外文翻译--是否杠杆、股利政策及盈利能力会影响公司未来的价值？

原文：The Effects of Firm and Country-level Governance Mechanisms on Dividend Policy, Cash Holdings, and Firm Value: a Cross-country StudyIntroductionThis study examines the effects of firm- and country-level corporate governance mechanisms on dividends and cash holding policies and their joint impact on firm value using a sample of over 3,000 listed firms from 21 countries.Firms outside the US are often controlled by a large shareholder. For example, Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) trace the ultimate owners of 2,980 publicly traded firms from nine East Asian economies and find more than two-thirds of them have controlling owners. Faccio and Lang (2002) carry out a similar task for over 5,000 firms from 13 Western European countries. They find that ownership concentrations among these Europeans firms are even higher than those of Asian firms. The primary agency problem for firms with high ownership concentration is the conflict between the controlling shareholders and those of minority shareholders. With de facto control, coupled with insufficient legal protection of investor rights in many countries, the controlling owners often engage in activities that increase private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. These agency conflicts are further exacerbated when the controlling owners have excess control rights1.This paper contributes to the literature on international corporate governance in four ways. First, it provides additional evidence on the linkage between excess control, dividend/cash holding policies, and firm value, respectively. It also directly test the valuation effects of dividend and cash holding policies. Second, this study extends the strand of literature on the importance of investor protection in corporate governance. The empirical analysis reveals that the country-level investor protection mitigates the1 Excess control rights are computed as the difference between the voting rights and the cash flow rightsheld by the largest owner. The common use of pyramidal structure, cross-shareholdings, dual class shares,and other control enhancing mechanisms result in the largest owners having control beyond their ownershipstake [see Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000)].entrenchment effect of excess control by forcing the insiders to disgorge cash. Furthermore, the valuation effects of dividend and cash holdings policies are also dependent on the legal environment a firm operates in. Third, it demonstrates that how the policy choices affect firm performance depends on firm and country-level governance mechanisms. Fourth, it explicitly considers the interdependence among policies and firm value by adopting a simultaneous equations approach. The results indicate that dividend payout, cash holdings, and firm values are interrelated.The remainder of the paper is organized as followings. In the next section, I present some theoretical and empirical results on the relations between dividend/cash holding policies and corporate governance mechanisms and discuss studies examining the effects of the corporate governance on firm value.The effects of corporate governance mechanisms on firm policies and performanceTwo effects of high ownership concentrationTwo effects are hypothesized to coexist in firms with high ownership concentration: (1) a positive incentive effect, i.e., the large shareholders have interests and power to engage in value maximization activities given their high ownership stake; (2) a negative entrenchment effect. As pointed out by Denis & McConnell (2002), “If large shareholders benefit only from proportionate cash dividends and appreciation in the market value of their shares there is no conflict between large shareholders and minority shareholders.” However, private benefits of control do exist and are quite substantial in some cases. With de facto control, large shareholders might divert corporate resources to themselves at the expense of minority shareholders. More recent studies provide ample evidence supporting this entrenchment effect. This adverse effect is exacerbated when the largest owner’s control rights are further enhanced through the use of pyramidal structure, cross-shareholding, or super voting shares. Under these circumstances, the largest owners often have control rights in excess of their cash flow rights, which gives them strong incentives to expropriateminority shareholders.LLSV (1998, 2000) establish the importance of legal protection of investor rightsas a country-level corporate governance regime. They discover that there exists significant differences across countries in the degree of investor rights protection. Firms in countries with strong investor protection have low ownership concentration and better access to external financing than those in countries with poor investor protection. The primary agency conflict for firms with concentrated ownership structure is between the controlling owners and minority shareholders. The investors’ legal rights and enforcement of law mitigates this agency conflict. Therefore, any cross-country governance analysis must control for the country-level governance effect.Dividend policyEasterbrook (1984) proposes that dividend payments force firms to raise fund from capital markets which provide monitoring of managers. Therefore, the managerial agency problem can be mitigated through dividend policy. Jensen (1986) posits that managers may use lower dividends in order to retain resources which can be used for excessive salary, perquisite consumption, or investing in projects that benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders. Faccio, Lang, and Young (2001) present a different view on the use of dividends. Using a sample of over 5,000 firms with concentrated ownership structure, they document that dividend payment is positively (negatively) associated with the excess control held by the largest shareholder of firms that are tightly (loosely) affiliated with business groups. They contend that outsiders perceive firms that are tightly affiliated with business groups have high agency costs and therefore discount firm value ex ante. In fear of value discount, the controlling owners use dividends as a bonding device. However, outsiders seem to be less alert to the agency problems in firms loosely affiliated with groups. Therefore, the controlling owners are able to retain dividends. For a sample of over 4,000 firms from 33 countries, LLSV (2000) find that firms operating in countries with better shareholder protection pay higher dividends. Taken together, both firm and country-level corporate governance mechanisms are important determinants of dividend policy.Cash holdingsCash holdings are associated with both benefits and costs in the context of agency theory. The existing literature presents two major motives of holding cash (1) the transaction costs motive and (2) the precautionary motive. According to these two motives, firms should hold high cash balances if the costs of raising external funds or the costs of cash shortfalls are high. The pecking order theory presented in Myers and Majluf (1984) supports the view of holding cash for transactional and/or precautionary motives. Researchers find substantial evidence supporting these arguments. For example, using all firms on the COMPUSTAT over the period of 1952 through 1994, Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) find that smaller firms, firms with good investment opportunities, firms with more volatile cash flows hold more cash. Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2003) test the effect of financial constraints on corporate cash holdings by contrasting the propensity of holding cash between financially constrained and unconstrained firms. They find that the sensitivity of changes in cash holdings to cash flows is positive only for financially constrained firms, consistent with the precautionary motive of hoarding cash in anticipation of future investment opportunities. An alternative view of corporate cash holding is presented in Opler et al. (1999) which contends that cash holdings is simply an outcome of financing and investment decisions. Firms generating large cash flows would pay off debt, make dividend payment, and have high cash balances. Firms with low cash flows draw down their cash balances and use high leverage.More recent studies on cash holdings focus their attentions on the costs of holding high levels of cash. For example, Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003) explore the relation between cash holdings and shareholder rights for about 11,000 firms across 45countries. They find a negative relation between firm level cash holdings and the degree of legal protection of shareholders. In their cross-country study on the determinants of cash holdings, Lins and Kalcheva (2004) find that when the management is entrenched and the investors are not well-protected, cash holdings has an incremental negative effect on firm value. Taken together, these findings suggest that the costs of holding cash is particularly high when the firm- or country-level corporate governance mechanisms do not offer sufficient protection tominority shareholders.Empirical analysisCountry random effect models are used in all the regression analyses to control for overall country effects and to test the effect of country level investor protection on dividend payment, cash holdings and Tobin’s Q. The Hausman test results suggest that the random effects estimator do not differ systematically from those estimated using a fixed effect model. Therefore, the random effect model is more appropriate for my analysis. I control for the industry effects by including industry group dummies using the Campbell (1996) classification.Dividend policy and corporate governanceFirst, I examine the effect of firm level governance on dividend policy by regressing dividend payout ratio against the excess control while controlling for other firm- and country-specific factors that have been shown to be various determinants of dividend ratio. On the one hand, the controlling owners with excess control rights have strong incentives to retain dividends for perquisite consumption or to invest in projects that increase private benefits of control. However, Faccio and Lang (2001) find that excess control is positively related to dividend when the outside investors perceive firms with excess control to be vulnerable to expropriation problems. Whether excess control increases or decreases dividend payments becomes an empirical issue that will be addressed in my regression analysis. I later investigate the policy effects on firm value to directly test whether dividend payments could prevent value discount, a view presented but not tested in Faccio and Lang (2001).LLSV (2000a) document a positive relation between country-level shareholder protection and corporate dividend payment. To control for this effect, I adopt two legal protection measures commonly used in previous studies. The first legal protection measure is the legal origin dummy (Common law) set to 1 if a firm is operating in a country having a common law legal origin and zero otherwise [see LLSV (1998)]. LLSV (1998) find that common law countries generally offer better investor protection relative to civil law countries. An alternative measure is the Anti-director rights index taking on a value ranging from 0 to 5 [see LLSV (1998)].Another country level determinant of dividend payment is the reserve requirement which is the minimum percentage of total share capital that the host country’s corporate laws mandate for corporations to hold to prevent their dissolution. Under this restriction, corporations are required to retain a proportion of their annual earnings until the threshold is reached. This restriction prevents firms from distributing all its earnings as dividend. I expect a negative relation between reserve and dividend ratio.Firm value and corporate governanceTo assess the valuation impact of corporate governance regimes, I first explore the entrenchment effect of excess control.The coefficient on excess control is negative and significant at the 5% level, in line with the findings of Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002). Leverage has a negative effect on firm value. High growth firms receive high valuations. Large firms have low values, possibly because these firms are mature in their industries and have fewer growth opportunities.Summary and conclusionsThis study examines the effects of corporate governance mechanisms at both firm and country level on dividend and cash holding policies as well as their interrelationships. The regression analyses show that excess control is negatively related to dividend payment and positively related to cash holdings, consistent with the notion that the entrenched shareholders have the propensity to retain cash for private benefits. I also test whether the country-level shareholder protection influences the behavior of controlling shareholders’ policy decisions by including interaction terms between excess control and Anti-director rights index and find that strong investor protection partially offset the negative effect of excess control on dividend payout.In the analysis of governance effects on firm value, my results support the findings of Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002) that excess control has a negative valuation effect as well as the results reported in LLSV (2002) that country level investor protection has a positive effect on firm value. I also find that both dividend payments and cash holdings are positively related to firm value. However,the valuation effects of these policies depend on the ownership structure. When the controlling owners have excess control, incremental dividend payment becomes a credible signal to outsiders that they will be less likely to be expropriated. In contrast, the incremental level of cash holdings has a negative effect on firm value when the controlling owners have excess control rights, indicating the possibility for misuse of free cash flow is high when the owners become entrenched.Given the potential endogeneity of these policy choices and firm performance, I employ a simultaneous equations model to account for their interdependence. The result indicate that cash holdings supports dividend payout. Both dividend payments and cash reserves have positive effects on firm value after controlling for potential endogeneity. Taken together, my findings indicate that firms with entrenched shareholders have high agency costs manifested as having low dividend payments and/or high cash holdings. These policy choices directly affect firm performance. The legal protection of shareholder rights plays an important role in deterring expropriation activities at the firm level. Firms that are prone to expropriation problems due to their ownership structure may use dividend and or cash holding policies as bonding devices to present value discount.Source: Zhang, Rongrong,2005.“The Effects of Firm and Country-level Governance Mechanisms on Dividend Policy, Cash Holdings, and Firm Value: A Cross-country Study”. Georgia Southern University.January.pp.1-8.译文：企业和国家层面的结构治理机制对企业股利政策、现金持有量和企业价值的影响：一个跨国企业研究简介本文通过研究来自21个国家超过3000家上市公司样本来探讨企业股息和现金持有政策及其对企业治理机制的影响。

本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文：The Impact of Dividend Policy on Shareholders’ Wealth1. IntroductionIn an ever-increasing Indian economy, globalization, liberalization and privatization together with rapid strides made by information technology, have brought intense competition in every field of activity. So, Indian companies at present are dazed, confused, and apprehensive. To maintain the competitiveness of, and add value to the companies, today’s finance managers have to make critical business and financial decisions which will lead to long-run perspective with the objective of maximizing the shareholders’ wealth.Shareholders’ wealth is represented in the market price of the company’s common stock, which, in turn, is the function of the company’s investment, financing and dividend decision. Managements' primary goal is shareholders' wealth maximization, which translates into maximizing the value of the company as measured by the price of the company’s common stock. Shareholders like cash dividends, but they also like the growth in EPS that results from ploughing earning back into the business. The optimal dividend policy is the one that maximizes the company's stock price which leads to maximization of shareholders' wealth and thereby ensures more rapid economic growth. The present study is intended to study how far the dividend payout has impact on shareholders' wealth in general; and in particular to study the relationship between the shareholders' wealth and the dividend payout and to analyze whether the level of dividend payout affects the wealth of the shareholders.2. Statement of the ProblemsIn India few studies have analyzed the relationship between the shareholders'wealth and dividend payment. Net earnings are divided into two parts –retained earnings and dividends. The retained earnings of the business may be reinvested and treated as a source of long-term funds. The dividend should be distributed to the shareholders in order to maximize their wealth as they have invested their money in the expectation of being made better off financially. Therefore, the present study mainly analyses how far the level of dividend payout affects the shareholders' wealth, particularly in (Organic and Inorganic) Chemical Companies in India.3. Objectives of the Study• To study the relationship between dividend payout and shareholders' wealth.• To analyze the impact of variation in dividend policy on shareholders' wealth of dividend paying and non-paying companies in (Organic and Inorganic) Chemical Companies India.• To analyze the impact of retained earnings and past performance in the presence of dividend policy on shareholders’ wealth of (Organic and Inorganic) Chemical Companies in India.4. Hypotheses• H1: “There is no significant difference in average market valu e relative to book value of equity between dividend payers and non-payers of (Organic and Inorganic) chemical companies.”• H2:“There is no significant impact of dividend policy on shareholders’ wealth in (Organic and Inorganic) chemical companies.”5. Methodology5.1. Sources of DataThe study used only secondary data which are collected from CMIE (Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy) prowess package. Analytical method is used for interpreting the data. The data collected from this source have been compiled and used with due care as per the requirements of the study.5.2. Sampling DesignOriginally the sample for this study has been planned to choose from the list of companies listed in National Stock Exchange (NSE). Since the number of companieslisted in the NSE is lesser in number (21 companies in Organic and Inorganic Chemical Industry), the sample of 28 companies in Chemical Industry (Organic-19 and Inorganic-9) has been chosen from 114 listed companies in BSE (Bombay Stock Exchange) using Multi-Stage Random Sampling Technique. The sample units have been chosen for the study based on the availability of required financial data like share price, DPS etc.6. Tools used for Analysis of DataThe equations and variables used for the study are given below:The subscript ‘i’ denotes the ith company in a sample of ‘n’ companies selected from a particular industry, and all variables are measured in the ith time period. Market price per share is the closing prices for the year. To analyze the data, the statistical tools that have been used are Mean, Standard Deviation, multiple regression technique and stepwise regression method to ascertain best fitted model for predicting the dividend policy impact on shareholder’s wealth. The significance of various explanatory variables has been tested by computing t-values. To determine the proportion of explained variation in the dependent variable, the coefficient of determination (R2) has been worked out. The significance of R2 has also been tested with the help of F-Value.7. Period of the StudyThe data used for the analysis are relating to the selected (Organic and Inorganic) Chemical Companies for the period of Ten years (1997-2006).8. Analysis and Results8.1. Comparison of Shareholders’ Value between Dividend Payers an dNon-Payers among Organic CompaniesBefore going through evaluating the relationship between dividend policy and shareholders’ wealth of selected (Organic and Inorganic) chemical companies in India, it has been tried to compare the average wealth of investors between dividend paying and non-paying Organic and Inorganic companies in India. The comparison of mean shareholders’ wealth of companies of all types pooled under dividend paying and non-paying companies are also carried out. The mean values between two groups arecompared with t-values. The results of the analysis are shown from tables 1 – 3.Table 1: Year-wise Comparison of Market Value to Book Value of Equity between Dividend Payers and Non-Payers among Organic Chemical Companies in IndiaYear Dividend Payers Dividend Non-Payers Mean SD Mean SD t-value LS 1997 1.89 1.55 1.00 1.88 1.13 ns1998 1.87 1.54 0.98 1.86 1.14 ns1999 1.90 1.56 0.97 1.83 1.19 ns2000 1.90 1.58 0.97 1.84 1.18 ns2001 1.87 1.53 0.99 1.89 1.12 ns2002 1.83 1.49 0.97 1.82 1.13 ns2003 1.84 1.50 0.95 1.82 1.16 ns2004 1.87 1.52 0.98 1.86 1.15 ns2005 1.82 1.41 0.97 1.89 1.11 ns2006 1.83 1.43 0.97 1.85 1.14 nsAll Years 1.86 1.44 0.98 1.76 3.81 0.01An examination of the results of year-wise comparison of market value of equity to its book value between dividend payers and non-payers of chemical companies in India (vide table 3) shows that the mean market value of equity relative to book value is well above 1 for all the years under study as well as for pooled years. It has been ranging from minimum of 1.53 in 2005 to 1.60 in 2000 with overall mean of 1.56 for all the years. This shows that the market value is well above the book value for the chemical companies which pay dividend. But the scenario has been slightly different in the case of dividend non-paying chemical companies in India.Table 2: Year-wise Comparison of Market Value to Book Value of Equity between Dividend Payers and Non-Payers among Inorganic Chemical Companies.Year Dividend Payers Dividend Non-Payers Mean SD Mean SD t-value LS 1997 1.04 0.56 -0.70 1.70 2.39 0.051998 1.03 0.54 -0.68 1.62 2.47 0.041999 1.05 0.58 -0.71 1.68 2.43 0.052001 1.10 0.72 -0.76 1.75 2.36 0.052002 1.07 0.65 -0.77 1.85 2.29 ns2003 1.07 0.66 -0.74 1.75 2.35 0.052004 1.07 0.63 -0.69 1.68 2.38 0.052005 1.05 0.59 -0.87 1.98 2.32 0.052006 1.06 0.60 -0.93 2.07 2.31 0.05All Years 1.06 0.58 -0.75 1.48 8.36 0.00An average market value relative to book value is <1, revealing marginal increase in wealth of the investors of these companies. The mean values vary between 0.50 in 2006 to 0.57 in 1997 and 1998. The decline in mean value in 2006 has indicated the decline in wealth of the investors during the period. However, comparison of mean values between dividend payer and non-payer under chemical sector (Organic and Inorganic) revealed that the wealth creation in each year does not show any significant difference. However, in the long-run, the difference is highly significant at 1 per cent level.H1: “There is no significant difference in average market value relative to book value of equity between dividend payers and non-payers of (Organic and Inorganic) chemical companies in India.”Table 3: Year-wise Comparison of Market Value to Book Value of Equity Between Dividend Payers and Non-Payers among Organic and Inorganic Chemical Companies.Year Dividend Payers Dividend Non-Payers Mean SD Mean SD t-value LS 1997 1.57 1.32 0.57 1.92 1.63 ns1998 1.56 1.30 0.57 1.89 1.64 ns1999 1.58 1.33 0.55 1.88 1.70 ns2000 1.60 1.35 0.55 1.89 1.71 ns2001 1.58 1.31 0.55 1.94 1.68 ns2002 1.54 1.27 0.54 1.91 1.68 ns2004 1.57 1.30 0.56 1.90 1.67 ns2005 1.53 1.20 0.51 2.00 1.67 ns2006 1.54 1.22 0.50 2.00 1.71 nsAll Years 1.56 1.25 0.54 1.85 5.49 0.00The H1 is rejected. Therefore, it is found that in the long-rum, wealth of shareholders of dividend paying chemical companies has increased significantly when compared to that of the dividend non-paying counterparts, which further shows the impact of dividend policy on wealth creation. Hence H1 stands: “There is significant difference in average market value relative to book value of equity between dividend payers and non-payers of (Organic and Inorganic) chemical companies in India.”8.2. Relationship between Dividend Policy and Shareholders’ WealthDividend Paying Organic Chemical CompaniesTable 4: Results of Regression showing the Impact of Dividend Policy on Market Value of Equity of ALL DIVIDEND PAYING ORGANIC CHEMICAL COMPANIES in India.The impa ct of dividend policy on shareholders’ wealth of organic and inorganic chemical companies with adoption of dividend policy has been elicited using multiple regression analysis. The Dividend per share (DPS) has been used as proxy for measuring the dividend policy of the companies and Market value (MV) of equity of the companies under study is considered as proxy for measuring the shareholders’ wealth and used as dependent variable. Apart from DPS, Retained earnings (RE), lagged Price-Earning Ratio (PEt-1) and lagged Market value of equity (MVt-1) are also used as explanatory variables in order to know whether dividend policy of Organic and Inorganic chemical companies are dominated by these factors in influencing the creation of shareholders’ wealth. Table 4 shows the regression results for all selected organic chemical companies in India with regard to impact of initiating dividend payout on shareholders’ wealth. Perusal of the results indicates that the fit of all four models is significant at 1 per cent level (F = 23.77, p < 0.01 formodel 1, F = 11.77, p < 0.01 for model 2, F = 7.44, p < 0.01 for model 3 and F = 123.15, p < 0.01 for model 4). Among the four models, F value for model 4 is very high. Further, the coefficients of DPS in all four models are highly significant at 1 per cent level and positive in sign (β = 92.68, t = 4.88, p < 0.01 in model 1; β = 92.81, t = 4.84, p < 0.01 in model 2; β = 94.57, t = 4.66, p < 0.01 in model 3; and β = 32.34, t = 3.08, p < 0.01 in model 4). Also, from the perusal of adjusted R2 values, it is clear that the explanatory variables in the model 4 could together explain 80.46 per cent of the variance in market value, whereas explanatory variables in model 1, 2 and 3 could, together, explain 18.70 per cent, 17.87 per cent and 17.83 per cent respectively of the variance in dependent variable Hence, model 4 is the appropriate one for the final interpretation. Interestingly, the coefficient of DPS in model 4, though statistically significant, has declined considerably in the presence of RE and lagged MV, even though the coefficients of those variables are insignificant. Also, the intercepts, which are insignificant in the first three models, become significant in model 4, indicating that there are some factors inherent in the market dominated over dividend policy when market has started considering RE and lagged MV of organic chemical companies under chemical sector.H2: “There is no significant impact of dividend policy on shareholders’ wealth in Organic Chemical Companies in I ndia.”9. Summary and Concluding RemarksGenerally, higher dividend increases the market value of the share and vice versa. Shareholders preferred current dividend to future income so, dividend is considered as an important factor which determines the shar eholders’ wealth. This is normally true in case of salaried individuals, retired pensioners and others with limited incomes. Dividend has information content and the payment of dividend indicates that the company has a good earning capacity. The wealth of the shareholders is greatly influenced mainly by five variables viz., Growth in Sales, Improvement of Profit Margin, Capital Investment Decisions (both working capital and fixed capital), Capital Structure Decisions, Cost of Capital (Dividend on Equity, Interest on Debt) etc. As far as the dividend paying companies are concerned, there is a significantimpact of dividend policy on shareholders’ wealth in Organic Chemical Companies. Whereas, as far as the Inorganic Chemical Companies are concerned, the share holders’ wealth is not influenced by the dividend payout.Source: R. Azhagaiah, Sabari Priya.N. The Impact of Dividend Policy on Shareholders’ Wealth. International Research Journal of Finance and Economics,2008(20) :P181－187.译文：对股东财富影响的股利政策1．简介印度经济不断发展，在全球化、自由化和私有化，特别是信息技术取得了迅速进展的情形下，带来了在各个活动领域的激烈竞争。

外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策在当今复杂多变的经济环境中，上市公司财务舞弊问题日益严重，不仅损害了投资者的利益，破坏了市场的公平和透明，也给整个经济社会带来了负面影响。

本文旨在深入探讨外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊的原因，并提出相应的对策，以维护市场的健康稳定发展。

一、外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊的原因（一）利益驱动利益是导致外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊的首要原因。

公司管理层为了达到个人或团体的经济利益，如获取高额薪酬、奖金、股票期权等，可能会操纵财务数据。

此外，公司为了满足上市要求、获得融资、避免退市等，也会不惜通过舞弊手段来美化财务报表。

（二）公司治理结构不完善公司内部治理结构的缺陷为财务舞弊提供了机会。

如果董事会、监事会等监督机制失效，管理层权力过大且缺乏有效制衡，就容易出现财务舞弊行为。

同时，内部审计部门独立性不足，无法发挥有效的监督作用，也使得财务舞弊难以被及时发现和制止。

（三）外部监管不力证券监管部门的监管力度不足，法律法规不够健全，对财务舞弊行为的处罚力度不够严厉，使得上市公司违法成本较低。

此外，审计机构、评级机构等第三方中介机构未能尽职尽责，也在一定程度上纵容了财务舞弊行为的发生。

（四）压力与动机公司面临的业绩压力、市场竞争压力以及来自股东和投资者的期望压力，都可能促使管理层采取不正当手段来达到预期的财务目标。

例如，当公司业绩不佳时，为了稳定股价、避免投资者恐慌抛售，管理层可能会选择财务舞弊。

（五）财务人员职业道德缺失部分财务人员缺乏职业操守和道德底线，为了个人利益或者迫于上级压力，参与或协助财务舞弊。

他们可能故意篡改财务数据、编制虚假财务报告，严重违背了会计职业的诚信原则。

（六）信息不对称上市公司与投资者之间存在信息不对称，投资者难以获取公司真实、准确、完整的财务信息。

这种信息差距使得上市公司更容易进行财务舞弊，而投资者难以察觉和防范。

二、外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊的对策（一）完善公司治理结构建立健全的公司治理机制，优化董事会结构，增强董事会的独立性和专业性。

外文翻译原文Material Source: Fortune; 11/24/2008 Author: Tully-Shawn Dividend policy, one of the three corporation financial decisions, has been concerned among theoreticians and practitioners. John Linter (1956) brought forward a model of dividend adjustment. According to the model, firm that is currently paying dividends at the rate of Depts., and that has a target payout ratio of POR, ill adjust (ADJ) its dividend rate, but less than fully, as its earnings per share (EPS) changes. Modigliani and Miller (1961) argued that dividend policy has no effect on either the price of a firm’s stock or its cost of capital, a perfect world, the dividend policy is irrelevant to shareholders wealth. His proposition has laid a solid theoretical foundation for the dividend policy. After that, economists have offered explanations in different ways about dividend payment, such as effect of taxes, ividend signaling, agency costs issues and transaction costs. Over decades, conformists could not come to an agreement. Thus, Black, Fischer (1976) gave it a name “dividend puzzle”.In China, the dividend policy of listed companies has its unique characteristic in the strong emerging market economy if comparing the type of dividend payment in China with the type used in developed countries. In addition to cash dividend and stock dividend, several mixed types of dividend payment derive from cash dividend and stock dividend such as mix of bonus issues and dividend, mix of rights issues and dividend, According to China Secur ities Journal’s relative statistical data, there are more listed companies who adopted the pattern of stock dividend in 1993 which were 36%, and more listed companies adopted cash dividend policy during 1994 and 1995 which were 40% and 36% respectively. The companies that paid no dividends account for 35%, 54%, 59% and 62% respectively during the period of 1996 and 1999. The proportion of total listed companies that adopted cash dividend increased from 47% to 54% during 2000 and 2001.In this situation, in o rder to resolve the “dividend puzzle”, many Chinese scholars have done a number of empirical studies. Two main approaches were taken in these studies:First, using event study method to analyze the influence of different dividend the policy on share price and the value of a firm. Wei Chen at (1999) empirical analyzedthe dividend policy of Shanghai stock market by the method of Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) and studies the existence and character of the signaling effect of dividend policy in this market. This study showed that the degree of CAR was very different from different dividend policy. The CAR of right issue was higher than cash dividend but lower than bonus. Yu Qiao et al (2001) found that there was evidential positive statistical relationship between the dividends and mix dividend policies of firms on the stock market. But their study showed that the market was not sensitive with cash dividends. This phenomenon is opposition with the result being observed in developed countries’ mature markets. Gang Wei (2000) found that dividend policy often signal the information of long-term earnings about a firm for investors.Second, based on diversified dividend policy theories, analyzers analyzed dynamic reasons of dividend policy, and tried to find impact of dynamic factors and influencing extent on dividend policy of firms. Different point of view offered different significant conclusions. For example, cash dividend may be affected by currency balance and retained earnings, and has positive relationship with them (Yang, 2000); different size of firms choose different pattern of dividend: small firms tend to choose stock dividend, while large firms prefer cash dividend (Yan, 2001; Zhao, 2001). If the firms have lower proportion of holding state shares and corporative shares and the stronger self-growth and development of firms, the firms enjoy the higher stock dividend payment, and also the lower cash dividend payment (Lu, 1999).Domestic theoretic and empirical researches based mostly on profit flow (net income, EPS or retained earnings) investigated the dividend policy, and ignored the effect on cash flow. In fact, cash dividend distribution not only depends on profitability of firms, but also depends on free cash flow to firm. Compare profit flow with cash flow, the latter not only express the value which has been created by firm, but also express how many value that has been realized. From the point of view of cash flow to analyze it, it can patch the faults of profit flow (accounting policy choice, earning management), and declare real relationship between cash flow and the ability of cash payout.Recently, more and more investors prefer cash flow, because of the idea that “cash is king” which have become many managers’ conception. Therefore,this paper seeks to analyze the problem of cash dividend payment from the cash flow point of view, and three questions answered in this paper: (1) how much cash will be distributed to shareholders by paying a cash dividend after all expenses. What is theactual dividend? (2) Why is the cash dividend payment higher or lower than cash flow? What are the factors that affect cash dividend payment? (3) What are the features of cash dividend payment in different industries?Firstly, the payment of cash dividend is usually less than accounting profit in Chinese listed companies, but quite a number of listed companies which had more payment of cash dividend than free cash flow to equity, the gap between cash dividend and FCFE is right issue. By theory, the phenomenon of both cash dividend and right issue is contrary to basic regulation of corporate financial management. This phenomenon of self-contradiction may be related to the rule by China security commission in 2000, which the listed companies must have cash dividend payment last three years while they finance by adding shares or right issue. In contrast, cash dividend payment in some listed companies were less than free cash flow to equity, which is result in forming cash storage in these firms. In China, dividend payment of firm can be described as: the firms have very few cash dividend payment and more stock dividend payment, while some firms have not paid any dividend. This is maybe one of the evidences that Chinese stock market full of speculation and unfair financing from stock market.Secondly, payment of cash dividend in Chinese listed companies is relevantly positive for current return per share and total assets but negative for debt to asset ratio. For the index of cash flow, it is closely related to the payment of cash dividend and net operating cash flow; the index of free cash flow to equity is irrelevant. This is because listed companies understand the index of free cash flow to equity in significant limit, they seldom use free cash flow. Additionally, the payment of cash dividend is irrelevant to non-outstanding shares.Lastly, comparatively, the results indicate that firms with a higher ROE, ONCF and higher cash dividend payment belong to traditional industry; the firms with a higher ROE, lower ONCF and lower cash dividend payment belong to high-tech industry. We find there are quite many firms, which cannot make enough residual cash flow, but they still invest big projects. They return back cash dividend to shareholders by financing from stock market. Other firms with little investment opportunity have plenty of cash flow but no cash dividend payment, still finance too. These phenomena should be paid more attention to.译文股利政策资料来源：财富；11/24/2008作者：Tully-Shawn 股利政策，是理论家和实践家一直关注的公司的三个财务决策之一。

中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Profit PatternsThe most important objective of companies is to create, develop and maintain one or more competitive advantages in order to generate dividends for the shareholders. For a long time, it was simply a question of dominating the market, either by costs or by a policy of differentiation. As Michael Porter advised, it was essential to avoid being “stuck in the middle”. This way of thinking set up competitive rivalry in a closed world, and tended towards stability. This model is less and less relevant today for whole sectors of the economy. We see a multitude of strategic movements which defy the logic of the old system. “Profit Patterns” lists numerous strategies which have joined the small number that we knew before. These patterns often combine to give rise to strategic models which are better adapted to the new and changing needs of the consumer.Increasing the value of a company depends on its capacity to predict Valuemigration from one economic sector to another or from one company to another has unimaginable proportions, in particular because of the new phenomena that mass investment and venture capital represent. The public is looking for companies that will succeed in the future and bet on the winner.Major of managers have a talent for recognizing development market trends There are some changing and development trends in all business sectors. They can be erected into models, thereby making it possible to acquire a technique for predicting them. This consists of recognizing them in the actual economic context. This book proposes thirty strategic prediction models divided into seven families. Predicting is not enough: one still has to act in time! Managers analyze development trends in the environment in order to identify opportunities. They then have to determine a strategic plan for their company, and set up a system aligning the internal and external organizational structure as a function of their objectives.For most of the 20th century, mastering strategic evolution models was not a determining factor, and formulas for success were fixed and relatively simple. In industry, the basic model stated that profit was a function of relative market share. Today, this rule is confronted with more and more contradictions: among car manufacturers for example, where small companies like Toyota are more profitable than General Motors and Ford. The highest rises in value have become the exclusive right of the companies with the most efficient business designs. These upstart companies have placed themselves in the profit zone of their sectors thanks, in part, to their size, but also to their new way of doing business – exploiting new rules which are sources of value creation. Among the new rules which define a good strategic plan are:1. Strong orientation towards the customer2. Internal decisions which are coherent with the overall activity, concerning the products and services as well as the involvement in the different activities of the value chain3. An efficient mechanism for value–capture.4. A powerful source of differentiation and of strategic control, inspiring investorconfidence in future cash-flow.5. An internal organization carefully designed to support and reinforce the company’s strategic plan.Why does value migrate? The explanation lies largely in the explosion of risk-capital activities in the USA. Since the 40’s, of the many companies that have been created, about a thousand have allowed talented employees, the “brains”, to work without the heavy structures of very big companies. The risk–capital factor is now entering a new phase in the USA, in that the recipes for innovation and value creation are spreading from just the risk-capital companies to all big companies. A growing number of the 500 richest companies have an internal structure for getting into the game of investing in companies with high levels of value-creation. Where does this leave Eur ope? According to recent research, innovation in strategic thinking is under way in Europe, albeit with a slight time-lag. Globalization is making the acceptation of these value-creation rules a condition of global competitively .There is a second phenomenon that has an even more radical influence on value-creation –polarization: The combination of a convincing and innovative strategic plan, strategic control and a dominant market share creates a terrific increase in investor confidence. The investors believe that the company has established its position of strength not only for the current, but also for the next strategic cycle. The result is an exponential growth in value, and especially a spectacular out-distancing of the direct rivals. The polarization process typically has two stages. In phase 1, the competitors seem to be level. In fact, one of them has unde rstood, has “got it”, before the others and is investing in a new strategic action plan to take into account the pattern which is starting to redefine the sector. Phase 2 begins when the conditions are right for the pattern to take over: at this moment, th e competitor who “got it”, attracts the attention of customers, investors and potential recruits (the brains). The intense public attention snowballs, the market value explodes to leave the nearest competitor way behind. Examples are numerous in various sectors: Microsoft against Apple and Lotus, Coca-Cola against Pepsi, Nike against Reebok and so on. Polarization of value raises the stakes and adds a sense of urgency: The first company to anticipate market changeand to take appropriate investment decisions can gain a considerable lead thanks to recognition by the market.In a growing number of sectors today, competition is concentrated on the race towards mindshare. The company which leads this race attracts customers who attract others in an upwards spiral. At the transition from phase 1 to phase 2, the managing team’s top priority is to win the mindshare battle. There are three stages in this strategy: mind sharing with customers gives an immediate competitive advantage in terms of sales; mind sharing with investors provides the resources to maintain this advantage, and mind sharing with potential recruits increases the chances of maintaining the lead in the short and the long term. This triple capture sets off a chain reaction releasing an enormous amount of economic energy. Markets today are characterized by a staggering degree of transparency. Successes and failures are instantaneously visible to the whole world. The extraordinary success of some investors encourages professional and amateurs to look for the next hen to lay a golden egg. This investment mentality has spread to the employment market, where compensations (such as stock-options) are increasingly linked to results. From these three components - customers, investors and new talent – is created the accelerating phenomenon, polarization: thousands of investors look towards the leader at the beginning of the race. The share value goes up at the same time as the rise in customer numbers and the public perception that the current leader will be the winner. The rise in share-price gets more attention from the media, and so on. How to get the knowledge before the others, in order to launch the company into leadership? There are several attitudes, forms of behavior and knowledge that can be used: being paranoiac, thinking from day to day that the current market conditions are going to change; talking to people with different points of view; being in the field, looking for signs of change. And above all, building a research network to find the patterns of strategic change, not only in one’s particular sector, but in the whole economy, so as always to understand the patterns a bit better and a bit sooner than the competitors.Experienced managers can detect similarities between movements of value in different circumstances. 30 of these patterns can be divided into 7 categories.Some managers understand migrations of value before other managers, allowing them to continually improvise their business plan in order to find and exploit value. Experience is an obvious advantage: situations can repeat themselves or be similar to others, so that experienced managers recognize and assimilate them quickly. There about 30 patterns .which can be put into 7 groups according to their key factors. It is important to understand that the patterns have three general characteristics: multiplicity,variants and cycles. The principle of multiplicity indicates that while a sector or a company may be affected by just one simple strategic pattern, most situations are more complicated and involve several simultaneously evolving patterns. The variants to the known models are developed in different circumstances and according to the creativity of the users of the models. Studying the variants gives more finesse in model-analysis. Finally, each model depends on economic cycles which are more or less long. The time a pattern takes to develop depends on its nature and also on the nature of the customers and sector in question.1) The first family of strategic evolution patterns consists of the six “Mega patterns”: these models do not address any particular dimension of the activity (customer, channels of distribution and value chain), but have an overall and transversal influence. They owe their name “Mega” to their range and their impact (as much from the point of view of the different economic sectors as from the duration). The six Mega models are: No profit, Back to profit, Convergence, Collapse in the middle, De facto standard and Technology shifts the board. • The No profit pattern is characterized by a zero or negative result over several years in a company or economic sector. The first factor which favors this pattern is the existence of a single strategic a plan in several competitors: they all apply differentiation by price to capture market-share. The second factor is the loss of the “crutch” of the sector, that is the end of a system of the help, such as artificially maintained interest levels, or state subsidies. Among the best examples of this in the USA are in agriculture and the railway industry in the 50’s and 60’s,and in the aeronautical industry in the 80’s and 90’s.• The Back to profit pattern is characterized by the emergence of innovative strategic plans or the projects which permit the return of profits. In the 80’s, the watch industry was stagnating in a noprofits zone. The vision of Nicolas Hayek allowed Swatch and other brands to get back into a profit-making situation thanks to a products pyramid built around the new brand.The authors rightly attribute this phenomenon to investors’ recognition of the superiority of these new business designs. However this interpretation merits refinement: the superiority resides less in the companies’ current capacity to identify the first an indications of strategic discontinuity than in their future capacity to develop a portfolio of strategic options and to choose the right one at the right time. The value of a such companies as Amazon and AOL, which benefit from financial polarization, can only be explained in this way. To be competitive in the long-term, a company must not only excel in its “real” market, but also in its financial market. Competition in both is very fierce, and one can not neglect either of these fields of battle without suffering the consequences. This share-market will assume its own importance alongside the commercial market, and in the future, its successful exploitation will be a key to the strategic superiority of publicly-quoted companies.Increasing the value of a company depends on its capacity to predictValue migration from one economic sector to another or from one company to another has unimaginable proportions, in particular because of the new phenomena that mass investment and venture capital represent. The public is looking for companies that will succeed in the future and bet on the winner.Major managers have a talent for recognizing development market trendsThere are some changing and development trends in all business sectors. They can be erected into models, thereby making it possible to acquire a technique for predicting them. This consists of recognizing them in the actual economic context.Predicting is not enough: one still has to act in timeManagers analyze development trends in the environment in order to identify opportunities. They then have to determine a strategic plan for their company, and set up a system aligning the internal and external organizational structure as a function of their objectivesSource: David .J. Morrison, 2001. “Profit Patterns”. Times Business.pp.17-27.译文：利润模式一个公司价值的增长依赖于公司自身的能力的预期，价值的迁移也只是从一个经济部门转移到另外一个经济部门或者是一个公司到另外一个意想不到的公司。

外文翻译Capital Structure and Firm Performance Material Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve SystemAuthor: Allen N. BergerAgency costs represent important problems in corporate governance in both financial and nonfinancial industries. The separation of ownership and control in a professionally managed firm may result in managers exerting insufficient work effort, indulging in perquisites, choosing inputs or outputs that suit their own preferences, or otherwise failing to maximize firm value. In effect, the agency costs of outside ownership equal the lost value from professional managers maximizing their own utility, rather than the value of the firm.Theory suggests that the choice of capital structure may help mitigate these agency costs. Under the agency costs hypothesis, high leverage or a low equity/asset ratio reduces the agency costs of outside equity and increases firm value by constraining or encouraging managers to act more in the interests of shareholders. Since the seminal paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976), a vast literature on such agency-theoretic explanations of capital structure has developed (see Harris and Raviv 1991 and Myers 2001 for reviews). Greater financial leverage may affect managers and reduce agency costs through the threat of liquidation, which causes personal losses to managers of salaries, reputation, perquisites, etc. (e.g., Grossman and Hart 1982, Williams 1987), and through pressure to generate cash flow to pay interest expenses (e.g., Jensen 1986). Higher leverage can mitigate conflicts between shareholders and managers concerning the choice of investment (e.g., Myers 1977), the amount of risk to undertake (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976, Williams 1987), the conditions under which the firm is liquidated (e.g., Harris and Raviv 1990), and dividend policy (e.g., Stulz 1990).A testable prediction of this class of models is that increasing the leverage ratio should result in lower agency costs of outside equity and improved firm performance, all else held equal. However, when leverage becomes relatively high, further increases generate significant agency costs of outside debt – including higher expected costs of bankruptcy or financial distress – arising from conflicts between bondholders and shareholders.1 Because it is difficult to distinguish empiricallybetween the two sources of agency costs, we follow the literature and allow the relationship between total agency costs and leverage to be non-monotonic.Despite the importance of this theory, there is at best mixed empirical evidence in the extant literature (see Harris and Raviv 1991, Titman 2000, and Myers 2001 for reviews). Tests of the agency costs hypothesis typically regress measures of firm performance on the equity capital ratio or other indicator of leverage plus some control variables. At least three problems appear in the prior studies that we address in our application.First, the measures of firm performance are usually ratios fashioned from financial statements or stock market prices, such as industry-adjusted operating margins or stock market returns. These measures do not net out the effects of differences in exogenous market factors that affect firm value, but are beyond management’s control and therefore cannot reflect agency costs. Thus, the tests may be confounded by factors that are unrelated to agency costs. As well, these studies generally do not set a separate benchmark for each firm’s performance that would be realized if agency costs were minimized.We address the measurement problem by using profit efficiency as our indicator of firm performance. The link between productive efficiency and agency costs was first suggested by Stigler (1976), and profit efficiency represents a refinement of the efficiency concept developed since that time.2 Profit efficiency evaluates how close a firm is to earning the profit that a best-practice firm would earn facing the same exogenous conditions. This has the benefit of controlling for factors outside the control of management that are not part of agency costs. In contrast, comparisons of standard financial ratios, stock market returns, and similar measures typically do not control for these exogenous factors. Even when the measures used in the literature are industry adjusted, they may not account for important differences across firms within an industry –such as local market conditions – as we are able to do with profit efficiency. In addition, the performance of a best-practice firm under the same exogenous conditions is a reasonable benchmark for how the firm would be expected to perform if agency costs were minimized.Second, the prior research generally does not take into account the possibility of reverse causation from performance to capital structure. If firm performance affects the choice of capital structure, then failure to take this reverse causality into account may result in simultaneous-equations bias. That is, regressions of firmperformance on a measure of leverage may confound the effects of capital structure on performance with the effects of performance on capital structure.We address this problem by allowing for reverse causality from performance to capital structure. We discuss below two hypotheses for why firm performance may affect the choice of capital structure, the efficiency-risk hypothesis and the franchise-value hypothesis. We construct a two-equation structural model and estimate it using two-stage least squares (2SLS). An equation specifying profit efficiency as a function of the firm’s equity capital ratio and other variables is use d to test the agency costs hypothesis, and an equation specifying the equity capital ratio as a function of the firm’s profit efficiency and other variables is used to test the net effects of the efficiency-risk and franchise-value hypotheses. Both equations are econometrically identified through exclusion restrictions that are consistent with the theories.Third, some, but not all of the prior studies did not take ownership structure into account. Under virtually any theory of agency costs, ownership structure is important, since it is the separation of ownership and control that creates agency costs (e.g., Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet 1985). Greater insider shares may reduce agency costs, although the effect may be reversed at very high levels of insider holdings (e.g., Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988). As well, outside block ownership or institutional holdings tend to mitigate agency costs by creating a relatively efficient monitor of the managers (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1986). Exclusion of the ownership variables may bias the test results because the ownership variables may be correlated with the dependent variable in the agency cost equation (performance) and with the key exogenous variable (leverage) through the reverse causality hypotheses noted above.To address this third problem, we include ownership structure variables in the agency cost equation explaining profit efficiency. We include insider ownership, outside block holdings, and institutional holdings.Our application to data from the banking industry is advantageous because of the abundance of quality data available on firms in this industry. In particular, we have detailed financial data for a large number of firms producing comparable products with similar technologies, and information on market prices and other exogenous conditions in the local markets in which they operate. In addition, some studies in this literature find evidence of the link between the efficiency of firms and variables that are recognized to affect agency costs, including leverage andownership structure (see Berger and Mester 1997 for a review).Although banking is a regulated industry, banks are subject to the same type of agency costs and other influences on behavior as other industries. The banks in the sample are subject to essentially equal regulatory constraints, and we focus on differences across banks, not between banks and other firms. Most banks are well above the regulatory capital minimums, and our results are based primarily on differences at the margin, rather than the effects of regulation. Our test of the agency costs hypothesis using data from one industry may be built upon to test a number of corporate finance hypotheses using information on virtually any industry.We test the agency costs hypothesis of corporate finance, under which high leverage reduces the agency costs of outside equity and increases firm value by constraining or encouraging managers to act more in the interests of shareholders. Our use of profit efficiency as an indicator of firm performance to measure agency costs, our specification of a two-equation structural model that takes into account reverse causality from firm performance to capital structure, and our inclusion of measures of ownership structure address problems in the extant empirical literature that may help explain why prior empirical results have been mixed. Our application to the banking industry is advantageous because of the detailed data available on a large number of comparable firms and the exogenous conditions in their local markets. Although banks are regulated, we focus on differences across banks that are driven by corporate governance issues, rather than any differences in-regulation, given that all banks are subject to essentially the same regulatory framework and most banks are well above the regulatory capital minimums.Our findings are consistent with the agency costs hypothesis – higher leverage or a lower equity capital ratio is associated with higher profit efficiency, all else equal. The effect is economically significant as well as statistically significant. An increase in leverage as represented by a 1 percentage point decrease in the equity capital ratio yields a predicted increase in profit efficiency of about 6 percentage points, or a gain of about 10% in actual profits at the sample mean. This result is robust to a number of specification changes, including different measures of performance (standard profit efficiency, alternative profit efficiency, and return on equity), different econometric techniques (two-stage least squares and OLS), different efficiency measurement methods (distribution-free and fixed-effects), different samples (the “ownership sample” of banks with detailed ownership data and the “full sample” of banks), and the different sample periods (1990s and 1980s).However, the data are not consistent with the prediction that the relationship between performance and leverage may be reversed when leverage is very high due to the agency costs of outside debt.We also find that profit efficiency is responsive to the ownership structure of the firm, consistent with agency theory and our argument that profit efficiency embeds agency costs. The data suggest that large institutional holders have favorable monitoring effects that reduce agency costs, although large individual investors do not. As well, the data are consistent with a non-monotonic relationship between performance and insider ownership, similar to findings in the literature.With respect to the reverse causality from efficiency to capital structure, we offer two competing hypotheses with opposite predictions, and we interpret our tests as determining which hypothesis empirically dominates the other. Under the efficiency-risk hypothesis, the expected high earnings from greater profit efficiency substitute for equity capital in protecting the firm from the expected costs of bankruptcy or financial distress, whereas under the franchise-value hypothesis, firms try to protect the expected income stream from high profit efficiency by holding additional equity capital. Neither hypothesis dominates the other for the ownership sample, but the substitution effect of the efficiency-risk hypothesis dominates for the full sample, suggesting a difference in behavior for the small banks that comprise most of the full sample.The approach developed in this paper can be built upon to test the agency costs hypothesis or other corporate finance hypotheses using data from virtually any industry. Future research could extend the analysis to cover other dimensions of capital structure. Agency theory suggests complex relationships between agency costs and different types of securities. We have analyzed only one dimension of capital structure, the equity capital ratio. Future research could consider other dimensions, such as the use of subordinated notes and debentures, or other individual debt or equity instruments.译文资本结构与企业绩效资料来源: 联邦储备系统理事会作者：Allen N. Berger 在财务和非财务行业，代理成本在公司治理中都是重要的问题。

外文翻译---浅析企业负债经营的利与弊nEnterprise liability n is a business model that has gained popularity in recent years。

It involves assigning responsibility for the ns of a company to the company itself。

rather than to individual employees or managers。

This approach can have both advantages and disadvantages。

which will be discussed in this article.Advantages of Enterprise Liability nOne of the main advantages of enterprise liability n is that it can help to ce the risk of lawsuits against individual employees or managers。

When a company is held liable for its ns。

it can be easier for employees to avoid personal liability。

This can be especially important in industries where the risk of lawsuits is high。

such as healthcare or finance.Another advantage of enterprise liability n is that it can helpto improve accountability within a company。

文献信息：文献标题：Impact of Aggressive Working Capital Management Policy on Firms’ Profitability（激进的营运资本管理政策对企业盈利能力的影响）国外作者：Mian Sajid Nazir，Talat Afza文献出处：《The IUP Journal of Applied Finance》,2009,Vol.15,PP19-30 字数统计：英文2669单词，14456字符；中文4407汉字外文文献：Impact of Aggressive Working Capital Management Policyon Firms’ ProfitabilityIntroductionThe corporate finance literature has traditionally focused on the study of long-term financial decisions, particularly investments, capital structure, dividends or company valuation decisions. However, short-term assets and liabilities are important components of total assets and need to be carefully analyzed. Management of these short-term assets and liabilities warrants a careful investigation since the working capital m anagement plays an important role in a firm’s profitability and risk as well as its value (Smith, 1980). Efficient management of working capital is a fundamental part of the overall corporate strategy in creating the shareholders’ value. Firms try to keep an optimal level of working capital that maximizes their value (Deloof, 2003; Howorth and Westhead, 2003 and Afza and Nazir, 2007).In general, from the perspective of Chief Financial Officer (CFO), working capital management is a simple and straightforward concept of ensuring the ability of the organization to fund the difference between the short-term assets and short-term liabilities (Harris, 2005). However, a ‘Total’ approach is desired as it can cover all thecompany’s activities relating to vendor, cu stomer and product (Hall, 2002). In practice, working capital management has become one of the most important issues in the organizations where many financial executives are struggling to identify the basic working capital drivers and an appropriate level of working capital (Lamberson, 1995). Consequently, companies can minimize risk and improve the overall performance by understanding the role and drivers of working capital management.A firm may adopt an aggressive working capital management policy with a low level of current assets as a percentage of total assets, or it may also be used for the financing decisions of the firm in the form of high level of current liabilities as a percentage of total liabilities. Excessive levels of current assets may have a negative effect on the firm’s profitability, whereas a low level of current assets may lead to a lower level of liquidity and stockouts, resulting in difficulties in maintaining smooth operations (Van Horne and Wachowicz, 2004).The main objective of working capital management is to maintain an optimal balance between each of the working capital components. Business success heavily depends on the financial executives’ ability to effectively manage receivables, inventory, and payables (Filbeck and Krueger, 2005). Firms can reduce their financing costs and/or increase the funds available for expansion projects by minimizing the amount of investment tied up in current assets. Most of the financial managers’ time and efforts are allocated towards bringing non-optimal levels of current assets and liabilities back to optimal levels (Lamberson, 1995). An optimal level of working capital would be the one in which a balance is achieved between risk and efficiency. It requires continuous monitoring to maintain proper level in various components of working capital, i.e., cash receivables, inventory and payables, etc.In general, current assets are considered as one of the important components of total assets of a firm. A firm may be able to reduce the investment in fixed assets by renting or leasing plant and machinery, whereas the same policy cannot be followed for the components of working capital. The high level of current assets may reduce the risk of liquidity associated with the opportunity cost of funds that may have been invested in long-term assets. Though the impact of working capital policies onprofitability is highly important, only a few empirical studies have been carried out to examine this relationship. This study investigates the potential relationship of aggressive/conservative policies with the accounting and market measures of profitability of Pakistani firms using a panel data set for the period 1998-2005. The present study is expected to contribute to better understand these policies and their impact on profitability, especially in emerging markets like Pakistan.Research MethodologyVariables Used in the StudyThis study uses aggressive investment policy as used by Weinraub and Visscher (1998), who analyzed working capital policies of 126 industrial firms in the US market. Aggressive Investment Policy (AIP) results in minimal level of investment in current assets versus fixed assets. In contrast, a conservative investment policy places a greater proportion of capital in liquid assets with the opportunity cost of less profitability. If the level of current assets increases in proportion to the total assets of the firm, the management is said to be more conservative in managing the current assets of the firm. In order to measure the degree of aggressiveness of working capital investment policy, the following ratio was used:where a lower ratio means a relatively aggressive policy.On the other hand, an Aggressive Financing Policy (AFP) utilizes higher levels of current liabilities and less long-term debt. In contrast, a conservative financing policy uses more long-term debt and capital and less current liabilities. The firms are more aggressive in terms of current liabilities management if they are concentrating on the use of more current liabilities which put their liquidity on risk. The degree of aggressiveness of a financing policy adopted by a firm is measured by working capital financing policy, and the following ratio is used:where a higher ratio means a relatively aggressive policy.The impact of working capital policies on the profitability has been analyzed through accounting measures of profitability as well as market measures of profitability, i.e., Return on Assets (ROA) and Tobin’s q. These variables of return are calculated as:Tobin’s q compares the value of a company given by financial markets with the value of a company’s assets. A low q (between 0 and 1) means that the cost to replace a firm’s assets is greater than the value of its stock. This implies that the stock is undervalued. Conversely, a high q (greater than 1) implies that a firm’s stock is more expensive than the replacement cost of its assets, which implies that the stock is overvalued. It is calculated as:where Market Value of Firm (MVF) is the sum of book value of long plus short term and market value of equity. Market value of equity is calculated by multiplying the number of shares outstanding with the current market price of the stock in a particular year.Control VariablesIn working capital literature, various studies have used the control variables along with the main variables of working capital in order to have an apposite analysis of working capital management on the profitability of firms (Lamberson, 1995; Smith and Begemann, 1997; Deelof, 2003; Eljelly, 2004; Teruel and Solano, 2005 and Lazaridis and Tryfonidis, 2006). On the same lines, along with working capital variables, the present study has taken into consideration some control variables relating to firms such as the size of the firm, the growth in its sales, and its financial leverage. The size of the firm (SIZE) has been measured by the logarithm of its totalassets, as the original large value of total assets may disturb the analysis. The growth of firm (GROWTH) is measured by variation in its annual sales value with reference to previous year’s sales[(Sales t –Sales t –1)/Sales t –1]. Moreover, the financial leverage (LVRG) was taken as the debt to equity ratio of each firm for the whole sample period. Some studies, like Deloof (2003) in his study of large Belgian firms, also considered the ratio of fixed financial assets to total assets as a control variable; however, this variable cannot be included in the present study because of unavailability of data, as most of the firms do not disclose full information in their financial statements. Finally, since good economic conditions tend to be reflected in a firm’s profitability (Lamberson, 1995), this phenomenon has been controlled for the evolution of the economic cycle using the GDPGR variable, which measures the real annual GDP growth in Pakistan for each of the study year from 1998 to 2005.Statistical AnalysisThe impact of aggressive and conservative working capital policies on the profitability of the firms has been evaluated by applying the panel data regression analysis. The performance variables (ROA and Tobin’s q) as well as the TCA/TA and TCL/TA along with the control variables were regressed using the SPSS software. The following regression equations are run to estimate the impact of working capital policies on the profitability measures.where,TCA/TA=Total current assets to total assets ratioTCL/TA i=Total current liabilities to total assets ratioROA i=Return on assetsTobin’s q i=V alue of qSIZE i=Natural log of firm sizeGROWTH i=Growth of salesLVRG i=Financial leverage of firmsGDPGR i=Real Annual GDP growth rate of Pakistanα=Intercept; andε=Error term of the modelSample and DataThe sample of the study consists of all non-financial firms listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE). KSE has divided the non-financial firms into various industrial sectors based on their nature of business. In order to be included in the sample, a firm must be in business for the whole study period. Also, firms should neither have been delisted by the KSE nor merged with any other firm during the whole window period. New incumbents in the market during the study period have also not been included in the sample. Furthermore, firms must have complete data for the period 1998-2005. Firms with negative equity during the study period have also been excluded. Thus, the final sample consists of 204 non-financial firms from 17 various industrial sectors.This study used annual financial data of 204 non-financial firms for the period 1998-2005. The panel data set was developed for eight years and for the 204 sampled firms which produced 1,632 year-end observations. The required financial data for the purpose of the study was obtained from the respective companies’annual reports and publications of State Bank of Pakistan. The data regarding annual average market prices was collected from the daily quotations of KSE.AnalysisTable 1 presents the results of regression model in which the impact of working capital investment policy on the performance measurements has been examined. The F-values of regression models run are found statistically significant, whereas Durbin-Watson statistics of more than 1.8 indicate less correlation among the independent variables of the regressions models. The t-statistics of working capital investment policy is positive and statistically significant at 1% level for Return on Assets and Tobin’s q. The positive coefficient of TCA/TA indicates a negative relationship between the degree of aggressiveness of investment policy and return on assets. As the TCA/TA increases, the degree of aggressiveness decreases, and return on assets increases. Therefore, there is a negative relationship between the relative degree of aggressiveness of working capital investment policies of firms and both performance measures, i.e., ROA and Tobin’s q. This similarity in market and accounting returns confirms the notion that investors do not believe in the adoption of aggressive approach in the working capital management, hence, they do not give any additional weight to the firms on KSE.Table 2 reports regression results for working capital financing policy and the performance measures. The F-value of regression models and Durbin-Watson statistics indicate similar results as reported in Table 1. The negative value of coefficient for TCL/TA also points out the negative relationship between the aggressiveness of working capital financing policy and return on assets. The higher the TCL/TA ratio, the more aggressive the financing policy, that yields negative return on assets. However, surprisingly, the relationship between Tobin’s q and working capital financing policy has been established as positive and statistically significant. Investors were found giving more weight to the firms which are adopting an aggressive approach towards working capital financing policy and having higher levels of short-term and spontaneous financing on their balance sheets.The control variables used in the regression models are natural log of firm size, sales growth, real GDP growth and the average leverage. All the control variables have their impact on the performance of the firms. Firms’size causes the returns of the firms to be increased and it is found to be statistically significant. Moreover, GROWTH and LVRG are found to be significantly associated with the book-based returns on assets which confirm the notion that leverage and growth are strongly correlated with the book value-based performance measures (Deloof, 2003 and Eljelly,2004). Real GDP growth may not affect the returns based on book values; however, investors may react positively to a positive change in the level of economic activity which is in accordance with the findings of Lamberson (1995).The above results contradict the findings of Gardner et al. (1986), Deloof (2003), Eljelly (2004) and Teruel and Solano (2005); however, they are in accordance with Afza and Nazir (2007) and produced a negative relationship between the aggressiveness of working capital policies and accounting measures of profitability. Managers cannot create value if they adopt an aggressive approach towards working capital investment and working capital financing policy. However, if firms adopt aggressive approach in managing their short-term liabilities, investors give more value to those firms. The degree of aggressiveness of working capital policies adopted helps only in creating shareholders’wealth through increased market performance, whereas accounting performance cannot be increased by being aggressive in managing the working capital requirements. The results of this study are somewhat different from those conducted in the developed economies. Pakistan is one of the emerging economies and Pakistani markets are not fully transparent and efficient to fully absorb the impact of information. The study results confirm this state of Pakistani markets.ConclusionThe present study investigates the relationship between the aggressive/conservative working capital asset management and financing polices and its impact on profitability of 204 Pakistani firms divided into 16 industrial groups by KSE for the period 1998-2005. The impact of aggressive/conservative working capital investment and the financing policies has been examined using panel data regression models between working capital policies and profitability. The study finds a negative relationship between the profitability measures of firms and degree of aggressiveness of working capital investment and financing policies. The firms report negative returns if they follow an aggressive working capital policy. These results were furthervalidated by examining the impact of aggressive working capital policies on market measures of profitability, which was not tested before. The results of Tobin’s q were in line of the accounting measures of profitability and produced almost similar results for working capital investment policy. However, investors were found giving more value to those firms that are more aggressive in managing their current liabilities.The study used a new measure of profitability, i.e., Tobin’s q and panel data regression analysis, to investigate the relationship between working capital management and firm returns in Pakistan. The findings of the present study are expected to contribute significantly to finance literature. The results of the present study are in contradiction to those of some earlier studies on the issue. This phenomenon may be attributed to the inconsistent and volatile economic conditions of Pakistan. The reasons for this contradiction may further be explored in future researches.The study also suggests some policy implications for the managers and prospective investors in the emerging market of Pakistan. Firms with more aggressive policy towards working capital may not be able to generate more profit. So, as far as the book value performance is concerned, managers cannot generate more returns on assets by following aggressive approach towards short-term assets and liabilities. On the other hand, investors are found giving more value to the firms that adopt an aggressive approach towards working capital financing policies. The market value of firms using high level of current liabilities in their financing is more than the book value. The investors believe that firms with less equity and less long-term loans would be able to perform better than the others. However, there are various other factors like agency problem which may play a pivotal role in such cases, and so these factors may further be explored in future.中文译文：激进的营运资本管理政策对企业盈利能力的影响简介企业融资文章历来侧重于研究长期财务决策，特别是投资、资本结构、股利和公司估值决策。

盈利能力外文资料翻译译文资本结构与企业盈利能力的关系一直是众多学者探讨的焦点问题之一。

资本结构关乎企业的资金成本、财务风险、盈利能力，而资金成本和财务风险都最终影响到企业的持续盈利能力。

本文主要从财务困境成本理论和代理成本理论来分析资本结构对企业盈利能力的影响。

企业的资本结构与盈利能力之间的相关性不明显，但是提高企业的长期资本负债率可以改善企业的权益资本净利率。

长期债务的资金成本主要体现为利息费用和筹资费用。

由于利息费用和筹资费用可以抵税，所以企业的实际资本成本要低于债权人索取的报酬率。

债务资本的成本主要由公司的财务结构、偿债能力、经营活动现金净流量、经营能力、经营效益、市场利率以及当前的市场经济状况决定。

长期负债通常面临更大的通货膨胀影响，投资者要求的报酬中必然会包含着通货膨胀的因素影响；长期负债由于使用期限更长而受企业经营不稳定性的影响就更大，长期债务面临更大的信贷违约风险，因此长期债务资本成本一般比短期资本的成本高。

本文以有效的资本市场为前提假设——债权人都是理性的，所以随着企业长期债务资本率的提高，债权人必然会索取越来越高的报酬率。

权益资本的成本包括机会成本。

企业的权益资本通常是无偿使用的，其不需要偿付本金，不是必须向所有者支付资金成本，但站在企业所有者的角度来看，企业所有者投入的资本以及在经营过程中积累的资本也应于使用后取得相应的报酬，也就是所谓的资金成本，权益资本成本隐含着一种机会成本。

权益资本成本是企业所有者要求的最低投资收益率。

目前资本资产定价模型是用来求权益资本成本的主要模型之一，但是资本资产定价模型只考虑了权益资本的机会成本而没有考虑到新股的发行费用，但笔者认为权益资本成本主要由使用股东权益的机会成本和新股的发行费用构成。

经过相关统计，新股的发行费用一般占到新股发行市价的5%-10%，也就是说发行10个亿大概有7500万的发行费用，对一个企业来说这是一笔非常大的支出，所以计算权益资本成本时必须要考虑新股的发行费用。

公司股权结构对盈余稳健性的影响：来自中国的证据The Effects of Corporate Ownership Structure on Earnings Conservatism: Evidence from China原文出处：Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting ISSN 1946-052X 2010, Vol. 2, No. 1: E3译文：本文研究企业的所有制结构对收入保守主义的增量效应，研究中国上市公司的数据。

我们采用的概念有巴苏（1997）保守主义定义盈余稳健性和采用条件的实证模型，Ball和Shivakumar（2005年）来衡量发展程度的盈利保守主义。

我们的实证结果显示，公司的盈利具有较高的非流通股股东有较低的盈余稳健性。

与以前的研究中，这种一致点表明，该公司与国家和集中的所有权结构更可能依赖于私人通信，以减少信息不对称和内部解决代理问题，从而创造一个低的盈余稳健性的需求。

本研究结果有助于我们了解公司的所有权结构的性能影响在新兴市场和后共产主义市场的盈利。

关键词：盈余稳健性，非流通股股东，股权结构，后共产主义研究，股权分置，国家所有制1。

介绍在20世纪90年代，中国发射了上海证券交易所和随后的深圳证券交易所上市。

除了允许国有企业（国有企业）取得外国资本证券交易所的建立，其目的是提高性能的国有企业通过在资本市场的压力和问责制。

然而，由于政治和经济问题及可能的外资收购的地方国有企业，中国政府拒绝了一个完整的企业私有化，并打算保留其立场作为企业的东主，为了抢占资源分配的控制范围内国家（Allen等，2005）。

该国目前有一些共产主义元素和一些适用范围更广共产党党内监督的资本主义分子，从这个意义上我们主要是在未知的水域。

斯洛文尼亚的后共产主义哲学家齐泽克（2010年），中国的资本主义和共产主义，而独特的合成比是不稳定的，一直是广泛成功的实验，已经持续了30年之久。

上市公司价值分析中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)译文：上市公司内在价值分析一、关于内在价值随着中国资本市场的发展，中国股市将逐步走向成熟，价值投资将在未来中国股市中占主导地位，证券市场的价值投资就是当证券的市场价格低于它的内在价值时买入，并长期持有或当证券的市场价格高于它的内在价值一定程度时卖出。

因此，对于中国股市的价值投资而言首要问题是确定上市公司股票的内在价值。

同时为了风险投资，企业并购和资产重组等资本运作的需要，迫切需要适合中国公司的可操作性强的价值评估体系。

本杰明.格雷厄姆在《证券分析》这本书中是这样描写内在价值这个概念的总结性地概括：1、内在价值是无法确定具体数值的，难以把握的概念。

2、内在价值可根据公司历史收益数据来推算，但只可做参考。

因为从历史收益数据是无法估算出不确定的未来收益的。

3、虽然无法得出内在价值的精确数字，但内在价值可以用一个近似值范围来表达并用它判断股价被高估或低估。

4 、市场价格经常偏离证券的实际价值。

5、当市场价格偏离证券的实际价值时，市场中会出现自我纠正的趋势。

但对某些证券价值的高估和低估经常会持续极长的一段时间。

国内外评估公司内在价值的主要方法有：(一)资产价值基础法它是通过对公司资产进行估价的方式来评估公司的价值。

目前国际上通行的资产估价标准主要有账面价值重置成本法和清算价值等。

1、账面价值法账面价值法是一种基于会计理论的方法根据资产负债表得出净资产并进行适当调整但结果可能不代表盈利能力，特点是简便但不准确。

2 、重置成本法重置成本法是指以目前的价格水平重新建造一个与被评估资产完全相同或类似的资产的成本特点是立足于现在时点的资产价值未考虑未来资产的收益情况。

3 、清算价值法清算价值法是基于公司的总资产在市场变现后减去总负债的价值，特点是只考虑资产价值而没有考虑机构组织的无形资产和商誉（goodwill）适合于破产企业。

(二)现金流量贴现法现金流量贴现法的基石是现值规律。

本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文：Effects Of Working Capital Management On Sme Profitability The corporate finance literature has traditionally focused on the study of long-term financial decisions. Researchers have particularly offered studies analyzinginvestments, capital structure, dividends or pany valuation, among other topics. Butthe investment that firms make in short-term assets, and the resources used withmaturities of under one year, represent the main share of items on a firm’s balancesheet. In fact, in our sample the current assets of small and medium-sized Spanish firmsrepresent 69.48 percent of their assets, and at the same time their current liabilitiesrepresent more than 52.82 percent of their liabilities.Working capital management is important because of its effects on the firm’sprofitability and risk, and consequently its value (Smith, 1980). On the one hand,maintaining high inventory levels reduces the cost of possible interruptions in theproduction process, or of loss of business due to the scarcity of products, reduces supplycosts, and protects against price fluctuations, among other advantages (Blinder andManccini, 1991). On the other, granting trade credit favors the firm’s sales in variousways. Trade credit can act as an effective price cut (Brennan, Maksimovic and Zechner,1988; Petersen and Rajan, 1997), incentivizes customers to acquiremerchandise attimes of low demand (Emery, 1987), allows customers to check that the merchandisethey receive is as agreed (quantity and quality) and to ensure that the services contractedare carried out (Smith, 1987), and helps firms to strengthen long-term relationships withtheir customers (Ng, Smith and Smith, 1999). However, firms that invest heavily ininventory and trade credit can suffer reduced profitability. Thus,the greater theinvestment in current assets, the lower the risk, but also the lower the profitabilityobtained.On the other hand, trade credit is a spontaneous source of financing that reducesthe amount required to finance the sums tied up in the inventory and customer accounts.But we should bear in mind that financing from suppliers can have a very high implicitcost if early payment discounts are available. In fact the opportunity cost may exceed 20percent, depending on the discount percentage and the discount period granted (Wilner,2000; Ng, Smith and Smith, 1999). In this respect, previous studies have analyzed thehigh cost of trade credit, and find that firms finance themselves with seller credit whenthey do not have other more economic sources of financing available (Petersen andRajan, 1994 and 1997).Decisions about how much to invest in the customer and inventory accounts, andhow much credit to accept from suppliers, are reflected in the firm’s cash conversioncycle, which represents the average number of days between the date when the firmmust start paying its suppliers and the date when it begins to collect payments from itscustomers. Some previous studies have used this measure to analyze whether shorteningthe cash conversion cycle has positive or negative effects on the firm’sprofitability.Specifically, Shin and Soenen (1998) analyze the relation between the cash conversioncycle and profitability for a sample of firms listed on the US stock exchange during theperiod 1974-1994. Their results show that reducing the cash conversion cycle to areasonable extent increases firms’ profitability. More recently, Deloof (2003) analyzes asample of large Belgian firms during the period 1992-1996. His results confirm thatBelgian firms can improve their profitability by reducing the number of days accountsreceivable are outstanding and reducing inventories. Moreover, he finds that lessprofitable firms wait longer to pay their bills.These previous studies have focused their analysis on larger firms. However, themanagement of current assets and liabilities is particularly important in the case of smalland medium-sized panies. Most of these panies’ assets are in the form ofcurrent assets. Also, current liabilities are one of their main sources of external financein view of their difficulties in obtaining funding in the long-term capital markets(Petersen and Rajan, 1997) and the financing constraints that they face (Whited, 1992;Fazzari and Petersen, 1993). In this respect, Elliehausen and Woken (1993), Petersenand Rajan (1997) and Danielson and Scott (2000) show that small and medium-sizedUS firms use vendor financing when they have run out of debt. Thus, efficient workingcapital management is particularly important for smaller panies (Peel and Wilson,1996).In this context, the objective of the current work is to provide empirical evidenceabout the effects of working capital management on profitability for a panel made up of8,872 SMEs during the period 1996-2002. This work contributes to the literature in twoways. First, no previous such evidence exists for the case of SMEs. Weuse a sample ofSpanish SMEs that operate within the so-called continental model, which ischaracterized by its less developed capital markets (LaPorta, López-de-Silanes,Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997), and by the fact that most resources are channeled throughfinancial intermediaries (Pampillón, 2000). All this suggests that Spanish SMEs havefewer alternative sources of external finance available, which makes them moredependent on short-term finance in general, and on trade credit in particular. AsDemirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) suggest, firms operating in countries with moredeveloped banking systems grant more trade credit to their customers, and at the sametime they receive more finance from their own suppliers. The second contribution isthat, unlike the previous studies by Shin and Soenen (1998) and Deloof (2003), in thecurrent work we have conducted tests robust to the possible presence of endogeneityproblems. The aim is to ensure that the relationships found in the analysis carried outare due to the effects of the cash conversion cycle on corporate profitability and not viceversa.Our findings suggest that managers can create value by reducing their firm’snumber of days accounts receivable and inventories. Similarly, shortening the cashconversion cycle also improves the firm’s profitability.We obtained the data used in this study from the AMADEUS database. This database was developed by Bureau van Dijk, and contains financial and economic data on European panies.The sample prises small and medium-sized firms from Spain. The selection of SMEs was carried out according to the requirements established by theEuropeanmission’s remendation 96/280/CE of 3April, 1996, on the definition of small and medium-sized firms. Specifically, we selected those firms meeting the following criteria for at least three years: a) have fewer than 250 employees; b) turn over less than €40 million; and c) possess less than €27 million of total assets.In addition to the application of those selection criteria, we applied a series of filters. Thus, we eliminated the observations of firms with anomalies in their accounts, such as negative values in their assets, current assets, fixed assets, liabilities, current liabilities, capital, depreciation, or interest paid. We removed observations of entry items from the balance sheet and profit and loss account exhibiting signs that were contrary to reasonable expectations. Finally, we eliminated 1 percent of the extreme values presented by several variables. As a result of applying these filters, we ended up with a sample of 38,464 observations.In order to introduce the effect of the economic cycle on the levels invested inworking capital, we obtained information about the annual GDP growth in Spain fromEurostat.In order to analyze the effects of working capital management on the firm’sprofitability, we used the return on assets (ROA) as the dependent variable. We definedthis variable as the ratio of earnings before interest and tax to assets.With regards to the independent variables, we measured working capitalmanagement by using the number of days accounts receivable, number of days ofinventory and number of days accounts payable. In this respect, number of daysaccounts receivable (AR) is calculated as 365 ×[accounts receivable/sales].Thisvariable represents the average number of days that the firm takes to collect paymentsfrom its customers. The higher the value, the higher its investment in accountsreceivable.We calculated the number of days of inventory (INV) as 365 ×[inventories/purchases]. This variable reflects the average number of days of stock heldby the firm. Longer storage times represent a greater investment in inventory for aparticular level of operations.The number of days accounts payable (AP) reflects the average time it takesfirms to pay their suppliers. We calculated this as 365 × [accounts payable/purchases].The higher the value, the longer firms take to settle their payment mitments to theirsuppliers.Considering these three periods jointly, we estimated the cash conversion cycle(CCC). This variable is calculated as the number of days accounts receivable plus thenumber of days of inventory minus the number of days accounts payable. The longerthe cash conversion cycle, the greater the net investment in current assets, and hence thegreater the need for financing of current assets.Together with these variables, we introduced as control variables the size of thefirm, the growth in its sales, and its leverage. We measured the size (SIZE) as thelogarithm of assets, the sales growth (SGROW) as (Sales1 –Sales0)/Sales0, the leverage(DEBT) as the ratio of debt to liabilities. Dellof (2003) in his study of large Belgianfirms also considered the ratio of fixed financial assets to total assets as a controlvariable. For some firms in his study such assets are a significant part of totalassets.However our study focuses on SMEs whose fixed financial assets are less important. Infact, panies in our sample invest little in fixed financial assets (a mean of 3.92percent, but a median of 0.05 percent). Nevertheless, the results remain unaltered whenwe include this variable.Furthermore, and since good economic conditions tend to be reflected in a firm’s profitability, we controlled for the evolution of the economic cycle using the variable GDPGR, which measures the annual GDP growth.Current assets and liabilities have a series of distinct characteristics according to the sector of activity in which the firm operates. Thus, Table I reports the return on assets and number of days accounts receivable, days of inventory, and days accounts payable by sector of activity. The mining industry and services sector are the two sectors with the highest return on their assets, with a value of 10 percent. Firms that are dedicated to agriculture, trade (wholesale or retail), transport and public services, are some way behind at 7 percent.With regard to the average periods by sector, we find, as we would expect, that the firms dedicated to the retail trade, with an average period of 38 days, take least time to collect payments from their customers. Construction sector firms grant their customers the longest period in which to pay – more than 145 days. Next, we find mining sector firms, with a number of days accounts receivable of 116 days. We also find that inventory is stored longest in agriculture, while stocks are stored least in the transport and public services sector. In relation to the number of days accounts payable, retailers (56 days) followed by wholesalers (77 days) pay their suppliers earliest. Firms are muchslower in the construction and mining sectors, taking more than 140 days on average to pay their suppliers. However, as we have mentioned, these firms also grant their own customers the most time to pay them. Considering all the average periods together, we note that the cash conversion cycle is negative in only one sector – that of transport and public services. This is explained by the short storage times habitual in this sector. In this respect, agricultural and manufacturing firms take the longest time to generate cash (95 and 96 days, respectively), and hence need the most resources to finance their operational funding requirements.Table II offers descriptive statistics about the variables used for the sample as a whole. These are generally small firms, with mean assets of more than €6 million; their return on assets is around 8 percent; their number of days accounts receivable is around 96 days; and their number of days accounts payable is very similar: around 97 days. Together with this, the sample firms have seen their sales grow by almost 13 percent annually on average, and 24.74 percent of their liabilities is taken up by debt. In the period analyzed (1996-2002) the GDP has grown at an average rate of 3.66 percent in Spain.Source: Pedro Juan García-Teruel and Pedro Martínez-Solano ,2006.“Effects of Working Capital Management on SME Profitability” .International Journal of Managerial Finance,vol. 3, issue 2, April,pages 164-167.译文：营运资金管理对中小企业的盈利能力的影响公司理财著作历来把注意力集中在了长期财务决策研究，研究者详细的提供了投资决策分析、资本结构、股利分配或公司估值等主题的研究，但是企业投资形成的短期资产和以一年到期方式使用的资源，表现为公司资产负债表的有关下昂目的主要部分。

The influence of corporate governance on the relationbetween capital structure and valueCapital structure: relation with corporate value and main research streamsWhen looking at the most important theoretical contributions on the relation between capital structure and value, as illustrated in Figure 1, it becomes immediately evident that there is a substantial difference between the early theories and the more recent ones.Modigliani and Miller (1958), who had originally asserted that there was no relationship between capital structure and value ; in 1963, instead, reached the paradoxical and provocative conclusion that a maximum level of debt would mean a maximum level of firm value, due to the fact that interest is tax deductible . Many later contributions pointed out that this effect is compensated when considering personal taxes (Miller, 1977),an eventual lack of tax capacity, due to the presence of economic loss, the effect of other types of tax shields (De Angelo and Masulis, 1980), as well as the introduction of the costs(direct and indirect) of financial distress; all these situations end up creating a trade-off between debt costs and benefits. Point L’ in Figure 1c indicates an optimal level of debt,beyond which any rise in leverage would cause an increase in the benefits of debt that would be less than proportional with respect to the costs of financial distress. Furthermore, this non monotonic relation would be modified even more when considering agency costs as well as the costs of financial distress . Finally, one last stream of research (Myers, 1984,Myers 1984) points out managerial preferences when choosing financing resources . In this case no optimal level of debt becomes ‘‘objectively’’ evident, but this is due to the various situations the manager had to deal with over time. The function of managerial preference has particular relevance due to information asymmetries, therefore the level of firm indebtedness will be determined by the tangent between the firm value function and the curve of manager indifference.Furthermore, it can be observed that debt increases in correspondence with the better the firm’s reputation is on the market (Chevalier, 1995). Research has shown similarities between firms that belong to the same sector (Titman and Wessels, 1988);in other words, capital structure tends to be industry-specific.The empirical comparison between the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory seems to be controversial. On one hand, empirical evidence shows moderate coherence with the trade-off theory, when revenue and agency problems are taken into consideration contextually; on the other hand, the negative relation between leverage and firm profit does not seem to support the trade-off theory, as it confirms a hierarchical order in financial decision making.It is, thus, clear that the topic of capital structure is anything but defined and that there are still many open problems regarding it.As many authors have noted (Rajan and Zingales, 1995) capital structure is a ‘‘hot’’ topic in finance. By analyzing international literature the main research priorities and new analytical approaches are related to:the important comparison between ‘‘rational’’ and ‘‘behavioural’’ finance (Barberis and Thaler, 2002);a lively comparison made between the pecking order theory and the trade-off theory(Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999);the attempt to apply these theories to small firms (Berger and Udell, 1998, Fluck, 2001);the role of corporate governance on the relation between capital structure and value(Heinrich, 2000, Bhagat and Jefferis, 2002, Brailsford et al., 2004, Mahrt-Smith, 2005).The behavioural approach, that considers the pecking order of financial resources in terms of ‘‘irrational’’ preferences, caused an immediate reaction from Stewart Myers in 2000 and 2001 and jointly with Shyam-Sunder in 1999 (Myers, 2000; 2001; Shyam-Sunder and Myers,1999). Stewart Myers is the founder of the pecking order theory[7]. Problems of information asymmetry, together with transaction costs, would be able to offer a rational explanation to managerial behaviour when financial choices are made following a hierarchical order (Fama and French, 2002). In other words, according to Myers and Fama, there should be a‘‘rational’’ explanation to the phenomenon observed by Stein, Baker, Wrugler, Barberis and Thaler.Moreover, studies on capital structure have also been done looking at small and medium size firms (Berger and Udell, 1998, Michaelas et al., 1999, Romano et al., 2000, Fluck, 2001),due to the relevant economic role of these firms (in Europe they are 95 percent of the total firms operating). Zingales (2000) as well has emphasizedthe fact that today ‘‘ . . . the attention shown towards large firms tends to partially obscure firms that do not have access to the financial markets . . . ’’. In one of the most interesting studies done on this topic, Berger and Udell (1998) asserted that firm financial behaviour depends on what phase of their life cycle they are in. In fact, there should be an optimal pro-tempore capital structure, related to the phase of the life cycle that the firm is in.Finally, the observations of Michael Jensen (1986), made throughout his many contributions on corporate governance, as well as those of Williamson (1988), have encouraged a line of research that, revitalized in the second part of the nineties, seems to be quite promising as a means to analyze how corporate governance directly or indirectly influences the relation between capital structure and value (Fluck, 1998, Zhang, 1998, Myers, 2000, De Jong, 2002,Berger and Patti, 2003, Brailsford et al., 2004, Mahrt-Smith, 2005). In synthesis, it is possible to affirm, as it follows, that a joined analysis of capital structure and corporate governance is necessary when describing and interpreting the firm’s ability to create value (Zingales, 2000, Heinrich, 2000, Bhagat and Jefferis, 2002). This type of consideration could help overcome the controversy found when studying the relation between capital structure and value, on both a theoretical and empirical level.Influence of corporate governance on the relation between capital structure and value.Capital structure can be analyzed by looking at the rights and attributes that characterize the firm’s assets and that influence, with different levels of intensity, governance activities. Equity and debt, therefore, must be considered as both financial instruments and corporate governance instruments (Williamson, 1988): debt subordinates governance activities to stricter management, while equity allows for greater flexibility and decision making power. It can thus be inferred that when capital structure becomes an instrument of corporate governance, not only the mix between debt and equity and their well known consequences as far as taxes go must be taken into consideration. The way in which cash flow is allocated (cash flow right) and, even more importantly, how the right to make decisions and manage the firm (voting rights) is dealt with must also be examined. For example, venture capitalists areparticularly sensitive to how capital structure and financing contracts are laid out, so that an optimal corporate governance can be guaranteed while incentives and checks for management behavior are well established (Zingales, 2000)[10].Coase (1991), in a sort of critique on his own work done in 1937, points out that it is important to pay more attention to the role of capital structure as an instrument that can mediate and moderate economical transactions within the firm and, consequently, between entrepreneurs and other stakeholders (corporate governance relations).As explicitly pointed out by Bhagat and Jefferis (2002), when they pay particular attention to the relations between cause and effect and to their interactions recently described on a theoretical level (Fluck, 1998, Zhang, 1998, Heinrich, 2000, Brailsford et al., 2004,Mahrt-Smith, 2005), a ‘‘research proposal’’ that future empirical studies should evaluate should be, how corporate governance can potentially have a relevant influence on the relation between capital structure and value, with an effect of mediation and/or moderation.The five relations identified in Figure 2 describe:the relation between capital structure and firm value (relation A) through a role of corporate governance ‘‘mediation’’ ; the relation between capital structure and firm value (relation A) through the role of capital governance ‘‘moderation’’ (relation D);the role of corporate governance as a determining factor in choices regarding capital structure (relation E).All five relations shown in Figure 2 are particularly interesting and show two threads of research that focus on the relations between:corporate governance and capital structure, where the dimensions of the corporate governance determine firmfinancing choices, causing a possible relation of co-causation Whether management voluntarily chooses to use debt as a source of financing to reduce problems of information asymmetry and transaction, maximizing the efficiency of its firm governance decisions, or the increase in the debt level is forced by the stockholders as an instrument to discipline behavior and assure good corporate governance, capital structure is influenced by corporate governance (relation E) and vice versa (relation B).On one hand, a change in how debt and equity are dealt with influences firmgovernance activities by modifying the structure of incentives and managerial control. If, through the mix debt and equity, different categories of investors all converge within the firm, where they have different types of influence on governance decisions, then managers will tend to have preferences when determining how one of these categories will prevail when defining the firm’s capital structure. Even more importantly, through a specific design of debt contracts and equity it is possible to considerably increase firm governance efficiency.On the other hand, even corporate governance influences choices regarding capital structure (relation E). Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) show how firmfinancing choices are made by management following an order of preference; in this case, if the manager chooses the financing resources it can be presumed that she is avoiding a reduction of her decision making power by accepting the discipline represented by debt.Internal resource financing allows management to prevent other subjects from intervening in their decision making processes. De Jong (2002) reveals how in the Netherlands managers try to avoid using debt so that their decision making power remains unchecked. Zwiebel(1996) has observed that managers don’t voluntarily accept the ‘‘discipline’’ of debt; other governance mechanisms impose that debt is issued. Jensen (1986) noted that decisions to increase firm debt are voluntarily made by management when it intends to ‘‘reassure’’stakeholders that its governance decisions are ‘‘proper’’.In this light, firm financing decisions can be strictly deliberated by managers-entrepreneurs or else can be induced by specific situations that go beyond the will of the management.ConclusionThis paper define a theoretical approach that can contribute in clearing up the relation between capital structure, corporate governance and value, while they also promote a more precise design for empirical research. Capital structure represents one of many instruments that can preserve corporate governance efficiency and protect its ability to create value.Therefore, this thread of research affirms that if investment policies allow for value creation,financing policies, together with other governance instruments, can assure that investment policies are carried out efficiently while firmvalue is protected from opportunistic behavior.In other words, various authors (Borsch-Supan and Koke, 2000, Bhagat and Jefferis, 2002 and Berger and Patti, 2003) point out the necessity to analyze the relation between capital structure and value by always taking into consideration the interaction between corporate governance variables such as ownership concentration, management participation in the equity capital, the composition of the Board of Directors, etc.Furthermore, there is a problem in the way to operationalize these constructs, due to multidimensional nature of these. It is quite difficult to identify indicators that perfectly correspond to theoretical constructs; it means that proxy variables, or empirical measures of latent constructs, must be used (Corbetta, 1992).Moreover, it must be considered possible that there may be distortions in the signs and entities of the connections between variables due to endogeneity problems, or rather the presence of co-variation even when there is no cause, and reciprocal cause, where the distinction between the cause variable and the effect variable are lacking, and the two reciprocally influence each other.From an econometric point of view, therefore, it would seem to be important to further investigate the research proposal outlined above, by empirically examining the model proposed in Figure 2 using appropriate econometric techniques that can handle the complexity of the relations between the elements studied. Some proposals for study can be found in literature; the use of lagged variables is criticized by Borsch-Supan and Koke(2000) that affirm that it would be better to determine instrumental variables that influence only one of the two elements of study; Berger and Patti (2003), Borsch-Supan and Koke(2000) and Chen and Steiner (1999) promote the application of structural model equations to solve these problems, that is a method appropriate for examining the causal relations between latent, one-dimensional or multi-dimensional variables, measured with multiple indicators (Corbetta, 1992).In conclusion, this paper defines a theoretical model that contributes to clarifying the relations between capital structure, corporate governance and firm value, while promoting,as an aim for future research, a verification of the validity of this modelthrough application of the analysis to a wide sample of firms and to single firms. To study the interaction between capital structure, corporate governance and value when analyzing a wide sample of firms,the researcher has to take into account the relations showed in Figure 2, look at problems of endogeneity and reciprocal causality, and make sure there is complementarity between all the three factors. Such an analysis deserves the application of refined econometric techniques. Moreover, these relations should be investigated in a cross-country analysis, to catch the role of country-specific factors.Source: Maurizio La Rocca,2007 “The influence of corporate governance on the relation between capital structure and value”. corporate gorernance,vol.7,no.3april,pp.312-325.公司治理对本钱结构和企业价值关系的影响本钱结构: 关系到公司价值及其主要研究趋向当查看关于描述本钱结构与企业价值两者之间总体关系的最重要的理论文献时，会明显感触感染到早期的理论与新近的理论有本色性的分歧。

中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)The path-to-profitability of Internet IPO firmsAbstractExtant empirical evidence indicates that the proportion of firms going public prior to achieving profitability has been increasing over time. This phenomenon is largely driven by an increase in the proportion of technology firms going public. Since there is considerable uncertainty regarding the long-term economic viability of these firms at the time of going public, identifying factors that influence their ability to attain key post-IPO milestones such as achieving profitability represents an important area of research. We employ a theoretical framework built around agency and signaling considerations to identify factors that influence the probability and timing of post-IPO profitability of Internet IPO firms. We estimate Cox Proportional Hazards models to test whether factors identified by our theoretical framework significantly impact the probability of post-IPO profitability as a function of time. We find that the probability of post- IPO profitability increases with pre-IPO investor demand and change in ownership at the IPO of the top officers and directors. On the other hand, the probability ofpost-IPO profitability decreases with the venture capital participation, proportion of outsiders on the board, and pre-market valuation uncertainty.Keywords: Initial public offerings, Internet firms, Path-to-profitability, Hazard models, Survival1. Executive summaryThere has been an increasing tendency for firms to go public on the basis of a promise of profitability rather than actual profitability. Further, this phenomenon is largely driven by the increase in the proportion of technology firms going public. The risk of post-IPO failure is particularly high for unprofitable firms as shifts in investor sentiment leading to negative market perceptions regarding their prospects or unfavorable financing environments could lead to a shutdown of external financing sources thereby imperiling firm survival. Therefore, the actual accomplishment of post-IPO profitability represents an important milestone in the company's evolution since it signals the long-term economic viability of the firm. While the extant research in entrepreneurship has focused on factors influencing the ability of entrepreneurial firms to attain important milestones prior to or at the time of going public, relatively little is known regarding the timing or ability of firms to achieve critical post-IPO milestones. In this study, we construct a theoretical framework anchored on agency and signaling theories to understand the impact of pre-IPO factors such as governance and ownership structure, management quality, institutional investor demand, and third party certification on firms' post-IPO path-to-profitability. We attempt to validate the testable implications arising from our theoretical framework using the Internet industry as our setting. Achieving post-issue profitability in a timely manner is of particular interest for Internet IPO firms since they are predominantly unprofitable at the time of going public and are typically characterized by high cash burn rates thereby raising questions regarding their long-term economic viability. Since there is a repeated tendency for high technology firms in various emerging sectors of the economy to go public in waves amid investor optimism followed by disappointing performance, insights gained from a study of factors that influence the path-to-profitability of Internet IPO firms will help increase our understanding of the development path and long-term economic viability of entrepreneurial firms in emerging, high technology industries.2. IntroductionThe past few decades have witnessed the formation and development of several vitallyimportant technologically oriented emerging industries such as disk drive, biotechnology, and most recently the Internet industry. Entrepreneurial firms in such knowledge intensive industries are increasingly going public earlier in their life cycle while there is still a great deal of uncertainty and information asymmetry regarding their future prospects (Janey and Folta, 2006). A natural consequence of the rapid transition from founding stage firms to public corporations is an increasing tendency for firms to go public on the basis of a promise of profitability rather than actual profitability.3 Although sustained profitability is no longer a requirement for firms in order to go public, actual accomplishment of post-IPO profitability represents an important milestone in the firm's evolution since it reduces uncertainty regarding the long-term economic viability of the firm. In this paper, we focus on identifying observable factors at the time of going public that have the ability to influence the likelihood and timing of attaining post-IPO profitability by Internet firms. We restrict our study to the Internet industry since it represents a natural setting to study the long-term economic viability of an emerging industry where firms tend to go public when they are predominantly unprofitable and where there is considerably uncertainty and information asymmetry regarding their future prospects.4The attainment of post-IPO profitability assumes significance since the IPO event does not provide the same level of legitimizing differentiation that it did in the past as sustained profitability is no longer a prerequisite to go public particularly in periods where the market is favorably inclined towards investments rather than demonstration of profitability (Stuartet al., 1999; Janey and Folta, 2006). During the Internet boom, investors readily accepted the mantra of “growth at all costs” and enthusiastically bid up the post-IPO offering prices to irrational levels (Lange et al., 2001). In fact, investor focus on the promise of growth rather than profitability resulted in Internet start-ups being viewed differently from typical new ventures in that they were able to marshal substantial resources virtually independent of performance benchmarks (Mudambi and Treichel, 2005).Since the Internet bubble burst in April 2000, venture capital funds dried up and many firms that had successful IPOs went bankrupt or faced severe liquidity problems (Chang, 2004). Consequently, investors' attention shifted from their previously singular focus on growth prospects to the question of profitability with their new mantrabeing “path-to- profitability.” As such, market participants focused on not just whe ther the IPO firm wouldbe able to achieve profitability but also “when” or “how soon.” IPO firms unable to credibly demonstrate a clear path-to-profitability were swiftly punished with steeply lower valuations and consequently faced significantly higher financing constraints. Since cash flow negative firms are not yet self sufficient and, therefore, dependent on external financing to continue to operate, the inability to raise additional capital results in a vicious cycle of events that can quickly lead to delisting and even bankruptcy.5 Therefore, the actual attainment of post-IPO profitability represents an important milestone in the evolution of an IPO firm providing it with legitimacy and signaling its ability to remain economically viable through the ups and downs associated with changing capital market conditions. The theoretical framework supporting our analysis draws from signaling and agency theories as they relate to IPO firms. In our study, signaling theory provides the theoretical basis to evaluate the signaling impact of factors such as management quality, third party certification, institutional investor demand, and pre-IPO valuation uncertainty on the path-to-profitability. Similarly, agency theory provides the theoretical foundations to allow us to examine the impact of governance structure and change in top management ownership at the time of going public on the probability of achieving the post-IPO profitability milestone. Our empirical analysis is based on the hazard analysis methodology to identify the determinants of the probability of becoming profitable as a function of time for a sample of 160 Internet IPOs issued during the period 1996–2000.Our study makes several contributions. First, we construct a theoretical framework based on agency and signaling theories to identify factors that may influence the path-to- profitability of IPO firms. Second, we provide empirical evidence on the economic viability of newly public firms (path-to-profitability and firm survival) in the Internet industry. Third, we add to the theoretical and empirical entrepreneurship literature that has focused on factors influencing the ability of entrepreneurial firms to achieve critical milestones during the transition from private to public ownership. While previous studies have focused on milestones during the private phase of firm development such as receipt of VC funding and successful completion of a public offering (Chang, 2004; Dimov and Shepherd, 2005; Beckman et al., 2007), our study extends this literature by focusing on post-IPOmilestones. Finally, extant empirical evidence indicates that the phenomenon of young, early stage firms belonging to relatively new industries being taken public amid a wave of investor optimism fueled by the promise of growth rather than profitability tends to repeat itself over time.6 However, profitability tends to remain elusive and takes much longer than anticipated which results in investor disillusionment and consequently high failure rate among firms in such sectors. 7 Therefore, our study is likely to provide useful lessons to investors when applying valuations to IPO firms when this phenomenon starts to repeat itself.This articles proceeds as follows. First, using agency and signaling theories, we develop our hypotheses. Second, we describe our sample selection procedures and present descriptive statistics. Third, we describe our research methods and present our results. Finally, we discuss our results and end the article with our concluding remarks.3. Theory and hypothesesSignaling models and agency theory have been extensively applied in the financial economics, management, and strategy literatures to analyze a wide range of economic phenomena that revolve around problems associated with information asymmetry, moral hazard, and adverse selection. Signaling theory in particular has been widely applied in the IPO market as a framework to analyze mechanisms that are potentially effective in resolving the adverse selection problem that arises as a result of information asymmetry between various market participants (Baron, 1982; Rock, 1986; Welch, 1989). In this study, signaling theory provides the framework to evaluate the impact of pre-IPO factors such as management quality, third party certification, and institutional investor demand on the path-to-profitability of Internet IPO firms.The IPO market provides a particularly fertile setting to explore the consequences of separation of ownership and control and potential remedies for the resulting agency problems since the interests of pre-IPO and post-IPO shareholders can diverge. In the context of the IPO market, agency and signaling effects are also related to the extent that insider actions such as increasing the percentage of the firm sold at the IPO, percentage of management stock holdings liquidated at the IPO, or percentage of VC holdings liquidated at the IPO can accentuate agency problems with outside investors and, as a consequence, signal poorperformance (Mudambi and Treichel, 2005). We, therefore, apply agency theory to evaluate the impact of board structure and the change in pre-to-post IPO ownership of top management on the path-to-profitability of Internet IPO firms.3.1. Governance structureIn the context of IPO firms, there are at least two different agency problems (Mudambi and Treichel, 2005). The first problem arises as a result of opportunistic behavior of agents to increase their share of the wealth at the expense of principals. The introduction of effective monitoring and control systems can help mitigate or eliminate this type of behavior and its negative impact on post-issue performance. The extant corporate governance literature has argued that the effectiveness of monitoring and control functions depends to a large extent on the composition of the board of directors. We, therefore, examine the relationship between board composition and the likelihood and timing of post-IPO profitability.The second type of agency problem that arises in the IPO market is due to uncertainty regarding whether insiders seek to use the IPO as an exit mechanism to cash out or whether they use the IPO to raise capital to invest in positive NPV projects. The extent of insider selling their shares at the time of the IPO can provide an effective signal regarding which of the above two motivations is the likely reason for the IPO. We, therefore, examine the impact of the change in ownership of officers and directors around the IPO on the likelihood and timing of attaining post-issue profitability.3.2. Management qualityAn extensive body of research has examined the impact of to management team (TMT) characteristics on firm outcomes for established firms as well as for new ventures by drawing from human capital and demography theories. For instance, researchers drawing from human capital theories study the impact of characteristics such as type and amount of experience of TMTs on performance (Cooper et al., 1994; Gimeno et al., 1997; Burton et al., 2002; Baum and Silverman, 2004). Additionally, Beckman et al. (2007) argue that demographic arguments are distinct from human capital arguments in that they examine team composition and diversity in addition to experience. The authors consequently examine the impact of characteristics such as background affiliation, composition, and turnover of TMT members on thelikelihood of firms completing an IPO. Overall, researchers have generally found evidence to support arguments that human capital and demographic characteristics of TMT members influence firm outcomes.Drawing from signaling theory, we argue that the quality of the TMT of IPO firms can serve as a signal of the ability of a firm to attain post-IPO profitability. Since management quality is costly to acquire, signaling theory implies that by hiring higher quality management, high value firms can signal their superior prospects and separate themselves from low value firms with less capable managers. The beneficial impact of management quality in the IPO market includes the ability to attract more prestigious investment bankers, generate stronger institutional investor demand, raise capital more effectively, lower underwriting expenses, attract stronger analyst following, make better investment and financing decisions, and consequently influence the short and long-run post-IPO operating and stock performance(Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005). Thus, agency theory, in turn, would argue that higher quality management is more likely to earn their marginal productivity of labor and thus have a lower incentive to shirk, thereby also leading to more favorable post-IPO outcomes.8We focus our analyses on the signaling impact of CEO and CFO quality on post-IPO performance. We focus on these two members of the TMT of IPO firms since they are particularly influential in establishing beneficial networks, providing legitimacy to the organization, and are instrumental in designing, communicating, and implementing the various strategic choices and standard operating procedures that are likely to influence post- IPO performance.3.3. Third party certificationThe extant literature has widely recognized the potential for third party certification as a solution to the information asymmetry problem in the IPO market (Beatty, 1989; Carter and Manaster, 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Jain and Kini, 1995, 1999b; Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). The theoretical basis for third party certification is drawn from the signaling models which argue that intermediaries such as investment bankers, venture capitalists, and auditors have the ability to mitigate the problem of information asymmetry by virtue of their reputation capital (Booth and Smith, 1986; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Jain and Kini,1995, Carter et al., 1998). In addition to certification at the IPO, intermediaries, through their continued involvement,monitoring, and advising role have the ability to enhance performance after the IPO. In the discussion below, we focus on the signaling impact of venture capitalists involvement and investment bank prestige on post-IPO outcomes3.4. Institutional investor demandPrior to marketing the issue to investors, the issuing firm and their investment bankers are required to file an estimated price range in the registration statement. The final pricing of the IPO firm is typically done on the day before the IPO based upon the perceived demand from potential investors. Further, the final offer price is determined after investment bankers ave conducted road shows and obtained indications of interest from institutional investors. Therefore, the initial price range relative to the final IPO offer price is a measure of institutional investor uncertainty regarding the value of the firm. Since institutional investors typically conduct sophisticated valuation analyses prior to providing their indications of demand, divergence of opinion on valuation amongst them is a reflection of the risk and uncertainty associated with the prospects of the IPO firm during the post-IPO phase. Consistent with this view, Houge et al. (2001) find empirical evidence to indicate that greater divergence of opinion and investor uncertainty about an IPO can generate short- run overvaluation and long-run underperformance. Therefore, higher divergence of opinion among institutional investors is likely to be negatively related to the probability of post-IPO profitability and positively related to time-to-profitability.A related issue is the extent of pre-market demand by institutional investors for allocation of shares in the IPO firm. Higher pre-issue demand represents a favorable consensus of sophisticated institutional investors regarding the prospects of the issuing firm. Institutional investor consensus as well as their higher holdings in the post-IPO firm is likely to be an informative signal regarding the post-IPO prospects of the firm.4. Sample description and variable measurementOur initial sample of 325 Internet IPOs over the period January 1996 to February 2000 was obtained from the Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Internet Research Report dated February 17，2000. The unavailability of IPO offering prospectuses and exclusion of foreign firms reduces the sample size to 205 firms. Further, to be included in our sample, we require that financial and accountinginformation for sample firms is available on the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat files and IPO offering related information is accessible from the Securities Data Corporation's (SDC) Global New Issues database. As a result of these additional data requirements, our final sample consists of 160 Internet IPO firms. Information on corporate governance variables (ownership, board composition, past experience of the CEO and CFO), and number of risk factors is collected from the offering prospectuses.Our final sample of Internet IPO firms has the following attributes. The mean offer price for our sample of IPO firms is $16.12. The average firm in our sample raised $99.48 million. The gross underwriting fee spread is around seven percent. About 79% of the firms in our sample had venture capital backing. Both the mean and median returns on assets for firms in our sample at the time of going public are significantly negative. For example, the average operating return on assets for our sample of firms is − 56.3%. The average number of employees for the firms in our sample is 287. The average board size is 6.57 for our sample. In about 7.5% of our sample, the CEO and CFO came from the same firm. In addition, we find that 59 firms representing 37% of the sample attained profitability during the post-IPO period with the median time-to-profitability being three quarters from the IPO date.5. Discussion of results and concluding remarksThe development path of various emerging industries tend to be similar in that they are characterized by high firm founding rates, rapid growth rates, substantial investments in R&D and capital expenditures, potential for product/process breakthroughs, investor exuberance, huge demand for capital, large number of firms going public while relatively young, and a struggle for survival during the post-IPO phase as profitability and growth targets remain elusive and shifts in investor sentiment substantially raise financing constraints. Recently, the Internet has rapidly emerged as a vitally important industry that has fundamentally impacted the global economy with start-up firms in the industry attracting $108 billion of investment capital during the period 1995–2000。

中文3155字外文文献翻译译文一、外文原文原文：Do Leverage, Dividend Policy and Profitability influence the Future Value of Firm? Evidence from IndiaINTRODUCTIONWith the ushering of economic liberalization in 1992, Indian stock market has undergone several changes over the last decade. These include introduction of new exchanges, massive computerization and electronic limit order book integrating the stock exchanges across the nation, establishing of clearing corporation and subsequent introduction of new derivative products in the market. Perhaps the most important among these changes was the establishment of Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) in 1992 as the market watchdog. SEBI, since it’s inception has strived in the direction of narrowing the information gap between Indian corporations and investors, enforce better corporate governance practices through guidelines, rules and regulations and through active market for corporate control that has marked a new era in the Indian financial arena. The investors reveled their confidence through their participation in the primary and secondary market. Large number of new companies came to the primary market over 1993-96 and the market capitalization of S&PCNX 500 has increased considerably over 1990s. India has emerged as an emerging economy with largest number of companies listed in its stock markets.Over the last decade corporate governance has received considerable importance in Indian financial market. With the initiation of market for corporate control and activities in the merger and acquisition market, CEOs have assigned tremendous importance for creating value for their firms. Accordingly companies from different sectors (and/or ownership groups) have adopted different strategies to signal theirearning and growth potential over the years and thereby influence their stock prices. With this in the background this paper attempts to analyze the factors that influenced the future value of the companies listed in Indian stock markets and also how the effect of these factor changes over different categories of firms.Background LiteratureThe well-developed and vibrant literature in modern corporate finance has its root in the seminal paper by Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller (1958, 1963),(M-M henceforth). This branch of finance started with the assumption of perfect information and complete markets. It postulates that in a typical neoclassical market with perfect competition, absence of agency costs, transaction and banking costs, the average cost of raising fund for any firm is completely independent of its capital structure. With the same set of assumptions M-M (1963) argued that the value of the firm is unaffected by the dividend policy. However, over time many of these simplified assumptions were relaxed and subsequent research showed capital structure does matter and there could exist optimal dividend policy in the modified M-M framework.Academic literature over the last decade has documented the effect of different strategic factors influencing the firm values for the developed countries. Rappaport (1981, 1987) has used value creation literature for corporate mergers and acquisition and underlined the importance of growth rate, operating profit, income tax rate and fixed capital investment as the major factor influencing the firms’ value. Recently some of the studies concentrated on emerging market to analyze the factors that influenced the firms’value in this market. Ben Naceur and Goaied (2002) investigated value creation process for Tunisian stock exchange using a random probit model with unbalanced panel data. It considered that the managers’ succeeded creating value to its share holders if the market value of the share exceeds the book value of the corporation and vice versa. The authors considered three main determinants of value creation: financial policy, profitability and dividend policy.In the modified M-M framework, literature has shown that firm’s performance depends on the capital structure (or financial policy). Ross (1977) argued thatmore leverage would signal the investors about the improved firm prospect and influence the firm’s value in future. Increase in dividend payout increases the investors’ income at present and signal the expected future cash flow for the corporation. Profitability is undoubtedly one of the major factors determining the firm value. Ben Naceur and Goaied(2002) argued that while profitability and debt have positive effect on the probability of crating future value, the pay-out have reverse effect on the same.India has one of the most developed stock markets in the world with large number of domestic and international players investing in Indian stock market. With maximum number of companies listed in the Indian stock exchanges from different industries and different ownership groups (e.g. business affiliated firms, Indian standalone, foreign standalone) and with the emphasis on corporate governance practices, India has become an important and interesting destination for such studies. Among the available studies in this area, Sahu (2002) used a sample of companies listed in BSE to explain the abnormal stock returns by dividend stability and found no statically significant result. Another study by Tuli and Mittal (2001) used 101 Indian firms and found price earning ratio is significantly influenced by variability of market price and dividend pay out ratio.However, the authors did not find any significant effect of industry and ownership pattern on price to earning ratio.This papers aims at determining the factors influencing the probability of future firm value for Indian corporations after controlling for the industry and time specific effects. In particular this study attempts to answer the following questions:（1）How the probability of future value creation is affected by firm’s profitability, financing pattern and the dividend pay-out policy?（2）Whether the firms belonging to business groups have different effect on probability of value creation?DataThe primary source of the data for this paper is PROWESS database, compiled by Center for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE). This dataset is similar to the COMPUSTAT database in USA. We have selected the firms that are presently included in S&PCNX 500 index. The accounting and stock price data for thesecompanies are extracted for the year 1989-90 to 2001-02 from Prowess dataset for this study.So far we have done the univariate and bivariate analysis in the previous section.To examine the factors effecting the future value creation of the firms listed in the Indian stock exchange we examine the effect of previous year’s leverage, dividend and profitability on the MBVR of the company in a multivariate framework.Variable DescriptionMarket to book value ratio (MBVR) is defined as the ratio of closing price of the equity to book value of equity at the end of the financial year. MBVR is the dependent variable for the OLS regression. For the logit model the dependent variable is a binary series, which takes the value 1 if price to book value ratio is greater than one (i.e., market perceived that future value of the firm is going to increase) and zero otherwise.The other variables of interest include those representing Leverage Policy,Dividend Policy and Profitabilit y that have key bearing on the firms’ future value creation. While the ratio of total amount of long-term debt to total amount of equity capital (LEVERAGE) is included to proxy the leverage policy of the corporation, the ratio of total dividend to total earning of the firm (PAY_OUT) i s included to capture the dividend policy of the same. The profitability of a company, on the other hand, is captured by the ratio of net profit to net worth of the firm, which is also known as return on equity (ROE).To control for the size of the firm we consider total assets (ASSET) of the firm as a proxy variable. To control for the differenced arising due to the firms belonging to different business groups this paper considers different dummy variables. If the firm is Among the large number of listed companies, those included in S&PCNX 500 are often considered for empirical studies for their liquid nature and representative characteristics.Private Indian standalone then the dummy, D_PVT_IND, take the value one and zero otherwise. If, on the other hand, a firm is private foreign standalone then the dummy, D_PVT_FOR, take the value one and otherwise zero. Indian companies differ considerably access the industries. So industry dummies were used to controlfor industry specific heterogeneity. Since 1990, Indian economy has undergone several changes, which have their influence on the corporate valuation. So time dummies were also included to control for the time trend. All the nominal variables are deflated by GDP deflator and expressed at constant price of 1987-88.(Insert Table-1 here)Table 1: Descriptive statistics(MBVR) is ratio of closing price of the equity to book value of equity at the end of thefinancial year. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total amount of long-term debt to total amount ofequity capital.PAY_OUT is the ratio of total dividend to total earning of the firm. Returnon equity (ROE) is the ratio of net profit to net worth of the firm.ASSET total assets of thefirm.Variable All Firms Large Firms Small Firms Group FirmsIndianStandaloneFirmsForeign StandaloneFirmsMBVRLE VERAGE DIVIDEND P AY OFF3.137(5.993)1.726(4.140)0.023(0.029)2.133(3.537)3.057(7.151)0.025(0.028)3.349(6.372)1.441(3.063)0.023(0.029)2.833(5.659)1.973(4.470)0.024(0.030)2.850(5.119)1.247(3.094)0.024(0.026)5.776(8.255)0.319(0.484)0.020(0.023)PROFITABILITY (ROE) 0.138(0.367)0.095(0.449)0.148(0.346)0.133(0.372)0.168(0.283)0.148(0.Table 1 shows the mean values and the standard deviations (in parenthesis) of the variables under consideration under six different cases (namely, all firms, large firms, small firms, group-affiliated firms, Indian standalone firms and foreign standalone firms). The descriptive statistics reported in Table 1 shows that the value of a firm, in terms of MBVR, is higher for the small firms and the foreign standalone firms. Large firms get more leverage than any other category of firms. Profitability of the firm, in terms of ROE, is higher for the Indian standalone companies. Table 2 shows the Pearson correlation coefficient matrix between the variables of interest. It shows that MBVR has significant negative correlation with leverage and size of the firm and positive correlation with dividend policy and profitability of the firm. In the Appendix Figure 1 and 4 show that with the ushering of economic liberalization there is a sharp rise in MBVR and ROE in the year 1992, which have gradually decreased over the years. Figure 2 shows since post liberalization period, the leverage has shown an increasing trend. However, dividend payout policy does not depict any significanttrend over this period.The coefficient of lagged value of leverage (-O.44) and its square term (0.007)imply that as the leverage of the firm increases, the probability of raise in future firm’s values declines at a decreasing rate. The negative influence of leverage on the probability of future value creation was observed across the ownership groups and size. The profitability of the firm (as apparent from the coefficient of ROE) increases the probability of increase in future value creation. Point to note is, this increase is higher for foreign standalone firms as compare to Indian standalone or group-affiliated firms.Unlike the OLS model, the dividend payout did not significantly explain the chance of future value creation. Neither in the pooled model nor in the size and ownership group specific regression the coefficient of payout was significantly different from zero at 10per cent level.ResultThis paper analyzed the accounting factor that influence the probability of increase in future m arket valuation of the firms’ listed in Indian stock exchange after controlling for the time and industry specific effects. The empirical results indicate that the increase in leverage has a negative impact on the chance of future value increase of the firm. It could be because more reliance on credit increases the conflict of interest between shareholders and creditors, giving more control to the managers/promoter, which in turn have a negative influence on the future valuation. Alike Naceur and Goaied (2002), we found previous year’s profitability positive influences future firm’s value, a s increase in profitability might have signaled better quality of size. This finding could be because of the fact that the dividend payment the future per management. However, the pay-off did not significantly influence the probability of future MBVR increase in the pooled model as well as the models across ownership group an formance varied considerably across firms listed in Indian stock exchange.ConclusionThis paper investigates the value creation process of the firms listed in the Indian stock market and their dependence on the accounting variables. It used an unbalancedlogit model and found that the increase in profitability has a positive influence on the probability of creating future value and the relation is stronger for foreign standalone firms as compared to private Indian standalone or business group owned firms. Leverage, one the other hand, has negative impact on the chances of increase in future value of the corporation and this relation was uniform across size and ownership group. It could be because of the potential conflict of interest between the equity holders and the creditors that got reflected in the stock prices. The dividend pay-off policy of the firm, however, could not significantly influence the probability of future value creation of the firms listed in Indian stock market.Source:Saurabh Ghosh,2008“Do Leverage, Dividend Policy and Profitability Influence Future Value of Firm? Evidence from India”.Reserve Bank of India.July.pp.1-3.二、翻译文章译文：是否杠杆、股利政策及盈利能力会影响公司未来的价值？介绍随着1992年以来的经济自由化，印度股市在过去十年经历了很多变化。

股利政策和公司价值的关系
股利政策是指公司将利润用于向股东支付股息的决策。

股利政策和公
司价值之间存在着一定的关系。

通常情况下，股利政策的优秀会对公司的
价值产生积极影响，而股利政策的劣质则会对公司的价值产生负面影响。

在股利政策优秀的情况下，公司股息分配的增加会吸引更多投资者关
注和投资，进而推升公司股价，提高公司市值。

此外，股利政策优秀的公
司更容易获得投资者的信任和忠诚度，进而吸引更多长期投资者的持股，
为企业提供更加稳定和可持续的发展基础。

相反，如果股利政策劣质，比如过度分配股息或不定期分配股息，会
造成投资者对公司的不信任，股价下跌，市值缩水。

还有可能面临资金短缺、投资者离场等问题，给公司带来较大的风险。

因此，公司应该根据自身的实际情况和市场需求，合理制定股利政策，以提高公司的价值和市场竞争力。

盈利能力对公司价值的影响研究随着市场经济的发展和加快，企业的经营价值愈加引人关注。

而其中最为重要的一个因素，便是企业的盈利能力。

其在一定程度上代表着企业的发展能力、竞争力以及后续的发展空间等等，因此其对公司价值的影响显得尤为重要。

本文旨在通过深入探讨，更为全面地了解盈利能力对公司价值的影响。

一、企业盈利能力企业盈利能力即企业的盈利水平，通俗的讲，就是企业生产经营所得的利润。

企业盈利能力的大小，在很大程度上决定了企业的经济实力与稳健性。

通常情况下，我们通过企业盈利率（ROE）来描述企业的盈利能力，它所度量的即为“股本报酬率”，又称资本回报率。

二、盈利能力对公司价值的影响1.视角不同，企业价值不一样企业的价值，其实是一个相对概念。

不同的人以不同的视角观察企业，则会发现企业的价值不完全一致。

例如，股东会在乎的是公司的股权回报率，而债主则会关注公司的稳健性以及还款能力。

但是，不论企业价值从哪个角度出发，企业的盈利能力都是一个很重要的指标。

2.股东层面在股东层面，盈利能力依据其率先与股东获取小我财产的能力，因此，企业盈利能力的强与弱，往往反映在股票价格的变化上。

比如，如果一个企业的利润和价值都有很好的表现，那么股票的价格也会随之上涨。

相反，如果一家企业的盈利状况不佳，股价也必然下跌。

3.债券持有人层面对于债券持有人来说，企业的盈利能力对其影响主要体现在企业还本付息的能力上，因此会关注企业的还款能力以及风险成本等情况。

如果企业的盈利能力不好，其还本付息的采纳率也就会降低，从而影响企业债券的信誉度以及债券价格等等。

4.企业内部管理层面在企业内部管理层面，盈利能力意味着一家企业可以投入更多的资本到经营中，这将通过生产效率的提升以及技术进步等途径来提高企业对竞争市场的控制力。

同时，企业管理层会将盈利能力也作为企业现金流的重要指标，因为只有企业的现金流足够充足，它才能更自如地开展各种活动。

三、提升企业盈利能力的途径对于企业来说，提升盈利能力也可通俗地称为一种规范的创新过程。

财务杠杆与公司价值摘要对于资本结构的争论已经持续了几十年，争论的关键点在于资本结构对公司价值的影响是积极还是消极的。

许多关于这个问题的文献背离了莫迪利亚尼和米勒（1958年）的开创性著作和他们的无关性理论（即MM定理：指在一定的条件下，企业无论以负债筹资还是以权益资本筹资都不影响企业的市场总价值。

）。

随后许多研究人员同意了他们资本结构最优化的观点。

这项研究的目的在于评估增加财务杠杆对南非公司价值的影响是正面还是负面的。

此外，鉴于目前当地利率市场化的高水平和波动性，本报告也研究本地利率的波动性是如何影响资本结构的。

这项研究使用来自麦格雷戈BFA数据库从1998-2007年期间的辅助数据来进行研究。

样本包括113约翰内斯堡证券交易所（JSE）的上市公司，为了得到不同行业在这方面的动态分析，这些公司按照行业分类。

为检验结果进行了回归分析。

结果发现，增加财务杠杆与公司价值是负相关的。

这项研究证明利率对资本结构的影响是非决定性的。

1. 杠杆与资本结构1.1杠杆和资本结构据沃德和普赖斯（2006年），财务杠杆是通过债务融资而不是股权融资的资本的比例。

因此，杠杆越高，债务在公司的资本结构的金额就越高。

费勒，罗斯，韦斯特和约旦，（2004）也指出资本结构是指公司用以提供其经营活动的债券和股票的数额比例。

1.2 最优资本结构当一个企业的价值最大化，而资本成本最小化时，将实现最优债务/权益比率（费勒等人，2004年和艾哈特和布里格姆，2003）。

相比之下，迈尔斯（1984）认为，不同的资本结构理论并不能解释实际的融资行为，因此它对企业最优资本结构的建议是很可笑的。

然而各类研究人员已经发现证据，可以证明最优资本结构和公司价值最大化之间是正相关的。

沃德和普赖斯（2006年）指出，在一个盈利的企业里，增加债务/权益比率可以增加股东回报，但同时也增加了风险。

沙玛（2006）指出杠杆和公司价值之间有直接的关系。

拉舍（2003）声称，提高债务融资水平会增加每股收益率（EPS）和资产收益率（ROE）。