浅谈公允价值计量属性在新准则中的应用外文文献

公允价值计量在我国会计核算中的应用研究(外文翻译参考)毕业设计（论文）外文参考资料及译文译文题目：公允价值会计的危机:正确理解最近的辩论学生姓名：葛慧敏学号： 0901208036 专业：会计学所在学院：商学院指导教师：王思武职称：讲师2013年3月10日The Crisis of Fair Value Accounting: Making Sense ofthe Recent Debate*Christian LauxGoethe-University FrankfurtandChristian LeuzThe University of Chicago Booth School ofBusiness & NBERApril 2009(Forthcoming in Accounting, Organizations andSociety)AbstractThe recent financial crisis has led to a vigorous debate about the pros and cons of fair-value accounting (FV A). This debate presents a major challenge for FV A g oing forward and standard setters’ push to extend FV A into other areas. In this article, we highlight four important issues as an attempt to make sense of the debate. First, much of the controversy results from confusion about what is new and different about FV A. Second, while there are legitimate concerns about marking to market (or pure FV A) in times of financial crisis, it is less clear that these problems apply to FV A as stipulated by the accounting standards, be it IFRS or U.S. GAAP. Third, historical cost accounting (HCA) is unlikely to be the remedy. There are a number of concerns about HCA as well and these problemscould be larger than those with FV A. Fourth, although it is difficult to fault the FV A standards per se, implementation issues are a potential concern, especially with respect to litigation. Finally, we identify several avenues for future research.Key Words: Mark-to-market；Fair value accounting；Financial institutions；Liquidity；Financial crisis；Banks；Procyclicality1. IntroductionThe recent financial crisis has turned the spotlight on fair-value accounting (FV A) and led to a major policy debate involving among others the U.S. Congress, the European Commission as well banking and accounting regulators around the world. Critics argue that FV A, often also called mark-to-market accounting (MTM),1has significantly contributed to the financial crisis and exacerbated its severity for financial institutions in the U.S. and around the world.2On the other extreme, proponents of FV A argue that it merely played the role of the proverbial messenger that is now being shot (e.g., Turner, 2008; Veron, 2008).3In our view, there are problems with both positions. FV A is neither responsible for the crisis nor is it merely a measurement system that reports asset values without having economic effects of its own.In this article, we attempt to make sense of the current fair-value debate and discuss whether many of the arguments in this debate hold up to further scrutiny. We come to the following four conclusions. First, much of the controversy about FV A results from confusion about what is new and different about FV A as well as different views about the purpose of FV A. In our view, the debate about FV A takes us back to several old accounting issues, like the tradeoff between relevance and reliability, which have been debated for decades. Except in rare circumstances, standard setters will always face these issues and tradeoffs; FV A is just another example. This insight is helpful to better understand some of the arguments brought forward in the debate.Second, there are legitimate concerns about marking asset values to market prices in times of financial crisis once we recognize that there are ties to contractsand regulation or that managers and investors may care about market reactions over the short term. However, it is not obvious that these problems are best addressed with changes to the accounting system. These problems could also (and perhaps more appropriately) be addressed by adjusting contracts and regulation. Moreover, the concern about the downward spiral is most pronounced for FV A in its pure form but it does not apply in the same way to FV A as stipulated by U.S. GAAP or IFRS. Both standards allow for deviations from market prices under certain circumstances (e.g., prices from fire sales). Thus, it is not clear that the standards themselves are the source of the problem. However, as our third conclusion highlights, there could be implementation problems in practice. It is important to recognize that accounting rules interact with other elements of the institutional framework, which could give rise to unintended consequences. For instance, we point out that managers’ concerns about litigation could make a deviation from market prices less likely even when it would be appropriate. Concerns about SEC enforcement could have similar effects. At the same time, it is important to recognize that giving management more flexibility to deal with potential problems of FV A (e.g., in times of crisis) also opens the door for manipulation. For instance, managers could use deviations from allegedly depressed market values to avoid losses and impairments. Judging from evidence in other areas in accounting (e.g., loans and goodwill) as well as the U.S. savings and loans (S&L) crisis, this concern should not be underestimated. Thus, standard setters and enforcement agencies face a delicate tradeoff (e.g., between contagion effects and timely impairment).Fourth, we emphasize that a return to historical cost accounting (HCA) is unlikely to be a remedy to the problems with FV A. HCA has a set of problems as well and it is possible that for 3certain assets they are as severe, or even worse than the problems with FV A. For instance, HCA likely provides incentives engage in so called “gains trading” or to securitize and sell assets. Moreover, lack of transparency under HCA could make matters worse during crises.We conclude our article with several suggestions for future research. Basedon extant empirical evidence, it is difficult to evaluate the role of FV A in the current crisis. In particular, we need more work on the question of whether market prices significantly deviated from fundamental values during this crisis and more evidence that FV A did have an effect above and beyond the procyclicality of asset values and bank lending.In Section 2, we provide a quick overview over FV A and some of the key arguments for and against FV A. In Section 3, we discuss the concern that FV A contributes to contagion and procyclicality as well as ways to address this concern, including how current accounting practices help to alleviate problems of contagion. We consider potential implementation problems in Section 4 and conclude with suggestions for future research in Section 5.2. Fair-value accounting: What is it and what are the key arguments?FV A is a way to measure assets and liabilities that appear on a company’s balance sheet. FAS 157 defines fair value as “the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date.” When quoted prices in active markets for identical assets or liabilities are available, they have to be used as the measurement for fair value (Level 1 inputs). If not, Level 2 or Level 3 inputs should be used. Level 2 applies to cases for which there are observable inputs, which includes quoted prices for similar assets or liabilities in active markets, quoted prices from identical or similar assets in 4inactive markets, and other relevant market data. Level 3 inputs are unobservable inputs (e.g.,model assumptions). They should be used to derive a fair value if observable inputs are not available, which is commonly referred to as a mark-to-model approach.Fair value is defined similarly under IFRS as the amount for which an asset could be exchanged, or a liability settled, between knowledgeable, willing parties, in an arm’s length transaction. In determining fair value, IFRS make similardistinctions among inputs as FAS 157: Quoted prices in active markets must be used as fair value when available. In the absence of such prices, an entity should use valuation techniques and all relevant market information that is available so that valuation techniques maximize the use of observable inputs (IAS 39). It is recognized that an entity might have to make significant adjustments to an observed price in order to arrive at the price at which an orderly transaction would have taken place (e.g., IASB Expert Advisory Panel, 2008).3. Fair-value accounting, illiquidity, and financial crisesFV A and its application through the business cycle have been subject to considerable debate (e.g., ECB, 2004; Banque de France, 2008; IMF, 2008). The chief concern is that FV A is procyclical, i.e., it exacerbates swings in the financial system, and that it may even cause a downward spiral in financial markets. U.S. GAAP and, more recently, also IFRS allow for a re-classification of fair-value assets into a category to which HCA and less stringent impairment tests apply. U.S. GAAP and IFRS have mechanisms to avoid negative spillovers in distressed markets and a downward spiral.To address contagion and procyclicality is not to have direct (mechanical) regulatory or contractual ties to FV A. For instance, it would be possible to adjust the accounting numbers for the purpose of determining regulatory capital. Such adjustments already exist. For example, for the purpose of calculating regulatory capital, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Federal Reserve adjust bank’s equity as reported under U.S. GAAP for unrealized losses and gains for available-for-sale (AFS) debt securities to obtain Tier 1 capital (e.g., Schedule HC-R in FR Y-9C). Thus, regulatory capital as calculated by U.S. banking regulators is not affected by changes in the fair value of AFS debt securities, unless they are sold or the impairments are other-than-temporary.13Similarly, Li (2008) documents that debt contracts often exclude fair-value changes in accounting-based debt covenants. These examples demonstrate that it is not clear that contagion and procyclicality are bestaddressed directly in the accounting system. Perhaps these issues are better left to the prudential regulators and contracting parties, who in turn can make adjustments to the numbers reported in the financial statements as they see fit. In our view, this is an interesting issue for future research. In summary, Allen and Carletti (2008) and Plantin et al. (2008a)provide important contributions to the FV A debate by illustrating potential contagion effects. However, they do not show that HCA would bepreferable. In fact, Plantin et al. (2008a) are quite explicit about the problems of HCA. Furthermore, they do not speak directly to the role of FV A in the current crisis because they do not model FV A as implemented in practice. As noted above, FV A as required by U.S. GAAP or IFRS as well as U.S. regulatory capital requirements for banks have mechanisms in place that should alleviate potential contagion effects. Whether these mechanisms work properly in practice is our next question.4. Are there implementation problems with fair-value accounting standards?Given the discussion in the preceding section, it is not obvious that extant accounting standards can be blamed for causing contagion effects. But it is possible that, in practice or in crises, the standards do not work as intended. Ultimately, this is an empirical question and answering it is beyond the scope of this article. But we can at least raise and discuss two important implementation issues.Many have argued that both the emphasis of FAS 157 on observable inputs (i.e., Level 1 and Level 2) and extant SEC guidance make it very difficult for firms to deviate from market prices, even if these prices are below fundamentals or give rise to contagion effects (e.g., Wallison, 2008a, Bigman and Desmond, 2009). Consistent with these claims, the relevant standards in U.S. GAAP and IFRSas well as guidance for these standards are quite restrictive as to when it is appropriate for managers to deviate from observable market prices.However,such restrictions should not be surprising. By allowing deviations from market price in some instances, standard setters face the problem of distinguishing between a situation in which a market price is indeed misleading and a situation in which a manager merely claims that this is soin order to avoid a write-down. Without restrictive guidance, the standards could be easily gamed. There is evidence that managers can be reluctant to take write-downs even when assets are substantially impaired.15Consistent with this concern, current estimates of banks’ loan losses far exceed the write-downs that banks have taken so far and they also exceed the difference between the loans’ carrying valu es and banks’ fair value disclosures for these loans according to FAS 107 (e.g., Citigroup, 2009; Goldman Sachs, 2009; IMF, 2009).16 While this expected feature of second-best standards is one explanation for the criticism of FV A during the crisis, it is clearly also possible that extant rules and guidance are too restrictive (even from a second-best perspective) and that we would have been better off giving managers more flexibility in the crisis.17This is in essence the view that the House Financial Services Committee adopted in a hearing on MTM accounting rules on March 12, 2009. As a result of this political pressure, the FASB relaxed the conditions for moving assets into Level 3 in April 2009. Moreover, the financial statements of U.S. banks for fiscal 2008 show that banks have been able to move assets into the Level 3 Category as the financial crisis unfolded, so it was clearly not impossible to move to models (see also IMF, 2008). But it is of course possible that banks did not move enough assets into the Level 3 category to prevent contagion effects. In the end, we need more research on this issue.18A second implementation problem may arise from litigation risk. Deviations from market prices under existing FV A standards require substantial judgement by the preparers and the auditors. However, managers, directors and auditors face severe litigation risks as well as substantial legal penalties, including prison terms, which recently have been increased by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. In this environment, managers, directors, and auditors are likely to weigh thepersonal costs and risks associated with deviations from market prices differently than investors. For example, it is conceivable that a manager is reluctant to use an appropriate model-based fair value that is higher than an observable price from a very illiquid market, especially when there is substantial down-side risk for the economy or the firm, as there typically is in financial crises.From a litigation risk perspective, guidance as to when deviations are appropriate is likely to play an important role, especially in litigious environments and when enforcement is strong. Thus, it is possible that, once we recognize the litigation aspect, improvements in the standards’ implementation were (and perhaps are still) needed. However, as litigation serves as an important enforcement mechanism, there are tradeoffs as we highlighted earlier in this section for SEC enforcement. This second implementation problem also highlights that it is important to evaluate accounting standards within the context of the institutional environment in which they operate.195、Conclusion and suggestions for future researchThe preceding sections illustrate that the debate about FV A is full of arguments that do not hold up to further scrutiny and need more economic analysis. Moreover, it is important to recognize that standard setters face tradeoffs, and in this regard FV A is no exception. One example is the tradeoff between relevance and reliability, which is at the heart of the debate of when to deviate from market prices in determining fair values. Another example is that FV A recognizes losses early thereby forcing banks to take appropriate measures early and making it more difficult to hide potential problems that only grow larger and would make crises more severe. But this benefit gives rise to another set of tradeoffs. First, FV A introduces volatility in the financial statement in “normal times” (when prompt action is not needed). Second, full FV A can give rise to contagion effects in times of crisis, which need to be addressed – be it in the accounting system or with prudential regulation. In our view, it may bebetter to design prudential regulation that accepts FV A as a starting point but sets explicit counter-cyclical capital requirements than to implicitly address the issue of financial stability in the accounting system by using historical costs. It is an illusion to believe that ignoring market prices or current information provides a foundation for a more solid banking system. But we admit that the tradeoff between transparency and financial stability as well as the interactions between accounting and prudential regulation needs further analysis (see also Landsman, 2006).A related issue is the question of how investors respond to additional disclosures that firms provide in times of crisis. There are a few studies that examine firms’ responses to transparency crises and their economic consequences (e.g., Leuz and Schrand, 2008). The current crisis provides an interesting setting to further explore these issues further. An analysis of European banks’ annual reports by KPMG (2008) suggests that, in 2007, banks increased their disclosures related to financial instruments, in part due to the beginning of the crisis. It would be interesting to study what determines disclosure (or non-disclosure), how investors reacted to these disclosures and whether there are signs that investors overreact to such disclosures.Finally, it is important to recognize that accounting rules and changes in them are shaped by political processes (like any other regulation). The role of the political forces further complicates the analysis. For instance, it is possible that changing the accounting rules in a crisis as a result of political pressures leads to worse outcomes than sticking to a particular regime (e.g., Brunnermeier etal., 2009). In this regard, the intense lobbying and political interference with the standard setting process during the current crisis provide a fertile ground for further study.In sum, the fair-value debate is far from over and much remains to be done. ReferencesAdrian, T., & Shin, H.S. (2008). Liquidity and leverage. Federal Reserve Bank ofNew York Staff Reports, No. 328.Allen, F., & Carletti, E. (2008). Mark-to-market accounting and liquidity pricing. Journal of Accounting and Economics45, 358-378.American Bankers Association (2008). Letter to SEC. September 23, 2008.Ball, R. (2008). Don’t shoot the messenger … or ignore the message, Note.Bank of America (2004). Letter to FASB. September 17. 2004.Banque de France (2008). Financial stability review. Special issue on valuation, No 12, October.Barberis, N., & Thaler, R. (2003). A survey of behavioral finance. In G.M. Constantinides, M. Harris, & R. M. Stulz, Handbook of the Economics of Finance, vol. 1, chapter 18, pages 1053-1128. North Holland, Amsterdam: Elsevier.Barth, M. (2004). Fair Values and Financial Statement Volatility. In: The Market Discipline Across Countries and Industries, Claudio Borio, William Curt Hunter, George G Kaufman, and Kostas Tsatsaronis (eds). Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.Barth, M.E., Beaver, W.H., & Landsman, W.R. (2001). The relevance of the value-relevance literature for financial accounting standard setting: another view. Journal of Accounting and Economics 31, 77-104.Beatty, A., Chamberlain, S. & Magliolo, J. (1995). Managing financial reports of commercial banks: The influence of taxes, regulatory capital and earnings. Journal of Accounting Research33, 231-261.Beaver, W.H. (1981). Financial reporting: An accounting revolution. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.Benston, G. J. (2008). The shortcomings of fair-value accounting described in SFAS 157. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 27, 101-114.Berger, A.N., Herring, R.J., & Szegö, G.P. (1995). The role of capital in financial institutions. Journal of Banking and Finance19, 393-340.Bernard, V.L., Merton, R.C., & Palepu, K.G. (1995). Mark-to-market accountingfor banks and thrifts: Lessons from the Danish experience. Journal of Accounting Research 33, 1-32.Bigman, D., & Desmond, M. (2009). Mark-to-messy accounting change. , April 02, 2009.Brunnermeier, M.K., & Pedersen, L.H. (forthcoming). Market liquidity and funding liquidity. Review of Financial Studies.Brunnermeier, M.K., Crocket, A., Goodhart, C., Persaud, A. & Shin, H. (2009). The fundamental principles of financial regulation. Geneva Reports on the World Economy 11. International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies. Geneva, Switzerland.Citigroup (2009). Industry focus: U.S. Banks, Research report by Citigroup Global Markets, March 2, 2009.Credit Suisse (2008). Letter to the SEC, File Number 4-573, November 13, 2008. Coval, J.D., Jurek, J.W., & Stafford, E. (2009). The pricing of investment grade credit risk during the financial crisis. Working Paper.DeBondt, W.F.M., & Thaler, R. (1985). Does the stock market overreact? The Journal of Finance40, 793-805.Disclosure Insight (2009). Comment letter on proposed staff position under FASB Statement No. 157, Fair Value Measurements, March 25, 2009.ECB (2004). Fair value accounting and financial stability. By ECB staff team led by A. Enria. Occasional Paper Series, No. 13, April 2004.公允价值会计的危机:正确理解最近的辩论作者：Christian Laux and Christian Leuz出处：Forthcoming in Accounting,Organizations and Society摘要最近的金融危机已经导致了一个关于公允价值会计的优缺点(FVA)的激烈争论。

浅议新会计准则中公允价值的运用【摘要】近年来，国际会计准则及美国等一些市场经济发达国家会计准则，纷纷将公允价值作为重要甚至是首选的计量属性加以运用，以提高会计信息的相关性。

从计量属性角度看，公允价值在某种程度上代表着财务会计的发展方向。

因此，其运用的范围和程度也就成了衡量一个国家或一个地区、一个组织会计国际化程度的重要标志。

公允价值在我国的运用道路很曲折，2006年2月15日财政部颁布的新会计准则大量启用了公允价值计量模式，为了适应社会主义市场经济发展需要，规范企业公允价值计量和披露，提高会计信息质量，今年财政部制定了《企业会计准则第39号——公允价值计量》，自2014年7月1日起施行。

本文根据公允价值的概念分析公允价值运用的范围，揭示公允价值在我国运用的必然性。

【关键词】新会计准则公允价值运用目录1 公允价值的概述 (1)1.1公允价值的概念 (1)1.1.1 公允价值的定义 (1)1.1.2公允价值的本质 (1)1.2公允价值的表现形式及特征 (1)1.2.1公允价值的表现形式 (1)1.2.2公允价值的特征 (1)1.3公允价值于其他计量属性的关系研究 (2)2 公允价值运用的范围 (2)2.1公允价值运用的理论基础 (2)2.1.1公允价值符合现代会计目标 (2)2.1.2公允价值符合相关性和可靠性质量特征 (2)2.1.3公允价值符合会计要素本质 (3)2.2 公允价值运用的层次性 (3)2.2.1公允价值层次性的概述 (3)2.2.2层次化公允价值计量的归宿：市场脱手价格 (3)2.2.3对公允价值进行分层计量时提高会计信息质量的要求 (3)2.2.4对公允价值进行分层计量时实现财务报告目标的需要 (4)2.2.5对公允价值进行分层计量有助于实现“决策有用的计量观” (4)2.3公允价值在会计核算中的运用 (4)2.3.1公允价值的确认 (4)2.3.2公允价值的计量 (4)2.3.3会计报告中的公允价值 (5)2.4公允价值在具体会计准则中的应用 (6)2.4.1非金融资产的公允价值计量 (6)2.4.2负债和企业自身权益工具的公允价值计量 (6)2.4.3其他业务的公允价值计量 (6)3 公允价值运用的意义 (6)3.1运用公允价值的理论意义 (7)3.2 运用公允价值的现实意义 (7)3.3 公允价值在实践运用中存在的不足 (8)3.3.1缺乏完善的理论体系指导 (8)3.3.2公允价值可靠性难以控制 (8)3.3.3公允价值不易直接获取 (8)3.3.4公允价值实际操作难度大 (8)3.4公允价值的前景展望 (9)【结语】 (9)【参考文献】 (10)浅议新会计准则中公允价值的运用一、公允价值概述（一）公允价值的概念1、公允价值的定义所谓公允价值，国际会计准则委员会（IASC）将其定义为：熟悉情况和自愿的双方在一项公平交易中，能够将一项资产进行交换或将另一项负债进行结算的金额。

外文文献：FAIR VALUE ACCOUNTING IN THE BANKING SECTOR The Financial Instruments Joint Working Group (JWG) of Standard Setters issued in December 2000 the consultative document entitled “Draft Standard and Basis for Conclusions –Financial Instruments and Si milar Items”. The Draft Standard reviews and assesses an extensive use of fair value accounting (FVA) as the basis for the valuation of all financial instruments in a bank’s balance sheet. The work of the JWG is linked to the long-term strategy of the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) –recently replaced by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) –to introduce a comprehensive FVA framework for the recognition and measurement of financial instruments. The JWG invited comments on the Draft Standard from all interested parties by 30 September 2001. The IASB will evaluate the long-term prospects of FVA in the light of the comments received.This note conveys the comments of the European CentralBank (ECB) on an important dimension of the proposal put forward by the JWG, notably the application of FVA to the banking sector. After reviewing the main innovations of the Draft Standard, the note focuses on the critical aspects associated with the application of a full FVA regime to the banking sector and presents a possible way forward.The main innovations of the Draft Standard for the banking sectorThe present accounting rules for banks in the European Union distinguish between financial instruments held for trading purposes (in the trading book) and those intended to be held to maturity (in the banking book). Instruments held in the trading book are valued at market prices. A profit and/or loss arising from the revaluation of trading book instruments is recognised in the profit and loss account. The accounting rules for the trading book thereby take all market risks (i.e. price risk, interest rate risk, foreign exchange risk and liquidity risk) into account. Banking book instruments, by contrast, are carried in thebalance sheet at the lower of historical cost and market value. Whereas a loss on a banking book instrument is transferred to the profit and loss account, unrealised gains are not recognised and can therefore become hidden reserves in the balance sheet. Therefore, the accounting rules for the banking book do not take market risks into account (except for the foreign exchange risk, where the end-period value is usually applied to almost all balance sheet items).The Draft Standard proposes a uniform rule for all financial instruments. The assets and liabilities are carried in the balance sheet at market values, if they are available, or at fair values calculated as an approximation of the market value by using a present value model for discounting the expected future cash flow. For banks, this would imply that the trading and banking books would receive equal accounting treatment, whereby all changes in value would be recognised in the balance sheet and transferred to the profit and loss account. The foreseenrevaluation applies irrespective of whether a profit or loss has been realised or remains unrealised because all instruments are either marked to market or the fair value is estimated. The hidden reserves that may arise under the existing accounting rules thus disappear. Market risks would be taken into account when calculating the value of financial instruments in both the trading and the banking book.Critical aspectsAccording to its proponents, an FVA regime may constitute, from a conceptual point of view, an alternative approach to reporting financial performance in order to avoid some of the problems associated with the current historical cost accounting. One of its main advantages would be to enhance the degree of transparency of financial statements. However, this point of view remains theoretical due to the absence of homogeneity and therefore comparability in FVA methodologies. Furthermore, the possible concrete application of a full FVA regime(applying to all assets and liabilities) to the banking sector gives rise to some serious problems and concerns.The application of FVA may be suitable for the trading book of banks, which refers to transactions (buying and selling) of marketable securities and related instruments with the objective of making a profit from short-term price variations. The use of fair value for these transactions is consistent with the availability of market prices and the short-term horizon. However, the application of FVA to the banking book of banks, i.e. to non-negotiable instruments such as loans, appears to be inappropriate for at least three main reasons.First, the issue of relevance. FVA principles do not reflect properly the way in which banks manage their core business, namely the granting of loans. The essence of bank management in this area lies in taking long-term decisions about credit quality and concentration and fostering customer relationships over the life of the contracts. It is less concerned about short-term variations thatrepresent the basis for the use of FVA principles. Therefore, there is the possibility that the introduction of FVA for the banking book might in principle create incentives for banks to alter their core business. This would be the case if banks decided to reduce their exposure to increased volatility of income (stemming from the accounting recognition of interest rate risk in the banking book) by shortening the average maturity of loans. Other ways to achieve the same goal would be the recourse to hedging techniques and the increased use of variable interest rates. The decision to reduce the average maturity of loans would depend also on other factors, including the nature of customer demand and the specific cost structure of individual banks.Second, the issue of feasibility. There are serious doubts that an adequate fair value can be determined for bank loans, which are non-negotiable instruments precisely because they embody elements that cannot be easily quantified in a standardised manner. First, there are, bydefinition, no secondary markets for these instruments. This is particularly true where credit risk markets do not appear to be sufficiently deep and liquid for the purpose concerned. Second, some relevant information for the determination of the fair value of loans (i.e. that stemming from the bilateral relationship between the borrower and the lender) would never be priced in a market. Third, the estimation techniques currently available (including the one proposed in the Draft Standard) suffer from methodological problems (e.g. modelling of non-interest income, appropriate discount rate, etc.), which increase the risks of error. Accordingly, they do not represent an effective benchmark for obtaining reliable fair values for loans. Therefore, the application of FVA to bank loans would give rise to many uncertainties hindering and working against the transparency and comparability of financial statements. It is acknowledged, however, that the current and future developments in banks’ credit risk management systems –recognised also in the new capital adequacy regime proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision –may provide accounting standard-setters with useful elements to refine their methodologies, in particular regarding the measurement of credit risk.Doubts are also raised with regard to the application of FVA to the liability side of banks. For instance, the suggested methodology (the so-called “own credit risk”) to determine the fair value of debt instruments issued by banks entails that, if the rating of a bank deteriorates, the value of its equity will ultimately increase (since the difference in revaluation of debt instruments is accounted in the profit and loss account). This outcome is counter-intuitive and can be misleading for shareholders and creditors.Third, the issue of prudence. The use of FVA in the banking book would entail that potential profits and losses would be treated in the same way, by being recognised as soon as they emerge. This goes against the principle ofprudence according to which losses stemming from the banking book should be recognised as soon as they are known, even if only potential, whereas profits should be recognised only if they are actually realised. Potential profits should be recognised only for marketable instruments. Therefore, there is the possibility that the application of FVA to the banking book might induce banks to adopt an imprudent behaviour. This is a crucial aspect also from the viewpoint of the banking supervisory function.Possible way forwardIn light of the critical aspects mentioned above, the ECB has a negative stance towards the possibility of applying an FVA regime to the banking book of banks. Against this background, the following developments could be considered in order to make a constructive use of the valid arguments that lie behind FVA.A first development would entail that, whereas FVAwould not be recognised as an accounting standard for the banking book of banks, supervisory authorities might use it as a supplementary instrument to complement their assessment of the situation of individual credit institutions.A second development involves the adoption by banks of the so-called “dynamic provisioning”. This entails recognising that a proportion of the loan portfolio can deteriorate in the future and that this proportion can be measured ex ante on the basis of a specific statistical analysis. It would also involve the disclosure by banks of the results of stress-test analyses conducted on the interest rate sensitivity of the banking book. This approach would allow two criticisms associated with the current accounting standards to be overcome, notably that potential credit losses remain hidden until signs of deterioration are evident and that market participants have insufficient information about the interest rate risk profile of banks.中文译文：银行业公允价值会计核算联合工作组的标准制定金融工具在2000年12月发出题为“金融工具及其标准草案和结论的基础”类似的项目的咨询文件。

公允价值中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文:Fair Value is here to stayThe fair value guidance in SFAS 157 Fair Value Measurements, does not represent, as many perceive, a radical departure from previous accounting rules. SFAS 157 is the result of a natural evolution that has been taking place for more than 30 years. SFAS 157 is the result of anatural evolution that has been taking place for more than 30 years.Many who oppose SFAS 157 do so because of the current economic environment. This current economy, during which many hedge funds and other institutional investors face significant other-than-temporary write-downs on illiquid assets, is, however, an anomaly. Any valuation method that does not require significant write-downs in the current environment would fail to provide a reasonable representation of fair value for those illiquid assets.When it was introduced in 2007, SFAS 157 amended, deleted, or otherwise affected more than 40 areas of accounting guidance, including SFAS 13, Accounting for Leases. SFAS 13, issued in 1976, introduced the fair value concept when it described an asset being sold in an "arm's length transaction between unrelated parties." Since then, the accounting framework has continued to move away from a historical cost model and toward a fair value model.Throughout this transition, accounting standards were issued that discussed fair value in different contexts. SFAS 157 was designed primarily to provide a uniform definition of fair value and a universal measurement framework. Contrary to popular perception, SFAS 157 does not require any new items to be measured at fair value; it specifies the framework to be used wherever other standards require that items be measured at fair value.Along the WayMany accountants were educated during an era when colleges taught the tenets of historical cost as part of the fundamental framework of accounting. To those watching the fair value model slowly supplant the cost model during the past 30 years, it may seem like a dramatic change in thinking has recently occurred, but much of this shift is attributable to the ongoing development of accounting standards and rules, rather than a change in approach.To those watching the fair value model slowly supplant the cost model during the past 30 years, it may seem like a dramatic change in thinking has recently occurred, but much of this shift is attributable to the ongoing development of accounting standards and rules, rather than a change in approach. Prior to SFAS 87,Accounting for Pensions, and SFAS 106, Employers' Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions, many companies paid for these benefits on a pay-as-you go cash basis, with little attention given to the fair value of the plan assets that were needed to be set aside to cover the cost of such benefits or how to account for them on an accrual basis. SASs 87 and 106 required companies for the first time to factor in the fair value of plan assets when determining their benefit obligations.The next sweeping implementation of fair value took place when companies began to adopt SFAS 133, Accounting for Derivatives and HedgingActivities, in 1999. Prior to SFAS 133, companies were not required to put all derivatives on their balance sheet at fair value; derivatives were not even defined in the literature. For the first time, complex financial instruments, many of which were involved in hedging relationships, were subject to fair valuation. Soon after, SFAS 140, Transfers of Financial Assets, gave rise to difficult-to-value seductive financial assets, such as residential and commercial mortgage-hacked securities RMBS and CMBS, which in turn gave rise to collateralized debt obligationsCDO and other financial instruments. A barrage of valuation techniques based on higher math designed to account for securitization followed.SFAS 157 had a significant impact on fair value accounting for illiquid securities, which are typically among the most difficult assets to value. Prior to SFAS 157, companies often cherry-picked information to support valuations for illiquid positions, regardless of accuracy. Now, they are required to consider all "reasonably available" information and use the best data available to support their market assumptions and parameters.Even though SFAS 157 has been in effect for more than a year, many illiquid assets are still being valued based on previous methodologies that are clearly inaccurate.Today's EnvironmentIn the current economic environment, air value accounting facesintensified scrutiny, challenging situations, and significant opposition. Attention is especially focused on three areas:? Other-than-temporary write-downs,? Fresh-start accounting, and? Illiquid securities.Other-than-temporary write-downs.With Level 1 securities, determining when to record an other-than-temporary impairment can he as straightforward as deciding how much time has passed since an impairment began. When the tech bubble burst, for example, companies often realized after six to nine months that asset values weren't going to recover any time soon, if at all.But what about Level 2 or Level 3 assets that are valued using sophisticated modeling techniques? Prior to SFAS 157, companies and their auditors might have agreed to hold off or postpone making an adjustment, due to a lack of relevant and reliable information. SFAS 157 has driven companies to consider new types and sources of information, and to work harder to support valuations for Level 2 and Level 3 assets. Companies are now expected to support their Level 2 and Level 3 assets almost as if they were Level I assets.In evaluating goodwill for other-than temporary impairment, SFAS 157 suggests that a publicly traded stock price, if available, is the best indicator of fair value. But even when a stock price is available, other,more traditional methods of fair value, such as discounted cash flow, must also be considered. The challenge lies in supporting these other methods in the current environment of declining prices.With the release of FASB Staff Position FSP FAS 1 15-2 and FAS 124-2,Recognition and Presentation of Other-Than-Temporary Impairments, in April 2009, companies are able to bifurcate certain losses on debt securities classified as held-to-maturity or available-for-sale between the portion related to credit conditions and the portion related to noncredit conditions. The noncredit portion will be recognized on the balance sheet until the debt security matures or is sold. In many situations, the amount reclassified to the balance sheet will include losses previously recognized in other periods. This new rule has caused controversy among practitioners and standards setters, primarily because it delays the inevitable recognition of those losses in earnings when the debt security is sold or matures.Fresh-start accounting Companies petitioning for Chapter 11 bankruptcy need to know whether they will qualify for fresh start accounting based on their reorganization value according to the provisions of AICPA Statement of Position SOP 90-7, Financial Reporting by Entities in Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Code.SOP 90-7 provides a two-step test. The first step requires a comparison of reorganization value with the value of postposition claimsand obligations immediately prior to court confirmation. This balance sheet solvency test is a moving target throughout a bankruptcy proceeding, because there may be large fluctuations in reorganization value and claims until the plan is implemented. The second step requires that holders of existing common shares immediately before court confirmation have, as a group, less than 50% of the new company's shares upon emergence from bankruptcy. The challenge here involves the negotiations that take place between debtor and creditor committees and the company, which are then subject to final court approval.Illiquid securities. When determining fair value, companies must consider the frequency with which securities are traded. Fair value is more readily supportable for a frequently traded security than for one that is thinly traded because SFAS 157 emphasizes the importance of observable prices.Today, a company's desire to hold a position, together with its requirement to value that position, is causing a unique anomaly in the valuation world, as securities that would otherwise trade normally are increasingly subject to write-downs. A good valuation model must take into account all facts and circumstances. For example, when the market is dry for a specific illiquid security, the valuation methodology must consider any widening credit spreads, liquidity premiums from the time of the last active trading activity to the then-current indications, and discountrates implicit in nonbinding broker quotes.With the finalization in April 2009 of FSP FAS 157-4, Determining Fair Value When the Volume and Level of Activity for the Asset or Liability Have Significantly Decreased and Identifying Transactions that Are Not Orderly, companies are now subject to additional disclosure requirements and must carefully support how observable prices from inactive markets areused in valuations. Companies may also need to explain significant differences between different inputs to value.FSP FAS 157-4 did not come about without opposition; it generated nearly 400 comment letters within a short period. The author is not aware of any other proposed accounting rule that generated so many comment letters within such a short time and that underwent such a drastic turn around before being finalized.Tomorrow's EnvironmentU.S. companies are facing a seemingly inevitable changeover to International Financial Reporting Standards IFRS. Fair value guidance under U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles GAAP is primarily rules-based, while fair value guidance under IFRS is based on principles. Principles often evolve into rules, but, in this case, rules appear to be reverting back to their origin as principles.Fair value guidance under SFAS 157 and íFRS are different inseveral respects. For example, IFRS does not define the term "market participants," does not include the concepts of principal market or "highest and best use," and does not generally permit imaret pricing. While there will be convergence to eliminate many differences, companies will need to embrace and understand the principles based approach behind IFRS.Fair value will continue to generate challenges for accountants, especially if and when IFRS is adopted. The sooner companies come to grips with the impact of fair value accounting, the better, because fair value is here to stay.翻译:公允价值仍留在此处在美国财务会计准则委员会《财务会计准则公告第157号公允价值计量》(SFAS 157)的指导下,公允价值计量,并不代表尽可能多的感知,与以前的会计准则大相径庭。

公允价值：FASB的新准则及其对我国的启示(1)摘要：公允价值一直是我国会计界关注的一个热点，我国在使用公允价值计量的过程中，曾经有过惨痛的教训。

在2006年2月颁布的新会计准则中，作为会计国际化的重要步骤，我国又一次在很多具体会计准则中使用公允价值，这又引起大家的关注。

近期，美国财务会计准则委员会（FASB）就公允价值计量发布了一项新准则：第157号财务会计准则公告（SFAS No.157）——公允价值计量。

本文在介绍和分析FASB的新准则（公允价值计量）的基础上，认为我国可以适度的使用公允价值，并且要加强对公允价值的监管，尤其是关于衍生金融工具公允价值计量与披露的监管。

关键词：公允价值计量启示一、公允价值：FASB的新准则2006年9月15日，美国财务会计准则委员会（FASB）就公允价值计量发布了一项新准则：第157号财务会计准则公告（SFAS No.157）——公允价值计量。

新准则对使用公允价值计量资产和负债提出了改进性指南，并且对投资者的信息披露要求做出了回应，规定公司应就以公允价值计量的资产和负债的范围、公允价值计量中使用的信息以及公允价值计量对收入产生的影响等方面做出更多的披露。

在这一项新准则里（SFAS No.157），美国财务会计准则委员会（FASB）确定了公允价值的定义，确立了一个在一般公认会计准则（GAAP）范围内的公允价值计量的框架，详细地阐述了公允价值计量的披露事项。

这项会计准则适用于在FASB以期的会计准则公告中要求或者允许使用公允价值计量的会计实务中，同时该准则并没有扩大公允价值的应用范围。

1、FASB制定公允价值新准则的背景在157号财务会计准则公告（SFAS No.157）公布之前，美国一般公认会计原则（GAAP）中有超过40个会计准则要求（或允许）会计主体按照公允价值计量资产和负债。

在美国的会计实务中，存在着各种各样的关于公允价值的定义，但是对于公允价值在一般公认会计原则（GAAP）范围内使用的指导意见却是很少的，并且为数不多的指导意见分布在许多要求（或者是允许）使用公允价值计量的会计准则公告中。

论公允价值在新准则中的运用摘要公允价值一直是国际会计界关注的一个话题，完全实施公允价值会计是今后国际会计准则理事会的工作目标。

文章就公允价值的实施背景及涵义出发，分析新会计准则下公允价值计量模式的运用以及对我国上市公司信息披露的影响，同时指出在全球经济环境的影响下，公允价值计量在我国实行所面临的难点及顺利推行的对策与建议。

[关键词] 新会计准则公允价值会计信息AbstractFair value of the international accounting profession has been a topic of interest, full implementation of fair value accounting in the future work of the International Accounting Standards Board goals. Article on the implementation of the fair value of the background and meaning, analyzing the new accounting standards for the use of fair value model and the information disclosure of listed companies on China's impact, noting that the global economic environment, the fair value measurement are facing in our country Difficulties and smooth implementation of the countermeasures and suggestions.[Key words] New Accounting Standards Fair value Accounting information目录一、公允价值的产生、发展及实施背景 (4)二、公允价值实施的必要性 (5)（一）保持企业的经营能力，实现资本保全 (5)（二）提高会计信息的相关性，合理地反映企业的财务状况 (6)（三）会计国际化的必然要求和是我国经济形势发展的需要 (7)三、新准则中公允价值的计量及其影响 (8)（一）投资性房地产的公允价值计量及其影响 (9)（二）公允价值计量在债务重组中的运用及其影响 (12)（三）企业合并的公允价值计量及其影响 (13)四、我国运用公允价值计量面临的难点 (13)（一）缺乏成熟的市场环境 (13)（二）缺乏可操作性 (14)（三）法制不够完善和监管不力 (14)（四）会计人员素质需要提高 (15)五、在我国实施我国公允价值计量的对策 (15)（一）完善公允价值理论 (15)（二）加快市场经济发展，建立成熟的市场环境 (15)（三）加强监管 (16)（四）提高会计人员素质和职业道德 (16)参考文献 (17)论公允价值在新准则中的运用2006年2月15日，财政部发布了39项企业会计准则，其中公允价值的运用成为人们关注的焦点。

论公允价值在新企业会计准则中的应用观前言随着经济的发展，企业的经营模式逐渐多样化和复杂化，传统的会计准则已经不能完全适应企业经营的要求。

因此，国际会计准则委员会（IASB）逐步推出新的企业会计准则（IFRS）以取代传统的会计准则。

其中，公允价值是IFRS的重要组成部分。

本文将就公允价值在新企业会计准则中的应用观进行探讨。

什么是公允价值公允价值是指以市场主体之间的交易价格为基础，采用市场相关数据，根据公允价值计量基准，测定某一项资产或负债在市场上被交易时实现的价值。

公允价值提供了一种更加准确地反映市场变化的信息，能够更好地反映企业的资产和负债实际价值。

公允价值的优势公允价值在新企业会计准则中被广泛应用，并具有以下优势：更准确的反映实际价值传统的会计准则一般使用成本计量法或折旧摊销法来计价，这种方法难以反映资产实际价值。

而公允价值能够及时反映资产或负债的真实价值，更加准确地反映企业商业活动的变化。

更好的风险管理功能公允价值能够提供更为准确的市场价格信息，防范企业在资产估值上的失误，降低风险，并且能为企业制定更为科学的投资和财务决策提供支持。

更清晰地反映企业业绩公允价值计量能够在财务报表中很好地反映企业的投资收益和净资产价值，使得企业业绩的变化更加清晰明了。

更利于透明度公允价值上市公司的资产评估更加透明，反应更及时，符合市场对上市公司内在价值的高度关注。

应用场景公允价值在新企业会计准则中得到了广泛应用，包括以下几个方面：非流动资产计量企业的非流动资产主要包括固定资产、土地使用权、投资性房地产等。

企业在取得非流动资产后，不仅要考虑成本价，还需要不断关注资产市场变化，及时采用公允价值测定非流动资产的价值。

这样做可以更好地反映资产价值，使企业持有的非流动资产价值更加准确。

支出资产的确认企业在取得支出资产时，需要衡量资产的公允价值，以便更准确地反映企业净利润的变化，并为企业制定更为科学的经营、投资和财务决策提供支持。

浅析公允价值计量属性在新会计准则中的应用公允价值计量属性，在新会计准则中得到广泛的应用。

公允价值是指可交易资产或负债的结算价格，或者是在充分竞争市场环境中，市场参与者相互协商达成的价格。

新会计准则强调公允价值计量属性的应用，是为了更好地反映企业的经济现状和财务状况，更准确地客观反映资产和负债的价值变化，使财务报表更具有可比性和可理解性，更加贴近实际情况，以期为公司管理、投资者和其他利益相关者提供更为准确、全面和透明的财务信息。

一、公允价值计量属性在资产计价中的应用在新会计准则中，公允价值计量属性在资产计价中得到了广泛的应用。

例如，在固定资产的计价中，公允价值计量属性被应用在重估固定资产时的计价处理。

企业可以根据市场价格、生产成本等因素对资产进行重估，以确定资产的实际价值，进而根据公允价值计量属性进行会计处理。

在无形资产的计价中，企业应当根据公允价值计量属性的要求，对无形资产进行公允价值的计量和披露。

此外，在应收账款中也应用了公允价值计量属性。

在资产计价中应用公允价值计量属性，使资产价值更加准确地反映出实际情况，客观反映资产的价值变化，更加全面地反映出企业的财务状况。

二、公允价值计量属性在负债计价中的应用在新会计准则中，公允价值计量属性不仅应用于资产计价中，也广泛应用于负债计价中。

例如，在金融负债的计价中，企业应当根据公允价值计量属性的要求计量回购协议、债券发行费、利息费用等负债相关的项目。

此外，在应付款项中也应用了公允价值计量属性。

通过公允价值计量属性的应用，可更加准确地反映出实际情况，客观反映负债的价值变化，使财务报表更具有可理解性和可比性。

三、公允价值计量属性应用的优势公允价值计量属性的应用，有着众多的优势。

其首要优势在于公允价值计量属性可以准确反映资产、负债的市场价值。

通过公允价值计量属性的应用，可以更加客观地反映资产的实际价值，使相关信息更加真实可靠。

其次，公允价值计量属性的应用有助于提高财务报表的可比性。