测量中国的农产品出口的食品安全标准的影响【外文翻译】

农产品出口数据与质量检验标准随着全球化的发展，农产品出口在国际贸易中扮演着重要的角色。

然而，农产品的质量问题一直是制约农产品出口的重要因素之一。

为了确保农产品出口的质量和安全，各国都制定了相应的质量检验标准。

本文将探讨农产品出口数据与质量检验标准之间的关系，并分析其对农产品出口的影响。

一、农产品出口数据的重要性农产品出口数据是指农产品出口的数量和金额等相关信息。

这些数据对于了解农产品出口的规模和趋势具有重要意义。

首先，农产品出口数据可以反映一个国家或地区的农业生产能力和竞争力。

通过分析农产品出口数据，可以了解到不同国家或地区的农业发展水平和农产品质量。

其次，农产品出口数据对于制定农业政策和农产品市场预测也具有重要参考价值。

通过分析农产品出口数据，政府可以及时调整农业政策，提高农产品出口的竞争力。

此外，农产品出口数据还可以为农产品贸易谈判提供依据，帮助国家争取更有利的贸易条件。

二、质量检验标准的意义质量检验标准是指对农产品质量进行检验和评估的标准。

质量检验标准的制定旨在保障农产品的质量和安全，防止低质量农产品进入市场。

质量检验标准可以从多个方面对农产品进行评估，包括农产品的外观、口感、营养成分、农药残留等。

通过质量检验标准，可以确保农产品符合国际贸易的要求，提高农产品的市场竞争力。

此外，质量检验标准还可以保护消费者的权益，确保他们购买到安全、健康的农产品。

三、农产品出口数据与质量检验标准的关系农产品出口数据与质量检验标准之间存在着密切的关系。

首先，农产品出口数据可以反映农产品的质量水平。

如果一个国家或地区的农产品出口数据持续增长，说明其农产品质量较高，受到国际市场的认可。

相反，如果农产品出口数据下降，可能意味着该国或地区的农产品质量存在问题，需要加强质量检验和监管。

其次，质量检验标准可以影响农产品出口数据。

如果一个国家或地区的质量检验标准过于严格，可能会导致农产品出口量减少。

因为农产品需要符合质量检验标准才能出口，如果标准过高，可能会增加农产品出口的难度。

食品安全与卫生标准对果品出口的影响目录一、食品安全与卫生标准的严格要求 (2)二、主要果品出口国及其市场份额 (5)三、果品加工与增值产品的市场潜力 (7)四、果品出口的主要品种与地区分布 (10)五、果品出口市场的总体规模与增长趋势 (14)随着现代生活方式的改变和饮食结构的调整，消费者对健康和环保的重视程度不断提高。

绿色果品和有机果品因其安全、健康、环保的特点，满足了消费者对高品质生活的追求，成为越来越多家庭的首选。

绿色果品与有机果品的兴起为果品出口市场带来了新的机遇和挑战。

为了抓住机遇、应对挑战，出口企业应积极提升产品质量和附加值，加强品牌建设和市场推广，同时密切关注国际贸易动态和政策变化，灵活调整出口策略和市场布局。

各国政府纷纷出台支持有机农业的政策，如减免税款、提供资金和技术支持等，推动有机食品市场的扩大。

在中国，政府也积极推动绿色果品和有机果品的发展，通过加强农产品质量安全管理、提高农产品附加值等方式，提升中国农产品在国际市场上的地位和影响力。

声明：本文内容来源于公开渠道或根据行业大模型生成，对文中内容的准确性不作任何保证。

本文内容仅供参考，不构成相关领域的建议和依据。

一、食品安全与卫生标准的严格要求（一）国际食品安全与卫生标准概述1、食品安全与卫生标准的国际框架在果品出口市场中，食品安全与卫生标准受到严格监管，这主要基于一系列国际协议和组织，如世界卫生组织（WHO）、联合国粮农组织（FAO）以及世界贸易组织（WTO）等。

这些机构制定了多项关于食品安全与卫生的国际标准和指南，旨在确保全球食品贸易中的产品质量和消费者健康。

2、主要进口国的特定要求不同国家和地区对进口果品的安全与卫生标准有所不同，但普遍遵循一些核心原则，如农药残留限量、微生物污染控制、重金属及有害化学物质含量限制等。

例如，欧盟、美国和日本等发达国家对进口果品的检验标准尤为严格，要求提供详细的产地证明、农药使用记录及残留检测报告等。

中文2479字Revealed comparative advantage and competitiveness of China’sagricultural productsZhan JingEconomy and Management Collage, Nanhua University, Hengyang,4210100, China中国主要农产品的显性比较优势及竞争力分析詹晶（南华大学经济管理学院，湖南衡阳，421001）译文正文：中国主要农产品的显性比较优势及竞争力分析詹晶（南华大学经济管理学院，湖南衡阳，421001）摘要：本文在大量数据的基础上测算了1980－2003年期间中国部分农产品的显性比较优势指数及其比较竞争力。

测算结果表明中国在可食用蔬菜、茶叶等农产品上仍然具有比较优势，但是24 年来中国农产品的显性比较优势指数呈现下降趋势。

关键词：农产品; 国际贸易; 显性比较优势(RCA); 竞争力中国的农产品出口，为增加外汇、就业机会及城乡居民收入做出了重大贡献。

2003年农产品贸易余额为2.5美元亿美元，占外贸顺差总额的9.8％。

诚（2003）报道，由农产品出口可直接和间接创造19.88个就业机会。

巴拉萨（1965）在全球层面上首次提出了中国农产品的相对竞争力可以通过显示性比较优势分析（RCA），这对意识到中国农产品的竞争地位有作用的。

显示性比较优势的公式有某些类型的测量方法可以判定一个产业的竞争力，其中RCA指数就是重要的一个，RCA的概念基于的是传统的贸易理论。

原来的RCA指数，由巴拉萨（1965），可以被定义为：RCA= (X ij /X it) / (X nj / X nt)其中x表示出口,i代表一个国家，j是一种商品，x ij表示i国用来出口商品j。

t代表一组商品和n代表一组国家。

因此,该方程分析一个国家的出口占世界出口的商品与该国的出口总额占世界出口总额。

如果i国家j商品的世界出口份额，占i国的所有产品的世界出口份额越大，RCA将越大于1，这表明一个国家在生产特定商品上有一个“显性”比较优势。

食品安全问题对农产品出口的影响与控制近年来，食品安全问题逐渐引起人们的广泛关注和重视。

食品安全问题不仅对人体健康造成威胁，同时也对农产品出口带来了巨大的影响。

本文将探讨食品安全问题对农产品出口的影响，并提出相应的控制措施。

一、食品安全问题对农产品出口的影响1. 影响农产品出口量和价值食品安全问题的暴露会严重损害农产品的信誉和声誉，导致国外消费者对农产品的购买意愿大幅减弱。

一旦农产品失去了国外市场，不仅出口量会减少，还会导致农产品价格下跌，给农民带来巨大的经济损失。

2. 扰乱农产品贸易秩序食品安全问题会扰乱农产品贸易秩序，引发国际贸易纠纷。

一旦农产品出现安全问题，进口国可能会实施贸易限制措施，如禁止进口、增加检验检疫要求等。

这不仅对农产品出口国造成直接影响，还会使得国际贸易环境动荡不安，进而对全球农产品市场产生负面影响。

3. 损害国家形象和国际声誉食品安全问题的出现会对农产品出口国家形象和国际声誉造成严重损害，降低国家的软实力和竞争力。

国际社会普遍认为，一个国家的食品安全水平是衡量其经济、科技和管理水平的重要标志。

因此，食品安全问题会影响国家在国际舞台上的地位和影响力。

二、食品安全问题的控制措施1. 加强立法和监管农产品出口国应加强相关食品安全立法，完善食品安全监管体系。

制定严格的食品安全标准和质量监督制度，并加强对农产品生产、加工和销售环节的监测和检查，严惩违法行为，提高食品安全保障水平。

2. 推进农产品质量安全追溯体系建设建立健全农产品质量安全追溯体系，对农产品的生产、加工、流通等环节进行全程监控和追溯。

通过追溯体系，可以快速发现和追踪食品安全问题的源头，从而及时采取措施防止问题扩大，并保护农产品出口市场的信誉。

3. 提升农产品质量安全认证水平加强农产品质量安全认证工作，提升农产品质量和安全水平。

推广和普及国家认可的农产品质量认证体系，鼓励农业生产者通过认证体系认证，提高农产品出口的竞争力。

4. 强化信息公开与沟通合作加强食品安全信息的公开、透明和及时性，向国内外消费者提供真实、准确的农产品安全信息。

毕业设计（论文）外文翻译题目：影响中国的人民币汇率变动对农产品出口的影响：出口到日本的案例研究英文题目：The Effect of China's RMB Exchange RateMovement on Its Agricultural Export: A CaseStudy of Export to Japan系别：专业：班级：学号：姓名：指导老师：填表日期：影响中国的人民币汇率变动对农产品出口的影响：出口到日本的案例研究Longjiang Chen摘要本文试图考察变化和波动之间的关系来分析中国的人民币汇率和其农业出口。

建立了一个模型来分析人民币汇率影响农产品出口所面临两个运动约束包括中国特定的汇率制度和存在技术性贸易壁垒的农业贸易。

该模型表明,民币汇率的影响运动依赖汇率水平的比较(升值或折旧)效应和汇率风险的效果。

以中国农产品出口日本为例,实证检验以中国对日本农产品出口为例，进行了实证检验。

一个模型（1，1）指定衡量汇率波动和日常生活的回归与结构打破虚拟变量估计基于单位根检验结果与结构。

结果表明人民币兑日元升值将促进出口增长，与积极汇率波动促进农产品出口到日本而阻碍出口。

然而，汇率波动对出口影响远小于汇率水平，从而导致消极的净出口政策对农产品出口的影响实证结果进行了讨论。

关键词：汇率；农产品出口；中国前言改革开放以来中国在2005年七月人民币汇率形成机制，人民币已波动频繁。

在这方面，密切关注了对人民币汇率的影响波动对中国出口的影响。

由于每个行业都有自己的特点，其汇率变动可能对不同的行业有不同的影响。

因此，克莱因（1990）指出，影响实际汇率波动对出口贸易在商品的水平下必须进一步调查，。

一般来说，农产品有相对于制成品，和为较低的初始投资成本，存在的长期合同等这样的行业性质特殊。

人们普遍承认，影响汇率变动对农产品贸易的不同，对制造品贸易也不同。

经谢尔登和马克克劳斯顿（2002）证实，相对于其他行业，实际汇率不确定性具有较显著的负向影响农产品贸易的作用。

出口瓜果标准When it comes to exporting fruits and vegetables, ensuring adherence to international standards is crucial. 出口水果和蔬菜时，确保符合国际标准至关重要。

Meeting these standards not only ensures the health and safety of consumers but also maintains the reputation of the exporting country. 符合这些标准不仅能确保消费者的健康与安全，还能维护出口国的声誉。

Therefore, it is imperative for exporters to be well-versed in the standards set by importing countries. 因此，出口商有必要熟悉进口国设定的标准。

One of the most common standards that exporters need to comply with is the Maximum Residue Limits (MRLs) for pesticides. 最常见的出口标准之一是对农药最大残留限量的要求。

This entails limiting the amount of pesticide residues present on fruits and vegetables to ensure they are safe for consumption. 这意味着限制水果和蔬菜上的农药残留量，以确保它们适合食用。

Exceeding MRLs can lead to rejection of the shipment or even a ban on future exports, causing significant financial losses. 超出最大残留限量可能导致货物被拒绝或者甚至对未来的出口进行禁止，造成巨大的经济损失。

食品安全专业蔬菜论文中英文外文翻译文献1. 王涛, 徐亚男. 我国蔬菜生产与安全的现状与对策[J]. 广东农业科学, 2010, 37(13): 45-47.2. 斯宪芳, 卢仁志. 蔬菜中的重金属和农药残留及其安全问题的调查分析[J]. 中国环境监测, 2007, 23(5): 116-118.3. 范翠华, 阮荣平, 段爱敏,等. 无公害蔬菜生产技术对蔬菜品质及其营养成分的影响[J]. 广东农业科学, 2009, 36(19): 98-100.4. Yeoh S H, Chua T H. Trace metal levels in vegetables from selected farms in Johor Bahru and Kluang[J]. Malaysian Journal of Nutrition, 2002, 8(1): 11-17.5. Mahdi Y, Richardson D G, Abdulla H K, et al. Heavy metal content of some vegetables collected from different areas of Baghdad city, Iraq[J]. Environmental Monitoring and Assessment, 2012, 184(11): 6813-6821.6. 潘云贤, 王振球. 现代环境背景下蔬菜农药安全问题的研究与探讨[J]. 科技资讯, 2007(19): 575.7. 鲍云飞, 顾振中. 蔬菜中农药残留标准及其对我国的启示[J]. 中国农业资源与区划, 2010, 31(2): 23-26.8. 杨忠伦. 我国现代农业生产与蔬菜种植技术的发展现状及对策思考[J]. 产业技术创新, 2018(17): 71.以上8篇文献主要探讨了蔬菜生产与安全问题，包括无公害蔬菜生产技术对蔬菜品质及其营养成分的影响，以及蔬菜中的重金属和农药残留及其安全问题的调查分析等方面。

农业食品安全标准了解国内外农产品食品安全标准的要求农业食品安全是任何国家都非常重视的问题。

由于食品安全事关公众健康，各国纷纷制定了一系列严格的农产品食品安全标准，以确保食品的质量和安全。

本文将介绍国内外农产品食品安全标准的要求及其对农业发展的影响。

一、国内农产品食品安全标准要求在中国，农产品食品安全标准经过多年的完善和发展，形成了一套相对完整的体系。

国内农产品食品安全标准主要包括农药残留限量、兽药残留限量、重金属限量等要求。

其中，农药残留限量是农产品中农药残留量的最高允许限度，以保障食品不受农药污染。

兽药残留限量是指农产品中兽药残留量的标准，以确保食品不受动物药物残留的影响。

重金属限量则是指农产品中重金属含量的最高允许限度，以防止农产品受到重金属污染。

此外，国内农产品食品安全标准还包括了品质要求、包装标识、生产管理等方面的要求。

品质要求主要是针对食品的外观、味道、营养成分等进行严格的检验，保证食品的质量。

包装标识要求则是要求农产品在包装上必须标明生产日期、保质期、生产厂商等信息，方便消费者了解产品的来源和保质期。

生产管理要求是指在农产品的生产、存储、加工等过程中，必须符合一定的卫生、安全标准，确保食品不受污染。

总的来说，国内农产品食品安全标准的要求非常严格，旨在保障公众的健康和权益。

这些标准的制定和实施，对于提高农产品的质量、确保食品安全起到了至关重要的作用。

二、国外农产品食品安全标准要求国外农产品食品安全标准的要求各有不同，但大致可以归纳为三个方面：食品卫生安全、质量要求和标识规定。

在食品卫生安全方面，国外标准要求农产品在生产、加工、包装和运输过程中要遵循严格的卫生标准，禁止使用有害物质，确保食品不受污染。

此外，对于一些敏感物质和致癌物质的检测也相当严格，以保证食品的安全性。

质量要求方面，国外标准对农产品的外观、色泽、口感、营养成分等均有详细的规定。

只有符合这些要求的产品才能销售到市场上。

标识规定方面，国外标准对农产品的包装和标识要求非常严格。

中英文翻译(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)附件1：翻译译文热处理对豆奶（豆腥味）过氧化脂质含量的影响豆腥味是导致豆奶风味不理想的重要因素，为了以最大限度的降低豆奶的豆腥味，我们研究了热处理对过氧化脂质的影响，是影响豆腥味的一个重要因素。

我们还以豆奶为原料并在制作过程中使用加热工序制备了各种甜点，从而通过感官实验来评价加热对其的影响。

经过浸泡和在75℃热处理的肿涨的大豆在相对湿度80-90％处理十分钟的过氧化脂质的含量比大豆中缺乏脂氧合酶和14％或更少的热处理的大豆制备出的豆奶的过氧化脂质含量要大大降低。

此外，设计热烫浸泡和肿胀的大豆在沸水中处理了30秒的豆奶的过氧化脂质含量可以与缺失脂肪氧合酶的大豆制作出的豆奶过氧化脂质含量相媲美。

蛋奶布丁，巴伐利亚奶油以及经过热处理的大豆制作出的豆腐其中的豆腥味都得到了显著的改善。

关键词：大豆豆奶过氧化脂质豆腥味大豆长期以来都是作为高营养食品代名词在日本人的饮食文化中具有具足轻重的作用。

最近的研究表明，大豆蛋白具有降低胆固醇的作用（爱德森等人，1995），大豆皂苷具有抗癌活性（肯尼迪，1995),以及大豆异黄酮对乳腺癌和前列腺癌具有一定的抑制作用（彼得森&贝尔内斯,1991;彼得森G&贝尔内斯S，1993），以及对于骨质疏松症（土田等人，1999）具有一定的预防作用。

根据以上情况可知，由大豆制成的加工食品的价值就是作为人体异黄酮的来源。

大豆被用于很多的食品中，包括豆腐，纳豆，味精，酱油，豆浆。

豆奶作为一种可利用的饮料，可以广泛应用于果冻，蛋奶布丁等甜品的制作原料。

然而，脂肪氧合酶产生的独特的豆腥味对消费者的喜好产生了重大的影响。

因此尽可能的减少豆腥味是能够使豆浆脱颖而出并广泛推广的关键性的挑战。

有几种用于激活脂肪氧合酶的方法已经被提出：温水处理研磨的方法（越后等，1991），其中，大豆在70℃热水中浸泡，然后用95℃的热水进行匀浆;热烫（赛斯&纳特，1988）的方法，用99.3℃的热水进行处理，以及微波加热的方法（王&托莱多，1987）。

Policy Reforms Affecting Agricultural Incentives:Much Achieved,Much StillNeededKym AndersonFor decades,earnings from farming in many developing countries have been depressed by a pro-urban bias in own-country policies,as well as by governments of richer countries favoring their farmers with import barriers and subsidies.Both sets of policies reduce national and global economic welfare and inhibit agricultural trade and economic growth.They almost certainly add to inequality and poverty in developing countries, since three-quarters of the world’s billion poorest people depend on farming for their live-lihood.During the past two decades,however,numerous developing country governments have reduced their sectoral and trade policy distortions,while some high-income countries also have begun reducing market-distorting aspects of their farm policies.The author surveys the changing extent of policy distortions to prices faced by developing-country farmers over the past half century,and provides a summary of new empirical estimates from a global economy-wide model that yield estimates of how much could be gained by removing the interventions remaining as of2004.The author concludes by pointing to the scope and prospects for further pro-poor policy reform in both developing and high-income countries.JEL codes:F13,F14,Q17,Q18For many decades agricultural protection and subsidies in high-income(and some middle-income)countries have been depressing international prices of farm products,which lowers the earnings of farmers and associated rural businesses in developing countries(Johnson1991;Tyers and Anderson1992).Those policies almost certainly add to inequality and poverty,since three-quarters of the world’s poorest people depend directly or indirectly on agriculture for their main income (World Bank2007).Currently less than15million relatively wealthy farmers in developed countries,with an average of almost80hectares per worker,are being The World Bank Research Observer#The Author2009.Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/THE WORLD BANK.All rights reserved.For permissions,please e-mail:journals.permissions@ doi;10.1093/wbro/lkp014Advance Access publication November9,200925:21–55helped at the expense of not only consumers,taxpayers,and producers of other tradables in those rich countries but also the majority of the1.3billion relatively impoverished farmers and their large families in developing countries who,on average,have to earn a living from just2.5hectares per worker.But in addition to this external policy influence on rural poverty,the govern-ments of many developing countries have directly taxed their farmers over the past half-century.A well-known and often-cited example is the taxing of exports of plantation crops in post-colonial Africa(Bates1981).Furthermore,many developing countries in the1960s and1970s chose also to pursue an import-substituting industrialization strategy,predominantly by restricting imports of manufactures.As Krueger,Schiff,and Valde´s(1988,1991)showed in their seminal multi-country study,this indirectly taxed other tradable sectors in those developing economies,including agriculture.Thus the price incentives facing farmers in many developing countries have been depressed by both own-country and other countries’farm,food,and trade policies.I will survey the extent to which government policies at home and abroad have distorted prices faced by developing-country farmers over the past half-century.I begin with a brief examination of the methodology required to measure the extent of own-country distortions to farmer incentives.I then survey analyses of the effects of those agricultural and trade policies on incentives over time,focusing on the worsening of that situation between the1950s and early 1980s and on the progress that has been made over the25years since then.Notwithstanding recent reforms,many price distortions remain in the agricul-tural sector of both developing and high-income countries.I provide a summary of new empirical estimates from a global economy-wide model that indicate how much could be gained by removing the interventions remaining as of2004.I conclude by pointing to the scope and prospects for further pro-poor policy reform in both developing and high-income countries.National Distortions to Incentives:Basic Theory1Bhagwati(1971)and Corden(1997)define the concept of a market policy distor-tion as something that governments impose to create a gap between the marginal social return to a seller and the marginal social cost to a buyer in a transaction. Such a distortion creates an economic cost to society which can be estimated using welfare-measuring techniques such as those pioneered by Harberger (1971).As Harberger notes,this focus allows a great simplification in evaluating the marginal costs of a set of distortions:changes in economic costs can be evalu-ated by taking into account the changes in volumes directly affected by such dis-tortions,ignoring all other changes in prices.In the absence of divergences such 22The W orld Bank Research Observer,vol.25,no.1(February2010)as externalities,the measure of a distortion is the gap between the price paid and the price received,irrespective of whether the level of these prices is affected by the distortion.2Importantly,the total effect of distortions on the agricultural sector will depend not just on the size of the direct agricultural policy measures,but also on the magnitude of distortions generated by direct policy measures altering incentives in non-agricultural sectors.It is relative prices,and hence relative rates of government assistance,that affect producers’incentives.In a two-sector model an import tax has the same effect on the export sector as an export tax: the Lerner(1936)Symmetry Theorem.This carries over to a model that has many sectors,and is unaffected if there is imperfect competition domestically or internationally or if some of those sectors produce only non-tradables (Vousden1990,pp.46–7).The Symmetry Theorem is therefore also relevant for considering distortions within the agricultural sector.In particular,if import-competing farm industries are protected,for example via import tariffs,this has similar effects on incentives to produce exportables as does an explicit tax on agricultural exports;and if both measures are in place,this is a double imposition on farm exporters.Direct Agricultural DistortionsConsider a small,open,perfectly competitive national economy with many firms producing a homogeneous farm product with just primary factors.In the absence of externalities,processing,producer-to-consumer wholesale plus retail marketing margins,exchange rate distortions,and domestic and international trading costs,that country would maximize national economic welfare by allow-ing the domestic producer and consumer prices of that product to both equal E times P,where E is the domestic currency price of foreign exchange and P is the foreign currency price of this identical product in the international market.That is,any government-imposed diversion from those two equalities,in the absence of any market failures or externalities,would be welfare-reducing for that small economy.Price-distorting Trade Measures at the National Border.The most common distortion is an ad valorem tax on competing imports(usually called a tariff),t m.Such a tariff on imports is the equivalent of a production subsidy and a consumption tax, both at rate t m.If that tariff on the imported primary agricultural product is the only distortion,its effect on producer incentives can be measured as the nominal rate of assistance(NRA)to farm output conferred by border price support(NRA BS), which is the unit value of production at the distorted price,less its value at the Anderson23undistorted free market price,expressed as a fraction of the undistorted price:3NRA BS¼EÂPð1þt mÞÀEÂPEÂP¼t mð1ÞThe effect of that import tariff on consumer incentives in this simple economy is to generate a consumer tax equivalent(CTE)on the agricultural product forfinal consumers:CTE¼t mð2ÞThe effects of an import subsidy are identical to those in equations(1)and(2)for an import tax,but t m in that case would have a negative value.Governments sometimes also intervene with an export subsidy s x(or an export tax,in which case s x would be negative).If that were the only intervention,then:NRA BS¼CTE¼s xð3ÞDomestic Producer and Consumer Price-distorting Measures.Some governments provide a direct production subsidy for farmers,s f(or production tax,in which case s f is negative,including via informal taxes in kind by local and provincial governments).In that case,if only this distortion is present,the effect on producer incentives can be measured as the nominal rate of assistance to farm output con-ferred by domestic price support(NRA DS),which is as above except s f replaces t m or s x,but the CTE in that case is zero.Similarly,if the government just imposes a consumption tax c c on this product(or consumption subsidy,in which case c c is negative),the CTE is as above except c c replaces t m or s x,but the NRA DS in that case is zero.The combination of domestic measures and border price support provides the following total rate of assistance to output,NRA o,and total consumer tax equival-ent,CTE:NRA o¼NRA BSþNRA DSð4ÞCTE¼NRA BSþc tð5ÞWhat if the Exchange Rate System Is also Distorting Prices?Should a multi-tier foreign exchange rate regime be in place,then another policy-induced price wedge exists.A simple two-tier exchange rate system creates a gap between the price received by all exporters and the price paid by all importers for foreign cur-rency,changing both the exchange rate received by exporters and that paid by importers from the equilibrium rate E that would prevail without this distortion in the domestic market for foreign currency(Bhagwati1978).This requires24The W orld Bank Research Observer,vol.25,no.1(February2010)controls by the government on current account transfers.In the past it was common for exporters to be required to surrender their foreign currency earnings to the central bank for exchange to local currency at a low official rate,which is equivalent to a tax on exports to the extent that the official rate is below what the exchange rate would be in a market without government intervention.That implicit tax on exporters reduces their incentive to export and hence the supply of foreign currencyflowing into the country.With less foreign currency,demanders are willing to bid up its purchase price,providing a potential rent for the govern-ment which can be realized by auctioning off the limited supply of foreign cur-rency extracted from exporters,or by creating a legal secondary market.Either mechanism will create a gap between the official and parallel rates(Dervis,de Melo and Robinson1981).If the government chooses to allocate the limited foreign currency to different groups of importers at different rates,that is called a multiple exchange rate system.Some lucky importers may even be able to purchase it at the low official rate.The more that is allocated and sold to demanders whose marginal valuation is below the equilibrium rate,the greater the unsatisfied excess demand and hence the stronger the incentive for an illegal or“black”market to form,and for less-unscrupulous exporters to lobby the government to legalize the secondary market for foreign exchange and to allow exporters to retain some fraction of their exchange rate earnings for sale in the secondary market.Such a right given to exporters to retain and sell a portion of foreign exchange receipts would increase their incentives to export,and thereby reduce the shortage of foreign exchange and hence the secondary market exchange rate(Tarr1990;Martin 1993).For present purposes,what matters is that,where a country has distortions in its domestic market for foreign currency,the exchange rate relevant for calculat-ing the NRA o or the CTE for a particular tradable product depends,in the case of a dual exchange rate system,on whether the product is an importable or an exportable one,while in the case of multiple exchange rates it depends on the specific rate applying to that product each year.The precise way in which that can be handled is detailed in Anderson and others(2008).What if Farm Production Involves not just Primary Factors but also Intermediate Inputs?Where intermediate inputs are used in farm production,any taxes or sub-sidies on their production,consumption,or trade would alter farm value added and thereby also affect farmer incentives.Sometimes a government will have directly offsetting measures in place,such as a domestic subsidy for fertilizer use by farmers but also a tariff on fertilizer imports.In other situations there will be farm input subsidies but an export tax on thefinal product.In principle all these items could be brought together to calculate an effective rate of direct assistance Anderson25to farm value added.The nominal rate of direct assistance to farm output,NRA o, is a component of that,as is the sum of the nominal rates of direct assistance to all farm inputs,call it NRA i.Where there are significant distortions to input costs, their ad valorem equivalent can be accounted for by summing each input’s NRA times its input–output coefficient to obtain the combined NRA i,and adding that to the farm industry’s nominal rate of direct assistance to farm output,NRA o,to get the total nominal rate of assistance to farm production,NRA.What about Post-farmgate Costs?If a state trading corporation is charging exces-sively for its marketing services and thereby lowering the farm-gate price of a product,for example as a way of raising government revenue in place of an expli-cit tax,the extent of that excess is treated as if it were an explicit tax.Some farm products,including some that are not internationally traded,are inputs into a processing industry that may also be subject to government inter-ventions.In that case the effect of those interventions on the price received by farmers for the primary product also needs to be taken into account.The Mean and Variance of Agricultural NRAs.When it comes to averaging across countries,each polity is an observation of interest,so a simple average is mean-ingful for the purpose of political economy analysis.But if one wants a sense of how distorted agriculture is in a group of countries,a weighted average is needed. The weighted average NRA for covered primary agriculture can be generated by multiplying each primary industry’s share of production(valued at the farm-gate equivalent undistorted prices)by its corresponding NRA and adding across indus-tries.The overall sectoral rate,NRAag,also could include actual or assumed infor-mation for the non-covered commodities and,where it exists,the aggregate value of non-product-specific assistance to agriculture.A weighted average can be gen-erated also for just the tradables part of agriculture—including those industries producing products such as milk and sugar that require only light processing before they can be traded—by assuming that its share of non-product-specific assistance equals its weight in the total.Call that NRAag t.In addition to the mean,it is important to provide also a measure of the dis-persion or variability of the NRA estimates across the covered products.The cost of government policy distortions to incentives in terms of resource misallocation tends to increase as the degree of substitution in production increases(Lloyd 1974).In the case of agriculture which involves the use of farm land that is sector-specific but transferable among farm activities,the greater the variation of NRAs across industries within the sector,the higher will be the welfare cost of those market interventions.A simple indicator of dispersion is the standard devi-ation around the weighted mean of industry NRAs within the agricultural sector. 26The W orld Bank Research Observer,vol.25,no.1(February2010)Trade Bias in Agricultural Assistance.A trade bias index is also needed to indicate the changing extent to which a country’s policy regime has an anti-trade bias within the agricultural sector.This is important because,as mentioned above,the Lerner(1936)Symmetry Theorem demonstrates that a tariff assisting import-competing farm industries has the same effect on farmers’incentives as if there were a tax on agricultural exports;and,if both measures are in place,this is a double imposition on farm exporters.The higher is the nominal rate of assistance to import-competing agricultural production(NRAag m)relative to that for expor-table farm activities(NRAag x),the more incentive producers in that subsector will have to bid for mobile resources that would otherwise have been employed in export agriculture,other things being equal.Indirect Agricultural Assistance or Taxation via Non-agricultural DistortionsIn addition to direct assistance to,or taxation of,farmers,the Lerner(1936) Symmetry Theorem further demonstrates that their incentives are also affected indirectly by government assistance to non-agricultural production in the national economy.The higher is the nominal rate of assistance to non-agricul-tural tradables production(NRAnonag t),the more incentive producers in other tradable sectors will have to bid up the value of mobile resources that would otherwise have been employed in agriculture,other things being equal.If NRAag t is below NRAnonag t,one might expect there to be fewer resources in agriculture than there would be under free market conditions in the country,notwithstand-ing any positive direct assistance to farmers,and conversely.One way to capture this is to calculate a Relative Rate of Assistance,RRA, defined as:RRA¼1þNRAag t1þNRAnonag tÀ1ð6ÞSince an NRA cannot be less than21if producers are to earn anything,neither can an RRA.This measure is a useful indicator for providing international comparisons over time of the extent to which a country’s policy regime has an anti-or pro-agricultural bias.National Distortions to Farmer Incentives:The Evolutionof PoliciesBefore turning to the contemporary(post-World W ar II)situation,it would be insightful to examine briefly the long history of government intervention inAnderson27international markets for farm products by today’s advanced economies,since similar political economy forces may influence policy choices in later-developing countries.Attention then turns to the price-distorting policies of developing countries since the1950s as they became independent from their colonial masters. The Long History in High-income Countries,BrieflyBritain was thefirst country to have an industrial revolution.Prior to that revolu-tion—from the late1100s to the1660s—Britain used export taxes and licenses to prevent domestic food prices from rising excessively.But during1660–90a series of Acts gradually raised food import duties(making imports prohibitive under most circumstances)and reduced export restrictions on grain.These pro-visions were made even more protective of British farmers by the Corn Laws of 1815.True,the famous repeal of the Corn Laws in the mid-1840s heralded a period of relatively unrestricted food trade for Britain,4but then agricultural pro-tection returned in the1930s and steadily increased over the nextfive decades.Similar tendencies have been observed in many other West European countries, although on the Continent the period of free trade in the19th century was con-siderably shorter,and agricultural protection levels during the past150years have been somewhat higher on average than in Britain.Kindleberger(1975) describes how the19th-century free-trade movements in Europe reflected the national economic,political,and sociological conditions of the time.Agricultural trade reform was less difficult for countries such as Britain with overseas terri-tories that could provide the metropolis with a ready supply of farm products.The fall in the price of grain imports from America in the1870s and1880s provided a challenge for all,however.Denmark coped well by moving more into livestock production to take advantage of cheaper grain.Italians coped by sending many of their relatives to the New World.Farmers in France and Germany successfully sought protection from imports,however,and so began the post-Industrial Revolution growth of agricultural protectionism in densely populated countries. Meanwhile,tariffs on West European imports of manufactures were progressively reduced after the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade(GATT)came into force in the late1940s,thereby adding to the encouragement of agricultural relative to manufacturing production(Lindert1991;Findlay and O’Rourke2007).Japan provides an even more striking example of the tendency to switch from taxing to increasingly assisting agriculture relative to other industries.Its industri-alization began later than in Europe,after the opening up of the economy follow-ing the Meiji Restoration in1868.By1900Japan had switched from being a small net exporter of food to becoming increasingly dependent on imports of rice (its main staple food and responsible for more than half the value of domestic food production).This was followed by calls from farmers and their supporters for 28The W orld Bank Research Observer,vol.25,no.1(February2010)rice import controls.Their calls were matched by equally vigorous calls from manufacturing and commercial groups for unrestricted food trade,since the price of rice at that time was a major determinant of real wages in the non-farm sector. The heated debates were not unlike those that led to the repeal of the Corn Laws in Britain six decades earlier.In Japan,however,the forces of protection tri-umphed,and a tariff was imposed on rice imports from1904.That tariff then gradually rose over time,raising the domestic price of rice to more than 30percent above the import price during World War I.Even when there were food riots because of shortages and high rice prices just after that war,the Japanese government’s response was not to reduce protection but instead to extend it to its colonies and to shift from a national to an imperial policy of rice self-sufficiency.That involved accelerated investments in agricultural development in the colonies of Korea and Taiwan behind an ever-higher external tariff wall that by the latter1930s had driven imperial rice prices to more than60percent above those in international markets(Anderson and Tyers1992).After the Pacific War ended and Japan lost its colonies,its agricultural protection growth resumed and spread from rice to an ever-wider range of farm products.The other high-income countries were settled by Europeans relatively recently and are far less-densely populated.They therefore have had a strong comparative advantage in farm products for most of their history following Caucasian settle-ment,and so have felt less need to protect their farmers than Europe or north-east Asia.Indeed Australia and New Zealand until the late20th century tended—like developing countries—to adopt policies that discriminated against their farmers(Anderson,Lloyd and MacLaren2007).Developing Countries since the1950sIn the Republic of Korea and Taiwan,China in the1950s,as in many newly independent developing countries,initially adopted an import-substituting indus-trialization strategy which harmed agriculture.But in those two economies that policy was replaced in the early1960s with a more neutral trade policy that resulted in very rapid export-oriented industrialization.That development strategy in those densely populated economies imposed competitive pressure on the farm sector which,just as in Japan in earlier decades,prompted farmers to lobby(suc-cessfully,as it happened)for ever-higher levels of protection from import protec-tion(Anderson and Hayami1986,ch.2).Many less-advanced and less-rapidly growing developing countries not only adopted import-substituting industrialization strategies in the late1950s or early 1960s(Little,Scitovsky,and Scott1970;Balassa and Associates1971)but also imposed direct taxes on their exports of farm products.The latter practice was especially rife in Africa(Bates1981).It was common in the1950s and1960s, Anderson29and in some cases even in the1970s and1980s,also to use dual or multiple exchange rates so as to tax indirectly both exporters and importers(Bhagwati 1978;Krueger1978).This added to the anti-trade bias of developing countries’trade policies.That policy history is now well known,and has been documented extensively in previous surveys(for example Krueger1984).Less well-known is the extent to which many emerging economies have belatedly followed the examples of Korea and Taiwan in abandoning import-substitution and opening their economies.Some(for example Chile)started in the 1970s,while others(for example India)did not do so in a sustained way until the 1990s.Some have adopted a very gradual pace of reform,with occasional rever-sals,while others have moved rapidly to open markets.Some have reduced export taxes but simultaneously raised import barriers.And some have adopted the rheto-ric of reform but in practice have done little to free up their economies.To get a clear sense of the overall impact of these reform attempts,there is no substitute for empirical analysis that quantifies over time the types of indicators raised in the theory section above.Building on recent work by the International Food Policy Research Institute(IFPRI)and the OECD(Orden and others2007;OECD2007),a World Bank project recently undertook such analysis,to which we now turn. National Distortions to Farmer Incentives:Empirical Estimatespost-World War IIAfter post-World W ar II reconstruction,Japan continued to raise its agricultural pro-tection,just as had been happening in Western Europe,but to even higher levels. Domestic prices exceeded international market prices for grains and livestock pro-ducts in both Japan and the European Community in the1950s,but by less than40 percent.By the early1980s the difference was more than80percent for Japan but was still around40percent for the EC—and was still close to zero for the agricul-tural-exporting rich countries of Australasia and North America(Anderson and Hayami1986,table2.5).Virtually all of that assistance to Japanese and European farmers in that period was due to restrictions on imports of farm products.Since1986the OECD(2008)has been computing annual producer and consu-mer support estimates by member countries.For the OECD member countries as a whole,producer support rose between1986–88and2005–07in US dollar terms (from$239to$263billion)but has come down when expressed as a share of support-inclusive returns to farmers(from37to26percent).Because of some switching of support instruments,including switching to measures that are based on non-current production or on long-term resource retirement,the share of that assistance provided via market price support measures has fallen from three-quar-ters to one-half.When the PSE payment is expressed as a percentage of undistorted30The W orld Bank Research Observer,vol.25,no.1(February2010)prices to make it an NRA,the NRA fall is from59to35percent between1986–88and2005–07(OECD2008).This indicator suggests high-income country pol-icies have become considerably less trade–distorting,at least in proportional terms,even though farmer support in high-income countries has continued to grow in dollar terms because of growth in the value of their farm output.As for developing countries outside north-east Asia,the main comprehensive set of pertinent estimates over time is for the period just prior to when reforms became widespread.They were generated as part of a major study of18developing countries from the1960s to the mid-1980s by Krueger,Schiff,and Valde´s(1988, 1991).That study by the World Bank,whose estimates are summarized in Schiff and Valde´s(1992),shows that the depression of incentives facing farmers has been due only partly to various forms of agricultural price and trade policies, including subsidies to food imports.Much more important in many cases have been those developing countries’non-agricultural policies that hurt their farmers indirectly.The two key ones have been manufacturing protectionism(which attracts resources from agriculture to the industrial sector)and overvalued exchange rates(which attract resources to sectors producing non-tradables,such as services).That indirect impact was negative for all four groups of countries shown in table1,whereas the impact of direct agricultural policies was negative only for the two lowest-income country groups.In addition to the total assistance being more negative the poorer the country group,table1also reveals that it is lower for producers of exportables than for the subsector focused on import-com-peting farm products,suggesting a strong anti-trade bias for the sector as a whole.Since there were no comprehensive multiregion studies of the Krueger,Schiff, and Valde´s type for developing countries that monitored progress over the sub-sequent reform period,5a new study was recently launched by the World Bank aimed atfilling this lacuna.The new study covers not only41developing countries but also14European transition economies as well as20high-income countries.The results from that study6do indeed reveal that there has been a substantial reduction in distortions to agricultural incentives in developing countries over the past two to three decades.They also reveal that progress has not been uniform across countries and regions,and that—contrary to some earlier claims(for example from Jensen,Robinson,and Tarp2002)—the reform process is far from complete.In particular,many countries still have a wide dis-persion in NRAs for different farm industries and in particular have a strong anti-trade bias in the structure of assistance within their agricultural sector;and some countries have“overshot”in the sense that they have moved from having an average rate of assistance to farmers that was negative to one that is positive, rather than stopping at the welfare-maximizing rate of zero.Moreover,the var-iance in rates of assistance across commodities within each country,and in aggre-gate rates across countries,remains substantial;and the beggar-thy-neighbor。