外文翻译--跨境合并和收购：欧洲、美国的经验

并购的外⽂翻译兼并和收购当前的问题⼀、兼并与收购：全球视野许多⽤来解释为什么会发⽣兼并和收购（并购）的理论已经被提出来了。

效率理论认为，兼并的发⽣是为了利⽤经济规模或协同作⽤。

市场⼒量理论认为，合并创造了寡头垄断的利益。

代理理论认为并购可以解决代理问题，删除⽆效的经理，或者也可以作为⼀种机制，兼并和收购，可能是⼀个傲慢或帝国⼤厦动机不明智收购的经理的代理问题的表现。

多样化的福利或税收，也被认为是并购的动机。

虽然没有单⼀的兼并和收购的凝聚⼒理论，这些理论⼤部分已收到⾄少有⼀些经验⽀持。

并购交易的估值短期效应已被记录在众多事件的研究中。

这些研究⼀致发现积极累积异常的报酬，⽬标公司股东的股份从15％到40％，取决于研究的时间段和交易类型。

当投标⼈的异常报酬似乎是接近零，甚⾄可能略有下降，⽽联合投标⼈的⽬标回报率普遍是正相关，那就意味着并购活动创造了价值。

其他著名的规律，平均⽬标股价的反应显⽰着与股票报价相⽐，购买价更⾼。

要约收购与兼并相⽐，敌对与友好相⽐，那宁愿是优惠多的投标⼈，⽽不是单⼀的投标竞赛。

这些特点，往往对投标⼈的回报有相反的效果。

因此，投标⼈的回报往往是较低的股票融资，并购交易，敌对收购，多个投标⼈的⽐赛。

另⼀种已知的规律是并购浪潮。

⽶切尔和⽊亨利在1996年以及哈福德在2005年发现，特定⾏业的合并浪潮在有⾜够资⾦流的经济、管理、技术的冲击中发⽣的。

这表明，当某些⾏业正处于企业扩张或⽜市、资产⼤规模地调动的过程中，并购活动将会很活跃。

美国经历了六个激烈的并购阶段。

有趣的是每⼀阶段都发⽣在⼀次强烈的经济扩张和强劲的股市上，紧接着股价就会⼤幅下跌。

第⼀次并购浪潮发⽣在⼆⼗世纪初，巩固了⽯油、钢铁、矿业和烟草等⾏业。

这次并购是为了垄断。

第⼆次并购浪潮发⽣在20世纪20年代，当时，以蓬勃发展的股市为导向，巩固通信、公共事业和汽车等⾏业。

由于反托拉斯法的制定，创造⾮法垄断，这个期间的⼤部分并购集中在垂直整合。

跨国并购名词解释跨国并购指的是一家公司从一个国家购买或合并另一家公司，使其业务跨越国界。

这种交易可以在同一行业内进行，也可以涉及不同行业的公司之间的交易。

以下是一些与跨国并购相关的名词解释：1. 并购（M&A）：并购是指一家公司通过购买或合并另一家公司来扩大自己的业务规模。

并购可以是国内的，也可以是跨国的。

2. 跨国公司（MNC）：跨国公司是指在多个国家拥有业务和子公司的公司。

通过并购，公司可以扩大其在不同国家和地区的业务。

3. 目标公司（target company）：目标公司是指被并购或收购的公司。

被并购的公司的股权和资产将会转移到收购方。

4. 收购方（acquirer）：收购方是指发起并购或收购的公司。

收购方一般具有较强的财务实力和资源，通过并购扩大业务规模和市场份额。

5. 利益相关方（stakeholder）：利益相关方是指在并购交易中可能受到影响或对交易结果有利害关系的各方，包括收购方、目标公司的股东、员工、供应商和客户等。

6. 股权收购（equity acquisition）：股权收购是指收购方通过购买目标公司的股票或股权来完成并购交易。

7. 兼并（merger）：兼并是指两家或多家公司合并成为一家新的公司。

在跨国并购中，兼并往往需要协调不同国家的法律和监管要求。

8. 反垄断审查（antitrust review）：反垄断审查是指政府部门对并购交易进行的调查和审查，以确保交易不会导致市场垄断或不正当竞争。

9. 并购财务顾问（M&A financial advisor）：并购财务顾问是一家专业机构或个人，为并购交易提供财务建议和支持，包括估值、尽职调查和交易结构等方面的服务。

10. 跨国并购金融法律顾问（cross-border M&A legal advisor）：跨国并购金融法律顾问是一家专业的法律事务所或个人，为并购交易提供法律咨询和服务，包括交易文件的起草、合规性审查和跨国法律事务管理等方面的支持。

原文：Examining the relationship between trade balance and exchange rate: the case of China’s trade with the USAIn this paper, we investigate the nexus between China’s trade balance and the real exchange rate vis-a`-vis the USA. Using the bounds testing approach to cointegration, we find evidence that China’s trade balan ce and real exchange rate vis-a-vis the USA are cointegrated, and using the autoregressive distributed lag model we find that in both the short run and the long run a real devaluation of the Chinese RMB improves the trade balance; as a result, there is no evidence of a J-curve type adjustment.1、IntroductionThere is now a large literature that examines the nexus between trade balance and real exchange rate on developing countries (see, inter alia, Narayan and Narayan, 2004; Wilson and Tat, 2001; Lal and Lowinger, 2002; Kale, 2001; Singh, 2002). Recent empirical literature for developing countries finds a J-curve type adjustment of the trade balance due to shocks in the real exchange rate. For instance, Wilson and Pat (2001) do not find any evidence of the J-curve for Singapore. Lal and Lowinger (2002) find evidence of the J-curve for a group of East Asian countries; Kale (2001) finds evidence of the J-curve for Turkey; and Narayan and Narayan (2004) find evidence of the J-curve type adjustment of the trade balance for Fiji.1.We investigate the r elationship between China’s trade bala nce and its exchange rate vis-a-vis the USA dollar. Our approach is as follows: (1) to investigate evidence for contegration, we use the bounds testing approach; (2) to estimate the long-run and short-run elasticity, we use the autoregressive distributed lag model suggested by Pesaran and Shin (1999); and (3) to estimate the impact of shocks to exchange rate on the trade balance, we apply the impulse–response functions.The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the trade balance model to be estimated. This is followed by a brief description of the methodology used in this study. The penultimate section contains the empirical findings. In the last section, the results are discussed.Model and MethodologyModelOur model is as follows:Ln EMt =α+β1lnRERt + εtwhere ln EMt is the logarithm of the real exports to real imports ratio; ln RERt is the logarithm of the real exchange rate (RMB per US dollar), defined as the number of units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency; α is a constant; and εt is a error term. According to the J-curve hypothesis, an increase in real exchange rate initially reduces the demand for the home country’s exports but increases its demand for imports. This initially leads to a deterioration of the trade balance due to the belief that imports in local currency increase more than the initial increase in exports after a change in price. However, as export and import volumes adjust to price changes over time, the trade balance improves. Hence, it is expecte d thatβ1＞0.MethodologyTo implement the bounds testing procedure, it is essential to model Equation 2 as a conditional autoregressive distributed lag model (ARDL) as follows:Here, all the variables are as previously defined. The bounds test for examining evidence for a long-run relationship can be conducted using either the F-test or the t-test. We find that in the long run, a 1% increases in the real exchange rate leads to a 1.2% increase in the export to import ratio, implying an improvement of China’s trade balance relative to the USA. This result is statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. In the short run, we find that a 1% increase in the real exchange rate leads to a 0.5% increase in the trade balance. This result is also statistically significant at the 1% level. The error correction term ECt-1, which measures the speed of adjustment to restore equilibrium in the dynamic model, has a negative sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level ensuring that the series is non-explosive and that long-run equilibrium is attainable. The coefficient of -0.42 implies that a deviation from the long-run ME ratio during this period is corrected by about 42% in the next period – an indication that, following a shock, convergence to equilibrium is swift, taking slightly over two years.Impulse–response functionRecent studies (Lal and Lowinger, 2002; Narayan,2004) on the J-curve recommend that the best way of deriving evidence of the J-curve is by using the impulse–response functions. We find and plot the response of trade balance to one standard deviation shock to real exchange rate in Fig. 1, and the response of exchange rates to one standard deviation shock to the trade balance in Fig. 2.The impulse–response function reveals that a one standard deviation shock to the real exchange rate (or devaluation of the RMB) leads to a very volatile response of trade balance for the first three years. After three years, however, the impact of shocks to real exchange rate on the trade balance dies out. Moreover, there is no evidence of any J-curve type adjustment of the trade balance.ConclusionThis paper examines the nexus between China’s trade balance with the USA and the real exchange rate. The test for a long-run relationship between trade balance and real exchange rate is based on the bounds testing approach. while the short-run and long elasticities are estimated using the ARDL estimator. We gauge the response of trade balance to one standard deviation shock to the real exchange rate using the impulse–response function. Our findings are as follows: (1) we find that China’s trade balance and real exchange rate vis-a`-vis the USA is cointegrated; (2) the long-run and short-run elasticities on the real exchange rate are positive and statistically significant, implying that a devaluation of the real exchange rate improves China’s trade balance; and (3) the impulse–response analysis suggests that a one standard deviation shock to real exchange rate creates a lot of instability in China’s trade balance for the first three years but the impact of this shock dies out thereafter.An important distinction between the present study and the literature on developing countries is that while most studies on developing countries find a J-curve type adjustment of the trade balance to shocks in real exchange rate, China’s experience is different: a real devaluation improves the trade balance in both the short run and the long run, which may be part of the reason for China’s exceptional export performance.外文题目Examining the relationship between trade balance andexchange rate: the case of China’s trade with the USA出处：Applied Economics Letters作者：Paresh Kumar Narayan检验贸易平衡和汇率之间的关系：以中国与美国为例子摘要在本文中，我们探讨中国与美国之间贸易平衡和实际汇率的的关系。

跨国公司的跨境并购战略在全球化的背景下，跨国公司的跨境并购战略成为了一种常见的商业行为。

跨境并购指的是一家公司通过收购或合并另一家位于不同国家的公司，以扩大自己的国际市场份额或获得新的技术和资源。

这种战略对于企业来说具有重要意义，但也面临着许多挑战。

首先，跨境并购战略需要公司具备一定的财力实力。

跨国公司往往需要支付高昂的并购成本，包括股份、现金以及其他交易费用。

同时，还需要承担并购过程中的风险，如汇率波动、法律和监管问题等。

因此，只有具备足够的财力实力的公司才能成功实施这种战略。

其次，跨境并购需要公司具备良好的公司管理能力和文化适应能力。

在跨境并购过程中，不同国家和地区的企业文化、法规制度以及商业环境都会存在差异。

成功的跨境并购需要公司能够灵活适应，并且能够在合并后实现顺利的整合。

同时，公司需要注意并购目标的文化差异可能带来的管理难题，例如沟通不畅、员工抵触情绪等。

第三，跨境并购战略需要公司具备敏锐的市场洞察力。

公司在选择跨境并购目标时，需要准确评估目标公司的潜力和风险。

这需要公司对目标市场的了解和洞察力，包括了解当地的市场规模、竞争环境、消费者需求以及政治与经济风险等。

只有准确判断市场前景，才能确定投资的合理性。

此外，跨境并购战略还需要公司与目标公司之间建立良好的合作关系和沟通渠道。

跨国并购往往存在着语言、文化和国别等方面的差异，这给合并后的企业带来了许多困难。

因此，在并购前阶段，公司需要加强与目标公司的沟通与合作，加深彼此的了解，为后续的整合打下良好的基础。

最后，成功的跨境并购战略还需要公司在法律和监管方面具备合规意识。

不同国家和地区对于外国投资存在不同的规定和限制，公司需要遵循当地的法律和监管要求，确保并购过程的合法性和透明度。

此外，跨境并购还需要与各相关利益相关方保持良好的关系，遵守商业道德与社会责任。

综上所述，跨国公司的跨境并购战略在全球化进程中扮演着重要角色。

然而，成功实施这一战略面临着种种挑战，包括财力实力、公司管理和文化适应能力、市场洞察力、公司合作关系和法律合规等方面的挑战。

跨国公司及跨国并购1. 背景介绍跨国公司（Multinational Corporation, MNC）是指在多个国家开展业务活动，并具有实际经营控制力的企业。

这类企业通过在不同国家设立子公司、分支机构或合资企业来扩展其市场份额和国际影响力。

跨国并购（Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions, M&A）则是指跨国公司通过收购或合并其他国家的企业来实现战略目标和业务扩张。

在全球化的背景下，跨国公司和跨国并购成为推动企业国际化和增加竞争优势的重要手段。

本文将介绍跨国公司的概念、形成原因、特点以及跨国并购的定义、动机和影响。

2. 跨国公司2.1 概念和形成原因跨国公司是指在多个国家开展业务并具有实际经营控制力的企业。

其形成原因主要包括以下几个方面：1.市场扩张需求：企业通过跨国公司的形式进入其他国家市场，以获取更大的销售额和利润空间。

2.资源优化：通过在不同国家投资和生产，跨国公司可以利用各国的资源优势，实现成本降低和效益最大化。

3.风险分散：在多国开展业务可以降低单一市场风险，增加企业的稳定性和抗风险能力。

4.技术创新：通过在多国开展研发和创新活动，跨国公司可以获得更多的技术资源和创新机会。

2.2 特点和优势跨国公司具有以下特点和优势：1.全球化战略：跨国公司制定全球化战略，通过在不同国家建立子公司和分支机构，实现全球资源整合和市场占有。

2.规模经济：跨国公司通过规模经济效应，实现成本降低和效益最大化。

3.全球资源配置：跨国公司可以通过在不同国家投资和生产，利用各国资源优势，实现生产要素的高效配置。

4.全球品牌影响力：跨国公司通过在多个国家开展业务，建立了跨国品牌影响力，提高了企业在全球市场中的竞争力。

3. 跨国并购3.1 定义和动机跨国并购是指跨国公司通过收购或合并其他国家的企业来实现战略目标和业务扩张。

其主要动机包括以下几个方面：1.市场扩张：通过并购其他国家企业，跨国公司可以快速进入新市场，并获得更多的销售额和市场份额。

434国际商务名词解释大全1. 国际商务（International Business）：指跨越国界进行的商业活动，涉及跨国贸易、投资、合作等方面的经济活动。

2. 进出口贸易（Import and Export Trade）：指在国家间进行的商品和服务的买卖活动，包括商品的进口和出口。

3. 跨国公司（Multinational Corporation）：指在多个国家开展经营活动并拥有跨国经营能力的公司，通常在多个国家设有子公司或分支机构。

4. 外包（Outsourcing）：指企业将原本在内部完成的某些工作、业务或服务外部委托给其他公司或机构进行处理。

5. 直接投资（Foreign Direct Investment）：指一国企业或个人直接在其他国家投资设立企业并参与其经营活动。

6. 公司并购（Mergers and Acquisitions）：指一家公司通过购买或合并其他公司来扩大自身规模或进入新的市场。

7. 跨文化沟通（Cross-cultural Communication）：指在不同文化背景下进行交流和互动的过程，需要克服语言、价值观、行为习惯等方面的差异。

8. 贸易壁垒（Trade Barrier）：指国家为保护本国产业或市场而采取的措施，如关税、配额、技术壁垒等，对跨国贸易造成限制。

9. 跨国营销（International Marketing）：指企业根据不同国家或地区的市场需求和特点，制定不同的营销策略和方案。

10. 子公司（Subsidiary）：指一家公司控制或持有另外一家公司的股份，并能对其经营和决策产生影响。

11. 贸易平衡（Trade Balance）：指一个国家或地区在一定时期内商品和服务的出口与进口之间的差额。

12. 竞争优势（Competitive Advantage）：指企业相对于竞争对手在市场中具备的特殊优势，包括技术、创新、成本、品牌等方面的优势。

13. 供应链管理（Supply Chain Management）：指企业在供应商、制造商、经销商和客户之间构建和协调的物流与信息流的整体运作体系。

国际税收规则下的跨国合并与收购在国际税收规则下，跨国合并与收购是一种经济活动的形式，它在全球范围内对公司的发展和运营产生着深远的影响。

本文将探讨跨国合并与收购在国际税收规则下的相关问题，包括税收筹划、税收风险和税务合规等方面。

一、税收筹划跨国合并与收购往往涉及到不同国家之间的税务政策差异，税收筹划成为企业在此过程中需要考虑的重要因素。

通过巧妙地利用税收优惠政策及避免国际双重征税，企业可以实现合并或收购的经济效益最大化。

例如，通过选择合适的收购结构和交易方式，可以降低交易成本和税收负担，进而提高收购效率和公司整体竞争力。

二、税收风险在跨国合并与收购过程中，涉及到的税收风险是难以忽视的。

首先，不同国家之间的税收规则和法律存在差异，可能导致合并与收购交易中的税务争议和风险。

其次，各国对合并与收购交易可能会采取不同的税收待遇和税收监管，企业需要对税务政策变化保持高度关注，以避免潜在的税务风险。

三、税务合规在国际跨国合并与收购过程中，企业需要遵守各国的税收合规要求，确保在合并与收购过程中不违反任何税法规定。

企业需要制定合理的合规计划，确保税务合规的履行，并通过专业的税务顾问进行税务尽职调查，确保交易的合法性和合规性。

四、合并与收购对税务政策的影响合并与收购交易往往会对不同国家的税务政策产生积极或消极的影响。

一方面，合并与收购可以通过整合企业资源，提高经济效益，促进国家税收的增长。

另一方面，合并与收购可能导致税基流失、避税等问题，对国家税收造成一定的冲击。

因此，国际社会普遍关注合并与收购交易对税务政策的影响，并对跨国合并与收购采取相应的监管措施，以维护税收的公平性和稳定性。

综上所述，国际税收规则下的跨国合并与收购是一项复杂而重要的经济活动。

企业应充分考虑税收筹划、税收风险和税务合规等方面的问题，并在合并与收购过程中与专业的税务顾问密切合作，以确保交易的成功实施和税务风险的控制。

同时，各国政府和国际组织应加强合并与收购交易的监管，提高税收规则的透明度和合理性，为跨国合并与收购提供稳定可靠的税务环境。

国外企业并购整合研究近年来，随着全球经济的发展和国际市场的竞争加剧，国外企业并购整合成为了一个热门的研究领域。

在这个全球化时代，跨国并购已经成为企业实现快速发展和扩大市场份额的一种重要战略。

国外企业并购整合是指一个国外企业通过收购或合并其他国家的企业，以实现资源整合、市场扩张、降低成本、提高竞争力等目的的过程。

这种战略行为既涉及到经济层面的资本和资源配置，也涉及到管理层面的组织结构调整和文化融合。

国外企业并购整合的动机多种多样。

其中最主要的动机是实现规模经济和经营效益的提升。

通过并购，企业可以实现资源的共享和优化配置，提高生产效率和供应链管理效能。

此外，国外企业并购还可以帮助企业进入新兴市场，扩大销售渠道，增加市场份额。

另外，一些企业也通过并购来实现技术创新和研发能力的增强，以保持竞争优势。

国外企业并购整合的过程中面临着许多挑战和问题。

首先是跨国文化的融合。

不同国家和地区的企业存在着不同的管理方式、企业文化和价值观念，如何在并购过程中实现文化的融合成为了一个非常关键的问题。

其次是组织结构的整合。

并购后的企业往往需要进行组织结构的调整和重组，以实现资源的整合和协同效应。

最后是法律和财务风险的管控。

在跨国并购中，需要考虑到不同国家的法律法规和财务制度的差异，以避免法律风险和财务风险的出现。

国外企业并购整合的成功与否还与企业自身的能力和经验密切相关。

企业需要具备足够的财务实力和管理能力，才能够顺利完成并购整合过程。

同时，企业还需要具备良好的战略眼光和市场洞察力，以确保选择合适的并购目标和实施正确的整合策略。

对于国外企业并购整合研究的未来发展趋势，可以预见的是，随着全球市场的进一步一体化和竞争的加剧，国外企业并购整合将会越来越普遍和重要。

同时，随着科技的进步和信息技术的应用，跨国并购的整合过程也将变得更加复杂和多样化，需要企业在管理、技术和人力资源等方面具备更高的能力和素质。

国外企业并购整合是一个充满挑战和机遇的领域。

跨境企业并购与整合随着全球化进程的不断推进，跨境企业并购与整合已经成为了全球经济中不可忽视的一部分。

企业通过并购与整合来获取新的市场、技术和资源，进而实现成本优势和规模效应。

在这个过程中，企业不仅仅面临着语言、文化、法律等多方面的挑战，还要能够高效地整合不同公司的运营和管理。

一个成功的跨境企业并购与整合必须考虑到多个因素。

首先，企业需要进行全面的尽职调查，了解目标企业的财务状况、行业地位、法律风险等情况。

这有助于企业评估目标企业的价值和潜力，为后续的谈判和整合做好准备。

同时，企业还需要在谈判过程中充分考虑双方的利益和需求，通过合理的交易结构和价格来实现双赢。

其次，企业在跨境并购与整合中需要重视文化差异。

不同国家和地区的企业文化差异非常大，这常常成为制约并购与整合成功的主要因素之一。

企业应该尽可能了解并尊重目标企业的文化，通过文化交流和融合来实现跨境并购与整合的顺利进行。

此外，企业还需要在管理层和员工中建立文化融合的意识，提供培训和支持，以促进跨境并购与整合的顺利进行。

第三，法律和法规也是跨境企业并购与整合中需要关注的重要问题。

不同国家和地区的法律和法规各不相同，而且法律环境的变化可能会对跨境并购与整合产生重大影响。

企业需要充分了解目标企业所在国家的法律和法规，并与专业法律团队合作，确保并购与整合符合各项法律要求。

此外，企业还需要根据不同国家的法律要求，制定合适的合同和条款，保护自身的利益。

除了以上几点，还有一些其他的因素对跨境企业并购与整合也有着重要的影响。

例如，企业需要考虑到跨境并购与整合所带来的财务风险，包括外汇风险、市场风险等。

此外，企业还需要考虑到知识产权和技术转让等重要问题，以保护自身的核心竞争力。

总之，跨境企业并购与整合是一个复杂的过程，需要企业充分考虑多个因素，并做出合理的决策。

企业应该在并购前进行充分的尽职调查，了解目标企业的情况，同时要充分考虑文化差异和法律环境等因素。

通过合理的交易结构和谈判，以及文化融合和法律合规，企业可以实现并购与整合的成功，为企业的发展提供新的机遇和动力。

外文题目：Supervising cross-border banks in Europe出处：Journal of Banking Regulation; Aug2008, Vol. 9 Issue 4, p227-246, 20p作者：Aerdt Houbenn, Iskander Schrijvers and Tim Willems原文：AbstractThis paper investigates the institutional set-up of European banking supervision against the backdrop of the current structure of the European banking market.The point of departure is that, in order to avoid incentive problems and white spots, the institutional structure of supervision should reflect the structure of the market under supervision. Based on different data for the largest entities, this paper seeks to determine the prime orientation of European banks: is it national,regional, pan-European or global? It is established that European banks are still primarily nationally oriented,that the number of internationally oriented banks is small and that global activities are almost as large as European ones. Moreover, these banks’ European activities are shown to be clustered, reflecting different regional orientations. In the absence of substantive pan-European banks, this differentiated market structure calls for a tailor-made approach to supervision in Europe. This suggests building on the model for consolidated supervision.IntroductionEuropean integration and broader globalisation have spurred cross-border mergers and acquisitions(M&As) in virtually all economic sectors.Until recently, this process was less prominent in the banking sector. Both the number and value of European cross-border M&As in the financial sector have, however, been on the rise of late, reflecting European banks’ strategic pursuit of diversification benefits and economies of scale and scope. Underlying factors have been liberalisation and deregulation, as well as progress in information technology.This development has fuelled a discussionon whether the current institutional set-up of prudential supervision in Europe is still suited to deal with the emerging economic reality of large cross-border exposures, especially in the banking sector. In this context, some have even clamoured for the introduction of a centralised,pan-European supervision of banks.To promote the solidity of individual financial institutions, and therewith of economy-wide financial stability, while minimising any ensuing distortions, the supervisory set-up needs to be both effective and efficient. In a cross-border context, this requires harmonised supervisory standards, adequate decisionmaking power, balanced incentives, limited supervisory layers and reliable insights into the specific circumstances of institutions under supervision. Clearly, in a tightly integrated banking sector, as may be expected in Europe in the long run, this implies an integrated,centralised form of supervision. But the key question is: does the current structure of the European banking sector already call for a centralised supranational European supervisory authority? Or would a pan-European approach likely reduce the efficacy and efficiency of supervision? Is there an intermediate, tailormade set-up?The question of what supervisory model corresponds best with the current structure of the European banking landscape is central to this paper. To address this question, the following section discusses the existing supervisory structure governing cross-border banking activities in Europe, together with its strengths and weaknesses. Three alternative approaches are presented in the subsequent section, again along with their strengths and weaknesses. Then a further section analyses the empirical features that characterise the European banking sector. This sets the stage for a discussion on the currently preferable supervisory structure for European banks in the penultimate section, including remaining challenges.The final section concludes.The current european supervisory structure for cross-border banksThe current European Union (EU) supervisory structure for cross-border banks finds its origin in the First and Second European Banking Directives (1977, 1988), and has evolved through a number of additional legislative acts commonly referred to as the ‘Single Market Programme’.Today it represents a mixed form of home- and host-country control on the basis of the subsidiarity principle, supported by a limitednumber of articles in the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) on consultation,cooperation and information sharing.Article 129 CRD goes furthest in granting decision-making power to the home supervisor, specifically for the authorisation of group-wide internal risk-based models.The CRD is supplemented by provisions for mutual recognition and cooperation among supervisory authorities laid down in the socalled ‘Memoranda of Understanding’(MoUs).These MoUs are mostly bilateral and generally include practical provisions with respect to cooperation and information sharing in ongoing supervision, including in the field of on-site inspections.More specifically, the allocation of supervisory responsibilities currently depends on whether foreign operations are run as branches or subsidiaries. In the case of branches, the consolidating (or group) supervisor in the country where the parent of the group is incorporated (the home country), is responsible for prudential supervision and the provision of deposit insurance.In the case of subsidiaries,these responsibilities are borne by the subconsolidating supervisor in the country, where the subsidiary is located as a separate legal entity(the host country). Since preserving financial stability is still primarily a national responsibility and given that emergency lending requires local currency, the host central bank acts as the lender of last resort.Finally, the consolidating supervisor is responsible for the stability of the entire group on a consolidated level. To that end,Article 129 CRD stipulates that the consolidating supervisor shall coordinate the gathering and dissemination of relevant information, and the planning of supervisory activities both in going concern and in emergency situations.This set-up has the advantage of safeguarding the interests of host countries in the case of foreign subsidiaries over which the host country supervisor has direct supervisory power, while also advancing adequate supervision at the consolidated or group level.Nonetheless, the current supervisory structure has several substantial disadvantages. First, externalities may arise on account of the incongruity in coverage between the responsibilities for supervision on the one hand, and those for financial stability and crisis management on the other. In particular, negative spillover effects may occur in the case of foreign branches, which are of systemic importance to thehost country but are insignificant to the home country. The home supervisor may then attach less importance to sustaining such a branch, since its failure would not endanger financial stability in its own country.For this reason, supervisory authorities in Eastern Europe are reluctant to allow banking activities in the form of foreign branches for fear of losing control over their national financial stability.In fact, New Zealand requires foreign banks to operate via subsidiaries —over which it has supervisory power —rather than branches, as its banking sector is dominated by Australian banks that are not systemically important to the Australian financial system.In the EU, the majority of cross-border banking activities are currently undertaken through subsidiaries, but the share of branches is also significant.Expansion through subsidiaries, however, has become relatively more common in recent years, reflecting increased cross-border penetration into retail markets.Secondly, it is doubtful whether the current set-up has sufficient incentives for the supervisors involved to pass on information adequately.Supervisory authorities in one country may tend to limit the knowledge about mishaps they share with partner supervisory authorities in order to avoid loss of confidence in an institution or to cover up their own failings. This may undermine the efficacy of supervision in normal circumstances.Thirdly, the current structure of cooperation between supervisors built upon MoUs is laborious and may prove unstable under stress or in times of crises. After all, MoUs do not—and cannot—cover all eventualities, are not legally enforceable, and lack political accountability.Were an extremely adverse event to occur, prerogatives might be questioned;a supervisory party might be tempted to renege on earlier agreements and any other party would have no formal means of opposing.Moreover,information sharing might then become slower and more patchy, thereby lessening the speed and quality of decision making. These are essential elements in crisis management, which may thus become less effective.A fourth disadvantage is its administrative inefficiency. Given the predominance of crossborder activities via legally separate subsidiaries,the current supervisory structure implies that cross-border banks have to deal with numerous differentsupervisors and accompanying regulations.A typical large financial institution might have to report in a variety of formats to more than 20 autonomous supervisors within the EU.This implies an onerous administrative and regulatory burden. In response, Nordea(the largest banking group in Scandinavia,headquartered in Sweden) has raised the idea of converting all its foreign subsidiaries into branches — thereby bringing all regulatory issues back to its consolidating supervisor, the Swedish Finansinspektionen.In sum, the current supervisory set-up is not fully equipped to deal with the challenges of a cross-border banking system: incentives for information sharing may be inadequate, cooperation is laborious and may founder under stress, and institutions’administrations are heavily burdened. In some instances, the regulatory environment even dictates the business structure. In this light, with a view to fostering a market-driven and stable development of the European banking system, consideration should be given to alternative supervisory structures.Alternative supervisory structuresIn broad terms, among the alternatives to the current set-up that have been proposed for Europe, three supervisory models can be distinguished for cross-border operating banks:(1)centralised supervision conducted by a pan-European Financial Authority (EFA);(2)coordinated supervision conducted by a European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS),comprising both a central EFA and all national financial authorities in the EU;and (3)consolidated (lead) supervision, comprising only the consolidated (lead) and sub-consolidated supervisory authorities actually supervising a given institution. This section weighs these alternatives, specifically by gauging the implications for information sharing, crisis management and financial stability, neutrality(ie ensuring a level playing field) and political accountability, as well as for the efficiency of the banks and the supervisor. A tentative assessment is also given of the political feasibility.A pan-European Financial AuthorityIn this model, supported for instance by Breuer,Couppey-Soubeyran and Sessin,andArnold,a central body is fully responsible for the supervision of all cross-border activities through branches and subsidiaries of EU banks.This central body, commonly referred to as the EFA, cooperates with the representatives of all 27 EU supervisors in ongoing supervision and crisis management.Indeed, a variant of this model has a two-tier structure in which the centre directly supervises all institutions with significant cross-border activities in the EU and delegates the supervision of domestically oriented banks to the national supervisors.In each variant of this model however, all ultimate decision making takes place at the centre and any decentralised implementation also falls under the centre’s responsi bility and control.Supervision by a single, pan-European supervisor would have the advantage of creating unambiguous incentives. Conflicts of interest between EU countries would no longer influence supervisory actions and all possible cross-border externalities would be internalised.The EFA would promote a level playing field and would have a clear-cut mandate to promote financial stability in the EU. Administrative procedures would be harmonised to the extent possible, duplication of supervisory activities would be avoided and decision making could be quick in crisis situations.On the other hand, a centralised pan-European supervisor would generally be located further away from the institutions it supervises and would thus risk lacking relevant,up-to-date knowledge of local financial conditions and practices. To the extent that the EFA’s executive bodies are lean, countries may feel ill-represented in (and may thus resist) its decision making, while if all EU member states are represented, decision making is likely to prove complex and time-consuming. But the model’s real impediment lies in its poor political feasibility. This relates, first, to the absence of a federal financing mechanism that would cover the costs of a possible bank bailout. Indeed, it is unthinkable that a centralised body would decide on supervisory actions but would be able to leave eventual costs to be borne at the local level. Secondly, such a set-up would require a far-reaching institutional and legal convergence of national supervisory structures in the EU. While recent years has seen some convergence, notably a move to more integrated and autonomous supervisory authorities, major differences remain.Beyond this, in view of the current emphasis on subsidiarity, it is unlikely that politicians will agree with a transfer of supervisoryresponsibilities to a supranational European body. In this context, the establishment of a central pan-European authority would create challenges as to the accountability of such a regulatory‘Leviathan’.In all, implementation of this model in the near futureseems unrealistic.A European System of Financial SupervisorsThe second model for the supervision of Europe’s banks also concentrates decision making, but places greater weight on the role of the national supervisors.The balance is delicate: international coordination is established in an ESFS in which both the centre and the national supervisors are represented. Decision making within this ESFS is similar to that on monetary policy by the European System of Central Banks (viz. in a Council, by majority voting, with each member state in principle having a single vote alongside the representation of the ECB as the centre). Supervisory implementation is expressly decentralised. In this model, the consolidated supervisor is responsible for supervising all EU-wide operations of a given bank, including its branches and subsidiaries, but any sub-consolidated supervisor can appeal to the ESFS if it feels its interests are insufficiently taken into account. If the ESFS subsequently judges a complaint well founded, it may overrule the consolidated supervisor. Crisis management is decided upon at the European level, although the national teams of the relevant sub-consolidated supervisors remain in charge of implementation.Among others, Vives,and Schoenmaker and Van Laecke have advocated this model.外文题目：Supervising cross-border banks in Europe出处：Journal of Banking Regulation; Aug2008, Vol. 9 Issue 4, p227-246, 20p作者：Aerdt Houbenn, Iskander Schrijvers and Tim Willems译文：欧洲跨境银行的监管摘要本文探讨了在反对当前欧洲金融市场结构的背景下，如何建立欧洲银行监管机构。