了解中国的崛起
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中国的崛起中国的崛起,不可能只是某一个领域的崛起,而是全方位的发展,如科学技术、经济发展、开放程度等。
只有这些因素发生合力作用,一个国家才能算是真正强大起来。
在我成长的17年间,从赖在父母房里看彩电,到在客厅沙发上看TCL液晶电视,再到宅在自己房里用电脑看在线电影,我却深切地感受到在一路奔涌的经济发展大潮的挟裹下,中国下层百姓生活的巨变。
拿破仑曾说过:“中国是一头沉睡的雄狮,一旦醒来,整个世界都会为之颤抖。
”改革开放三十多年来,人们见证了这个预言的实现,见证了这头东方睡狮是如何苏醒并以雄健的姿态腾飞的。
中国的经济飞速崛起,大家有目共睹。
今二十年来,我国经济一直保持高增长率快速发展。
2008年,我们的首都北京成功举办了奥运会;2010年,广州亚运会成功落幕,上海成功举办了世界博览会……这一系列盛世豪宴,让全世界感受到中国经济的蓬勃发展,也让世界人民一睹强大的经济后盾支持下的国家方方面面的风采。
中国科技提升,使海外震惊。
在进入21世纪以来,我国已多次向太空发射卫星和飞船以探索太空的奥秘。
2003年“神舟5号”飞船载着中国宇航员杨利伟飞向太空,2008年,中国宇航员翟志刚迈出走向太空的第一步,他的一小步是中国的一大步!2011年,中国第四代隐形战机歼20成功试飞 (2013)年,国防科技大学研制的“银河二号”超级计算机,成为当今世界运算速度最快,综合技术领先的超级计算机。
2013年,神舟十号成功发射···这一切,使得整个世界为中国科技的进步感到震惊。
中国的国际地位显著提高,“弱国无外交”,可以说是新中国初期的真实写照,然而这种情况在近年来悄然逆转。
首先,中国作为联合国的五个常任理事国之一,拥有对重大决议的否决权。
其次,在国际性商讨中,中国所必须参与大国。
再次,中国在各种其他类会议中也扮演着很重要的角色博鳌亚洲论坛,达沃斯全球经济论坛等一系列国际性的商业活动,都是在中国的主持下进行的。
中国崛起有人把中国看作是一条令人惧怕的大龙,这条饥饿的龙想要吞噬世界所有资源。
龙在中国是一个吉祥的象征,在封建社会时代,龙是权威的代表,中国人自己是认为是龙的传人,可见龙在中国的位置是多么的重要。
而龙在西方国家切是邪恶的象征,西方有很多的画都是“屠杀恶龙”作品,连电影中都有恶龙的存在,描述的龙的邪恶及人民是怎么样屠杀恶龙的。
西方人对中国的古代史、近代史以及当代中国的发展不了解,不了解中国的历史、文化,不了解中国人和不了解中国国情!因此,产生的对中国的许多误会、偏见,西方国家的人民都是在当时中学,大学的历史课上获取得。
认识水平就是中学、大学的历史教科书的教育水平,认识水平中的深刻印象就是中国是一个有的悠久的历史,是是一个落后、无知的国家,二次世界大战被日本侵略而打的8年抗战的国家。
说到中国,西方的民众都会知道中国是一个社会主义国家,但现在中国如何?很多的西方普通民众只是偶尔从电视、报纸中零星知道点中国的现状,很多都还停留在中学,大学的认识中。
西方人民通常认为中国和亚洲其他国家如日本、韩国是一样,是差不多的单一民族国家,许多西方人民都会把中国人民称为华族。
实际上,中国是一13亿人口的多民族国家,中国有960万平方公里的领土,幅员辽阔。
中国决不是一个单一的市场,世界1/5的人口决定的中国是一个消费大国,就算是基本的物质生活条件也是一个庞大的数字,幅员辽阔也决定的中国是一个多样的市场。
有人担心中国的崛起会成为世界不稳定的一个来源,那是人民对中国历史的不了解,中国的历史显示,中国不是一个侵略扩张的国家。
中国的元朝,清朝都是少数民族侵略并占领中国,最后都变成中国的一个少数民族,中国的领土也变的越来越大。
如佛教在印度产生,传到中国后切可以在中国一直流传到现在,而产生佛教的印度已经很少人信奉佛教拉,再如社会主义国家的建立是产生于前苏联,后来传到中国后一直到现在,而苏联已经解体使的苏联分裂成15个国家,而且都是实行资本主义社会。
中国崛起的意思
中国崛起的意思,是指:随着世界格局和国际关系的变化而出现了一些新的变化,是指世界政治、经济、
军事、文化、科技等方面正在发生变化。
中国在历史上曾被称为"东亚病夫",现在也是发展中国家。
现在在世界上很多地方都能看到我们民族曾经遭受的苦难。
中国人曾有过"落后就要挨打"的教训,这不能成为我们继续发展的包袱。
在政治制度方面,中国共产党领导下的多党合作制度以及政治协商会议制度等多种政治组织形式,使得我们民族有了实现真正民主发展与进步和争取国家富强、人民幸福伟大复兴的希望,从而促进了中国社会的民主化与现代化。
当前我们正在经历着一个新时代----------------- 社会主义初级阶段。
这个时候,
雲西昧们镪珪岩搖白哫不.自.钔呢芏奋虬搓油IJ]与A计值讲的剑新搭油怒±1茳抑由垡K族伟士售华由困埜
当。
T E D演讲—M a r t i n J a c q u e s《了解中国的崛起》(中英对照)Martin Jacques: Understanding the rise of ChinaThe world is changing with really remarkable speed. If you look at the chart at the top here, you’ll see that in 2025 these Goldman Sachs projections suggest that the Chinese economy will be almost the same size as the American economy. And if you look at the chart for 2050, it’s projected that the Chinese economy will be twice the size of the American economy, and the Indian economy will be almost the same size as the American economy. We should bear in mind here these projections were drawn up before the Western financial crises.世界正在以惊人的速度飞快得改变着。
如果你看着这上方的图表,你会看到在2025年,高盛投资公司的这些预测表明中国经济规模会和美国经济几乎相当。
如果看 2050年的图表,预测表明中国经济规模将会是美国经济的两倍,印度的经济规模将会和美国的经济几乎持平。
在这里,我们应该记住这些预测是在西方经济危机之前做出的。
A couple of weeks ago, I was looking at the latest projection by BNP (Banque Nationale de Paris) PARIBAS for when China will have a larger economy than the United States. Goldman Sachs projected 2027. The post-crisis projection is 2010. That’s just a decade way.几周前,我查看法国巴黎银行的最近预测,中国在什么时候会超越美国经济,成为第一大经济体。
了解中国的崛起演讲稿The wor l d is changi n n g with real l y remarkabl e e speed. If y y ou look at t he chart at the top her e e, you’ll se e e that in 20225, these Go l dman Sachs p p rojections s s uggest that the Chinese economy wil l be almost t he same siz e e as the Ame r ican econom y y. And if yo u u look at th e e chart for 22050, it’s p r ojected tha t the Chines e e economy wi l l be twice t he size of t he American economy, an d d the Indian economy wil l be almost t he same siz e e as the Ame r ican econom y y. And we sh o o uld bear in mind here t h h at these pr o o jections we r e drawn up b b efore the W e e stern finan c c ial crisis.A couple of weeks ago, I was lookin g g at the lat e e st projecti o o n by BNP Pa r ibas for wh e e n China wil l have a lar g g er economy t han the Uni t ed States. G G oldman Sach s s projected 22027. The po s s t-crisis pr o o jection is 22020. That’s just a deca d d e away. Chi n n a is going t o change th e e world in t w w o fundament a a l respects.First of al l, it’s a hu g g e developin g g country wi t h a populat i on of 1.3 b i llion peopl e e, which has been growin g g for over 300 years at a r ound 10 per c c ent a year.And within a decade, it w w ill have th e e largest ec o o nomy in the world. Neve r before in t he modern e r a has the l a a rgest econo m m y in the wo r ld been tha t of a devel o o ping countr y y, rather th a a n a develop e e d country. S S econdly, fo r the first t ime in the m m odern era, t he dominant country in t he world --which I thi n n k is what C h h ina will be c c ome -- will be not from the West an d d from very,very differ e e nt civiliza t ional roots.Now I know it’s a wide s s pread assum p p tion in the West that, a a s countries modernize, t hey also We s s ternize. Th i s is an ill u u sion. It’s a a n assumptio n n that moder n n ity is a pr o o duct simply of competit i on, markets and technol o o gy. It is n o o t; it is al s s o shaped eq u u ally by his t ory and cul t ure. China i s not like t he West, an d d it will no t become lik e e the West. I t will rema i n in very f u u ndamental r e e spects very different. N N ow the big q q uestion her e e is obvious l y, how do w e e make sense of China? H o o w do we try to understa n n d what Chin a a is? And th e e problem we have in the West at the moment by-a n n d-large is t hat the con v v entional ap p p roach is th a a t we unders t and it real l y in Wester n n terms, usi n n g Western i d d eas. We can’t. Now I wa n n t to offer y y ou three bu i lding block s s for trying to understa n n d what Chin a a is like --just as a b e e ginning.Th e e first is t h h is, that Ch i na is not r e e ally a nati o o n state. Ok a a y, it’s cal l ed itself a nation stat e e for the la s s t hundred y e e ars. But ev e e ryone who k n n ows anythin g g about Chin a a knows it’s a lot older than this. T T his was wha t China look e e d like with the victory of the Qin D D ynasty in 2221 B.C. at t h h e end of th e e warring st a a te period -- the birth o o f modern Ch i na. And you can see it a a gainst the b b oundaries o f modern Chi n n a. Or immed i ately after w w ard, the Ha n n Dynasty, s t ill 2,000 y e e ars ago. An d d you can se e e already it occupies mo s s t of what w e e now know a s s Eastern Ch i na, whichi s s where the v v ast majorit y y of Chinese lived then a a nd live now.Now what i s s extraordin a a ry about th i s is, what g g ives China i t’s sense o f being Chin a a, what give s s the Chines e e the sense o o f what it i s s to be Chin e e se, comes n o o t from the l ast hundred years, not f rom the nat i on state pe r iod, which i s what happ e e ned in the W W est, but fr o o m the perio d d, if you li k k e, of the c i vilization s s tate. I’m t h h inking here, for exampl e e, of custom s s like ances t ral worship, of a very d d istinctive n n otion of th e e state, lik e e wise, a ver y y distinctiv e e notion of t he family, s s ocial relat i onships lik e e guanxi, Co n n fucian valu e e s and so on.These are a a ll things t h h at come fro m m the period of the civi l ization sta t e. In other words, Chin a a, unlike th e e Western st a a tes and mos t countries i n the world,is shaped b b y its sense of civiliza t ion, its ex i stence as a civilizatio n n state, rat h h er than as a a nation sta t e. And ther e e’s one othe r thing to a d d d to this, a a nd that is t his: Of cou r se we know C C hina’s big,huge, demog r aphically a n n d geographi c c ally, with a a population of 1.3 bill i on people. W W hat we ofte n n aren’t rea l ly aware of is the fact that China i s extremely diverse and very plural i stic, and i n n many ways v v ery decentr a a lized. Y ou c c an’t run a p p lace on thi s s scale simp l y from Beij i ng, even th o o ugh we thin k k this to be the case. I t’s never be e e n the case.So this is C C hina, a civ i lization st a a te, rather t han a natio n n state. And what does i t mean? Well I think it h h as all sort s s of profoun d d implicatio n n s.I’ll giv e e you two qu i ck ones. Th e e first is t h h at the most important p o o litical val u u e for the C h h inese is un i ty, is the m m aintenance o o f Chinese c i vilization. Y ou know, 2,000 years a g g o, Europe: b b reakdown, t h h e fragmenta t ion of the H H oly Roman E m m pire [Roman Empire]. It divided, an d d it’s remai n n ed divided e e ver since. C C hina, over t he same tim e e period, we n n t in exactl y y the opposi t e direction,very painf u u lly holding this huge c i vilization, civilizatio n n state toge t her.The se c c ond is mayb e e more prosa i c, which is Hong Kong. D D o you remem b b er the hand o o ver of Hong Kong by Bri t ain to Chin a a in 1997? Y o o u may remem b b er what the Chinese con s s titutional p p roposition w w as. One cou n n try, two sy s s tems. And I’ll lay a wa g g er that bar e e ly anyone i n n the West b e e lieved them. “Window dr e e ssing. When China gets i t’s hands o n n Hong Kong,that won’t b b e the case.”” 13 years o n n, the polit i cal and leg a a l system in Hong Kong i s s as differe n n t now as it was in 1997.We were wr o o ng. Why wer e e we wrong? W W e were wron g g because we thought, na t urally enou g g h, in natio n n state ways. Think of G e e rman unific a a tion, 1990.What happen e e d? Well, ba s s ically the E E ast was swa l lowed by th e e West. One n n ation, one s s ystem. That is the nati o o n state men t ality. But y y ou can’t ru n n a country l ike China, a a civilizati o o n state, on the basis o f one civili z z ation, one s s ystem. It d o o esn’t work.So actually the respons e e of China t o o the questi o o n of Hong K o o ng -- as it will be to t he question of Taiwan -- was a natu r al response: one civili z z ation, many systems.Le t me offer y o o u another b u u ilding bloc k k to try and understand C C hina -- may b b e not such a a comfortabl e e one. The C h h inese have a a very, very different c o o nception of race to mos t other coun t ries. Do yo u u know, of t h h e 1.3 billi o o n Chinese, o o ver 90 perc e e nt of them t hink they b e e long to the same race, t he Han. Now this is com p p letely diff e e rent from t h h e other wor l d’s most po p p ulous count r ies. India,the United S S tates, Indo n n esia, Brazi l-- all of t hem are mul t iracial. Th e e Chinese do n n’t feel lik e e that. Chin a a is only mu l tiracial re a a lly at the m m argins. So t he question is, why? We l l the reaso n n, I think, e e ssentially i s, again, b a a ck to the c i vilization s s tate.A his t ory of at l e e ast 2,000 y e e ars, a hist o o ry of conqu e e st, occupat i on, absorpt i on, assimil a a tion and so on, led to t he process b b y which, ov e e r time, thi s s notion of t he Han emer g g ed -- of co u u rse, nurtur e e d by a grow i ng and very powerful se n n se of cultu r al identity.Now the gr e e at advantag e e of this hi s s torical exp e e rience has b b een that, w i thout the H a a n, China co u u ld never ha v v e held toge t her. The Ha n n identity h a a s been the c c ement which has held th i s country t o o gether. The great disad v v antage of i t is that th e e Han have a very weak c o o nception of cultural di f ference. Th e e y really be l ieve in the i r own super i ority, and t hey are dis r espectful o f those who a a re not. Hen c c e their att i tude, for e x x ample, to t h h e Uyghurs a n n d to the Ti b b etans.Or l e e t me give y o o u my third b b uilding blo c c k, the Chin e e se state. N o o w the relat i onship betw e e en the stat e e and societ y y in China i s s very diffe r entfrom th a a t in the We s s t. Now we i n n the West o v v erwhelmingl y y seem to th i nk -- in th e e se days at l east -- tha t the author i ty and legi t imacy of th e e state is a function of democracy. T T he problem w w ith this pr o o position is that the Ch i nese state e e njoys more l egitimacy a n n d more auth o o rity amongs t the Chines e e than is tr u u e with any W W estern stat e e. And the r e e ason for th i s is becaus e e-- well, t h h ere are two reasons, I t hink. And i t’s obviousl y y got nothin g g to do with democracy, b b ecause in o u u r terms the Chinese cer t ainly don’t have a demo c c racy. And t h h e reason fo r this is, f i rstly, beca u u se the stat e e in China i s s given a ve r y special --it enjoys a a very speci a a l significa n n ce as the r e e presentativ e e, the embod i ment and th e e guardian o f Chinese ci v v ilization, o o f the civil i zation stat e e. This is a s s close as C h h ina gets to a kind of s p p iritual rol e e.And the s e e cond reason is because,whereas in E E urope and N o o rth America,the state’s s power is c o o ntinuously c c hallenged --I mean in t he European tradition, h h istorically against the church, aga i nst other s e e ctors of th e e aristocrac y y, against m e e rchants and so on -- fo r1,000 year s s, the power of the Chin e e se state ha s s not been c h h allenged. I t’s had no s e e rious rival s s. So you ca n n see that t h h e way in wh i ch power ha s s been const r ucted in Ch i na is very d d ifferent fr o o m our exper i ence in Wes t ern history.The result, by the way, is that th e e Chinese ha v v e a very di f ferent view of the stat e e. Whereas w e e tend to vi e e w it as an i ntruder, a s s tranger, ce r tainly an o r gan whose p o o wers need t o o be limited or defined a a nd constrai n n ed, theChi n n ese don’t s e e e the state like that a t all. The C h h inese view t he state as an intimate-- not just as an intim a a te actually, as a membe r of the fam i ly -- not j u u st in fact a a s a member o o f the famil y y, but as th e e head of th e e family, th e e patriarch o o f the famil y y. This is t h h e Chinese v i ew of the s t ate -- very, very diffe r ent to ours. It’s embed d d ed in socie t y in a diff e e rent kind o f way to wha t is the cas e e in the Wes t.And I wou l d suggest t o o you that a c c tually what we are deal i ng with her e e, in the Ch i nese contex t, is a new k k ind of para d d igm, which i s different from anythi n n g we’ve had to think ab o o ut in the p a a st. Know th a a t China bel i eves in the market and t he state. I mean, Adam S S mith, alrea d d y writing i n n the late 188th century s s aid, “The C h h inese marke t is larger a a nd more dev e e loped and m o o re sophisti c c ated than a n n ything in E u u rope.” And, apart from t he Mao peri o o d, that has remained mo r e-or-less t h h e case ever since. But t his is comb i ned with an extremely s t rong and ub i quitous sta t e. The stat e e is everywh e e re in China.I mean, it’s leading f i rms, many o f them are s t ill publicl y y owned. Pri v v ate firms, h h owever larg e e they are, l ike Lenovo,depend in m a a ny ways on s s tate patron a a ge. Targets for the eco n n omy and so o o n are set b y y the state.And the sta t e, of cours e e, its autho r ity flows i n n to lots of o o ther areas -- as we are familiar wi t h -- with s o o mething lik e e the the on e e-child poli c c y.Moreover, this is a v v ery old sta t e tradition, a very old tradition o f statecraft. I mean, if you want an illustratio n n of this, t h h e Great Wal l isone. Bu t this is an o o ther, this i s the Grand Canal, whic h h was constr u u cted in the first insta n n ce in the f i fth century B.C. and wa s s finally co m m pleted in t h h e seventh c e e ntury A.D. I t went for 11,114 miles,linking Bei j ing with Ha n n gzhou and S h h anghai. So t here’s a lo n n g history o f extraordin a a ry state in f rastructura l projects i n n China, whi c c h I suppose helps us to explain wha t we see tod a a y, which is something l i ke the Thre e e Gorges Dam and many ot h h er expressi o o ns of state competence w w ithin China. So there w e e have three building bl o o cks for try i ng to to un d d erstand the difference t hat is Chin a a -- the civ i lization st a a te, the not i on of race a a nd the natu r e of the st a a te and its r elationship to society.And yet we s s till insist,by-and-lar g g e, in think i ng that we c c an understa n n d China by s s imply drawi n n g on Wester n n experience, looking at it through W W estern eyes,using West e e rn concepts.If you wan t to know wh y y we unerrin g g ly seem to g g et China wr o o ng -- our p r edictions a b b out what’s g g oing to hap p p en to China are incorre c c t -- this i s s the reason. Unfortunat e e ly I think,I have to s a a y that I th i nk attitude towards Chi n n a is that o f a kind of l ittle Weste r ner mentali t y. It’s kin d d of arrogan t. It’s arro g g ant in the s s ense that w e e think that we are best,and theref o o re we have t he universa l measure. A n n d secondly,it’s ignora n n t. We refus e e to really a a ddress the i ssue of dif f erence. Y ou know, there’s a very in t eresting pa s s sage in a b o o ok by Paul C C ohen, the A m m erican hist o o rian. AndP a a ul Cohen ar g g ues that th e e West think s s of itself a a s probably t he most cos m m opolitan of all culture s s. But it’s n n ot. In many ways, it’s t he most par o o chial, beca u u se for 200 y y ears, the W e e st has been so dominant in the worl d d that it’s n n ot really n e e eded to und e e rstand othe r cultures, o o ther civili z z ations. Bec a a use, at the end of the d d ay, it coul d d, if necess a a ry by force, get its ow n n way. Where a a s those cul t ures -- vir t ually the r e e st of the w o o rld, in fac t -- which h a a ve been in a a far weaker position, v i s-a-vis the West, have b b een thereby forced to u n n derstand th e e West, beca u u se of the W e e st’s presen c c e in those s s ocieties. A n n d therefore,they are, a a s a result, more cosmop o o litan in ma n n y ways than the West.I mean, take t he question of East Asi a a. East Asia:Japan, Kor e e a, China, e t c. -- a thi r d of the wo r ld’s popula t ion lives t h h ere, now th e e largest ec o o nomic regio n n in the wor l d. And I’ll tell you no w w, that East Asianers, p e e ople from E a a st Asia, ar e e far more k n n owledgeable about the W e e st than the West is abo u u t East Asia. Now this p o o int is very germane, I’m m afraid, to the present.Because wh a a t’s happeni n n g? Back to t hat chart a t the beginn i ng -- the G o o ldman Sachs chart. What is happenin g g is that, v e e ry rapidly i n historica l terms, the world is be i ng driven a n n d shaped, n o o t by the ol d d developed c c ountries, b u u t by the de v v eloping wor l d. We’ve se e e n this in t e e rms of the G G20 -- usurp i ng very rap i dly the pos i tion of the G7, or the G G8. And ther e e are two co n n sequences o f this. Firs t, the West i s rapidly l o o sing its in f luence in t h h e world. Th e e re was a dr a a matic illus t ration of t h h isactually a year ago -- Copenhage n n, climate c h h ange confer e e nce. Europe was not at t he final ne g g otiating ta b b le. When di d d that last h h appen? I wo u u ld wager it was probabl y y about 200 y y ears ago. A n n d that is w h h at is going to happen i n n the future.And the se c c ond implica t ion is that the world w i ll inevitab l y, as a con s s equence, be c c ome increas i ngly unfami l iar to us, b b ecause it’l l be shaped b b y cultures a a nd experien c c es and hist o o ries that w e e are not re a a lly familia r with, or c o o nversant wi t h. And at l a a st, I’m afr a a id -- take E E urope, Amer i ca is sligh t ly differen t-- but Eur o o peans by an d d large, I h a a ve to say, a a re ignorant, are unawar e e about the w w ay the worl d d is changin g g. Some peop l e -- I’ve g o o t an Englis h h friend in C C hina, and h e e said, “The continent i s s sleepwalki n n g into obli v v ion.” Well,maybe that’s s true, mayb e e that’s an e e xaggeration. But there’s s another pr o o blem which g g oes along w i th this -- t hat Europe i s increasin g g ly out of t o o uch with th e e world -- a n n d that is a sort of los s s of a sense of the futu r e. I mean, E E urope once,of course, o o nce command e e d the futur e e in it’s co n n fidence. Ta k k e the 19th c c entury for e e xample. But this, alas,is no longe r true.If y o o u want to f e e el the futu r e, if you w a a nt to taste the future,try China --there’s ol d d Confucius.This is a r a a ilway stati o o n the like o o f which you’ve never se e e n before. I t does n’t ev e e n look like a railway s t ation. This is the new G G uangzhou ra i lway statio n n for the hi g g h-speed tra i ns. China a l ready has a bigger netw o o rk than any other count r y in the wo r ld andwill soon have m o o re than all the rest of the world p u u t together.Or take thi s s: Now this i s an idea, b b ut it’s an i dea to by t r ied out sho r tly in a su b b urb of Beij i ng. Here yo u u have a meg a a bus, on the upper deck c c arries abou t 2,000 peop l e. It trave l s on rails d d own a subur b b an road, an d d the cars t r avel undern e e ath it. And it does spe e e ds of up to about 100 m i les an hour. Now this i s s the way th i ngs are goi n n g to move, b b ecause Chin a a has a very specific pr o o blem, which is differen t from Europ e e and differ e e nt from the United Stat e e s. China ha s s huge numbe r s of people and no spac e e. So this i s s a solution to a situat i on where Ch i na’s going t o have many, many, many cities over20 million p p eople.Okay, so how wou l d I like to finish? Wel l, what shou l d our attit u u de be towar d d s this worl d d that we se e e very rapid l y developin g g before us?I think the r e will be g o o od things a b b out it and t here will b e e bad things about it. B u u t I want to argue, abov e e all, a big picture pos i tive for th i s world. Fo r 200 years,the world w a a s essential l y governed b b y a fragmen t of the hum a a n populatio n n. That’s wh a a t Europe an d d North Amer i ca represen t ed. The arr i val of coun t ries like C h h ina and Ind i a -- betwee n n them 38 pe r cent of the world’s pop u u lation -- a n n d others li k k e Indonesia and Brazil a a nd so on, r e e present the most import a a nt single a c c t of democr a a tization in the last 2000years. Civ i lizations a n n d cultures,which had b e e en ignored,which had n o o voice, whi c c h were not l istened to,which were n n ot known ab o o ut, will ha v v e a differe n n t sort of r e e presentatio n n in this wo r ld. As huma n n ists, wemu s s t welcome, s s urely, this transformat i on. And we w w ill have to learn about these civil i zations.Th i s big ship h h ere was the one sailed i n by Zheng H H e in the ea r ly 15th cen t ury on his g g reat voyage s s around the South China Sea, the Ea s s t China Sea and across t he Indian O c c ean to East Africa. The little boat in front of it was the o o ne in which, 80 years l a a ter, Christ o o pher Columb u u s crossed t h h e Atlantic.(Laughter) O O r, look car e e fully at th i s silk scro l l made by Z h h uZhou in 13668. I think t hey’re play i ng golf. Ch r ist, the Ch i nese even i n n vented golf.Welcome to the future.Thank you.。
作者: 刘立群[1,2]
作者机构: [1]北京外国语大学德语系教授 [2]中国德国研究会副会长兼秘书长
出版物刊名: 中国报道
页码: 106-106页
主题词: 中国崛起 德国人 出版 施密特 前总理 畅销书 德文版 密码
摘要:对中国渎者来说,德国人弗郎克·泽林的名字还很陌生,不过他在德国已颇有名气,因为在短短几年内他相继出版了5部与当今中国迅速崛起有关的书。
他与前总理施密特合著的《与中国为邻》出版后引起轰动,另一部书《中国震惊》出版后迅即登上德国畅销书宝座。
2005年泽林出版《中国密码》一书德文版并随后译成英文,一经问世便引起评论界广泛重视和高度评价,称“如果德国不愿接受惨遭淘汰的命运,则必须破解‘中国密码’”,而此书正可以“唤醒德国人”。
了解中国的崛起马丁·杰克斯剑桥大学政治和国际研究系高级研究员世界正在以惊人的速度飞快得改变着。
如果你看着这上方的图标,你会看到在2025年,高盛投资公司的这些预测,表明中国经济规模会和美国经济几乎相当。
如果看2050年的图表,预测表明中国经济规模将会是美国经济的两倍,印度的经济规模将会和美国的经济几乎持平。
在这里,我们应该记住这些预测是在西方经济危机之前做出的。
几周前,我查看法国巴黎银行的最近预测(2010),中国在什么时候会超越美国经济,成为第一大经济体。
高盛投资公司预测是2027年。
危机过后的预测是2020年。
这也不过只有10年的光景。
中国将在两个基本方面上改变世界。
首先,中国是一个幅员辽阔的发展中国家,它有13亿人口。
在过去30年间,它以每年百分之10左右的经济增长率发展。
在未来10年间,它会有世界上最大的经济体。
在世界近代史中,以前从来都是发达国家,还没有一个发展中的国家变成了世界上最大的经济体。
第二,在现代史中第一次在世界上,我认为中国会变成大国,它有别于西方国家,它是从非常、非常不同的文明根源发展起来的大国。
现在我知道西方国家有一个普遍的假设,随着国家的现代化,它们也会西方化。
这是个幻想。
这是对于现代化仅仅是竞争、市场和技术的一种产品的假设。
中国的现代化不仅仅是这样的,也是由历史和文化共同作用下形成的。
中国不同于西方国家,它也不会变成和西方国家一样。
它会在非常基础的方面表现得非常不同。
现在这的大问题明显是,我们该怎样认识中国?我们该怎样了解中国?在西方我们现在的问题答题上是传统的办法。
我们用西方的术语,用西方的观点来了解真正的中国。
我们不能这样。
现在我想给大家三个基础理由来试着了解中国,这只是开始。
首先是这个,中国事实上不是一个民族国家。
在过去的几百年,中国自称是一个民族国家。
但对中国很了解的人知道中国比这历史要悠久得多。
中国是在公元前221年也就在战国时期的末期从秦朝一统江山起,现代中国就诞生了。
我国崛起的发展历程我国崛起的发展历程可以追溯到改革开放以来的近四十年。
自1978年以来,我国利用市场经济改革的机会,实现了自身发展的奇迹,成为当今世界上最具影响力的国家之一。
改革开放的第一步是经济体制的重大调整。
1978年,我国开始了农村改革,放开了农民的生产经营权,并引入了一系列的农村改革措施。
农村改革的成功为后续的改革提供了向心力。
随着时间的推移,我国逐步实行了一系列的市场经济改革措施,包括吸收外资的政策、建立特区和经济开发区等。
这些措施极大地激发了经济活力,为我国崛起打下了坚实基础。
改革开放的第二步是外贸的快速增长。
随着市场经济的推进,我国逐渐融入了全球经济体系。
自1978年至今,我国的贸易额以惊人的速度增长,出口额从1978年的208亿美元增长至2018年的2.5万亿美元。
我国的快速增长在世界贸易中占据着重要的地位,这也为我国崛起提供了广阔的国际空间。
改革开放的第三步是科技创新的推动。
我国在科技创新方面取得了重大突破。
在过去的几十年里,我国加大了对教育和科研的投入,大力支持科技创新。
中国的科技企业以及高新技术产业得到了迅猛发展,成为我国崛起的重要支撑。
例如,我国在人工智能、5G通信、高铁、太空探测等领域取得了重大突破,成为全球科技创新的领头羊之一。
改革开放的第四步是人民生活水平的提高。
随着经济的飞速增长,我国人民的生活条件得到了显著改善。
人民的收入水平显著提高,消费需求不断增加,居民的贫困率大幅下降。
我国的基本医疗保险和社会保障体系也得到了健全,人民的基本生活保障得到有效保障。
这些改善为我国的社会稳定和国家崛起打下了坚实的基础。
我国崛起的发展历程是一个充满辛勤努力和艰辛困难的历程。
作为世界最大的发展中国家,我国在经济增长、科技创新、人民生活水平提高等方面取得了巨大的成功。
我国的崛起不仅给自己带来了长足发展,也为全球稳定和繁荣作出了巨大贡献。
随着我国不断进行的改革开放和科技创新,我相信我们国家的崛起将会继续取得更加辉煌的成就。
中国的崛起同世界上其他已经崛起和正在崛起的国家一样,中国的崛起之路在取得巨大成就的同时,也经历了无数的风风雨雨,但中华民族从来都是一个敢于挑战艰险不断拼搏向前的民族,不管遇到什么困难、挫折,它总能以崭新的姿态不断的向前发展,它的成长之路无可辩驳的说明了这一点。
由于军阀混战,日本帝国主义侵略中国,再加上三年内战,新中国成立之初,面临了几乎不可逾越的障碍:工业发展水平极低、城市工业畸形、区域工业布局极不平衡、基础设施遭到了很大的破坏、通货膨胀极其严重、粮价飞涨…..,当时中国是世界上最贫穷的国家之一,平均国民收入仅是印度的一半,世界上很多过国家都对中国逾越这个“烂摊子”的能力表示怀疑。
但中华民族自始至终都是一个不屈服的民族,在中国共产党的领导下,全国人民万众一心,众志成城,齐心协力共同为新中国的发展而不懈奋斗。
中华人民共和国成立后,中国共产党全国人民对农业、手工业和资本主义工商业进行了社会主义改造,产生了重大的意义,在理论上和实践上丰富和发展了马克思列宁主义的科学社会主义理论,极大地促进了工、农、商业的社会变革和整个国民经济的发展。
实现了把生产资料私有制转变为社会主义公有制的任务。
政治上社会主义基本制度在我国初步建立;经济上社会主义计划经济在我国基本确立,为我国社会主义工业化开辟了道路;从此计入了社会主义初级阶段。
1955年7月,一届全国人大会议审议通过了“一五”计划,其确定的基本计划的主要任务是:集中主要力量,进行苏联帮助我国设计的156个大型建设项目为中心,友由694个大中型建设项目组成的工业建设,建立我国社会主义工业化的基础。
但中国的发展道路从来都不是一帆风顺的,在建设新中国的过程中我国曾遇到过重大的挫折和挑战,1958年的“大跃进”,是作为1957年整风反右之后要出现“经济建设高潮”提出来的,形成了一场包含层层高压和层层虚报的政治运动。
这段时期是我国经济波动最大的时期,工业产值增长速度最高时打54.8%,最低时至-32.8%。
中国崛起的十个阶段杨帆序:关于中国崛起的大趋势10年前《中国走向崩溃》红极一时,但是他预测错了。
为什么,应该总结一下原因,中国还是有潜力的,我的《崛起十个阶段》在十月一日登在《环球时报》上了。
当然问题也不可忽视,主要就是腐败和利益集团干政。
如果重大决策错误,比如把人民币自由兑换了,没有几年就出大事。
长期就是人口来化了,技术上不去。
不过近5-年不会出大事。
奈比斯特《中国大趋势》已发行1400万册。
又是一个吹捧的。
我看还是多听听中国人自己的吧。
环球时报约稿:中国崛起的十个阶段中国政法大学教授杨帆近代中国的衰落开始于1840年战争失败,以后105年连战连败,不平等条约到1906年就签定700多个,中国丧失了三分之一领土,被迫实行5%的关税,经济总量从世界的30% 下降到5%。
而美国实行46%的关税,经济从世界2%上升到30%。
中国崛起的标志是1945年抗日战争胜利,以后还有6次战争的胜利,解放军围绕边境打了一圈,赢得了联合国对中华人民共和国的承认,奠定了以后和平与发展,改革与开放的基础。
中国崛起的第二个阶段,是新中国的建立与发展。
随着国家强大我们必将统一台湾。
国家的强大是志士仁人奋斗100多年积累的成果,忘记或否定这段历史,是许多人低估中国崛起潜力,轻言“中国崩溃”的根本原因。
第三个阶段是社会的安定和人口的增加,造成70年经济高速度增长。
年中国人口一直徘徊在4----4。
5亿之间,人均寿命只有36岁,经济不能增长,从洋务派以来所付出了建立近代工业的努力基本付诸东流,到1949年工业只占工农业的10%。
社会主义民生政策促使人口在30年内增加到8亿多,人均寿命提高到68岁,年轻人比例大大提高。
年轻人储蓄率高,储蓄等于投资是宏观经济的基本假设,巨额投资造就经济高速增长,这就是中国70年经济高速增长的秘密。
第四阶段是工业化原始积累。
我们一直认为计划经济搞单一国有制,压低消费,限制个人自由,是一种超阶段的“左倾错误”,应该搞新民主主义或社会主义初级阶段,却搞了高级阶段的许多东西。
我要告诉你中国正在崛起作文朋友!今天我可得好好跟你唠唠,中国啊,就像一颗超级耀眼的星星,正在以一种超酷的方式崛起呢!你看啊,先从咱的吃说起。
以前啊,能填饱肚子就不错了,现在呢?大街小巷到处都是美食的天堂。
从传统的八大菜系到世界各地的美食,应有尽有。
而且咱中国的美食还走向了世界,什么火锅啊,那红红的锅底,热辣辣的涮菜,在国外也是大受欢迎。
这美食的发展可不仅仅是为了满足口腹之欲,背后是整个农业、物流、商业的大发展。
农民伯伯们种出越来越多品种的新鲜食材,物流像小火箭一样快速把食材运到各地,商家们再把它们变成美味端上桌。
这就是中国崛起在舌尖上的体现呀。
再说说穿的。
以前的衣服款式就那么几种,颜色也单调得很。
现在呢?时尚秀场上,中国的设计师们创意无限,传统的刺绣、云锦等元素和现代时尚完美结合。
在商场里,各种风格的衣服琳琅满目,你可以今天穿着嘻哈风的潮服,明天换上优雅的中式旗袍。
而且咱们的衣服还大量出口呢,世界上好多人都穿着“中国制造”的衣服,这就像咱中国人给全世界送上的时尚大礼包。
住的方面也超厉害。
城市里高楼大厦像春笋一样冒出来,那些现代化的建筑设计又酷又实用。
小区里的环境也是美美的,绿化做得像小花园一样。
以前很多人住在简陋的房子里,现在好多家庭都住进了宽敞明亮的大房子。
而且咱们的建筑技术也走向了世界,帮助其他国家建桥、盖楼。
就像那“一带一路”倡议下的项目,咱们的建筑团队到国外去,展示中国建造的实力,让世界看到中国崛起在一砖一瓦间。
行就更不用说了。
中国的高铁,那速度,“嗖”一下就到目的地了。
以前出远门坐个绿皮火车要晃晃悠悠好久,现在高铁几个小时就能让你穿越好几个城市。
高速公路也四通八达,就像一张巨大的蜘蛛网,把各个地方紧密连接起来。
还有那飞机,航线越来越多,让你可以轻松地飞到世界各地。
共享单车在城市里随处可见,绿色出行方便又环保。
这些交通上的发展让咱中国人的生活更便捷,也让中国在世界的联系更紧密,这是中国崛起在道路上的奔跑啊。
中国的崛起和发展对世界的影响是什么?随着中国经济和国力的迅速增长,中国的崛起和发展已经成为了世界瞩目的焦点。
中国的影响不仅仅局限于亚洲地区,而是影响深远甚至波及全球。
那么,中国的崛起和发展对世界的影响是什么呢?下面将分别从经济、政治、文化等方面进行分析。
一、经济方面1.中国经济的崛起已经成为了全球经济结构的重要组成部分。
中国在全球制造业产值中所占比重不断增加,对于全球经济发展的带动作用越来越明显。
2.中国不断扩大对外开放,提供了更多机会和平台,搭建起了沟通各国经济的桥梁。
同时,中国积极参与国际贸易谈判,推动全球贸易自由化和区域合作。
3.中国正在发扬和平和互惠互利的精神,在国际上积极推进亚投行、一带一路等倡议,为发展中、欠发达国家提供财务支持,并且帮助推进这些国家的基础设施建设、经济发展等。
二、政治方面1.在联合国安理会等国际机构中,中国发挥着越来越重要的作用,为全球和平稳定提供了重要支持。
同时,中国也愿意参与国际事务,与其他国家保持良好的合作关系,推动各种国际机制的改革与完善。
2.中国始终坚持抗击恐怖主义和边境安全问题,为全球和平和安全发挥了重要作用。
特别是在和平使命和海上联合军演等方面,中国作为重要参与国,积极推动了国际安全合作。
3.中国立足于对国家主权和安全的坚定维护,为维护全球和平和安全注入了积极力量。
通过与各国的政治沟通,积极推进各种问题的解决,为尽力维护地区和世界各地的和平稳定做出了贡献。
三、文化方面1. 中国的文化传统在全球范围内具有广泛的影响力。
中国古代哲学思想、传统文化艺术等在世界范围内享有盛誉,为全球文化交流和传承贡献了巨大的力量。
2. 中国的文化输出正在不断增强,将更多的中国文化推向世界舞台。
同时,中国也愿意开放更多的文化交流平台,努力加强中外文化之间的对话,推动全球文化交流发展。
3. 中国不断加强文化产业的发展,提高中国文化走向世界的实力。
通过加强文化产业的创新、发展和国际合作,推广中国文化节庆活动等,努力将中国文化推向更广阔的全球舞台。
文化软实力对中国崛起的影响一,崛起的内涵崛起,看似简单的两个字,古今中外不同的人有不同的理解。
崛起,在汉语字典里的解释是“兴起”或“突起”。
崛起,在英语中对应的单词是“rise”,英语词典里译为become more powerful”表示“更有权力”。
而今天我们说的崛起作为一个专门的术语,是指一个国家发展到一定程度,其实力的增强足可以对地区或世界的格局和稳定产生明显的影响。
崛起所反映的是国家所期望的某一种状态或目标,所刻画的是国家发展变化的一种过程,以及其发展变化所带来的巨大影响力。
首先,崛起是一种目标、是一种国家战略,也是国家利益的需要。
无论哪个国家都希望自己的经济、政治、军事、科学文化的实力能不断持续地发展,在改善本国人民的生活、加强本国军事保障、巩固本国社会稳定的同时,缩小本国和其它国家之间各方面的差距,提高自己在国际社会中的地位和声望,体现自己在地区或世界上的影响力。
因此,不管承不承认、不管明不明确,事实上崛起终究是一个国家长期战略目标的一部分。
其次,崛起是一个过程,是国家为实现其战略目标、维护其国家利益而努力的过程。
崛起过程尽管可能会因国内外的种种因素而遇到各种波折,在某个或某些阶段出现停滞或凝固,甚至于倒退,但从整体上讲.崛起是一个呈上升态势的变化过程,是一个动态的过程。
最后,崛起是一种影响,它是国家发展到一定程度的结果。
崛起使本国繁荣富强,使自身国民经济、政治、科学、国防等综合实力得以显著的提高。
同时,崛起也使其它国家原先的相对领先趋势或优先感明显削弱,因尔可以对一个地区的秩序甚至予整个世界的格局产生举足轻重的影响。
二,崛起的类型纵观历史,各个大国的崛起方式不外乎两种——武力崛起和和平崛起。
武力堀起是国家的堀起和战争、武力和暴力不可分。
在武力崛起的过程中,国家是一部战争机器,国家间的武力行为是解决各种矛盾纷争、确保函家崛起的有效手段。
但是和平崛起的崛超过程是和平的,并且崛起的目标也是为了争取世界的和平。
中国的崛起改革开放的经济奇迹中国的崛起: 改革开放的经济奇迹自1978年改革开放以来,中国经历了一场令世界瞩目的崛起。
目前,中国已成为世界第二大经济体,并在许多领域取得了令人瞩目的成就。
本文将探讨中国崛起的原因、改革开放政策的关键要素以及中国经济奇迹的影响。
一、改革开放的原因中国的崛起始于1978年,当时中国领导层意识到苏联的计划经济模式无法推动经济增长。
中国领导人决定进行改革开放,以引进外资和技术,实现经济现代化。
改革开放的原因之一是为了改善中国人民的生活水平。
在改革开放之前,中国的经济处于崩溃边缘,人民面临着贫困和不平等。
通过引进外资、扩大对外开放和改革国有企业,中国的经济逐渐复苏,并为人民提供了更好的生活条件。
二、改革开放政策的关键要素改革开放的成功在于其坚持了一系列关键要素。
其中包括:1.市场经济导向:中国采取了逐步转向市场经济的政策,放开了价格管制,鼓励民营企业的发展,并吸引外国企业来华投资。
2.外资引进:中国通过吸引外资,引进外资技术和管理经验,促进了中国工业的现代化进程。
这为中国创造了大量就业机会,并提高了人民的生活水平。
3.对外开放:中国扩大了对外贸易,降低了贸易壁垒,吸引了大量外国投资者和合作伙伴。
这不仅促进了中国经济的发展,也加强了中国与世界其他国家的联系。
4.国有企业改革:中国对国有企业进行了改革,引入市场机制和竞争机制,提高了国有企业的效率和竞争力。
三、中国经济奇迹的影响中国经济奇迹的影响深远且多方面。
以下是其主要影响之一:1.减少了全球贫困:中国的崛起带来了数亿人的脱贫。
中国采取了一系列扶贫政策,投资于基础设施建设和教育,提升了农村地区的经济状况。
中国的成功经验已成为世界各国减贫的重要参考。
2.推动全球经济增长:中国经济的快速增长为全球经济增长做出了巨大贡献。
中国的巨大市场吸引了全球企业,促进了国际贸易和投资。
3.加强了中国的国际地位:中国经济的崛起使其在国际舞台上发挥了更重要的作用。
我眼中的中国崛起在当下,国际形势竞争激烈,中国能伫立于世界强国之林,她的发展,她的改革,她的崛起,有着多方面的影响因。
1,在全球化时代,国际竞争已经成为世界经济的热点之一。
在国际金融危机的影响下,世界进入了如震荡起伏,各种各样的大局势,大调整,中国却在这种震荡中,觉醒,复苏。
2,中国的和平发展成为影响国际形势的重要因素,我国的国际地位稳步上升。
中国的发展本身就是对世界和平与发展的贡献。
从20世纪80年代开始,我国共解决了2亿多贫苦人口的温饱问题,这是人类史上的的一壮举。
世界银行行长沃尔森说,中国20年来对全球扶贫事业做出巨大贡献的国家,中国的发展以近乎并将继续给地区和世界带来广阔市场和合作空间。
中国是在国际竞争视角下崛起的。
3,从改革开放的角度来看,中国取得了显著地成就,我们锐意进取推进各方面体制改革,是我国成功实现了高度集中的计划经济体制,到充满活力的社会主义市场经济体制的伟大历史转折点。
我们不断扩大对外开放。
是我国成功实现了从封闭到全方位开放的伟大历史转折。
我们坚持对外开放的基本国策,打开国门搞建设,加快经济开放性发展。
从建设特区到开放沿海,沿江。
沿边,内陆地区再到加入世界贸易组织,从大国模引进来到大踏步走出去,利用国际国内两个市场,两种资源水平显著提高,国际竞争力不断增强。
我们坚信以经济建设为中心,我国综合国力买上新台阶,国际竞争力不断增强。
我国坚持以经济建设为中心,我国着力保障和改善民生,人民生活总体上达到小康水平。
这些年我国城乡居民增长最快,得到实惠最多的时期,在新农村全面教育高等教育总规模,大中小学在校生数量居世界第一。
办学质量不断提高。
就业规模继续扩大,全社会创业活力明显增强。
社会保证制度更加健全。
改革开放加快了中国崛起的步伐!4,中国已经成为世界第二大经济体,世界工业生产第一大国,世界最大的国内投资国,世界第三大贸易国等等,纵观取得这些骄人的成绩背后,是我们改革开放,对外开放取得伟大历史跨越。
社会主义新中国的崛起1949年10月1日,中华人民共和国宣告成立,标志着社会主义新中国的崛起。
这个历史性的时刻揭开了中国走向独立、自由和富强的新篇章。
本文将从政治、经济、文化等多个方面,探讨社会主义新中国的崛起及其影响。
一、政治崛起社会主义新中国崛起的一个重要方面就是政治崛起。
新中国成立后,中国共产党领导中国人民建立了人民代表大会制度,实现民主集中制的政治体制。
这一政治体制为中国提供了国家治理的基础,并且确保了广大人民群众有参与国家事务的权利。
在这个过程中,工农联盟得到加强,广大农民和工人的利益得到了有效保护,这无疑为社会主义新中国的崛起奠定了坚实的基础。
二、经济崛起经济建设是社会主义新中国崛起的重要支柱。
成立之初,中国面临着饥饿、贫穷和经济落后的困境。
然而,中国共产党领导下的中央政府坚持独立自主、自力更生的原则,通过土地改革和农民合作社的推行,实现了农业的社会主义改造。
随后,中央政府推动了工业化进程,在全国范围内进行了大规模的工业化建设。
在这个过程中,中国发展起了钢铁、煤炭、电力等重要产业,为经济崛起提供了坚实的基础。
同时,中国还积极推行对外开放政策,与其他国家开展了广泛的经济合作,这进一步推动了中国经济的崛起。
三、文化崛起社会主义新中国的崛起不仅在政治和经济上取得了显著成就,文化和教育也得到了大力发展。
新中国成立后,中国全面实施了义务教育制度,大力推行素质教育,为广大人民提供了平等的受教育机会。
与此同时,中国还加大了文化宣传的力度,通过文艺作品、媒体宣传和学术研究等方式,积极传播社会主义思想和价值观,提高广大人民的思想觉悟和文化素养。
这些文化崛起的努力为社会主义新中国的发展奠定了文化基础,也推动了全民族的精神文明建设。
总结社会主义新中国的崛起是中国人民和中国共产党共同努力的结果。
通过政治、经济和文化等多个方面的努力,新中国成功实现了国家独立和人民解放,并在全球范围内崭露头角。
社会主义新中国的崛起对世界产生了深远的影响,不仅为广大发展中国家树立了榜样,也为人类社会的进步做出了重要贡献。
The world is changing with really remarkable speed. If you look at the chart at the top here you’ll see that in 2025, these Goldman Sachs projections suggest that the Chinese economy will be almost the same size as the American economy. And if you look at the chart for 2050, it’s projected that the Chinese economy will be twice the size of the American economy, and the Indian economy will be almost the same size as the American economy. And we should bear in mind here that these projections were drawn up before the western financial crisis. A couple of weeks ago, I was looking at the latest projection by BNP Paribas for when china will have a larger economy than the United States. Goldman Sachs projected 2027. The post-crisis projection is 2020. That’s just a decade away. China is going to change the world in two fundamental respects. First of all, it’s a huge developing country with a population of 1.3 billion people, which has been growing for over 30 years at around ten percent a year. And with in a decade, it will have the largest economy in the world. Never before in the modern era has the largest economy in the world been that of a developing country, rather than a developed country. Secondly, for the first time in the modern era, the dominant country in the world which I think is what China will become will be not from the West and fromvery, very different civilizational roots. Now I know it’s a widespread assumption in the West that, as countries modernize, they also Westernize. This is an illusion. It’s an assumption that modernity is a product simply of competition, markets and technology. It’s not; it is also shaped equally by history and culture. China is not like the West, and it will not become like the West. It will remain in very fundamental respects very different. Now the big question here is obviously, how do we make sense of China? How do we try to understand what China is? And the problem we have in the West at the moment by-and-large is that the conventional approach is that we understand it really in western terms, using western ideas. We can’t. Now I want to offer you three building blocks for trying to understand what China is like-just as a beginning. The first is this, that China is not really a nation state. Okay, it’s called itself a nation state for the last hundred years. But everyone who knows anything about China knows it’s a lot older than this. This was what china looked like with the victory of the Qin Dynasty in 221 B.C. at the end of the warring state period- the birth of modern China. And you can see it against the boundaries of modern China. Or immediately afterward, the Han Dynasty, still 2000 years ago, and you can see already itoccupies most of what we now know as Eastern China, which is where the vast majority of Chinese lived then and live now. Now what is extraordinary about this is, what gives China it’s sense of being China, what gives the Chinese the sense of what it is to be Chinese, comes not from the last hundred years, not from the nation state period which is what happened in the West, but from the period, if you like, of the civilization state. I’m thinking here, for example, of customs like ancestral worship, of a very distinctive notion of the state, likewise, a very distinctive notion of the family, social relationships like guanxi, Confucian values and so on. These are all things that come from the period of the civilization state. In other words, China, unlike the western states and most countries of the world, is shaped by its sense of civilization, its existence as a civilization state, rather than as nation state. And there’s one other thing to add to this, and that is this. Of course we know China’s big, huge, demographically and geographically, with a population of 1.3 billion people. What we often don’t really aware of is the fact that China is extremely diverse and very pluralistic, and in many ways very decentralized. You can’t run a place on this scale simply from Beijing, even though we think this to be the case. It’s never been the case. So this is China, a civilization state,rather than a nation state. And what does it mean? Well I think it has all sorts of profound implications. I’ll give you two quick ones. The first is that the most important political value for the Chinese is unity, is the maintenance of Chinese civilization. You know, 2000 years ago, Europe: breakdown, the fragmentation of the Holy Roman Empire. It divided, and it’s remained divided ever since. China, over the same time period, went in exactly the opposite direction, very painfully holding this huge civilization, civilization state together. The second is maybe more prosaic, which is Hong Kong. Do you remember the handover of Hong Kong by Britain to China in 1997? You may remember what the Chinese constitutional proposition was. One country, two systems. And I’ll lay a wager that barely anyone in the West believed them. “Window dressing. When China gets its hands on Hong Kong, that won’t be the case.” Thirteen years on, the political and legal system in Hong Kong is as different now as it was in 1997. We were wrong. Why were we wrong? We were wrong because we thought, naturally enough, in nation state ways. Think of German unification, 1990. What happened? Well, basically the East was swallowed by the West. One nation, one system. That’s the nation state mentality. But you can’t run a country like China, a civilization state, on the basis of “onecivilization, one system”. It doesn’t work. So actually the response of China to the question of Hong Kong-as it will be to the question of Taiwan-was a natural response: one civilization, many systems. Let me offer you another building block to try and understand China, maybe not such a comfortable one. The Chinese have a very, very different conception of race to most other countries. Do you know, of the 1.3 billion Chinese, over 90 percent of them, think they belong to the same race, the Han. Now this is completely different from the other world’s most populous countries. India, the United States, Indonesia, Brazil-all of them are multiracial. The Chinese don’t feel like that. China is only multiracial really at the margins. So the question is, why? Well the reason, I think, essentially is, again, back to the civilization state. A history of at least 2000 years, a history of conquest, occupation, absorption, assimilation and so on, led to the process by which, over time, this notion of the Han emerged-of course nurtured by a growing and very powerful sense of cultural identity. Now the great advantage of this historical experience has been that, without the Han, China could never have held together. The Han identity has been the cement which has held this country together. The great disadvantage of it is that the Han have a very weak conceptionof cultural difference. They really believe in their own superiority, and they are disrespectful of those who are not. Hence their attitude, for example, to the Uyghurs and to the Tibetans…Or let me give you my third building block, the Chinese state. Now the relationship between the state and society in China is very different from that in the West. Now we in the West overwhelmingly seem to think-in these days at least-that the authority and legitimacy of the state is a function of democracy. The problem with this proposition is that the Chinese state enjoys more legitimacy and more authority amongst the Chinese than is true with any western state. And the reason for this is because-well, there are two reasons, I think. And it’s obviously got nothing to do with democracy, because in our terms the Chinese certainly don’t have a democracy. The reason for this is, firstly, because the state in China is given a very special-it enjoys a very special significance as the representative, the embodiment and the guardian of Chinese civilization, of the civilization state. This is as close as China gets to a kind of spiritual role. And the second reason is because whereas in Europe and North America, the state’s power is continuously challenged-I mean in the European tradition, historically against the church, against other sectors of thearistocracy, against merchants and so on-for 1000 years, the power of the Chinese state has not been challenged. It’s had no serious rivals. So you can see that the way in which power has been constructed in China is very different from our experience in western history. The result, by the way, is that the Chinese have a very different view of the state. Whereas we tend to view it as an intruder, a stranger, certainly an organ whose power need to be limited or defined and constrained, the Chinese don’t see the state like that at all. The Chinese view the state as an intimate- not just as an intimate actually, as a member of the family-not just in fact as a member of the family, but as the head of the family, the patriarch of the family. This is the Chinese view of the state-very, very different to ours. It’s embedded in society in a different kind of way to what is the case in the West. And I would suggest to you that actually what we are dealing with here, in the Chinese context, is a new kind of paradigm, which is different from anything we’ve had to think about in the past. Know that China believes in the market and the state. I mean, Adam Smith, already writing in the late 18th century said, “The Chinese market is larger and more developed and more sophisticated than anything in Europe.”And, apart from the Mao period, that remained more-or-less the case ever since. Butthis is combined with an extremely strong and ubiquitous state. The state is everywhere in China. I mean, its leading firms, many of them are still publicly owned. Private firms, however large they are, like Lenovo, depend in many ways on state patronage. Targets for the economy and so on are set by the state. And the state, of course, its authority flows into lots of other areas-as we are familiar with-with something like the one-child policy. Moreover, this is a very old state tradition, a very old tradition of statecraft. I mean, if you want an illustration of this, the Great Wall is one. This is another, the Grand Canal, which was constructed in the first instance in the fifth century BC and was finally completed in the seventh century AD. It went for 1114 miles, linking Beijing with Hangzhou and Shanghai. So there’s a long history of extraordinary state infrastructural projects in China, which I suppose helps us to explain what we see today, which is something like the Three Gorges Dam and many other expressions of state competence within China. So there we have three building blocks for trying to understand the difference that is China-the civilization state, the notion of race and the nature of the state and its relationship to society. And yet we still insist, by-and-large, in thinking that we can understand China by simply drawing on western experience, looking at itthrough western eyes, using western concepts. If you want to know why we unerringly seem to get China wrong-our predictions about what’s going to happen to China are incorrect-this is the reason. Unfortunately I think, I have to say that I think, attitude towards china is that of a kind of little westerner mentality. It’s kind of arrogant. It’s arrogant in the sense that we think that we are best, and therefore we have the universal measure. And secondly, it’s ignorant. We refuse to really address the issue of difference. You know, there’s a very interesting passage in a book by Paul Cohen, the American historian. And he argues that the west thinks of itself as probably the most cosmopolitan of all cultures. But it’s not. In many ways, it’s the most parochial, because for 200 years, the west has been so dominant in the world that it’s not really needed to understand other cultures, other civilizations. Because, at the end of the day, it could, if necessary by force, get its own way. Whereas those cultures-virtually the rest of the world, in fact-which have been in a far weaker position, vis-à-vis the west, have been thereby forced to understand the west, because of the west’s presence in those societies. And therefore, they are, as a result, more cosmopolitan in many ways than the west. I mean take the question of East Asia: Japan, Korea, China, etc. A thirdof the world’s population lives there, now the largest economic region in the world. And I’ll tell you now, the East Asianers, people from East Asia, are far more knowledgeable about the west than the west is about East Asia. Now this point is very germane, I’m afraid, to the present. Because what’s happening? Back to that chart at the beginning-the Goldman Sachs chart. What’s happening is that, very rapidly in historical terms, the world is being driven and shaped, not by the old developed countries, but by the developing world. We’ve seen this in terms of the G20-usurping very rapidly the position of the G7, or the G8. And there are two consequences of this. First, the west is rapidly losing its influence in the world. There was a dramatic illustration of this actually a year ago, Copenhagen, climate change conference. Europe was not at the final negotiating table. When did that last happen? I would wager it was probably about 200 years ago. And that is what is going to happen in the future. And the second implication is that the world will inevitably, as a consequence, become increasingly unfamiliar to us, because it’ll be shaped by cultures and experiences and histories that we are not familiar with, or conversant with. And at last, I’m afraid-take Europe, America is slightly different-but Europeans by and large, I have to say, are ignorant, are unaware about theway the world is changing. Some people-I’ve got an English friend in China, and he said, “The continent is sleepwalking into oblivion.” Well, maybe that is true, maybe that’s an exaggeration. But there’s another problem which goes along with this is that Europe is increasingly out of touch with the world and that is a sort of loss of a sense of the future. I mean, Europe once, of course, once commanded the future in its confidence. Take the 19th century for example. But this, alas, is no longer true. If you want to feel the future, if you want to taste the future, try China- there’s old Confucius. This is a railway station the like of which you’ve never seen before. It doesn’t even look like a railway station. This is the new Guangzhou railway station for the high-speed trains. China already has a bigger network than any other country in the world and will soon have more than all the rest of the world put together. Or take this: now this is an idea, but it’s an idea to be tried out shortly in a suburb of Beijing. Here you have a mega bus, on the upper deck carries about 2000 people. It travels on rails down a suburban road, and the cars travel underneath it. And it does speeds of up to about 100 miles an hour. Now this is the way things are going to move, because China has very specific problem, which is different from Europe and different from the United States. China has huge numbers ofpeople and no space. So this is a solution to a situation where China’s going to have many, many, many cities over twenty million people. Okay, so how would I like to finish? Well, what should our attitude be towards this world that we see very rapidly developing before us? I think there will be good things about it and there will be bad things about it. But I want to argue, above all, a big picture positive for this world. For 200 years, the world was essentially governed by a fragment of the human population. That’s what Europe and North America represented. The arrival of countries like China and India- between them 38 percent of the world’s population- and others like Indonesia and Brazil and so on, represent the most important single act of democratization in the last 200 years. Civilizations and cultures which had been ignored, which had no voice, which were not listened to, which were not known about, will have a different sort of representation in this world. As humanists, we must welcome, surely, this transformation. And we’ll have to learn about these civilizations. This big ship here was the one sailed in by Zheng He in the early 15th century on his great voyages around the South China Sea, the East China Sea and across the Indian Ocean to East Africa. The little boat in front of it was the one in which, 80 years later, Christopher Columbus crossed theAtlantic. Or, look carefully at this silk scroll mad by Zhu Zhou in 1368. I think they’re playing golf. Christ, the Chinese even invented golf. Welcome to the future. Thank you.。