The industry with the highest return in 2007 wasB. oil equipment.65. Investors can ______ invest in an industry with the highest expected return by purchasing ______.B. not; industry-specific iShares66. Which of the following are key economic statistics that are used to describe the state of the macroeconomy?I) gross domestic productII) the unemployment rateIII) inflationIV) consumer sentimentV) the budget deficitE. I, II, III, IV, and V67. An example of a positive demand shock isE. a decrease in tax rates.68. An example of a negative demand shock isA. a decrease in the money supply.B. a decrease in government spending.E. A and B.69. During which stage of the industry life cycle would a firm experience stable growth in sales?A. Consolidation70. The emerging stock market exhibiting the highest local currency return in 2007 wasB. ChinaE. China71. Sector rotationC. is shifting the portfolio more heavily toward an industry or sector that is expected to perform well in the future.72. According to Michael Porter, there are five determinants of competition. An example of _____ is when new entrants to an industry our pressure on prices and profits.A. Threat of Entry73. According to Michael Porter, there are five determinants of competition. An example of _____ is when competitors seek to expand their share of the market.B. Rivalry between Existing Competitors74. According to Michael Porter, there are five determinants of competition. An example of _____ is when the availability limits the prices that can be charged to customers.C. Pressure from Substitute Products75. According to Michael Porter, there are five determinants of competition. An example of _____ is when a buyer purchases a large fraction of an industry's output and can demand price concessions.D. Bargaining power of Buyers76. Assume the U.S. government was to decide to increase the budget deficit. This action will most likely cause __________ to increaseA. interest ratesB. government borrowingD. both A and B77. If interest rates decrease, business investment expenditures are likely to ______ and consumer durable expenditures are likely to _________.A. increase, increase78. An example of a defensive industry is ________.B. the tobacco industryC. the food industryE. B and CTwo firms, C and D, both produce coat hangers. The price of coat hangers is $1.20 each. Firm C has total fixed costs of $750,000 and variable costs of 30 cents per widget. Firm D has total fixed costs of $400,000 and variable costs of 50 cents per widget. The corporate tax rate is 40%. If the economy is strong, each firm will sell 2,000,000 widgets. If the economy enters a recession, each firm will sell 1,400,000 widgets.79. If the economy enters a recession, the total revenue of Firm C will be ________.A. $1,680,00080. If the economy enters a recession, the total cost of Firm C will be ________.B. $1,170,00081. If the economy enters a recession, the before tax profit of Firm C will be ________.C. $510,00082. If the economy enters a recession, the tax of Firm C will be ________.D. $204,00083. If the economy enters a recession, the after tax profit of Firm C will be ________.E. $306,00084. If the economy is strong, the total revenue of Firm C will be ________.D. $2,400,00085. If the economy is strong, the total cost of Firm C will be ________.C. $1,305,00086. If the economy is strong, the before tax profit of Firm C will be ________.B. $1,050,00087. If the economy is strong, the tax of Firm C will be ________.A. $420,00088. If the economy is strong, the after-tax profit of Firm C will be _______.E. $630,00089. If a firm's sales decrease by 15% and profits decrease by 20% during a recession, the firms operating leverage is ____________?A. 1.33Short Answer Questions90. Discuss the tools of the U.S. government's "demand-side" policy. Include in your discussion of these tools the relative advantages and disadvantages of each in terms of the effect of the use of these tools on the economy.The two tools of the government's "demand-side" policy are fiscal and monetary policy. Fiscal policy is the use of government spending and taxing for the specific purpose of stabilizing the economy. Fiscal policy, once enacted, has the most direct and immediate effect on the economy. However, the formulation and implementation of fiscal policy is extremely slow, as such policy must be approved by both the legislative and executive branches of the federal government. Monetary policy consists of actions taken by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRS) to influence the money supply and/or interest rates. Monetary policy is relatively easy to formulate and to implement, but has less direct impact on the economy than fiscal policy. The most widely used tool of the FRS is the open market operations, in which the Fed buys or sells bonds for the Fed's account. Buying securities increases the money supply; selling securities decreases the money supply. Open market operations occur daily. Other FRS tools include adjusting the discount rate, which is the interest rate the Fed charges banks onshort-term loans, and altering reserve requirements, which are the fraction of deposits that banks must maintain in cash deposits with the Fed. Reductions in the money supply signal an expansionary monetary policy; lowering reserve requirements increase the money supply, and thus, stimulate the economy. The Fed walks a fine line: expansionary monetary policy probably will lower interest rates and stimulate investment and consumption in the short run, but ultimately inflation probably will result.Feedback: The rationale of this question is to ascertain whether the student has an understanding of the basic principles of macroeconomics.91. Discuss the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)'s indexes of economic indicators, and how each of the categories of these indicators might be used by the securities' analyst.The NBER has developed a set of cyclical indicators to help forecast, measure, and interpret short-term fluctuations in economic activity. The leading economic indicators are those that tend to increase or decrease in advance of the rest of the economy. These indicators are used to forecast the state of the economy for the coming period (usually one year). Coincident economic indicators move in tandem with the broad economy, and are used to confirm (or disconfirm) an earlier economic prediction. Lagging economic indicators are those that move after the broad economy, and are used to identify the end of a stage of the business cycle (such as a trough) and as an indication that another stage of business cycle (such as the expansion) is about to begin. The S&P 500 stock index is an excellent leading economic indicator, as would be expected by market efficiency proponents. However, if the stock market anticipates general economic trends, the task of the fundamentalist using economic forecasts to identify attractive industries (and thus stocks) for the future becomes even more impossible.Feedback: The purpose of this question is to ascertain the student's understanding of the widely quoted economic indicators and the usefulness (and lack thereof) in securities' analysis.92. Discuss the industry life cycle, how this concept can be used by security analysts, and the limitations of this concept for security analysis.The industry life cycle may be defined by the following stages: start up (rapid and increasing growth), consolidation (sable growth), maturity (slowing growth), and relative decline (minimal or negative growth). Investors interested in identifying new, and presumably ultimately successful, industries will use this technique, trying to get in on the "ground floor". In the start up stage, no historical data is present; thus, one cannot identify potentially successful firms. However, typically, all of the firms are selling at low prices and the investor will "diversify across the industry" by buying many different stocks in the industry. If the industry becomes successful, the surviving firms will appreciate substantially in value; the non-surviving firms will be written off as losses. Typically, in this stage, firms are paying little or no dividends. Investment in this stage is for the risk-tolerant investor. As the industry moves from the start up to the consolidation stage, firms begin paying or increasing dividends; the surviving firms become more successful, begin to enjoy economies of scale, and are moving up the learning curve in terms of cost efficiency. In the maturity stage, the growth has slowed and dividends may have increased; less risk is involved. By the relative decline stage, the firm has no new exciting capital budgeting projects and may have become an "income stock", by paying out a higher than average level of dividends. At this stage, the stock may be attractive for the risk-averse retiree interested in dividend income. However, the stock must be watched carefully in this stage, as this industry may be dying (buggy whips). However, over the industry life cycle, the clientele for the firms' stocks have changed, from the risk-tolerant to the risk averse.The problem with using this concept for investment purposes is identifying where the industry is in the industry life cycle. In addition, all industries do not move through the cycle in the same fashion. In fact, the goal is to avoid the relative decline stage.Feedback: The purpose of this question is to ascertain whether the student understands the industry life cycle, how the concept can be used by investors, and the limitations of the concept for investors.93. Discuss the ways in which the global economy might have an effect on a firm whose headquarters are in Montana. Be specific - cite some of the relevant factors that should be considered.A firm that operates from Montana cannot ignore the global economy. The firm may make sales to other countries, employ people from other countries, and invest in other countries. It may face price competition from similar firms abroad, be subject to wages that are different from those paid by foreign firms, and management may have less power to do what it wants due to labor unions. Exports of its products and imports will be influenced by the global economy. Interest rates in other countries will determine part of the return on the firm's investments. Exchange rates pose an additional risk if the company wants to repatriate its earnings. Countries' political and economic policies should be considered, with some being more predictable than others. Global markets have some linkages, but there are significant variations in performance among countries.Feedback: This question emphasizes the importance of the global economy, which should not be ignored when doing a macroeconomic analysis.94. List and discuss three of the five determinants of competition suggested in Porter's 1985 study.The determinants are: the threat of entry from new competitors, rivalry between existing competitors, price pressure from substitute products, the bargaining power of buyers, and the bargaining power of suppliers. Each of these is discussed below.Threat of entry from new competitors - If there are high profit margins in the industry, new competitors will be likely to enter. There may be some barriers to entry that existing firms can establish to discourage this. Possible barriers include longstanding relationships with suppliers and buyers, proprietary knowledge or patents, brand loyalty, and experience in the market. Rivalry between existing competitors - This could lead to price competition and lower profit margins. Expansion of one firm cuts into the rivals' market shares. Firms with homogeneous products face price pressure because they are unable to differentiate their products from their competitors' products. High fixed costs might force a company to operate at close to full capacity.Price pressure from substitute products - If firms in related industries produce similar products, the firm may not be able to charge as much for its product. Some examples are carbonated beverages and fruit drinks, paint and wallpaper, and movies and videos. Many other examples may be offered.Bargaining power of buyers - Buyers might have bargaining power if they purchase a substantial proportion of the firm's output. The firm might have to settle for accepting a lower price for its products. The automobile industry is an example given in the textbook. Bargaining power of suppliers - If the firm depends on a supplier to provide much of its inputs, the supplier might demand a higher price. This is especially true if there are no easily available alternative suppliers. Labor unions are cited as an example.Feedback: This question tests the student's understanding of the relationships among industry structure, competitive strategy, and profitability.。
The Causal Effect of Market Priming on Trust:An Experimental Investigation Using Randomized Control Omar Al-Ubaydli1,2,3,4,Daniel Houser2,3,John Nye4,5,Maria Pia Paganelli6,Xiaofei Sophia Pan7*1Research Department,Bahrain Center for Strategic,International and Energy Studies,Awali,Bahrain,2Department of Economics,George Mason University,Fairfax, Virginia,United States of America,3Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Sciences,George Mason University,Fairfax,Virginia,United States of America,4Mercatus Center,George Mason University,Arlington,Virginia,United States of America,5International Laboratory for Institutional Analysis of Economic Reforms,National Research University,Higher School of Economics,Moscow,Russia,6Department of Economics,Trinity University,San Antonio,Texas,United States of America, 7Department of Economics,Harvard University,Cambridge,Massachusetts,United States of AmericaAbstractWe report data from laboratory experiments where participants were primed using phrases related to markets and trade.Participants then participated in trust games with anonymous strangers.The decisions of primed participants are compared to those of a control group.We find evidence that priming for market participation affects positively the beliefs regarding the trustworthiness of anonymous strangers and increases trusting decisions.Citation:Al-Ubaydli O,Houser D,Nye J,Paganelli MP,Pan XS(2013)The Causal Effect of Market Priming on Trust:An Experimental Investigation Using Randomized Control.PLoS ONE8(3):e55968.doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055968Editor:Frank Krueger,George Mason University/Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study,United States of AmericaReceived June8,2012;Accepted January4,2013;Published March5,2013Copyright:ß2013Al-Ubaydli et al.This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License,which permits unrestricted use,distribution,and reproduction in any medium,provided the original author and source are credited.Funding:These authors have no support or funding to report.Competing Interests:The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.*E-mail:xpan@IntroductionWe report data from a laboratory experiment that suggests participation in markets causes trusting behavior to increase.We say that trust is present when one party(the sender)places resources at the disposal of another party(responder)under the expectation that this will increase the sender’s payoff,and in the absence of any enforceable commitment by the responder.An essential feature of trust is that the sender is vulnerable in a way that is not captured entirely by probabilistic risk[1].An additional feature of trust is that an absence of trust where trust could be present constitutes social inefficiency,i.e.,society leaving resources on the table.The positive effects of trust on economic growth have been well documented[2-5],while the effect of formal institutions–including markets–on trust has generated less consistent findings.In his investigation of the effect of markets and competitiveness on morality,Chen[6]highlights the diverse views in the literature:on the one hand,commerce leads to more gentle manners[7],it cordializes mankind[8],and enhances man’s virtues[9-11].On the other hand,some suggest the competitive instinct degrades judgment[12]and undermines society’s moral foundations[13].Additionally,markets may hurt altruism and cooperation[14]and formal institutions,such as markets,can have adverse effects on informal institutions and social norms[15-17]. Existing empirical research has not resolved these contradic-tions.Henrich et al.’s[18-20]study of small-scale societies suggests that exposure to markets increases the strength of other-regarding preferences yet has little effect on cooperation.In other laboratory studies,Herrmann et al.[21]find that cooperation is enhanced by exposure to markets,yet Reeson and Tisdell[22]find the opposite. Using macroeconomic data,Zak and Knack[3]find a strong relationship between the incidence of markets/formal institutions and generalized trust across countries.One reason for these conflicting results may be that,in most empirical studies,exposure to markets or other formal institutions is endogenous to the environment rather than randomly and exogenously assigned by the investigator[3].Consequently,the effect of markets on pro-social behaviors such as trust is extremely difficult to infer from naturally occurring data.To circumvent endogeneity problems we employ a laboratory experiment with randomized control.Our design consists of randomly priming participants,without their awareness,to think about markets.Following this they participate in a trust game[23]. We find a positive effect of market-priming on the amount sent by senders to anonymous partners.Further,using a Cox decompo-sition[24]we offer evidence that this increase is a consequence of increased trust rather than an increase in altruistic generosity. This is the first study,to the best of our knowledge,that measures the effect of priming markets on trust,and the first study that deploys randomized control in an effort to understand the relationship between markets and trust(one related paper is[22], which looked at the relationship between markets and cooperation in a public goods game without using priming methods).North[5]argues that the proliferation of formal institutions in modern economic history helped move society from narrowly personal to more broadly anonymous exchange and thereby helped launch the remarkable economic growth we have witnessed since the18th century.As institutions improved,generalized trust in commerce can arise as a byproduct of clear formal rules,greater economic and political competition,and enhanced enforcement. Our results suggest an indirect mechanism that may reinforce direct institutional effects.In particular,the presence of decen-tralized market institutions may promote trust over time by providing repeated opportunities to experience benefits from interactions with strangers.BackgroundThe Simplified Trust GameConsider the simplified trust game (henceforth STG)shown in Figure 1,which is played with an anonymous partner.The sender starts with $8and can choose to send $0,$2,$4or $6to the responder.Any amount sent is tripled.Upon observing the sender’s choice,the responder chooses how much of the tripled amount to return to the sender,keeping the rest for herself.In the trust game,the standard assumption is that players are selfish earnings maximizers,and that this is common knowledge.The unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE)is socially inefficient:the responder should return nothing,and thus the sender should send nothing.Note that in the STG,the determinant of social efficiency is trust:the amount that the sender sends;and the larger the amount sent,the higher the efficiency.Trustworthiness (the amount returned by the respond-er)merely determines the distribution of the economic pie conditional upon its size.Perceptions of trustworthiness do have an indirect effect on efficiency via their effect on the likelihood of trust,which is captured by the SPNE argument.However,conditional on a certain level of trust,variation in trustworthiness has no impact upon efficiency.Data from experiments are regularly inconsistent with the predictions of zero trust (thus minimal efficiency)[23]:senders on average send about half of their endowment and responders return about that amount back,with the absolute amount returned by responders increasing in the amount received from the senders.Consequently,social efficiency is greater than predicted by the SPNE.This has led economists to consider alternative assumptions about human preferences.One class of alternatives allows for other-regarding preferences.The most basic is pure altruism whereby players explicitly care about each other’s welfare,or impure altruism [25],where players take direct pleasure from theact of giving.Other models assume that players have a distaste for inequity [26],that they seek to reciprocate kind actions with rewards and unkind actions with punishments [27-28],or that people like to signal altruism to themselves and others [29],[30].The other alternatives model players as possessing limited cognitive abilities.This leads to behavior being sensitive to payoff-irrelevant features of the environment,such as the wording of instructions [31].Priming research has generated important insights in the study of the effects of cognitive limitations.Priming ResearchSocial psychology research has established that the mental representation of a phenomenon can have an effect on behavior outside the context of that phenomenon.An example would be someone unconsciously walking slowly after watching a commer-cial about elderly people;in this case,the mental representation of elderly people contains the observation that elderly people tend to walk slowly,and this then affects the person’s walking speed.An important driver of these behavioral effects of mental representations is that people have limited cognitive abilities.This prevents them from always accessing the most relevant mental representations required for a task or decision,and it means that mental representations that have been recently or chronically accessed have an effect on behavior even if they are not directly relevant.This effect can be thought of as a spillover effect of the mental representation.In the walking example above,the commercial increased the accessibility of the mental representation of elderly people and it had an effect on walking speed despite its irrelevance to what we would normally regard as the determinants of walking speed,such as how quickly the person feels that they need to walk and their physical capabilities.Formally,the effect of a mental representation M on decision D is mediated by the accessibility of M at the time in which decision D is being made.When completely inaccessible,the effect is zero;as the level of accessibility increases,so too does the size of the effect.Social psychologists have developed techniques for manip-ulating the accessibility of a mental representation,allowing them to estimate the effect of the mental representation on a decision.Consider the following simple model adapted from [32].Let d be an action choice,such as the choice of food at a restaurant.An individual has a mental representation M with accessibility a [½0,1 .M may be irrelevant in the sense that the individual would not consciously choose to access it when choosing d .Let d 0denote the individual’s preferred choice when M is completely inaccessible,a ~0,and let d M denote the individual’s preferred choice when M is maximally accessible,a ~1.The individual chooses d to maximize:U ~{(1{a )(d {d 0)2{a (d {d M )2The individual will therefore choose d Ã~(1{a )d 0z ad M .The researcher wants to estimate the effect of the mental representa-tion,d M {d 0.If the researcher can manipulate a ,then she can estimate L d Ã=L a ~d M {d 0.Priming research is the study of techniques for varying a and the effects of varying a .a is considered to have some steady-state value a ;if a w 0then M is chronically accessible,e.g.,someone who works in a hospital has mental representations of health-related issues accessible throughout the day (including outside work;see [33]).The researcher can increase a by e w 0using a variety of methods,including the word-rearrangement tasks which we use in our experimentsbelow.Figure 1.Simplified trust game;player 1=Sender,player 2=Responder.doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055968.g001Upon estimating the causal effect of a mental representation,a follow-up question is:what determines the mental representation? This is the focus of the large literature on stereotyping(see for example[34]).Mental representations are shaped by an individ-ual’s experiences.Thus,for example,an individual’s mental representation of soccer is based upon her own experiences with soccer.Initially,she might experience soccer primarily through playing it and so,if she enjoys playing soccer,her mental representation should be a positive one.Should she subsequently have a sequence of negative experiences,such as incurring painful injuries while playing,this will render her mental representation of soccer more negative.We now use this model linking the experiences that form M,the accessibility of M and the decision D to analyze the relationship between markets and trust.Application to Markets and TrustWhat is the effect of the mental representation of markets on the decisions to trust and to be trustworthy?The exposure of people to markets,primarily through participating in markets,generates a mental representation of markets.This mental representation may be chronically accessible depending on the frequency of an individual’s interaction with markets.Circumstantial factors may make it temporarily more accessible at any given point in time, yielding a gross accessibility of the mental representation(for further discussion see[33]).At various junctures,an individual may find herself needing to make a trust or trustworthiness decision.If the mental represen-tation of markets is accessible,then this decision may be affected. Existing theoretical and empirical evidence allows us to speculate about the sign of the effect,though due in part to an absence of randomized control,the literature is nowhere near consensus.Our hypotheses are derived primarily from the following two observa-tions.Observation1.Economic interactions with strangers in the absence of markets might be dangerous and should be avoided. Economic interactions in the absence of markets typically require some degree of trust.Throughout most of our evolutionary history,interactions with strangers have been fraught with danger and exploitation[20],hence strangers are generally unworthy of the trust required for an economic interaction.On the other hand, economic interactions in markets can generate positive outcome and positive experiences for all parties.Individuals come to associate reciprocal benefits to market transactions,and be more willing to trust and being trustworthy in market exchanges. Observation2.Where the rule of law is enforced,markets interactions do not require a high level of personal trust.The threat of third-party punishment should a trader breach the terms of a contract significantly decreases the risk and vulnerability otherwise associated with engaging in an economic transaction [5].This greatly facilitates the creation of economic surplus through exchange.For this reason,markets create a substantial upside to interacting with strangers(beyond any existing upside, e.g.,some people enjoy meeting new people).Naturally,even in the presence of markets,individuals may choose to trade with people they know and to avoid strangers even if markets afford them some protection from those strangers. However economic surplus is often highest when the parties interacting differ in their preferences/endowments and when the parties have the opportunity to specialize in production.The heterogeneity and specialization required for the generation of economic surplus typically lie outside the radius of personal acquaintances.Thus we would expect to see a positive association between market proliferation and interactions with anonymous strangers.This is in fact what Henrich et al.[35]find in their study of market participation in primitive societies.Combining these two observations with humans’cognitive limitations allows us to propose a mechanism linking markets and trust.The limits of cognition prevent mental representations from encoding all the relevant game-theoretic considerations of a situation,including credible threats of punishment for breaching a contract.Plausibly,an individual with a history of market-mediated economic interactions with strangers would(potentially incorrectly)assign some of the desirable behavior of trading partners to increased trustworthiness of those trading partners rather than a rational desire to avoid breach-of-contract-punish-ment by those partners.Thus our main hypothesis is that market participation increases trust and trustworthiness.An additional factor that reinforces this mechanism is that compared to the counterfactual of not participating in a particular market,market participation is generally a positive experience for all parties.Ultimately,this derives from the fact that all the parties in a trade have veto power:if any party felt as if they were not benefiting from the exchange,then they would simply not participate.(For goods and services where some aspects of the satisfaction from consumption are hidden from the buyer at the point of purchase,e.g.,when buying a used car,there is certainly room for a negative experience.However there a variety of tools at the consumer’s disposal that ensure that such episodes are the exception rather than the norm,such as consumer reviews, reputational concerns of the seller,the ability to return unsatis-factory goods and so on.Moreover the purchaser always has a veto right suggesting that on average,one does not enter such trades without a reasonable expectation of a positive outcome,an expectation likely built upon a history of positive outcomes in similar trades.).Experimental StrategyOur manipulation derives from the priming literature([36];see [32]for an example from the economics literature).We lead participants in some treatments to think about markets and trade. Immediately following this,we ask them to play a STG involving an anonymous stranger.We compare the behavior of treated individuals with that of a control group that did not experience such priming.This allows us to gather evidence on the effect of markets on the beliefs about anonymous strangers.If the market-primed group trusts more,then this supports our main hypothesis that markets have a positive effect on trust.We chose not to measure beliefs directly for several reasons. First,and most importantly,priming effects can evaporate quickly [36],and inserting a belief-elicitation task between the priming and the main task risked attenuating the treatment effect.Second, we were concerned by the possibility of participants hedging against their decisions rather than stating their true beliefs(under incentivized beliefs).The combination of our two experiments in this study helps us gather evidence on expectations without measuring them directly using an established method in the literature.An extension to this paper might consider an alternative method for addressing the above drawbacks:running extra sessions with two groups.One makes decisions like Experiment I,and the other only has its beliefs about the actions of the other group elicited.This way,the beliefs can be incentivized without fear of hedging.However this comes at the cost of a greater deviation in the nature of the instructions compared to the method we use in this study.We employ randomized control to circumvent the endogeneity problem that arises in the analysis of naturally occurring data.Note that market effects on trust in the experiment do not operate via any effect on incentives–only via context.In controlled experiments,when manipulating context,experimenter demand effects are a concern[36],[37].Experimenter demand effects are (conscious or unconscious)changes in experimental subjects’behavior resulting from cues about what constitutes appropriate behavior,possibly due to forming an interpretation of the experiment’s purpose.Experimental economists are typically unconcerned by such demand effects since they are investigating the causal effect of changes in incentives or other substantial institutional features,changes that are likely to overwhelm the effect of contextual factors[38].Our concerns stem from restricting our focus to payoff-irrelevant features of the environment,and we take steps to address these concerns.Experiment I:Simple Trust GameProcedureParticipants were students from George Mason University. Each session had either eight or ten participants performing two tasks.The first was a priming task[36].Control and treatment groups perform a task that differed only in that‘markets’were primed in the treatment,and‘no coherent theme’was primed in the control.To avoid experimenter demand effects,participants were not informed of the goal of the priming task,nor did any deduce it or become aware of it inadvertently(see the funneled debriefing below).The priming task was as follows.Each participant faced15lists of five words.In each list,the words were randomly arranged,and the participant needed to form a grammatically correct sentence using four of the five words.For example,in the list,flew,eagle, the,plane,around.,an acceptable solution was,the eagle flew around..Participants were allotted six minutes to complete this task,which was not saliently rewarded.We created a list of words associated with markets and trade using a thesaurus and we validated our choices by asking a separate group of participants to list words that make them think about markets and/or trade(see Table S1in File S1for the full lists;they were created by taking one of the exemplary lists provided in[36]and giving it a market theme).The difference between treatment and control was that in the treatment,12of the 15lists had a word that was relevant to markets and/or trade. Participants in each session were randomly assigned either treatment or control.The second task was the STG shown in Figure1.We used the STG rather than the conventional trust game because we wanted to use the strategy method for the responders,and so we had to limit the number of their decision nodes.We wanted to use the strategy method to maximize the data acquired from each participant,and hence power.Participants were randomized into the role of either the sender or the responder and were anonymously matched with a unique partner.Senders and responders were in the same room and all instructions were read out aloud.The responders’strategy choice involved describing what they would do in each of their three possible decision nodes,i.e.,what they would do if the sender sends$2,what they would do if the sender sends$4,and what they would do if the sender sends$6(known as the strategy method). Behavior in the game yielded a measure of trust(senders)and trustworthiness(responders).In each of the first twelve sessions,following the second task,we randomly selected two participants who were in the treatment and asked them to perform a funneled debriefing[36].This is a short, verbally-administered survey that investigates the extent to which the participant was aware of the priming and the goals of the experiment.In every case,participants were unaware they were primed.Research HypothesesThe STG requires two decisions between anonymous strangers: the sender chooses how much to send and the responder chooses how much to return.A strategic analysis by either player leaves scant ground for optimism about the outcome of the interaction: trust and trustworthiness should be zero.This is due in part to the anonymity of the interaction and the absence of third-party enforcement.However given limited cognition,an accessible mental representation of markets may affect decisions. Hypothesis1a.In the STG,senders primed to think about markets(treatment)send a larger amount on average than those under the control prime(control).(See the SI for a mathematical statement of our hypotheses.) The sender’s decision calculus is as follows.The strategic analysis leaves the sender unwilling to trust an anonymous stranger. However the accessible market representation involves a positive view of the results of interacting with an anonymous stranger, where both parties benefit from the interaction.Therefore trust is higher when the market representation is more accessible. Hypothesis1b.In the STG,responders primed to think about markets(treatment),at each of their three decision nodes, choose to return a larger amount than those under the control prime(control).The responder’s decision calculus is as follows.The strategic analysis leaves the responder unwilling to reciprocate trust,since she is simply improving the sender’s lot at her own expense. However the accessible market representation involves a positive view of the results of interacting with an anonymous stranger, where both parties benefit from the interaction.Therefore trustworthiness is higher when the market representation is more accessible.In both the sender’s and the responder’s decision,the decision-maker ignores the fact that part of the reason all parties in an anonymous market transaction succeed is the threat of third-party enforcement,and that this threat is absent in the trust game. However imperfect cognition ensures that this fact does not uniquely dominate the decision calculus.ResultsWe ran14sessions of the STG,yielding a total of130 observations:31senders+31responders in the control,and34 senders+34responders in the treatment.The main descriptive statistics are in Table1,and they are graphed in Figure2.To test Hypothesis1a,we compare sender behavior in the control prime condition(control)to sender behavior in the market prime condition(treatment).Result1a.In the STG,senders primed to think about markets send substantially more than senders in control. Senders sent an average of1.0more under the market prime than under control,as can be seen in the first pair of bars in Figure2.(Recall that the amount sent is tripled.)This difference is large(over half a standard deviation)and it is significant at the p,0.05level using either a two-sided t-test or Mann-Whitney test. Using a regression to control for session effects(results available on request)leads to an increase in the magnitude of the treatment effect and a decrease in the p-value(p,0.01).Result1b.In the STG,responders under the market prime (treatment)return insignificantly more than responders under the control prime(control).As can be seen in the last three pairs of bars in Figure 2,at each of their three decision nodes,responders return more under treatment (market prime)than under control.The difference is small (15%,5%and 10%of a standard deviation,respectively),and statistically insignificant (all p-values exceed 0.40regardless of the statistical test employed).Recall that Fehr’s definition of trust [1]is the sender placing resources at the disposal of the responder under the expectation that this will increase the sender’s payoff,and in the absence of any legal commitment by the responder.Result 1a finds that market priming leads to the senders placing greater resources at the disposal of the responder.This is consistent with the idea that markets have a positive causal effect on trust.Moreover,since trust (and not trustworthiness)determines social efficiency,this exper-iment is also consistent with markets having a positive causal effect on social efficiency.However as discussed above,there are several determinants of how much an individual chooses to send in a trust game.Beyond trust,sender choices are driven by other-regarding preferences,such as altruism (pure or impure)and inequity aversion [26].The experiment below further investigates the source of the treatment effect on trust.Experiment II:Distinguishing Trust from other-regarding Preferences ProcedureExperiment II used different participants than Experiment I.Each session had two tasks,the first being identical to theprimingFigure 2.Bar charts (with standard error bands)of average behavior in Experiment 1,the simplified trust game,by condition.doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055968.g002Table 1.Sample means (and standard deviations)for simple trust game;n denotes the number of unique senders and the number of unique responders,and each responder made three choices.SentReturned if 2sent Returned if 4sent Returned if 6sent Control (n =31) 2.4(2.0)0.65(1.4) 3.1(1.9) 5.2(3.2)Treatment (n =34)3.4(1.9)0.85(1.5)3.2(1.8)5.5(3.1)doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055968.t001。
