The Fugitive Evidence on Public versus Private Law Enforcement

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Journal of the Japanese and International Economies16,536–558(2002)doi:10.1006/jjie.2002.0512Fiscal Policy Effectiveness in Japan1Kenneth N.KuttnerFederal Reserve Bank of New York,New YorkandAdam S.PosenInstitute for International Economics,Washington,DCReceived January18,2002;revised August30,2002Kuttner,Kenneth N.,and Posen,Adam S.—Fiscal Policy Effectiveness in JapanThe effectiveness offiscal policy in Japan over the past decade has been a matter of greatcontroversy.We investigate the effectiveness of Japanesefiscal policy over the1976–1999period using a structural V AR analysis of real GDP,tax revenues,and public expenditures.Wefind that expansionaryfiscal policy,whether in the form of tax cuts or of public worksspending,had significant stimulative ing a new method of computing policymultipliers from structural V ARs,we calculate that the multiplier on tax cuts is about25%higher at a four-year horizon than that on public works spending,though both are wellin excess of one.A historical decomposition reveals that Japanesefiscal policy was con-tractionary over much of the1990s,and a significant proportion of the variation in growthcan be attributed tofiscal policy shocks;accordingly,most of the run-up in public debtis attributable to declining tax revenues due to the recession.Examining savings behaviordirectly,wefind limited evidence of Ricardian effects,insufficient to offset the short-term ef-fects of discretionaryfiscal policy.J.Japan.Int.Econ.,December2002,16(4),pp.536–558.1Correspondence should be addressed to Adam Posen,Institute for International Economics,1750 Massachusetts Avenue N.W.,Washington,D.C.20036.Fax:202-454-5432.E-mail:aposen@. An earlier version was presented at the CEPR-NBER-TCER Conference on Issues in Fiscal Adjust-ment,December13–14,2001,Tokyo,Japan.We are grateful to Stanley Fischer,Fumio Hayashi, Takeo Hoshi,Richard Jerram,John Makin,George Perry,Mitsuru Taniuchi,and Tsutomu Watanabe for helpful comments and advice.Samantha Davis provided excellent research assistance during the revisions.The views expressed here and any errors are those of the authors,and not necessarily those of Federal Reserve Bank of New York,the Federal Reserve System,or the IIE. c Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Institute for International Economics.2002.5360889-1583/02$35.00c 2002Elsevier Science(USA)All rights reserved.FISCAL POLICY EFFECTIVENESS IN JAPAN537 Federal Reserve Bank of New York,New York,and Institute for International Economics,Washington,DC.c 2002Elsevier Science(USA)Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers:E62,E65,E21.The effectiveness offiscal policy in Japan in the1990s has been at least as controversial as the currently more public disputes over monetary policy.There has been open debate over the degree to which expansionaryfiscal policy has even been tried,let alone whether it has been effective,along with widespread assertions about the degree of forward-looking behavior by Japanese savers.The highly visible and rapid,more than doubling of Japanese public debt in less than a decade speaks for itself to a surprising number of observers:thefiscal deficit has grown sharply,yet the economy has continued to stagnate,sofiscal stabilization failed.No less an economist than Milton Friedman recently wrote,”[D]oesfiscal stimulus stimulate?Japan’s experience in the‘90s is dramatic evidence to the contrary.Japan resorted repeatedly to large doeses offiscal stimulus in the form of extra government spending....The result:stagnation at best,depression at worst, for most of the past decade.”2But it is easy to demonstrate from just charting publicly available data that the bulk of the increase in Japanese public debt is due to a plateau in tax revenue rather than to increased public expenditure or even discretionary tax cuts.This of course reflects the inverse cyclical relationship between output and tax revenue.If one applied a plausible tax elasticity of1.25to reasonable measures of the widening output gap(e.g.,those estimated in Kuttner and Posen(2001)),the result would be a much-reduced estimate of the structural budget deficit.In fact,using the measure of potential based on a constant productivity trend growth rate of2.5%a year all but eliminates the non-social security portion of the deficit.Moreover,as measured by thefiscal shocks derived from our estimates in this paper,fiscal policy has been generally contractionary since1997.More tellingly,the massive increase in Japanese government debt outstanding over the period has had little apparent effect to date on either the level of long-term interest rates or the steepness of the yield curve,or the yen–dollar exchange rate. This is commonly attributed to the passivity of Japanese savers,and there surely has been no sign of crowding out or of inflation fears.This fact has not gone unremarked upon in thefinancial press.3Nevertheless,citing the eventual need to pay obligations,including those off of the government balance sheet(such as pen-sions),the ratings agencies downgraded Japanese local currency sovereign debt to 2Friedman,“No More Economic Stimulus Needed,”Wall Street Journal,October10,2001,p.A17. See also Ian Campbell,“Friedman Opposes Stimulus Package,”UPI Newswire,October9,2001.3The Economist observed,“[government bond yields]fell as the government pumped the economy with...fiscal stimulus,as the yen plummeted by40%from its high in the middle of1995,and even as the government’s debt climbed to100%of GDP.By late[1997]the Japanese government was able to borrow more cheaply than any other government in recorded history.”“Japanese Bonds:That Sinking Feeling,”The Economist,February21,1998,pp.74–75.538KUTTNER AND POSENAA-(by Standard and Poor’s,April15,2002)and A2(by Moody’s,May30, 2002).4But with the exception of a brief panic-induced spike in rates in Jan-uary1999,more than half of which was reversed within two months,holders of Japanese government bonds have yet to take any significant capital losses. Against this background of declining tax revenues and relatively stable long-term nominal interest rates,the actual course of Japanesefiscal policy has been almost tumultuous,rather than one of unremitting spend-spend-spend,as often assumed.The divergence of common perceptions from reality may be due in part to the fact that Japan has a centralized,if arcane,fiscal system.5Every year since 1994has brought announcements of various tax reforms,but their actual impact is difficult to ascertain.6On the public spending side,estimating the mamizu(“true water”)of any Japanesefiscal stimulus requires great care,given institutional complications.7Meanwhile,in terms of revenue collection,the Japanese tax base is rather small by developed economy standards,especially on the household side, where salaried urban workers pay a disproportionate share of the taxes,and small business owners and rural residents pay almost none.8The absence of obvious interest rate,inflation,or crowding out effects from the fiscal measures undertaken leads us to examine what really happened withfiscal policy in Japan in the1990s.If standard theory tells us that expansionaryfiscal policy drives up interest rates,limiting that policy’s effectiveness,then perhaps the absence of an interest rate rise is indicative of the opposite.Ourfirst considera-tion therefore is simply whether thefiscal impulses had Keynesian countercyclical signs and what impact those impulses had.As many observers have stressed,tra-ditional public works in Japan more closely approximate the building of pyramids in hinterlands,famous to macroeconomics undergraduates,than do those in any other OECD country.9Some have indicated that they would expect the multiplier on such wasteful expenditures to be less than one.10Of course,although Keynes 4See Arkady Ostrovsky and Christopher Swann,“Japan hit by downgrade in credit rating,”Financial Times,April16,2002,p.13,and David Ibison,“Japan’s sovereign debt rating downgraded,”, May31,2002.5See Ishi(2000)for a historical perspective;Balassa and Noland(1988),Bayoumi(1998),and OECD Economic Survey:Japan(1999),for institutional descriptions;and Schick(1996)for a com-parison of U.S.and Japanese budget processes.Tax Bureau(2000)gives the official account of the tax system.6See Watanabe et al.(2001)and Tax Bureau(2000).7See Posen(1998).8See Balassa and Noland(1988).9Sixty percent of the Japanese coastline is today reportedly encased in concrete(Ian Buruma,“The Japanese Malaise,”New York Review of Books,July5,2001,p.5).Similar examples are easy to come by:see,for example,Martin Wolf,“Japan’s Economic Black Holes,”Financial Times,January17, 2001,p.21,and Bergsten,Ito,and Noland(2001,pp.64–65).10In June1998the then—Vice Minister of Finance for International Affairs Eisuke Sakakibara (1999,p.45),expressed a contrary point of view:“Concerning the currentfiscal package,I know that there have been various criticisms of it,but I think there is now a wider acceptance,even in the international community,of public works as a more effective means than tax cuts.In addition,under current circumstances,a strong multiplier effect can be expected....”FISCAL POLICY EFFECTIVENESS IN JAPAN539 maintained that even overtly wasteful public works projects were an effective source offiscal expansion,several observers have stressed that in the Japanese context tax cuts are likely to be more effective.We then turn to historical decompositions of the effect offiscal policy on the Japanese economy in the1990s.The ample variation in Japanesefiscal policy,mov-ing from contractionary to expansionary and back to contractionary,with some tax measures temporary and others permanent,provides a rich basis for econometric investigation.Upon that investigation,it becomes clear thatfiscal policy provides an apparent explanation for a surprisingly large amount of the variation in Japanese economic growth over the period.Meanwhile,on the tax side,all tax cuts were preceded and accompanied by loud declarations by government officials that even-tually taxes would have to go up—whether due to the looming demographic threat, to the unsustainability of Japanese public debt,or to the supposedly declining po-tential growth rate.Even though wefind that these well-publicized dangers from debt did not have any obvious short-run effect on multipliers,we also directly examine the possibility of Ricardian equivalence.Finally,we conclude by consid-ering some of the questions raised by the apparentfiscal power granted through savers’passivity in Japan.The analysis here builds on earlier work applying a structural V AR approach tofiscal policy in Japan(Kuttner and Posen,2001),but extends that paper’s in-vestigations in four important ways.First,impulse response functions and their standard errors are calculated,allowing a clear sense of the significance and inter-action offiscal policy shocks.Second,fiscal shocks and their contributions to GDP growth in the1990s are computed and plotted,yielding an analysis of the historical record.Third,a new approach is introduced to compute“pure”policy multipliers from structural vector autoregressions(V ARs)in order to give a clearer picture of the effects of tax and expenditure changes in isolation.And fourth,throughout the paper,a variety of robustness checks are considered,especially with regard to the results’sensivity to the identifying assumptions.1.THE SHORT-RUN EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICYTo assess the impact offiscal policy on the economy,we employ a structural three-variable V AR model adapted from Blanchard and Perotti(1999),which is designed to identify the impact offiscal policy while explicitly allowing for con-temporaneous interdependence among output,taxes,and spending.The one-lag version of the structural V AR can be expressed succinctly asA0Y t=A1Y t−1+Bεt,(1) where Y t=(T t,E t,X t) is the vector of the logarithms of real tax revenue,real expenditure,and real GDP,andεt is interpreted as a vector of mutually orthogonal shocks to the three jointly endogenous variables.540KUTTNER AND POSENFollowing Blanchard and Perotti,a key identifying assumption is that real GDP is allowed to have a contemporaneous effect on tax receipts,but not on expenditure. (As discussed below,however,plausible changes to this assumption make no substantive difference to the results.)The model also assumes that taxes do not depend contemporaneously on expenditure(or vice versa)although tax shocks are allowed to affect spending within the year.This assumption reflects the institutional setup forfiscal policy in Japan,where taxes are mostly collected from withholding and consumption,spending is mostly implemented with a lag,and both automatic stabilizers and the size of the public sector are limited.With these assumptions imposed,the model can be written asT t=a130X t+a111T t−1+a121E t−1+a131X t−1+εT tE t=a211T t−1+a221E t−1+a231X t−1+b21εT t+εE t(2)X t=a310T t+a320E t+a311T t−1+a321E t−1+a331X t−1+εX t,where a i j0,a i j1,and b i j represent the i,j th elements of the A0,A1,and B matrices.Thus a130captures the within-period elasticity of tax receipts with respect to GDP,b21is the effect of tax shocks on expenditure,and a310and a32allow taxes andexpenditure to affect real GDP contemporaneously.With seven parameters to estimate from the six unique elements of the covariance matrix of reduced-form V AR residuals,the model in(2)is not identified,however.11 Our strategy,like that of Blanchard and Perotti,is to use independent informationon the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to real GDP(i.e.,a130)to identifythe model.Drawing on Giorno et al.(1995),we set this parameter equal to1.25, yielding an exactly identified model.Reliable comprehensive quarterlyfiscal data for Japan are not available to the public or to the internationalfinancial organizations,unfortunately,and so we fit the model instead to annual consolidated central,state,and localfiscal data, compiled by the IMF,spanningfiscal years1976through1999.12Tax receipts are defined as direct and indirect tax revenue,excluding social security contributions. Expenditure corresponds to the sum of current and capital expenditure,less so-cial security and interest payments.13The estimated model also includes a linear trend and a trend interacted with a post-1990dummy to capture the post-1990 11See Hamilton(1994,chapter11)for a complete discussion of identification and estimation of structural V ARs.12This lack of timely higher frequency data is of course of policy significance,as well as presenting a difficulty for research.As Stanley Fischer(2001,p.163)observes,“Indeed,there is a general problem offiscal transparency in Japan...the key issues are lack of consolidation among differentfiscal units and the absence of quarterly data,which means thatfiscal information is on average about eight months out of date.”13As noted by Blanchard and Perotti(1999),estimating the third equation in the structural V AR is equivalent to using a measure of“cyclically adjusted”tax receipts(and a similarly adjusted measure of spending)as instruments for taxes and spending in a two-stage least squares regression.FISCAL POLICY EFFECTIVENESS IN JAPAN541TABLE IThe Relationship between Taxes,Spending,and GDP:Estimated Parameters of the Structural V AREquationIndependent variable Lag Tax Expenditure GDP Tax receipts t——−0.03 Expenditures t——0.17∗∗Real GDP t 1.25——Tax receipts t−10.71∗∗∗−0.12−0.25∗∗Expenditures t−10.030.78∗∗∗0.02 Real GDP t−1−0.58∗∗0.66∗0.59∗∗∗Tax shock t—−0.03—Trend−0.004−0.0020.033∗∗∗Trend×(t>1990)−0.018−0.010−0.038∗∗∗Adjusted R20.9960.9950.997 Durbin–Watson 1.66 2.30 1.85 Source.Authors’calculations,based on trivariate structural V AR including real tax revenue,real government expenditures and real GDP,estimated on24annual observations spanningfiscal years 1976through1999.Note.Asterisks indicate statistical signficance:∗∗∗for0.01,∗∗for0.05,and∗for0.10.The coefficient of1.25on real GDP in the tax equation is imposed a priori as an identifying assumption.The adjusted R-squared and Durbin–Watson statistics are from the reduced form V AR equations.Further details can be found in the text.slowdown in trend GDP growth.14The estimated parameters are displayed in Table I.Interpreting individual coefficients of a simultaneous equation model is difficult,of course,but it is worth noting that expenditures have a positive,statis-tically significant impact on real GDP.Figure1plots the impulse response functions for the four-year time-horizon relevant for policy analysis,along with90%confidence bands associated with the estimates.As shown in thefirst two panels of the last row of thefigure,tax cuts and expenditure increases both have expansionary effects.Moreover,the estimated effects are statistically significant at a one-to two-year horizon,as well as for the current year in the case of expenditure shocks.The estimated magnitudes of both tax and expenditure effects are comparable as well.The upper left-hand panel of Fig.1shows that tax revenue shocks tend to be relatively transitory,effectively vanishing after one year,notwithstanding the characterization of most Japanese tax law changes as permanent in intent.15,16In contrast,the center panel of the 14The model makes no explicit distinction between temporary and permanent tax and expenditure changes,in part because the temporary tax changes enacted in Japan have been much smaller in magnitude than the permanent ones(see Watanabe et al.,2001).Many of the supposedly permanent tax changes were offset by subsequent tax legislation,however,and this pattern should be picked up by the model’s dynamics.15This pattern is documented in Watanabe et al.(2001).Because of the feedback between tax revenues and GDP,and the greater-than-unit elasticity of tax revenue with respect to GDP,the impact of a10%tax shock on tax revenue is slightly less than10%.16The lack of a significant response of expenditures to tax shocks may appear atfirst to contradict the results of Ihori et al.(2001),who found Granger causality from the taxes to expenditures,expressed542KUTTNER AND POSEN years after shockp e r c e n t effect of tax shock on tax 01234-14-7714effect of tax shock on spending 01234-10-5051015effect of tax shock on GDP 01234-551015effect of spending shock on tax 01234-14-70714effect of spending shock on spending 01234-10-551015effect of spending shock on GDP 01234-5051015effect of GDP shock on tax 01234-14-70714effect of GDP shock on spending 01234-10-5051015effect of GDP shock on GDP01234-5051015FIG.1.Estimated impulse responses from structural V AR.Standard errors were computed via Monte-Carlo.Dashed lines represent 90%con fidence intervals.No standard errors are given for the contemporaneous effects of GDP and spending shocks on spending,as these are fixed by assumption.The tax shock represents a tax cut,and the spending shock represents a spending increase.figure shows that public works spending shocks are highly persistent,in keeping with institutional and journalistic accounts of government behavior in Japan (and elsewhere).The dynamic effects of tax and spending shocks,including the expansionary effect of tax cuts on GDP,are easier to interpret (and more dramatic)when put in yen terms,as is done in Table I.To do so requires scaling up the response by the inverse of the share of taxes in GDP,which averaged 19%during the 1990s.This adjustment results in a cumulative Y =484increase in GDP in response to a Y =100tax cut.One explanation for the size of the response is that,over the sample period,tax cuts have tended to be associated with spending increases;in fact,the cumulative increase in spending is roughly equal to the decrease in taxes (although this effect as a share of GDP.A closer look shows that the results are consistent,however:in our model,positive tax shocks decrease the level of real GDP in our model while leaving expenditures largely unchanged in the near term,which leads in turn to an increase in expenditures as a share of GDP.FISCAL POLICY EFFECTIVENESS IN JAPAN543 is estimated rather imprecisely).17Overall,GDP rises by more than twice the sum of the spending and tax effects.The immediate impact of a10%positive spending shock on GDP is1.6%, however,which translates into Y=84for a Y=100spending increase,and the stimulus builds only slightly over time.One reason for the smaller estimated effect of spending than of tax shocks is that taxes tend to rise in response to positive spending shocks in this sample,partly offsetting the expansionary impact of the spending increase.This can be interpreted as evidence of the expensive maintenance of unproductive Japanese public works projects.Overall,the increase in GDP is about1.75times the net effect of the spending minus the tax increases—smaller than the effect of tax shocks,but still a respectable economic impact.Deriving a model with sufficient structure to assess the impact offiscal pol-icy clearly requires a number of strong identifying assumptions.As noted above, three such assumptions are embedded in a Blanchard–Perotti framework:first,that current taxes do not depend directly on current expenditures;second,that current expenditures to not respond directly to current GDP;and third,that the within-year elasticity of tax revenues with respect to GDP is1.25.Since the model is exactly identified,these restrictions are not formally testable,of course,but the reported results are robust to plausible changes in all three of these assumptions.18 In particular,allowing for a contemporaneous effect from spending shocks to tax revenues(instead of the other way around)has virtually no effect on the results. The results are slightly more sensitive to changes to the assumed elasticity of tax revenues,but for plausible values of the parameter(i.e.,ranging from1.0to 1.5),the estimates are qualitatively similar to those reported above.And it turns out that assuming a plausible,negative elasticity of expenditures with respect to GDP(reflecting a presumed countercyclical use offiscal policy)actually increases the estimated effects offiscal shocks.These robustness checks therefore indicate that thefindings are not merely an artifact of the model’s identifying assump-tions.This analysis shows that,when it has been used,discretionaryfiscal policy in Japan has in fact had the effects predicted in standard closed-economy macroe-conomic analyses.Both tax cuts and spending increases lead to higher real GDP, although the tendency for taxes and spending to move together has reduced the impact of spending increases.19The commonly held perception offiscal policy’s 17Blanchard and Perotti(1999)found a qualitatively similar pattern in the U.S.data.18The full results obtained under these alternative assumptions are available from the authors upon request.19Further work is needed to reconcile our results on the sizable effects offiscal policy in Japan with thefindings(using very different econometric approaches)of Bayoumi(2001)and Perri(1999) thatfiscal policy had the expected sign but very small effects,and of Ramaswamy and Rendu(2000) that“public consumption had a dampening impact on activity in the1990s.”A likely explanation is that these analyses did not take full account of the dynamic interactions among GDP,tax revenue, and expenditure in the way that we were able to.544KUTTNER AND POSENineffectiveness in all likelihood stems from a failure to recognize the dependence of tax receipts with respect to GDP:as GDP falls,tax revenue shrinks,but to conclude from this that changes in the deficit have not affected growth would be incorrect.2.MULTIPLIERS ON TAX CUTS AND PUBLIC SPENDINGThe difficulty in reading off a simple multiplier from our estimations is that in the data(and therefore in Japanese reality over the period)tax cuts generally have been accompanied by spending increases;expenditure increases,on the other hand, have generally been accompanied by tax increases.So,for example,in Table II, where we list the Y=484estimate of the effect on GDP of a Y=100tax cut,we are actually reporting the four-year cumulative effect of the tax cut and of the accompanying expenditure increase seen in the data.A fair comparison of the effects of(or multiplier on)tax cuts and expenditure increases therefore requires taking into account any correlation between taxes and expenditures.To do this,we examine the responses to linear combinations of tax and spending shocks calculated to generate a cumulative1%change in the variable of interest, and a cumulative zero response to the other variable,measured at a four-year hori-zon.The response of GDP to this combination of shocks is then used to calculate a “pure”multiplier on tax or spending shocks.For example,a−0.66%(expansion-ary)tax shock combined with a−0.21%(contractionary)spending shock gives a1%reduction in tax revenues over four years,with no cumulative impact on spending,and a net0.47%increase in real GDP.Scaling this response by the inverse of the share of taxes in GDP(using the 1990–1999)average of19%)yields a multiplier for tax cuts of2.5;a similar calculation for spending increases gives a multiplier of2.0.As a result of this difference in magnitudes,the cumulative four-year gain to Japanese GDP from a revenue neutral shift of Y=100from public works spending to tax cuts is Y=47.TABLE IIThe Dynamic Impact of Fiscal Policy:Estimated Yen-Denominated Impulse Responses(Effects of expansionary Y=100shocks,in yen)Impact of−Y=100tax shock Impact of+Y=100spending shockTaxes Spending GDP Taxes Spending GDP Year0−963162010084Year1−32161583487105Year2036168377789Four-year cumulative−111104484127332353Source.Authors’calculations based on the estimated structural V AR.Note.The impact of Y=100tax and spending shocks are computed assuming taxes andspending represent19%of GDP.FISCAL POLICY EFFECTIVENESS IN JAPAN545 These estimates also understate the beneficial effects of tax cuts,because they do not directly capture the allocative efficiency gains from changes in Japanese tax code,just the immediate macroeconomic impact.Though such gains can be exaggerated,there is good reason to believe that such supply-side effects would be large in Japan today.These effects atfirst glance may seem rather large,relative to other published estimates;in fact they are quite close to comparably calculated multipliers for the United States,such as those of Blanchard and Perotti(1999).The“multipliers”reported there,however,are defined differently from those we calculate.Blanchard and Perotti reported multipliers defined as the ratio of the peak response of GDP to the size of the initial shock to taxes or spending.That method can be misleading, however,as it fails to take into account either the dynamics of the response or the tendency for taxes and spending to move together.20Using our method to calculate comparable multipliers from Blanchard and Perotti’s trend-stationary estimates, we obtain a multiplier of roughly4.0for tax shocks—considerably larger than our estimate for Japan.Our estimated spending multiplier for Japan is somewhat higher than the comparable multiplier for the United States calculated from the Blanchard–Perotti results,but quite close to similar calculations based on their estimated response to military spending shocks.In contrast to these results,the Economic Planning Agency(EPA)of the Japanese government(now the Cabinet and Fiscal Office)has published declining esti-mates of the multiplier onfiscal policy for the past several years.In May1995, the EPA World Economic Model5th Version reported cumulative multipliers on government investment of1.32in thefirst year,1.75in the second year,and2.13 in the third year(down from1.39,1.88,and2.33in the4th Version),and far lower multipliers on income tax reductions(0.46,0.91,and1.26,down from0.53,1.14, and1.56in the4th Version).21In October2001,the EPA released the multipli-ers from the1998revised version of the model,with the cumulative multipliers on government investment declining to1.12,1.31,and1.10,and on income tax reductions of0.62,0.59,and0.05.22Leaving aside the question of whether these changes represent statistically significant differences,given the difficulties of esti-mating these multipliers,it is worth considering the source of this divergence from our results.The difficulty in making a strict comparison lies in the unavailability(at least publicly,in English)of the details of the EPA’s large-scale macro model,partic-ularly with regard to the assumed response of monetary policy built in.As the discussion in OECD(2000,pp.60–64)makes clear,while there are a number of20Basing the multiplier on the peak response could,for example,yield a nonzero multiplier even if the effect on GDP were completely reversed in subsequent periods.21See“The EPA World Economic Model5th Version:Basic Structure and Multipliers,”Economic Analysis Series139,May,1995,www.esri.cao.go.jp/en/archive/bun/abstract/139-e.html.22See“The ESRI Short-Run Macroeconometric Model of Japanese Economy:Basic Structure and Multipliers,”October2001,www.esri.cao.go.jp/en/archive/e-dis/abstract/006-e.html.。

译文：有争议的研究：科学的好与坏工作于因流感引起的变异，但这并非唯一一个风险可能会超过受益的项目。

Geoff Brumfiel这听起来像一个很伟大的想法：实验变异产生一种罕见且致命的病毒以便于科学家在认识新兴的菌株方面做更好的工作。

但这听起来也像一个可怕的想法——这项研究可以创造一种易于传播和生产的病毒，它将有益于有益使用生物武器的恐怖分子。

去年的新闻说道两个研究小组已经完成这项工作，但H5N1禽流感病毒就足以在全球各地造成恐惧，因此迅速暂停了工作。

的一位美国生物安全小组已经撤销将调查结果公布在Nature和Science上的限制，认为工作有明确的潜在好处，社区的数据循环研究显示变异后的病毒似乎比原来少致死。

但这段插曲突出显示了在有意义的研究和有威胁的研究之间的分界线是多么的薄。

在许多科学领域充满这样的调查。

有些人可能会破坏全球安全，而其他人可能会为家庭创造困境。

这四个自然的例子显示，这里几乎没有明确列出一个来，但他们真的感觉到这个难题出现的是多么的频繁——科学家们必须不断地问自己，是否利大于弊。

核燃料或核武器？一种可以快速有效的区分核电厂和核医学的放射性同位素的技术是很多物理学家梦寐以求的。

但同位素分离也是制造核武器的关键，因此，这种技术可以更容易执行和隐瞒对这类武器的非法工作。

自然存在的铀矿石，主要是铀-238，不能维持爆炸需要的链式反应，只有裂变成0.7%浓度铀-235才行。

反应堆使用的原料多集中于浓度3-5%。

而制造原子弹，它必须被浓缩到90％以上，从一个到另外一个的分类一直是核武器扩散的主要障碍之一。

今天一个国家的最先进的技术，涉及到数千台离心机，因此需要大量的空间、电力，精密加工的零件和时间。

激光可以更加高效。

铀原子核的微小质量差异改变其电子壳层的能量水平。

微调的激光与其他技术一起可以激发所需的同位素的水平，可以从剩余的里面区分出铀-235。

这工作可以做的很快速秘密。

在2004年，韩国的科学家大约在几周之内发现用激光可以让少量的铀-235来靠近造武器的纯度。

他们拥有巨大的脚用英语写作文The Fascination of Giant Feet.In the annals of biological diversity, there exist many remarkable features that make certain species stand out. Among these, the possession of exceptionally large feet is undoubtedly a noteworthy trait. Imagine waking up one day to discover that the feet you once knew had transformedinto something larger than life, with each step you take sending ripples of awe through those who behold them.The allure of having gigantic feet is not merely about size; it's about the potential they unlock. Think of the stability such feet would provide, enabling one to traverse treacherous terrains with ease. The ability to distribute weight evenly across a larger surface area would reduce the risk of sinking into soft ground or slipping on slick surfaces. Moreover, the increased surface area of the feet could potentially enhance one's grip on objects, whetherit's scaling a cliff or picking up a delicate item.The implications of having giant feet extend beyond mere practicality. Imagine the psychological impact such a feature would have on an individual's sense of power and confidence. Walking with such immense feet would undoubtedly command attention, not just physically but also metaphorically. It would be a constant reminder of one's uniqueness and the potential to leave an indelible mark on the world.The social dynamics surrounding individuals with giant feet would also be fascinating to observe. Would they be seen as freaks of nature, or would their uniqueness be celebrated? Would they find themselves ostracized due to their difference, or would they embrace it as a source of strength and pride? The answers to these questions are as diverse as the individuals who might possess such a trait.The cultural implications of giant feet are also rich with potential. In some cultures, size is a symbol of power and strength, while in others, it might be seen as a sign of divinity or mystery. The way such feet are interpretedand incorporated into folklore, mythology, and even art would be fascinating to explore. Would artists seek to capture the beauty and majesty of these feet, or would they focus on the oddity and uniqueness?From a scientific perspective, the existence of giant feet raises numerous intriguing questions. How would such feet evolve? What genetic traits would be responsible for such a phenomenon? Would such feet come with any physiological drawbacks, such as increased risk of injury or reduced mobility? The answers to these questions could provide valuable insights into the mechanics of biological evolution and adaptation.In conclusion, the possession of giant feet is a fascinating concept that offers a window into the wonders of biological diversity and the potential it holds. Whether one views this trait as a curse or a blessing, it undoubtedly serves as a reminder of the boundless possibilities that lie within the realm of nature's creativity. As we continue to explore the mysteries of thenatural world, it's exciting to imagine what other remarkable traits await discovery.。

福费廷（FORFEITING）研究复旦大学刘秀婷教授福费廷（FORFEITING）或称为无追索权的融资,又称买断，包买票据，英文名称为“Forfeiting”，但“Forfaiting”也有使用，源于法语的“à forfait”，本来是“放弃权利”之意。

福费廷是对其的中文音译。

福费廷指延期付款的大宗贸易交易中，出口商把经进口商承兑的，并按不同的定期利息计息的，通常由进口商所在银行开具远期信用证（开证银行根据申请人的要求和指示，向受益人开立的具有一定金额，在一定期限内凭规定的单据，在指定的地点付款的书面保证文件。

是独立文件，不依附于贸易合同），无追索权地售予出口商所在银行或大金融公司的一种资金融通方式。

它是一种为出口商贴现已经承兑的、通常由进口商方面的银行担保的远期票据服务，属票据融资。

通过以无追索权的方式买断出口商的远期债权，融资银行或大金融公司对已经信用证开证银行承兑的远期汇票向信用证受益人（出口商）提供票据贴现，这样出口商能够立即回笼资金，使出口商在获得出口融资的同时，消除了出口商因远期收汇风险及汇率和利率带来潜在风险。

在国内也将这种方式称为包买票据业务，而融资商通常被称为包买商。

福费廷是一种以无追索权形式为出口商贴现大额远期票据提供融资并能防范信贷风险与汇价风险的金融服务。

二战后瑞士苏黎世银行协会首先开办福费廷业务，自1965年以后，从西欧国家开始推行，近些年来尤其在德国、瑞士、东欧国家及发展中国家的设备贸易中得到发展。

据统计，全世界年均福费廷交易量占世界贸易额的2%。

目前，这一在欧美国家广泛使用的出口贸易融资手段已在中国流行。

福费廷作为一种灵活简便，有效的融资方式，在国际市场上发展非常迅速。

对优化我国出口结构，改善企业资金流动状况和加速我国银行国际化的进程都有着重要的作用，是我国贸易融资发展的必然趋势。

目前外资银行也有意把这种业务推广到我国，开始了外资银行与中资银行抢占中国福费廷业务“制高点”的争夺战。

GISSF-HF试验：一项随机、双盲、安慰剂对照试验探究n-3多不饱和脂肪酸对于治疗慢性心衰患者的疗效GISSF-HF研究员*概要背景众多流行病学和实验研究表明，n-3多不饱和脂肪酸（n-3 PUFA）治疗包括心律失常在内的动脉粥样硬化心血管疾病的效果良好。

为验证n-3 PUFA是否能降低该类疾病的发病率和死亡率，我们在众多因任何原因而出现心衰症候的人群中展开了一项调查研究。

方法在意大利的326家心脏病学中心和31所内科医学中心，我们进行了一项随机、双盲、安慰剂对照试验。

该试验不考虑引起心衰的原因和左心室射血分数等因素，将纽约心脏协会（NYHA）心功能II~IV级的患者用一台隐蔽的、由计算机控制的电话随机系统分组，患者随机每日服用1g n-3 PUFA （n=3494）或安慰剂（n=3481），并在随后3.9年中位随访期内（四分位距为3.0~4.5）接受随访观察。

试验的主要终点为总生存期（首次用药到因任何原因死亡的时间），和总生存期或因心血管疾病入院的时间。

采用意向治疗分析。

此项研究已在临床试验网（网址为：）登记注册，编号为NCT00336336。

研究发现我们对所有随机选取的患者进行分析，其中n-3 PUFA组和安慰剂组中分别有955名（27%）和1014名（29%）患者因任何原因出现死亡（校正后的风险比[HR]为0.91，[95.5% CI 0.833–0.998]，P=0.041）。

两组中分别还有1981名（57%）和2053名（59%）患者因心血管疾病死亡或入院（校正后的HR为0.92，[99% CI 0.849–0.999]，P=0.009）。

按绝对值计算，56名患者需要接受中位随访期为3.9年的治疗才能预防一例死亡，或是44名患者需要接受中位随访期为3.9年的治疗才能预防一例如心血管疾病导致的死亡或入院。

两组中出现的主要不良反应均为肠胃功能紊乱，这一比例在n-3 PUFA 组中为3%（96人），而安慰剂组也为3%（92人）。

Evidence-Based Method随着科学技术的不断进步，我们面临的问题和挑战也日益复杂多样。

在这种情况下，依靠科学的证据来解决问题成为了一种十分重要的方法。

Evidence-based method，即基于证据的方法，指的是通过收集、分析和运用科学证据来做出决策和解决问题的一种方法。

在医学、教育、管理、政策制定等领域，Evidence-based method都得到了广泛的应用和推崇。

本文将从以下几个方面来探讨Evidence-based method的意义、特点及应用。

1. 证据的重要性在决策和问题解决过程中，经验和直觉固然重要，但更加可靠和稳健的方法是依据科学的证据来做出决策。

因为证据是客观的、可量化的，能够帮助我们避免主观偏见和错误的判断。

在医疗领域，医生通常会根据临床试验的结果以及大量的研究数据来选择最佳的治疗方案，而不是仅仅依据自己的经验和直觉。

在教育领域，教育工作者也应该依据教育心理学和教育研究的成果来设计课程和教学方法，以提高教学效果。

证据的重要性无论在个人生活还是专业领域都是不可忽视的。

2. Evidence-based method的特点Evidence-based method与传统的经验主义方法有着明显的不同点。

Evidence-based method强调的是基于大量的科学研究和实证数据，而不是基于个人或小范围的经验。

Evidence-based method更加注重系统性和客观性，它需要进行严格的数据收集、分析和评估，以确保所得出的结论是客观和可靠的。

Evidence-based method还要求对证据进行合理的解释和运用，避免片面地使用证据来支持某种观点或立场。

3. Evidence-based method的应用在各个领域，Evidence-based method都有着广泛的应用。

在医学领域，Evidence-based medicine已经成为了临床实践的重要方法之一，它不仅能够帮助医生选择最佳的治疗方案，还能够提高医疗机构的管理效率和医疗资源的利用率。

英语哲学思想解读50题1. The statement "All is flux" was proposed by _____.A. PlatoB. AristotleC. HeraclitusD. Socrates答案：C。

本题考查古希腊哲学思想家的观点。

赫拉克利特提出了“万物皆流”的观点。

选项A 柏拉图强调理念论；选项B 亚里士多德注重实体和形式；选项D 苏格拉底主张通过对话和反思来寻求真理。

2. "Know thyself" is a famous saying from _____.A. ThalesB. PythagorasC. DemocritusD. Socrates答案：D。

此题考查古希腊哲学家的名言。

“认识你自己”是苏格拉底的名言。

选项A 泰勒斯主要研究自然哲学；选项B 毕达哥拉斯以数学和神秘主义著称；选项C 德谟克利特提出了原子论。

3. Which philosopher believed that the world is composed of water?A. AnaximenesB. AnaximanderC. ThalesD. Heraclitus答案：C。

本题考查古希腊哲学家对世界构成的看法。

泰勒斯认为世界是由水组成的。

选项A 阿那克西美尼认为是气；选项B 阿那克西曼德认为是无定；选项D 赫拉克利特提出万物皆流。

4. The idea of the "Forms" was put forward by _____.A. PlatoB. AristotleC. EpicurusD. Stoics答案：A。

这道题考查古希腊哲学中的概念。

柏拉图提出了“理念论”，即“形式”。

选项B 亚里士多德对其进行了批判和发展；选项C 伊壁鸠鲁主张快乐主义；选项D 斯多葛学派强调道德和命运。

5. Who claimed that "The unexamined life is not worth living"?A. PlatoB. AristotleC. SocratesD. Epicurus答案：C。

1、环保机构必须对接触教室空⽓中的⽯棉纤维给孩⼦健康带来的危害做出反应。

因为不可能关闭学校的建筑。

所以的⽅法就是着⼿实施强制性⽴即消除所有学校建筑中的⽯棉的计划，⽽不管这些建筑物是否在使⽤中。

下列哪⼀个，假如正确，是有⼒的原因来说明环境保护机构不应当实⾏上⾯所提出的计划? (A)可⾏的消除⽯棉的技术通常增加空中的⽯棉含量。

(B)学校是居民活动最可能导致⽯棉释放到⼤⽓中的场所。

(C)接触空⽓中⽯棉的孩⼦⽐接触空中的⽯棉的成⼈得癌症的风险更⼤。

(D)消除⽯棉的成本在各个学校中不同，它取决于被除去⽯棉的量及可接近的程度。

(E)不可能确切判定含有⽯棉的建筑材料是否且什么时候将分解并且释放⽯棉纤维⽽进⼊空⽓。

解析：本题实际上要找⼀个选项来⽀持不应着⼿实施强制性⽴即消除⽯棉的计划。

(A)说明消除⽯棉的技术增加空⽓中的⽯棉含量，意味着消除⽯棉的效果反⽽更差，因此，⽀持了不应着⼿实施强制性⽴即消除⽯棉的计划;(B)与消除⽯棉的计划⽆关;(C)是⼀个新的⽐较;(D)涉及的成本不同，但只要利⼤于弊就应实施强制性⽴即消除⽯棉的计划;(E)与(B)⼀样，与消除⽯棉的计划较远。

2、Aedesalbopictus是蚊⼦的⼀个变种，最近在美国东南部衍居，它没有当地的沼泽蚊⼦分布⼴。

沼泽蚊⼦与A.都能携带有时能使⼈致命的病毒，但丸对公众健康危害更⼤。

下列选项除哪个外，如果正确，都能提供附加信息来⽀持以上所做出的对公共健康产⽣危害的判断。

(A)与沼泽蚊⼦不同，A.原产于亚洲，且20世纪80年代中期以前在美国还没有发现过A.的幼⾍。

(B)不同于沼泽蚊⼦，A.albopictus倾向于在⼈类居住地附近度过它们的⼤部分成熟期。

(C)不同于沼泽蚊⼦的幼⾍，A.albopictus幼⾍⽣存于花盆、锡罐，和许多盛有少量⽔的家⽤物体中。

(D)与沼泽蚊⼦相⽐较，A.albopictus是⼤量所知的能导致⼈类严重疾病的病毒的宿主。