Education and Social Capital

教育和人口的意义英语作文标题，The Significance of Education and Population。

Education and population are two fundamental elements that shape the trajectory of a society. They are interconnected, with education playing a crucial role in harnessing the potential of a population and drivingsocietal progress. In this essay, we will delve into the significance of education and population, exploring howthey intertwine and influence each other's development.Firstly, let's examine the importance of education. Education serves as the cornerstone of societal development, empowering individuals with knowledge, skills, and values necessary for personal and professional growth. Through education, individuals acquire the ability to think critically, solve problems, and adapt to an ever-changing world. Moreover, education fosters social cohesion by promoting understanding, tolerance, and respect for diversity. A well-educated population is better equipped toparticipate in democratic processes, contribute to economic prosperity, and address pressing global challenges such as climate change and poverty.Furthermore, education plays a pivotal role in shaping population dynamics. Access to quality education,particularly for girls and women, has been shown tocorrelate with lower fertility rates and improved maternal and child health outcomes. Education empowers women to make informed decisions about their reproductive health, leading to smaller family sizes and better overall well-being. Additionally, educated individuals are more likely to participate in family planning programs, leading to more sustainable population growth and reduced strain on resources. Therefore, investing in education is not only a matter of human rights but also a strategic imperative for achieving demographic stability and sustainable development.On the other hand, population dynamics also influencethe educational landscape of a society. Rapid population growth can strain educational resources, leading to overcrowded classrooms, inadequate infrastructure, anddisparities in access to education. In developing countries with high fertility rates, governments often struggle to provide quality education for all children, exacerbating social inequalities and hindering economic progress. Moreover, population growth can outpace the expansion of educational opportunities, resulting in a lack of skilled workers to meet the demands of a competitive global economy. Thus, addressing population challenges is essential for creating an enabling environment for education andfostering human capital development.In conclusion, education and population areinextricably linked, each playing a crucial role in shaping the future of societies. Education empowers individuals to fulfill their potential and contribute to the common good, while population dynamics influence the availability and quality of educational opportunities. By investing in education and addressing population challenges, governments and policymakers can build a more equitable, prosperous,and sustainable world for future generations. It is imperative that we recognize the interdependence ofeducation and population and work towards harnessing their transformative power for the greater good.。

Annu.Rev.Sociol.1998.24:1–24Copyright ©1998by Annual Reviews.All rights reservedSOCIAL CAPITAL:Its Origins andApplications in Modern Sociology Alejandro Portes Department of Sociology,Princeton University,Princeton,New Jersey 08540KEY WORDS:social control,family support,networks,sociabilityA BSTRACTThispaper reviews the origins and definitionsof social capital in the writings of Bourdieu,Loury,and Coleman,among other authors.It distinguishes foursources of social capital and examines their dynamics.Applications of the concept in the sociological literature emphasize its role in social control,infamilysupport,and in benefits mediated by extrafamilial networks.I provideexamples of each of these positive functions.Negative consequences of thesame processes also deserve attention for a balanced picture of the forces at play.I review four such consequences and illustrate them with relevant ex-amples.Recent writings on social capital have extended the concept from an individual asset to a feature of communities and even nations.The final sec-tionsdescribe this conceptual stretch and examine its limitations.I argue that,as shorthand for the positive consequences of sociability,social capitalhas a definite place in sociological theory.However,excessive extensions of the concept may jeopardize its heuristic value.Alejandro Portes:Biographical SketchAlejandroPortes is professor of sociology at Princeton University andfaculty associate of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public Affairs.He for-merly taught at Johns Hopkins where he held the John Dewey Chair in Artsand Sciences,Duke University,and the University of Texas-Austin.In 1997he heldthe Emilio Bacardi distinguished professorship at the University ofMiami.In the same year he was elected president of the American Sociologi-cal Association.Born in Havana,Cuba,he came to the United States in 1960.He was educated at the University of Havana,Catholic University of Argen-tina,and Creighton University.He received his MA and PhD from the Uni-versity of Wisconsin-Madison.0360-0572/98/0815-0001$08.001A n n u . R e v . S o c i o l . 1998.24:1-24. D o w n l o a d e d f r o m a r j o u r n a l s .a n n u a l r e v i e w s .o r g b yS w i ssAca dem icLi bra ryC onsor t iaon3/24/9.F orpe rsonaluseo nl y.Portes is the author of some 200articles and chapters on national devel-opment,international migration,Latin American and Caribbean urbaniza-tion,and economic sociology.His most recent books include City on the Edge,the Transformation of Miami (winner of the Robert Park award for best book in urban sociology and of the Anthony Leeds award for best book in urban anthropology in 1995);The New Second Generation (Russell Sage Foundation 1996);Caribbean Cities (Johns Hopkins University Press);and Immigrant America,a Portrait.The latter book was designated as a centen-nial publication by the University of California Press.It was originally pub-lished in 1990;the second edition,updated and containing new chapters on American immigration policy and the new second generation,was published in 1996.Introduction During recent years,the concept of social capital has become one of the most popular exports from sociological theory into everyday language.Dissemi-nated by a number of policy-oriented journals and general circulation maga-zines,social capital has evolved into something of a cure-all for the maladies affecting society at home and abroad.Like other sociological concepts that have traveled a similar path,the original meaning of the term and its heuristic value are being put to severe tests by these increasingly diverse applications.As in the case of those earlier concepts,the point is approaching at which so-cial capital comes to be applied to so many events and in so many different contexts as to lose any distinct meaning.Despite its current popularity,the term does not embody any idea really new to sociologists.That involvement and participation in groups can have positive consequences for the individual and the community is a staple notion,dating back to Durkheim’s emphasis on group life as an antidote to anomie and self-destruction and to Marx’s distinction between an atomized class-in-itself and a mobilized and effective class-for-itself.In this sense,the term social capital simply recaptures an insight present since the very beginnings of the disci-pline.Tracing the intellectual background of the concept into classical times would be tantamount to revisiting sociology’s major nineteenth century sources.That exercise would not reveal,however,why this idea has caught on in recent years or why an unusual baggage of policy implications has been heaped on it.The novelty and heuristic power of social capital come from two sources.First,the concept focuses attention on the positive consequences of sociability while putting aside its less attractive features.Second,it places those positive consequences in the framework of a broader discussion of capital and calls atten-tion to how such nonmonetary forms can be important sources of power and in-fluence,like the size of one’s stock holdings or bank account.The potential fungi-bility of diverse sources of capital reduces the distance between the sociologi-2PORTESA n n u . R e v . S o c i o l . 1998.24:1-24. D o w n l o a d e d f r o m a r j o u r n a l s .a n n u a l r e v i e w s .o r g b y S w i s s A c a d e m i c L i b r a r y C o n s o r t i a o n 03/24/09. F o r p e r s o n a l u s e o n l y .cal and economic perspectives and simultaneously engages the attention of policy-makers seeking less costly,non-economic solutions to social problems.In the course of this review,I limit discussion to the contemporary reemer-gence of the idea to avoid a lengthy excursus into its classical predecessors.To an audience of sociologists,these sources and the parallels between present so-cial capital discussions and passages in the classical literature will be obvious.I examine,first,the principal authors associated with the contemporary usage of the term and their different approaches to it.Then I review the various mechanisms leading to the emergence of social capital and its principal appli-cations in the research literature.Next,I examine those not-so-desirable con-sequences of sociability that are commonly obscured in the contemporary lit-erature on the topic.This discussion aims at providing some balance to the fre-quently celebratory tone with which the concept is surrounded.That tone is es-pecially noticeable in those studies that have stretched the concept from a property of individuals and families to a feature of communities,cities,and even nations.The attention garnered by applications of social capital at this broader level also requires some discussion,particularly in light of the poten-tial pitfalls of that conceptual stretch.Definitions The first systematic contemporary analysis of social capital was produced by Pierre Bourdieu,who defined the concept as “the aggregate of the actual or po-tential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition”(Bourdieu 1985,p.248;1980).This initial treatment of the concept appeared in some brief “Provisional Notes”published in the Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales in 1980.Because they were in French,the article did not gar-ner widespread attention in the English-speaking world;nor,for that matter,did the first English translation,concealed in the pages of a text on the sociol-ogy of education (Bourdieu 1985).This lack of visibility is lamentable because Bourdieu’s analysis is arguably the most theoretically refined among those that introduced the term in contem-porary sociological discourse.His treatment of the concept is instrumental,fo-cusing on the benefits accruing to individuals by virtue of participation in groups and on the deliberate construction of sociability for the purpose of cre-ating this resource.In the original version,he went as far as asserting that “the profits which accrue from membership in a group are the basis of the solidarity which makes them possible”(Bourdieu 1985,p.249).Social networks are not a natural given and must be constructed through investment strategies oriented to the institutionalization of group relations,usable as a reliable source of other benefits.Bourdieu’s definition makes clear that social capital is decomposable into two elements:first,the social relationship itself that allows individuals to SOCIAL CAPITAL:ORIGINS AND APPLICATIONS 3A n n u . R e v . S o c i o l . 1998.24:1-24. D o w n l o a d e d f r o m a r j o u r n a l s .a n n u a l r e v i e w s .o r g b y S w i s s A c a d e m i c L i b r a r y C o n s o r t i a o n 03/24/09. F o r p e r s o n a l u s e o n l y .claim access to resources possessed by their associates,and second,the amount and quality of those resources.Throughout,Bourdieu’s emphasis is on the fungibility of different forms of capital and on the ultimate reduction of all forms to economic capital,defined as accumulated human labor.Hence,through social capital,actors can gain di-rect access to economic resources (subsidized loans,investment tips,protected markets);they can increase their cultural capital through contacts with experts or individuals of refinement (i.e.embodied cultural capital);or,alternatively,they can affiliate with institutions that confer valued credentials (i.e.institu-tionalized cultural capital).On the other hand,the acquisition of social capital requires deliberate invest-ment of both economic and cultural resources.Though Bourdieu insists that the outcomes of possession of social or cultural capital are reducible to economic capital,the processes that bring about these alternative forms are not.They each possess their own dynamics,and,relative to economic exchange,they are characterized by less transparency and more uncertainty.For example,trans-actions involving social capital tend to be characterized by unspecified obliga-tions,uncertain time horizons,and the possible violation of reciprocity expec-tations.But,by their very lack of clarity,these transactions can help disguise what otherwise would be plain market exchanges (Bourdieu 1979,1980).A second contemporary source is the work of economist Glen Loury (1977,1981).He came upon the term in the context of his critique of neoclassical theories of racial income inequality and their policy implications.Loury ar-gued that orthodox economic theories were too individualistic,focusing exclu-sively on individual human capital and on the creation of a level field for com-petition based on such skills.By themselves,legal prohibitions against em-ployers’racial tastes and implementation of equal opportunity programs would not reduce racial inequalities.The latter could go on forever,according to Loury,for two reasons—first,the inherited poverty of black parents,which would be transmitted to their children in the form of lower material resources and educational opportunities;second,the poorer connections of young black workers to the labor market and their lack of information about opportunities:The merit notion that,in a free society,each individual will rise to the level justified by his or her competence conflicts with the observation that no one travels that road entirely alone.The social context within which individual maturation occurs strongly conditions what otherwise equally competent in-dividuals can achieve.This implies that absolute equality of opportunity,…is an ideal that cannot be achieved.(Loury 1977,p.176)Loury cited with approval the sociological literature on intergenerational mobility and inheritance of race as illustrating his anti-individualist argument.However,he did not go on to develop the concept of social capital in any detail.4PORTESA n n u . R e v . S o c i o l . 1998.24:1-24. D o w n l o a d e d f r o m a r j o u r n a l s .a n n u a l r e v i e w s .o r g b y S w i s s A c a d e m i c L i b r a r y C o n s o r t i a o n 03/24/09. F o r p e r s o n a l u s e o n l y .He seems to have run across the idea in the context of his polemic against or-thodox labor economics,but he mentions it only once in his original article and then in rather tentative terms (Loury 1977).The concept captured the differen-tial access to opportunities through social connections for minority and nonmi-nority youth,but we do not find here any systematic treatment of its relations to other forms of capital.Loury’s work paved the way,however,for Coleman’s more refined analy-sis of the same process,namely the role of social capital in the creation of hu-man capital.In his initial analysis of the concept,Coleman acknowledges Loury’s contribution as well as those of economist Ben-Porath and sociolo-gists Nan Lin and Mark Granovetter.Curiously,Coleman does not mention Bourdieu,although his analysis of the possible uses of social capital for the ac-quisition of educational credentials closely parallels that pioneered by the French sociologist.1Coleman defined social capital by its function as “a vari-ety of entities with two elements in common:They all consist of some aspect of social structures,and they facilitate certain action of actors—whether per-sons or corporate actors—within the structure”(Coleman 1988a:p.S98,1990,p.302).This rather vague definition opened the way for relabeling a number of dif-ferent and even contradictory processes as social capital.Coleman himself started that proliferation by including under the term some of the mechanisms that generated social capital (such as reciprocity expectations and group en-forcement of norms);the consequences of its possession (such as privileged access to information);and the “appropriable”social organization that pro-vided the context for both sources and effects to materialize.Resources ob-tained through social capital have,from the point of view of the recipient,the character of a gift.Thus,it is important to distinguish the resources themselves from the ability to obtain them by virtue of membership in different social structures,a distinction explicit in Bourdieu but obscured in Coleman.Equat-ing social capital with the resources acquired through it can easily lead to tau-tological statements.2Equally important is the distinction between the motivations of recipients and of donors in exchanges mediated by social capital.Recipients’desire toSOCIAL CAPITAL:ORIGINS AND APPLICATIONS 51The closest equivalent to human capital in Bourdieu’s analysis is embodied cultural capital,which is defined as the habitus of cultural practices,knowledge,and demeanors learned through exposure to role models in the family and other environments (Bourdieu 1979).2Saying,for example,that student A has social capital because he obtained access to a large tuition loan from his kin and that student B does not because she failed to do so neglects the possibility that B’s kin network is equally or more motivated to come to her aid but simply lacks the means to do.Defining social capital as equivalent with the resources thus obtained is tantamount to saying that the successful succeed.This circularity is more evident in applications of social capital that define it as a property of collectivities.These are reviewed below.A n n u . R e v . S o c i o l . 1998.24:1-24. D o w n l o a d e d f r o m a r j o u r n a l s .a n n u a l r e v i e w s .o r g b y S w i s s A c a d e m i c L i b r a r y C o n s o r t i a o n 03/24/09. F o r p e r s o n a l u s e o n l y .gain access to valuable assets is readily understandable.More complex are the motivations of the donors,who are requested to make these assets available without any immediate return.Such motivations are plural and deserve analy-sis because they are the core processes that the concept of social capital seeks to capture.Thus,a systematic treatment of the concept must distinguish among:(a )the possessors of social capital (those making claims);(b )the sources of social capital (those agreeing to these demands);(c )the resources themselves.These three elements are often mixed in discussions of the concept following Coleman,thus setting the stage for confusion in the uses and scope of the term.Despite these limitations,Coleman’s essays have the undeniable merit of introducing and giving visibility to the concept in American sociology,high-lighting its importance for the acquisition of human capital,and identifying some of the mechanisms through which it is generated.In this last respect,his discussion of closure is particularly enlightening.Closure means the existence of sufficient ties between a certain number of people to guarantee the obser-vance of norms.For example,the possibility of malfeasance within the tightly knit community of Jewish diamond traders in New York City is minimized by the dense ties among its members and the ready threat of ostracism against vio-lators.The existence of such a strong norm is then appropriable by all members of the community,facilitating transactions without recourse to cumbersome legal contracts (Coleman 1988a:S99).After Bourdieu,Loury,and Coleman,a number of theoretical analyses of social capital have been published.In 1990,WE Baker defined the concept as “a resource that actors derive from specific social structures and then use to pursue their interests;it is created by changes in the relationship among actors”(Baker 1990,p.619).More broadly,M Schiff defines the term as “the set of elements of the social structure that affects relations among people and are in-puts or arguments of the production and/or utility function”(Schiff 1992,p.161).Burt sees it as “friends,colleagues,and more general contacts through whom you receive opportunities to use your financial and human capital”(Burt 1992,p.9).Whereas Coleman and Loury had emphasized dense net-works as a necessary condition for the emergence of social capital,Burt high-lights the opposite situation.In his view,it is the relative absence of ties,la-beled “structural holes,”that facilitates individual mobility.This is so because dense networks tend to convey redundant information,while weaker ties can be sources of new knowledge and resources.Despite these differences,the consensus is growing in the literature that so-cial capital stands for the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of mem-bership in social networks or other social structures.This is the sense in which it has been more commonly applied in the empirical literature although,as we will see,the potential uses to which it is put vary greatly.6PORTESA n n u . R e v . S o c i o l . 1998.24:1-24. D o w n l o a d e d f r o m a r j o u r n a l s .a n n u a l r e v i e w s .o r g b y S w i s s A c a d e m i c L i b r a r y C o n s o r t i a o n 03/24/09. F o r p e r s o n a l u s e o n l y .Sources of Social CapitalBoth Bourdieu and Coleman emphasize the intangible character of social capital relative to other forms.Whereas economic capital is in people’s bank accounts and human capital is inside their heads,social capital inheres in the structure of their relationships.To possess social capital,a person must be related to others,and it is those others,not himself,who are the actual source of his or her advan-tage.As mentioned before,the motivation of others to make resources avail-able on concessionary terms is not uniform.At the broadest level,one may dis-tinguish between consummatory versus instrumental motivations to do so.As examples of the first,people may pay their debts in time,give alms to charity,and obey traffic rules because they feel an obligation to behave in this manner.The internalized norms that make such behaviors possible are then ap-propriable by others as a resource.In this instance,the holders of social capital are other members of the community who can extend loans without fear of nonpayment,benefit from private charity,or send their kids to play in the street without concern.Coleman (1988a:S104)refers to this source in his analysis of norms and sanctions:“Effective norms that inhibit crime make it possible to walk freely outside at night in a city and enable old persons to leave their houses without fear for their safety.”As is well known,an excessive emphasis on this process of norm internalization led to the oversocialized conception of human action in sociology so trenchantly criticized by Wrong (1961).An approach closer to the undersocialized view of human nature in modern economics sees social capital as primarily the accumulation of obligations from others according to the norm of reciprocity.In this version,donors pro-vide privileged access to resources in the expectation that they will be fully re-paid in the future.This accumulation of social chits differs from purely eco-nomic exchange in two aspects.First,the currency with which obligations are repaid may be different from that with which they were incurred in the first place and may be as intangible as the granting of approval or allegiance.Sec-ond,the timing of the repayment is unspecified.Indeed,if a schedule of repay-ments exists,the transaction is more appropriately defined as market exchange than as one mediated by social capital.This instrumental treatment of the term is quite familiar in sociology,dating back to the classical analysis of social ex-change by Simmel ([1902a]1964),the more recent ones by Homans (1961)and Blau (1964),and extensive work on the sources and dynamics of reciproc-ity by authors of the rational action school (Schiff 1992,Coleman 1994).Two other sources of social capital exist that fit the consummatory versus instrumental dichotomy,but in a different way.The first finds its theoretical underpinnings in Marx’s analysis of emergent class consciousness in the in-dustrial proletariat.By being thrown together in a common situation,workers learn to identify with each other and support each other’s initiatives.This soli-SOCIAL CAPITAL:ORIGINS AND APPLICATIONS 7A n n u . R e v . S o c i o l . 1998.24:1-24. D o w n l o a d e d f r o m a r j o u r n a l s .a n n u a l r e v i e w s .o r g b y S w i s s A c a d e m i c L i b r a r y C o n s o r t i a o n 03/24/09. F o r p e r s o n a l u s e o n l y .darity is not the result of norm introjection during childhood,but is an emer-gent product of a common fate (Marx [1894]1967,Marx &Engels [1848]1947).For this reason,the altruistic dispositions of actors in these situations are not universal but are bounded by the limits of their community.Other members of the same community can then appropriate such dispositions and the actions that follow as their source of social capital.Bounded solidarity is the term used in the recent literature to refer to this mechanism.It is the source of social capital that leads wealthy members of a church to anonymously endow church schools and hospitals;members of a suppressed nationality to voluntarily join life-threatening military activities in its defense;and industrial proletarians to take part in protest marches or sym-pathy strikes in support of their fellows.Identification with one’s own group,sect,or community can be a powerful motivational force.Coleman refers to extreme forms of this mechanism as “zeal”and defines them as an effective an-tidote to free-riding by others in collective movements (Coleman 1990,pp.273–82;Portes &Sensenbrenner 1993).The final source of social capital finds its classical roots in Durkheim’s ([1893]1984)theory of social integration and the sanctioning capacity of group rituals.As in the case of reciprocity exchanges,the motivation of donors of socially mediated gifts is instrumental,but in this case,the expectation of re-payment is not based on knowledge of the recipient,but on the insertion of both actors in a common social structure.The embedding of a transaction into suchstructure has two consequences.First,the donor’s returns may come not8PORTESFigure 1Actual and potential gains and losses in transactions mediated by social capitalA n n u . R e v . S o c i o l . 1998.24:1-24. D o w n l o a d e d f r o m a r j o u r n a l s .a n n u a l r e v i e w s .o r g b y S w i s s A c a d e m i c L i b r a r y C o n s o r t i a o n 03/24/09. F o r p e r s o n a l u s e o n l y .directly from the recipient but from the collectivity as a whole in the form of status,honor,or approval.Second,the collectivity itself acts as guarantor that whatever debts are incurred will be repaid.As an example of the first consequence,a member of an ethnic group may endow a scholarship for young co-ethnic students,thereby expecting not re-payment from recipients but rather approval and status in the collectivity.The students’social capital is not contingent on direct knowledge of their benefac-tor,but on membership in the same group.As an example of the second effect,a banker may extend a loan without collateral to a member of the same relig-ious community in full expectation of repayment because of the threat of com-munity sanctions and ostracism.In other words,trust exists in this situation precisely because obligations are enforceable,not through recourse to law or violence but through the power of the community.In practice,these two effects of enforceable trust are commonly mixed,as when someone extends a favor to a fellow member in expectation of both guaranteed repayment and group approval.As a source of social capital,en-forceable trust is hence appropriable by both donors and recipients:For recipi-ents,it obviously facilitates access to resources;for donors,it yields approval and expedites transactions because it ensures against malfeasance.No lawyer need apply for business transactions underwritten by this source of social capi-tal.The left side of Figure 1summarizes the discussion in this section.Keeping these distinctions in mind is important to avoid confusing consummatory and instrumental motivations or mixing simple dyadic exchanges with those em-bedded in larger social structures that guarantee their predictability and course.Effects of Social Capital:Recent Research Just as the sources of social capital are plural so are its consequences.The em-pirical literature includes applications of the concept as a predictor of,among others,school attrition and academic performance,children’s intellectual de-velopment,sources of employment and occupational attainment,juvenile de-linquency and its prevention,and immigrant and ethnic enterprise.3Diversity of effects goes beyond the broad set of specific dependent variables to which social capital has been applied to encompass,in addition,the character and meaning of the expected consequences.A review of the literature makes it pos-sible to distinguish three basic functions of social capital,applicable in a vari-ety of contexts:(a )as a source of social control;(b )as a source of family sup-port;(c )as a source of benefits through extrafamilial networks.SOCIAL CAPITAL:ORIGINS AND APPLICATIONS 93The following review does not aim at an exhaustive coverage of the empirical literature.That task has been rendered obsolete by the advent of computerized topical searches.My purpose instead is to document the principal types of application of the concept in the literature and to highlight their interrelationships.A n n u . R e v . S o c i o l . 1998.24:1-24. D o w n l o a d e d f r o m a r j o u r n a l s .a n n u a l r e v i e w s .o r g b y S w i s s A c a d e m i c L i b r a r y C o n s o r t i a o n 03/24/09. F o r p e r s o n a l u s e o n l y .As examples of the first function,we find a series of studies that focus on rule enforcement.The social capital created by tight community networks is useful to parents,teachers,and police authorities as they seek to maintain dis-cipline and promote compliance among those under their charge.Sources of this type of social capital are commonly found in bounded solidarity and en-forceable trust,and its main result is to render formal or overt controls unnec-essary.The process is exemplified by Zhou &Bankston’s study of the tightly knit Vietnamese community of New Orleans:Both parents and children are constantly observed as under a “Vietnamese microscope.”If a child flunks out or drops out of a school,or if a boy falls into a gang or a girl becomes pregnant without getting married,he or she brings shame not only to himself or herself but also to the family.(Zhou &Bankston 1996,p.207)The same function is apparent in Hagan et al’s (1995)analysis of right-wing extremism among East German beling right-wing extremism a sub-terranean tradition in German society,these authors seek to explain the rise of that ideology,commonly accompanied by anomic wealth aspirations among German adolescents.These tendencies are particularly strong among those from the formerly communist eastern states.That trend is explained as the joint outcome of the removal of social controls (low social capital),coupled with the long deprivations endured by East Germans.Incorporation into the West has brought about new uncertainties and the loosening of social integration,thus allowing German subterranean cultural traditions to re-emerge.Social control is also the focus of several earlier essays by Coleman,who laments the disappearance of those informal family and community structures that produced this type of social capital;Coleman calls for the creation of for-mal institutions to take their place.This was the thrust of Coleman’s 1992presidential address to the American Sociological Association,in which he traced the decline of “primordial”institutions based on the family and their re-placement by purposively constructed organizations.In his view,modern soci-ology’s task is to guide this process of social engineering that will substitute obsolete forms of control based on primordial ties with rationally devised ma-terial and status incentives (Coleman 1988b,1993).The function of social capital for social control is also evident whenever the concept is discussed in conjunction with the law (Smart 1993,Weede 1992).It is as well the central focus when it is defined as a property of collectivities such as cities or nations.This latter approach,associated mainly with the writings of political scientists,is discussed in a following section.The influence of Coleman’s writings is also clear in the second function of social capital,namely as a source of parental and kin support.Intact families and those where one parent has the primary task of rearing children possess 10PORTESA n n u . R e v . S o c i o l . 1998.24:1-24. D o w n l o a d e d f r o m a r j o u r n a l s .a n n u a l r e v i e w s .o r g b y S w i s s A c a d e m i c L i b r a r y C o n s o r t i a o n 03/24/09. F o r p e r s o n a l u s e o n l y .。

The Influence of Social Capital on Contemporary
Education
作者： 盛冰
作者机构： 北京师范大学教育政策与法律研究所,北京100875
出版物刊名： 北京师范大学学报：社会科学版
页码： 128-134页
主题词： 教育;人力资本;社会资本
摘要：20世纪90年代以来,社会资本已经成为当今社会科学领域最前沿和最具影响力的概念之一.学术界从重视人力资本转向重视社会资本,这是理论上的超越和升华,对于教育而言,将打破人力资本理论在教育领域的霸权地位,给教育带来深远影响.对社会资本本身的研究将凸显教育者与受教育者之间关系的主体间交往的本质;社会资本使传统的智力观受到了挑战;促进了知识的新生产;知识传授过程既受社会资本的影响,同时本身也生产社会资本;学校、家庭、社会之间的网络以及学生、家长、教师之间的关系在学生学业成就和学校发展方面具有极其重要的作用.。

湖南农业大学学报(社会科学版)2021年2月第22卷第1期Journal of Hunan Agricultural University(Social Sciences),Feb.2021,22(1):077-086DOI:10.13331/ki.jhau(ss).2021.01.010社会资本对就业中过度教育匹配的影响及其机制----来自CFPS2018的证据赵昕，蒋文莉(中南财经政法大学公共管理学院，湖北武汉430073)摘要：基于中国家庭动态调查(CFPS)2018数据，研究了社会资本对就业中过度教育匹配的影响及其作用机制，结果表明：总体上，社会资本对劳动者就业中过度教育匹配具有负向影响，在考虑内生性问题后该结论依旧稳健；考虑群体异质性情况下，社会资本对女性、城市户口持有和学历水平较高的群体出现过度教育匹配方面有着更强的抑制效用；社会资本通过提高关系重视程度、提升内部晋升可能和增强外部市场连接性等影响机制降低就业中过度教育匹配的出现。

关键词：社会资本；过度教育匹配；影响机制中图分类号：F241.2文献标志码：A文章编号：1009-2013(2021)01-0077-10Social capital's influence on over-education matching in employment and its mechanism:Evidence from CFPS2018ZHAO Xin，JIANG Wenli(School of Public Administration,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wuhan430073,China)Abstract:Based on the data from the China Family Panel Studies(CFPS)in2018,this article studies social capital's influence on over-education matching in employment and its mechanism.The results show that social capital has a holistic negative effect on the over-education matching in employment,and the conclusion remains stable after the endogenous problems are taken into account.Considering group heterogeneity,social capital has a stronger inhibiting effect on over-education matching among the female and groups with city permanent residency and higher educational level.Social capital reduces the over-education matching in employment by attaching importance to relationship, increasing the possibility of internal promotion and enhancing the connectivity with external market.Keywords:social capital;over-education matching;mechanism—、问题的提出教育匹配问题一直是教育经济学及劳动经济学研究的重要课题。

教育公平与社会发展高中生英语作文Educational Equity and Social DevelopmentEducation is a fundamental right that should be accessible to all, regardless of their socioeconomic background, race, gender, or any other characteristic.However, in many societies, educational equity is still a challenge to achieve.This essay will argue that educational equity is crucial for social development and that efforts should be made to ensure that every individual has access to quality education.Firstly, educational equity is essential for social development because it promotes a more just and equitable society.When everyone has access to quality education, regardless of their background, it creates a level playing field and ensures that individuals can reach their full potential.This, in turn, leads to a more productive and innovative society, as individuals from diverse backgrounds bring different perspectives and ideas to the table.Secondly, educational equity is crucial for social development because it helps to reduce poverty and inequality.Access to quality education can provide individuals with the skills and knowledge necessary to escape the cycle of poverty and improve their living conditions.Moreover, when everyone has access to education, it helps to break down barriers and reduce social hierarchies, leading to a more cohesive and harmonious society.However, achieving educational equity is not without its challenges.One of the main obstacles to achieving educational equity is economic disparity.Many individuals from low-income families cannot afford the high costs associated with education, such as tuition fees, textbooks, and transportation.As a result, they are often excluded from accessing quality education, perpetuating the cycle of poverty and inequality.Another challenge to achieving educational equity is discrimination and social偏见.Individuals from certain racial, ethnic, or religious backgrounds may face discrimination and偏见, making it difficult for them to access education.Moreover, girls and women in some societies may be excluded from education due to traditional gender roles and stereotypes.To address these challenges and achieve educational equity, it is essential for governments and society as a whole to take action.One way to do this is to increase funding for education, particularly in low-income areas.This can help to reduce economic barriers and ensure that everyone has access to quality education.Additionally, it is crucial to implement policies that promote diversity and inclusion in education, such as affirmative action and scholarships for underprivileged students.In conclusion, educational equity is a crucial component of social development.By ensuring that everyone has access to quality education,regardless of their background, we can create a more just, equitable, and prosperous society.Efforts should be made to address the challenges to achieving educational equity, such as economic disparity and discrimination, through increased funding and inclusive policies.Only by doing so can we truly achieve social development and create a better future for all.。

Education and Economic Growth作者：林君文来源：《留学》2018年第22期IntroductionLucas （1988）held the view that “public spending on education promotes human capital，which in turn contributes to economic growth” . This paper will use three groups of countries with different characteristics to explore the relationships between education and economic growth.Education is important for individual. Educated individuals are more likely to get better jobs，higher earnings. Education is also vital from a social perspective. Investment in education， by raising the skill level of the labor force， improves productivity. Education leadsbetter health for individuals and healthier individuals are more productive. Higher levels of educations lead to lower fertility， which has a generational impact on economic development.Education and Economic GrowthAlthough theoretically there seems to be a link between investment in education and economic growth， this does not hold for all countries.Figure 1 shows mean years of schooling for four East European countries， 1990-2015. These countries do well in terms of education， with a mean of 12.2years，similar to highly developed countries （as defined by the United Nations Human Development Report） in 2015. They perform less well on GDP per capita.As figure 2 illustrates ， in 1990， GDP per capita of these countries waswell belowaverage global GDP per capita.What explains the “high education but low GDP per capita” phenomenon in Eastern European countries？Their trade policies are less open， partly because they are landlocked countries. Also， they were countries within， or satellites of， the former Soviet Unionwhich collapsed in the early 1990s.The relationship is completely differentin Middle East countries. As figure 3 shows， mean years of schooling was about 5.5 in 1990， below the world average. Butthey performed very well in terms of GDP per capita （shown in figure 4 ） which was $73，637 （$PPP） in 2015， almost double that of highly developed countries （$39，600）. In contrast， mean years of schooling was about 9，three years below that of the highly developed countries （12.2）.These are oil-producing counties， which leads to high levels of GDP. But building an economy on one natural resource is problematic， since the price of the resource will fluctuate， and will eventually be used up.The East Asian Tigers witnessed rapid growth from 1961-1990. Theyfocused on investment in human capitaland have continued to thrivebeing among the top 20 countries in terms of HDI . The Asian Tigers are still developing rapidly compared to other highly developed countries. Their development plan rested on investment in human capital， particularly technological and scientific education. Today， average years of schooling of the four East Asian Tigers is 12， close to that in highly developed countries.ChinaAs an emerging star in East Asia， China，the world’s second largest economy， is attracting global attention. Are the Asian Tigers a good model for China？During the past three decades， Chinaexperienced significant economic development. Its average annual GDP growth rate was9.6%， compared to 4.9% for the Asian Tigers.China has also witnessed a big increase in GDP per capita，from 194 （US$） in 1980 to 8，069 （US$） in 2015.One reason for this is the early attention the China paid to investment in human capital. In the 1950s， China implemented an illiteracy-elimination movement. In 1986 it enacted a nine-year compulsory education project. Mean years of education increased by about 1.1 years nationwide. This emphasis on education continues today. According to World Bank data，China’s educational expendituresincreased from 1.8% of GDP in 1995 to 4% in 2016.As a result， mean years of education increased 1.9 years， 1995-2015. The contribution of education to HDI growth increased from 24.3% during 1980-1990 to 44.2% during 2000-2010.Education played an important role in the economic growth of China， as it did for the Asian Tigers. However，China’s GDP per capita is still relatively low. This is perhaps because of the low quality of education in China. Improving educational quality， and eliminating the enrollment gap between urban and rural areas，is important for future development.ConclusionClearly， education is a necessary but not sufficient condition for sustainable economic growth.Overall， economic policies that do not rely solely on natural resources， that emphasize openness to trade， and that promote investment in education lead to more sustainable economic growth.References：Robert E. LUCAS. 1988. On the Mechanics of Economic Development.Biswajit Maitra and C.K. Mukhopadhyay. 2012. Public Spending on Education， Health care and Economic Growth in Selected Countries of Asia and the PacificEmbargo. 1993. A World Bank Policy Research Report—The East Asian Miracle （Economic Growth and Public Policy）China National Human Development Report 2016： Social Innovation for Inclusive Human Development.UNHR.David E. Bloom. 2007. Education， Health， and Development.林君文年龄：16城市：上海就读学校：上海交通大学附属中学年级：高二未来申请目标专业：经济类今年夏天，我与来自约翰霍普金斯大学的经济学教授Barbara Morgan一起度过了一个月左右的暑假时间，并在她的帮助下完成了一篇完整的宏观经济学论文。

英语作文-国内外中等教育行业的教育投资与资金管理In the realm of global and domestic education, the management of funds and investments within the medium of secondary education is a pivotal concern that shapes the quality and accessibility of learning environments. Across various countries, the allocation and utilization of financial resources in secondary education systems significantly impact educational outcomes and opportunities for students.Education investment in the secondary sector encompasses a broad spectrum of financial activities, ranging from governmental budget allocations to private sector contributions and international aid. Effective management of these funds is crucial for ensuring equitable access to quality education, upgrading infrastructure, enhancing teaching quality, and integrating technological advancements into the learning process.At the national level, governments play a central role in funding secondary education. Public expenditure on education reflects a country's commitment to nurturing its human capital and preparing the next generation for societal challenges. Countries with robust economies often allocate substantial portions of their budgets to education, viewing it as an investment in future economic productivity and social stability.Moreover, the management of education funds involves strategic planning and transparent allocation mechanisms. Budgetary decisions must consider demographic trends, regional disparities, and evolving educational needs. For instance, urban areas might require different investment priorities compared to rural or underserved regions. Hence, policymakers must balance equity with efficiency in resource allocation to ensure that all students receive a standardized level of education regardless of their geographicor socioeconomic background.Beyond governmental initiatives, the private sector also plays a vital role in funding secondary education. Corporate sponsorships, philanthropic donations, and partnerships between educational institutions and businesses contribute additional resources tosupplement public funding. These collaborations often focus on specific areas such as vocational training, technology integration, or extracurricular enrichment programs, thereby diversifying the educational opportunities available to students.Internationally, development aid and partnerships between countries facilitate the exchange of best practices, expertise, and financial support for educational projects. Multilateral organizations and NGOs channel resources into educational initiatives aimed at enhancing educational access, improving teacher training, and promoting educational innovation in developing nations.Effective management of education funds requires accountability and monitoring mechanisms to ensure that investments translate into tangible educational outcomes. Regular audits, performance evaluations, and stakeholder consultations are integral to assessing the impact of financial investments on student achievement, school infrastructure, and overall educational quality.In conclusion, the management of funds and investments in secondary education is a multifaceted endeavor that requires strategic planning, equitable distribution, and transparent governance. By prioritizing education funding, governments, private sector entities, and international organizations can collectively foster an inclusive and high-quality learning environment that empowers students to thrive in an increasingly interconnected world. As such, the prudent management of education funds is not merely an economic necessity but a moral imperative to secure a brighter future for generations to come.。

Social Capital and Social Quilts:Network Patterns ofFavor Exchange∗Matthew O.Jackson,Tomas Rodriguez-Barraquer,and Xu Tan†June2010,Revision:August7,2011Forthcoming in the American Economic ReviewAbstractWe examine the informal exchange of favors in societies such that any two individ-uals interact too infrequently to sustain exchange,but such that the social pressure ofthe possible loss of multiple relationships can sustain exchange.Patterns of exchangethat are locally enforceable and renegotiation-proof necessitate that all links are“sup-ported”:any two individuals exchanging favors have a common friend.In symmetricsettings,such robust networks are“social quilts”:tree-like unions of completely con-nected subnetworks.Examining favor exchange networks in75villages in rural India,wefind high levels of support and identify characteristics that correlate with support.Keywords:Social Networks,social capital,favor exchange,support,social quilts, renegotiation-proofJEL Classification Codes:D85,C72,L14,Z131IntroductionHuman beings rely on cooperation with others for their survival and growth.Although some forms of cooperation and behavior are enforced by social,religious,legal,and political in-stitutions that have emerged throughout history,much of development,growth,and basic∗We gratefully acknowledgefinancial support from the NSF under grants SES–0647867,SES–0752735, and SES–0961481.The data were gathered in collaboration with Abhijit Banerjee,Arun Chandrasekhar, and Esther Duflo,whom we thank for making the data analysis here possible.We are also grateful to the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab(J-PAL)and the Centre for Microfinance at the Institute for Financial Management and Research in Chennai(CMF at IFMR)for support and help in the data collection. We thank Scott Altman,Nicolas Carayol,Avner Grief,Ian Jewitt,Mihai Manea,Markus Mobius,Larry Samuelson,Sudipta Sarangi,Giancarlo Spagnolo,and three anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions.†All three authors are at the Department of Economics,Stanford University,Stanford,California 94305-6072USA.Jackson is also an external faculty member at the Santa Fe Institute.Emails:jack-sonm@,trodrig@,and xutan@.day-to-day functioning relies on a society’s ability to“informally”encourage cooperative behavior.This sort of informal enforcement of cooperation ranges from basic forms of quid-pro-quo(or tit-for-tat in game theory parlance)to more elaborate forms of social norms and culture,all of which must function without enforceable contracts or laws.1Indeed,con-tracting costs are prohibitive for many day-to-day favors that people exchange,ranging from offering advice to a colleague,a small loan to a friend,or emergency help to an acquaintance. Such informal favor exchange and cooperative behaviors,in one form or another,underly much of the literature on social capital.Although there is a large literature on social capital,there is a paucity of work that provides careful foundations for how social structure relates to such favor exchange and cooperative behavior.Moreover,as we show here,favor networks do not necessarily exhibit the suggested patterns predicted by some of the previous literature.These points are related to each other since some standard network measures have emerged loosely from the literature discussing the role of networks in fostering cooperation.In particular,the importance of social pressures on fostering cooperation has deep roots in the sociology literature including seminal work by Georg Simmel(1950),James S.Coleman(1988)and more recently by David Krackhardt(1996),among others(see the literature discussion below).Standard measures of network clustering and transitivity have grown in part out of those works.Clustering measures examine the extent to which two friends of a given agent are friends of each other. In the data on favor exchange networks in rural India that we examine here,clustering is on the order of ten to thirty percent.A puzzle emerges as to why one sees that level of clustering,and not some other higher level,and even whether clustering is really the appropriate measure for capturing social pressures.In contrast,the concept of“support”that emerges from our theoretical analysis measures the number of pairs of friends that have some other friend in common.As we shall see in the data,support is several times higher than clustering,and indeed this distinction is consistent with the theory presented here.2 To be specific,in this paper we provide a game theoretic foundation for social enforce-ment of informal favor exchange,and also examine network patterns of favor exchange from 75rural villages.In particular,we consider settings where simple bilateral quid-pro-quo enforcement is insufficient to sustain favor exchange.Some bilateral interactions may be infrequent enough that they fail to allow natural self-enforcement of cooperation or favor ex-change.However,when such interactions are embedded in a network of interactions whose functioning can be tied to each other,then individuals canfind it in their interest to co-1In fact,the term“ostracism”(which has Greek origins based on a practice of banishments that originated in the Athenian democracy)has come to embody the idea of individuals cutting ties with members of society who do not perform properly.2This does not imply that clustering might not emerge from other models of favor exchange,and clustering remains an important network statistic-but one that is conceptually distinct from support.Also,numbers of friends in common are reported in various network case studies(e.g.,for an early discussion see James A.Barnes(1954)),which is a form of support-for which our theory now provides a foundation.Friends in common have also been used in modeling network formation(e.g.,see Matthew O.Jackson and Brian W. Rogers(2007))and prediction of relationships(e.g.,see David Liben-Nowell and Jon Kleinberg(2007)).operate given(credible)threats of ostracism or loss of multiple relationships for failure to behave well in any given relationship.We provide complete characterizations of the net-work patterns of favor exchange that are sustainable by a form of equilibrium satisfying two robustness criteria.The setting that we examine is such that opportunities for one agent to do a favor for another agent arrive randomly over time.Providing a favor is costly,but the benefit outweighs the cost,so that it is efficient for agents to provide favors over time.However, it could be that the cost of providing a favor today is sufficiently high that it is not in an agent’s selfish interest to provide the favor even if that means that he or she will not receive favors from that person again.Thus,networks of relationships are needed to provide sufficient incentives for favor exchange,and it may be that an agent risks losing several relationships by failing to provide a favor.We characterize the network structures that correspond to robust equilibria of favor exchanges.The criteria that we examine are twofold:first,the threats of which relationships will be terminated in response to an agent’s failure to deliver a favor must be credible.Credibility is captured by the game theoretic concept of“renegotiation-proofness”.3After an agent has failed to deliver a favor,that relationship is lost,but which additional relationships are lost in the continuation equilibrium,must be such that there is not another equilibrium continuation that all agents prefer to the given continuation.This sort of renegotiation-proofness rules out unreasonable equilibria such as the“grim-trigger”sort of equilibrium where once anyone fails to provide a single favor the whole society grinds to a halt and nobody provides any favors in the future.At that point, it would be in the society’s interest to return to some equilibrium where at least some favors are provided.Renegotiation-proof equilibria can be complex,but have some nice intuitions underlying their structure as we explain in detail.The second criterion that we impose is a robustness condition that we call“robustness against social contagion.”It is clear that to sustain favor exchange,an agent must expect to lose some relationships if the agent fails to deliver a favor.Those lost relationships can in turn cause other agents to lose some of their relationships since the incentives to provide favors change with the network structure. This can lead to some fragility of a society,as one agent’s bad behavior can ripple through the society.The robustness against social contagion requires that the ripple effects of some agent’s bad behavior be confined to that agent’s neighbors and not propagate throughout the network.In symmetric settings,the combination of renegotiation-proofness and robustness require a unique type of network configuration of favor exchanges.We call those configurations “social quilts.”A social quilt is a union of small cliques(completely connected subnetworks), where each clique is just large enough to sustain cooperation by all of its members and where the cliques are laced together in a tree-like pattern.One of our main theoretical results shows that configurations of favor exchange that are sustained in robust equilibria are precisely the3Although there are several definitions in the literature for infinitely repeated games,our games have a structure such that there is a natural definition which has an inductive structure reminiscent of that of Jean Pierre Benoit and Vijay Krishna(1993).social quilts.We then extend the model to allow heterogeneity in the cost,value,and arrival rates of favors to various individuals.In the more general setting,we prove that any robust equilibrium network must exhibit a specific trait:each of its links must be“supported”. That is,if some agent i is linked to an agent j,then there must be some agent k linked to both of them.This is related to,but quite distinct from,various clustering measures.With the theoretical underpinnings in hand,we then examine social networks in75vil-lages in southern rural India.4Using these data5we can examine the networks of various forms of social interaction including specific sorts of favor exchange.In line with the theoret-ical predictions,wefind that the number of favor links that have this sort of social support is in the range of eighty percent in these villages.Moreover,the level of support is significantly higher than what would arise if links were formed at random(even with some geographic bias to formation),and significantly higher than levels of clustering.We analyze various aspects of the levels of support and alsofind that it is significantly higher for favor relationships than other sorts of relationships.Our research contributes to the understanding of informal favor exchange as well as social networks in several ways:•We provide an analysis of repeated interactions where individual’s decisions are influ-enced by the network pattern of behavior in the community,and this provides new insights into repeated games on networks.•Our model includes dynamic choices of both favor provision and relationships and provides new insights into the co-evolution of networks and behavior,and in particular into the phenomenon of ostracism.6•Our analysis suggests a new source of inefficiency in informal risk and favor sharing, showing why individuals may have to limit the number of relationships in which they take part.•A by-product of our analysis is an operational definition of social capital that is more specific and tighter than many existing definitions,and it makes tight predictions about how relationships in a society must be organized.4Although we apply some of ourfindings to favor relationships in Indian Villages,such informal favor exchange is clearly not limited to developing countries.For example,a recent New York Times/CBS News poll(reported in the New York Times,December152009)found that53percent of surveyed unemployed workers in the U.S.had borrowed money from friends or family as a result of being unemployed.5These data are particularly well-suited for our study as they provide network structure for various favor relationships,and moreover have this for many separate villages.We are not aware of any other data set having these attributes.In particular,in these data we have information about who borrows rice and kerosene from whom,who borrows small sums of money from whom,who gets advice from whom,who seeks emergency medical aid from whom,and a variety of other sorts of relationships,as well as gps data.6As we shall see,ostracism has further consequences in terms of lost relationships,beyond those directly involving the individual being punished.•We identify a necessary property of such favor exchange networks that we call“support”and show how this is distinguished from clustering measures.•We examine data that include many sorts of interactions and cover75different villages, andfind that the networks exhibit substantial and significant distinctions between our measure of support and standard measures of clustering.1.1Related LiteratureAs mentioned above,there is a large literature on social capital that studies the ability of a society to foster trust and cooperation among its members.7Although that literature is extensive and contains important empirical studies and many intuitive ideas,it has struggled in providingfirm theoretical foundations and the term“social capital”has at times been used very loosely and as a result has lost some of its bite.8Part of the contribution of our paper is to provide an explicit modeling of how societies can enforce cooperative favor exchange and how this is linked to the social network structure within a society.In this way,our paper provides a concrete definition of social capital that is embedded in three components:a notion of equilibrium that embodies notions of ostracism and social expectations of individual behaviors,implications of this for resulting social network structure,and individual payoffs from the resulting behaviors.Coleman(1988)discusses closure in social networks,emphasizing the ability of small groups to monitor and pressure each other to behave.Here we provide a new argument for, and a very specific variety of,closure.A specific form of minimal clique structures emerge because of a combination of renegotiation-proofness and a local robustness condition,rather than for informational,monitoring,or pressuring reasons.Minimal sized cliques offer credible threats of dissolving in the face of bad behavior,and in terms of minimal contagion for a society.Our analysis also formalizes this in terms of support and contrasts it with clustering.The most closely related previous literature in terms of the theoretical analysis of a repeated game on a network is a series of papers that study prisoners’dilemmas in network settings,including Werner Raub and Jeroen Weesie(1990),S.Nageeb Ali and David ler (2009),Steffen Lippert and Giancarlo Spagnolo(2011),and Maximilian Mihm,Russell Toth, Corey Lang(2009).9In particular,Raub and Weesie(1990)and Ali and Miller(2009)show how completely connected networks shorten the travel time of contagion of bad behavior7For example,see George C.Homans(1958),Glenn Loury(1977),Pierre Bourdieu(1986),Coleman(1988, 1990),Michael Woolcock(1998),Partha Dasgupta(2000),Robert D.Putnam(1993,1995,2000),Edward L. Glaeser,David Laibson,and Bruce Sacerdote(2002)Luigi Guiso,Paola Sapienza,and Luigi Zingales(2004), Guido Tabellini(2009),among others.8See Joel Sobel(2002)for an illuminating overview and critique of the literature.9Other studies of network structure and cooperative or various forms of risk-sharing behavior and the relationship to social network structures include Marcel Fafchamps and Susan Lund(2003),Joachim De Weerdt and Stefan Dercon(2006),Yann Bramoull´e and Rachel Kranton(2007),Francis Bloch,Garance Genicot,and Debraj Ray(2007,2008),Dean Karlan,Markus Mobius,Tanya Rosenblat and Adam Szeidl (2009),and Felipe Balmaceda and Juan F.Escobar(2011).which can quicken punishment for deviations.Although cliques also play a prominent role in some of those papers,it is for very different reasons.In those settings,individuals do not have information about others’behaviors except through what they observe in terms of their own interactions.Thus,punishments only travel through the network through contagious behavior(or word-of-mouth),and the main hurdle to enforcing individual cooperation is how long it takes for someone’s bad behavior to come to reach their neighbors through chains of contagion.10Our analysis is in a very different setting,where individuals have complete information.The quilts in our setting emerge because they do not lead to large contagions but instead compartmentalize the damage from an individual’s defection.Moreover,the quilts consist of minimal sized cliques because only those sorts of implicit punishments are immune to renegotiation.Matthew Haag and Roger Lagunoff(2004)provide another reason favoring small cliques: heterogeneity.In their analysis large differences in preferences can preclude cooperative behavior,and so partitioning a group into more homogeneous subgroups can enable coop-erative behavior which might not be feasible otherwise.Although our reasoning behind cliques comes from different sources,when we examine heterogeneous societies we dofind assortativity in who exchanges favors with whom.Here,it is not because of direct reciprocity considerations,but because robustness requires balanced cliques and so agents need to have similar valuations of favors in order for their cliques to be critical.In this way,we provide new insights into homophily,where relationships of agents are biased towards others who have similar characteristics in terms of their values and arrival rates of favors.Finally,our analysis of the data not only provides support for the support measure, but also uncovers significant differences between different sorts of relationships,as might be expected based on the different ways in which links might form across applications(e.g., see Matthew O.Jackson(2008)).Here we add a new angle to this understanding,finding statistically distinct patterns of support in various sorts of favor and social networks.These suggest some interesting questions for future research.2A Model of Favor Exchange2.1Networks,Favors,and PayoffsAfinite set N={1,...,n}of agents are connected in a social network described by an undirected11graph.Given that the set of agents N isfixed throughout the analysis,we represent a network,generically denoted g,simply by the set of its links or edges.Let g N be the set of all links(so the set of all subsets of N of size2),and let G={g|g⊂g N}be the set of all possible networks.For simplicity,we write ij to represent the link{i,j},and10That approach builds on earlier work by Avner Greif(1989),Michihiro Kandori(1992),Glenn Ellison (1994),Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Andrew Postlewaite(1995)among others,who studied the ability of a society to sustain cooperation via threats of contagions of bad behavior.11This is not necessary for the analysis,and we comment later on possible extensions to directed networks.so ij ∈g indicates that i and j are linked under the network g .We write g −ij to denote the network obtained from g by deleting a link ij .For an integer k ,0≤k ≤n (n −1)/2,let G k be the set of all networks that have exactly k links,so that G k ={g ∈G :|g |=k }.The neighbors of agent i are denoted N i (g )={j |ij ∈g }.We follow a convention that rules out self-links,and so all agents in N i (g )are distinct from i .The degree of agent i in the network g is the number of his or her neighbors denoted by d i (g )=|N i (g )|.Time proceeds in discrete periods indexed by t ∈{0,1,...}and in any given period,there is a chance that an agent will need a favor from a friend or will be called upon to grant a favor to a friend.In particular,an agent i who is connected to an agent j (so that ij ∈g )anticipates a probability p >0that j will need a favor from i in period t and a probability p that i will need a favor from j .It is assumed that at most one favor will be needed across all agents in any given period,and so we require that n (n −1)p ≤1,and we allow the sum to be less than one to admit the possibility that no favor is needed in a given period.This is a proxy for a Poisson arrival process,where the chance that two favors are needed precisely at the same moment is 0.By letting the time between periods be small,the chance of more than one favor being called upon in the same period goes to 0.Thus,when applying the model it is important to keep in mind that periods are relatively small compared to the arrival rate of favors.A restriction of this formulation is that p does not depend on the network structure.More generally,the chance that i needs a favor from j will depend on many things including how many other friends i has.We characterize the equilibrium networks for the more general case in Section 5.We begin with the current case since it more clearly provides the basic intuitions,but the results have very intuitive analogs for the general case that are easy to describe once we have presented the simpler case.Doing a favor costs an agent an amount c >0and the value of the favor to an agent is an amount v >c .Receiving a “favor”can embody many things including getting advice,borrowing a good,borrowing money,or receiving some service.The important aspect is that the value of a favor to the receiving agent exceeds the cost to the providing agent,so that it is ex ante Pareto efficient for agents to exchange favors over time.However,we examine settings where it is impossible (or too costly)for agents to write binding contracts to perform favors whenever called upon to do so.This applies in many developing countries,and also in developed countries where it is prohibitively costly and complex to write complete contracts covering the everyday sort of favors that one might need from friends.Thus,we examine self-enforcing favor exchange.Agents discount over time according to a factor 0<δ<1.Thus,if there were just two agents who always performed favors for each other,then they would each expect a discounted stream of utility of p (v −c )1−δ.The more interesting case from a network perspective is the one that we examine,where c >δp (v −c )1−δ.In this case,favor exchange between two agents in isolation is not sustainable.When called upon to perform a favor,the agent sees a cost that exceeds the future value of potential favor exchange(in isolation)and so favor exchange cannot be sustained between two people alone,but must be embedded in a larger context in order to be sustained.Sustaining favor exchange between two individuals requires a high enough frequency of arrival coupled with a high enough marginal benefit from a favor and sufficient patience.In a marriage,there are generally sufficiently many opportunities for each spouse to help the other out with some task or need that bilateral favor exchange can be sustained.However,in other contexts, where such needs are rarer-such as a need to borrow cash due to an emergency,or a need for medical advice,etc.,one might need a multilateral setting to sustain favor exchange.A society is described by(N,p,v,c,δ).2.2The GameThe favor exchange game is described as follows:•The game begins with some initial network in place,denoted g0.•Period t begins with a network g t−1in place.•Agents(simultaneously)12announce the links that they are willing to retain:L i⊂={ij|j∈L i and i∈L j}.N i(g t−1).The resulting network is gt.With probability2pk t need for a(single)favor •Let k t be the number of links in gtarises and with probability1−2pk t there is no need for a favor in the period.If a favor is needed,then it could apply to any link in gwith equal likelihood and then goteither direction.If a favor is needed,then let i t denote the agent called upon to do the.favor and j t the agent who needs the favor,where i t j t∈gt•Agent i t chooses whether or not to perform the favor.If the favor is performed theni t incurs the cost c and agent j t enjoys the benefit v.Otherwise no cost or benefit isincurred.−i t j t if the need for a favor arose and it was not •The ending network,denoted g t,is gtperformed,and is gotherwise.tPeople make two sorts of choices:they can choose with whom they associate and they can choose to do favors or not to do favors.Opportunities for favor exchange arise randomly, as in a Poisson game,and people must choose whether to act on favors as the need arises. Choices of which relationships to maintain,however,can be made essentially at any time. In the model this is captured by subdividing the period into link choices and favor choices, 12Given the equilibrium refinements that we use,whether or not the link choices are simultaneous is effectively irrelevant.so that agents have a chance to adjust the network after any favor choice,and before the next potential favor arises.This structure embodies several things.First,favor relationships can either be sustained or not.Once a favor is denied,that relationship cannot be resuscitated.Thus,at any point in time an agent’s decision is which relationships to maintain.This simplifies the analysis in that it eliminates complicated forms of punishment where various agents withhold favors from an agent over time,but then eventually revert to providing favors.It can be motivated on various behavioral(e.g.,emotional)or pro-social grounds and effectively it acts as a sort of refinement of the set of all possible punishments that might occur,as it requires that one of the ostracizing agents be the one who failed to get the favor.Eventually,one would like to extend the analysis to situations where after some period of time forgiveness is possible, but this simplification allows us to gain a handle on sustainable network structures as the problem is already complex,and it appears that much of the intuition carries over to the moreflexible case,but that is a subject for further research.Second,we do not consider the formation of new links,but only the dissolution of links. This embodies the idea that the formation of new relationships is a longer-term process and that decisions to provide favors and/or ostracize an agent can be taken more quickly and are shorter term actions.It is important to note that we cover the case where society starts with the complete network,so we do not a priori restrict the links that might be formed, and so our results do make predictions about which networks can be formed/sustained in a society.The important wedge that we impose is that an agent who has lost a relationship cannot(quickly)replace it with a newly formed one.One other aspect of the model is important to mention.Agents do not exchange money for favors even though,hypothetically,favor exchange could be monetized.Of course we do not see monetization of all favors in reality,as when a colleague asks to borrow a book we tend not to charge her or him a rental fee;but that empirical observation does not explain why we do not charge our friends and acquaintances for every favor that we perform.One explanation is a behavioral one:that monetizing favors would fundamentally change the way in which people perceive the relationship,and this explanation is consistent with people no longer viewing a monetized relationship as a long run relationship.More discussion of this point is given by David M.Kreps(1997).The specifics of why at least some favors are not monetized is outside of our scope.For now,we consider a complete information version of the game,in which all agents observe all moves in the game at every node.We discuss limited information variations in Section7.An agent i’s expected utility from being in a network g that he or she expects to existforever13isu i(g)=d i(g)p(v−c)1−δ13This applies at any point within the period other than at the a time at which the agent is called to receive or produce a favor.。

成考作文题目套用模板英文回答：Topic: The Role of Education in Shaping Society。

Introduction:Education plays an integral role in molding and shaping societies. It provides individuals with the knowledge, skills, and values necessary to contribute meaningfully to their communities and the world at large. Education empowers citizens, fosters innovation, and promotes economic and social progress.Paragraph 1: Fostering Intellectual Development and Critical Thinking。

Education cultivates intellectual curiosity, critical thinking, and analytical abilities. Through exposure to diverse perspectives, students develop the capacity toengage in informed discussions, solve problems, and make reasoned judgments. This intellectual development iscrucial for the advancement of knowledge, the dissemination of ideas, and the preservation of democratic values.Paragraph 2: Building Social Capital and FosteringCivic Engagement。