本科毕业论文（设计）
外文翻译
原文：
Accounts Receivable Financing and Information Asymmetry Abstract：This study investigates the effect of information asymmetry between managers and outsiders on the use of accounts receivable in financing the firm’s operations. Th e information impounded in receivables pertains to the firm’s customers rather than the firm and therefore differs from the information embedded in other assets. The unique information content of accounts receivable makes it a likely candidate to use as a financing tool for highly information asymmetric firms. Consistent with the Pecking Order Theory, I find that the likelihood of using accounts receivable financing increases with the firm’s information asymmetry. I also find that the innate component of th e firm’s earnings quality measure is more influential than the discretionary component in explaining the use of AR financing.
Keywords: Information asymmetry, capital structure, asset-backed financing, receivables.
1. Introduction
Accounts receivable (hereafter, AR) are open accounts owed to the firm by trade customers. They are part of the firm’s working capital and constitute 14 percent of 2005 US industrial firms’ total assets, making them one of the largest asset groups on industrial firms’ balance she et. AR serve as a tool for firms to extend credit to their business partners and are often instrumental in facilitating sale of goods.
From a creditor standpoint, the information characteristics associated with AR differ from other firm’s assets. While the information on firm’s other assets is related to the firm’s performance, the information on the firm’s AR and their value depends on other firms’ performance, i.e. the customers. Furthermore, AR share many attributes of financial assets, including their reparability and relative liquidity. These
attributes of AR, as well as the diversification effect of multiple customers comprising the receivable account on the balance sheet, make this asset different and potentially lower in its information asymmetry tha n the rest of the firm’s assets.
The Pecking Order Theory (Myers, 1984 and Myers and Majluf, 1984) predicts that firms characterized by asymmetric information will tend to use the least information sensitive financing options available to them before turning to other options which may be mispriced by the market. Boot and Thakor (1993) show that value can be added in splitting an asset into two separate securities; one informational sensitive, the other less so. In this study, I investigate whether the distinct information characteristics of AR increases the likelihood of using AR as a tool in financing when information asymmetry between firm’s management and outsiders increases.
Using a unique hand collected dataset of all COMPUSTAT firms available for the fiscal year 2005 in the two 2-digit SIC code industries 73 and 37 (business services and transportation equipment), which are characterized by high ratios of AR to assets, I test whether the firm’s information asymmetry is related to its decision to use AR financing. AR financing is defined as any type of financing which distinctly relies on AR, either as collateral or as an eligibility requirement and includes the following types of financing: securitization, factoring, AR collateralized debt, and collateralized debt with an AR eligibility requirement. Remaining observations are divided between two additional groups: firms having debt collateralized by many assets which do not specifically mention AR and firms using uncollateralized debt or debt collateralized by assets other than AR (such as mortgages).
I first explore the association between leverage and the use of AR financing. I find that on average, firms that use AR financing have higher leverage relative to firms that do not use AR financing. I then test whether information asymmetry is related to the decision of the firm to use AR financing, after controlling for leverage. I find that the use of AR financing is associated with three sets of proxies of the firm’s information asymmetry: 1) analyst forecasts (both standard deviation and absolute forecast error), 2) balance sheet based variables that have been found to be correlated with information asymmetry, and 3) disclosure (both quality of earnings as well as
