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外文文献翻译模板广东工业大学华立学院本科毕业设计(论文)外文参考文献译文及原文系部管理学部专业人力资源管理年级 2008级班级名称 08人力资源管理1班学号 150********学生姓名王凯琪指导教师2012年 5 月目录1 外文文献译文 (1)2 外文文献原文 (9)德国企业中老化的劳动力和人力资源管理的挑战本文的主要目的就是提供一个强加于德国公司的人力资源管理政策上的人口变化主要挑战的概况。
尽管更多方面的业务受到人口改变的影响,例如消费的改变或储蓄和投资,还有资金的花费,我们把注意力集中劳动力老龄化促使人事政策的变化上。
涉及广泛的人力资源管理政策,以有关进行创新和技术变化的招募问题为开端。
1 老化的劳动力及人力资源管理由于人口的变化,公司劳动力的平均年龄在未来将会更年长。
因此,劳动力高于50的年龄结构占主导地位的集团不再是一个例外,并将成为一个制度。
在此背景下,年长的工人的实际份额,以及最优份额,部分是由企业特征的差异加上外在因素决定的。
2 一般的挑战尽管增加公众对未来人口转型带来的各种挑战的意识,公司对于由一个老化劳动力引起的问题的意识仍然是相当低的。
事实上,只有25%的公司预计人口统计的变化在长远发展看来将会导致严重的问题。
然而,现在越来越多关于老化劳动力呈现的挑战和潜在的解决方案的文献。
布施提出了一种分析老员工一般能力的研究文集,并给出有关于年长工人的人力资源政策的实例。
目前,华希特和萨里提出一篇关于研究公司对于提前退休的态度和延长工作生涯的态度的论文。
在这些研究中,老员工的能力通常被认为是不同的,并不逊色,同时指出一个最优的劳动力取决于不同的公司的特殊要求。
一般来说,然而由于越来越缺少合格的员工,人口统计的变化将使得在各种人事政策方面上的压力逐渐增加。
特别是,没有内部人力资源部门的中小型企业,因此缺乏足够的特殊的基础设施,则面临着严峻的挑战。
与他们正常的大约两到五年的计划水平相反,他们将越来越多地要处理长期的个人问题和计划。
广东工业大学华立学院本科毕业设计(论文)外文参考文献译文及原文系部城建学部专业土木工程年级 2011级班级名称 11土木工程9班学号 23031109000学生姓名刘林指导教师卢集富2015 年5 月目录一、项目成本管理与控制 0二、Project Budget Monitor and Control (1)三、施工阶段承包商在控制施工成本方面所扮演的作用 (2)四、The Contractor’s Role in Building Cost Reduction After Design (4)一、外文文献译文(1)项目成本管理与控制随着市场竞争的激烈性越来越大,在每一个项目中,进行成本控制越发重要。
本文论述了在施工阶段,项目经理如何成功地控制项目预算成本。
本文讨论了很多方法。
它表明,要取得成功,项目经理必须关注这些成功的方法.1。
简介调查显示,大多数项目会碰到超出预算的问……功控制预算成本.2.项目控制和监测的概念和目的Erel and Raz (2000)指出项目控制周期包括测量成……原因以及决定纠偏措施并采取行动。
监控的目的就是纠偏措施的。
.。
标范围内。
3.建立一个有效的控制体系为了实现预算成本的目标,项目管理者需要建立一……被监测和控制是非常有帮助的。
项目成功与良好的沟通密。
决( Diallo and Thuillier, 2005).4.成本费用的检测和控制4.1对检测的优先顺序进行排序在施工阶段,很多施工活动是基于原来的计……用完了。
第四,项目管理者应该检测高风险活动,高风险活动最有。
..重要(Cotterell and Hughes, 1995)。
4.2成本控制的方法一个项目的主要费用包括员工成本、材料成本以及工期延误的成本。
为了控制这些成本费用,项目管理者首先应该建立一个成本控制系统:a)为财务数据的管理和分析工作落实责任人员b)确保按照项目的结构来合理分配所有的……它的变化-—在成本控制线上准确地记录所有恰..。
Sensing Human Activity:GPS Tracking感应人类活动:GPS跟踪Stefan van der Spek1,*,Jeroen van Schaick1,Peter de Bois1,2and Remco de Haan1Abstract:The enhancement of GPS technology enables the use of GPS devices not only as navigation and orientation tools,but also as instruments used to capture travelled routes:assensors that measure activity on a city scale or the regional scale.TU Delft developed aprocess and database architecture for collecting data on pedestrian movement in threeEuropean city centres,Norwich,Rouen and Koblenz,and in another experiment forcollecting activity data of13families in Almere(The Netherlands)for one week.Thequestion posed in this paper is:what is the value of GPS as‘sensor technology’measuringactivities of people?The conclusion is that GPS offers a widely useable instrument tocollect invaluable spatial-temporal data on different scales and in different settings addingnew layers of knowledge to urban studies,but the use of GPS-technology and deploymentof GPS-devices still offers significant challenges for future research.摘要:增强GPS技术支持使用GPS设备不仅作为导航和定位工具,但也为仪器用来捕捉旅行路线:作为传感器,测量活动在一个城市或区域范围内规模。
英文翻译分院宋体四号字专业宋体四号字届别宋体四号字学号宋体四号字姓名宋体四号字指导教师宋体四号字200X年X月X日<文献翻译一:原文>××××××1××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××备注:英文文献翻译原文必须注明出处11.著作:作者姓名.书名[M].xx:出版社,xxxx,xx.2.论文:作者姓名.论文题目[D].杂志名称,xxxx():xx.以英文大写字母方式标识各种参考文献,专著[M]、论文集[C]、报纸文章[N]、期刊文章[J]、学位论文[D]、报告[R]。
宁波大学科学技术学院本科毕业设计(论文)系列表格<文献翻译一:译文>宁波大学本科毕业设计(论文)系列表格<文献翻译二:原文>××××××2××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××备注:英文文献翻译原文必须注明出处21.著作:作者姓名.书名[M].xx:出版社,xxxx,xx.2.论文:作者姓名.论文题目[D].杂志名称,xxxx():xx.以英文大写字母方式标识各种参考文献,专著[M]、论文集[C]、报纸文章[N]、期刊文章[J]、学位论文[D]、报告[R]。
要求:1、外文资料翻译内容要求:外文资料的内容应为本学科研究领域,并与毕业设计(论文)选题相关的技术资料或专业文献,译文字数应不少于3000汉字以上,同时应在译文末注明原文的出处。
不可采用网络中直接有外文和原文的。
2、外文资料翻译格式要求:译文题目采用小二号黑体,居中;译文正文采用宋体小四号,段前、段后距为0行;行距:固定值20磅。
英文原文如果为打印的话用新罗马(Times New Roman)小四号字。
装订时原文在前,译文在后。
文章中有引用的地方在原文中也要体现。
参考文献也要翻译成中文!用于无线传感器网络数据估算的节能协调算法摘要:无线传感器网络的各节点是用电池供电的,网络的生存期取决于各节点的能耗大小。
考虑到这类传感器网络在不同地方,节点都是检测单一现象并发送信息到汇聚中心(Fusion Center, FC为其缩写形式),以便汇聚中心能够处理实时信息。
在传统的系统中,数据处理任务是由汇聚中心来完成的,在传输之前是没有进行加工处理的。
在综合各种适值计算方法基础上,把网络分成了多个簇,数据分两个部分进行处理。
第一个部分是在各个簇的各个传感器节点上完成本地数据共享。
第二部分将在汇聚中心从各簇节点接收到所有的信息后完成。
本地数据共享将会使比特数据传输方面更高效。
在每个簇的所有节点上,我们可以采用相同的数据备份和一个虚拟的多输入-多输出(V-MIMO)架构,在簇到汇聚(FC)中心之间进行数据传输。
一个虚拟V-MIMO网络是由一组的分布式节点组成,每个节点都有自己的天线。
通过他们之间的数据共享,这些节点将变成传统的MIMO 系统。
在协同/虚拟的MIMO架构提出之前,协同阶段是没有进行任何数据处理或压缩的。
我们改变现有的V-MIMO网络算法来适应我们所关心的特殊类别的传感器网络。
我们用正交的时空分组码(STBC)作为MIMO部分。
通过仿真表明,这种算法相比于传统系统更加节能。
I.简介一个典型的无线传感器网络是由一组小型的、低价的和只有有限能源的传感器节点组成。
外文翻译原文:Progress in ComputersThe first stored program computers began to work around 1950. The one we built in Cambridge, the EDSAC was first used in the summer of 1949.These early experimental computers were built by people like myself with varying backgrounds. We all had extensive experience in electronic engineering and were confident that that experience would stand us in good stead. This proved true, although we had some new things to learn. The most important of these was that transients must be treated correctly; what would cause a harmless flash on the screen of a television set could lead to a serious error in a computer.As far as computing circuits were concerned, we found ourselves with an embarass de richess. For example, we could use vacuum tube diodes for gates as we did in the EDSAC or pentodes with control signals on both grids, a system widely used elsewhere. This sort of choice persisted and the term families of logic came into use. Those who have worked in the computer field will remember TTL, ECL and CMOS. Of these, CMOS has now become dominant.In those early years, the IEE was still dominated by power engineering and we had to fight a number of major battles in order to get radio engineering along with the rapidly developing subject of electronics.dubbed in the IEE light current electrical engineering.properly recognised as an activity in its own right. I remember that we had some difficulty in organising a conference because the power engineers’ ways of doing things were not our ways. A minor source of irritation was that all IEE published papers were expected to start with a lengthy statement of earlier practice, something difficult to do when there was no earlier practice Consolidation in the 1960sBy the late 50s or early 1960s, the heroic pioneering stage was over and the computer field was starting up in real earnest. The number of computers in the worldhad increased and they were much more reliable than the very early ones . To those years we can ascribe the first steps in high level languages and the first operating systems. Experimental time-sharing was beginning, and ultimately computer graphics was to come along.Above all, transistors began to replace vacuum tubes. This change presented a formidable challenge to the engineers of the day. They had to forget what they knew about circuits and start again. It can only be said that they measured up superbly well to the challenge and that the change could not have gone more smoothly.Soon it was found possible to put more than one transistor on the same bit of silicon, and this was the beginning of integrated circuits. As time went on, a sufficient level of integration was reached for one chip to accommodate enough transistors for a small number of gates or flip flops. This led to a range of chips known as the 7400 series. The gates and flip flops were independent of one another and each had its own pins. They could be connected by off-chip wiring to make a computer or anything else.These chips made a new kind of computer possible. It was called a minicomputer. It was something less that a mainframe, but still very powerful, and much more affordable. Instead of having one expensive mainframe for the whole organisation, a business or a university was able to have a minicomputer for each major department.Before long minicomputers began to spread and become more powerful. The world was hungry for computing power and it had been very frustrating for industry not to be able to supply it on the scale required and at a reasonable cost. Minicomputers transformed the situation.The fall in the cost of computing did not start with the minicomputer; it had always been that way. This was what I meant when I referred in my abstract to inflation in the computer industry ‘going the other way’. As time goes on people get more for their money, not less.Research in Computer Hardware.The time that I am describing was a wonderful one for research in computer hardware. The user of the 7400 series could work at the gate and flip-flop level and yet the overall level of integration was sufficient to give a degree of reliability far above that of discreet transistors. The researcher, in a university or elsewhere, could build any digital device that a fertile imagination could conjure up. In the Computer Laboratory we built the Cambridge CAP, a full-scale minicomputerwith fancy capability logic.The 7400 series was still going strong in the mid 1970s and was used for the Cambridge Ring, a pioneering wide-band local area network. Publication of the design study for the Ring came just before the announcement of the Ethernet. Until these two systems appeared, users had mostly been content with teletype-based local area networks.Rings need high reliability because, as the pulses go repeatedly round the ring, they must be continually amplified and regenerated. It was the high reliability provided by the 7400 series of chips that gave us the courage needed to embark on the project for the Cambridge Ring.The RISC Movement and Its AftermathEarly computers had simple instruction sets. As time went on designers of commercially available machines added additional features which they thought would improve performance. Few comparative measurements were done and on the whole the choice of features depended upo n the designer’s intuition.In 1980, the RISC movement that was to change all this broke on the world. The movement opened with a paper by Patterson and Ditzel entitled The Case for the Reduced Instructions Set Computer.Apart from leading to a striking acronym, this title conveys little of the insights into instruction set design which went with the RISC movement, in particular the way it facilitated pipelining, a system whereby several instructions may be in different stages of execution within the processor at the same time. Pipelining was not new, but it was new for small computersThe RISC movement benefited greatly from methods which had recently become available for estimating the performance to be expected from a computer design without actually implementing it. I refer to the use of a powerful existing computer to simulate the new design. By the use of simulation, RISC advocates were able to predict with some confidence that a good RISC design would be able to out-perform the best conventional computers using the same circuit technology. This prediction was ultimately born out in practice.Simulation made rapid progress and soon came into universal use by computer designers. In consequence, computer design has become more of a science and less of an art. Today, designers expect to have a roomful of, computers available to do their simulations, not just one. They refer to such a roomful by the attractive nameof computer farm.The x86 Instruction SetLittle is now heard of pre-RISC instruction sets with one major exception, namely that of the Intel 8086 and its progeny, collectively referred to as x86. This has become the dominant instruction set and the RISC instruction sets that originally had a considerable measure of success are having to put up a hard fight for survival.This dominance of x86 disappoints people like myself who come from the research wings.both academic and industrial.of the computer field. No doubt, business considerations have a lot to do with the survival of x86, but there are other reasons as well. However much we research oriented people would like to think otherwise. high level languages have not yet eliminated the use of machine code altogether. We need to keep reminding ourselves that there is much to be said for strict binary compatibility with previous usage when that can be attained. Nevertheless, things might have been different if Intel’s major attempt to produce a good RISC chip had been more successful. I am referring to the i860 (not the i960, which was something different). In many ways the i860 was an excellent chip, but its software interface did not fit it to be used in a workstation.There is an interesting sting in the tail of this apparently easy triumph of the x86 instruction set. It proved impossible to match the steadily increasing speed of RISC processors by direct implementation of the x86 instruction set as had been done in the past. Instead, designers took a leaf out of the RISC book; although it is not obvious, on the surface, a modern x86 processor chip contains hidden within it a RISC-style processor with its own internal RISC coding. The incoming x86 code is, after suitable massaging, converted into this internal code and handed over to the RISC processor where the critical execution is performed.In this summing up of the RISC movement, I rely heavily on the latest edition of Hennessy and Patterson’s books on computer design as my supporting authority; see in particular Computer Architecture, third edition, 2003, pp 146, 151-4, 157-8.The IA-64 instruction set.Some time ago, Intel and Hewlett-Packard introduced the IA-64 instruction set. This was primarily intended to meet a generally recognised need for a 64 bit address space. In this, it followed the lead of the designers of the MIPS R4000 and Alpha. However one would have thought that Intel would have stressed compatibility with the x86; the puzzle is that they did the exact opposite.Moreover, built into the design of IA-64 is a feature known as predication which makes it incompatible in a major way with all other instruction sets. In particular, it needs 6 extra bits with each instruction. This upsets the traditional balance between instruction word length and information content, and it changes significantly the brief of the compiler writer.In spite of having an entirely new instruction set, Intel made the puzzling claim that chips based on IA-64 would be compatible with earlier x86 chips. It was hard to see exactly what was meant.Chips for the latest IA-64 processor, namely, the Itanium, appear to have special hardware for compatibility. Even so, x86 code runs very slowly.Because of the above complications, implementation of IA-64 requires a larger chip than is required for more conventional instruction sets. This in turn implies a higher cost. Such at any rate, is the received wisdom, and, as a general principle, it was repeated as such by Gordon Moore when he visited Cambridge recently to open the Betty and Gordon Moore Library. I have, however, heard it said that the matter appears differently from within Intel. This I do not understand. But I am very ready to admit that I am completely out of my depth as regards the economics of the semiconductor industry.AMD have defined a 64 bit instruction set that is more compatible with x86 and they appear to be making headway with it. The chip is not a particularly large one. Some people think that this is what Intel should have done. [Since the lecture was delivered, Intel have announced that they will market a range of chips essentially compatible with those offered by AMD.]The Relentless Drive towards Smaller TransistorsThe scale of integration continued to increase. This was achieved by shrinking the original transistors so that more could be put on a chip. Moreover, the laws of physics were on the side of the manufacturers. The transistors also got faster, simply by getting smaller. It was therefore possible to have, at the same time, both high density and high speed.There was a further advantage. Chips are made on discs of silicon, known as wafers. Each wafer has on it a large number of individual chips, which are processed together and later separated. Since shrinkage makes it possible to get more chips on a wafer, the cost per chip goes down.Falling unit cost was important to the industry because, if the latest chipsare cheaper to make as well as faster, there is no reason to go on offering the old ones, at least not indefinitely. There can thus be one product for the entire market.However, detailed cost calculations showed that, in order to maintain this advantage as shrinkage proceeded beyond a certain point, it would be necessary to move to larger wafers. The increase in the size of wafers was no small matter. Originally, wafers were one or two inches in diameter, and by 2000 they were as much as twelve inches. At first, it puzzled me that, when shrinkage presented so many other problems, the industry should make things harder for itself by going to larger wafers. I now see that reducing unit cost was just as important to the industry as increasing the number of transistors on a chip, and that this justified the additional investment in foundries and the increased risk.The degree of integration is measured by the feature size, which, for a given technology, is best defined as the half the distance between wires in the densest chips made in that technology. At the present time, production of 90 nm chips is still building upSuspension of LawIn March 1997, Gordon Moore was a guest speaker at the celebrations of the centenary of the discovery of the electron held at the Cavendish Laboratory. It was during the course of his lecture that I first heard the fact that you can have silicon chips that are both fast and low in cost described as a violation of Murphy’s law.or Sod’s law as it is usually called in the UK. Moore said that experience in other fields would lead you to expect to have to choose between speed and cost, or to compromise between them. In fact, in the case of silicon chips, it is possible to have both.In a reference book available on the web, Murphy is identified as an engineer working on human acceleration tests for the US Air Force in 1949. However, we were perfectly familiar with the law in my student days, when we called it by a much more prosaic name than either of those mentioned above, namely, the Law of General Cussedness. We even had a mock examination question in which the law featured. It was the type of question in which the first part asks for a definition of some law or principle and the second part contains a problem to be solved with the aid of it. In our case the first part was to define the Law of General Cussedness and the second was the problem;A cyclist sets out on a circular cycling tour. Derive an equation giving the direction of the wind at any time.The single-chip computerAt each shrinkage the number of chips was reduced and there were fewer wires going from one chip to another. This led to an additional increment in overall speed, since the transmission of signals from one chip to another takes a long time.Eventually, shrinkage proceeded to the point at which the whole processor except for the caches could be put on one chip. This enabled a workstation to be built that out-performed the fastest minicomputer of the day, and the result was to kill the minicomputer stone dead. As we all know, this had severe consequences for the computer industry and for the people working in it.From the above time the high density CMOS silicon chip was Cock of the Roost. Shrinkage went on until millions of transistors could be put on a single chip and the speed went up in proportion.Processor designers began to experiment with new architectural features designed to give extra speed. One very successful experiment concerned methods for predicting the way program branches would go. It was a surprise to me how successful this was. It led to a significant speeding up of program execution and other forms of prediction followedEqually surprising is what it has been found possible to put on a single chip computer by way of advanced features. For example, features that had been developed for the IBM Model 91.the giant computer at the top of the System 360 range.are now to be found on microcomputersMurphy’s Law remained in a state of suspension. No longer did it make se nse to build experimental computers out of chips with a small scale of integration, such as that provided by the 7400 series. People who wanted to do hardware research at the circuit level had no option but to design chips and seek for ways to get them made. For a time, this was possible, if not easyUnfortunately, there has since been a dramatic increase in the cost of making chips, mainly because of the increased cost of making masks for lithography, a photographic process used in the manufacture of chips. It has, in consequence, again become very difficult to finance the making of research chips, and this is a currently cause for some concern.The Semiconductor Road MapThe extensive research and development work underlying the above advances has been made possible by a remarkable cooperative effort on the part of theinternational semiconductor industry.At one time US monopoly laws would probably have made it illegal for US companies to participate in such an effort. However about 1980 significant and far reaching changes took place in the laws. The concept of pre-competitive research was introduced. Companies can now collaborate at the pre-competitive stage and later go on to develop products of their own in the regular competitive manner.The agent by which the pre-competitive research in the semi-conductor industry is managed is known as the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA). This has been active as a US organisation since 1992 and it became international in 1998. Membership is open to any organisation that can contribute to the research effort.Every two years SIA produces a new version of a document known as the International Technological Roadmap for Semiconductors (ITRS), with an update in the intermediate years. The first volume bearing the title ‘Roadmap’ was issued in 1994 but two reports, written in 1992 and distributed in 1993, are regarded as the true beginning of the series.Successive roadmaps aim at providing the best available industrial consensus on the way that the industry should move forward. They set out in great detail.over a 15 year horizon. the targets that must be achieved if the number of components on a chip is to be doubled every eighteen months.that is, if Moore’s law is to be maintained.-and if the cost per chip is to fall.In the case of some items, the way ahead is clear. In others, manufacturing problems are foreseen and solutions to them are known, although not yet fully worked out; these areas are coloured yellow in the tables. Areas for which problems are foreseen, but for which no manufacturable solutions are known, are coloured red. Red areas are referred to as Red Brick Walls.The targets set out in the Roadmaps have proved realistic as well as challenging, and the progress of the industry as a whole has followed the Roadmaps closely. This is a remarkable achievement and it may be said that the merits of cooperation and competition have been combined in an admirable manner.It is to be noted that the major strategic decisions affecting the progress of the industry have been taken at the pre-competitive level in relative openness, rather than behind closed doors. These include the progression to larger wafers.By 1995, I had begun to wonder exactly what would happen when the inevitable point was reached at which it became impossible to make transistors any smaller.My enquiries led me to visit ARPA headquarters in Washington DC, where I was given a copy of the recently produced Roadmap for 1994. This made it plain that serious problems would arise when a feature size of 100 nm was reached, an event projected to happen in 2007, with 70 nm following in 2010. The year for which the coming of 100 nm (or rather 90 nm) was projected was in later Roadmaps moved forward to 2004 and in the event the industry got there a little sooner.I presented the above information from the 1994 Roadmap, along with such other information that I could obtain, in a lecture to the IEE in London, entitled The CMOS end-point and related topics in Computing and delivered on 8 February 1996.The idea that I then had was that the end would be a direct consequence of the number of electrons available to represent a one being reduced from thousands to a few hundred. At this point statistical fluctuations would become troublesome, and thereafter the circuits would either fail to work, or if they did work would not be any faster. In fact the physical limitations that are now beginning to make themselves felt do not arise through shortage of electrons, but because the insulating layers on the chip have become so thin that leakage due to quantum mechanical tunnelling has become troublesome.There are many problems facing the chip manufacturer other than those that arise from fundamental physics, especially problems with lithography. In an update to the 2001 Roadmap published in 2002, it was stated that the continuation of progress at present rate will be at risk as we approach 2005 when the roadmap projects that progress will stall without research break-throughs in most technical areas “. This was the most specific statement about the Red Brick Wall, that had so far come from the SIA and it was a strong one. The 2003 Roadmap reinforces this statement by showing many areas marked red, indicating the existence of problems for which no manufacturable solutions are known.It is satisfactory to report that, so far, timely solutions have been found to all the problems encountered. The Roadmap is a remarkable document and, for all its frankness about the problems looming above, it radiates immense confidence. Prevailing opinion reflects that confidence and there is a general expectation that, by one means or another, shrinkage will continue, perhaps down to 45 nm or even less.However, costs will rise steeply and at an increasing rate. It is cost that will ultimately be seen as the reason for calling a halt. The exact point at which an industrial consensus is reached that the escalating costs can no longer be met willdepend on the general economic climate as well as on the financial strength of the semiconductor industry itself.。
毕业设计外文文献及译文文献、资料题目:INTELLIGENT BUILDING ALARM 文献、资料来源:网络文献、资料发表(出版)日期:2012,2院(部):信息与电气工程学院专业:电气工程与自动化班级:电气084姓名:邓红坤学号: 2008121017指导教师:王克河翻译日期:2012、2、29外文文献:INTELLIGENT BUILDING ALARMBACKGROUND OF THE INVENTIONThis invention relates to an intelligent alarm system for 5 detecting hazardous situations ina building informing building occupants of optimal escape routes or survival strategies and assisting emergency personnel in rescuing people inside the building。
Building hazards, including fire,earthquakes,intruders,etc., have the potential for large numbers of casualties. Effective building alarm systems must have the capability to process a plurality of input types to determine the nature of the situation involving danger to persons in thebuilding. The building alarm system must also have more than simple audio/visual outputs for helping people in the building find safe escape routes.Use of the term building in this invention refers to any structure including,but not limited to, office buildings, commercial buildings,factory/warehouses, residential homes, etc. Aspectsof building alarm systems are described 20 in, U.S。
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范文:(见下一页)韩国**对经济影响的分析①原作者名可直接用英文经济学 061*班 2006*****6 张三[译][摘要] 本文研究的目的*******的影响。
在探讨*****影响各行业的产出、就业、收入、增值和进口中应用了投入产出模型。
*******************。
根据研究的结果,得出结论*********的作用。
[关键词] ***** 投入-产出模型 **效应 **效应一、引言在当今经济全球化***************。
2016届本科毕业设计(论文)文献翻译题目宋体三号字,加粗学院宋体四号字专业宋体四号字班级宋体四号字学号宋体四号字姓名宋体四号字指导教师宋体四号字开题日期宋体四号字文献一:(宋体五号)英文题目(居中,Times New Roman字体,三号加粗)正文(英文不少于10000印刷符号,Times New Roman字体,五号,首行缩进2.5字符,单倍行距,两边对齐)翻译一:(宋体五号,另起一页)中文题目(居中,黑体,三号加粗)正文(中文不少于2000字,宋体,五号,单倍行距,首行缩进2字符)文献二:(宋体五号,另起一页)英文题目(居中,Times New Roman字体,三号加粗)正文(英文不少于10000印刷符号,Times New Roman字体,五号,首行缩进2.5字符,单倍行距,两边对齐)翻译二:(宋体五号,另起一页)中文题目(居中,黑体,三号加粗)正文(中文不少于2000字,宋体,五号,单倍行距,首行缩进2字符)(请参照下面模板)文献一:Research on Spillover Effect of Foreign Direct Investment1. IntroductionIn recent decades, economists have begun to identify technical progress, or more generally, knowledge creation, as the major determinant of economic growth. Until the 1970s, the analysis of economic growth was typically based on neoclassical models that explain growth with the accumulation of labor, capital, and other production factors with diminishing returns to scale. In these models, the economy converges to steady state equilibrium where the level of per capita income is determined by savings and investment, depreciation, and population growth, but where there is no permanent income growth. Any observed income growth per capita occurs because the economy is still converging towards its steady state, or because it is in transition from one steady state to another.The policies needed to achieve growth and development in the framework of these models is therefore straightforward: increases in savings and investments and reductions in the population growth rate, shift the economy to a higher steady state income level. From the view of developing countries, however, these policies are difficult to implement. Low income and development levels are not only consequences, but also causes of low savings and high population growth rates. The importance of technical progress was also recognized in the neoclassical growth models, but the determinants of the level of technology were not discussed in detail; instead, technology was seen as an exogenous factor. Yet, it was clear that convergence in income percapita levels could not occur unless technologies converged as well.From the 1980s and onwards, growth research has therefore increasingly focused on understanding and ontogenetic technical progress. Modern growth theory is largely built on models with constant or increasing returns to reproducible factors as a result of the accumulation of knowledge. Knowledge is, to some extent, a public good, and R&D, education, training, and other investments in knowledge creation may generate externalities that prevent diminishing returns to scale for labor and physical capital. Taking this into account, the economy may experience positive long-run growth instead of the neoclassical steady state where per capita incomes remain unchanged. Depending on the economic starting point, technical progress and growth can be based on creation of entirely new knowledge, or adaptation and transfer of existing foreign technology.Along with international trade, the most important vehicle for international technology transfer is foreign direct investment (FDI). It is well known that multinational corporations (MNCs) undertake a major part of the world’s private R&D efforts and production, own and control most of the world’s advanced technology. When a MNC sets up a forei gn affiliate, the affiliate receives some amount of the proprietary technology that constitutes the parent’s firm specific advantage and allows it to compete successfully with local firms that have superior knowledge of local markets, consumer preferences, and business practices. This leads to a geographical diffusion of technology, but not necessarily to any formal transfer of technology beyond the boundaries of the MNCs; the establishment of a foreign affiliate is, almost per definition, a decision to internalize the use of core technology.However, MNC technology may still leak to the surrounding economy through external effects or spillovers that raise the level of human capital in the host country and createproductivity increases in local firms. In many cases, the effects operate through forward and backward linkages, as MNCs provide training and technical assistance to their local suppliers, subcontractors, and customers. The labor market is another important channel for spillovers, as almost all MNCs train operatives and managers who may subsequently take employment in local firms or establish entirely new companies.It is therefore not surprising that attitudes towards inward FDI have changed considerably over the last couple of decades, as most countries have liberalized their policies to attract all kinds of foreign investment. Numerous governments have even introduced various forms of investment incentives to encourage foreign MNCs to invest in their jurisdiction. However, productivity and technology spillovers are not automatic consequences of FDI. Instead, FDI and human capital interact in a complex manner, where FDI inflows create a potential for spillovers of knowledge to the local labor force, at the same time as the host country’s level of human capital determines how much FDI it can attract and whether local firms are able to absorb the potential spillover benefits.2. Foreign Direct Investment and SpilloversThe earliest discussions of spillovers in the literature on foreign direct investment date back to the 1960s. The first author who systematically introduced spillovers (or external effects) among the possible consequences of FDI was MacDougall (1960), who analyzed the general welfare effects of foreign investment. The common aim of the studies was to identify the various costs and benefits of FDI.Productivity externalities were discussed together with several other indirect effects that influence the welfare assessment, such as those arising from the impact of FDI on government revenue, tax policies, terms of trade, and the balance of payments. The fact that spillovers included in the discussion was generally motivated by empirical evidence from case studies rather than by comprehensive theoretical arguments.Yet, the early analyses made clear that multinationals may improve locatives efficiency by entering into industries with high entry barriers and reducing monopolistic distortions, and induce higher technical efficiency if the increased competitive pressure or some demonstration effect spurs local firms to more efficient use of existing resources. They also proposed that the presence may lead to increases in the rate of technology transfer and diffusion. More specifically, case studies showed that foreign MNCs may:(1) Contribute to efficiency by breaking supply bottlenecks (but that the effect may become less important as the technology of the host country advances);(2) Introduce new know-how by demonstrating new technologies and training workers who later take employment in local firms;(3) Either break down monopolies and stimulate competition and efficiency or create a more monopolistic industry structure, depending on the strength and responses of the local firms;(4) Transfer techniques for inventory and quality control and standardization to their local suppliers and distribution channels;Although this diverse list gives some clues about the broad range of various spillover effects, it says little about how common or how important they are in general. Similar complaints can be made about the evidence on spillovers gauged from the numerous case studies discussing various aspects of FDI in different countries and industries. These studies often contain valuable circumstantial evidence of spillovers, but often fail to show how significant the spillover effectsare and whether the results can be generalized.For instance, many analyses of the linkages between MNCs and their local suppliers and subcontractors have documented learning and technology transfers that may make up a basis for productivity spillovers or market access spillovers. However, these studies seldom reveal whether the MNCs are able to extract all the benefits that the new technologies or information generate among their supplier firms. Hence, there is no clear proof of spillovers, but it is reasonable to assume that spillovers are positively related to the extent of linkages.Similarly, there are many works on the relation between MNCs entry and presence and market structure in host countries, and this is closely related to the possible effects of FDI on competition in the local markets. There are also case studies of demonstration effects, technology diffusion, and labor training in foreign MNCs. However, although these studies provide much detailed information about the various channels for spillovers, they say little about the overall significance of such spillovers.The statistical studies of spillovers, by contrast, may reveal the overall impact of foreign presence on the productivity of local firms, but they are generally not able to say much about how the effects come about. These studies typically estimate production functions for locally owned firms, and include the foreign share of the industry as one of the explanatory variables. They then test whether foreign presence has a significant positive impact on local productivity once other firm and industry characteristics have been accounted.Research conclude that domestic firms exhibited higher productivity in sectors with a larger foreign share, but argue that it may be wrong to conclude that spillovers have taken place if MNC affiliates systematically locate in the more productive sectors. In addition, they are also able to perform some more detailed tests of regional differences in spillovers. Examining the geographical dispersion of foreign investment, they suggest that the positive impact of FDI accrue mainly to the domestic firms located close to the MNC affiliates. However, effects seem to vary between industries.The results on the presence of spillovers seem to be mixed; recent studies suggest that there should be a systematic pattern where various host industry and host country characteristics influence the incidence of spillovers. For instance, the foreign affiliate’s levels of tech nology or technology imports seem to influence the amount of spillovers to local firms. The technology imports of MNC affiliates, in turn, have been shown to vary systematically with host country characteristics. These imports seem larger in countries and industries where the educational level of the local labor force is higher, where local competition is tougher, and where the host country imposes fewer formal requirements on the affiliates’ operations.Some recent studies have also addressed the apparent contradictions between the earlier statistical spillover studies, with the hypothesis that the host country’s level of technical development or human capital may matter as a starting point.In fact, in some cases, large foreign presence may even be a sign of a weak local industry, where local firms have not been able to absorb any productivity spillovers at all and have therefore been forced to yield market shares to the foreign MNCs.3. FDI Spillover and Human Capital DevelopmentThe transfer of technology from MNC parents to its affiliates and other host country firms is not only mbodied in machinery, equipment, patent rights, and expatriate managers and technicians,but is also realized rough the training of local employees. This training affects most levels of employees, from simple manufacturing operatives through supervisors to technically advanced professionals and top-level managers. While most recipients of training are employed in the MNCs own affiliates, the beneficiaries also include employees among the MNCs suppliers, subcontractors, and customers.Types of training ranged from on-the-job training to seminars and more formal schooling to overseas education, perhaps at the parent company, depending on the skills needed. The various skills gained through the elation with the foreign MNCs may spill over directly when the MNCs do not charge the full value of the training provided to local firms or over time, as the employees move to other firms or set up their own businesses.While the role of MNCs in primary and secondary education is marginal, there is increasingly clear evidence hat FDI may have a noticeable impact on tertiary education in their host countries. The most important effect is perhaps on the demand side. MNCs provide attractive employment opportunities to highly skilled graduates in natural sciences, engineering, and business sciences, which may be an incentive for gifted students to complete tertiary training, and MNCs demand skilled labor, which may encourage governments to invest in higher education.Many studies undertaken in developing countries have emphasized the spillovers of management skills. There is evidence of training and capacity development in technical areas, although the number of detailed studies appears smaller.While training activities in manufacturing often aim to facilitate the introduction of new technologies that are embodied in machinery and equipments, the training in service sectors is more directly focused on strengthening skills and know-how embodied in employees. This means that training and human capital development are often more important in service industries. Furthermore, many services are not tradable across international borders, which mean that service MNCs to a great extent are forced to reproduce home country technologies in their foreign affiliates. As a consequence, service companies are often forced to invest more in training, and the gap between affiliate and parent company wages tends, therefore, to be smaller than that in manufacturing.4. ConclusionThis paper has noted that the interaction of FDI and spillovers is complex and highly non-linear, and that several different outcomes are possible. FDI inflows create a potential for spillovers of knowledge to the local labor force, at the same time as the host country’s level of human capital determines how much FDI it can attract and whether local firms are able to absorb the potential spillover benefits. Hence, it is possible that host economies with relatively high levels of human capital may be able to attract large amounts of technology intensive foreign MNCs that contribute significantly to the further development of labor skills. At the same time, economies with weaker initial conditions are likely to experience smaller inflows of FDI, and those foreign firms that enter are likely to use simpler technologies that contribute only marginally to local learning and skill development.翻译一:外商直接投资溢出效应研究1.引言在最近几十年中,经济学家们已开始确定技术进步,或更普遍认为知识创造,作为经济增长原动力的一个重要决定因素,直到20世纪70年代,分析经济增长运用典型的新古典主义模型来解释经济增长的积累,劳动力、资本等生产要素与收益递减的规模。
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毕业设计/论文外文文献翻译院系经济管理学院专业班级金融0804班原文出处亚洲经济观察姓名姚静文评分指导老师吴义能华中科技大学武昌分校2012年2月15日信贷紧缩使得中国民间融资蓬勃发展尽管中国的经济繁荣,但中国的中小企业发展却很不顺利。
一方面,中小企业的固定成本在不断上升。
另一方面,随着全球经济形势的恶化和人民币升值,来自海外客户的订单正在缩减。
仿佛这些还不够,筹集中小企业运营所需要的资金变得越来越困难,且融资成本越来越高。
根据政府的指令,银行已经开始总体压缩银行贷款。
据总部位于伦敦的Capital Economics(资本经济学公司)于10月24日发布的最新研究表明,第三季度银行新增净贷款仅比去年同期略有增长从1.65万亿上升到1.73万亿人民币(相当于从2600亿上升到2720亿美元)。
但是,按照中国人民银行使用的更广泛的定义,融资总额接近2.5万亿元人民币,同比下降了近三分之一。
这是个令人担忧的结果吗?马克·威廉(Mark Williams),Capital Economics 的首席中国经济学家在研究报告中指出:“中国政府官员对信贷总额增长的控制至少要持续一段时间,但其代价是将更多的借款人推向不受监管的地下贷款机构。
”事实上,近期银行贷款达到了创纪录的高水平,政府控制银行贷款,旨在避免金融部门的崩溃,但这种做法也加剧了中小企业所面临的困境。
无论政府紧缩银行贷款的意图和目的是什么,中小企业都被挤出正规信贷渠道,这也助长了高利贷和其他黑市贷款的崛起,包括典当行、信托基金甚至富裕人群等等。
香港经济和政治咨询公司丝绸之路的董事总经理本·辛芬德费尔(Ben Simpfendorfer)表示:“私人贷款的数量在过去几年呈现爆炸性的增长。
你越是挤压正规市场,越多的企业会被挤入黑市,最终形成一个两级或平行的银行体系。
”破产倒闭非正规银行体系也并非中国所独有。
位于新帕尔茨的纽约州立大学(SUNY)的经济学教授萨拉·许(Sara Hsu)表示:“纵观历史,世界各地一直都在使用非正规银行体系。
”在美国银行系统正规化之前,有些一般性商店会向企业和个人提供贷款和信贷额度。
中国的非正规银行系统也不是最近才出现的。
多年以来,它一直是中小企业金融支持的重要来源。
但是黑市银行系统肯定是有风险的。
今年,接二连三地出现了多起贷款违约、企业倒闭的事件,社会影响很大。
有人担心非正式贷款人不是在支持中小型企业而是在助长投机。
该问题的部分原因在于,中国的银行(其中有几个已经跻身世界最大银行之列)宁愿把重点放在服务大型国有企业(国企)客户,而不是中小企业。
位于上海的中欧国际工商学院(CEIBS)金融研究中心副主任加里·刘(Gary Liu)教授表示,银行面临的最大挑战之一是,他们不能为自己的储蓄和贷款产品设定利率,其利率必须保持在中国人民银行(PBoC)设定的基准利率上下1%的范围之内。
他在最近发表在《环球时报》的文章中表示,目前一年期存款的利率为3.5%,一年期贷款的利率为6.56%。
由于银行无法调整其贷款利率以反映不同的客户的贷款风险,所以银行不愿向中小企业贷款。
随着地下钱庄数量的增加及其贷款利率的上升,中国的监管机构变得紧张起来。
温家宝总理已发出公开警告,指出了地下借贷的危险性,有时候其利率甚至会超过100%。
在十月初的温州市访问期间,当地媒体援引温家宝的讲话:“应采取有效措施遏制高利贷的趋势,打击非法募捐,并妥善处理抵押物和资金短缺的问题,以防止风险在区域范围内蔓延和不断变化。
”非正规银行体系的确切规模无法确定。
政府的估计是大约4000亿美元。
但也有人说其实远远不止这个数,其实要高得多。
即使中国的国有银行也会提供另类信用。
例如,银行找到那些可以提供企业贷款的人群后,以“委托”贷款方式充当中间人角色。
据彭博社报道,去年委托贷款占社会融资总额14.27万亿的近8%,而2002年的占比仅为0.9%。
社会融资指贷款和其他资金来源,如股票和债券的回报。
此外还有很多其他信贷来源。
渣打银行的一个报告显示,典当行及贷款担保人(两者均不归中国人民银行监管)也在和小额贷款公司竞争,小额贷款公司的贷款业务也已经超越了原有的、监管规定的范围。
国企也想在贷款业务上分一杯羹,这让事态更加复杂。
总而言之,辛芬德费尔表示:“富人正在寻求办法提高投资的回报。
”温州模式温州向来以企业家精神而闻名遐迩,而中国的地下钱庄也是在20世纪90年代在温州开始兴起。
中欧商学院的刘教授表示,中国人民银行统计资料表明约有89%的温州人参与了民间借贷。
纽约州立大学的徐教授表示:随着中国经济改革在20世纪70年代末开始进行,“温州并没有得到很多‘国家’资金支持。
”温州的典当行和贷款担保人也做起了银行替代业务,为温州众多的非国有企业填补了一个越来越大的缺口,因为对于银行业来说,这些企业是“未知的实体”。
这种戒心至今仍在继续。
相比之下,许多地下贷款人“往往认识借款人,或者认识借款担保人。
”但是,辛芬德费尔表示,地下钱庄已经偏离了它们支持中国民营中小企业的作用。
随着固定资产价格特别是中国房地产价格的上升,与公司业务投资相比,投机往往能够给借款人带来更快的回报。
另外,信贷紧缩也是一个因素。
在经过了一年的疯狂放贷之后,中国在2010年开始提高银行存款准备金率。
通货膨胀正在成为一个问题,关于不良贷款和地方政府债务的担忧导致中国的贷款政策逐步收紧。
今年,存款准备金率创下新高,中国的银行现在必须将存款的21%作为存款准备金。
然而,紧缩开始的时间偏偏适逢许多中小企业都致力于投资,需要获得贷款完成投资。
很多企业发现自己没有选择,只能转向地下钱庄,只能接受越来越高的贷款利息。
瑞士信贷中国研究部主管文森特·陈表示,中国人民银行的信贷紧缩手段导致情况更加恶化。
“他们最大的错误是没有提高利率。
政府是在用老办法处理新问题。
”中国人民银行有权提高存款准备金率,但加息需要得到中国国务院批准。
因此,虽然存款准备金率处于历史高位,加息却很谨慎。
流动性紧张,但资本需求却在上升,所以非正规贷款机构的利率上涨速度要快得多。
许教授表示:“如果你不提高‘正规银行系统’的利率,你就等于是在为获得贷款的企业提供补贴。
因为它们贷款的真实成本比它们支付的利息更高。
”不平衡的做法文森特·陈表示:随着不平衡的增长,违约的风险正在加大。
“在2009年和2010年,人们的期望很高,所以他们去借钱。
他们需要支付的利率越来越高,‘现在’不是能否赚钱的问题,而是能否全身而退的问题。
信用链就是这样开始破裂的。
”目前已经出现了不少影响很大的违约事件,其中的一些就发生在温州。
虽然在信贷紧缩背景下,破产并不让人惊讶,但地下钱庄对违约没什么办法。
文森特·陈表示:“如果企业对地下钱庄违约,那么这些钱庄可能会开始对存款者违约。
地下钱庄通常以每年15%的利率吸纳存款,再以30%至40%的利率发放贷款。
”9月,中国国家媒体报道,200多名在浙江省(温州属于浙江省)的商人由于无法支付债务而失踪。
其中一些已经躲藏起来,还有人自杀了。
温州的一个著名眼镜制造商的老板留下他债务超过了20亿元人民币公司一走了之,这些债务中既有正规贷款也有地下钱庄的贷款。
然而,除了违约的问题,一个不受监管的非正规银行系统将使得中国监管机构更难以控制信贷流动或收紧银根。
正规经济部门的变化可能在非正规部门产生意想不到的后果。
文森特·陈表示:“这在一定程度上影响了政府的调控。
”文森特·陈和辛芬德费尔都认为,中国可以通过更快的银行业改革来避免其面临的非正规银行业的问题。
辛芬德费尔表示:“如果在过去10年中,中国建立了私人银行部门的话,就能更好地应对现在发生的事情。
”然而,许教授指出,非正规行业发挥了很大的作用,中国的监管部门还没有来得及建立一个小公司的贷款网络。
她表示:“解决方案是在地方一级设立经政府批准的、‘能够’了解小企业的、较小的金融机构。
”尽管中小企业规模不大,它们却很重要。
中国工信部数据显示,中国城市劳动力的80%在中小型企业工作。
徐教授认为,如果没有非正规银行帮助中小企业,中国过去20年来的增长可能不会那么快。
她表示:“非正规银行系统是有必要的,政府没有阻止其发展,这说明政府是默许的。
”近来,中小企业的倒闭和违约引起了足够多的媒体关注,官员需要做出回应。
一些地方政府最近已经宣布将为小企业创造官方的信贷来源。
例如,上海刚刚成立了一个30亿元人民币的基金,以支持中小企业。
在9月,中国工信部宣布了其第一个针对中小企业的“成长计划”。
该计划的目标包括提高中小企业的业务结构,目前还不清楚它将带来什么样的政策。
除了支持中小企业,温州官员也在试图通过设置利率上限控制这类贷款。
据市政府网站上发布的通知,非正规贷款利率应不超过一年期贷款官方利率6.56%的130%。
然而,这样的规定将很难执行。
许教授表示,虽然一些较小的贷款方案获得了成功,要遏制中国非正规银行业对信贷流动的影响还需要采取更大的努力。
她表示:“这将是一个全新的管理项目,政府必须为中小企业的发展提供资金,加以推动。
”出处:沃伦·怀特. 信贷紧缩使得中国民间融资蓬勃发展. 亚洲经济观察,2011,(8)Why China's Credit Squeeze Is Big Business for LoanSharksDespite the country's economic boom, China's small and midsized enterprises (SMEs) haven't had an easy ride. Their fixed costs are rising and orders from overseas customers are shriveling as the global economic climate darkens and China's currency strengthens. And as if that weren't enough, it's getting harder -- and more expensive -- to tap the funding needed to run the businesses.Under orders from Beijing, banks have been putting the squeeze on lending generally. According to a research note published on October 24 by London-based Capital Economics, net new bank lending in the third quarter was up only slightly from a year ago -- to RMB 1.65 trillion from RMB 1.73 trillion (US$260 billion from US$272 billion). But the total amount of financing extended under the broader definition used by China's central bank fell by nearly one-third, to just under RMB 2.5 trillion.The worrying upshot? As Mark Williams, Capital Economics chief China economist, said in the research note: "Officials have reasserted control over total credit growth, at least for a while, but at the cost of pushing more borrowers into the arms of unregulated underground lenders."Indeed, the government's reining in of bank lending, which hit record levels recently, is designed to avoid a financial sector crash. But the practice also has compounded the difficulties facing smaller Chinese firms. For all intents and purposes, they have been squeezed out of the formal credit channels, which is fueling the rise of loan sharks and other black market lending -- from pawnshops, trusts or even wealthy individuals. "The number of private banks has exploded over last few years," notes Ben Simpfendorfer, managing director of Silk Road Associates, an economic and political consultancyin Hong Kong. "The tighter you squeeze in the formal market,the more you squeeze into the black market and you end up with a two-tier, or parallel, banking structure."Going UnderInformal banking is also not unique to China. "Throughout history, they've been used all over the world," says Sara Hsu, a professor of economics at the Sta te University of New York (SUNY) in New Paltz. Before the banking system was formalized in the U.S., for example, companies and individuals took out loans and credit lines from general stores.And China's informal banking system is not new; it's been an important source of financial support for SMEs for a number of years. But black market banking, of course, has risks. At a surprisingly fast clip, there have been a number of high-profile defaults and company closures this year amid concerns that informal lenders are encouraging speculation rather than supporting the country's SMEs.Part of the problem is that China's banks -- several of which are now among the world's largest -- prefer to focus on serving big, state-owned enterprise (SOEs), rather than SMEs. According to Gary Liu, deputy director of the financial research center at the China Europe International Business School (CEIBS) in Shanghai, one of the big challenges facing the banks is that they are barred from setting interest rates on their savings and lending products, and must instead keep within 1% of the benchmark rate set by the central bankers at the Peoples' Bank of China (PBoC). Currently, the rate is 3.5% for one-year savings products and 6.56% for one-year loans. Since banks are unable to adjust rates on their loans to reflect the risks of lending to different customers, they are unwilling to lend to SMEs, Liu noted in a recent article published in Global Times newspaper.As the number of underground banks increases, and as interest rates fro m such lenders climb, China's regulators are getting nervous. Premier Wen Jiabao has been issuing public warnings of the dangers of underground borrowing, in which interestrates can run more than 100%. During a visit to the city of Wenzhou in early October, local press quoted Wen as stating, "Effective measures should be taken to contain the trend of usury, crack down on illegal fundraising and properly handle the problems of collateral and capital shortage in order to prevent risks from spreading and evolving on a regional scale."The exact size of the informal banking sector is impossible to determine. The government estimates that it is around US$400 billion. Others say it's much greater. Even China's state-run banks offer their own alternative source of credit. "Entrusted" loans, for example, allow banks to serve as middlemen by identifying high-net-worth individuals who can provide corporate loans. According to Bloomberg, entrusted loans last year accounted for nearly 8% of the RMB 14.27 trillion raised in social financing -- a term referring to loans and other funding sources, such as returns on stocks and bonds -- compared with 0.9% in 2002.But other sources of credit abound. A report by Standard Chartered Bank noted that pawn shops and loan guarantors -- both of which fall outside PBoC regulations -- also compete with small-loan companies, which have taken to lending beyond their original, regulated parameters. Adding to the complexity, SOEs also want a piece of the lending action. All told, "the wealthy are looking to increase their returns," says Simfendorfer.The Wenzhou ModelIt was in Wenzhou -- a city famed for its entrepreneurial spirit -- where China's underground banks got their start in the 1990s. Liu of CEIBS points to PBoC stats suggesting that around 89% of individuals in Wenzhou are involved in private lending.As the country's economic reforms began in the late 1970s, "Wenzhou didn't receive a lot of [state] funds," says SUNY's Hsu. Local pawnshops and loan guarantors set up alternative businesses as banks, filling a gaping gap for many of thecity's non-state companies since the firms "were an unknown entity to the banking sector," Hsu notes. That wariness continues today, in contrast to many underground lenders, which "know the borrower most of the time, or they know the person guaranteeing the borrower."According to Simpfendorfer, however, underground banks have strayed from their role of supporting China's private SMEs. With increasing fixed-asset prices, particularly in China's property market, borrowers have been able to get faster returns through speculation than from, say, investing in the growth of their own companies.Then there's the credit squeeze. After a year of wild lending, China started increasing banks' reserve requirements in 2010. Inflation was becoming a problem and concerns about bad loans and local government debt led to a gradual draw down of the country's lending policies. This year, the reserve ratio reached an all-time high, and the country's banks are now required to keep 21% of their deposits in reserve. The tightening, however, started at a time when many SMEs were committed to investments for which they would need to take out loans to complete. Many found themselves with no choice but to turn to underground banks and borrowing at increasingly high interest rates.Vincent Chan, head of China research at Credit Suisse, says the situation has been exacerbated by how the PBoC has gone about tightening credit. "The biggest mistake they've made is to not increase the interest rate. The government is using old methods to deal with new problems."China's central bank can increase reserve ratios on its own, but interest rate increases require the assent of China's State Council. So while reserve ratios are at record highs, interest rates have increased cautiously. With liquidity tight but demand for capital rising, interest rates started rising much faster at informal lending institutions. "When you don't raise the interest rate [in the formal sector], you'regiving a subsidy to the enterprises that are receiving the loan," Hsu notes. "They're essentially getting something that in reality costs more."Imbalancing ActAs the imbalances grow, Chan says, the risk of defaults increases. "In 2009 and 2010, people had high expectations, so they borrowed," he notes. "They are in the position of having to borrow at higher and higher interest rates -- and it is [now] not a question of whether you can make money, but whether you can just get away safely. This is where the credit chain starts to break."There have already been a number of high-profile defaults, including in Wenzhou. While bankruptcies during a credit crunch aren't a surprise, the underground sector has little recourse when it comes to defaults. "If companies default on underground banks, these banks might start to default on their borrowers, as they usually source money at around a 15% annual interest rate and re-lend at 30% to 40%," says Chan.In September, China's state media reported that more than 200 businessmen in Zhejiang province, where Wenzhou is located, went missing when they couldn't pay their debts. In addition to those who have gone into hiding, a handful of businessmen have turned to suicide. One prominent eyeglass manufacturer in Wenzhou left his company mired in more than RMB 2 billion of debt, sourced from both official and underground banks.In addition to default problems, however, an unregulated banking sector makes it more difficult for China's regulators to control the flow of credit or tighten the money supply. And changes in the formal sector can have unintended consequences in the informal sector. "In a certain way, it undermines government control," Chan states.Both Chan and Simpfendorfer say China could have avoided the problems it is facing in the informal sector with faster banking reforms. "If, over the last 10 years,they had developed a private banking sector, they would have had a better handle on what was going on now," says Simpfendorfer. Hsu, however, notes that the informal sector did its job so well that China's regulators haven't had time to build a loan network for smaller companies. "The solution would be to have smaller institutions at the local level that are approved by the government and [are able to] get to know the smaller companies," she notes.Despite their size, these companies are important. SMEs employ 80% of China's urban labor force, according to China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. Without informal banks helping SMEs, SUNY's Hsu says China would probably not have experienced the same level of growth that is has over the past 20 years. "The informal system has been necessary," she adds. "The government has given its tacit approval by not preventing its development."Of late, SME closures and defaults have attracted enough media attention to draw a response from officials. Some local governments have announced plans recently to create official sources of credit for small enterprises. Shanghai, for example, has just set up a RMB 3 billion fund to support SMEs. In September, China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology announced its first "growth plan" targeting SMEs. While the plan's goals include improving the business structure of SMEs, it's unclear what policies will come out of it.In addition to supporting SMEs, Wenzhou officials have tried to rein in such lending by setting a ceiling for interest rates. According to a notice posted on the city government website, the interest rate on informal loans should not exceed the official interest rate of 6.56% for a one-year loan by more than 130%. A rule like this, however, will be hard to enforce. While some of the smaller lending programs have been successful, Hsu notes, it will take a much bigger effort to curb the informal banking sector's influence on the flow of China's credit. "It's really a whole new project the government would have to fund and promote," she says.Published November 22, 2011 in Arabic Knowledge@WhartonSource: White, Warren. Why China's Credit Squeeze Is Big Business for Loan Sharks. Asian Economy Review, Oct, 2011.。