1997年金融危机(英文)

97年亚洲金融危机大事记在1997年亚洲金融危机以前，东南亚国家的经济已经连续10年高速增长。

伴随着经济的高速增长，这些国家的银行信贷额以更快的速度增加，短期外债也达到前所未有的水平。

其中相当部分投向房地产。

投资的增加导致资产价格膨胀(主要是泰国和马来西亚)。

此外，汇率制度缺乏弹性也使得大量外债没有考虑汇率风险。

这些都为危机的发生埋下了伏笔。

危机首先从泰国爆发。

1997年3月至6月期间，泰国66家财务公司秘密从泰国银行获得大量流动性支持。

此外，还出现了大量资本逃离泰国。

泰国中央银行将所有的外汇储备用于维护钉住汇率制度，但仍然以失败告终。

7月2日，泰国财政部和中央银行宣布，泰币实行浮动汇率制，泰铢价值由市场来决定，放弃了自1984年以来实行了14年的泰币与美元挂钩的一揽子汇率制。

这标志着亚洲金融危机正式爆发。

很快，危机开始从泰国向其它东南亚国家蔓延，从外汇市场向股票市场蔓延。

7月9日，马来西亚股市指数下跌至18个月来最低点。

菲律宾、马来西亚等国中央银行直接干预外汇市场，支持本国货币。

7月11日，印度尼西亚、菲律宾扩大本国货币的浮动范围。

8月4日，泰国央行行长被迫辞职，新的央行行长猜瓦特上任。

8月13日，印尼财政部和印尼银行联合宣布，放弃钉住美元的汇率政策，实行自由浮动汇率制度，印尼盾大幅下跌55%。

随着危机的发展，以国际货币基金组织为首的国际社会开始向危机国家提供了大量援助。

但这些国家的金融市场仍在恶化，并波及香港和美国市场。

危机国家在采取措施稳定金融市场和金融体系时，也开始进行经济和金融改革。

8月11日，由国际货币基金组织主持的援助泰国国际会议在东京举行。

经过协商，确定对泰国提供约为160亿美元的资金援助，以稳定泰国的经济和金融市场秩序。

香港特区政府首次动用外汇基金，提供10亿美元，参与泰国的贷款计划。

9月1日，菲律宾股票市场继续下跌，菲股综合指数击穿2000点防线，最后以1975.20点收盘，是四年来最低记录。

Financial crisis of 2007–2009From Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaThis article is about background financial market events dating from July 2007. For the financial market conditions of 2008 and 2009, see Global financial crisis of 2008–2009. For an overview of all economic problems during the late 2000s, see Late 2000s recession.The financial crisis of 2007–2009 has been called the most serious financial crisis since the Great Depression by leading economists,[1] with its global effects characterized by the failure of key businesses, declines in consumer wealth estimated in the trillions of U.S. dollars, substantial financial commitments incurred by governments, and a significant decline in economic activity.[2] Many causes have been proposed, with varying weight assigned by experts.[3] Both market-based and regulatory solutions have been implemented or are under consideration,[4] while significant risks remain for the world economy.[5] [edit] BackgroundThe immediate cause or trigger of the crisis was the bursting of the United States housing bubble which peaked in approximately 2005–2006.[6][7] High default rates on "subprime" and adjustable rate mortgages (ARM), began to increase quickly thereafter. An increase in loan incentives such as easy initial terms and a long-term trend of rising housing prices had encouraged borrowers to assume difficult mortgages in the belief they would be able to quickly refinance at more favorable terms. However, once interest rates began to rise and housing prices started to drop moderately in 2006–2007 in many parts of the U.S., refinancing became more difficult. Defaults and foreclosure activity increased dramatically as easy initial terms expired, home prices failed to go up as anticipated, and ARM interest rates reset higher.Share in GDP of U.S. financial sector since 1860.[8]In the years leading up to the start of the crisis in 2007, significant amounts of foreign money flowed into the U.S. from fast-growing economies in Asia and oil-producing countries. This inflow of funds made it easier for the Federal Reserve to keep interest rates in the United States too low (by the Taylor rule) from 2002–2006 which contributed to easy credit conditions, leading to the United States housing bubble. Loans of various types (e.g., mortgage, credit card, and auto) were easy to obtain and consumers assumed an unprecedented debt load.[9][10] As part of the housing and credit booms, the amount of financial agreements called mortgage-backed securities (MBS), which derive their value from mortgage payments and housing prices, greatly increased. Such financial innovation enabled institutions and investors around the world to invest in the U.S. housing market. As housing prices declined, major global financialFrom 2000 to 2003, the Federal Reserve lowered the federal funds rate target from 6.5% to 1.0%.[25] This was done to soften the effects of the collapse of the dot-com bubble and of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, and to combat the perceived risk of deflation.[26] The Fed then raised the Fed funds rate significantly between July 2004 and July 2006.[27] This contributed to an increase in 1-year and 5-year adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) rates, making ARM interest rate resets more expensive for homeowners.[28] This may have also contributed to the deflating of the housing bubble, as asset prices generally move inversely to interest rates and it became riskier to speculate in housing.[29][30]U.S. Current Account or Trade DeficitIn 2005, Ben Bernanke addressed the implications of the USA's high and rising current account (trade) deficit, resulting from USA imports exceeding its exports.[31] Between 1996 and 2004, the USA current account deficit increased by $650 billion, from 1.5% to 5.8% of GDP. Financing these deficits required the USA to borrow large sums from abroad, much of it from countries running trade surpluses, mainly the emerging economies in Asia and oil-exporting nations. The balance of payments identity requires that a country (such as the USA) running a current account deficit also have a capital account (investment) surplus of the same amount. Hence large and growing amounts of foreign funds (capital) flowed into the USA to finance its imports. This created demand for various types of financial assets, raising the prices of those assets while lowering interest rates. Foreign investors had these funds to lend, either because they had very high personal savings rates (as high as 40% in China), or because of high oil prices. Bernanke referred to this as a "saving glut."[32] A "flood" of funds (capital or liquidity) reached the USA financial markets. Foreign governments supplied funds by purchasing USA Treasury bonds and thus avoided much of the direct impact of the crisis. USA households, on the other hand, used funds borrowed from foreigners to finance consumption or to bid up the prices of housing and financial assets. Financial institutions invested foreign funds in mortgage-backed securities. USA housing and financial assets dramatically declined in value after the housing bubble burst.[33][34][edit] Sub-prime lendingU.S. Subprime lending expanded dramatically 2004-2006In addition to easy credit conditions, there is evidence that both government and competitive pressures contributed to an increase in the amount of subprime lending during the years preceding the crisis. Major∙As early as 1997, Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan fought to keep the derivatives market unregulated.[citation needed] With the advice of the President's Working Group on Financial Markets,[62] the U.S. Congress and President allowed the self-regulation of the over-the-counter derivatives market when they enacted the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000. Derivatives such as credit default swaps (CDS) can be used to hedge or speculate against particular credit risks. The volume of CDS outstanding increased 100-fold from 1998 to 2008, with estimates of the debt covered by CDS contracts, as of November 2008, ranging from US$33 to $47 trillion. Total over-the-counter (OTC) derivative notional value rose to $683 trillion by June 2008.[63]Warren Buffett famously referred to derivatives as "financial weapons of mass destruction" in early 2003.[64][65][edit] Increased debt burden or over-leveragingLeverage Ratios of Investment Banks Increased Significantly 2003-2007U.S. households and financial institutions became increasingly indebted or overleveraged during the years preceding the crisis. This increased their vulnerability to the collapse of the housing bubble and worsened the ensuing economic downturn. Key statistics include:∙USA household debt as a percentage of annual disposable personal income was 127% at the end of 2007, versus 77% in 1990.[66]∙U.S. home mortgage debt relative to gross domestic product (GDP) increased from an average of 46% during the 1990s to 73% during 2008, reaching $10.5 trillion.[67]∙In 1981, U.S. private debt was 123% of GDP; by the third quarter of 2008, it was 290%.[68]∙From 2004-07, the top five U.S. investment banks each significantly increased their financial leverage (see diagram), which increased their vulnerability to a financial shock. These five institutions reported over $4.1 trillion in debt for fiscal year 2007, about 30% of USA nominal GDP for 2007. Lehman Brothers was liquidated, Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch were sold at fire-sale prices, and Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley became commercial banks, subjecting themselves to more stringent regulation. With the exception of Lehman, these companies required or received government support.[69]∙Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two U.S. Government sponsored enterprises, owned or guaranteed nearly $5 trillion in mortgage obligations at the time they were placed into conservatorship by the U.S. government in September 2008.[70][71]These seven entities were highly leveraged and had $9 trillion in debt or guarantee obligations, an enormous concentration of risk, yet were not subject to the same regulation as depository banks.[edit] Financial innovation and complexityA protester on Wall Street in the wake of the AIG bonus payments controversy is interviewed by news media.The term financial innovation refers to the ongoing development of financial products designed to achieve particular client objectives, such as offsetting a particular risk exposure (such as the default of a borrower) or to assist with obtaining financing. Examples pertinent to this crisis included: the adjustable-rate mortgage; the bundling of subprime mortgages into mortgage-backed securities (MBS) or collateralized debt obligations (CDO) for sale to investors, a type of securitization; and a form of credit insurance called credit default swaps(CDS). The usage of these products expanded dramatically in the years leading up to the crisis. These products vary in complexity and the ease with which they can be valued on the books of financial institutions.In a Peabody Award winning program, NPR correspondents argued that a "Giant Pool of Money" (represented by $70 trillion in worldwide fixed income investments) sought higher yields than those offered by U.S. Treasury bonds early in the decade. Further, this pool of money had roughly doubled in size from 2000 to 2007, yet the supply of relatively safe, income generating investments had not grown as fast. Investment banks on Wall Street answered this demand with the MBS and CDO, which were assigned safe ratings by the credit rating agencies. In effect, Wall Street connected this pool of money to the mortgage market in the U.S., with enormous fees accruing to those throughout the mortgage supply chain, from the mortgage broker selling the loans, to small banks that funded the brokers, to the giant investment banks behind them. By approximately 2003, the supply of mortgages originated at traditional lending standards had been exhausted. However, continued strong demand for MBS and CDO began to drive down lending standards, as long as mortgages could still be sold along the supply chain. Eventually, this speculative bubble proved unsustainable.[72]The CDO in particular enabled financial institutions to obtain investor funds to finance subprime and other lending, extending or increasing the housing bubble and generating large fees. A CDO essentially places cash payments from multiple mortgages or other debt obligations into a single pool, from which the cash is allocated to specific securities in a priority sequence. Those securities obtaining cash first received investment-grade ratings from rating agencies. Lower priority securities received cash thereafter, with lower credit ratings but theoretically a higher rate of return on the amount invested.[73][74]For a variety of reasons, market participants did not accurately measure the risk inherent with this innovation or understand its impact on the overall stability of the financial system.[75] For example, the pricing model for CDOs clearly did not reflect the level of risk they introduced into the system. The average recovery rate for "high quality" CDOs has been approximately 32 cents on the dollar, while the recovery rate for mezzanine CDO's has been approximately five cents for every dollar. These massive, practically unthinkable, losses have dramatically impacted the balance sheets of banks across the globe, leaving them with very little capital to continue operations.[76]Another example relates to AIG, which insured obligations of various financial institutions through the usage of credit default swaps. The basic CDS transaction involved AIG receiving a premium in exchangefor a promise to pay money to party A in the event party B defaulted. However, AIG did not have the financial strength to support its many CDS commitments as the crisis progressed and was taken over by the government in September 2008. U.S. taxpayers provided over $180 billion in government support to AIG during 2008 and early 2009, through which the money flowed to various counterparties to CDS transactions, including many large global financial institutions.[77][78]The limitations of a widely-used financial model also were not properly understood.[79][80] This formula assumed that the price of CDS was correlated with and could predict the correct price of mortgage backed securities. Because it was highly tractable, it rapidly came to be used by a huge percentage of CDO and CDS investors, issuers, and rating agencies.[80] According to one article[80]: "Then the model fell apart. Cracks started appearing early on, when financial markets began behaving in ways that users of Li's formula hadn't expected. The cracks became full-fledged canyons in 2008—when ruptures in the financial system's foundation swallowed up trillions of dollars and put the survival of the global banking system in serious peril... Li's Gaussian copula formula will go down in history as instrumental in causing the unfathomable losses that brought the world financial system to its knees."As financial assets became more and more complex, and harder and harder to value, investors were reassured by the fact that both the international bond rating agencies and bank regulators, who came to rely on them, accepted as valid some complex mathematical models which theoretically showed the risks were much smaller than they actually proved to be in practice [81]. George Soros commented that "The super-boom got out of hand when the new products became so complicated that the authorities could no longer calculate the risks and started relying on the risk management methods of the banks themselves. Similarly, the rating agencies relied on the information provided by the originators of synthetic products. It was a shocking abdication of responsibility." [82]Certain financial innovation may also have the effect of circumventing regulations, such as off-balance sheet financing that affects the leverage or capital cushion reported by major banks. For example, Martin Wolf wrote in June 2009: "...an enormous part of what banks did in the early part of this decade – theoff-balance-sheet vehicles, the derivatives and the 'shadow banking system' itself – was to find a way round regulation."[83][edit] Boom and collapse of the shadow banking systemIn a June 2008 speech, U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, then President and CEO of the NY Federal Reserve Bank, placed significant blame for the freezing of credit markets on a "run" on the entities in the "parallel" banking system, also called the shadow banking system. These entities became critical to the credit markets underpinning the financial system, but were not subject to the same regulatory controls. Further, these entities were vulnerable because they borrowed short-term in liquid markets to purchase long-term, illiquid and risky assets. This meant that disruptions in credit markets would make them subject to rapid deleveraging, selling their long-term assets at depressed prices. He described the significance of these entities: "In early 2007, asset-backed commercial paper conduits, in structured investment vehicles, in auction-rate preferred securities, tender option bonds and variable rate demand notes, had a combined asset size of roughly $2.2 trillion. Assets financed overnight in triparty repo grew to $2.5 trillion. Assets held in hedge funds grew to roughly $1.8 trillion. The combined balance sheets of the then five major investment banks totaled $4 trillion. In comparison, the total assets of the top five bank holding companies in the United States at that point were just over $6 trillion, and total assets of the entire banking system were about $10 trillion." He stated that the "combined effect of these factors was a financial system vulnerable to self-reinforcing asset price and credit cycles."[12]2007 bank run on Northern Rock, a UK bankOne of the first victims was Northern Rock, a medium-sized British bank.[98] The highly leveraged nature of its business led the bank to request security from the Bank of England. This in turn led to investor panic and a bank run in mid-September 2007. Calls by Liberal Democrat Shadow Chancellor Vince Cable to nationalise the institution were initially ignored; in February 2008, however, the British government (having failed to find a private sector buyer) relented, and the bank was taken into public hands. Northern Rock's problems proved to be an early indication of the troubles that would soon befall other banks and financial institutions.Initially the companies affected were those directly involved in home construction and mortgage lending such as Northern Rock and Countrywide Financial, as they could no longer obtain financing through the credit markets. Over 100 mortgage lenders went bankrupt during 2007 and 2008. Concerns that investment bank Bear Stearns would collapse in March 2008 resulted in its fire-sale to JP Morgan Chase. The crisis hit its peak in September and October 2008. Several major institutions either failed, were acquired under duress, or were subject to government takeover. These included Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and AIG.[99]See also: Federal takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac[edit] Credit markets and the shadow banking systemTED spread and components during 2008During September 2008, the crisis hits its most critical stage. There was the equivalent of a bank run on the money market mutual funds, which frequently invest in commercial paper issued by corporations to fund their operations and payrolls. Withdrawal from money markets were $144.5 billion during one week, versus $7.1 billion the week prior. This interrupted the ability of corporations to rollover (replace) their short-term debt. The U.S. government responded by extending insurance for money market accounts analogous to bank deposit insurance via a temporary guarantee[100] and with Federal Reserve programs to purchase commercial paper. The TED spread, an indicator of perceived credit risk in the general economy, spiked up in July 2007, remained volatile for a year, then spiked even higher in September 2008,[101] reaching a record 4.65% on October 10, 2008.In a dramatic meeting on September 18, 2008 Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke met with key legislators to propose a $700 billion emergency bailout. Bernanke reportedly tells them: "If we don't do this, we may not have an economy on Monday."[102] The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act also called the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) is signed into law on October 3, 2008.[103]Economist Paul Krugman and U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner explain the credit crisis via the implosion of the shadow banking system, which had grown to nearly equal the importance of the traditional commercial banking sector as described above. Without the ability to obtain investor funds in exchange for most types of mortgage-backed securities or asset-backed commercial paper, investment banks and other entities in the shadow banking system could not provide funds to mortgage firms and other corporations.[12][58]This meant that nearly one-third of the U.S. lending mechanism was frozen and continued to be frozen into June 2009.[104] According to the Brookings Institution, the traditional banking system does not have the capital to close this gap as of June 2009: "It would take a number of years of strong profits to generate sufficient capital to support that additional lending volume." The authors also indicate that some forms of securitization are "likely to vanish forever, having been an artifact of excessively loose credit conditions." While traditional banks have raised their lending standards, it was the collapse of the shadow banking system that is the primary cause of the reduction in funds available for borrowing.[105][edit] Wealth effectsThere is a direct relationship between declines in wealth, and declines in consumption and business investment, which along with government spending represent the economic engine. Between June 2007 and November 2008, Americans lost an estimated average of more than a quarter of their collective net worth. By early November 2008, a broad U.S. stock index the S&P 500, was down 45 percent from its 2007 high. Housing prices had dropped 20% from their 2006 peak, with futures markets signaling a30-35% potential drop. Total home equity in the United States, which was valued at $13 trillion at its peak in 2006, had dropped to $8.8 trillion by mid-2008 and was still falling in late 2008. Total retirement assets, Americans' second-largest household asset, dropped by 22 percent, from $10.3 trillion in 2006 to $8 trillion in mid-2008. During the same period, savings and investment assets (apart from retirement savings) lost $1.2 trillion and pension assets lost $1.3 trillion. Taken together, these losses total a staggering $8.3 trillion.[106]Further, U.S. homeowners had extracted significant equity in their homes in the years leading up to the crisis, which they could no longer do once housing prices collapsed. Free cash used by consumers from home equity extraction doubled from $627 billion in 2001 to $1,428 billion in 2005 as the housing bubble built, a total of nearly $5 trillion over the period.[16][107][108] U.S. home mortgage debt relative to GDP increased from an average of 46% during the 1990s to 73% during 2008, reaching $10.5 trillion.[109]To offset this decline in consumption and lending capacity, the U.S. government and U.S. Federal Reserve have committed $13.9 trillion, of which $6.8 trillion has been invested or spent, as of June 2009.[110] In effect, the Fed has gone from being the "lender of last resort" to the "lender of only resort" for a significant portion of the economy. In some cases the Fed can now be considered the "buyer of last resort."The New York City headquarters of Lehman Brothers.Economist Dean Baker explained the reduction in the availability of credit this way:"Yes, consumers and businesses can't get credit as easily as they could a year ago. There is a really good reason for tighter credit. Tens of millions of homeowners who had substantial equity in their homes two years ago have little or nothing today. Businesses are facing the worst downturn since the Great Depression. This matters for credit decisions. A homeowner with equity in her home is very unlikely to default on a car loan or credit card debt. They will draw on this equity rather than lose their car and/or have a default placed on their credit record. On the other hand, a homeowner who has no equity is a serious default risk. In the case of businesses, their creditworthiness depends on their future profits. Profit prospects look much worse in November 2008 than they did in November 2007 (of course, to clear-eyed analysts, they didn't look too good a year ago either). While many banks are obviously at the brink, consumers and businesses would be facing a much harder time getting credit right now even if the financial system were rock solid. The problem with the economy is the loss of close to $6 trillion in housing wealth and an even larger amount of stock wealth. Economists, economic policy makers and economic reporters virtually all missed the housing bubble on the way up. If they still can't notice its impact as the collapse of the bubble throws into the worst recession in the post-war era, then they are in the wrong profession."[111]At the heart of the portfolios of many of these institutions were investments whose assets had been derived from bundled home mortgages. Exposure to these mortgage-backed securities, or to the credit derivatives used to insure them against failure, caused the collapse or takeover of several key firms such as Lehman Brothers, AIG, Merrill Lynch, and HBOS.[112][113][114][edit] Global contagionThe crisis rapidly developed and spread into a global economic shock, resulting in a number of European bank failures, declines in various stock indexes, and large reductions in the market value of equities[115] and commodities.[116] Moreover, the de-leveraging of financial institutions, as assets were sold to pay back obligations that could not be refinanced in frozen credit markets, further accelerated the liquidity crisis and caused a decrease in international trade.World political leaders, national ministers of finance and central bank directors coordinated theirefforts[117] to reduce fears, but the crisis continued. At the end of October 2008 a currency crisis developed, with investors transferring vast capital resources into stronger currencies such as the yen, the dollar and the Swiss franc, leading many emergent economies to seek aid from the International Monetary Fund.[118][119][edit] Effects on the global economy[edit] Official economic projectionsOn November 3, 2008, the EU-commission at Brussels predicted for 2009 an extremely weak growth of GDP, by 0.1 percent, for the countries of the Euro zone (France, Germany, Italy, etc.) and even negative number for the UK (-1.0 percent), Ireland and Spain. On November 6, the IMF at Washington, D.C., launched numbers predicting a worldwide recession by -0.3 percent for 2009, averaged over the developed economies. On the same day, the Bank of England and the Central Bank for the Euro zone, respectively, reduced their interest rates from 4.5 percent down to three percent, and from 3.75 percent down to 3.25 percent. Economically, mainly the car industry seems to be involved. As a consequence, starting from November 2008, several countries launched large "help packages" for their economies.The U.S. Federal Reserve Open Market Committee release in June 2009 stated: "...the pace of economic contraction is slowing. Conditions in financial markets have generally improved in recent months. Household spending has shown further signs of stabilizing but remains constrained by ongoing job losses, lower housing wealth, and tight credit. Businesses are cutting back on fixed investment and staffing but appear to be making progress in bringing inventory stocks into better alignment with sales. Although economic activity is likely to remain weak for a time, the Committee continues to anticipate that policy actions to stabilize financial markets and institutions, fiscal and monetary stimulus, and market forces will contribute to a gradual resumption of sustainable economic growth in a context of price stability."[136] Economic projections from the Federal Reserve and Reserve Bank Presidents include a return to typical growth levels (GDP) of 2-3% in 2010; an unemployment plateau in 2009 and 2010 around 10% with moderation in 2011; and inflation that remains at typical levels around 1-2%.[137][edit] Responses to financial crisis[edit] Emergency and short-term responsesMain article: Subprime mortgage crisis#ResponsesThe U.S. Federal Reserve and central banks around the world have taken steps to expand money supplies to avoid the risk of a deflationary spiral, in which lower wages and higher unemployment lead to aself-reinforcing decline in global consumption. In addition, governments have enacted large fiscal stimulus packages, by borrowing and spending to offset the reduction in private sector demand caused by the crisis. The U.S. executed two stimulus packages, totaling nearly $1 trillion during 2008 and 2009.[138] This credit freeze brought the global financial system to the brink of collapse. The response of the USA Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, and other central banks was immediate and dramatic. During the last quarter of 2008, these central banks purchased US$2.5 trillion of government debt and troubled private assets from banks. This was the largest liquidity injection into the credit market, and the largest monetary policy action, in world history. The governments of European nations and the USA also raised the capital of their national banking systems by $1.5 trillion, by purchasing newly issued preferred stock in their major banks.[99]Governments have also bailed-out a variety of firms as discussed above, incurring large financial obligations. To date, various U.S. government agencies have committed or spent trillions of dollars in loans, asset purchases, guarantees, and direct spending. For a summary of U.S. government financial commitments and investments related to the crisis, see CNN - Bailout Scorecard.。

1997年与2008年两次国际金融危机成因、特征和影响比较分析及对中国企业的影响摘要近几十年来，随着人类经济发展的速度加快，随之而来的问题也日益凸现，随着全球化的发展，金融危机也开始向全球蔓延.1997年爆发于泰国、后迅速扩散到整个东南业井波及世界的东南亚金融危机，使许多东南亚国家和地区的汇市、股市轮番暴跌，金融系统乃至整个社会经济受到严重创伤.2008年由美国华尔街引爆的世界金融危机有如巨风海啸，迅速波及全球。

不管是同属发达国家的欧洲联盟国家，还是经济尚未开放的非洲，以及是坐享石油美元的中东，或者说是新兴崛起的一系列国家，都在感受着这场金融巨风带来的狂扫与震撼。

从1997年泰铢引发的亚洲金融危机到2008 年美国次贷危机引发的全球金融危机的全面爆发，我国面临外部需求萎缩带来的经济下滑的风险。

本课题通过比较1997年与2008年国际金融危机成因、特征和影响，旨在透过近十几年来两次金融危机的表象，把握经济运行的规律。

通过分析比较这两次金融危机的成因，总结出其内在的相同点，再分析我国现阶段经济运行的形式，找出我国经济发展中存在的问题，提出相应的合理化的建议。

以及通过比较两次经济危机的特征和影响，总结出金融危机爆发后对中国企业的的影响，并提出合理化的防措施，有利于提早做准备，防患于未然。

In rece nt decades, with the developme nt of the econo mic , a series of questi ons is coming up .with the development of globalization, the financial crisis are spreadingacross the world .Southeast Asian financial crisis, which broke out in Thailand, quicklyspread throughout the en tire southeast of the world, made the stock market tumbli ng in many southeast Asian countries , , repeatedly trading financial system and even the entire social economy suffered serious wounds. the world financial crisis in 2008 det on ated by Wall Street like gia nt wind tsu nami, quickly spread arou nd the world. Whether the cou ntries of the Europea n Un io n, or Africa n ,in which economy have not been open, or the countries of Middle East, or rather, a series of new countries all felt this financial giant wind brings the crazy esau and shock.from world financial crisis caused by the Thai baht in 1997 to the subprime mortgage crisis triggered in Amercia in2008, Chi na faces the risk of econo mic dow ntur n atrophy due to the exter nal dema nd withered .This topic compared the causes , characteristics and in flue nce of the in ter nati onal financial crisis in 1997 and 2008,through the study on the appearance of the financial crisis past doze ns of years, grasp the econo mic operati on of the law. An alysize and comparied the causes of the financial crisis, the author sums up their inner similarities, then an alyzes the curre nt form of econo mic operati on of the econo mic developme nt of our cou ntry, find out the problems existed in the develop ing of our econo mic. propose corresp onding rati on alizati on suggesti on. And through compari ng the two econo miccrisis, summarized the characteristics and effects of the financial crisis after the outbreak of the in flue nce of Chin ese en terprises, and puts forward some precauti onary measures, which is helpful for the rati on alizati on of prepari ng early.正文」、两次金融危机演变过程比较分析（一）1997年亚洲金融危机的演变过程分析1997年6月，一场金融危机在亚洲爆发，这场危机的发展过程十分复杂。

亚洲金融风暴免费编辑添加义项名B添加义项?所属类别:其他经济相关亚洲金融危机指发生于1997年的一次世界性金融风波。

1997年7月2日，亚洲金融风暴席卷泰国。

不久，这场风暴波及马来西亚、新加坡、日本和韩国、中国等地。

泰国、印尼、韩国等国的货币大幅贬值，同时造成亚洲大部分主要股市的大幅下跌;冲击亚洲各国外贸企业，造成亚洲许多大型企业的倒闭，工人失业，社会经济萧条。

打破了亚洲经济急速发展的景象。

亚洲一些经济大国的经济开始萧条，一些国家的政局也开始混乱。

泰国，印尼和韩国是受此金融风暴波及最严重的国家。

新加坡，马来西亚，菲律宾和香港也被波及，中国大陆和台湾则几乎不受影响。

∙∙1997Asian financial crises∙∙1997年7月2日∙∙∙∙折叠编辑本段爆发原因亚洲国家的经济形态导致;美国经济利益和政策的影响;乔治·索罗斯的个人及一些支持他的资本主义集团的因素;亚洲国家的经济形态导致:新马泰日韩等国都为外向型经济的国家，他们对世界市场的依附很大。

亚洲经济的动摇难免会出现牵一发而动全身的状况。

以泰国为例，泰铢在国际市场上是否要买卖不由政府来主宰，而泰国本身并没有足够的外汇储备量，面对金融家的炒作，该国经济不堪一击。

而经济决定政治，所以，泰国政局也就动荡了。

国内学者的分析:直接触发因素、内在基础因素和世界经济因素。

折叠编辑本段发展阶段折叠第一阶段1997年7月2日，泰国宣布放弃固定汇率制，实行浮动汇率制，引发一场遍及东南亚的金融风暴。

当天，泰铢兑换美元的汇率下降了17%，外汇及其他金融市场一片混乱。

在泰铢波动的影响下，菲律宾比索、印度尼西亚盾、马来西亚林吉特相继成为国际炒家的攻击对象。

1997年8月，马来西亚放弃保卫林吉特的努力。

一向坚挺的新加坡元也受到冲击。

印尼虽是受"传染"最晚的国家，但受到的冲击最为严重。

1997年10月下旬，国际炒家移师国际金融中心香港，矛头直指香港联系汇率制。

关于1997年亚洲金融风暴的探析一、亚洲金融风暴概述1997年亚洲金融风暴是亚洲金融史上最严重的一次金融危机，它从发生到结束用时约为两年时间。

该危机开始于1997年7月泰国的货币和股票市场崩溃，随后蔓延到韩国、印尼、菲律宾等亚洲国家。

本场危机的影响远不止于亚洲地区，其对世界经济的冲击仍在影响着人们。

二、亚洲金融风暴的原因1997年亚洲金融风暴的根本原因是亚洲国家采取了宽松的货币政策和扩张性的信贷政策，导致泡沫和债务的快速增长。

同时，亚洲金融体系脆弱，国内金融监管不力，外资流入过度依赖短期外债、银行信用担保和外汇套利等方式，导致危机爆发。

三、危机对亚洲各国的影响亚洲金融风暴对亚洲各国经济的影响十分严重，2000年前后的亚洲，几乎所有的亚洲国家经济增长都出现了明显的下降趋势，且相应的失业率呈增长趋势。

其中又以泰国、印尼等国家受到影响最为严重。

四、国际金融机构对危机的反应在亚洲金融危机中，国际货币基金组织(IMF)和世界银行(WB)等国际金融机构通过向危机国家提供金融援助和技术协助等形式来缓解亚洲金融危机的影响。

但是这些救助行动对于危机的根本解决并没有太大的作用，还引发了亚洲的反弹。

从这场危机中我们可以看出，IMF等国际机构的应对危机措施还需要进一步完善。

五、亚洲金融风暴对国际金融市场的影响亚洲金融危机影响最大的除了亚洲各国之外，还有世界其他地区的金融市场。

危机的爆发导致亚洲股市、货币和债券市场惨遭抛售，国际投资者纷纷把资金转移到其他地区市场，这也使得许多国家的经济形势雪上加霜。

六、案例1：泰国1997年7月，泰铢的汇率开始暴跌，导致了国内的银行破产和意大利银行等外国机构的巨额损失，泰国经济陷入严重的经济危机。

政府随后采取了对泰铢贬值、禁止银行外汇交易等措施，但这只加剧了泰国的经济萎缩。

七、案例2：韩国韩国的崩溃是1997年末至1998年初，在韩美银行宣布破产后，韩元突然贬值。

韩国政府随后颁布了一系列措施，如向IMF组织申请救助、向银行注入资金等来缓解金融风险带来的影响。

金融危机对全球经济的影响中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)金融危机对全球商业的影响目前，新的经济只是在部分工业化经济高度发达的国家初露端倪，在全球范围还属于萌芽状态。

不过这种经济的发展肯定对于世界政治和经济将产生越来越大的影响。

日本经济审议会1999年向日本政府提出对未来十年日本新经济计划的建议时说：“当前，世界文明正在发生变化，这一变化不是一般的‘进步’与“高度化”，而是要创造新的历史发展阶段的变化。

一直支撑战后增长的现代工业社会的规范已跟不上人类文明的巨大潮流。

在今后存在多种智慧的社会中，必须通过不断创造出新的智慧来搞活经济与文化。

为此，就必须能够更加容易地吸收世界的信息和知识，还要有更加容易向世界传递信息的环境。

同时，还必须拥有能够培养富于个性和创造性的组织和人才的计划和社会气氛”。

如果把上面所说的世界经济的变化加以概括，似乎可以说，未来经济有两大趋势：一个是经济知识化，表现为知识和信息成为经济发展最活跃、最重要的因素；另一个是经济全球化，表现为商品、劳务、资本、技术和人才在全球流动的加速。

这两大趋势相互联系、互相影响。

也可以说，新的经济将是以知识与技术创新为基础，以全球为市场的时代。

它将促使各国的增长模式、产业构成、经济体制、社会结构、教育制度、文化取向等产生深刻的变化，也将对各国的对内、对外政策提出新课题。

三、经济全球化的大趋势及其两重性经济全球化的发端似可溯源到二次世界大战后期布雷顿森林体制的创建。

世界银行、国际货币基金组织和关贸总协定三大机构的建立与发展，给全球金融、贸易与投资活动以极大的推动。

美元与黄金挂钩使美元成为国际流通与储备的手段，首先便利了美国企业向全球的拓展。

不过，冷战时期两个世界市场的划分又使经济全球化受到一定限制。

冷战结束后，经济全球化得到进一步发展。

主要有两股力量推动：一股力量是信息技术革命和高新技术成长的大大促进了商品、劳务、资本、人才、技术的全球交流。

1997～1998年亚洲金融风暴，的前因后果金融风暴启示录对冲基金（ＨｅｄｇｅＦｕｎｄ）意为“风险对冲过的基金”，起源于上世纪５０年代初的美国，原指广泛利用金融衍生产品进行投资保值的一类基金，现今指利用各种金融衍生产品的杠杆效用，承担高风险、追求高收益的一种投资模式。

亚洲金融危机，又称亚洲金融风暴，是指１９９７年发源于泰国，之后进一步影响到临近亚洲国家，甚至全球货币、股票市场和其他资产价值的一场金融大危机。

其过程十分复杂，大致可分为三个阶段：第一阶段：１９９７年７月，以索罗斯为代表的国际金融投机者瞄准泰铢注入大量热钱，迫使泰国政府于７月２日宣布放弃实行了１４年的泰币与美元挂钩的一揽子汇率制，实行浮动汇率制。

亚洲金融危机正式爆发，并很快波及菲律宾、印尼、马来西亚等其它东南亚国家；１０月下旬，国际炒家移师香港，香港恒生指数自１９９６年以来首次跌破１００００点；１１月中旬，韩国爆发金融风暴，随之日本一系列银行和证券公司破产，东南亚金融风暴演变为亚洲金融危机。

第二阶段：１９９８年初，印尼金融风暴再起，由此陷入政治经济大危机。

受其影响，东南亚汇市再起波澜，新元、马币、泰铢、菲律宾比索等纷纷下跌，随之日元也大幅贬值，亚洲金融危机继续深化。

第三阶段：１９９８年８月初，国际炒家对香港发动新一轮进攻，香港特区政府予以回击，使其遭遇失利。

继而因俄罗斯国家政策的突变，在俄股市投下巨额资金的国际炒家再次大伤元气，并带动美欧国家股市、汇市的全面剧烈波动，由此亚洲金融危机具有了全球性的意义。

到１９９８年底，俄罗斯经济仍没有摆脱困境。

１９９９年，亚洲金融危机结束。

胡进、张才进：“全球金融动荡加剧的四大成因”, 《港澳经济》,1997年第3期。

而且过分集中于简单加工业。

结果在国际竞争日益加剧的冲击下，以劳动密集型产业为主体的东南亚国家出口扩张势头放缓，带动经济增长下降，从而导致经常项目赤字、外汇储备减少，进而对固定汇率产生压力，最终使金融风暴在区内广泛爆发。