信息不对称,企业信息披露和资本市场：信息披露的实证文献回顾【外文翻译】

金融体制、融资约束与投资——来自OECD的实证分析R．SemenovDepartment of Economics，University of Nijmegen，Nijmegen（荷兰内梅亨大学，经济学院）这篇论文考查了OECD的11个国家中现金流量对企业投资的影响.我们发现不同国家之间投资对企业内部可获取资金的敏感性具有显著差异,并且银企之间具有明显的紧密关系的国家的敏感性比银企之间具有公平关系的国家的低.同时，我们发现融资约束与整体金融发展指标不存在关系.我们的结论与资本市场信息和激励问题对企业投资具有重要作用这种观点一致，并且紧密的银企关系会减少这些问题从而增加企业获取外部融资的渠道。

一、引言各个国家的企业在显著不同的金融体制下运行。

金融发展水平的差别(例如，相对GDP的信用额度和相对GDP的相应股票市场的资本化程度），在所有者和管理者关系、企业和债权人的模式中，企业控制的市场活动水平可以很好地被记录.在完美资本市场,对于具有正的净现值投资机会的企业将一直获得资金。

然而，经济理论表明市场摩擦，诸如信息不对称和激励问题会使获得外部资本更加昂贵，并且具有盈利投资机会的企业不一定能够获取所需资本.这表明融资要素，例如内部产生资金数量、新债务和权益的可得性，共同决定了企业的投资决策.现今已经有大量考查外部资金可得性对投资决策的影响的实证资料（可参考，例如Fazzari（1998）、 Hoshi(1991)、 Chapman（1996）、Samuel(1998））.大多数研究结果表明金融变量例如现金流量有助于解释企业的投资水平。

这项研究结果解释表明企业投资受限于外部资金的可得性。

很多模型强调运行正常的金融中介和金融市场有助于改善信息不对称和交易成本，减缓不对称问题,从而促使储蓄资金投着长期和高回报的项目,并且提高资源的有效配置（参看Levine（1997)的评论文章）。

因而我们预期用于更加发达的金融体制的国家的企业将更容易获得外部融资.几位学者已经指出建立企业和金融中介机构可进一步缓解金融市场摩擦。

与上市公司会计信息披露有关的外文文献及翻译Analysis of the Relationship between Listed Companies’ Earnings Quality and Internal Control Information Disclosure* Jianfei Leng, Lu LiSchool of Business, Hohai University, Nanjing, China1、IntroductionThe cases of financial fraud lead to incalculable losses in these years, which are related to firm’s weak system of internal control. Now, both domestic and foreign have issued a series of legal norms. For example, Sarbanes- Oxley (SOX) Act force listed Companies to disclose their internal control information, including internal control deficiencies and internal self-assessment report and external auditor’s audit opinion. We formulate two important files: “Shanghai Stock Exchange listed companies internal control guidelines”and “Shenzhen Stock Exchange listed companies internal control guidelines”. These files require companies to disclose internal control self-assessment report and comments of external auditor’s audit, which greatly improve company’s effectiveness of internal control and quality of financial information. Accounting earnings is the score and one of the most important elements in all of the accounting information, which mainly refers to the company’s ability of forecasting future net cash flow. Higher earnings quality is the key to the effective function of the market and the insurance of the company’s future cash flow. The better quality of company’s earnings inclined to disclose more internal control information and to get more outside investment. Therefore, earnings quality is one of the most important factorsto affect internal control information disclosure. In this article, with the analysis of multiple regressions, we examine the relationship of earnings quality and internal control disclosure of information in the sample of 1273 nonfinancial firms in shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2010.2. Prior Research on Internal Control Information DisclosureListed companies’ internal control information disclosure is mostly voluntary before 2002, but few companies are willing to do so. Since Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act is enforced, many listed companies are forced to disclose their information of internal control, which providing more material and information to scholars who study listed companies’internal control. Researches on internal control information disclosure are mainly concentrated on the following four aspects:1) The current situation and solutions of internal control information disclosure.There are lots of researches on the current situation of internal control information disclosure,Mc. Mullen，Raghunandan and Rama [1] studied 4154 companies during 1989-1993, suggesting that only 26.5% companies are willing to disclose their internal control information, and that only 10.5% provide their internal control report among those companies with deficiencies on their financial reports. It shows that the proportion of companies voluntarily disclosing their internal control information is little, and that the companies with deficient financial report are more unwilling to provide the internal control self-assessment report. Hermanson [2] also did corresponding empirical research on listed company’s internal control information disclosure and got the same conclusion. Minghui Li[3] and Dongmei Qin [4] made related researches on the current situation of internal control information disclosure. They believed that current listed companies’ enthusiasm of disclosing internal control information is not strong, and much internal control information was not substantial but formal. Minghui Li [3] also drawn on the experiences of the United States in internal control information disclosure, and provided a series of suggestions and measures of improving internal control information disclosure. Hua Li, Lina Chen [5], Xiaofeng Dai and Jun Pan [6] analyzed the current situation of internal control information disclosure with internal control theories, and pointed out the problems and put forward the corresponding solution. Xinhua Dai and Qiang Zhang [7] mainly did the research on listed banks’internal control information disclosure, finding that our listed banks’system of internal control information disclosure is not standardized and sufficient. They interpreted the corresponding requirements of the US internal control information disclosure set by “Sarbanes-Oxley Act”, suggesting China to promote the improvement of listed banks’ internal control information step by step. According to relevant provisions of internal control information disclosure required by “Shanghai Stock Exchange Guidelines”and “The Notice on Listed Companies’Annual Report in 2006”, Youhong Yang and Wei Wang [8] analyzed the internal control information disclosure of listed companies on Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2006 with descriptive statistics, and found many problems.2) Impact factors of internal control information disclosure.Bronson, carcello, Raghunandan and Doyle, Ge, McVay suggested that there is a correlation between corporate identityand internal control information dis-closure. Company size, the proportion of institutional investor holding, the number of audit committee and the speed of earnings growth have impact on internal control information disclosure. Many other experts did empirical study on such question. Ge and McVay used a survey method to analyze the sample, discovering that the disclosure of material defects is related to the complexity of the company but there is no direct correlation with company size and profitability. Jifu Cai made a relevant empirical study of A-share listed companies to find impact factors of listed companies’ internal control information disclosure. The results showed that the companies with a better operating performance and higher reliability of financial report are more inclined to disclose its internal control information, and vice versa. This indicates that the company’s operating performance and reliability of financial report affect the listed companies’internal control information disclosure. Adrew J. Lcone selected listed companies who disclosed material defects of their internal control information in their annual reports as samples to study the impact factors of internal control information disclosure. The results show that the complexity of corporate structures, the changes in company structure and the inputs to internal control are all the impact factors of internal control information disclosure. Shaoqing Song and Yao Zhang studied A-share listed companies on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2006 to 2007, finding that there is a correlation between corporate governance characteristics and internal control information disclosure. Audit committee, annual statistics, company size and the place of listing have a significant impact on internal control information disclosure. Bin Wang andHuanhuan Liang [15] studied 1884 listed companies on Shenzhen Stock Exchange between 2001 and 2004. They made use of their rating reports of information disclosure quality to examine the inherent relationship between listed companies’corporate governance characteristics, characteristics of operating condition and information disclosure quality, finding that corporate governance characteristics and characteristics of operating condition have a certain impact on internal control information disclosure.3) The cost of internal control information disclosure.The studies on the cost of internal control information disclosure are not very much. J. Efrim, Boritz, Ping Zhang thought that the costs of disclosing internal control information is enormous, and the management did not believe that the benefits of internal control information disclosure would surpass the corresponding costs. Maria analyzed the sample which discloses their internal control information in accordance with SEC requirements, primarily study the relationship between the costs of disclosing internal control information and the effectiveness of the internal control system. It is found that the cost of disclosing deficiencies of internal control information is far more than that of defect-free.4) Correlation between internal control and earnings quality.There are many researches on the correlation between internal control and earnings quality. Doyle [11] studied the relationship between internal control and earnings quality, and found that internal control is a motivation of earnings quality. The studies of Chan [18] and Goh and Li [19] are similar. Chan [18] discovered that earnings management of those who disclose thematerial defects of internal control has a higher degree but the return on investment is very low. Goh and Li’s [19] also found that company’s earnings stability can be increased after improving the defects of internal control. Lobo and Zhou [20] made a comparison on companies’discretionary accruals between before implementing “Sarbanes-Oxley Act” and after implementing it, finding that companies’ discretionary accruals decreased a lot after the implementation of “Sarbanes-Oxley Act”. Doyle, Ge and Mcvay [10] divided the internal control defects into two aspects: corporate level and account level, finding that internal control defects on corporate level is influential to earnings quality, but there is no correlation between internal control defects on account level and earnings quality. Guoqing Zhang [21] selected nonfinancial A-share listed companies in 2007 as a research object to study the internal control quality on earnings quality. The results have shown that there is no close link between high quality internal control and earnings quality, but company’s characteristics and corporate governance factors may affect internal control quality and earnings quality systematically. Chunsheng Fang et al. [22] used questionnaire survey to examine the relationship between internal control system and financial reporting quality, finding that financial reporting quality improved after implementation of internal control system. Jun Zhang and Junzhi Wang [23] selected listed companies on Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2007 as sample, and used adjusted Jones model to calculate discretionary accruals and found that discretionary accruals significantly reduced after the review of internal control. Shengwen Xie and Wenhai Lai [24] selected A-share listed companies on Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2007 and 2008 as samples. They analyzed therelationship between internal control deficiencies and earnings quality by using a paired study, and found that listed companies’internal control information disclosure had an effect on earnings quality.Based on the above studies, we can see that internal control gets more attention after the promulgation of “Sarbanes-Oxley Act”. Current researches centralize on the defects of existing laws and regulations, the current situations of listed companies’internal control information disclosure, the relationship between listed companies’internal control information disclosure and their operating conditions, financial report quality and earnings quality. Among the current studies, most have focused on descriptive statistics and the relationship be-tween internal control quality and earnings quality, while there is no study use earnings quality as explanatory variable to reflect its effect on internal control information disclosure. Therefore, this article uses earnings quality as main explanatory variable and disclosure of internal control as the dependent variable to do empirical study, which compensate for the lack of current research to some extent.3. Method3.1. HypothesisHypothesis: the better the quality of earnings is, the higher the level of internal control information disclosure will be.According to agency theory and signaling theory, corporate trustee has obligation to report relevant information to the corporate capital owners, which give help to the operation of business. In the process of reporting, corresponding information is to pass the corporate relevant signal to the capital market. The signal can make the operator affect the flow of resources incapital market in a certain extent to improve the enterprise’s interests. There is the mutually reinforcing relationship between internal control information disclosure and the quality of earnings. A company that can fully disclose its information of internal control means that its managers have a good description of ethics. Meanwhile, a company that can take the initiative to show its internal control information in detail indicates that its company has a higher self-confidence, which will attract more capital market resources, increase its cash flow, enhance the quality of earnings, and improve management capabilities. Conversely, companies with good earnings quality will choose to voluntarily disclose their information of internal control in detail. They can distinguish themselves to the companies with inferior earnings quality and get more favor from investors.上市公司盈余质量与内部控制信息披露关系研究冷建飞，李璐（河海大学商学院，南京）1、前言近年来金融诈骗案件的发生带来了不可估量的损失，这与公司内部控制系统弱是有关系的。

企业社会责任论文：基于信息不对称的企业社会责任信息披露研究摘要：随着人们社会责任意识的提高，要求企业越来越多地披露有关社会责任方面的信息。

文章基于信息不对称视角对我国企业社会责任信息披露的现状进行了分析，探讨了完善企业社会责任信息披露的建议及对策。

Abstract: With people's awareness of social responsibility rising, corporates are asked to disclosure more and more information about social responsibility. This paper analyzes the status of the information disclosure of corporate social responsibility based on information asymmetry, and then proposes suggestions and countermeasures of perfection. 关键词：企业社会责任；信息不对称；信息披露Key words: corporate social responsibility；information asymmetry；information disclosure 0引言伴随着经济全球化，跨国公司的利益实现机制正在发生改变，在实现自身经济利益的同时，也越来越关注企业所应承担的社会责任。

根据现代企业组织理论，企业承担了社会责任就应当履行信息披露义务，披露社会责任信息。

现代企业经营权与所有权的分离产生了信息不对称问题，基于信息不对称而产生的一系列问题也得到了学术界的广泛关注。

社会责任信息披露扮演着与财务信息披露类似的角色，即增加信息透明度，降低信息不对称，从而提高信息披露质量。

社会责任会计是会计的一个新兴分支，是社会责任与会计的结合，是应有关各方对社会责任信息披露的要求而产生的，以会计的形式对企业的经营活动所带来的社会贡献和社会损害进行反应和控制。

企业社会责任信息披露中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文The Supply of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure Among US FirmsIntroductionCorporate social responsibility CSR activity is an area of intense and increasing interest both on the practice and academic fronts Investor interest in rms that engage in these activities has grown dramatically Between 1995 and 2005 investments of professionally managed assets grew from 7 trillion to 244 trillion while the share of these assets investedin socially responsible investments grew from 639 billion to 229 trillion Social Investment Forum [SIF] 2006 At the same time large institutional investors and multistakeholder groups –including the UN Principles for Responsible Investment project the Global Reporting Initiative GRI 2006 and the CERES a coalition of investors and public interest groups –have focused attention on the materiality of social and environmental information to equity analysis The magnitude and growth of socially responsible investing SRI assets has driven an equally dramatic growth in the need for information The objective of this study is to document the disclosure patterns of CSR by US rmsInvestors are not the only interested parties CSR activity provides an increasing focus of product development and marketing practitioners Research demonstrates that certain types of CSR activity produce value for rms in terms of brand loyalty and marketing advantages Brown and Dacin 1997 Sen and Bhattacharya 2001 As Handleman and Arnold 1999 p 36 notein any community it is common to nd retailers donating to local charities sponsoring little league sports teams and proudly displaying the national ag These actions demonstrate the retailers adherence to unwritten but powerful normative rules of acceptable social conduct such as becoming involved with the community and promoting national pride While the question of what exactly motivates rms to engage in CSR practices is a matter for ongoing research it is clear from the growthin both SRI assets and customer markets for socially responsible goods that there is a need for information on these practices The historical emphasis of traditional nancial information does not answer the needs of these parties who require information not only about future earnings but also about the rms social and environmental responsibility and interactions with the environment and home communities Adams 2004 Anderson et al 2005 The concern with non-nancial factors as well as with equity returns results in a demand for greater accountability from managers According to the SIF p 5 [i]ssues now occupying mainstream consciousness–corporate governance transparency accountability and greater disclosure – have long been central to the practice of social investingMost of the work in this area is directed at examining disclosures from European and Australian rms and nearly all multi-national studies indicate international differences in disclosure behavior In North America Cormier and Magnan 1999 proposed a costbenet approach to environmental disclosures The costs are the costs that other parties other than shareholders will use the information and the benets are the reduction in information asymmetry between managers and shareholders Cormier and Magnan 1999 tested this on a sample of Canadian rms and found that variables such as a rms reliance on capital markets and the trading volume for its stock were associated with increased environmentaldisclosure They also conclude that environmental disclosures are increasing over time and that the increased disclosure in Canada could be a function of the less litigious reporting environment found in Canada as opposed to the United States Alnajjar 2000 examined the 1990 social responsibility disclosures of Fortune 500 companies He found that size and protability affected the quality and quantity of disclosure Since there have been a number of changes in the disclosure environment since 1990 when the data was collected for the Alnajjar 2000 study and since the Cormier and Magnan 1999 looked at Canadian rms it is not clear how US corporations in the 2000s have responded to these increased demands for CSR information Furthermore prior research evaluating the content of CSR disclosures has focused primarily on a single reporting format generally the annual report more recently the corporate website Gray et al 1995 has suggested that the use of a single format for analysis purposes may be signicantly limiting the understanding that can be derived about CSR disclosure behavior We therefore extend this literature by exploring the entire identiable body of public disclosures made by the sample rms during 2004 A major contribution of our paper is the development of a means to assess directly the emphasis that management places on disseminating a given type of information prior research has largely relied upon frequency of disclosure alone as a proxy for emphasis In this paper we evaluate the state of reporting of social and environmentalresponsibility often known as corporate social responsibility or CSR reporting among a sample of US rms to determine what types of information are being provided and through what means of transmission We perform a content analysis on the disclosures made by a size-and industry-stratied sample of 50 publicly traded US rms during 2004 Results suggest that companies disclose a wide variety of CSR information through mandated and voluntary media Consistent with prior research we nd size-and industry-driven differences in disclosure behavior Our results suggest differences in the pattern and volume of disclosure in US rms when compared with other studies examining global enterprisesIn the next section we review the relevant theory and research and present the research questions and hypotheses Then we describe the research method and discuss the results We conclude with the implications of the study for reporting activists accounting rms regulators and academics who are reconsidering the nature of corporate reporting of non-nancial informationLiterature review research questions and hypothesesIt is difcult from an academic and theoretical perspective to disentangle the differences between a rms decision to engage in CSR activities and the decision on why how and when to report on those activities to stakeholders The choice of broad theoretical framework depends on whether the researcher approaches the question of CSR from aneconomic or an ethical standpoint Cetindamar and Husoy 2007 Ethical theories indicate that these activities should be promoted because they are the right thing to doEconomic theories indicate that these activities should be promoted only to the degree that they create shareholder wealth through increasing protVirtually all theoretical approaches carry the implication that it is not enough to partake of a CSR action it is necessary then to disseminate information about the action that has been taken A matter of signicant difference between the theories pertains to what actions should be taken and who should be informed of them To some extent the answer to the rst drives the answer to the second if the primary goal of the activity is to enlist the support of a particular party the rm will of necessity publicize the activity through channels likely to reach that party Therefore before launching an exploration of the approaches to disclosure we offer a brief overview of the why of CSR activity Neo-classical economicsBird et al 2007 adopt a traditional economic approach to the question suggesting that managers should apply net present value NPV analysis to all potential CSR activities and take only the actions that result in a positive NPV and thus increase shareholder wealth An important element of this theory in the CSR context is the neo-classical notion that the shareholder is the only stakeholder of signicant interest This study nds that markets are slow to impound the valuation implications ofnon-event-type actions into market prices with the exception of diversity initiatives While the authors do not explicitly consider the matter of information dissemination the implication of their approach is that disclosure should take place through the channels to which shareholders are accustomed ie mandatory lings such as annual reports and 10-Ks A problematic issue for the traditional neo-classical approach to CSR is that unlike production decisions CSR activities and their outcomes may not yield the mathematical tractability necessary for reliable NPV analysisMarketing strategyAnother stream of inquiry that suggests that CSR may be motivated mainly by wealth concerns is found in the marketing literature see Robin and Reidenbach 1987 for an extensive survey of this literature Brown and Dacin 1997 provide empirical evidence that consumer beliefs about products are inuenced by the information that they possess both about corporate ability the producers competitive advantage and about the producers CSR even though the CSR policies are often unrelated to the companys ability to produce Both items are key elements in creating a good corporate reputation posited by numerous theorists to provide a source of economic benets to an organization see Brown and Dacin 1997 for a review of this literature Brown and Dacin 1997 nd that negative CSR perceptions are shown to exert negative effects on consumer behavior whilepositive CSR perceptions exert positive effects on consumer behavior They note that even though there is potential economic value in doing so it can be difcult to communicate corporate positions built around developing CSR associations a need potentially answered by CSR disclosures in the public forumHandelman and Arnold 1999 provide further evidence on wealth creation through marketing activities subsumed under CSR They suggest that consumers appear to possess a demand for intangible factors indicating congruence with local social norms and values and that the rms promotion of these elements may yield a strategic angle equal to that of competitive positioning and product attributesConsistent with Brown and Dacin 1997 they nd that negative institutional associations exert a signicant negative effect on customer perceptions and behavior and suggest that stakeholders have a minimal level of institutional actions below which even highly positioned rms begin to experience negative consequences Hooghiemstra 2000 suggests that CSR activity is a form of impression management for the rm This image management theory –which encompasses matters of corporate identity and corporate image – is likewise driven by direct economic concerns such as customer perceptions and access to capital markets The marketing-oriented literature on CSR activity suggests these actions are a strategic tool to build and maintain customer loyalty and market shareThe implications for disclosure are that the primary targets for information are the existing customers and members of the public with a general interest and that the content of the disclosure will be chosen to emphasize congruence with customer valuesPolitical economyA third theoretical approach considers these actions through the lens of the political economy Campbell et al 2003 Cormier and Gordon 2001 Deegan 2002Deegan and Gordon 1996Dowling and Pfeffer 1975 Gray et al 1995a Guthrie and Parker 1990 ODonovan 2002 Maignan and Ralston 2002 In this approach the rm is not considered to be an economic entity that can be divorced from its social context it is instead an organic organism that is a party to a social contract with the other members of its context For the rm to survive it must obtain the support and approval of its stakeholders whether those be primary stakeholders those without whose support the rm cannot function at all including customers suppliers or providers of labor and capital or secondary stakeholders who are indirectly afliated but in a position to signicantly inuence the rms success including regulators and media Clarkson 1995 CSR activity and the consequent disclosure is a part of the ongoing communication process required in order to enlist and maintain that support Gray et al 1995a Under this general heading researchers have variously advanced theoretical arguments based on stakeholder theory Clarkson1995Hooghiemstra 2000 Maignan and Ralston 2002 and on legitimation ie Campbell 2000Grayet al 1995a to explain both CSR activities and disclosureLegitimation pertains to efforts on the part of the rm to establish maintain or repair public perception of its dedication to stakeholder norms and values thus evincing respect for the social contract that permits it access to capital and labor markets and other economic resources necessary to ensure organizational survival Dowling and Pfeffer 1975 outline three means to establishing or improving legitimacy adapting operations to conform to existing societal expectations altering social denitions to conform with existing rm operations or engaging in communication to promote its public identication with socially legitimate symbols values and institutions The degree to which the organization is visible andor relies on social and political support drives the concern for legitimacy and consequent access to resources and support Dowling and Pfeffer 1975 A potential issue with applying legitimacy theory to CSR activity is that social norms and values are largely a function of temporal matters – as issues are brought to the attention of society they seem to replace other issues of prior focus Bird et al 2007 Campbell 2000 2003 Campbell et al 2003 Gray et al 1995a Guthrie and Parker 1990 Therefore for legitimacy theory to yield rmly testable hypotheses it must be possible to identify both the population with whom the rm is concernedwith establishing legitimacy and the values that the population holds at the specic point in timeSourceLori Holder-WebbJeffrey RCohenLeda NathDavid WoodThe Supply of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure Among US Firms [J]Journal of Business Ethics200984P497-527译文美国公司提供的企业社会责任信息披露引言企业社会责任活动这个领域在实际操作和学术前沿方面正受到越来越多的强烈关注投资者对于从事这些活动的公司的关注急遽地增长从1995年至2005年投资了专业的管理资产从7万亿美元上升到244万亿美元而这些资产的份额投资于社会责任从6390亿美元上升到29万亿美元社会投资论坛[SIF]2006 同时大型机构投资者和多方利益相关团体包括联合国负责投资项目的原则全球报告倡议组织GRI2006年以及投资者和公众的利益集团联盟CERES都集中关注社会和环境信息对股票分析的重要性社会责任投资SRI的资产的规模和增长带动了对信息需求的同步增长这项研究的目的是记录美国公司对企业社会责任的披露方式投资者并不是对这些唯一感兴趣的人士企业社会责任活动导致了人们对产品开发和市场实践的重视日益增加研究表明某些类型的企业社会责任活动对公司的品牌忠诚度和市场优势很有价值布朗和达欣1997森和巴塔查亚 2001正如汉德曼和阿诺德 1999第 36页提到的在任何社会中经常会发现有零售商向当地慈善机构捐赠赞助少年运动队并骄傲地展示国旗这些行动表明了这些零售商遵守着一种不成文但具有强烈约束性的社会行为规定比如密切联系社会各界并增强民族自豪感尽管关于究竟是什么促使企业参与到社会责任活动实践中来这个问题依然在研究当中从社会责任投资财产的增长和社会责任产品的消费者市场的扩大中显而易见的是对这些活动的信息需求传统财务信息通常强调的不是这些群体的需要这些群体需要的不仅仅是未来的收益还有公司社会与环境的职责与环境和家庭社区的相互作用亚当斯2004安德森等2005对非经济因素和股票回报率的关注导致了管理者加强问责制的需要根据SIF第五页占据主流意识的问题公司治理透明度问责制和加强信息披露早已成为社会投资工作的中心在这方面的工作大部分是针对欧洲和澳大利亚的研究几乎所有的多国研究表明在信息披露行为上存在国际差异在北美考米尔和麦格曼1999所提出的成本获利理论是用来应付环境的披露成本费用是指股东以外的其他各方将如何利用这些信息的信息成本成本获利是指在管理者和股东之间的信息不对称性减少考米尔和麦格曼1999测试了加拿大RMS的样本发现了这个变量例如一个资本市场和其股票成交量的依赖和环境信息披露的增加有关他们还得出结论环境信息披露是随着时间不断增加而在加拿大信息披露的增加可能可能会造成诉讼报告环境的减少但是在美国这是相反的纳扎尔2000年审查了1990年财富500强企业社会责任披露他发现规模和资本容量影响信息披露的质量和数量由于从纳扎尔2000研究时搜集的1990的数据以及考米尔和麦格南1999对加拿大公司的研究以来环境的披露已经发生了很大的变化所以目前还不清楚美国公司在21世纪如何应对日益增长的企业社会责任的信息需求此外以前的研究在评估企业社会责任信息披露的内容时主要集中在一个单一的报告格式通常是年度报告以及最近的公司网站等格雷等1995提出以供分析目的而使用单一格式可能在很大程度上限制了对企业社会责任披露行为产生的理解因此我们通过探索样本公司整个2004年期间公开披露的所有信息来扩展了这篇文章我们这篇文章主要的贡献是对直接评价给定类型的信息的传播强调方法的发展以前的研究在很大程度上依赖于作为重点代理的信息披露的频繁度在本文中我们评估社会和环境责任通常被称为企业责任会计或CSR在美国公司的一份样本中的报告状态由此确定什么类型的信息被提供并通过什么方式传播我们做了一份对50家公开上市的不同大小和行业的美国公司的披露做了一份内容分析结果表明企业社会责任信息是通过规定和各种自发媒体来披露的与以前的研究结果一致我们发现披露行为的差异是由规模和行业的不同导致的我们的研究结果表明美国公司的披露与其他全球企业相比在规模和数量上都有差异在下一节我们回顾了相关理论和研究并提出了研究问题和假设然后我们描述了研究方法以及讨论了结果我们对关于报告活动会计师事务所监管学者和对非财务信息的性质重新定义的学者的研究进行了总结文献综述问题研究和假设从学术和理论的角度去理清企业对从事企业社会责任活动的决定和为什么怎么以及何时对利益相关者报告这些活动之间的关系是很困难的研究者是否从经济或道德角度看企业社会责任问题决定了广泛理论框架的选择赛特德尔和赫索2007道德理论表明这些活动应当被推广因为他们是应当去做的正确的事经济学理论表明这些活动不仅应被推广到通过他们增加利润及创造股东财富的程度几乎所有推行的理论方法说明仅仅参与企业社会责任的行动是不够的因此对采取的行动的资料进行传播是十分必要的在理论中涉及的一个重大不同意义的问题是应该采取什么行动以及由谁来负责他们在一定程度上对的第一个以及第二个动因的回答是如果该活动的主要目标是争取一个特定派别的支持公司可能有通过各种渠道宣传活动达到这个派别要求的必要因此在发起披露情况的探索前我们提供了一个为什么要进行企业社会责任活动的简要概述伯德等人 2007 采用传统的经济学分析问题认为经理应该适应净现值 NPV 去分析所有潜在的企业社会责任活动并只执行有利于净现值的行动才能增加利益相关者的财富这个理论在企业社会责任语境的一个重要元素是古典概念即股东利益相关者是唯一重要的利益本研究发现市场渐渐忽视了评估的影响即无效模式伴随着多样性措施进入市场价格虽然作者并不能明确地考虑这件信息传播的重要暗示他们这种披露应该通过股东们习惯的渠道发生即托管的文档如年度报告和10-Ks 传统新古典方法在企业社会责任中运用有一个不确定的问题就是它不像生产决策那样企业社会责任活动及其结果可能不会放弃那个用数学就能容易解决的必要的可靠的净现值分析营销策略在营销文件中发现咨询的另一个分支说明企业社会责任主要可以被财富关系驱使见罗宾和瑞德巴赫1987年的一个广泛的调查文学布朗和达欣 1997 提供实证证据表明消费相信产品受公司所拥有的企业能力生产者的竞争优势和生产者的企业社会责任等有关信息的影响尽管企业社会责任制度通常与公司生产的能力毫无关系这两点都是创造一个良好的企业信誉的关键元素被大量的理论家假设可以带来组织经济利益见布朗和Dacin1997年的文献检阅布朗和达欣 1997 发现负面企业社会责任认知会对消费行为造成不良影响而正面的企业社会责任认知会对消费行为起到积极作用他们指出虽然这样做有潜在的经济价值但难以设立一个围绕发展企业社会责任协会的公司职位一个潜在的需要企业社会责任披露来回答的公共论坛汉德曼和阿诺 1999 提供进一步的证据表明可以通过企业社会责任这种营销活动创造财富他们建议当这个无形因素表明与当地社会规范与价值一致时该公司的推广这些元素可能会得到一种战略性视角从而在使得竞争中的定位和产品属性满足消费者的需求和布朗和达欣 1997 一样他们发现负面的制度组织会对顾客感知和行为产生负向影响建议利益相关者采取低于那些高位置的公司的最小的制度行动去体验负面后果霍格曼特 2000 表明企业社会责任活动是一种有效的公司管理这种形象管理理论包括企业个性和企业形象同样是被直接经济方面例如顾客感知和进入资本市场以市场为导向的文献在企业社会责任活动中建议这些行为是一种用来建立并维持顾客的忠诚度和市场份额的战略工具以披露为主要目标的信息会对客户和公众的兴趣产生影响并且我们披露的内容是经过挑选并强调与客户价值一致的政治经济学第三个理论方法通过政治经济的角度考虑这些行为坎贝尔等人2003考梅尔和戈登2001迪根2002Deegan和戈登1996道林和普弗佛1975格雷等人1995格思里和帕克1990奥多万诺2002麦格曼和拉斯顿2002 在这种方法中公司并不被认为是一个可以脱离其社会脉络的经济实体它代替一个有机的生物体和这个脉络的其他成员都是社会契约的当事人无论是主要的利益相关者没有他们的支持公司不可能正常运转包括客户供应商或劳动和资本提供者还是第二利益相关者那些间接参与但能够显著影响公司的人包括监管机构和媒体为了公司的生存必须得到利益相关者的支持和批准克拉克森1995 为了获得和维持支持企业社会责任活动和随之而来的披露是持续沟通过程的一个部分格雷等人1995在这个大标题下研究人员基于利益相关者理论克拉克森2000Hooghiemstra2000Maignan和拉斯顿2002 和合法化例如坎贝尔2000Grayet等人1995 提出各种先进的理论去解释企业社会责任活动和信息披露合法化在日后如在公司的建立维持等方面起很大作用公司为利益相关者准则和价值观的奉献重塑了这样的公众认知从而显出对社会契约尊重使公司得以进入资本和劳动力市场从而获得其他确保组织生存的必要经济资源道林和普弗佛1975列出三种方法建立或改善合法性用符合现有的社会期望去适应业务改变社会定义使其符合原有公司经营或者在和各类机构从事交流促进社会在公开合法符号价值观上进行认同和或依赖于社会和政治支撑驱使对合法性的关心以及相应的足够的资源和支持的程度对组织是可见的道林和普弗佛1975 在将合法性理论应用到企业社会责任活动中时有一个潜在的问题社会准则和价值观念主要是时间功能作为社会关注的问题时它们似乎取代其它问题成为焦点伯德等人2007坎贝尔20002003坎贝尔等人2003格雷等人1995格思里和帕克1990因此为了合法性理论能产生稳定的可测试假设必须确定建立合法性和价值观念的公司的人口以及他们在特定时间点拥有的价值是可以测定的出处洛瑞候德-韦布杰弗里科恩勒达纳特大卫伍德美国公司提供的企业社会责任信息披露[J]商业伦理杂志200984P497-527外文出处《Journal of Business Ethics》 200984P497-527外文作者 Lori Holder-WebbJeffrey RCohenLeda Nath David。

文献信息：文献标题：The impact of environmental information disclosures on shareholder returns in a company: An empirical study（企业环境信息披露对股东回报的影响：一项实证研究）国外作者：Ragothaman Srinivasan；Carr David文献出处：《International Journal of Management》,2008,25（4）, p613-620字数统计：英文 2030 单词，10523 字符；中文 3653 汉字外文文献：The impact of environmental information disclosures onshareholder returns in a company: An empirical studyThe Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (1986) has mandated Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) disclosures in the United States. This Act requires all manufacturing companies (SIC code 20-39) who employ more than 10 people to provide an annual report about the release of more than 300 specified toxic chemicals. Similar legislation exists in other countries as well. How is this information used by investors and corporations? We develop and test a regression model to answer this question. We also perform a few robustness tests. Our sample comes from TRI disclosures for “top 100” corporate polluters ba sed on COMPUSTAT data. Descriptive statistics and correlation measures are also provided. The higher the return on assets the higher is Tobin’s q (a proxy for firm value or shareholder wealth). The waste disposal variable (toxic air release) is a statistically significant predictor of Tobin’s q. As expected, the sign of the regression coefficientfor waste disposal is negative. In addition, firm size has a significant impact on Tobin’s q. A firm’s beta, P/E ratio, and the corporate governance variable are all statistically insignificant.1. IntroductionThe disastrous Union Carbide accident that occurred in India in 1984 and other smaller chemical accidents have caused anxiety in the public’s mind about the release of chemicals from factories. The Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (1986) has mandated Toxic Release Inventory TRI disclosures. This Act requires all manufacturing companies (SIC code 20-39) in the United States who employ more than 10 people to provide an annual report about release of more than 300 specified toxic chemicals. The TRI program offers environmental performance information to the public and is administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). How is this information used by investors and corporations?EPA’s Environmental Economics Research Strategy (EPA, 2004) identifies measuring the benefits of environmental information disclosures as one of its high priority research areas. Some interesting research results have already been published. For example, Konar and Cohen (1997) report negative stock price reactions to TRI disclosures in 1989. These negative stock returns forced companies to change their behavior. Those firms with the largest negative stock market returns to TRI announcements in 1989 subsequently reduced their emissions more than other firms in their industry. The purpose this research project is to examine the association between the TRI disclosures and firm value as measured by Tobin’s q. The goal of examining the association between the TRI disclosures and firm value will be accomplished through the development and testing of a regression model. A few robustness tests are also conducted. Tobin’s q is a widely used proxy for firm value in the finance literature (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick,2003) and is used in this study as the dependent variable.Several researchers have conducted event studies and documented negative stock price reactions to TRI announcements (Hamilton 1995 and Khanna et al. 1998). Eventstudies examine the stock price reactions on one or two days when the environmental information is disclosed. Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) also reported significant negative stock price reactions to bad environmental news such as oil spills. These event studies do not analyze longer-term stock price trends. These studies have generally used smaller samples. Moreover, they have used data from 1989 which are eighteen years old. To overcome these difficulties, a new regression model is developed which uses more recent data from 2000 TRI disclosures. The TRI disclosure data is compiled from raw data reported to the EPA on a facility-by-facility basis and not on a company-bycompany basis. The difficulty of aggregating to company-level data makes the 2000 TRI disclosures the most recent data currently available.2. Prior ResearchKarpoff and Lott (1993) report that when corporate illegal activities and other fraudulent financial schemes are revealed, stock price declines have been the result. In order to estimate the value of intangible assets, we propose to include environmental performance information among the explanatory variables (see Konar and Cohen 2001). Good environmental performance can translate into a good reputation for the firm as an ecology-friendly company and this can increase investor trust (Ragothaman and Lau, 2000). Similarly, bad environmental performance can lead to stock price declines.This research builds on prior research and expands knowledge in several different and new ways. 1) Data used in this study are more recent (than 1989) and come from TRI disclosures for the year 2000; 2) Tobin’s q is measured in accordance with suggestions from finance scholars; 3) The regression model includes some new variables; and a cross-sectional regression model is used. Descriptive statistics and correlation measures are also provided. New insights are gained about the impact of environmental disclosure programs on stockholders’ wealth. Our formulation for Tobin’s q follows that of Chung and Pruitt (1994) and Hirschey and Connolly (2005), where q is measured as the market value of common shares outstanding plus the bookvalue of total assets minus common equity, all divided by the book value of total assets. Tobin’s q is viewed as a market-based measure of firm valuation. In this paper, the effect of environmental disclosures on the market valuation of firms, proxied by Tobin’s q, is examined.Beta is a measure of the risk associated with owning shares in a firm and is commonly used to measure market risk. Konar and Cohen (1997) utilize beta to control for the systematic risk in security returns. Beta is included in this study as a control variable. Various measures of firm size appear in the literature. Dowell, Hart, and Young (2000) use the logarithm of total assets with mixed results in examining whether corporate global standards create or destroy market value. Hamilton (1995) uses the number of employees as a proxy for firm size in examining the relationship between Toxic Release Inventory data and media and stock market reactions. The logarithm of the number of employees (LEMP) is used as a proxy for firm size, and is included in the model as another control variable.Waste (toxic air release) is measured as waste disposal in pounds per revenue- dollar. Waste should be negatively related to Tobin’s q, as it measures the extent to which firms are “dirty.” Konar and Cohen (1997) use toxic chemi cal releases and the number of lawsuits to proxy waste. Hamilton (1995) uses the number of superfund sites to proxy waste. Return on assets (ROA), defined as net income divided by total assets, is used as a measure of firm-level performance. It is a proxy for profitability. ROA should be positively related to Tobin’s q, since better performing firms should be more highly valued in the marketplace, ceteris paribus. Hirschey and Connolly (2005) use profit margin to measure profitability.Another control variable used in this study is the price-to-earnings ratio. The price-to-earnings (PE) ratio is measured as the market price of a firm’s common stock divided by the firm’s income-per-share of common stock. The PE ratio is included in the model as a control variable to pick up the effect of firm-level growth. Firms that are growing rapidly should have a higher market valuation, as measured by Tobin’s q. Yet another control variable used in this paper is “audit opinion” which is a proxy for the corporate governance mechanism. Li et al. (2005) found that firms with higherstock market return tended to receive more clean (unqualified) audit opinions. In other words, audit opinion is negatively related to market value of the firm. Hodge et al. (2004) conducted an experimental research project and concluded that investors reacted to audit qualifications as if it signaled that management was strategically understating financial results. It could be posited that management was concerned about future performance and consequently understated the current performance. According to Choi and Jeter (1992), audit qualifications indicate that uncertainties associated with future cash flows have increased and consequently, the future market value of the firm can be adversely affected.3. Methodology and data sourcesResearchers at the Political Economy Research Institute (PERI) at the University of Massachusetts released, in 2004, the list of the top 100 corporate air polluters based on TRI data disclosed by companies in the year 2000. The toxic (air release) waste data are reported in pounds per revenue dollar. Data from COMPUSTAT were used to compute several operating and financial ratios for these 100 firms. The following independent variables were obtained from the COMPUSTAT database: market beta, return on assets, logarithm of number of employees, P/E ratio and audit opinion. Following Hirschey (2005), the following formula is used to estimate Tobin’s q: Tobin’s q = [Total assets + Total market value of equity –Book value of equity] / Total assets. Tobin’s q was also computed from the data obtained from the COMPUSTAT data base. Due to missing variables in the COMPUSTAT database, 9 companies were dropped. One more firm was deleted because of an extreme outlier. The final sample used in this study contains data from 90 companies.The multiple regression model used in this study is:Tobin’s q = f {market beta (risk), logarithm of number of employees, waste discharge per revenue dollar, return on assets, P/E ratio and audit opinion} The research questions are transformed into null hypotheses as given below:H1: Beta has no significant effect on Tobin’s q.H2: Size as measured by number of employees has no significant effect on Tobin’s q.H3: Waste discharge has no significant effect on Tobin’s q.H4: Return on assets has no significant effect on Tobin’s q.H5: Growth as measured by the P/E ratio has no significant effect on Tobin’s q.H6: Corporate governance as measured by audit opinion has no significant effect on Tobin’s q.4. Results and discussionThe descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. The average Tobin’s q for the sample firms is 2.176. The average amount of toxic air release (waste discharge) is 0.0009 pounds per revenue dollar. The mean for return of assets is 4.648 percent. The average beta (risk measure) is 1.121.Q ratio = Tobin’s QBeta = Market beta (risk)LEMP = Logarithm of number of employeesWaste = Waste disposal per revenue-dollarROA = Return on assetsP/E ratio = Price Earnings ratioAUOP = Audit opinionA correlation analysis of these six explanatory variables with the Tobin’s q and other independent variables was performed. The correlation results are reported inTable 2.The correlation analysis results indicate that Tobin’s q is strongly related to return on assets. The higher the return on assets, the higher is Tobin’s q. Beta, firm size and waste discharge are all negatively related to Tobin’s q. Beta and return on assets have strong negative correlation. Firm size and waste discharge are negatively correlated.Multicollinearity among independent variables may be present in the data and can potentially lead to unstable regression coefficients. A rule of thumb is suggested by Judge et al. (1985) to assess the impact of multicollinearity. They argue that a serious multicollinearity problem arises only when correlations among the explanatory variables are higher than 0.8. In our dataset, the highest correlation is between return on assets and beta at -0.411. Hence, the degree of collinearity present appears to be too small to invalidate estimation results.An ordinary least-squares regression model was developed to investigate the relationship between Tobin’s q and toxic air release, beta, return on assets, growth and other independent variables. Regression methodology permits the testing of six null hypotheses simultaneously. Tobin’s q was the dependent variable and the six explanatory variables mentioned earlier were the independent variables. The regression coefficients, t-statistics (in parentheses), and significance levels are reported in Table 3, column I. The multiple regression model has a respectable adjusted R-squared of 31.3 percent.Thbk 3: Mnhlpie Regression Resultse CONSTANT 2.565 2.450 2.62I 1.416(4.295)*°°(2.273)”(4. t40)*°’(1.320) BETA-0.029 -0.025 -0.025 •0.600(-0.186) (-0. I58) (-0. IG2) (-0.353)LOCi EMPLOYEES -0.363(-3.319)***-0.371(-2.919)**•-0.354(-3.219)***-0.506(-2.880)***WAS SALES -163.186(-2.244)*^-166.038(-2.172)**-137.856(- l.785)•-522.126(-l,846)•RETURH ON 0.1S6 0.157 0.149 0.138 ASSETS (4.343)*••(4.285)*••(4.049)**^ (3.407)**•PPE RATIO 0.013 0.013 0.015 0.010(1.574) (1.569) (1.787)* (1.158)0.030 0.029 0.023 0.I70(0.290) (0.278) (0,213) (1.329)0.016 0. I99(0.129) (1.323) CAPITAL-EXPEN/ -1.413SALES (-0.770)R&D £XP/SALES L236‹i.x8)â7610313 0.3W0.294 0.342 ‘The dependent verieble is Tobin’s O•Sintistically e igaificant at Um l evel**Statistically significant at 5& level***Statistically significant at IN level中文译文：企业环境信息披露对股东回报的影响：一项实证研究在美国，应急计划和社区知情权法案（1986）被授权披露企业有毒排放清单。

外文翻译原文Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets:A review of the empirical disclosure literatureMaterial Source:Journal of Accounting and Economics 31 (2001) 405–440Author:Paul M. Healy, Krishna G. PalepuFinancial reporting and disclosure are potentially important means for management to communicate firm performance and governance to outside investors. We provide a framework for analyzing managers’ reporting and disclosure decisions in a capital Markets setting,and identify key research questions. We then review current empirical researchon disclosure regulation, information intermediaries, and the determinants and economic consequences of corporate disclosure. Our survey concludes that current research has generated a number of useful insights. We identify many fundamental questions that remain unanswered, and changes in the economic environment that raise new questions for research.1 IntroductionCorporate disclosure is critical for the functioning of an efficient capital market.1 Firms provide disclosure through regulated financial reports, including the financial statements, footnotes, management discussion and analysis, and other regulatory filings. In addition, some firms engage in voluntary communication, suchas management forecasts, analysts’ presentations and conference calls, press releases, internet sites, and other corporate reports. Finally, there are disclosures about firms by information intermediaries, suchas financial analysts, industry experts, and the financial press.In this paper we review research on financial reporting and voluntary disclosure of information by management, summarize key researchfi ndings, and identify areas for future work. Section 2 examines the forces that give rise to demand for disclosure in a modern capital-market economy, and the institutions that increase the credibility of disclosures. We argue that demand for financial reporting and disclosure arises from information asymmetry and agency conflicts between managers and outside investors. The credibility of management disclosures is enhanced by regulators, standard setters, auditors and other capital market intermediaries. We use the disclosure framework to identify important questions for research, and review available empirical evidence.Section 3 reviews the findings on the regulation of financial reporting and disclosure. Much of this research documents that earnings, book values, and other required financial statement information is ‘‘value relevant’’. However, fundamental questions about the demand for, and effectiveness of, financial reporting anddisclosure regulation in the economy remain unanswered.Researchon effectiveness of auditors and information intermediaries is discussed in Section 4. There is evidence that financial analysts generate valuable new information through their earnings forecasts and stock recommendations. However, there are systematic biases in financial analysts’outputs, potentially arising from the conflicting incentives that they face. While theory suggests that auditors enhance the credibility of financial reports, empirical researchh as provided surprisingly little evidence to substantiate it.Section 5 reviews the economic determinants of managers’ financial reporting and disclosure decisions. Researchusing the contracting perspective finds that accounting decisions are influenced by compensation and lending contracts, as well as political cost considerations. Researchusing the capital market perspective documents that voluntary disclosure decisions are related to capital market transactions, corporate control contests, stock-based compensation, shareholder litigation, and proprietary costs.2 The role of disclosure in capital marketsIn this section, we examine the role of disclosure in modern capital markets. Information and incentive problems impede the efficient allocation of resourcesin a capital market economy. Disclosure and the institutions created to facilitate credible disclosure between managers and investors play an important role in mitigating these problems. The framework for disclosure that we discuss in this section is then used to develop implications for research.A critical challenge for any economy is the optimal allocation of savings to investment opportunities. There are usually many new entrepreneurs and existing companies that would like to attract household savings, which are typically widely distributed, to fund their business ideas. While both savers and entrepreneurs would like to do business with each other, matching savings to business investment opportunities is complicated for at least two reasons. First, entrepreneurs typically have better information than savers about the value of business investment opportunities and incentives to overstate their value. Savers, therefore, face an ‘‘information problem’’ when they make investmens in business ventures. Second, once savers have invested in their business ventures, entrepreneurs have an incentive to expropriate their savings, creating an ‘‘agency problem’’.3 Managers’ reporting decisionsResearch on managers’ reporting decisions has focused on two areas. The first area, often called positive accounting theory, focuses on management’s financial reporting choices. We provide a brief review of this literature; Fields et al. (2001) provide a more comprehensive survey of recent research in this area. The second area, the voluntary disclosure literature, focuses on management disclosure decisions.3.1 Positive accounting theory literatureThe positive accounting theory literature focuses on management’s motives for making accounting choices when markets are semi-strong form efficient, there are significant costs in writing and enforcing contracts, and there are political costs arising out of the regulatory process (see Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, 1986). The central focus of this literature is to examine the role of contracting and political considerations in explaining management accounting choices when there are agency costs and information asymmetry. Two types of contracts are examined, contracts between the firm and its creditors (debt contracts), and contracts between management and shareholders (compensation contracts). Political considerations include management’s concern about attracting explicit or implicit taxes, or regulatory actions.Contracts are not the only mechanisms for dealing with information asymmetry discussed in the positive accounting literature. For example, Watts and Zimmerman (1983, 1986) discuss the role of reputation as a mechanism for resolving information problems in the context of auditing.Empirical studies of positive accounting theory test whether managers make accounting method changes or accrual estimates to reduce the costs of violating bond covenants written in terms of accounting numbers, to increase the value of earnings-based bonuses under compensation contracts, or to reduce the likelihood of implicit or explicit taxes. Findings indicate that firms that use accounting methods to accelerate earnings are small and have relatively high leverage. Also, firms’ accrual decisions appear to be affected by compensation contracts.While a majority of positive accounting studies focus on analyzing postcontracting opportunistic accounting choices, some studies view the choice of accounting and disclosure as part of the contracting process itself. Holthausen and Leftwich(1983) , Watts and Zimmerman (1990), Smithan d Watts (1992), and Skinner (1993) argue that the use of accounting information in lending and compensation contracts should be viewed as endogenous. Consequently, the nature of a firm’s assets and its investment opportunity set simultaneously determine its optimal contracting relations and its accounting method choices. Watts and Zimmerman (1983) examine the role of voluntary interim reporting as an ex ante contracting part of corporate governance. The ex ante role of accounting in the contracting process is also examined by Zimmer (1986), Christie and Zimmerman (1994), and Skinner (1993).Although positive accounting theory studies generated several interesting empirical regularities regarding firms’ accounting decisions, there is ambiguity about how to interpret this evidence (see reviews by Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983; Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). For example, size is typically viewed as a proxy for political sensitivity, but is likely to proxy for many other factors. Also, as Palepu (1987), Healy and Palepu (1990), and DeAngelo et al. (1996) P.M. Healy, K.G. Palepu / Journal of Accounting and Economics 31 (2001) 405–440 419 suggest, accounting decisions by managers of highly leveraged firms in financial distress may in part reflect an attempt to conserve cash, or changes in investment opportunities.3.2 V oluntary disclosure literatureResearchon voluntary disclosure focuses on the information role of financial reporting for capital markets (see Healy and Palepu, 1993, 1995). This research supplements the positive accounting literature by focusing on stock market motives for accounting and disclosure decisions.Disclosure studies assume that, even in an efficient capital market, managers have superior information to outside investors on their firms’ expected future performance. If auditing and accounting regula tions work perfectly, managers’accounting decisions and disclosures communicate changes in their firm’s business economics to outside investors. Alternatively, if accounting regulation and auditing are imperfect, a more likely possibility, managers trade off between making accounting decisions and disclosures to communicate their superior knowledge of firm’s performance to investors, and to manage reported performance for contracting, political or corporate governance reasons.Management motives for making voluntary disclosure and their credibility are, therefore, interesting empirical questions.4.ConclusionCapital markets are becoming increasingly global as a result of a variety of developments. Institutional investors are looking to diversify by investing P.M. Healy, K.G. Palepu / Journal of Accounting and Economics 31 (2001) 405–440 433 around the globe; corporations are seeking capital wherever the terms are most attractive; and internet-based trading is making it easier for individual investors to invest in international capital markets. Financial deregulation is encouraging these activities.The globalization of capital markets has been accompanied by calls for globalization of financial reporting. This raises several interesting questions. First, is it optimal to have a global accounting standard setter given wide disparities in the development of financial reporting infrastructure across counties? Second, what economic forces will determine the speed with which convergence of financial reporting institutions will take place? Third, what are the political and economic consequences of such a convergence? Fourth, in the absence of convergence, will financial reporting informativeness be enhanced by global accounting standards?In summary, the increased pace of entrepreneurship and economic change has probably increased the value of reliable information in capital markets. However, the traditional financial reporting model appears to do a poor job of capturing the economic implications of many of these changes in a timely way. There is, therefore, an opportunity for future disclosure research to examine how financial reporting and disclosures adapt to changes in business and capital market environments. In addition, as we note earlier, there are many areas where our understanding of existing disclosure institutions and phenomena are limited. We believe that both opportunities make the disclosure area an exciting area of study for accounting scholars.译文信息不对称，企业信息披露和资本市场：信息披露的实证文献回顾资料来源:[J].会计和经济405-440 31(2001) 作者：Paul M. Healy, Krishna G. Palepu财务报告和信息披露是有潜在的外来投资者的重要手段，企业绩效管理，沟通和治理。

LNTU …Acc附录A会计信息质量在投资中的决策作用对私人信息和监测的影响安妮比蒂，美国俄亥俄州立大学瓦特史考特廖，多伦多大学约瑟夫韦伯，美国麻省理工学院1简介管理者与外部资本的供应商信息是不对称的在这种情况下企业是如何影响金融资本的投资的呢？越来越多的证据表明，会计质量越好，越可以减少信息的不对称和对融资成本的约束。

与此相一致的可能性是，减少了具有更高敏感性的会计质量的公司的投资对内部产生的现金流量。

威尔第和希拉里发现，对企业投资和与投资相关的会计质量容易不足，是容易引发过度投资的原因。

当投资效率低下时，会计的质量重要性可以减轻外部资本的影响，供应商有可能获得私人信息或可直接监测管理人员。

通过访问个人信息与控制管理行为，外部资本的供应商可以直接影响企业的投资，降低了会计质量的重要性。

符合这个想法的还有比德尔和希拉里的比较会计对不同国家的投资质量效益的影响。

他们发现，会计品质的影响在于美国投资效益，而不是在口本。

他们认为，一个可能的解释是不同的是债务和股权的美国版本的资本结构混合了SUS的日本企业。

我们研究如何通过会计质量灵敏度的重要性来延长不同资金来源对企业的投资现金流量的不同影响。

直接测试如何影响不同的融资来源会计，通过最近获得了债务融资的公司来投资敏感性现金流的质量的效果，债务融资的比较说明了对那些不能够通过他们的能力获得融资的没有影响。

为了缓解这一问题，我们限制我们的样本公司有所有最近获得的债务融资和利用访问的差异信息和监测通过公共私人债务获得连续贷款的建议。

我们承认，投资内部现金流敏感性叮能较低获得债务融资的可能性。

然而，这种町能性偏见拒绝了我们的假设。

具体来说，我们确定的数据样本证券公司有1163个采样公司（议会），通过发行资本公共债务或银团债务。

我们限制我们的样本公司最近获得的债务融资持有该公司不断融资与借款。

然而，在样本最近获得的债务融资的公司，也有可能是信号，在资本提供进入私人信息差异和约束他们放在管理中的行为。

LNTU---Acc附录A论企业经营业绩评价系统的构建企业作为盈利性组织，其目标是追求经济效益，企业的经济效益集中体现在经营业绩上。

业绩，也称为效绩，绩效、成效等，反映的是人们从事某一活动所取得的成绩或成果，经营业绩是企业在一定时期内利用其有限的资源从事经营活动取得的成果，表现为企业经营效益和经营者业绩两方面。

《辞海》中对“评价”的解释是：“评定货物的价格、还价。

今也指衡量人物或事物的价值。

”价格是价值的货币表现，评价实际上是一个判定价值的过程，就如《现代汉语词典》中的解释：“评价”是“评定价值高低、评定的价值”，管理活动中的评价是指根据确定的目标来测定对象系统的属性，并将这种属性变为客观定量的价值或者主观效用的行为。

评价作为判定人或事物价值的一种观念性活动，包括确定评价目的、选定评价标准(或评价参照系统)，获取评价信息，形成价值判断四个环节。

企业经营业绩评价是指运用科学，规范的评价方法，采用特定的指标体系，对照统一的评价标准，按照一定的程序，进行定量及定性分析，对企业一定经营期间的经营效益和经营者业绩作出真实、客观、公正的综合评判。

它是评价理论方法在经济领域的具体应用，它是在会计学和财务管理的基础上，运用计量经济学原理和现代分析技术而建立起来的剖析企业经营过程，真实反映企业现实经济状况，预测企业未来发展前景的一门科学。

建立和推行企业经营业绩评价制度，科学的评判企业经营成果，有助于正确引导企业经营行为，帮助企业寻找经营差距及产生的原因，提高经济效益。

同时，也为各有关部门对企业实施间接管理，加强宏观调控、制定经济政策和考核企业经营管理者业绩提供依据。

企业经营业绩评价系统的构建与实施必须建立在一定的理论基础之上，符合一定的原则，才能发挥其良好的功能，从而使业绩评价“客观”、“公平”、“合理”。

1企业经营业绩评价系统的理论基础(1) 资本保全理论在市场经济条件下，企业是出资者的企业，是一个资本集合体，所有者是惟一的剩余风险承担者和剩余权益享受者，出资者利益是企业最高利益。

102关于资本市场信息披露的文献综述于 芙（湘潭大学 湖南 湘潭 411105）摘 要：资本市场是一个信息驱动的市场，真实、准确、完整的信息披露，是投资者进行投资决策的先决条件，也是提升资本市场透明度、效率的内在要求。

特别是在我国全面推行以信息披露为核心的注册制背景下，如何提高上市公司信息披露质量已成为社会各界关注的重点话题。

基于此，本文梳理了国内外信息披露质量的相关研究成果，并提出了该领域未来可能的研究方向，希望能为学者更深入地研究信息披露质量这一问题提供参考。

关键词：资本市场；信息披露；信息披露质量中图分类号：F275.5 文献标识码：A DOI：10.19921/ki.1009-2994.2021-11-0102-034信息披露作为传递公司经营绩效、财务状况和发展趋势信息的重要手段，对资本市场有效运作起到至关重要的作用。

近年来，上市公司信息披露越来越受到政府监管机构的重视。

2020年3月，新修订的《证券法》对信息披露作了专章规定。

2021年1月中共中央办公厅、国务院办公厅印发的《建设高标准市场体系行动方案》更是强调了注册制改革下信息披露的核心地位。

同年3月，证监会发布的《上市公司信息披露管理办法》对上市公司信息披露新增了简明清晰、通俗易懂的要求，并鼓励上市公司自愿性信息披露。

这些标志着上市公司信息披露在制度方面迈出了坚实的一步。

回顾以往文献，学术界对信息披露的探讨，主要围绕代理问题和信息不对称问题展开，本文将基于这两个问题，从信息披露的影响因素和经济后果两个角度对相关研究进行介绍，并提出这一领域需要进一步研究的问题。

一、上市公司信息披露的形式信息不仅仅是连接上市公司与契约各方的桥梁和纽带，也是资本市场中不同群体财富再分配的重要指向标。

从经济学的角度来看，企业信息生产的最优数量为信息生产的边际成本等于边际收益时所生产的信息数量。

对于存在着大量企业和客户的竞争行业，市场力量足以引导其生产最优数量的产品，然而，由于财务会计信息具有公共产品的特征，市场外部性和搭便车问题使得会计信息的供给不足。

外文翻译原文：Discussion of related party transaction information disclosure normsAt present, the related party transactions of listed companies is widespread, many listed company has become an important part of business activities. In theory, related party transactions are neutral areas of the economy, market behavior is neither simple, nor "black box" trading. Its main role is to make full use of internal resources, lower transaction costs, improve operational efficiency and achieve the company goal of capital operation. However, because the purpose of related party transactions and forms the main body by the micro-economic control, so in practice, many listed companies, related party transactions not in the free competition under market conditions, but controlled by large shareholders. Particularly in the laws and regulations are not perfect, assessment and auditing role of intermediaries has not been fully played, accounting practitioners are not high quality case, related party transactions even easier to become part of the adjustment of profits of listed companies, the means to evade tax . This resulted in varying degrees of distortion of accounting information and misleading investors investment decisions.First, the existence of related party transactions in questionWhile certain related party transactions are conducted in public, but in many cases, related party transactions is not based on a fair and impartial, but to gloss over the party's financial position and operating results, to achieve set a good corporate image, to appease the creditors, incentives of investors. Obviously unfair related party transactions, mainly the following aspects:1. Adjustment of profits. ① The favorable transfer pricing and false sales to the inflated profits. If listed companies well below the market price of raw materialspurchased from related parties or stock merchandise on, he is far above the market price of the sale to related parties, the low prices, then the operating results of listed companies to gradually "brilliant "get up. ②profits through asset replacement regulation. Assets between related parties, the performance in the form of unequal exchange: one related party to purchase quality assets at low prices to listed companies and listed companies or non-performing assets of unequal exchange; two non-performing assets of listed companies and related debt equal to the related party stripped to reduce the financial costs, enhance profitability; three listed companies the market price much higher than the sale of bad assets to related parties in order to obtain significant disposal gains.2. Shift the burden of debt and costs. Between related parties bear the debt and costs, mainly in the following several forms: ① the other party to repay the debt; ②the other party to pay the purchase price; ③pay the other party; ④otherwise the other party to incur obligations and costs.3. Transfer of funds. By listed companies are often higher or lower than the market price, selling goods to related parties or to provide services to achieve the purpose of transfer of funds. In addition, listed companies and financial exchanges between related parties and lending are quite common, although business lending to each other between the acts not permitted by the regulations, but the related party transactions and the lending of funds between the two is difficult to strictly distinguish between , and the method was not responsible for the public.4. Reduce the tax burden. Reduce the tax burden through related party transactions, the main two things: First, the profits of profit-making enterprises will be transferred to the loss-making enterprises, to minimize the tax burden on the whole group; second is the use of different enterprises in different regions and tax incentives tax provisions of the difference , the profits to low tax or even more preferential tax policies related party.Second, the limitations of the relevant laws and regulations binding1. Difficult to control the related party relationship between the behavior of non-associated. In order to truly reflect the economic substance of related partytransactions, promulgated the "sale of assets between related parties, such as the Provisional Regulations on Accounting Treatment." The central element is: listed companies and transactions between related parties, if there is no conclusive evidence that the transaction price is fair, on the obviously unfair trading price of parts, shall be allowed to be recognized as current period profit as a capital surplus shall be dealt with and This part of the difference may not be used to increase the capital, or make up the losses. As the Interim Provisions on non-related party transactions is not to regulate, resulting in a number of listed companies by various means, the association of non-related party relationship, so that the original revenue from related parties into from non-affiliated parties, to achieve the manipulation of profit purposes. In addition, listed companies will be non-association of related party relationships since then replacement of non-monetary assets, monetary transactions: the first non-correlation of related party relationship, then a non-monetary asset exchange transactions, as the two document monetary transaction processing, asset replacement soon had a business into a sale of assets and acquired assets of the two document-monetary transactions to evade the "Accounting Standards for Enterprises - Non-monetary transactions" constraints, to increase the company's profits with .2. Relationship between related parties narrow the scope of the provisions. "Enterprise Accounting Standards - related party relationships and transactions disclosed in", the not give a clear definition of related parties, gave only a standard to judge the relationship between related parties, namely: direct or indirect control, joint control or direct significant impact; two or more parties with the subject's control. But indirect common control, significant indirect effects, with the under common control between two or more parties, not as a related party accounting standards; on the form is not in fact belong to the relationship between related parties, accounting standards only in principle requirements, but no specific requirements. Define the scope of related party relationships too narrow for the listed companies manipulated profits through related party transaction has left more space.3. Pricing policies on related party transaction disclosure requirements is too simple. "Accounting Standards for Enterprises - related party relationships andtransactions disclosure" requires listed companies in the notes to financial statements, the related party transactions pricing policy as one element of their transactions to be disclosed. However, the scope of the pricing policy, to which pricing policies can be used, different pricing policies apply to which types of transactions, etc., not to make provision. Currently, listed companies to disclose the related party transaction pricing policies varied, such as the ex-factory price, price agreements, plans price, contract price, the wholesale price so the choice of pricing policies are also highly irregular, and did not explain the pricing basis, with non-associated party transactions are consistent pricing policies and the amount of Wen Ti the difference, the resulting public right, "Accounting Standards - Related Party Relationships and Transactions disclosure" disclosure requirement widely questioned.4. Disclosure of information on irregular lack of effective monitoring. Currently, listed companies to disclose the actual related party relationships and transactions there are more problems: first, incomplete disclosure of related party relationships. Not many listed companies have a major impact on their companies or controlling shareholders to be disclosed as related party. Major individual investors, key management personnel and their close family members and other related parties, disclosed little. Second is the type of related party transactions do not grasp the accurate disclosure is not sufficient. Between related parties such as the guarantee and mortgage as a contingent liability on the license agreement, and key management personnel compensation, transfer and other receivables, the basic non-disclosure. Disclosure of related party transactions statement is too general, the current focus on disclosure of related party transactions form a large extent the disclosure, and its economic substance, the rationale behind, the production and operation of the parties to the transaction and the extent of current performance of the substance did not make disclosure. Third, the disclosure of related party transactions ambiguous content, such as the type of transaction, the transaction elements of the disclosure, or understatement, or incomplete, so that users of financial statements can not be clear, accurate accounting information. 4 is a fraud, in order to misconduct. All this, yet the lack of relevant rules and regulations to regulate and control.Third, disclosure of related party transactions on the normative Suggestions1. Stock Exchange's regulatory role to play. Stock Exchange listed company to disclose the contents of the related party transactions should have the power to examine, from the relevant laws and regulations to standardize the system. Establish government regulation, industry self-discipline and social supervision Trinity regulatory framework. Information disclosure in the securities market regulation, in the same time improve the ability of government regulation. Government regulation should be established, industry self-discipline and social supervision Trinity regulatory framework.2. Establish and improve laws and regulations safeguarding the interests of small investors in the system. For related party transactions due to the unfair result of shareholder interests are infringed upon, relevant laws and regulations should be appropriate provisions to protect victims, punish the aggressor. Should gradually establish a complete range of civil, criminal and administrative liability, including multi-level information disclosure regulatory regime, and gradually change the current excessive reliance on administrative control to regulate the securities market information disclosure practices. From the legislative point of view, to give small investors, certain special powers, such as in particular, small and medium investors to ask the court to reject the shareholder meeting, Board of Directors the powers of resolution.3. Expand the scope of related party relationships. Whether an association party relations, In addition to the accounting standards of the provisions, indirect common control, under common control with both sides in or to be considered as associated with. "International Accounting Standards No. 24 - the reveal of the related parties", the indirect joint control or significant influence indirectly, and with under common control between two or more parties, are considered related parties. According to our current situation, this could be reference.4. Increase disclosure of the contents of the related party transactions. Operating performance of listed companies have a significant impact related party transactions, in addition to existing disclosure requirements should be content, but also to disclosethe extent of its influence; involving the transfer of assets, mutual funds, such as guarantees and collateral information, regardless of their the amount of size, should be fully disclosed; on the relationship between related parties has been discharged from the original related parties, such as trade or financial dealings with its occurrence, it should be full disclosure.5. Standard pricing policies related party transactions. Resources or obligations between related parties of the transfer price is the key to understand the related party transactions. However, as "Enterprise Accounting Standards - related party relationships and transactions disclosed in" Related party transactions not provided pricing policy, which led to the pricing policies of listed companies to disclose highly irregular. In my opinion, can learn from the practice of international accounting standards, to make provision for this, such as the widely used internationally comparable uncontrolled price, resale price, cost plus profit price.6. Study abroad and learn from the disclosure requirements of related party transactions. If some countries require listed companies to disclose related party transactions outstanding amount of the settlement period and manner of senior staff or joint venture receivable and notes receivable, with joint ventures, directors and other related-party receivables, payables , director and CEO compensation and related party in the balance sheet of the commitments. Some countries also require listed companies on the amount of related party transactions in large amounts in the balance sheet disclosure of transactions with related parties are disclosed in the income statement. These practices, we should learn from.7. Increase disclosure of related party transactions violation penalties. For listed companies to manipulation related party transactions, accounting statements or to gloss over certain related party transactions it hidden, refused to disclose important information or distort the behavior of the appropriate punishment should be to develop rules and increase penalties. In addition, irregularities of listed companies, listed companies must not only punish, but also on the board of directors and related companies be held responsible in civil and criminal liability.Source: K.C. John Wei. Tunneling or propping: Evidence from connected transactions in China [J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2006(5):26-34. 译文：浅谈关联方交易信息披露规范目前，上市公司的关联交易十分普遍，很多上市公司关联交易已成为企业活动的重要组成部分。