DRRMS_X_FAT Report_EN_Domestic General_X_R1.00_(EN_TSDG9001.0086.0001)

中国金融监管体系英文报告以下是一份关于中国金融监管体系的英文报告：# China's Financial Regulatory SystemI. IntroductionChina's financial regulatory system plays a crucial role in ensuring the stability and security of the country's financial system. This report provides an overview of China's financial regulatory framework, its components, and the roles they play.II. Regulatory Bodies1. The People's Bank of China (PBOC): As the central bank, the PBOC formulates and implements monetary policy, regulates and supervises the financial market, and maintains financial stability.2. The China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC): Responsible for the regulation and supervision of the banking and insurance industries, including commercial banks, insurers, and other financial institutions.3. The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC): Oversees the securities market, including stock exchanges, securities firms, and fund management companies.III. Regulatory Objectives1. Financial Stability: Maintaining the stability of the financial system is a primary objective of financial regulation. This includes preventing systemic risks, safeguarding the integrity of financial institutions, and protecting consumers' rights and interests.2. Market Order: Regulators strive to maintain fair and transparent market conditions, preventing market manipulation, insider trading, and other fraudulent activities.3. Risk Prevention: Identifying, assessing, and mitigating various risks in the financial system, such as credit risks, liquidity risks, and market risks, is an important task of financial regulators.4. Consumer Protection: Protecting consumers' rights and interests is a key focus of financial regulation. This includes ensuring thetransparency of financial products and services, managing information disclosure, and handling complaints and disputes.IV. Challenges and Reforms1. Fintech Innovation: The rapid development of financial technology brings new challenges to the regulatory system. Regulators need to adapt to technological changes and ensure effective supervision in the digital finance era.2. Regulatory Coordination: Cooperation and information sharing among regulatory agencies are essential to ensure a comprehensive and consistent regulatory approach.3. International Alignment: As China's financial market becomes more integrated with the global economy, aligning domestic regulations with international standards becomes increasingly important.V. ConclusionChina's financial regulatory system is constantly evolving to adapt to the changing financial landscape. By maintaining financial stability,protecting consumers, and promoting market integrity, the regulatory framework helps to support China's economic growth and safeguard the interests of stakeholders in the financial system.。

主分量回归
主分量回归是将具有多重相关的变量集综合得出少数几个互不相关的主分量.两步:(1)找出自变量集的主分量,建立y与互不相关的前几个主分量的回归式.(2)将回归式还原为原自变量结果.详见,<<实用多元统计分析>>,方开泰;
主分量回归结果
Obs _MODEL_ _TYPE_ _DEPVAR_ _PCOMIT_ _RMSE_ Intercept x1 x2 x3 y 1 MODEL1 PARMS y 0.48887 -10.1280 -0.05140 0.58695 0.28685 –1 2 MODEL1 IPCVIF y 1 0.25083 1.00085 0.25038 –1 3 MODEL1 IPC y 1 0.55001 -9.1301 0.07278 0.60922 0.10626 –14 MODEL1 IPCVIF y 2 0.24956 0.00095 0.24971 -15 MODEL1 IPC y 2 1.05206 -7.7458 0.07381 0.08269 0.10735 -1
多重共线性检验方法（3）样本相关系数检验法
FG test results
fg=20.488013401 p=0.0001344625；拒绝零假设，认为存在多重共线性。具体那些变量之间存在多重共线性，除了上面提到的辅助回归的方法外，还有以下提到的条件数检验和方差膨胀因子法。
多重共线性检验方法：（4）特征值分析法所用的检验统计指标
补救措施
增加样本;岭回归或主分量回归;至少去掉一个具有多重共线性的变量;对具有多重共线性的变量进行变换.对所有变量做滞后差分变换(一般是一阶差分),问题是损失观测值,可能有自相关.采用人均形式的变量（例如在生产函数估计中）在缺乏有效信息时,对系数关系进行限制,变为有约束回归(Klein,Goldberger,1955),可以降低样本方差和估计系数的标准差,但不一定是无偏的(除非这种限制是正确的).对具有多重共线性的变量,设法找出其因果关系,并建立模型和原方程构成联立方程组.

Political Uncertainty and Corporate InvestmentCyclesBRANDON JULIO and YOUNGSUK YOOK∗November5,2010ABSTRACTWe document cycles in corporate investment corresponding with the timing of na-tional elections around the world.During election years,firms reduce investment ex-penditures by an average of4.8%relative to non-election years,controlling for growthopportunities and economic conditions.The magnitude of the investment cycles varieswith different country and election characteristics.We investigate several potential expla-nations andfind evidence supporting the hypothesis that political uncertainty leadsfirmsto reduce investment expenditures until the electoral uncertainty is resolved.Thesefind-ings suggest that political uncertainty is an important channel through which the politicalprocess affects real economic outcomes.∗Julio is at London Business School and Yook is at the Graduate School of Business at Sungkyunkwan Uni-versity.Patrick Bolton,Murillo Campello,Ethan Cohen-Cole,Alex Edmans,Zsuzsanna Fluck,Paolo Fulghieri, Dirk Hackbarth,Cam Harvey(Editor),Li Jin,Tae-Young Kim,Stewart Myers,Bang Nguyen-Dang,Meijun Qian,Philipp Schnabl,Vikrant Vig,Michael Weisbach,Toni Whited,two anonymous referees,and an asso-ciate editor provided useful comments as did seminar participants at the China Europe International Business School,Georgetown University,Hong Kong Baptist University,Hong Kong Polytechnic University,Korea Uni-versity,London School of Economics,Nanyang Technological University,Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration,Seoul National University,Sungkyunkwan University,University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,the2008Chinese International Conference in Finance,the2008AsianFA-NFA International Con-ference,the2009Paris Spring Corporate Finance Conference,the2009Singapore International Conference on Finance,the2009European Finance Association Conference,the2010American Finance Association Confer-ence,and the2010Finance Down Under Conference.“...how unrealistic any theory of investment opportunity is which leaves the polit-ical factor out of account”.Joseph A.Schumpeter(1939)The relationship between politics and economic outcomes has a long history in research and public debate.One important way in which politics is hypothesized to influence real decisions is through the channel of uncertainty and instability.In particular,the incentives and uncer-tainties associated with possible changes in government policy or national leadership have implications for the behavior of both politicians andfirms.The effects of policy uncertainty are especially relevant in light of the recentfinancial crisis and recession.There is a great deal of uncertainty as to how governments will shape policy to stimulate investment in the short run and formulate regulatory and economic policy in the long run.It has been argued that this uncertainty itself may be hindering a recovery by inducingfirms to delay investment until the uncertainty related to futurefinancial regulation and macroeconomic policy is resolved.1In this paper,we examine the effects of political uncertainty on the investment behavior of firms in the context of national elections.Elections in which the national leader is determined provide an interesting setting to study the effects of political uncertainty on investment for two important reasons.First,while standard models of policy typically assume a single welfare maximizing planner that makes policy choices over the entire life of the economy,the real world is characterized by leaders who face limited terms and may be replaced by other lead-ers with different policy preferences.Election outcomes are relevant to corporate decisions as they have implications for industry regulation,monetary and trade policy,taxation,and,in more extreme cases,the possible expropriation or nationalization of privatefirms.Second, investigating the impact of political uncertainty on investment is a challenging task due to the potential endogeneity between uncertainty and economic growth as the economic downturn itself has arguably generated a great deal of political uncertainty.Elections around the world provide a natural experimental framework for studying political influences in corporate in-vestment,allowing us to disentangle some of the endogeneity between economic growth and political uncertainty.If political uncertainty is higher when changes in national leadership are more probable,elections provide a recurring event that helps isolate the impact of policy uncertainty on investment from other confounding factors.The timing of elections is out of the control of any individualfirm and evenfixed in time by constitutional rules for a largeproportion of observations in our sample.In addition,elections around the world take place in different years over time,allowing us to net out any global trends in corporate investment. Using national elections in48countries between1980and2005,we examine changes in cor-porate investment as political uncertaintyfluctuates by comparing corporate behavior in the year leading up to the national election outcomes with that in non-election years.The intuition underlying the relationship between electoral uncertainty and investment is simple:if an election can potentially result in a bad outcome from afirm’s perspective,the option value of waiting to invest increases and thefirm may rationally delay investment until some or all of the policy uncertainty is resolved.The relationship between uncertainty and real investment has been modeled by Bernanke(1983)and Bloom,Bond and Van Reenen(2007), among others.In these models,firms become cautious and hold back on investment in the face of uncertainty.Others have modeled the effects of political uncertainty in a macroeco-nomic context.Rodrik(1991)and Pindyck and Solimano(1993)are prominent examples of this literature in which the uncertainty brought about by political factors leadsfirms to choose lower levels of investment expenditures.Chen and Funke(2003)model the private invest-ment decision in emerging markets in the face of policy uncertainty.More recently,Bloom, Flotoetto and Jaimovich(2009)model business cycles as a function of variation in levels of macroeconomic uncertainty.The idea that political instability can deter investment on the aggregate level is supported by empirical evidence.Barro(1991)and Alesina and Perotti(1996)find that measures of political instability and violence are correlated with cross-country differences in investment rates.Pindyck and Solimano(1993)and Mauro(1995)find evidence that political uncertainty and an index measuring bribery and corruption are negatively related to investment spending at the aggregate level.However,some difficulties arise in interpreting the aggregate evidence. First,it is not clear whether the various measures of political instability are exogenous to the economic conditions and the aggregate investment.Second,as discussed in Pindyck and Solimano(1993),the models of investment under uncertainty are less clear about how un-certainty affects long-run equilibrium investment rates,defined as the ratio of investment to capital stock,as uncertainty affects both the optimal capital stock and investment in the long run.The predictions of the models are less ambiguous when there are temporary shocks to the level of uncertainty as the uncertainty mainly works through investment rather than capitalstock in the short run.Indeed,Bernanke(1983)shows that events whose long-run implica-tions are uncertain can generate investment cycles by increasing the returns to waiting for new information,particularly when the source of uncertainty periodically renews itself over time.A temporary increase in uncertainty surrounding national elections creates incentives that may induce immediate declines in investment expenditures.Our empirical investigation provides results consistent with the political uncertainty hy-pothesis.We document novel and robust evidence that political uncertainty around national elections induces cycles in corporate investment.In the period leading up to the election,in-vestment expenditures decline by an average of4.8%,controlling for growth opportunities, cashflows,and economic conditions.To address the concern that the results may be driven by elections that are notfixed in time by constitution,we repeat the analysis by estimating our investment regressions only for countries withfixed election timing andfind similar re-sults.Additionally,we examine the determinants of early elections andfind a strong positive correlation between economic growth and the probability of holding an early election.To the extent that afirm’s investment expenditures are positively correlated with economic growth, this suggests that the inclusion of endogenously timed elections in the regressions has the net effect of reducing the dampening effect of electoral uncertainty on investment as the elections are generally called during periods of relatively high economic performance.Across countries,wefind that the temporary decline in investment expenditures is larger in countries with civil law origins,fewer checks and balances,less stable governments,and in countries with a higher ratio of central government spending to GDP.Within countries,the cycles are more pronounced forfirms in industries considered to be more sensitive to political outcomes.Elections in which the outcome is“close”as measured by voting results lead to deeper investment cycles than elections in which the victor wins by a large margin.We also find that investment rates drop more in election years in which the incumbent national leader is classified as“market-friendly”by the World Bank.We also show that the election-year drop in investment is followed by a small,temporary increase in investment in the year imme-diately following the election as the uncertainty over election outcomes subsides.However, the overall magnitude of the post-election increase in investment is smaller than that of the earlier decline.We also measure changes in cash holdings,finding temporary increases in cash balances in the year prior to the election in the amount of4.3%of the average cash toassets ratio,controlling forfirm and economic conditions.The increase in cash holdings is similar in magnitude to the election-year decline in investment,suggesting that the funds that would have been used as investment are temporarily held as cash until the election uncertainty is resolved.Political uncertainty is not the only mechanism whereby real outcomes can be affected around the timing of elections.There are two plausible alternative explanations in the lit-erature suggesting election-induced cycles in investment.Thefirst is the political business cycles hypothesis.Starting with Nordhaus’s(1975)model of political business cycles,there has been much debate over whether incumbents manipulatefiscal and monetary policy instru-ments to influence the level of economic activity prior to an election in order to maximize the probability of reelection.Thus,one alternative explanation for our results is that corporate investment is reacting to changing macroeconomic fundamentals.While the political business cycle hypothesis predicts that average economic activity should be higher just before the elec-tion,the actions used to stimulate the economy could have a crowding-out effect on private investment.The second alternative explanation is related to the value of political connections. Somefirms may have incentives to change their investment behavior to help ensure that their political connections remain in office through the election cycle.Bertrand,Kramarz,Schoar and Thesmar(2006)investigate the behavior of politically connectedfirms around municipal elections in France,andfind that thefirms managed by connected CEOs boost their invest-ment during election years,particularly in politically contested areas,likely in an attempt to help their connection get re-elected.We conduct formal tests of these alternative hypotheses andfind no evidence that they are operating in our sample offirms.We therefore view the political uncertainty hypothesis to be the explanation among existing theories that bestfits the patterns in the data.Thesefindings have two important contributions.First,we document a new stylized fact regarding corporate investment around the world.That is,there is a tendency forfirms to reduce investment in election years.These results demonstrate an important link between the political process and real outcomes.Second,the results suggest that political uncertainty mat-ters for afirm’s real investment and savings decisions.This provides an interesting illustration of the impact of uncertainty in general as an important determinant of investment dynamics.As far as we know,we are thefirst to examine the effects of national elections onfirm-level investment behavior around the world.The remainder of the paper proceeds in the following manner.Section II develops the empirical predictions and discusses the identification strategy.Section III summarizes the firm characteristics and the election data.Section IV presents our main empirical results related to corporate investment cycles around elections,including various subsample analyses, multiple robustness checks,and an examination of changes in corporate cash holdings around the election period.Section V concludes.I.Hypothesis Development and Empirical StrategyWhen a particular investment project is characterized by some degree of irreversibility and uncertainty over future cashflows or discount rates,the value of the investment project will be affected by the same factors that influence the pricing offinancial options,in particular,the volatility or uncertainty of the value of the underlying asset.The application of option pricing to capital budgeting has generated many empirical predictions and insights on how investment dynamics change in the face of uncertainty.Some classic examples include McDonald and Seigel(1986),who examine the valuation of operating options and the value of waiting to invest.They demonstrate that even moderate amounts of uncertainty can more than double the required rate of return for investment projects.Ingersoll and Ross(1992)model the timing decision in the face of interest rate uncertainty.They argue that,under the assumptions of irreversibility and uncertainty,the simple net present value(NPV)rule is not optimal from a value-maximizing perspective.Uncertainty increases the value of waiting to invest through what Bernanke(1983)termed the“bad news”principle.That is,an increase in uncertainty causes reductions in current investment only if there is some probability of a bad outcome.In the context of national elec-tions,this suggests thatfirms will delay investment in anticipation of possible negative changes in the country’s macroeconomic policy,taxation,monetary policy,or the general regulatory environment.However,in some cases,the outcome of an election could be construed as good news,regardless of who wins in the end.For example,if the current government is corruptor incompetent,firms could view a likely change in power as good news and hence may not reduce investment prior to the realization of the election outcome since any different outcome may be better than the current state of affairs.The bad news principle is more subtle in this case.For example,suppose afirm is choosing among several mutually exclusive investment projects,each with a positive expected return.Also suppose that the outcome of an upcoming election will increase the expected return of each of the investment projects,regardless of the outcome.Thefirm still has an incentive to delay investment if the outcome would reorder the rankings of the individual projects in terms of expected returns.Thus,the bad news principle does not require the possibility of extreme policies such as nationalization of private assets to induce changes in investment.Even positive changes in policy may induce an incentive forfirms to wait to invest as the outcome will still have implications for howfirms allocate investment spending across various investment opportunities.If political uncertainty matters forfirms,then the recurring nature of the political uncer-tainty around elections can generate cycles in investment spending.This is an application of Bernanke’s bad news principal that the possibility of a bad election outcome induces afirm to hold off on its investment projects.This leads to our primary hypothesis that investment expenditures are expected to decline in the year leading up to the election.That is,we expect the average effect of electoral uncertainty to be a temporary decline in the conditional mean investment rate for allfirms in the sample.The bad news principle also suggests that the value of waiting to invest will vary fromfirm tofirm and across countries.Within countries,the magnitude of the investment cycle may vary across elections,depending on the the degree of uncertainty regarding election outcomes.The spread between potential outcomes as well as the likelihood of each outcome will generate heterogeneity in the size of observed investment cycles.Across countries,we hypothesize that investment cycles will be more pronounced in countries with a higher probability of policy changes or a larger variation in possible policy outcomes after the election.Since we are investigating national elections,we expect the effect of elections to be larger for countries with more centralized governments.Political institutions may matter as well.Countries in which political decisions are more constrained by various checks and balances are less likely to experience large policy swings following a change of power.For example,presidential systems are typically considered to have greater checks and balances but lessflexibility inpolicy making relative to parliamentary systems,suggesting that perhaps large policy swings are more common in parliamentary systems.2We also expect that countries with less stable governments in general will experience larger changes in investment around elections.Within countries,we hypothesize that the drop in investment expenditures will be larger when the election outcome is more uncertain.In particular,we expect that cycles will be more pronounced for elections with close outcomes relative to those with large margins of victory. The amount of uncertainty regarding the impending election outcome is unobservable,but we do observe the election results and vote counts for each ing the size of the margin of victory as a proxy for the degree of outcome uncertainty in any given election, we examine whether investment cycles vary with the degree of uncertainty across elections within countries.We also investigate the political platform of the incumbent leader during the election year.The political platform of an incumbent with respect to economic policy may have asymmetric implications on investment cycles.Firms are likely to view a possible shift in leadership from a market-friendly leader to a socialist leader as worse news than a possible shift in the other direction.Our empirical strategy employs the timing of national elections around the world to test the political uncertainty hypothesis.It is important to note that the timing of elections is not a direct measure of political uncertainty.Hence,an important identification assumption is that political uncertainty is indeed higher on average in the period leading up to an election compared to other time periods.There is evidence fromfinancial markets that the uncertainty related to elections and political changes are reflected in asset prices.Bialkowski,Gottschalk and Wisniewski(2008)and Boutchkova,Doshi,Durnev and Molchanov(2010)examine the stock market volatility around national elections andfind that volatility is significantly higher than normal during the election period.Boutchkova et al.(2010)find that the return volatility is higher around elections forfirms operating in politically sensitive industries,suggesting that the increased volatility reflects a higher political risk.Bernhard and Leblang(2006)document changes in bond yields,exchange rates,and equity volatility around elections and other po-litical changes and show that these changes are larger during elections with less predictable outcomes.This evidence provides support for our identification assumption that political un-certainty is higher than normal during elections.Our empirical analysis produces two broad sets of results.In ourfirst set of results,we employ the variation across elections,countries,andfirms to help us identify the uncertainty channel to explain the reduction in corporate investment.Our basic approach in thisfirst step is to examine variation in corporate investment around the timing of national elections and to demonstrate that these changes are larger for events in which the uncertainty related to election outcomes is higher.We recognize that other mechanisms may be at play during election periods that can lead to changes in investment behavior.Therefore,our second set of results attempts to distinguish the political uncertainty channel from other existing hypotheses, namely the political business cycle hypothesis and the possible effects of political connections.II.Data DescriptionA.Election DataThis study considers248national elections in48countries held between1980and2005in which the outcome determined the national leader directly or indirectly.The detailed election information is obtained from a variety of sources.The primary source for election and regime change data is the Polity IV database maintained by the Center for International Develop-ment and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland.This database contains annual information on the regime and authority characteristics of all independent states with total populations greater than500,000.The second major source of information is the World Bank Database of Political Institutions.This source provides information about electoral rules and the classification of political platforms for the elected leaders and candidates.We supplement the election data with various internet sources3for cases in which the election information is missing from the Polity IV database or the Database of Political Institutions.Thefirst task for the election data collection is to identity the chief executive of each coun-try and the national elections associated with the selection of the chief executive.In a country with a presidential system,the supreme executive power is normally vested in the office of the president.Thus,presidential elections are naturally considered in our analysis for coun-tries with presidential systems.In a parliamentary system,the executive power is normallyvested in a cabinet responsible to parliament.In such a country,the prime minister or pre-mier,being the head of the cabinet and leader of the parliament,functions as the actual chief executive of the nation.Thus,legislative elections are utilized for countries with parliamen-tary systems as the outcome of such legislative election has the foremost influence over the appointment of prime minister.4Some countries use a hybrid system combining elements of both parliamentary and presidential democracy;a president and a prime minister coexist with both presidential and legislative elections held nationally.In such cases,the constitutional framework and practice is examined in greater detail to understand how executive power is divided between the two leaders,and the election associated with the leader who exerts more power over executive decisions is selected for the study5.As a robustness check,we repeat our analysis excluding the four countries for which the classification requires some discretion (Finland,France,Pakistan and Poland)andfind that the results are unchanged.The resulting data set comprises31countries with legislative elections,16countries with presidential elections,and one country(Israel)with prime ministerial elections.6Table I presents the classification of political systems and the number of elections utilized for each of the48countries in our sample.The table also shows the origin of each country’s legal system,as reported by La Porta,Lopez-de-Silanes,Shleifer,and Vishny(1998).[TABLE I HERE]Another important characteristic of national elections is whether the timing of the elec-tions is exogenously specified by electoral ernments under some electoral systems can be dissolved before the expiry of its full term for various reasons,and an election is then normally called to form a new government.This complicates the interpretation of our empirical results as the timing of elections may be endogenously connected to the country’s economic performance over time.Ito(1990),for example,documents that Japanese general elections have coincided with the periods of economic expansion,suggesting that the govern-ment opportunistically selected the timing of elections.To deal with the possible endogeneity of election timing,we classify countries as having either exogenous timing or endogenous timing.All countries with a record of early elections are classified as having endogenous tim-ing.All presidential elections,with the exception of Sri Lanka,are held on a regular basis and are classified as having exogenous timing.This leaves unclassified seven countries withparliamentary systems and one country with hybrid system.In order to classify those remain-ing countries,we refer to electoral laws and practices as well as the classification provided by Alesina,Cohen and Roubini(1992)7.Accordingly,three of the remaining countries,Czech Republic,Finland,and New Zealand,are classified as having endogenous timing8and the rest are classified as having exogenous timing.Table I reports the election timing classification for every country in our sample.Panel A of Table II summarizes the election data.Elections are held every3.8years on average and the average nominal term of a chief executive is4.4years.The next row reports the political platform of incumbent governments in the election years.The classification is based on the World Bank Database of Political Institutions,which refers to various sources including Political Handbook yearbooks in order to identify party orientation with respect to economic policy.9The World Bank classifies a government as being right-leaning if the political party is defined as conservative,Christian democratic,or right-wing by these sources. Left-leaning parties are those that are defined as communist,socialist,social democratic,or left-wing.Centrist parties are those that advocate strengthening private enterprise in a social-liberal context.We define the the incumbent political party as being”market-friendly”if the incumbent government in the election year is classified as right-leaning or centrist by the World Bank.Accordingly,63.3%of the incumbent administrations in the year leading up to an election are classified as market-friendly,and the remaining36.7%are classified as left-leaning.We also summarize the distribution of historical vote counts to give a sense for the degree of uncertainty surrounding a given election.On average,the winner of an election obtains41.9%of the total vote,followed by the runner-up at28.7%,and the third-place candidate receives12.2%of the total.The table also shows that45.6%of the elections are classified as having exogenous timing.Table II also shows that54%of the elections lead to the replacement of the national leader and43%of the elections result in change in the ruling party.[TABLE II HERE]B.Country-Level DataWe obtain institutional and macroeconomic data from various sources.The World Devel-opment Indicators from the World Bank is our primary source for the macroeconomic vari-ables including real GDP,central government spending,inflation,and real interest rate.We obtain data on the money supply(M1)from Political Risk Service’s International Country Risk Guide(ICRG).ICRG also reports the government stability ratings on a monthly basis for the countries in our sample.The government stability index assigns numbers between0and 12,where higher values indicate more stable governments.This time-varying index assesses the government’s ability to carry out its declared programs,and its ability to stay in office.The Database of Political Institutions provides a measure of the effectiveness of checks and balances in each political system on an annual basis10.The basic idea is to capture the number of decision makers whose agreement is necessary for the approval of policy changes. The measure is a count of the number of veto players in the political system at a given point in time based on the prevailing electoral rules and laws.It also takes into account whether the executive and legislative branches of government are controlled by the same party,which effectively reduces the checks and balances relative to having different parties controlling different branches of government.In presidential systems,the count is increased by one for the president and increased by one for each additional legislative body.For parliamentary systems,the count is increased by one for the prime minister and increased by the number of parties included in the governing coalition.The number is reduced if the party of the executive is the same as the largest party in any particular chamber of government.Table II shows that the average of checks in the sample is3.95with the standard deviation of1.95.The index of central bank independence(CBI)measures the extent to which the central bank is independent from the political power.This annual,time-varying index is taken from Cukierman,Webb,and Neypati(1992)for the period between1980and1989,and from Polillo and Guillen(2005)for the period between1990and2000.Initially,Cukierman,Webb,and Neypati(1992)constructed the index for72industrial and developing countries for the period between1950and1989.11Later,Polillo and Guillen extended the index to the period between 1990and2000according to the definition of Cukierman,Webb,and Neypati(1992).The index is a continuous score ranging between zero and one,where one indicates maximum。

【安全生产管理】中国进出口动物源性食品安全管理体系介绍xxxx年xx月xx日xxxxxxxx集团企业有限公司Please enter your company's name and contentv中国进出口动物源性食品安全管理体系介绍Introduction of Official Safety Control on Chinese Products ofAnimal Origin for Export & Import一、进出口食品安全法律、法规和标准体系Laws, Regulations and Standards on Import and Export Food Safety（一）法律Laws1、《中华人民共和国进出口商品检验法》Law of the People’s Republic of China on Import and Export Commodity Inspection2、《中华人民共和国进出境动植物检疫法》Law of the People's Republic of China on the Entry and Exit Animal and Plant Quarantine3、《中华人民共和国动物防疫法》Law of the People's Republic of China on Animal Disease Prevention4、《中华人民共和国食品卫生法》Food Hygiene Law of the People's Republic of China5、《中华人民共和国产品质量法》Product Quality Law of the People's Republic of China（二）法规Regulations中国最大的资料库下载1、《中华人民共和国进出境动植物检疫法实施条例》Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Entry and Exit Animal and Plant Quarantine2、《中华人民共和国进出口商品检验法实施条例》Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Import and Export Commodity Inspection3、《中华人民共和国兽药管理条例》Administrative Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Veterinary Medicine4、《中华人民共和国饲料管理条例》Administrative Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Feeding Fodder5、《中华人民共和国农药管理条例》Administrative Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Pesticides6、《中华人民共和国种畜禽管理条例》Administrative Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Breeding Stock and Poultry（三）部门规章Regulations of Ministry1、动物卫生控制Animal Disease Control（1）《供港澳活禽检验检疫管理办法》（国家质检总局第26号局令）（2）《动物疫情方案管理办法》（1999年10月20日农业部发布）（3）《国家动物疫情测报体系管理规范（试行）》（4）《国家高致病性禽流感防治应急预案》（5）《关于印发《高致病性禽流感防治技术规范》等7个重大动物疫病防治技术规范的通知》(1) Control Measures for report on animal epidemic situation (issued by Ministryof Agriculture on Oct 20th, 1999)(2) Control Measures for Inspection and Quarantine of Live Birds Supplied toHong Kong and Macao (Order of AQSIQ No.26)(3) Specifications on State Animal Epidemic Situation of report and Forecast(4) State Emergency Provision On Prevention and Cure of HPAI(5) Notification regarding of issuing 7 important epizootic control technicalprotocols including Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Control Technical Protocol ( MOA [2002] No. 74)2、进出口肉类、水产品及蜂蜜生产加工卫生安全控制Hygiene and Safety control on Processing of Meat, Aquatic product and honey for export and import（1）《进出境肉类产品检验检疫管理办法》（国家质检总局2002年第26号令）（2）《出口肉禽饲养用药管理办法》（3）《出口禽肉及其制品检验检疫要求》（4）《进出境水产品检验检疫管理办法》(国家质检总局2002年31号令)（5）《出口蜂蜜检验检疫管理办法》（国家质检总局第20号局令）（6）关于印发《出口鳗鱼产品检验检疫和监管要求（试行）》的通知(1) Control Measures for Inspection and Quarantine of Meat for entry-exit (AQSIQAnnouncement No. 26, 2002)(2) Regulation on Drug Usage Control for Export Chicken(3) Inspection and Quarantine requirements for Export Chicken and ChickenProducts(4) Inspection and Quarantine Administrative Measures for Entry and Exit AquaticProducts (AQSIQ Announcement No. 31, 2002)(5) Inspection and Quarantine Administrative Measures on honey and honeyProducts for export (CIQ Announcement No. 20)3、出口食品企业注册管理Administration on Registration of Food Establishments for Export（1）《出口食品卫生注册登记管理规定》（国家质检总局2002年第20号令）（2）《出口食品生产企业危害分析和关键控制点（HACCP）管理体系认证管理规定》（2002年认监委第3号公告）（3）《出口食品生产企业申请国外卫生注册管理办法》（认监委2002第15号公告）（4）《出口鳗鱼养殖场登记管理办法》(1) Administrative Regulation of Sanitary Registration for Food processingEstablishment for Export (AQSIQ Announcement No. 20)(2) Regulation on Administration of HACCP Management System Certification (CNCAAnnouncement No.3 2002)(3) Regulation for Administration of Domestic Manufacturers Regarding FoodExport Registration in Foreign Countries (CNCA Announcement No.15,2002)(4) Administrative Measures of registration on farm of eels for export4、残留监控Residue Monitoring（1）《兽药管理条例实施细则》（2）《农药管理条例实施办法》（农业部令20号）（3）《水产品药物残留专项整治计划》（4）《残留分析质量控制指南》（5）《关于发布《动物性食品中兽药最高残留限量》的通知》(1) Administrative Regulations on detailed rules for implementation of Veterinarydrugs(2) Administrative Regulations for implementation of Pesticide (MOA ORDER No.20)(2) Special Renovation Plan on Drug residues of aquatic products(3) Quality Control Guideline for Analysis of Residues(4) Notice on MRLs of veterinary drugs in the foods of animal5、病原微生物控制Pathogen Control（1）《关于执行<鲜、冻禽产品>国家标准的通知》（2）《关于进一步加强对境肉鸡产品检验检疫管理的通知》（3）《关于进一步加强禽流感防疫检疫工作的紧急通知》（4）《关于进一步加强进境肉类检验检疫工作的通知》（5）《进出境肉类产品检验检疫管理办法》(1) Circular Letter on the Implementation of National Standards of Fresh, Frozen Poultry Products(2) Circular Letter on Further Strengthening Quality Controls of Exported Chicken Products(3) Emergency Circular on Further Strengthening AI Prevention and Identification(4) Circular Letter on Further Strengthening Quality Controls of the Import of Meat Products(5) Management of Quality Inspection, Supervision and Quarantine of the Import and Export of Meat Products6、出口食品加工储运卫生控制Sanitary Control in Processing and Storage of Foods for Export（1）《出口食品生产企业卫生注册登记管理规定》（2）《肉类屠宰加工企业卫生注册规范》等规范（4）《食品生产加工企业质量安全监督管理办法》第52号局令(1) Administrative Regulation of Sanitary Registration for Food processing Establishment for Export(2) Sanitation Criteria for Slaughtering and Processing Enterprises of meat Products, and ect.(3) Administrative measure of supervision on quality and safety of food Processing Enterprises（四）技术标准1、国际标准( International Standards)（1）《动物卫生法典(OIE)》（2）《哺乳动物、禽、蜜蜂A和B类疾病诊断试验和疫苗标准手册》（3）《国际水生动物法典(OIE)》（4）《国际水生动物疾病诊断手册》（5）《国际植物保护组织（IPPC）有关标准》（6）《食品法典委员会（CAC）有关标准》(1) Terrestrial Animal Health Code(2) Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals(3) Aquatic Animal Health Code(4) Manual of Diagnostic Tests for Aquatic Animals(5) International Standards for Phytosanitary Measures(6) Relative standards of Codex Alimentarius Commission2、国内标准（部分GB和SN标准）Domestic standards (Some GB and SN)（1）GB 2707-1994 猪肉卫生标准（2）GB 2710-1996 鲜(冻)禽肉卫生标准（3）SN/T 0418—95 出口冻家兔肉检验规程（4）SN/T 0419—95 出口冻肉用鸡检验规程（5）SN/T 0384—95 出口冻对虾检验(1) GB 2707-1994 Hygiene standard for pork(2) GB 2710-1996 Hygienic standard for fresh (frozen) poultry(3) SN/T 0418—95 Rule for inspection of frozen rabbit meat for export(4) SN/T 0419—95 Rule for inspection of frozen chicken for export(5) SN/T 0384—95 Rule of the inspection of frozen prawn for export二、组织管理体系（Management System）（一）组织机构Organization根据我国有关法律法规和十届全国人大一次会议批准通过的新一届政府机构，我国涉及动物健康和保护、植物保护以及食品安全的官方机构主要有三个,即国家质量监督检验检疫总局、农业部和卫生部。