毕业论文-ted演讲martinjacques《了解中国的崛起》(中英对照)

yang lan: the generation thats remaking china the night before i was heading for scotland, i was invited to host the final ofchinas got talent show in shanghai with the 80,000 live audience in the stadium. guesswho was the performing guest?susan boyle. and i told her, im going to scotland thenext day. she sang beautifully, and she even managed to say a few words in chinese.[chinese]so its not like hello or thank you, that ordinary stuff. it means green onionfor free. why did she say that? because it was a line from our chinese parallel susanboyle -- a 50-some year-old woman, a vegetable vendor in shanghai, who loves singingwestern opera, but she didnt understand any english or french or italian, so shemanaged to fill in the lyrics with vegetable names in chinese. (laughter) and thelast sentence of nessun dorma that she was singing in the stadium was green onionfor free. so[as] susan boyle was saying that, 80,000 live audience sang together. that washilarious.so i guess both susan boyle and this vegetable vendor in shanghai belonged tootherness. they were the least expected to be successful in the business calledentertainment, yet their courage and talent brought them through. and a show and aplatform gave them the stage to realize their dreams. well, being different is notthat difficult. we are all different from different perspectives. but i think beingdifferent is good, because you present a different point of view. you may have thechance to make a difference. my generation has been very fortunate to witness and participate in the historictransformation of china that has made so many changes in the past 20, 30 years. iremember that in the year of 1990,when i was graduating from college, i was applyingfor a job in the sales department of the first five-star hotel in beijing, great wallsheraton -- its still there. so after being interrogated by this japanese managerfor a half an hour, he finally said, so, miss yang, do you have any questions to askme?i summoned my courage and poise and said,yes, but could you let me know, whatactually do you sell? i didnt have a clue what a sales department was about in afive-star hotel. that was the first day i set my foot in a five-star hotel. my life, and i feel proud of that. but then we are also so fortunate to witnessthe transformation of the whole country. i was in beijings bidding for the olympicgames. i was representing the shanghai expo. i saw china embracing the world and viceversa. but then sometimes im thinking, what are todays young generation up to? howare they different, and what are the differences they are going to make to shape thefuture of china, or at large, the world? so making a living is not that easy for young people. college graduates are notin short supply.in urban areas, college graduates find the starting salary is about 400 u.s. dollarsa month, while the average rent is above $500. so what do they do? they have to sharespace -- squeezed in very limited space to save money -- and they call themselvestribe of ants. and for those who are ready to get married and buy their apartment,they figured out they have to work for 30 to 40 years to afford their first apartment.that ratio in americawould only cost a couple five years to earn, but in china its30 to 40 years with the skyrocketing real estate price. so through some of the hottest topics on microblogging, we can see what youngpeople care most about. social justice and government accountability runs the firstin what they demand.for the past decade or so, a massive urbanization and developmenthave let us witness a lot of reports on the forced demolition of private property.andit has aroused huge anger and frustrationamong our young generation. sometimes peopleget killed, and sometimes people set themselves on fire to protest. so when theseincidents are reported more and more frequently on the internet,people cry for thegovernment to take actions to stop this. so the good news is that earlier this year, the state council passed a newregulation on house requisition and demolition and passed the right to order forceddemolition from local governments to the court. similarly, many other issues concerning public safety is a hot topicon the internet. we heard about polluted air, polluted water, poisoned food. and guesswhat, we have faked beef. they have sorts of ingredients that you brush on a pieceof chicken or fish, and it turns it to look like beef.and then lately, people arevery concerned about cooking oil, because thousands of people have been found[refining] cooking oil from restaurant slop. so all these things have aroused a hugeoutcry from the internet. and fortunately, we have seen the government respondingmore timely and also more frequently to the public concerns. while young people seem to be very sure about their participation in publicpolicy-making, but sometimes theyre a little bit lost in terms of what they want fortheir personal life. china is soon to pass the u.s. as the number one market for luxurybrands -- thats not including the chinese expenditures in europe and elsewhere. butyou know what, half of those consumers are earning a salary below 2,000 u.s. dollars.theyre not rich at all. theyre taking those bags and clothes as a sense of identityand social status. and this is a girl explicitly saying on a tv dating show that shewould rather cry in a bmw than smile on a bicycle.but of course, we do have youngpeople who would still prefer to smile, whether in a bmw or [on] a bicycle. so happiness is the most popular word we have heard through the past two years.happiness is not only related to personal experiences and personal values, but also,its about the environment. people are thinking about the following questions: arewe going to sacrifice our environment further to produce higher gdp? how are we goingto perform our social and political reform to keep pace with economic growth, to keepsustainability and stability? and also, how capable is the systemof self-correctnessto keep more people contentwith all sorts of friction going on at the same time?iguess these are the questions people are going to answer. and our younger generationare going to transform this country while at the same time being transformedthemselves.thank you very much.杨澜ted演讲：重塑中国的一代中文演讲稿在来爱尔兰的前一晚，我应邀主持了中国达人秀在上海的体育场和八万现场观众。

本文共有12752字，如对您有帮助，可购买打赏目录第一篇：中国崛起的英文演讲第二篇：中国崛起演讲第三篇：中国节日的英文演讲第四篇：中国功夫英文演讲第五篇：中国的崛起正文第一篇：中国崛起的英文演讲mr. robert,dear classmates:my speech is china's rise will benefit the whole world.in the past decades,especially after the implementation of reform and opening-up policy,china has witnessed remarkable changes in various fields and has attracted worldwide attention,so a wholly new word "china's rise"came into being.in the world arena,there are two apparently different viewpoints towards china's rise.some countries subjectively and baselessly think china's rise is horrifying and worrying,they interpret china as a growing monster,putting forward "china threat theory" to deter or contain this great country.but i hold the totally opposite opinion.china has diligent,wise and charismatic leaders,and most importantly,all of them are staunch supporters of a peaceful and prosperous world.every year,china sends a large number of peacekeepers to unstable areas all over the world,and china now has more peacekeepers than any other country.though china attaches great significance to its military affairs,the purpose are just to carry on self-defence and maintain peace instead of invading or threateningothers.as to economy and trade,this year,china has surpassed japan in economic volume,ranking second merely after the us.china has became an important export market not only for its neighboring countries,including the republic of korea and japan,but also the eu and the us. especially after the financial crisis occuring in xx,china has been leading global economic recovery.in the meantime,china is a responsible country with a rare sense of responsibility to all humanity.its aid to developing countries has been unconditional,and on the other hand, china waived many debts of scores of least developed countries from africa, asia, the caribbean and the south pacific.china is a peace-loving country,but that doesn't mean to gain peace and stability,it will give up necessary principles.it firmly upholds its national core interests.when it comes to sovereignty and territorial integrity,china will not yield or compromise,they are so holy that no country can interfere.china knows perfectly that it can't develop in isolation from the rest of the world,so china is more than happy to work with any countries who are willing to adhere to political trust and mutual cooperation.china actively supports solving disputes through dialogue and negotiation in a peaceful way,and it will unswervingly follow the path of peaceful development and stay open and inclusive.our leaders have beenreiterating we don't seek hegemony now,and we won't do it either even when china is a developed country.in a word,china's rise is sure to be a good chance for a healthier and richer world.罗伯特，亲爱的同学们：我的讲话是中国的崛起将造福于整个世界。

中国崛起的英文演讲第1篇第2篇第3篇第4篇第5篇更多顶部目录第一篇：中国崛起的英文演讲第二篇：中国崛起演讲第三篇：中国节日的英文演讲第四篇：中国功夫英文演讲第五篇：中国的崛起更多相关范文正文第一篇：中国崛起的英文演讲mr. robert,dear classmates:my speech is china’s rise plementation of reform and opening-up policy,china has arkable changes in various fields and has attracted e into being.in the e countries subjectively and baselessly think china’s rise is horrifying and onster,putting foratic leaders,and most importantly,all of them are staunch supporters of a peaceful and prosperous ber of peacekeepers to unstable areas all over the ore peacekeepers than any other country.though china attaches great significance to its military affairs,the purpose are just to carry on self-defence and maintain peace instead of invading or threatening others.as to economy and trade,this year,china has surpassedjapan in economic volume,ranking second merely after the us.china has became an important export market not only for its neighboring countries,including the republic of korea and japan,but also the eu and the us. especially after the financial crisis occuring in xx,china has been leading global economic recovery.in the meantime,china is a responsible country anity.its aid to developing countries has been unconditional,and on the other hand, china any debts of scores of least developed countries from africa, asia, the caribbean and the south pacific.china is a peace-loving country,but that doesn’t mean to gain peace and stability,it ly upholds its national core interests.es to sovereignty and territorial integrity,china promise,they are so holy that no country can interfere.china kno the rest of the ore than happy to utual cooperation.china actively supports solving disputes through dialogue and negotiation in a peaceful ent and stay open and inclusive.our leaders have been reiterating ony noe国家的观点认为主观和baselessly中国的崛起是令人震惊和担心，他们解释为中国不断增长的怪物，提出“中国威胁论”，以阻止或遏制这一伟大country.but我拥有完全相反的意见。

T E D演讲—M a r t i n J a c q u e s《了解中国的崛起》(中英对照)Martin Jacques: Understanding the rise of ChinaThe world is changing with really remarkable speed. If you look at the chart at the top here, you’ll see that in 2025 these Goldman Sachs projections suggest that the Chinese economy will be almost the same size as the American economy. And if you look at the chart for 2050, it’s projected that the Chinese economy will be twice the size of the American economy, and the Indian economy will be almost the same size as the American economy. We should bear in mind here these projections were drawn up before the Western financial crises.世界正在以惊人的速度飞快得改变着。

如果你看着这上方的图表,你会看到在2025年，高盛投资公司的这些预测表明中国经济规模会和美国经济几乎相当。

如果看 2050年的图表，预测表明中国经济规模将会是美国经济的两倍，印度的经济规模将会和美国的经济几乎持平。

在这里，我们应该记住这些预测是在西方经济危机之前做出的。

A couple of weeks ago, I was looking at the latest projection by BNP (Banque Nationale de Paris) PARIBAS for when China will have a larger economy than the United States. Goldman Sachs projected 2027. The post-crisis projection is 2010. That’s just a decade way.几周前，我查看法国巴黎银行的最近预测，中国在什么时候会超越美国经济，成为第一大经济体。

了解中国的崛起演讲稿The wor l d is changi n n g with real l y remarkabl e e speed. If y y ou look at t he chart at the top her e e, you’ll se e e that in 20225, these Go l dman Sachs p p rojections s s uggest that the Chinese economy wil l be almost t he same siz e e as the Ame r ican econom y y. And if yo u u look at th e e chart for 22050, it’s p r ojected tha t the Chines e e economy wi l l be twice t he size of t he American economy, an d d the Indian economy wil l be almost t he same siz e e as the Ame r ican econom y y. And we sh o o uld bear in mind here t h h at these pr o o jections we r e drawn up b b efore the W e e stern finan c c ial crisis.A couple of weeks ago, I was lookin g g at the lat e e st projecti o o n by BNP Pa r ibas for wh e e n China wil l have a lar g g er economy t han the Uni t ed States. G G oldman Sach s s projected 22027. The po s s t-crisis pr o o jection is 22020. That’s just a deca d d e away. Chi n n a is going t o change th e e world in t w w o fundament a a l respects.First of al l, it’s a hu g g e developin g g country wi t h a populat i on of 1.3 b i llion peopl e e, which has been growin g g for over 300 years at a r ound 10 per c c ent a year.And within a decade, it w w ill have th e e largest ec o o nomy in the world. Neve r before in t he modern e r a has the l a a rgest econo m m y in the wo r ld been tha t of a devel o o ping countr y y, rather th a a n a develop e e d country. S S econdly, fo r the first t ime in the m m odern era, t he dominant country in t he world --which I thi n n k is what C h h ina will be c c ome -- will be not from the West an d d from very,very differ e e nt civiliza t ional roots.Now I know it’s a wide s s pread assum p p tion in the West that, a a s countries modernize, t hey also We s s ternize. Th i s is an ill u u sion. It’s a a n assumptio n n that moder n n ity is a pr o o duct simply of competit i on, markets and technol o o gy. It is n o o t; it is al s s o shaped eq u u ally by his t ory and cul t ure. China i s not like t he West, an d d it will no t become lik e e the West. I t will rema i n in very f u u ndamental r e e spects very different. N N ow the big q q uestion her e e is obvious l y, how do w e e make sense of China? H o o w do we try to understa n n d what Chin a a is? And th e e problem we have in the West at the moment by-a n n d-large is t hat the con v v entional ap p p roach is th a a t we unders t and it real l y in Wester n n terms, usi n n g Western i d d eas. We can’t. Now I wa n n t to offer y y ou three bu i lding block s s for trying to understa n n d what Chin a a is like --just as a b e e ginning.Th e e first is t h h is, that Ch i na is not r e e ally a nati o o n state. Ok a a y, it’s cal l ed itself a nation stat e e for the la s s t hundred y e e ars. But ev e e ryone who k n n ows anythin g g about Chin a a knows it’s a lot older than this. T T his was wha t China look e e d like with the victory of the Qin D D ynasty in 2221 B.C. at t h h e end of th e e warring st a a te period -- the birth o o f modern Ch i na. And you can see it a a gainst the b b oundaries o f modern Chi n n a. Or immed i ately after w w ard, the Ha n n Dynasty, s t ill 2,000 y e e ars ago. An d d you can se e e already it occupies mo s s t of what w e e now know a s s Eastern Ch i na, whichi s s where the v v ast majorit y y of Chinese lived then a a nd live now.Now what i s s extraordin a a ry about th i s is, what g g ives China i t’s sense o f being Chin a a, what give s s the Chines e e the sense o o f what it i s s to be Chin e e se, comes n o o t from the l ast hundred years, not f rom the nat i on state pe r iod, which i s what happ e e ned in the W W est, but fr o o m the perio d d, if you li k k e, of the c i vilization s s tate. I’m t h h inking here, for exampl e e, of custom s s like ances t ral worship, of a very d d istinctive n n otion of th e e state, lik e e wise, a ver y y distinctiv e e notion of t he family, s s ocial relat i onships lik e e guanxi, Co n n fucian valu e e s and so on.These are a a ll things t h h at come fro m m the period of the civi l ization sta t e. In other words, Chin a a, unlike th e e Western st a a tes and mos t countries i n the world,is shaped b b y its sense of civiliza t ion, its ex i stence as a civilizatio n n state, rat h h er than as a a nation sta t e. And ther e e’s one othe r thing to a d d d to this, a a nd that is t his: Of cou r se we know C C hina’s big,huge, demog r aphically a n n d geographi c c ally, with a a population of 1.3 bill i on people. W W hat we ofte n n aren’t rea l ly aware of is the fact that China i s extremely diverse and very plural i stic, and i n n many ways v v ery decentr a a lized. Y ou c c an’t run a p p lace on thi s s scale simp l y from Beij i ng, even th o o ugh we thin k k this to be the case. I t’s never be e e n the case.So this is C C hina, a civ i lization st a a te, rather t han a natio n n state. And what does i t mean? Well I think it h h as all sort s s of profoun d d implicatio n n s.I’ll giv e e you two qu i ck ones. Th e e first is t h h at the most important p o o litical val u u e for the C h h inese is un i ty, is the m m aintenance o o f Chinese c i vilization. Y ou know, 2,000 years a g g o, Europe: b b reakdown, t h h e fragmenta t ion of the H H oly Roman E m m pire [Roman Empire]. It divided, an d d it’s remai n n ed divided e e ver since. C C hina, over t he same tim e e period, we n n t in exactl y y the opposi t e direction,very painf u u lly holding this huge c i vilization, civilizatio n n state toge t her.The se c c ond is mayb e e more prosa i c, which is Hong Kong. D D o you remem b b er the hand o o ver of Hong Kong by Bri t ain to Chin a a in 1997? Y o o u may remem b b er what the Chinese con s s titutional p p roposition w w as. One cou n n try, two sy s s tems. And I’ll lay a wa g g er that bar e e ly anyone i n n the West b e e lieved them. “Window dr e e ssing. When China gets i t’s hands o n n Hong Kong,that won’t b b e the case.”” 13 years o n n, the polit i cal and leg a a l system in Hong Kong i s s as differe n n t now as it was in 1997.We were wr o o ng. Why wer e e we wrong? W W e were wron g g because we thought, na t urally enou g g h, in natio n n state ways. Think of G e e rman unific a a tion, 1990.What happen e e d? Well, ba s s ically the E E ast was swa l lowed by th e e West. One n n ation, one s s ystem. That is the nati o o n state men t ality. But y y ou can’t ru n n a country l ike China, a a civilizati o o n state, on the basis o f one civili z z ation, one s s ystem. It d o o esn’t work.So actually the respons e e of China t o o the questi o o n of Hong K o o ng -- as it will be to t he question of Taiwan -- was a natu r al response: one civili z z ation, many systems.Le t me offer y o o u another b u u ilding bloc k k to try and understand C C hina -- may b b e not such a a comfortabl e e one. The C h h inese have a a very, very different c o o nception of race to mos t other coun t ries. Do yo u u know, of t h h e 1.3 billi o o n Chinese, o o ver 90 perc e e nt of them t hink they b e e long to the same race, t he Han. Now this is com p p letely diff e e rent from t h h e other wor l d’s most po p p ulous count r ies. India,the United S S tates, Indo n n esia, Brazi l-- all of t hem are mul t iracial. Th e e Chinese do n n’t feel lik e e that. Chin a a is only mu l tiracial re a a lly at the m m argins. So t he question is, why? We l l the reaso n n, I think, e e ssentially i s, again, b a a ck to the c i vilization s s tate.A his t ory of at l e e ast 2,000 y e e ars, a hist o o ry of conqu e e st, occupat i on, absorpt i on, assimil a a tion and so on, led to t he process b b y which, ov e e r time, thi s s notion of t he Han emer g g ed -- of co u u rse, nurtur e e d by a grow i ng and very powerful se n n se of cultu r al identity.Now the gr e e at advantag e e of this hi s s torical exp e e rience has b b een that, w i thout the H a a n, China co u u ld never ha v v e held toge t her. The Ha n n identity h a a s been the c c ement which has held th i s country t o o gether. The great disad v v antage of i t is that th e e Han have a very weak c o o nception of cultural di f ference. Th e e y really be l ieve in the i r own super i ority, and t hey are dis r espectful o f those who a a re not. Hen c c e their att i tude, for e x x ample, to t h h e Uyghurs a n n d to the Ti b b etans.Or l e e t me give y o o u my third b b uilding blo c c k, the Chin e e se state. N o o w the relat i onship betw e e en the stat e e and societ y y in China i s s very diffe r entfrom th a a t in the We s s t. Now we i n n the West o v v erwhelmingl y y seem to th i nk -- in th e e se days at l east -- tha t the author i ty and legi t imacy of th e e state is a function of democracy. T T he problem w w ith this pr o o position is that the Ch i nese state e e njoys more l egitimacy a n n d more auth o o rity amongs t the Chines e e than is tr u u e with any W W estern stat e e. And the r e e ason for th i s is becaus e e-- well, t h h ere are two reasons, I t hink. And i t’s obviousl y y got nothin g g to do with democracy, b b ecause in o u u r terms the Chinese cer t ainly don’t have a demo c c racy. And t h h e reason fo r this is, f i rstly, beca u u se the stat e e in China i s s given a ve r y special --it enjoys a a very speci a a l significa n n ce as the r e e presentativ e e, the embod i ment and th e e guardian o f Chinese ci v v ilization, o o f the civil i zation stat e e. This is a s s close as C h h ina gets to a kind of s p p iritual rol e e.And the s e e cond reason is because,whereas in E E urope and N o o rth America,the state’s s power is c o o ntinuously c c hallenged --I mean in t he European tradition, h h istorically against the church, aga i nst other s e e ctors of th e e aristocrac y y, against m e e rchants and so on -- fo r1,000 year s s, the power of the Chin e e se state ha s s not been c h h allenged. I t’s had no s e e rious rival s s. So you ca n n see that t h h e way in wh i ch power ha s s been const r ucted in Ch i na is very d d ifferent fr o o m our exper i ence in Wes t ern history.The result, by the way, is that th e e Chinese ha v v e a very di f ferent view of the stat e e. Whereas w e e tend to vi e e w it as an i ntruder, a s s tranger, ce r tainly an o r gan whose p o o wers need t o o be limited or defined a a nd constrai n n ed, theChi n n ese don’t s e e e the state like that a t all. The C h h inese view t he state as an intimate-- not just as an intim a a te actually, as a membe r of the fam i ly -- not j u u st in fact a a s a member o o f the famil y y, but as th e e head of th e e family, th e e patriarch o o f the famil y y. This is t h h e Chinese v i ew of the s t ate -- very, very diffe r ent to ours. It’s embed d d ed in socie t y in a diff e e rent kind o f way to wha t is the cas e e in the Wes t.And I wou l d suggest t o o you that a c c tually what we are deal i ng with her e e, in the Ch i nese contex t, is a new k k ind of para d d igm, which i s different from anythi n n g we’ve had to think ab o o ut in the p a a st. Know th a a t China bel i eves in the market and t he state. I mean, Adam S S mith, alrea d d y writing i n n the late 188th century s s aid, “The C h h inese marke t is larger a a nd more dev e e loped and m o o re sophisti c c ated than a n n ything in E u u rope.” And, apart from t he Mao peri o o d, that has remained mo r e-or-less t h h e case ever since. But t his is comb i ned with an extremely s t rong and ub i quitous sta t e. The stat e e is everywh e e re in China.I mean, it’s leading f i rms, many o f them are s t ill publicl y y owned. Pri v v ate firms, h h owever larg e e they are, l ike Lenovo,depend in m a a ny ways on s s tate patron a a ge. Targets for the eco n n omy and so o o n are set b y y the state.And the sta t e, of cours e e, its autho r ity flows i n n to lots of o o ther areas -- as we are familiar wi t h -- with s o o mething lik e e the the on e e-child poli c c y.Moreover, this is a v v ery old sta t e tradition, a very old tradition o f statecraft. I mean, if you want an illustratio n n of this, t h h e Great Wal l isone. Bu t this is an o o ther, this i s the Grand Canal, whic h h was constr u u cted in the first insta n n ce in the f i fth century B.C. and wa s s finally co m m pleted in t h h e seventh c e e ntury A.D. I t went for 11,114 miles,linking Bei j ing with Ha n n gzhou and S h h anghai. So t here’s a lo n n g history o f extraordin a a ry state in f rastructura l projects i n n China, whi c c h I suppose helps us to explain wha t we see tod a a y, which is something l i ke the Thre e e Gorges Dam and many ot h h er expressi o o ns of state competence w w ithin China. So there w e e have three building bl o o cks for try i ng to to un d d erstand the difference t hat is Chin a a -- the civ i lization st a a te, the not i on of race a a nd the natu r e of the st a a te and its r elationship to society.And yet we s s till insist,by-and-lar g g e, in think i ng that we c c an understa n n d China by s s imply drawi n n g on Wester n n experience, looking at it through W W estern eyes,using West e e rn concepts.If you wan t to know wh y y we unerrin g g ly seem to g g et China wr o o ng -- our p r edictions a b b out what’s g g oing to hap p p en to China are incorre c c t -- this i s s the reason. Unfortunat e e ly I think,I have to s a a y that I th i nk attitude towards Chi n n a is that o f a kind of l ittle Weste r ner mentali t y. It’s kin d d of arrogan t. It’s arro g g ant in the s s ense that w e e think that we are best,and theref o o re we have t he universa l measure. A n n d secondly,it’s ignora n n t. We refus e e to really a a ddress the i ssue of dif f erence. Y ou know, there’s a very in t eresting pa s s sage in a b o o ok by Paul C C ohen, the A m m erican hist o o rian. AndP a a ul Cohen ar g g ues that th e e West think s s of itself a a s probably t he most cos m m opolitan of all culture s s. But it’s n n ot. In many ways, it’s t he most par o o chial, beca u u se for 200 y y ears, the W e e st has been so dominant in the worl d d that it’s n n ot really n e e eded to und e e rstand othe r cultures, o o ther civili z z ations. Bec a a use, at the end of the d d ay, it coul d d, if necess a a ry by force, get its ow n n way. Where a a s those cul t ures -- vir t ually the r e e st of the w o o rld, in fac t -- which h a a ve been in a a far weaker position, v i s-a-vis the West, have b b een thereby forced to u n n derstand th e e West, beca u u se of the W e e st’s presen c c e in those s s ocieties. A n n d therefore,they are, a a s a result, more cosmop o o litan in ma n n y ways than the West.I mean, take t he question of East Asi a a. East Asia:Japan, Kor e e a, China, e t c. -- a thi r d of the wo r ld’s popula t ion lives t h h ere, now th e e largest ec o o nomic regio n n in the wor l d. And I’ll tell you no w w, that East Asianers, p e e ople from E a a st Asia, ar e e far more k n n owledgeable about the W e e st than the West is abo u u t East Asia. Now this p o o int is very germane, I’m m afraid, to the present.Because wh a a t’s happeni n n g? Back to t hat chart a t the beginn i ng -- the G o o ldman Sachs chart. What is happenin g g is that, v e e ry rapidly i n historica l terms, the world is be i ng driven a n n d shaped, n o o t by the ol d d developed c c ountries, b u u t by the de v v eloping wor l d. We’ve se e e n this in t e e rms of the G G20 -- usurp i ng very rap i dly the pos i tion of the G7, or the G G8. And ther e e are two co n n sequences o f this. Firs t, the West i s rapidly l o o sing its in f luence in t h h e world. Th e e re was a dr a a matic illus t ration of t h h isactually a year ago -- Copenhage n n, climate c h h ange confer e e nce. Europe was not at t he final ne g g otiating ta b b le. When di d d that last h h appen? I wo u u ld wager it was probabl y y about 200 y y ears ago. A n n d that is w h h at is going to happen i n n the future.And the se c c ond implica t ion is that the world w i ll inevitab l y, as a con s s equence, be c c ome increas i ngly unfami l iar to us, b b ecause it’l l be shaped b b y cultures a a nd experien c c es and hist o o ries that w e e are not re a a lly familia r with, or c o o nversant wi t h. And at l a a st, I’m afr a a id -- take E E urope, Amer i ca is sligh t ly differen t-- but Eur o o peans by an d d large, I h a a ve to say, a a re ignorant, are unawar e e about the w w ay the worl d d is changin g g. Some peop l e -- I’ve g o o t an Englis h h friend in C C hina, and h e e said, “The continent i s s sleepwalki n n g into obli v v ion.” Well,maybe that’s s true, mayb e e that’s an e e xaggeration. But there’s s another pr o o blem which g g oes along w i th this -- t hat Europe i s increasin g g ly out of t o o uch with th e e world -- a n n d that is a sort of los s s of a sense of the futu r e. I mean, E E urope once,of course, o o nce command e e d the futur e e in it’s co n n fidence. Ta k k e the 19th c c entury for e e xample. But this, alas,is no longe r true.If y o o u want to f e e el the futu r e, if you w a a nt to taste the future,try China --there’s ol d d Confucius.This is a r a a ilway stati o o n the like o o f which you’ve never se e e n before. I t does n’t ev e e n look like a railway s t ation. This is the new G G uangzhou ra i lway statio n n for the hi g g h-speed tra i ns. China a l ready has a bigger netw o o rk than any other count r y in the wo r ld andwill soon have m o o re than all the rest of the world p u u t together.Or take thi s s: Now this i s an idea, b b ut it’s an i dea to by t r ied out sho r tly in a su b b urb of Beij i ng. Here yo u u have a meg a a bus, on the upper deck c c arries abou t 2,000 peop l e. It trave l s on rails d d own a subur b b an road, an d d the cars t r avel undern e e ath it. And it does spe e e ds of up to about 100 m i les an hour. Now this i s s the way th i ngs are goi n n g to move, b b ecause Chin a a has a very specific pr o o blem, which is differen t from Europ e e and differ e e nt from the United Stat e e s. China ha s s huge numbe r s of people and no spac e e. So this i s s a solution to a situat i on where Ch i na’s going t o have many, many, many cities over20 million p p eople.Okay, so how wou l d I like to finish? Wel l, what shou l d our attit u u de be towar d d s this worl d d that we se e e very rapid l y developin g g before us?I think the r e will be g o o od things a b b out it and t here will b e e bad things about it. B u u t I want to argue, abov e e all, a big picture pos i tive for th i s world. Fo r 200 years,the world w a a s essential l y governed b b y a fragmen t of the hum a a n populatio n n. That’s wh a a t Europe an d d North Amer i ca represen t ed. The arr i val of coun t ries like C h h ina and Ind i a -- betwee n n them 38 pe r cent of the world’s pop u u lation -- a n n d others li k k e Indonesia and Brazil a a nd so on, r e e present the most import a a nt single a c c t of democr a a tization in the last 2000years. Civ i lizations a n n d cultures,which had b e e en ignored,which had n o o voice, whi c c h were not l istened to,which were n n ot known ab o o ut, will ha v v e a differe n n t sort of r e e presentatio n n in this wo r ld. As huma n n ists, wemu s s t welcome, s s urely, this transformat i on. And we w w ill have to learn about these civil i zations.Th i s big ship h h ere was the one sailed i n by Zheng H H e in the ea r ly 15th cen t ury on his g g reat voyage s s around the South China Sea, the Ea s s t China Sea and across t he Indian O c c ean to East Africa. The little boat in front of it was the o o ne in which, 80 years l a a ter, Christ o o pher Columb u u s crossed t h h e Atlantic.(Laughter) O O r, look car e e fully at th i s silk scro l l made by Z h h uZhou in 13668. I think t hey’re play i ng golf. Ch r ist, the Ch i nese even i n n vented golf.Welcome to the future.Thank you.。

关于中国崛起的英文演讲带翻译范文（精选多篇）1. Speech on the Rise of ChinaAs the world's most populous nation, China has been on a remarkable journey of transformation and modernization over the past few decades. Through economic liberalization, technological innovation, and a concerted effort to improve infrastructure and build up its industries, China has become a major economic and political force on the global stage. While challenges remain, China's rise is undoubtedly a significant development in the 21st century that will shape the future of the world.Over the past few decades, China has experienced astonishing levels of economic growth, averaging an annual GDP growth rate of roughly 9% over the past several decades. Today, China's economy is the second largest in the world, and its middle class has grown to over 400 million people. This rapid growth has led to significant improvements in living standards across the country, but it has also created numerous challenges as China seeks to maintain its growth trajectory while balancing environmental sustainability and social equity.Moreover, China's rise has created geopolitical tensions with other major powers, particularly the United States. The two countries have been engaged in a tense bilateral relationship that has been marked by trade tensions, strategic competition, and geopolitical posturing. As China becomes increasingly assertive on the world stage, it is likely that these tensions will continue to shape the dynamics of global politics.China's rise also has implications for the international system more broadly. As a major power, China is becoming increasingly influential in shaping global governance, from climate change tothe regulation of emerging technologies. The rise of China, along with other emerging powers, is challenging the dominance of the traditional actors in the international system, and there is an urgent need to rethink how global governance can be reformed to accommodate the new realities of the 21st century.In conclusion, China's rise is one of the defining developments of the 21st century. While it brings with it numerous opportunities, it also poses significant challenges for China and the rest of the world. It is up to global leaders to manage these challenges effectively and to ensure that the rise of China is ultimately a force for good in the world.中文翻译：作为世界上人口最多的国家，中国在过去几十年中经历了一次引人注目的转型和现代化之旅。

三一文库（）/演讲稿范文/演讲稿了解中国的崛起演讲稿Theworldischangingwithreallyremarkablespeed.Ifyoulookatthechart atthetophere,you'llseethatin2025,theseGoldmanSachsprojectionssu ggestthattheChineseeconomywillbealmostthesamesizeastheAmeric aneconomy.Andifyoulookatthechartfor2050,it'sprojectedthattheChi neseeconomywillbetwicethesizeoftheAmericaneconomy,andtheIndi aneconomywillbealmostthesamesizeastheAmericaneconomy.Andw eshouldbearinmindherethattheseprojectionsweredrawnupbeforeth eWesternfinancialcrisis.Acoupleofweeksago,IwaslookingatthelatestprojectionbyBNPParibas forwhenChinawillhavealargereconomythantheUnitedStates.Goldma nSachsprojected2027.Thepost-crisisprojectionis2020.That'sjustadec adeaway.Chinaisgoingtochangetheworldintwofundamentalrespects .Firstofall,it'sahugedevelopingcountrywithapopulationof1.3billionpeople,whichhasbeengrowingforover30yearsataround10percentayear .Andwithinadecade,itwillhavethelargesteconomyintheworld.Neverb eforeinthemodernerahasthelargesteconomyintheworldbeenthatofa developingcountry,ratherthanadevelopedcountry.Secondly,forthefi rsttimeinthemodernera,thedominantcountryintheworld--whichIthin kiswhatChinawillbecome--willbenotfromtheWestandfromvery,very differentcivilizationalroots.NowIknowit'sawidespreadassumptionintheWestthat,ascountriesmo dernize,theyalsoWesternize.Thisisanillusion.It'sanassumptionthatm odernityisaproductsimplyofcompetition,marketsandtechnology.Itis not;itisalsoshapedequallybyhistoryandculture.ChinaisnotliketheWes t,anditwillnotbecomeliketheWest.Itwillremaininveryfundamentalre spectsverydifferent.Nowthebigquestionhereisobviously,howdowem akesenseofChina?HowdowetrytounderstandwhatChinais?Andthepr oblemwehaveintheWestatthemomentby-and-largeisthattheconven tionalapproachisthatweunderstanditreallyinWesternterms,usingWe sternideas.Wecan't.NowIwanttoofferyouthreebuildingblocksfortryi ngtounderstandwhatChinaislike--justasabeginning.Nowwhatisextraordinaryaboutthisis,whatgivesChinait'ssenseofbein gChina,whatgivestheChinesethesenseofwhatitistobeChinese,comes notfromthelasthundredyears,notfromthenationstateperiod,whichis whathappenedintheWest,butfromtheperiod,ifyoulike,ofthecivilizati onstate.I'mthinkinghere,forexample,ofcustomslikeancestralworship ,ofaverydistinctivenotionofthestate,likewise,averydistinctivenotion ofthefamily,socialrelationshipslikeguanxi,Confucianvaluesandsoon.T heseareallthingsthatcomefromtheperiodofthecivilizationstate.Inoth erwords,China,unliketheWesternstatesandmostcountriesintheworl d,isshapedbyitssenseofcivilization,itsexistenceasacivilizationstate,ra therthanasanationstate.Andthere'soneotherthingtoaddtothis,andth atisthis:OfcourseweknowChina'sbig,huge,demographicallyandgeogr aphically,withapopulationof1.3billionpeople.Whatweoftenaren'trea llyawareofisthefactthatChinaisextremelydiverseandverypluralistic,a ndinmanywaysverydecentralized.Youcan'trunaplaceonthisscalesimp lyfromBeijing,eventhoughwethinkthistobethecase.It'sneverbeenthe case.SothisisChina,acivilizationstate,ratherthananationstate.Andwhatdoesitmean?WellIthinkithasallsortsofprofoundimplications.I'llgiveyout woquickones.ThefirstisthatthemostimportantpoliticalvaluefortheCh ineseisunity,isthemaintenanceofChinesecivilization.Youknow,2,000y earsago,Europe:breakdown,thefragmentationoftheHolyRomanEmpi re[RomanEmpire].Itdivided,andit'sremaineddividedeversince.China, overthesametimeperiod,wentinexactlytheoppositedirection,verypai nfullyholdingthishugecivilization,civilizationstatetogether.Thesecondismaybemoreprosaic,whichisHongKong.Doyouremember thehandoverofHongKongbyBritaintoChinain1997?Youmayremembe rwhattheChineseconstitutionalpropositionwas.Onecountry,twosyst ems.AndI'lllayawagerthatbarelyanyoneintheWestbelievedthem."Wi ndowdressing.WhenChinagetsit'shandsonHongKong,thatwon'tbeth ecase."13yearson,thepoliticalandlegalsysteminHongKongisasdiffere ntnowasitwasin1997.Wewerewrong.Whywerewewrong?Wewerewr ongbecausewethought,naturallyenough,innationstateways.Thinkof Germanunification,1990.Whathappened?Well,basicallytheEastwass wallowedbytheWest.Onenation,onesystem.Thatisthenationstateme ntality.Butyoucan'trunacountrylikeChina,acivilizationstate,onthebas isofonecivilization,onesystem.Itdoesn'twork.Soactuallytheresponse ofChinatothequestionofHongKong--asitwillbetothequestionofTaiwa n--wasanaturalresponse:onecivilization,manysystems.Nowthegreatadvantageofthishistoricalexperiencehasbeenthat,with outtheHan,Chinacouldneverhaveheldtogether.TheHanidentityhasbe enthecementwhichhasheldthiscountrytogether.Thegreatdisadvanta geofitisthattheHanhaveaveryweakconceptionofculturaldifference.T heyreallybelieveintheirownsuperiority,andtheyaredisrespectfulofth osewhoarenot.Hencetheirattitude,forexample,totheUyghursandtot heTibetans.Orletmegiveyoumythirdbuildingblock,theChinesestate.Nowtherelati onshipbetweenthestateandsocietyinChinaisverydifferentfromthatin theWest.NowweintheWestoverwhelminglyseemtothink--intheseda ysatleast--thattheauthorityandlegitimacyofthestateisafunctionofde mocracy.TheproblemwiththispropositionisthattheChinesestateenjo ysmorelegitimacyandmoreauthorityamongsttheChinesethanistruew ithanyWesternstate.Andthereasonforthisisbecause--well,therearet woreasons,Ithink.Andit'sobviouslygotnothingtodowithdemocracy,b ecauseinourtermstheChinesecertainlydon'thaveademocracy.Andth ereasonforthisis,firstly,becausethestateinChinaisgivenaveryspecial--itenjoysaveryspecialsignificanceastherepresentative,theembodimentandtheguardianofChinesecivilization,ofthecivilizationstate.Thisisasc loseasChinagetstoakindofspiritualrole.Andthesecondreasonisbecause,whereasinEuropeandNorthAmerica, thestate'spoweriscontinuouslychallenged--ImeanintheEuropeantra dition,historicallyagainstthechurch,againstothersectorsofthearistocr acy,againstmerchantsandsoon--for1,000years,thepoweroftheChine sestatehasnotbeenchallenged.It'shadnoseriousrivals.Soyoucanseeth atthewayinwhichpowerhasbeenconstructedinChinaisverydifferentfr omourexperienceinWesternhistory.Theresult,bytheway,isthattheCh inesehaveaverydifferentviewofthestate.Whereaswetendtoviewitasa nintruder,astranger,certainlyanorganwhosepowersneedtobelimited ordefinedandconstrained,theChinesedon'tseethestatelikethatatall.T heChineseviewthestateasanintimate--notjustasanintimateactually,a samemberofthefamily--notjustinfactasamemberofthefamily,butasth eheadofthefamily,thepatriarchofthefamily.ThisistheChineseviewoft hestate--very,verydifferenttoours.It'sembeddedinsocietyinadifferen tkindofwaytowhatisthecaseintheWest.AndIwouldsuggesttoyouthatactuallywhatwearedealingwithhere,int heChinesecontext,isanewkindofparadigm,whichisdifferentfromanyt。

了解中国的崛起演讲稿Ｔhe world is changing with really remarkable speed. Ｉf you look at the chart at the top here, you'll see that in 2025, these Ｇoldman Ｓachs projections suggest that the Ｃhinese economy will be almost the same size as the Ａmerican economy. Ａnd if you look at the chart for 2050, it's projected that the Ｃhinese economy will be twice the size of the Ａmerican economy, and the Ｉndian economy will be almost the same size as the Ａmerican economy. Ａnd we should bear in mind here that these projections were drawn up before the Ｗestern financial crisis. Ａ couple of weeks ago, Ｉ was looking at the latest projection by ＢＮＰＰaribas for when Ｃhina will have a larger economy than the Ｕnited Ｓtates. Ｇoldman Ｓachs projected 2027. Ｔhe post-crisis projection is 2020. Ｔhat's just a decade away. Ｃhina is going to change the world in two fundamental respects. Ｆirst of all, it's a huge developing country with a population of 1.3 billion people, which has been growing for over 30 years at around 10 percent a year.Ａnd within a decade, it will have the largest economy in the world. Ｎever before in the modern era has the largest economy 1 / 13in the world been that of a developing country, rather than a developed country. Ｓecondly, for the first time in the modern era, the dominant country in the world -- which Ｉ think is what Ｃhina will become -- will be not from the Ｗest and from very, very different civilizational roots.Ｎow Ｉ know it's a widespread assumption in the Ｗest that, as countries modernize, they also Ｗesternize. Ｔhis is an illusion. Ｉt's an assumption that modernity is a product simply of competition, markets and technology. Ｉt is not; it is also shaped equally by history and culture. Ｃhina is not like the Ｗest, and it will not become like the Ｗest. Ｉt will remain in very fundamental respects very different. Ｎow the big question here is obviously, how do we make sense of Ｃhina? Ｈow do we try to understand what Ｃhina is? Ａnd the problem we have in the Ｗest at the moment by-and-large is that the conventional approach is that we understand it really in Ｗestern terms, using Ｗestern ideas. Ｗe can't. Ｎow Ｉ want to offer you three building blocks for trying to understand what Ｃhina is like -- just as a beginning.Ｎow what is extraordinary about this is, what gives Ｃhina 2 / 13it's sense of being Ｃhina, what gives the Ｃhinese the sense of what it is to be Ｃhinese, comes not from the last hundred years, not from the nation state period, which is what happened in the Ｗest, but from the period, if you like, of the civilization state. Ｉ'm thinking here, for example, of customs like ancestral worship, of a very distinctive notion of the state, likewise, a very distinctive notion of the family, social relationships like guanxi, Ｃonfucian values and so on. Ｔhese are all things that come from the period of the civilization state. Ｉn other words, Ｃhina, unlike the Ｗestern states and most countries in the world, is shaped by its sense of civilization, its existence as a civilization state, rather than as a nation state. Ａnd there's one other thing to add to this, and that is this: Ｏf course we know Ｃhina's big, huge, demographically and geographically, with a population of 1.3 billion people. Ｗhat we often aren't really aware of is the fact that Ｃhina is extremely diverse and very pluralistic, and in many ways very decentralized. Ｙou can't run a place on this scale simply from Ｂeijing, even though we think this to be the case. Ｉt's never been the case.Ｓo this is Ｃhina, a civilization state, rather than a nation 3 / 13state. Ａnd what does it mean? Ｗell Ｉ think it has all sorts of profound implications. Ｉ'll give you two quick ones. Ｔhe first is that the most important political value for the Ｃhinese is unity, is the maintenance of Ｃhinese civilization. Ｙou know, 2,000 years ago, Ｅurope: breakdown, the fragmentation of the Ｈoly Ｒoman Ｅmpire [Ｒoman Ｅmpire]. Ｉt divided, and it's remained divided ever since. Ｃhina, over the same time period, went in exactly the opposite direction, very painfully holding this huge civilization, civilization state together.Ｔhe second is maybe more prosaic, which is Ｈong Ｋong. Ｄo you remember the handover of Ｈong Ｋong by Ｂritain to Ｃhina in 1997? Ｙou may remember what the Ｃhinese constitutional proposition was. Ｏne country, two systems. Ａnd Ｉ'll lay a wager that barely anyone in the Ｗest believed them. "Ｗindow dressing. Ｗhen Ｃhina gets it's hands on Ｈong Ｋong, that won't be the case." 13 years on, the political and legal system in Ｈong Ｋong is as different now as it was in 1997. Ｗe were wrong. Ｗhy were we wrong? Ｗe were wrong because we thought, naturally enough, in nation state ways. Ｔhink of Ｇerman unification, 1990. Ｗhat happened? Ｗell, basically the Ｅast 4 / 13was swallowed by the Ｗest. Ｏne nation, one system. Ｔhat is the nation state mentality. Ｂut you can't run a country like Ｃhina, a civilization state, on the basis of one civilization, one system. Ｉt doesn't work. Ｓo actually the response of Ｃhina to the question of Ｈong Ｋong -- as it will be to the question of Ｔaiwan -- was a natural response: one civilization, many systems.Ｎow the great advantage of this historical experience has been that, without the Ｈan, Ｃhina could never have held together. Ｔhe Ｈan identity has been the cement which has held this country together. Ｔhe great disadvantage of it is that the Ｈan have a very weak conception of cultural difference. Ｔhey really believe in their own superiority, and they are disrespectful of those who are not. Ｈence their attitude, for example, to the Ｕyghurs and to the Ｔibetans.Ｏr let me give you my third building block, the Ｃhinese state. Ｎow the relationship between the state and society in Ｃhina is very different from that in the Ｗest. Ｎow we in the Ｗest overwhelmingly seem to think -- in these days at least -- that the authority and legitimacy of the state is a function 5 / 13of democracy. Ｔhe problem with this proposition is that the Ｃhinese state enjoys more legitimacy and more authority amongst the Ｃhinese than is true with any Ｗestern state. Ａnd the reason for this is because -- well, there are two reasons, Ｉ think. Ａnd it's obviously got nothing to do with democracy, because in our terms the Ｃhinese certainly don't have a democracy. Ａnd the reason for this is, firstly, because the state in Ｃhina is given a very special -- it enjoys a very special significance as the representative, the embodiment and the guardian of Ｃhinese civilization, of the civilization state. Ｔhis is as close as Ｃhina gets to a kind of spiritual role.Ａnd the second reason is because, whereas in Ｅurope and Ｎorth Ａmerica, the state's power is continuously challenged -- Ｉ mean in the Ｅuropean tradition, historically against the church, against other sectors of the aristocracy, against merchants and so on -- for 1,000 years, the power of the Ｃhinese state has not been challenged. Ｉt's had no serious rivals. Ｓo you can see that the way in which power has been constructed in Ｃhina is very different from our experience in Ｗestern history. Ｔhe result, by the way, is that the Ｃhinese 6 / 13have a very different view of the state. Ｗhereas we tend to view it as an intruder, a stranger, certainly an organ whose powers need to be limited or defined and constrained, the Ｃhinese don't see the state like that at all. Ｔhe Ｃhinese view the state as an intimate -- not just as an intimate actually, as a member of the family -- not just in fact as a member of the family, but as the head of the family, the patriarch of the family. Ｔhis is the Ｃhinese view of the state -- very, very different to ours. Ｉt's embedded in society in a different kind of way to what is the case in the Ｗest.Ａnd Ｉ would suggest to you that actually what we are dealing with here, in the Ｃhinese context, is a new kind of paradigm, which is different from anything we've had to think about in the past. Ｋnow that Ｃhina believes in the market and the state. Ｉ mean, Ａdam Ｓmith, already writing in the late 18th century said, "Ｔhe Ｃhinese market is larger and more developed and more sophisticated than anything in Ｅurope." Ａnd, apart from the Ｍao period, that has remained more-or-less the case ever since. Ｂut this is combined with an extremely strong and ubiquitous state. Ｔhe state is everywhere in Ｃhina. Ｉ mean, it's leading firms, many of them are still 7 / 13publicly owned. Ｐrivate firms, however large they are, like Ｌenovo, depend in many ways on state patronage. Ｔargets for the economy and so on are set by the state. Ａnd the state, of course, its authority flows into lots of other areas -- as we are familiar with -- with something like the the one-child policy.Ｍoreover, this is a very old state tradition, a very old tradition of statecraft. Ｉ mean, if you want an illustration of this, the Ｇreat Ｗall is one. Ｂut this is another, this is the Ｇrand Ｃanal, which was constructed in the first instance in the fifth century Ｂ.Ｃ. and was finally completed in the seventh century Ａ.Ｄ. Ｉt went for 1,114 miles, linking Ｂeijing with Ｈangzhou and Ｓhanghai. Ｓo there's a long history of extraordinary state infrastructural projects in Ｃhina, which Ｉ suppose helps us to explain what we see today, which is something like the Ｔhree Ｇorges Ｄam and many other expressions of state competence within Ｃhina. Ｓo there we have three building blocks for trying to to understand the difference that is Ｃhina -- the civilization state, the notion of race and the nature of the state and its relationship to society.8 / 13Ａnd yet we still insist, by-and-large, in thinking that we can understand Ｃhina by simply drawing on Ｗestern experience, looking at it through Ｗestern eyes, using Ｗestern concepts. Ｉf you want to know why we unerringly seem to get Ｃhina wrong -- our predictions about what's going to happen to Ｃhina are incorrect -- this is the reason. Ｕnfortunately Ｉ think, Ｉhave to say that Ｉ think attitude towards Ｃhina is that of a kind of little Ｗesterner mentality. Ｉt's kind of arrogant. Ｉt's arrogant in the sense that we think that we are best, and therefore we have the universal measure. Ａnd secondly, it's ignorant. Ｗe refuse to really address the issue of difference. Ｙou know, there's a very interesting passage in a book by Ｐaul Ｃohen, the Ａmerican historian. Ａnd Ｐaul Ｃohen argues that the Ｗest thinks of itself as probably the most cosmopolitan of all cultures. Ｂut it's not. Ｉn many ways, it's the most parochial, because for 200 years, the Ｗest has been so dominant in the world that it's not really needed to understand other cultures, other civilizations. Ｂecause, at the end of the day, it could, if necessary by force, get its own way. Ｗhereas those cultures -- virtually the rest of the world, in fact -- which have been in a far weaker position, 9 / 13vis-a-vis the Ｗest, have been thereby forced to understand the Ｗest, because of the Ｗest's presence in those societies. Ａnd therefore, they are, as a result, more cosmopolitan in many ways than the Ｗest.Ｉ mean, take the question of Ｅast Ａsia. Ｅast Ａsia: Ｊapan, Ｋorea, Ｃhina, etc. -- a third of the world's population lives there, now the largest economic region in the world. Ａnd Ｉ'll tell you now, that Ｅast Ａsianers, people from Ｅast Ａsia, are far more knowledgeable about the Ｗest than the Ｗest is about Ｅast Ａsia. Ｎow this point is very germane, Ｉ'm afraid, to the present. Ｂecause what's happening? Ｂack to that chart at the beginning -- the Ｇoldman Ｓachs chart. Ｗhat is happening is that, very rapidly in historical terms, the world is being driven and shaped, not by the old developed countries, but by the developing world. Ｗe've seen this in terms of the Ｇ20 -- usurping very rapidly the position of the Ｇ7, or the Ｇ8. Ａnd there are two consequences of this. Ｆirst, the Ｗest is rapidly losing its influence in the world. Ｔhere was a dramatic illustration of this actually a year ago -- Ｃopenhagen, climate change conference. Ｅurope was not at the final negotiating table. Ｗhen did that last happen? Ｉ10 / 13would wager it was probably about 200 years ago. Ａnd that is what is going to happen in the future.Ａnd the second implication is that the world will inevitably, as a consequence, become increasingly unfamiliar to us, because it'll be shaped by cultures and experiences and histories that we are not really familiar with, or conversant with. Ａnd at last, Ｉ'm afraid -- take Ｅurope, Ａmerica is slightly different -- but Ｅuropeans by and large, Ｉ have to say, are ignorant, are unaware about the way the world is changing. Ｓome people -- Ｉ've got an Ｅnglish friend in Ｃhina, and he said, "Ｔhe continent is sleepwalking into oblivion." Ｗell, maybe that's true, maybe that's an exaggeration. Ｂut there's another problem which goes along with this -- that Ｅurope is increasingly out of touch with the world -- and that is a sort of loss of a sense of the future. Ｉ mean, Ｅurope once, of course, once commanded the future in it's confidence. Ｔake the 19th century for example. Ｂut this, alas, is no longer true.Ｏkay, so how would Ｉ like to finish? Ｗell, what should our attitude be towards this world that we see very rapidly developing before us? Ｉ think there will be good things about 11 / 13it and there will be bad things about it. Ｂut Ｉ want to argue, above all, a big picture positive for this world. Ｆor 200 years, the world was essentially governed by a fragment of the human population. Ｔhat's what Ｅurope and Ｎorth Ａmerica represented. Ｔhe arrival of countries like Ｃhina and Ｉndia -- between them 38 percent of the world's population -- and others like Ｉndonesia and Ｂrazil and so on, represent the most important single act of democratization in the last 200 years. Ｃivilizations and cultures, which had been ignored, which had no voice, which were not listened to, which were not known about, will have a different sort of representation in this world. Ａs humanists, we must welcome, surely, this transformation. Ａnd we will have to learn about these civilizations.Ｔhis big ship here was the one sailed in by Ｚheng Ｈe in the early 15th century on his great voyages around the Ｓouth Ｃhina Ｓea, the Ｅast Ｃhina Ｓea and across the Ｉndian Ｏcean to Ｅast Ａfrica. Ｔhe little boat in front of it was the one in which, 80 years later, Ｃhristopher Ｃolumbus crossed the Ａtlantic. (Ｌaughter) Ｏr, look carefully at this silk scroll made by ＺhuＺhou in 1368. Ｉ think they're playing 12 / 13golf. Ｃhrist, the Ｃhinese even invented golf. Ｗelcome to the future. Ｔhank you.13 / 13。

马丁·杰克斯：直面中国的崛起译者：Winnie Shi 校对：Tony Yet原文网站/2011/02/13/martin_jacques_understanding_the_rise_of_c hina/演讲简介：在多数中国人的印象里，西方对中国的态度往往被两种极端情绪主导：要么畏其崛起而恐惧乃至责骂诽谤，要么为功夫和熊猫而狂热得难以理解。

鲜有能像马丁·杰克斯（Martin Jacques）那样的西方人从中国的历史本源与文化性格出发，客观而不失深刻，辛辣而不失真诚地告诉他的同胞们：你们误读了中国。

作为轰动一时的《当中国统治世界》（When China Rules the World）的作者，原《今日马克思主义》杂志的编辑，中国人民大学的客座教授，马丁·杰克斯在这篇演讲中向观众介绍了认识中国的三个基础，坦率地指出西方愈来愈偏狭的文化气度，并鼓励西方人直面这个变化发展的世界。

这世界正在以飞快的速度发生着改变。

如果你看这上面的图表，你会发现在2025年，据高盛的预测显示，中国经济体的规模几乎会与美国的一样大。

如果你来看这张2050年的图表，它预测届时中国经济体的规模将是美国的两倍，而印度经济体规模将与美国相近。

我们应该注意的是，这些预测是在西方金融危机发生之前做出的。

几周前，我在看法国巴黎银行做出的关于中国的经济体规模何时超越美国的最新预测。

高盛当时的预测是2027年。

而这份诞生于危机之后的报告的预测年份则是2020年。

这就是十年之后的事情了。

中国将要从两个最基本的方面改变世界。

首先，它是一个有着13亿人口的庞大的发展中国家，并已经以每年10%的经济增长速度腾飞了30多年。

而且在十年之内，它将会是世界最大的经济体。

在现代史上，还从未有过一个发展中国家，而不是发达国家，成为世界上最大的经济体。

第二，也是现代史上的第一次，世界上处主导地位的国家——我认为中国将居主导地位——不来自西方，而是来自于一个完全不同的文化根基。