European union competition law

欧盟法规概况欧盟法规是欧洲联盟（European Union，EU）制定的法律规范，适用于欧盟成员国。

这些法规旨在确保欧盟内部市场的正常运作，推动成员国之间的一体化和协作。

以下是欧盟法规的一些概况：1.一体化原则：欧盟法规以一体化为基础，旨在打破国界，促使欧洲内部形成统一的市场。

这包括商品、服务、劳动力和资本的自由流通。

2.法律制定机构：欧盟法规的制定涉及欧洲议会、欧洲委员会和欧洲理事会等机构。

欧洲议会代表欧盟公民，欧洲委员会负责提出法案，欧洲理事会由成员国政府代表组成。

3.内部市场和竞争法规：欧盟致力于建立内部市场，促进成员国之间的自由贸易。

竞争法规旨在防止垄断和限制竞争的行为，保障公平竞争环境。

4.货物和服务贸易法规：欧盟通过标准化和认证等手段，促进成员国之间的货物和服务自由流通，使市场更加高效。

5.环境法规：欧盟制定了一系列环境法规，致力于保护环境、促进可持续发展和减缓气候变化。

这包括废物管理、水质保护、空气质量等方面的规定。

6.消费者权益法规：为了保护消费者权益，欧盟制定了一系列法规，涉及产品质量、安全标准、消费者信息和维权机制等方面。

7.数字市场法规：针对数字经济的快速发展，欧盟推出了一系列法规，涉及数据保护、电子商务、数字版权等领域。

8.移民和边境控制法规：欧盟通过一体化的移民和边境控制政策，努力协调成员国之间的移民和庇护事务。

9.货币和财政政策：欧元是欧盟的官方货币，欧洲央行负责欧元的货币政策。

欧盟还通过财政政策协调成员国的经济政策。

10.外交和安全政策：尽管欧盟的外交和安全政策主要由成员国负责，但欧盟也在一些领域展开合作，以促进共同安全和国际合作。

这些法规构成了欧盟的法律框架，对成员国的法律体系产生深远影响。

需要注意的是，欧盟法规的适用范围和权威性可能因法规性质而异。

I(Acts whose publication is obligatory)COUNCIL REGULATION(EC)No1419/2006of25September2006repealing Regulation(EEC)No4056/86laying down detailed rules for the application of Articles85 and86of the Treaty to maritime transport,and amending Regulation(EC)No1/2003as regards the extension of its scope to include cabotage and international tramp services(Text with EEA relevance)THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,and in particular Article83thereof,Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament(1),Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee(2),After consulting the Committee of the Regions, Whereas:(1)Application of the rules on competition in the maritimetransport sector has been subject to the provisions ofRegulation(EEC)No4056/86(3)since1987.Regulation(EEC)No4056/86originally had two functions.Firstly,itcontained procedural provisions for the enforcement ofCommunity competition rules in the maritime transportsector.Secondly,it laid down certain specific substantivecompetition provisions for the maritime sector andnotably a block exemption for liner shippingconferences,allowing them to fix prices and regulatecapacity under certain conditions,the exclusion ofpurely technical agreements from the application ofArticle81(1)of the Treaty and a procedure for dealingwith conflicts of international law.It did not apply tomaritime transport services between ports in one or tothe same Member State(cabotage)and internationaltramp vessel services.(2)Council Regulation(EC)No1/2003of16December2002on the implementation of the rules on competitionlaid down in Articles81and82of the Treaty(4)amended Regulation(EEC)No4056/86to bringmaritime transport under the common competitionenforcement rules applicable to all sectors with effectfrom1May2004,with the exception of cabotage andinternational tramp vessel services.However,the specificsubstantive competition provisions relating to themaritime sector continue to fall within the scope ofRegulation(EEC)No4056/86.(3)The liner shipping conference block exemption providedfor in Regulation(EEC)No4056/86exempts from theprohibition of Article81(1)of the Treaty agreements,decisions and concerted practices of all or part of themembers of one or more liner conferences which fulfilcertain conditions.The justification for the blockexemption in essence assumes that conferences bringstability,ensuring exporters reliable services whichcannot be achieved by less restrictive means.However,a thorough review of the industry carried out by theCommission has demonstrated that liner shipping isnot unique as its cost structure does not differ substan-tially from that of other industries.There is therefore noevidence that the industry needs to be protected fromcompetition.EN28.9.2006Official Journal of the European Union L269/1(1)Opinion of4July2006(not yet published in the Official Journal).(2)Opinion delivered on5July2006(not yet published in the OfficialJournal).(3)OJ L378,31.12.1986,p.4.Regulation as last amended by the2003Act of Accession.(4)OJ L1,4.1.2003,p.1.Regulation as amended by Regulation(EC)No411/2004(OJ L68,6.3.2004,p.1).(4)The first condition for exemption under Article81(3)requires that the restrictive agreement contributes toimproving the production or distribution of goods orto promoting technical or economic progress.Asregards the efficiencies generated by conferences,linerconferences are no longer able to enforce the conferencetariff although they still manage to set charges andsurcharges which are a part of the price of transport.There is also no evidence that the conference systemleads to more stable freight rates or more reliableshipping services than would be the case in a fullycompetitive market.Conference members increasinglyoffer their services via individual service agreementsentered into with individual exporters.In addition,conferences do not manage the carrying capacity thatis available as this is an individual decision taken byeach carrier.Under current market conditions pricestability and the reliability of services are brought aboutby individual service agreements.The alleged causal linkbetween the restrictions(price fixing and supply regu-lation)and the claimed efficiencies(reliable services)therefore appears too tenuous to meet the firstcondition of Article81(3).(5)The second condition for exemption under Article81(3)is that consumers must be compensated for the negativeeffects resulting from the restriction of competition.Inthe case of hard core restrictions,such as horizontal pricefixing which occur when the conference tariff is set andcharges and surcharges are jointly fixed,the negativeeffects are very serious.However no clearly positiveeffects have been identified.Transport users considerthat conferences operate for the benefit of the leastefficient members and call for their abolishment.Conferences no longer fulfil the second condition ofArticle81(3).(6)The third condition for exemption under Article81(3)isthat the conduct must not impose on the undertakingsconcerned restrictions which are not indispensable to theattainment of its objectives.Consortia are cooperativeagreements between liner shipping lines that do notinvolve price fixing and are therefore less restrictivethan conferences.Transport users consider them toprovide adequate,reliable and efficient scheduledmaritime services.In addition the use of individualservice agreements has increased significantly in recentyears.By definition,such individual service agreementsdo not restrict competition and provide benefits toexporters as they make it possible to tailor specialservices.Furthermore,because the price is established inadvance and does not fluctuate for a predeterminedperiod(usually up to one year),service contracts cancontribute to price stability.It has therefore not beenestablished that the restrictions of competitionpermitted under Regulation(EEC)No4056/86(pricefixing and capacity regulation)are indispensable for theprovision of reliable shipping services to transport usersas these can be achieved by less restrictive means.Thethird condition under Article81(3)is therefore notsatisfied.(7)Finally,the fourth condition under Article81(3)requiresthat the conference should remain subject to effectivecompetitive constraints.In current market circumstancesconferences are present in nearly all major trade lanesand they compete with carriers grouped in consortia andwith independent lines.Whilst there may be pricecompetition on the ocean freight rate due to theweakening of the conference system there is hardly anyprice competition with respect to the surcharges andancillary charges.These are set by the conference andthe same level of charges is often applied by non-conference carriers.In addition,carriers participate inconferences and consortia on the same trade,exchangingcommercially sensitive information and cumulating thebenefits of the conference(price fixing and capacity regu-lation)and of the consortia(operational cooperation forthe provision of a joint service)block exemptions.Giventhe increasing number of links between carriers in thesame trade,determining the extent to which conferencesare subject to effective internal and external competitionis a very complex exercise and one that can only be doneon a case by case basis.(8)Liner shipping conferences therefore no longer fulfil thefour cumulative conditions for exemption under Article81(3)of the Treaty and the block exemption in respectof such conferences should therefore be abolished.(9)The exclusion from the prohibition of Article81(1)ofthe Treaty of purely technical agreements and theprocedure for dealing with conflicts of law which mayarise are also redundant.Those provisions shouldtherefore also be deleted.(10)In the light of the above,Regulation(EEC)No4056/86should be repealed in its entirety.ENL269/2Official Journal of the European Union28.9.2006(11)Liner conferences are tolerated in several jurisdictions.In this,as in other sectors,competition law is not applied in the same way worldwide.In light of the global nature of the liner shipping industry,the Commission should take the appropriate steps to advance the removal of the price fixing exemption for liner conferences that exist elsewhere whilst maintaining the exemption for opera-tional cooperation between shipping lines grouped in consortia and alliances,in line with the recommendations of the OECD Secretariat in 2002.(12)Cabotage and international tramp vessel services have been excluded from the rules implementing Articles 81and 82of the Treaty originally laid down in Regulation (EEC)No 4056/86and subsequently in Regulation (EC)No 1/2003.They are currently the only remaining sectors to be excluded from the Community competition implementing rules.The lack of effective enforcement powers for these sectors is an anomaly from a regulatory point of view.(13)The exclusion of tramp vessel services from Regulation (EC)No 1/2003was based on the fact that rates for these services are freely negotiated on a case by case basis in accordance with supply and demand conditions.However,such market conditions are present in other sectors and the substantive provisions of Articles 81and 82already apply to these services.No convincing reason has been brought forward to maintain the current exclusion of these services from the rules implementing Articles 81and 82of the Treaty.Similarly,although cabotage services often have no effect on intra Community trade,this does not mean that they should be excluded from the scope of Regulation (EC)No 1/2003from the outset.(14)As the mechanisms enshrined in Regulation (EC)No 1/2003are appropriate for applying the competitionrules to all sectors,the scope of that Regulation should be amended so as to include cabotage and tramp vessel services.(15)Regulation (EC)No 1/2003should therefore be amended accordingly.(16)Since Member States may need to adjust their interna-tional commitments in the light of the abolition of the conference system,the provisions of Regulation (EEC)No 4056/86relating to the liner conference block exemption should continue to apply to conferences satisfying the requirements of Regulation (EEC)No 4056/86on the date of entry into force of this Regu-lation for a transitional period,HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:Article 1Regulation (EEC)No 4056/86shall be repealed.However,Article 1(3)(b)and (c),Articles 3to 7,Article 8(2)and Article 26of Regulation (EEC)No 4056/86shall continue to apply in respect of liner shipping conferences satisfying the requirements of Regulation (EEC)No 4056/86on 18October 2006,for a transitional period of two years from that date.Article 2Article 32of Regulation (EC)No 1/2003shall be deleted.Article 3This Regulation shall enter into force on the 20th day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union .This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.Done at Brussels,25September 2006.For the Council The PresidentM.PEKKARINENEN28.9.2006Official Journal of the European Union L 269/3。

欧盟知识点总结欧盟（European Union, EU）是一个由欧洲国家组成的政治经济联盟。

成立于1993年，是继联合国之后世界上第二大的国际组织。

欧盟旨在通过合作与整合，维护欧洲国家的和平、安全和繁荣。

欧盟的成员国包括28个欧洲国家，其中有19个国家采用了欧元作为货币单位。

欧盟的总部设在比利时的布鲁塞尔。

欧盟的组成欧盟由三个基本机构组成，分别是欧洲议会、欧洲委员会和欧洲理事会。

此外，还包括了欧洲法院、欧洲中央银行等一些附属机构。

欧盟的成员国必须遵守欧盟的法律，其中包括了欧盟的法规和指令。

欧盟的职能欧盟在政治、经济、社会等各个领域都有一定的职能。

在政治领域，欧盟制定了一系列的法规和政策来保障欧洲国家的和平与安全。

同时，欧盟也参与了许多国际事务，维护了欧洲在世界上的地位。

在经济领域，欧盟建立了一个统一的市场，促进了成员国之间的贸易与投资。

此外，欧盟还实行了共同的货币政策，采用了欧元作为统一的货币单位，促进了欧洲国家之间的经济一体化。

在社会领域，欧盟通过法规和政策，保障了欧洲公民的基本权利，促进了欧洲国家之间的文化交流与合作。

欧盟的挑战欧盟所面临的挑战主要包括了经济一体化的不平衡、难民危机、脱欧等。

经济一体化的不平衡主要体现在欧元区内的经济差异，这导致了金融危机和债务危机。

难民危机主要源于中东地区的动荡局势，导致了大量难民涌入欧洲。

脱欧是指英国自2016年以来所进行的脱离欧盟的进程。

当然，这仅仅是欧盟所面临的一部分挑战，欧盟的未来发展还将受到更多因素的影响。

欧盟的未来欧盟所面临的挑战可能会对其未来的发展造成一定的影响，但同时也会催生出一些新的机遇。

欧盟需要通过改革与合作来应对挑战，推动欧洲的一体化进程。

未来，欧盟可能会加强成员国之间的经济协调，实现更加均衡的经济一体化。

同时，欧盟也可能会推动更加积极的多边主义，参与到更多的国际事务中。

总的来说，欧盟作为一个政治经济联盟，其发展将受到许多因素的影响。

国际商法专业词汇中英文对照ANoteontheIncoterms（国际贸易术语通则解释）AbsoluteAdvantage(亚当.斯密的绝对优势理论)? AcceptancewithModifications（对邀约做出修改、变更的承诺）Acceptance（承诺/受盘）ActofStateDoctrine（国家行为主义）ActoftheParties（当事人的行为）AdministrativeManagement（经营管理）AdvisingandConfirmingLettersofCredit（信用证的通知和确认）AgentforInternationalSettlements（国际结算代理人）AgreementoftheParties（协议选择原则）Agriculture（农业协定）AlternativeDisputeResolution（ADR解决方式）AnticipatoryBreachinCommonLaw（普通法上预期违约）AntidumpingAuthority（反倾销机构）ApplicabilityoftheCISG?(CISG的适用范围) ApplicationofHomeStateLaborLawsExtraterritorially（内国劳工法律域外适用）ApplyingforaLetterofCredit（信用证的申请）ApprovalofForeignInvestmentApplications（外国投资申请的批准）Arbitrage（套汇）ArbitrationAgreementandArbitrationClauses（仲裁协议和合同中的仲裁条款）ArbitrationTribunals（仲裁机构）ArtisticPropertyAgreements（保护文学艺术作品的协定）ArtisticPropertyAgreements（文学艺术品产权协定）Assignment（合同权利转让）Attorney-General（法律总顾问）AutomaticDissolution（自动散伙）AverageClauses（海损条款）Avoidance（解除）BankDeposits（银行储蓄）BasesofIncomeTaxation（所得税的征税依据/基础）BattleoftheForms（形式上的分歧／冲突）BillsofLading?（提单）BranchBanking（银行的分支机构）BusinessFormandRegisteredCapital（企业形式和注册资本）BusinessForms（商业组织形式）Buyer'sRemedies（买方可以采取的救济措施）CarriageofGoodsbyAir（航空货物运输）CarriageofGoodsbySeaandMarineCargoInsurance（海上货物运输及其保险）Carrier'sDutiesunderaBillofLading（在提单运输方式下承运人的责任/义务）Carrier'sImmunities（承运人责任/义务的豁免）Cartels(企业联合/卡特尔) CategoriesofInvestmentProjects（外国投资的项目类别）Charterparties（租船合同）CharterpartiesbyDemise（光船出租合同）China's FundamentalPoliciesforEncouragingForeignInvestments （中国大陆鼓励外国投资的基本政策）ChoosingtheGoverningLaw（准据法的选择）CIF(cost,insuranceandfreight)(portofdestination)（ＣＩＦ成本＼保险费加运费付至指定的目的港）CivilLaw(民法法系) ClearanceandSettlementProcedures（交换和转让程序）CollectionofDocumentaryBillsThroughBanks（银行跟单托收）CommercialArbitration（国际商事仲裁）CommodityArrangements（初级产品/农产品安排）CommonEnterpriseLiability（企业的一般责任）CommonLaw(普通法系)CommonProceduresinHandlingBillsofExchange（汇票处理的一般程序）CommonStock（股票）CompanyTaxpayers（公司/法人企业纳税人）ComparativeAdvantage(大卫.李嘉图的比较优势理论) ComparisonofMunicipalLegalSystems(内国法系的比较研究) CompensationforWindingup（清算补偿）ComprehensiveAgreements（综合性的协定）CompulsoryLicenses（强制许可）ComputationofIncome（收入计算）ConformityofGoods（与合同约定相符合的货物）ConsenttotheJurisdictionoftheHostState（给予东道国管辖权的许可/同意）ConsiderationinCommonLaw（英美法上的对价）ContemporaryInternationalTradeLaw（当代国际贸易法）ContractLawfortheInternationalSaleofGoods（国际货物销售合同法）ContractLiabilityoftheAgent（代理人的合同义务）ContractLiabilityofthePrincipal（委托人的合同义务）ContractualIssuesExcludedfromtheCoverageofCISG（排除在CISG适用范围之外的合同问题）Copyrights（着作权/版权）CouncilforTrade-RelatedAspectsofIntellectualPropertyR ights（与知识产权有关的理事会）CoverageofTaxTreaties（税收条约的覆盖范围）CreationofAgency（代理创立）CreditorsofPartners（合伙人的债权人）CurrencyCrises:TheRoleofMonetaryPolicy（金融危机：货币政策的作用与地位）CurrencyExchangeObligationsofIMFMemberStates（国际货币基金组织成员国在外汇交易中的义务）CurrencyExchange（外汇交易）CurrencySupport（资金/财政援助）Custom（习惯）CustomsValuation（海关估价协定）DebtSecurities（债券）DecisionMakingwithintheWTO（WTO内部决定作出机制）DeficienciesintheGATT1947DisputeProcess（关税及贸易总协定1947争端解决程序的不足）DefiniteSumofMoneyorMonetaryUnitofAccount（确定货币的总额或者计价的货币单位）DefinitionandSpecialFeatures（定义和特征）DelayedBillsofLading（提单迟延）DenialofJustice（司法不公）DevelopmentBanks（发展银行）DirectEffect（直接效力）DirectExporting(直接出口)Directors'andOfficer'sDutiestotheCorporation（董事和经理/首席执行官对公司的义务）DisputeSettlement（争端的解决）DissolutionbyAgreement?（协议解散）DissolutionbyCourtOrder（依法院令状散伙）DissolutionofthePartnership（散伙）DistributionofEarningsandRecoveryofInvestments?（收入分配和投资回收）DistributiontoShareholders（红利分配权）DoctrineofImputability(归责原则) DocumentaryFormalities（文本格式要求）DoubleTaxationProvision（双重征税的规定）DoubleTaxation（双重征税）Duress（胁迫行为）DutiesofAgentandPrincipal（代理人和委托人的义务）DutiesofAgenttoPrincipal（委托人的义务）DutiesofPrincipaltoAgent（代理人、的义务）DutyofCareinPartnershipBusiness（对合伙事务尽心看护义务）DutyofLoyaltyandGoodFaith（忠诚和诚信义务）EffectivenessofanOffer（邀约/发盘的效力）EmploymentLawsintheEuropeanUnion（欧洲联盟雇佣/劳工法）EmploymentStandardsoftheOrganizationforEconomicCooper ationandDevelopment（经济合作与发展组织雇佣/劳工标准）EnforcementofExchangeControlRegulationsofIMFMemberSta tes（国际货币基金组织成员国对外汇交易管理规则的履行）EnforcementofForeignArbitralAwardsinthePeople'sRepubl icofChina（在中华人民共和国境内外国仲裁裁决的执行）EnforcementofForeignJudgment（外国法院判决的执行）EnforcementofPartnershipRightsandLiabilities（执行合伙事务的权利和责任）EnforcementofSecuritiesRegulationsInternationally（国际证券规则的执行）EnvironmentalRegulation（环境规则）EscapeClause（免责条款）Euro-currencyDeposits（欧洲货币储蓄）EuropeanCommunities-RegimefortheImportation,Sale,andD istributionofBananas（欧洲共同体对于香蕉的进口、销售和分销的管理）EuropeanUnionLawonTradeinServices（欧洲联盟关于服务贸易的法律）ExceptiononAdimpletiContractusinCivilLaw（大陆法上履行契约之抗辩权）Exceptions（例外）ExclusiveLicenses（独占许可）ExcusesforNon-performance（不履行的免责）ExcusesforNonperformance（不履行合同的抗辩/借口）ExemptionsforNewMembersfromIMFMemberStateCurrencyExch angeObligations（国际货币基金组织新成员国在外汇交易中义务的免除）ExportRestrictions(出口限制)Exporting(出口)Expropriation（征收）ExtraterritorialApplicationofU. S.SecuritiesLaws（美国证券法域外的适用问题）FailuretoExhaustremedies（没有用尽法律救济）FaultandCausation（过错和因果关系）FinanceMinistry（财政部）FinanceofInternationalTrade(国际贸易的结算/支付) FinancingForeignTrade（对外贸易的价金支付）FOB(freeonhoard)(portofshipment)（ＦＯＢ装运港船上交货）ForceMajeureClauses（不可抗力条款）ForeignInvestmentGuarantees（外国投资的担保）ForeignInvestmentLawsandCodes（外国投资法）FormalandInformalApplicationProcess（正式和非正式申请程序）FormationoftheContract（合同的成立）ForsedEndorsements（虚假背书）FraudExceptioninLettersofCreditTransaction(信用证交易的欺诈例外)FraudsonBillsofLading（提单欺诈）FraudulentMisrepresentation（受欺诈的误解）FreeZones（保税区/自由贸易区）FundamentalBreach（根本违约）GATSSchedulesofSpecificCommitments（服务贸易总协定减让表中的特别承诺）? GeneralAgreementonTradeinServices(服务贸易总协定) GeneralRequirementsandRightsoftheHolderinDueCourse（票据持有人的一般要求和权利）GeneralStandardsofPerformance（履行的一般标准）GeographicLimitations（地区限制）GovernmentControlsoverTrade(政府对贸易的管制) GovernmentGuarantees（政府担保）GovernmentalInterest（政府利益原则）GovernmentalSourcesofCapital（官方资金）GrantBackProvisions（回授的规定）HomestateRegulationofMultinationalEnterprises（本国对跨国企业的管理）HostStateRegulationofMultinationalEnterprises（东道国对跨国企业的管理）IllegalityandIncompetency（行为不合法性与主体不适当资格的认定）IMF"Conditionality"(国际货币基金组织的制约性) IMFFacilities（国际货币基金组织的机制）IMFOperations（国际货币基金组织的运作）IMFQuotas（国际货币基金的份额）ImmunitiesofStatesfromtheJurisdictionofMunicipalCourt s（国家豁免于内国法院的管辖权）Import-LicensingProcedures（进口许可证程序协定）IncomeCategories（收入分类）IncomeTaxRates（所得税税率）IncomeTaxes（所得税）IndependencePrinciplesandRuleofStrictCompliance（信用证独立原则和单证严格相符规则）IndirectExporting(间接出口) IndustrialPropertyAgreements（保护工业产权的协定）InnocentMisrepresentation（因无知的误解）Inquiry（调查）InsiderTradingRegulations（内幕交易规则）InsuranceCover（保险范围）IntegrationofCompanyandPersonalIncomeTaxes（公司和个人所得税的征收）IntellectualPropertyRightLaw（知识产权法）InternationalCenterfortheSettlementofInvestmentDisput es（解决投资争端国际中心）InternationalCommercialDisputeSettlement（国际商事争端的解决）?InternationalCourtofJustice（海牙联合国国际法院）InternationalFactoring（国际保理）InternationalFranchising(国际特许经营权)? InternationalLaborStandards（国际劳工标准）InternationalLicensingAgreement(国际许可证协议) InternationalLicensingAgreements（国际许可证协定）InternationalModelLaw(国际示范法) InternationalOrganizations(国际组织) InternationalPersons（国际法主体）InternationalRulesfortheInterpretationofTradeTerms(国际贸易术语解释通则) InternationalTradeCustomsandUsages(国际贸易惯例和习惯)InternationalTreatiesandConventions(国际条约和公约) InternationalTribunals（国际法庭）InterpretingoftheCISG(CISG的解释)InvitationOffer（要约邀请／要约引诱／询盘）InvoluntaryDissolution（非自愿解散）IssuanceofSecurities（证券发行）JurisdictionandVenue（管辖权和法院地）JurisdictioninCivilCases（民事案件的管辖权）JurisdictioninCriminalCases（刑事案件的管辖权）Know-how（技术秘密/专有技术）LackofGenuineLink（缺乏真实的联系）LackofNationality（无国籍）LackofStanding（身份不明）LawApplicabletoLettersofCredit（调整信用证的法律）LawofForeignInvestmentEnterprisesofChina（中国的外商投资企业法）LawofthePeople'sRepublicofChinaonChineseForeignContra ctualJointVentures（中华人民共和国中外合作企业法）LawofthePeople'sRepublicofChinaonChineseForeignEquity JointVentures?（中华人民共和国中外合资企业法）LawofthePeople'sRepublicofChinaonForeignCapitalEnterp rises（中华人民共和国外资企业法）LegalCharacteristics（定义和法律特征）LegalStructureoftheWTO（世界贸易组织的法律框架）LegalSystemofInternationalBusiness(国际商事的法律体系)LettersofCredit(L/C)（信用证）LiabilitiesofMakers,Drawers,Drawees,EndorsersandAccom modationParties（票据制作人、出票人、付款人、背书人、代发人/担保人的责任）LiabilityforEnvironmentalDamage（环境损害责任）LiabilityLimits（承运人责任/义务的限制）LicensingRegulations（许可证制度）LimitationsonForeignEquity（外国投资的资金比例限制）LimitationsontheExcusesThatDrawersandMakersCanUsetoAv oidPayingOffaBillorNote??661（票据制作人、出票人拒绝付款借口的限制）LiquidatedDamages（约定的损害赔偿金）Liquidation（清算）MaintainingMonetaryValue（维护币值稳定）MajorPrinciplesofGATT1994（关税及贸易总协定1947的主要原则）MarineInsurancePoliciesandCertificates（海运保险单和证书）MaritimeInsurance（海运保险）MaritimeLiens（留置权）MeansofDelivery（根据交付方式）Mediation（调停/调解）Membership（成员）MemorandumsofUnderstanding（谅解备忘录）MethodsofInvestmentContribution（出资方式）Mini-trial（模拟审判方式）MiscellaneousTaxes（混杂的，各种各样的税）Misrepresentation（误解）MixedSales（混合销售）ModificationofForeignInvestmentAgreements（外国投资协议的修改）MoneyandBanking(货币与金融)MonopolyControlAuthority(反垄断机构) MostSignificantRelationship（最密切联系原则）Most-favored-nationTreatment（最惠国待遇原则）MovementofWorkers（劳工流动）MultilateralInvestmentGuarantyPrograms（多边投资担保计划／安排）MultilateralTradeAgreements（多边贸易协定）MultilateralTradeNegotiations（多边贸易谈判）MultinationalEnterprise（跨国企业）MunicipalCourts（国内法院的实践）MunicipalLegalSystems（内国法系）NationalForeignInvestmentPolicies（内国的外国投资政策）NationalInvestmentGuaranteePrograms（内国／国家投资担保计划／安排）NationalLaw(国内法)NationalMonetarySystems（国内金融/货币体系）NationalTreatment（国民待遇原则）NationalityPrinciple（国籍原则）Negligent(innocent)Misrepresentation（因疏忽的误解）NegotiabilityofBillsandNegotiabilityofNotes（可流通的汇票和可流通的本票）Negotiation(谈判，议付)NoncompetitionClauses（限制竞争条款）Nondiscrimination（非歧视原则）NonimputableActs（免责行为）NontariffBarrierstoTrade(非关税贸易壁垒) NonwrongfulDissolution（非不法原因散伙）Objections（异议）ObligationsoftheParties（当事人各方的义务）ObligationsoftheSellerandtheBuyer（买卖双方的合同义务）Offer（要约／发盘）OperationofLaw（法律的原因而终止）OperationalReviews（营业审查）?OptingInandOut（加入和退出）OrganizationoftheIMF（国际货币基金组织的机构）OrganizationsAffiliatedwiththeUnitedNations(联合国的相关组织)OverseasPrivateInvestmentCorporation（海外私人投资公司的案件）ParentCompany（母公司）PassingofProperty（产权的转移）PassingofRisk（风险的转移）Patents（专利权）PayableonDemandorataDefiniteTime（付款要求或者在指定的付款时间）PaymentofthePrice（支付价款）PenaltiesforNoncompliance（对于不遵守法规的处罚）PerilsandLosses（保险危险和损失）PersonsImmunefromTaxation（个人所得税的免除）PiercingtheCorporateVeil（普通法上揭开公司的面纱/大陆法上公司人格否认原则）PlaceforDelivery（交付的地点）Post-TerminationRelationship（代理终止后的有关问题）PowersduringWindingup（合伙人在清算过程中的权力/权利）PracticesandUsages（交易习惯和商业惯例）Preemption（先买权/优先权）PreshipmentInspection（装运前检验协定）Price-Fixing（定价）PrivateInsurers（私人／商业保险）PrivateSourcesofCapital（私人资金）ProductsLiabilityLaws（产品质量法）PromissoryNotes（本票）PromoterofInternationalMonetaryCooperation（国际金融合作的促进者）Promoters（公司的发起人）ProtectionofNaturalResources（自然资源的保护）ProtectionofSubsidiaries（分支机构的保护制度）ProtectionofWorkers'RightsbytheCouncilofEurope（欧洲理事会关于劳工权利的保护）ProtectionthroughTariffs（关税保护）ProvingForeignLaw（外国法的查明）ProvisionsGoverningTradeinServicesintheNorthAmericanF reeTradeAgreement（北美自由贸易区协定中关于服务贸易的规定）QualityControls（质量控制）QuantityandField-of-UseRestrictions（对数量和使用领域的限制）RecognitionandEnforcementofAwards（仲裁裁决的承认和执行）RecognitionofForeignJudgments（外国裁决的承认）RefusaltoExerciseJurisdiction（拒绝执行管辖权）RegionalandInternationalDevelopmentAgencies（区域性和国际性发展机构）RegionalIntegration（区域联合）RegionalIntergovernmentalRegulationsonLabor（区域性政府间关于劳工的规定）RegionalIntergovernmentalRegulationsonTradeinServices （关于服务贸易的区域性政府间管理规则）RegionalMonetarySystems（区域性金融体系）RegulationofForeignWorkers（外籍员工的的管理规定）RegulationofPollution（防止污染规则）Relief（救济、赔偿）RemediesAvailabletoBothBuyersandSellers（买卖双方都可以采取的救济措施）RemediesforBreachofContract（违反合同的救济）RequestsforSpecificPerformance（要求继续/特定履行）ResidencyPrinciple（居住地原则）RestrictionsonResearchandDevelopment（对技术研究和发展的限制）RestrictionsThatApplyaftertheExpirationofIntellectual PropertyRights（知识产权保护期满后应用的限制）RestrictionsThatApplyaftertheExpirationoftheLicensing Agreement（知识产权使用许可合同期满后应用的限制）RighttoCompensation（主张赔偿的权利）RightsandDuties（权利与义务）RightsandResponsibilitiesofBeneficiaries（收款人/收益人的权利与义务）RightsandResponsibilitiesoftheAccountParty（付款人/信用证帐户申请人的权利与义务）RulesofOrigin（原产地规则）RulesofPrivateInternationalLaw（国际私法规则）Safeguards（保障措施协定）SanitaryandPhytosanitaryMeasures（卫生与植物卫生措施协定）ScopeandCoverageofGATT1947andGATT1994（关税及贸易总协定1947和1994文本的调整范围）ScreeningForeignInvestmentApplications（对外国投资申请的筛选/审查）SectoralLimitations（行业/部门限制）SecuritiesandExchangeCommission（证券交易委员会）SecuritiesExchanges（证券交易所）SecuritiesRegulations（证券规章）Seller'sObligations（卖方的义务）Seller'sRemedies（卖方可以采取的救济措施）SettlementofDisputesbetweenILOMemberStates（国际劳工组织成员国之间争端的解决）SettlementofDisputesbetweenIntergovernmentalOrganizat ionsandTheirEmployees（政府间国际组织与它的雇员之间争端的解决）SettlementofDisputesinInternationalTribunals（在国际法庭解决争端）SettlementofDisputesinMunicipalCourts（内国法院的争端解决途径）SettlementofDisputesthroughDiplomacy（通过外交途径解决争端）SettlementofDisputesthroughMunicipalCourts（通过内国法院解决国际商事争端）Shareholders'InspectionandInformationRights（股东的监督和知情权）Shareholders'Lawsuits（股东的诉权）Shareholders'Meetings（股东会议/大会）Shareholders'RightsandLiabilities（股东的权利和责任）SharpPractices（欺诈行为）SignedbytheMakerorDrawer（票据制作人或者出票人签名）SourcePrinciple（税收发生来源原则）SourcesofCorporateFinancing?（公司资本的来源）SourcesofForeignInvestmentLawofChina（中国外国投资法的渊源）SourcesofInternationalBusinessLaw(国际商法的渊源) SourcesofInternationalLaw（国际法的渊源）SourcesofInvestment（投资范围）SovereignorStateImmunity（国家主权豁免）Specialization(国际分工专门化)StandardofCare(给予外国人的待遇/关照标准)Start-UpStandards（设立标准）StateResponsibility（国家责任）StatementsandConductoftheParties（当事人的陈述和行为）StatutoryChoice-of-LawProvisions（强制选择条款）StructureoftheWTO（WTO的组织结构）SubordinateBusinessStructures（商业分支机构）SubsidiesandCountervailingMeasures（补贴与反补贴措施协定）SupervisionofForeignInvestment（外国投资的监管）SupremeCourtDecision（最高法院的裁决）SystemsforRelieffromDoubleTaxation（避免双重征税的救济体制）TakeoverRegulations（接管/收购规则）TakingDelivery（接受交付）Tariff-basedImportRestriction（约束进口关税）Tariffs(关税)TaxAvoidance（避税）TaxEvasion（逃税）TaxIncentives(税收激励)??TaxSparing（节税）TaxTreaties（税收条约）Taxation（税收）Taxpayers（纳税人）TechnicalBarrierstoTrade（贸易的技术壁垒）TechnologyTransfer(技术转让) TerminationofanAgency（代理的终止）TerminationofCorporations（公司的终止）TerritorialRestrictions（地区限制）TextilesandClothing（纺织品和服装协定）TheAcceptance（承诺／受盘）TheAdministrativeDiscretionofScreeningAuthorities（筛选/监管机构的管理权）TheAnglo-AmericanCommonLawSystem(普通法系或者英美法系)TheApplicableProcedureLaw（应用的程序法）TheApplicableSubstantiveLaw（应用的实体法）TheBankforInternationalSettlements（巴塞尔国际清算银行）TheBillofExchange（汇票）TheBoardofDirectors（董事会）TheBrettonWoodsSystem（布雷敦森林体系）TheBusinessForm（商业组织形式）TheBuyer'sRighttoAvoidtheContract（买方解除合同的权利）TheCentralBank（中央银行）TheChoiceofMoney（货币的选择）TheConventiononInsiderTrading（内幕交易的公约）TheDraftingoftheCISG(CISG的起草)theEconomicGlobalization（经济全球化）TheFinalActEmbodyingtheResultsoftheUruguayRoundofMult ilateralTradeNegotiations（乌拉圭回合多边贸易谈判结果的最后文本）TheForeignExchangeMarket（外汇交易市场）TheFoundingofGATT（关税及贸易总协定的成立）TheFrameworkAgreement（协定的框架）TheGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade（关税及贸易总协定）TheImportanceoftheSeparateLegalIdentityofJuridicalEnt ities（跨国企业作为拥有独立法律地位的实体之重要性）TheInterbankDepositMarket（银行间的储蓄市场）TheInternationalLaborOrganization（国际劳工组织）TheInternationalMonetaryFund（国际货币基金组织）TheInternationalStandard(国际待遇/标准) TheInternationalTransferofIntellectualProperty（工业产权的国际转让）TheIslamicLawSystem?（伊斯兰法系）TheLawGoverningBillsofExchange（调整汇票的法律制度）TheLawofAgency（国际商事代理法）TheMakingofInternationalLaw（国际法的构成）TheNationalStandard(国民待遇/标准) TheNegotiationandTransferofBillsandNotes（票据权利的转让和背书转让）TheObligationsofBanks（银行的义务/责任）ThePrincipalCharacteristics（基本特征）TheRoleofBanksinCollectingandPayingNegotiableInstrume nts（银行在可流通票据的托收和付款中的角色）TheRoman-GermanicCivilLawSystem(大陆法系或者罗马日耳曼法系) TheScopeofInternationalLawinActualPractice?（实践中国际法的范围）TheSubordinateStructure（分支结构）TheTransferofMoney（货币转移）TheTurningOverofDocuments（交付与货物有关的单证）TheUruguayRound（乌拉圭回合）TheValueofMoney（币值）TheWorldTradeOrganization(WTO)（世界贸易组织）TheWTOAgreement（WTO协定）ThirdPartyRelationsofthePrincipalandtheAgent（与委托人和代理人有关的第三人）Third-PartyClaimsandPersonalInjuries（第三方的权利和人身伤害）Third-PartyRights(HimalayaClause)（第三方的权利----喜玛拉亚条款）TimeCharterparties（定期租船合同）TimeforDelivery（交付的时间）TimeLimitations（时效）TradeBarriers（贸易壁垒）TradeinGoods(货物贸易) TradeLiberalizationThroughCooperation（通过合作实现贸易自由化）TradePolicyReview（贸易政策评审机制）TradeTerms（贸易术语）Trademarks（商标权）Trade-RelatedInvestmentMeasures（与贸易有关的投资措施协定）TradinginSecurities（证券交易）TransactionsCoveredinCISG（CISG适用的交易范围）TransnationalOrganizedLabor（有组织的跨境服务的劳工）Transparency(透明度)TreatiesandConventions（条约和公约）TrialCourtDecision（初等法院的裁决）TurnoverTaxes（流转/交易税）TyingClauses（搭售条款）UnconditionalPromiseorOrdertoPay（无条件的付款承诺和要求）UnfairCompetitionLaws（不正当竞争法）UNIDROITPrinciplesofInternationalCommercialContracts( PICC)(国际统一私法协会国际商事合同通则,简称PICC) UnitedNationsConventiononContractsfortheInternational SaleofGoods(CISG)(联合国国际货物销售合同公约,简称CISG) ValidityandFormationofInternationalSaleofContracts（国际货物销售合同的成立和效力）Visas（签证）VoyageCharterparties（航次租船合同）Waivers（让渡、放弃）WindingUp（合伙清算）WorldIntellectualPropertyOrganization（世界知识产权组织）WorldTradeOrganizationDisputeSettlementProcedures（世界贸易组织争端解决机制）WrongfulDissolution（不法原因散伙）WTOAntidumpingAgreement（世界贸易组织反倾销协议）WTODisputeSettlementProcedures（世界贸易组织的争端解决程序）。

欧盟法律体系概述欧盟（European Union）是由28个成员国组成的政治经济联盟，具有独立的法律体系。

欧盟法律体系的建立旨在保护成员国和欧盟公民的权益，确保欧洲内部市场的正常运作，并加强欧洲在国际事务中的影响力。

本文将对欧盟法律体系的组成以及其运作方式进行概述。

一、基本原则欧盟法律体系的基础是欧洲联盟条约（Treaties of the European Union），它规定了成员国的权利和义务，以及欧盟的机构和决策程序。

在条约的基础上，制定了大量的欧盟法律法规，这些法律法规是成员国必须遵守的。

欧盟法律体系的基本原则包括：1. 优先权原则：欧盟法律在成员国法律之上，成员国的国内法律必须与欧盟法律保持一致。

2. 直接效力原则：欧盟法律直接适用于成员国，成员国的法院必须执行欧盟法律。

3. 合作原则：欧盟法律的制定需要成员国之间的协商和合作，确保法律的民主性和多元性。

4. 逐步集中原则：欧盟法律的领域和范围在不断扩大，成员国需要逐步将主权移交给欧盟。

二、法律制定机构欧盟法律体系的法律制定机构包括欧洲委员会（European Commission）、欧洲议会（European Parliament）和欧洲理事会（Council of the European Union）。

欧洲委员会是欧盟的执行机构，负责制定欧盟法律的提案，并监督欧盟法律的实施。

欧洲委员会由28名委员组成，每个成员国派出一名委员。

欧洲议会是欧盟的立法机构，代表着欧洲公民的权益。

欧洲议会的议员由欧洲各成员国选举产生，根据议员人数的多少确定每个国家的代表席位。

欧洲理事会是由成员国政府的代表组成的机构，负责协商欧盟的法律制定和决策。

欧洲理事会的主席由成员国轮流担任，任期半年。

三、法律的适用和执行欧盟法律的适用范围覆盖了欧盟的所有成员国。

成员国的法院必须根据欧洲法院的判决，执行欧盟法律。

欧洲法院是欧盟法律体系的最高司法机构，负责解释规范欧盟法律的含义和适用范围。

一、不定项选择1．欧盟法渊源：P1⑴由成员国制定的作为成立条约的法律（基本立法）和由欧共体制定的法律（辅助立法）⑵为欧洲法院所承认的法律的一般原则⑶欧共体与非成员国之间达成的国际条约⑷欧洲法院的判例2．条约缩写：P2⑴欧洲煤钢共同体ECSC ⑵欧洲共同体条约EC Treaty⑶欧洲原子能共同体EURATOM ⑷合并条约Merger Treaty⑸关于欧共体主要机构的协定Convention on Certain Institution Common to European Communities⑹第一和第二预算条约First and Second Budgetary Treaties 1970 and 1975⑺关于增加成员国的条约Treaty of Accession 1973,1981,1986 and 1995⑻单一欧洲法SEA ⑼欧盟条约Treaty of European Union=TEU⑽阿姆斯特丹条约Treaty of Amsterdam=TA⑾罗马条约Treaty of Rome ⑿巴黎条约Treaty of Pairs⒀马斯特里赫特条约Treaty of Maastricht⒁里斯本条约The Treaty of Lisbon3．欧共体一体化的路径195年，欧洲一体化先驱让·莫内和法国外长舒曼首先提出建立欧洲煤钢共同体（即舒曼计划），旨在约束德国。

1951年4月18日，法、意、联邦德国、荷、比、卢6国签订了为期50年的《关于建立欧洲煤钢共同体的条约》。

1955年6月1日，参加欧洲煤钢共同体的6国外长在意大利墨西拿举行会议，建议将煤钢共同体的原则推广到其他经济领域，并建立共同市场。

1957年3月25日，6国外长在罗马签订了建立欧洲经济共同体与欧洲原子能共同体的两个条约，即《罗马条约》，于1958年1月1日生效。

1965年4月8日，6国签订了《布鲁塞尔条约》，决定将欧洲煤钢共同体、欧洲原子能共同体和欧洲经济共同体统一起来，统称欧洲共同体。

欧洲联盟的国际贸易规则随着全球化的深入发展，国际贸易在全球范围内得到了迅速的增长。

在这一背景下，欧洲联盟（European Union）作为一个重要的国际经济组织，制定了一系列的国际贸易规则，以促进欧盟成员国之间与其他国家之间的贸易发展。

本文将介绍欧盟的国际贸易规则，并探讨其对全球贸易的影响。

一、欧盟的共同商业政策欧盟的共同商业政策是指欧盟成员国对非成员国进行贸易和外经关系的方式和原则。

根据《里斯本条约》（Treaty of Lisbon）第206条，欧盟的贸易政策应遵守一些基本原则，如公正贸易、保护环境与消费者利益等。

同时，欧盟也致力于推进自由贸易并与其他国际组织进行合作，以增强全球贸易体系的稳定性。

二、欧盟的关税与非关税壁垒欧盟制定了一套完善的关税制度，其中包括进口税（Import duties）和出口税（Export duties）。

进口税涉及到欧盟成员国从非成员国进口的商品征收的税费，而出口税则是指欧盟成员国出口商品时可能需要支付的税费。

此外，欧盟还设立了一些非关税壁垒，如进口配额（Import quotas）、反倾销措施（Anti-dumping measures）和卫生检疫要求（Sanitary and phytosanitary requirements）等，以保护本国产业的利益。

三、欧盟的优惠制度与自由贸易协定为促进与其他国家之间的贸易合作，欧盟与一些部分发展中国家签署了一系列的优惠制度与自由贸易协定。

这些协定对涉及的商品降低或取消了关税税率，以便扩大贸易规模、促进经济发展。

例如，欧盟与非洲、加勒比和太平洋国家（ACP国家）签署了《经济伙伴协定》（Economic Partnership Agreements），为这些国家提供了更好的市场准入条件。

四、欧盟与世界贸易组织的关系作为世界贸易组织（World Trade Organization）的成员，欧盟在国际贸易中扮演着重要的角色。

欧洲联盟名词解释欧洲联盟（European Union，简称EU）是一个由欧洲国家组成的政治经济联盟，其目标是通过推动经济和政治合作，促进和平、稳定和繁荣。

1. 成员国: 欧洲联盟由27个成员国组成，这些国家通过签署欧洲联盟条约并遵守其规定，共同参与欧洲联盟的决策和政策制定。

2. 欧洲联盟条约: 欧洲联盟条约是欧洲联盟的宪法，规定了成员国之间的权力和义务，以及机构的组成和职能。

目前的欧洲联盟条约是《里斯本条约》，于2009年生效。

3. 单一市场: 欧洲联盟的核心目标之一是建立一个自由流动的单一市场，允许货物、人员、服务和资本在成员国之间自由流通。

这促进了经济一体化和增加了贸易和投资机会。

4. 欧元区: 欧元区是指那些使用欧元作为官方货币的欧洲联盟成员国。

这些国家实行相同的货币政策，由欧洲中央银行管理。

5. 欧洲议会: 欧洲议会是欧洲联盟的立法机构，代表欧盟公民的利益。

议会的议员由成员国以比例代表制选举产生，它共同制定和修改欧盟的法律，并对其他机构的决策进行监督。

6. 欧洲委员会: 欧洲委员会是欧洲联盟的行政机构，由27名委员组成，每个国家派出一名委员。

它负责制定欧盟的政策和法规，并实施和监督欧洲联盟的政策措施。

7. 欧洲理事会: 欧洲理事会是由每个成员国的国家元首或政府首脑组成的机构。

它提供欧盟的政治指导并制定战略性的指导方针。

欧洲理事会还负责处理与成员国之间的关系和促进欧盟内的合作。

8. 《里斯本战略》: 《里斯本战略》是欧盟在2000年采取的一项宏伟计划，旨在通过增加欧盟的经济竞争力和创新力，加强社会和环境可持续发展，以及提高就业和社会包容性。

9. 瑞典例外权: 瑞典例外权是指瑞典在加入欧盟时获得的特殊权力，允许其在某些特定领域保留国家主权，而不参与相关的欧盟政策制定和法定规定。

10. 整体性政策: 整体性政策是欧盟的一个特点，其涉及各个领域的政策相互联系和协调。

通过整体性政策，欧盟的目标是在各个政策领域中实现协同效应，以达到更好的结果和效益。

EUROPEANCOMMISSIONBrussels, 29.11.2017COM(2017) 712 finalCOMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIALCOMMITTEESetting out the EU approach to Standard Essential PatentsI NTRODUCTIONThe interplay between patents and standards is important for innovation and growth. Standards ensure that interoperable and safe technologies are widely disseminated among companies and consumers. Patents provide R&D with incentives and enable innovative companies to receive an adequate return on investments. Standards1frequently make reference to technologies that are protected by patents. A patent that protects technology essential to a standard is called a standard-essential patent (SEP). SEPs therefore protect technologies that are essential for complying with technical standards and for marketing products based on such standards.Standards support innovation and growth in Europe, in particular providing for interoperability of digital technologies that are the foundation of the Digital Single Market (DSM). For example, computers, smartphones or tablets connect to the internet or other devices via standardised technologies such as long-term evolution (LTE), WiFi, or Bluetooth, all of which are protected by SEPs. Without the widespread use of such standardised technologies, such interconnectivity would not be possible2.In the hyper-connected era, interconnectivity becomes even more crucial. A wide range of new products need to be interconnected, as to provide consumers with additional products and services (e.g. smart house appliances) and to create new business opportunities for European companies.The digitalisation of the economy creates great opportunities for EU industry. The estimated economic potential of IoT applications in devices for humans, homes, offices, factories, worksites, retail environments, cities, vehicles and the outdoors will be up to EUR 9 trillion per year by 2025 in developed countries3. The digitalisation of products and services can add more than EUR 110 billion in revenue to the European economy per year over the next five years4. The ability of connected devices and systems to work together is crucial for maximising this economic potential. Without interoperability, enabled by standards, 40 % of the potential benefits of IoT systems would not be reaped5.Without formal standardisation and SEPs, there would be, for example, no connected vehicles. Telediagnosis or remote operations with distant hospitals or to exchange patient information would not be possible either. Patent holders contribute technology for developing standards within standard developing organisations (SDOs). Once a standard is established and the holders of the SEPs have given a commitment to license them on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms, the technology included in the standard should be available to any potential user of the standard. Smooth licensing practices are therefore essential to guarantee fair, reasonable and non-1Regulation (EU) 1025/2012 on European standardisation defines the meaning of the terms “standard” and “technical specification”. In this document the term “standard” is used with both meanings for the sake of brevity.2 For instance, company X marketing residential alarm systems connected to the internet both via WiFi and LTE to provide consumers with enhanced security in case of power cut, would need a licence for these standardised technologies.3McKinsey, 2015. See also the objective set by President Juncker for 5G and the IoT in the State of the Union speech, 14.9.2016.4PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2015 and Boston Consulting Group, 2015. See also: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/digitising-european-industry#usefullinks5 See McKinsey (2015).discriminatory access to the standardised technologies and to reward patent holders so they continue to invest in R&D and standardisation activities. This in turn plays a prominent role in developing a connected society, where new market players outside the traditional ICT sectors (producers of household appliances, connected cars, etc.) need access to the standardised technology.The evidence however suggests that the licensing and enforcement of SEPs is not seamless and may lead to conflicts. Technology users accuse SEP holders of charging excessive licensing fees based on weak patent portfolios and of using litigation threats. SEP holders claim that technology users 'free ride' on their innovations and consciously infringe intellectual property rights (IPR) without engaging in good faith licensing negotiations6. Problems may be particularly acute when players coming from new industrial sectors who are unfamiliar with the traditional ICT business need access to standardised technologies. Disputes and delays in negotiations between technological users and holders may ultimately delay the widespread use of key standardised technologies. This can hamper the development of interconnected products in Europe, eventually affecting the competitiveness of the EU economy.In its April 2016 Communication on Standardisation Priorities for the Digital Single Market7, the Commission identified three main areas where the SEP licensing environment could be improved: opaque information on SEP exposure; unclear valuation of patented technologies reading on standards and the definition of FRAND; and the risk of uncertainty in enforcement of SEPs. In addition, the role of open source communities in the development of standards also should be assessed.There is therefore a need for a clear, balanced and reasonable policy for Standard Essential Patents in the EU with the aim of contributing to the development of the Internet of Things and harnessing Europe's lead role in in this context.Conflicting interests of stakeholders in certain SDOs may make it difficult for these organisations to provide effective guidance on such complex legal and intellectual property (IP) policy issues. Licensing platform initiatives in this area are still at an early stage and have not yet been adopted by implementers, who may well be hesitant given the uncertainty in the current SEP regulatory environment and who have little incentive to enter into a deal in this context.In addition, the standardisation of 5G and IoT is a global issue. Europe's industry retains a leading position in many sectors in global markets. The Commission notes the important role European standardisation plays in the global context8.The Commission therefore considers that there is an urgent need to set out key principles that foster a balanced, smooth and predictable framework for SEPs. These key principles reflect two main objectives: incentivising the development and inclusion of top technologies in standards, by preserving fair and adequate return for these contributions, and ensuring smooth and wide dissemination of standardised technologies based on fair access conditions. A balanced and successful policy on SEPs licensing should work to the benefit of start-ups in 6The economic stakes are very high: for example, the royalty income for 2G, 3G and 4G standards is approximately EUR 18 billion per year (CRA 2016).7The public consultation organised by the Commission in 2014 clearly shows divergent opinions on the challenges and solutions concerning the SEP environment. See http://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/newsroom/cf/itemdetail.cfm?item_id=7833.8 Patents declared to the ETSI represent 70% of worldwide SEPs (IPlytics, 2017).Europe and should serve all EU citizens by giving them access to products and services based on the best performing standardised technology.This Communication draws on the responsibility of all actors in the SEP licensing context, and all stakeholders are encouraged to contribute to making this framework work in practice. It is not intended to represent a statement of the law and is without prejudice to the interpretation of EU law by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). It does not bind the Commission as regards the application of EU rules on competition, and in particular Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).1.I NCREASING TRANSPARENCY ON SEP S EXPOSUREInformation on the existence, scope and relevance of SEPs is vital for fair licensing negotiations and for allowing potential users of a standard to identify the scale of their exposure to SEPs and necessary licensing partners. However, currently the only information on SEPs accessible to users can be found in declaration databases maintained by SDOs which may lack transparency. This situation makes licensing negotiations and the anticipation of risks related to SEPs particularly difficult to navigate for start-ups and SMEs. The primary purpose of declarations is to reassure an SDO and all third parties that the technology will be accessible to users, typically under a commitment to license under FRAND conditions.SDO databases may record tens of thousands of SEPs for a single standard, and this trend is growing9. The declarations are based on a self-assessment by the patent holder, and are not subject to scrutiny regarding the essentiality of the declared patent, which can evolve in the course of the standard adoption procedure. In addition, stakeholders report that even in concrete licensing negotiations licensors fail to substantiate their claims with more precise information. This is particularly unsatisfactory in the context of IoT where new players with little experience of SEPs licensing are continually entering the market for connectivity. The Commission therefore believes that measures, as outlined below, are needed to improve the information on SEPs.1.1.I MPROVING QUALITY AND ACCESSIBILITY OF INFORMATION RECORDED IN SDODATABASESThe Commission believes that SDOs should provide detailed information in their databases to support the SEP licensing framework. While SDO databases collect large amounts of declaration data10, they often do not provide user-friendly accessibility to interested parties, and lack essential quality features. The Commission therefore takes the view that the quality and accessibility of the databases should be improved11. First, data should be easily accessible through user friendly interfaces, both for patent holders, implementers and third parties. All declared information should be searchable based on the relevant standardisation projects, which may also require the transformation of historic data into current formats. Quality processes should eliminate also duplications and other obvious flaws. Finally, there should be links to patent office databases, including updates of patent status, ownership and its transfer. 9For instance, more than 23 500 patents have been declared essential to the Global System for Mobile Communication standard and the 3G or Universal Mobile Telecommunication System standards developed at the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). Such standard apply to all smartphones and devices having a mobile connection. For more figures, see 'Landscaping study on SEPs' IPlytics (2017) and 'Patents and Standards - A modern framework for IPR-based standardization' ECSIP (2014).10 Some SDOs require specific patent disclosures as they recognise their benefits, while others permit blanket declarations. This section of the Communication refers to SDOs with specific patent disclosure.11See for example the long running 'DARE' project to improve the ETSI’s database.Work on improving databases needs to be combined with a stricter scrutiny on compliance with declaration obligations as defined in current SDO policies to avoid incomplete declarations12.1.2.D EVELOPING AN INFORMATION TOOL TO ASSIST LICENSING NEGOTIATIONSThe Commission notes that the current declaration system in SDOs supports the technical standard setting process and is not geared towards future SEP licensing. However, it is clear that there are net benefits in extending the current practice and purpose of declarations and databases to the creation of new transparency tools which, without losing their main purpose, can greatly facilitate licensing negotiation. Proportionality considerations are essential in this context. Whilst excessive burdens for stakeholders should be avoided, it should be born in mind that in concrete licensing negotiations, patent holders necessarily have to invest in substantiating to SEP users why patents from the patent holders' portfolio are essential to the standard or how these patents are being infringed13. The Commission therefore believes that proposed incremental improvements with controlled costs can substantially reduce overall transaction costs during licensing negotiations as well as infringement risks, to benefit both parties in negotiations14.1.2.1.More up-to-date and precise declarationsDeclarations occur early on in the standardisation process, with normally no review later on. However, technical solutions proposed in standards negotiations evolve up until the final standard15 is agreed. While the majority of declarations concern patent applications, the patent claims under the final patent granted after adoption of the standard can differ considerably16, as their content may change during the granting process. Therefore, rightholders should review the relevance of their declarations at the time of adoption of the final standard (and subsequent significant revisions) and when a final granting decision on the patent is taken. Declarations should also include enough information to assess patent exposure. Patent holders should at least make reference to the section of the standard that is relevant to the SEP and to the link with the patent family. Declarations should also clearly identify a contact for the owner/licensor of the declared SEP.Finally, it should be noted that SEPs on key technologies are more frequently litigated17. Associated information is relevant for all interested licensees and can play a role in limiting the possibility of future litigation. SDOs should therefore provide the possibility and incentives for patent holders and technology users to report the case reference and main outcome of final decisions, positive or negative, on declared SEPs (including on essentiality and patent validity). As companies usually only litigate a few valuable patents within a portfolio, and both patent holders and users should have an interest in reporting decisions in their respective favour, the associated burden of this measure would be limited.12 For further details, please see the summary report of the public consultation organised by DG GROW in 2015. http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/14482/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/native.13 See CRA (2016).14 See section 3 below in relation to effective enforcement.15 For instance, a potential patent or patent application initially declared for a candidate technology may not be retained in the released standard, or the declared patent application may be revised during the granting process.16 For instance, 71% of SEPs declared at major SDOs (73% at the ETSI) are only granted after the standard has been released (IPlytics, 2017).17 See ECSIP (2014).1.2.2.Essentiality checksEvidence points to the risk of broad over-declarations and makes a strong case for more reliability with respect to SEP essentiality18. Stakeholders report that recorded declarations create a de facto presumption of essentiality in negotiations with licensees19. This scenario places a high burden on any willing licensee, especially SMEs and start-ups, to check the essentiality of a large number of SEPs in licensing negotiations.There is therefore a need for a higher degree of scrutiny on essentiality claims. This would require scrutiny being performed by an independent party with technical capabilities and market recognition, at the right point in time. Having said this, introducing such a scrutiny requirement to SEPs must be balanced against the cost20. However, an incremental approach, whereby scrutiny takes place at the request of either rightholders or prospective users, calibrating the depth of scrutiny and limiting checks to one patent within a family and to samples, could ensure the right cost-benefit balance of this measure21.1.2.3.Means of implementationWhile there are clear benefits to such increased transparency, the related burden needs to remain proportionate. Measures could therefore be extended gradually, and apply to new and key standards only, e.g. 5G.As a first step, stakeholders could be incentivised to value increased transparency, e.g. by way of certification that their declared SEP portfolios comply with transparency criteria. This certification could later be used in licensing negotiations and litigation. In addition, a recent study undertaken for the Commission suggests that SDOs may consider introducing (modest) fees for confirming SEP declarations after standard release and patent grants, to incentive SEP holders to revise and maintain only relevant declarations22.When considering essentiality checks, patent offices may well be natural candidates for exploiting synergies and reducing costs23. The Commission will support further analysis of their feasibility to ensure effective and proportionate solutions.Depending on the outcome of this project, an independent European body could be tasked to proceed with SEP essentiality assessment.18 See IPlytics (2017) and CRA (2016) and the summary of DG GROW public consultation on SEPs (2015).19 A number of studies on various key technologies suggests that when rigorously tested, only between 10% and 50% of declared patents are essential (CRA, 2016 and IPlytics, 2017).20 The cost of essentiality checks may be negligible compared to licensing revenues for key technologies (see CRA, 2016).21 For an analysis of cost and benefits, please see IPlytics (2017).22 See CRA (2016).23 See IPlytics (2017).2.G ENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR FRAND LICENSING TERMS FOR SEP SThe Commission considers that the parties are best placed to arrive at a common understanding of what are fair licensing conditions and fair rates, through good faith negotiations. Currently, licensing is hampered by unclear and diverging interpretations of the meaning of FRAND. The debate is particularly heated when it comes to valuation principles. Divergent views and litigation over FRAND licensing risk delaying the uptake of new technologies, standardisation processes and the roll-out of IoT in Europe. The Commission considers therefore that it is both necessary and beneficial to establish a first set of key signposts on the FRAND concept, so as to provide for a more stable licensing environment, guide parties in their negotiations and reduce litigation.The guiding elements set out below are based on the results of a public consultation24, analysis of best practices25, studies26, as well as national case law27. The Commission encourages stakeholders to engage in dialogue with each other and with the Commission, with the view to achieving further clarification and developing best practices. The Commission will monitor progress achieved and take complementary action on FRAND licensing, as needed.2.1.L ICENSING PRINCIPLESAs the CJEU has confirmed, an 'undertaking to grant licences on FRAND terms creates legitimate expectations on the part of third parties that the proprietor of the SEP will in fact grant licences on such terms'28.Both parties must be willing to engage in good faith negotiations, with the view to establishing licensing conditions that are fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory. Parties to a SEP licensing agreement, negotiating in good faith, are in the best position to determine the FRAND terms most appropriate to their specific situation.Efficiency considerations, reasonable licence fee expectations on both sides, the facilitation of the uptake by implementers to promote wide diffusion of the standard should be taken into account. It should be stressed in this respect that there is no one-size-fit-all solution to what FRAND is: what can be considered fair and reasonable differs from sector to sector and over time. For this reason, the Commission encourages stakeholders to pursue sectoral discussions with a view to establishing common licensing practices, based on the principles reflected in this Communication.The Commission considers that the following IP valuation principles should be taken into account:Licensing terms have to bear a clear relationship to the economic value of the patented technology. That value primarily needs to focus on the technology itself and in principle should not include any element resulting from the decision to include the technology in the standard.In cases where the technology is developed mainly for the standard and has little market value outside the standard, alternative evaluation 24 Public consultation on patents and standards: A modern framework for standardisation involving intellectual property rights.25 Licensing Terms of Standard Essential Patents: A Comprehensive Analysis of Cases, JRC 201726Study on Transparency, Predictability and Efficiency of SDO-based Standardization and SEP Licensing, Published on: 12/12/2016, (CRA study).27 See, in particular, Unwired Planet v. Huaweï [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat).28 Case C-170/13 Huawei Technologies, EU:C:2015:477, paragraph 53methods, such as the relative importance of the technology in the standard compared to other contributions in the standard, should be considered.∙Determining a FRAND value should require taking into account the present value added29of the patented technology. That value should be irrespective of the market success of the product which is unrelated to the patented technology.∙FRAND valuation should ensure continued incentives for SEP holders to contribute their best available technology to standards.∙Finally, to avoid royalty stacking, in defining a FRAND value, an individual SEP cannot be considered in isolation. Parties need to take into account a reasonable aggregate rate for the standard, assessing the overall added value of the technology30.The implementation of measures on SEP transparency can already support this objective. It can be addressed further, within the scope of EU competition law, by the creation of industry licensing platforms and patent pools, or based on indications by standardisation participants on the maximum cumulative rate that could be reasonably envisaged or expected.2.2.E FFICIENCY AND NON-DISCRIMINATIONThe non-discrimination element of FRAND indicates that rightholders cannot discriminate between implementers that are 'similarly situated'31.Given that FRAND is not one-size-fits-all, solutions can differ from sector to sector and depending on the business models in question.As mentioned above, FRAND negotiations imply good faith negotiations from both parties. Efficiency considerations can come into play as well. Transaction costs relating to the negotiation of a licence should be kept to the minimum necessary. Furthermore, in sectors where cross-licencing practices are widespread, efficiency gains related to such practices should be taken into account. These points need to be taken into account when assessing on a case by case basis whether a licensing offer is compatible with FRAND.In line with the approach presented above, the Commission considers that the same principles of efficiency support the practice of SEP portfolio licensing for products with global circulation32. As noted in a recent ruling33, a country-by-country licensing approach may not be efficient and may not be in line with a recognised commercial practice in the sector.2.3.P ATENT POOLS AND LICENSING PLATFORMS TO FACILITATE SEP LICENSINGThe creation of patent pools or other licensing platforms, within the scope of EU competition law, should be encouraged. They can address many of the SEP licensing challenges by offering better scrutiny on essentiality, more clarity on aggregate licensing fees and one-stop- shop solutions. For IoT industries, and particularly SMEs, newly exposed to SEP licensing disputes, this will bring more clarity to licensing conditions of SEP holders in a specific sector.29The present value is the value discounted to the time of the conclusion of the licence agreement. Allowing for the discounting over time is important against the backdrop of licence agreement running over several years in sometimes technologically fast moving business environments.30 On royalty stacking see CRA study.31 Unwired Planet v. Huaweï [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat).32However, FRAND licensing requires remuneration to be calculated in a manner that implementers wishing to develop a product for a specific, geographically limited area are not placed at a disadvantage.33 Unwired Planet v. Huaweï [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat).Measures to encourage the setting up of pools for key standardised technologies should be encouraged, e.g. facilitating access to pool management offers and technical assistance by SDO34. The Commission will consider further measures if these efforts are ineffective in IoT sectors.2.4.E XPLOITING AND DEEPENING FRAND EXPERTISEThere is a need to increase accessibility of experience, expertise and know-how around FRAND determination. Valuable insight has been gained and approaches developed from licensing agreements, mediations, arbitrations and court decisions over many years. Significant resources and efforts have been devoted to clarifying, analysing and valuing patents and technology. As there is no common repository for such expertise, work and research may be unnecessarily duplicated at serious cost to the parties involved. More accessible FRAND-related information could increase predictability for businesses such as IoT players, facilitate the licensing process in general and provide support and benchmarks in dispute settlement.The Commission will therefore set up an expert group with the view to gathering industry practice and additional expertise on FRAND licencing. In addition, the Commission will use all appropriate tools available to obtain further information to support its policy making with sufficient evidence.34For instance, the creation of pools may be encouraged by means of measures such as strengthening the relationship between SDOs and pools, providing incentives to participation and making universities and SMEs more aware of the advantages of becoming a licensor in a pool (ECSIP, 2015).3.A PREDICTABLE ENFORCEMENT ENVIRONMENT FOR SEP SDisputes on SEPs are an important factor in the licensing system when negotiations fail. A balanced and predictable enforcement environment has particularly positive effects on parties’ behaviour during negotiations, which in turn can speed up the spread of standardised technologies. IoT stakeholders report however that uncertainties and imbalances in the enforcement system have serious implications for market entry. SEPs show a higher degree of litigation than other patents35, which reinforces the need for a clear dispute framework in this area. While this Communication focuses on specific guidance on Standard Essential Patents, the Guidance on certain aspects of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the enforcement of intellectual property rights36 clarifies the IPRED regime more generally.The possibility to enforce is one of the key aspects of intellectual property rights37. The debate in the SEPs area has mainly focused on the availability of injunctive relief. Such relief aims to protect SEP holders against infringers unwilling to conclude a licence on FRAND terms. At the same time, safeguards are needed against the risk that good-faith technology users threatened with an injunction accept licensing terms that are not FRAND, or in the worst case, are unable to market their products (hold-ups).3.1.AVAILABILITY OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF UNDER THE H UAWEI VS ZTE JURISPRUDENCE In its Huawei judgment38, the CJEU established obligations applying to both sides of a SEP-licensing agreement, when assessing whether the holder of a SEP can seek an injunction against a potential licensee without being in breach of Article 102 TFEU. SEP holders may not seek injunctions against users willing to enter into a licence on FRAND terms, and the CJEU established behavioural criteria to assess when a potential licensee can be considered willing to enter into such a licence.The Commission considers that the elements below – which arise from national case-law in applying the Huawei judgment39, provide useful additional guidance for stakeholders.A number of courts have stressed that a prospective SEP licensee has to receive sufficiently detailed and relevant information to determine the relevance of the SEP portfolio and 35 ECSIP (2014).36COM(2017)70837Directive 2004/48/EC of 29.4.2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, pub. OJ L 195 of 2.6.2004, recital 338 Case C-170/13 Huawei Technologies, EU:C:2015:477.39 The CJEU held that Article 102 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that the proprietor of a patent essential to a standard established by a standardisation body, which has given an irrevocable undertaking to that body to grant a licence to third parties on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (‘FRAND’) terms, does not abuse its dominant position, within the meaning of that article, by bringing an action for infringement seeking an injunction prohibiting the infringement of its patent or seeking the recall of products for the manufacture of which that patent has been used, as long as:(1) prior to bringing that action, the proprietor has, first, alerted the alleged infringer of the infringement complained about by designating that patent and specifying the way in which it has been infringed, and, secondly, after the alleged infringer has expressed its willingness to conclude a licensing agreement on FRAND terms, presented to that infringer a specific, written offer for a licence on such terms, specifying, in particular, the royalty and the way in which it is to be calculated, and(2) where the alleged infringer continues to use the patent in question, the alleged infringer has not diligently responded to that offer, in accordance with recognised commercial practices in the field and in good faith, this being a matter which must be established on the basis of objective factors and which implies, in particular, that there are no delaying tactics.。

Criminal Law Convention on CorruptionStrasbourg, 27.I.1999The Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community entered into force on 1 December 2009. As a consequence, as from that date, any reference to the European Community shall be read as the European Union.Chart of renewal of declarations or reservationsProtocolCivil Law Convention on CorruptionExplanatory ReportFrançaisTranslationsGRECO WebsitePreambleThe member States of the Council of Europe and the other States signatory hereto,Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its members;Recognising the value of fostering co-operation with the other States signatories to this Convention;Convinced of the need to pursue, as a matter of priority, a common criminal policy aimed at the protection of society against corruption, including the adoption of appropriate legislation and preventive measures;Emphasising that corruption threatens the rule of law, democracy and human rights, undermines good governance, fairness and social justice, distorts competition, hinders economic development and endangers the stability of democratic institutions and the moral foundations of society; Believing that an effective fight against corruption requires increased, rapid and well-functioning international co-operation in criminal matters;Welcoming recent developments which further advance international understanding and co-operation in combating corruption, including actions of the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organisation, the Organisation of American States, the OECD and the European Union;Having regard to the Programme of Action against Corruption adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in November 1996 following the recommendations of the 19th Conference of European Ministers of Justice (Valletta, 1994);Recalling in this respect the importance of the participation of non-member States in the Council of Europe’s activities against corruption and welcoming their valuable contribution to the implementation of the Programme of Action against Corruption;Further recalling that Resolution No. 1 adopted by the European Ministers of Justice at their 21st Conference (Prague, 1997) recommended the speedy implementation of the Programme of Action against Corruption, and called, in particular, for the early adoption of a criminal law convention providing for the co-ordinated incrimination of corruption offences, enhanced co-operation for theprosecution of such offences as well as an effective follow-up mechanism open to member States and non-member States on an equal footing;Bearing in mind that the Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe decided, on the occasion of their Second Summit held in Strasbourg on 10 and 11 October 1997, to seek common responses to the challenges posed by the growth in corruption and adopted an Action Plan which, in order to promote co-operation in the fight against corruption, including its links with organised crime and money laundering, instructed the Committee of Ministers, inter alia, to secure the rapid completion of international legal instruments pursuant to the Programme of Action against Corruption;Considering moreover that Resolution (97) 24 on the 20 Guiding Principles for the Fight against Corruption, adopted on 6 November 1997 by the Committee of Ministers at its 101st Session, stresses the need rapidly to complete the elaboration of international legal instruments pursuant to the Programme of Action against Corruption;In view of the adoption by the Committee of Ministers, at its 102nd Session on 4 May 1998, of Resolution (98) 7 authorising the partial and enlarged agreement establishing the "Group of States against Corruption –GRECO", which aims at improving the capacity of its members to fight corruption by following up compliance with their undertakings in this field,Have agreed as follows:Chapter I – Use of termsArticle 1 – Use of termsFor the purposes of this Convention:a "public official" shall be understood by reference to the definition of "official", "public officer", "mayor", "minister" or "judge" in the national law of the State in which the person in question performs that function and as applied in its criminal law;b the term "judge" referred to in sub-paragraph a above shall include prosecutors and holders of judicial offices;c in the case of proceedings involving a public official of another State, the prosecuting State may apply the definition of public official only insofar as that definition is compatible with its national law;d "legal person" shall mean any entity having such status under the applicable national law, except for States or other public bodies in the exercise of State authority and for public international organisations.Chapter II – Measures to be taken at national levelArticle 2 – Active bribery of domestic public officialsEach Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the promising, offering or giving by any person, directly or indirectly, of any undue advantage to any of its public officials, for himself or herself or for anyone else, for him or her to act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her functions.Article 3 – Passive bribery of domestic public officialsEach Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the request or receipt by any of its public officials, directly or indirectly, of any undue advantage, for himself or herself or for anyone else, or the acceptance of an offer or a promise of such an advantage, to act or refrainfrom acting in the exercise of his or her functions.Article 4 – Bribery of members of domestic public assembliesEach Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law the conduct referred to in Articles 2 and 3, when involving any person who is a member of any domestic public assembly exercising legislative or administrative powers.Article 5 – Bribery of foreign public officialsEach Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law the conduct referred to in Articles 2 and 3, when involving a public official of any other State.Article 6 – Bribery of members of foreign public assembliesEach Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law the conduct referred to in Articles 2 and 3, when involving any person who is a member of any public assembly exercising legislative or administrative powers in any other State.Article 7 – Active bribery in the private sectorEach Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally in the course of business activity, the promising, offering or giving, directly or indirectly, of any undue advantage to any persons who direct or work for, in any capacity, private sector entities, for themselves or for anyone else, for them to act, or refrain from acting, in breach of their duties.Article 8 – Passive bribery in the private sectorEach Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, in the course of business activity, the request or receipt, directly or indirectly, by any persons who direct or work for, in any capacity, private sector entities, of any undue advantage or the promise thereof for themselves or for anyone else, or the acceptance of an offer or a promise of such an advantage, to act or refrain from acting in breach of their duties.Article 9 – Bribery of officials of international organisationsEach Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law the conduct referred to in Articles 2 and 3, when involving any official or other contracted employee, within the meaning of the staff regulations, of any public international or supranational organisation or body of which the Party is a member, and any person, whether seconded or not, carrying out functions corresponding to those performed by such officials or agents.Article 10 – Bribery of members of international parliamentary assembliesEach Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law the conduct referred to in Article 4 when involving any members of parliamentary assemblies of international or supranational organisations of which the Party is a member.Article 11 – Bribery of judges and officials of international courtsEach Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law the conduct referred to in Articles 2 and 3 involving any holders of judicial office or officials of any international court whose jurisdiction is accepted bythe Party.Article 12 – Trading in influenceEach Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the promising, giving or offering, directly or indirectly, of any undue advantage to anyone who asserts or confirms that he or she is able to exert an improper influence over the decision-making of any person referred to in Articles 2, 4 to 6 and 9 to 11 in consideration thereof, whether the undue advantage is for himself or herself or for anyone else, as well as the request, receipt or the acceptance of the offer or the promise of such an advantage, in consideration of that influence, whether or not the influence is exerted or whether or not the supposed influence leads to the intended result.Article 13 – Money laundering of proceeds from corruption offencesEach Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law the conduct referred to in the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Products from Crime (ETS No. 141), Article 6, paragraphs 1 and 2, under the conditions referred to therein, when the predicate offence consists of any of the criminal offences established in accordance with Articles 2 to 12 of this Convention, to the extent that the Party has not made a reservation or a declaration with respect to these offences or does not consider such offences as serious ones for the purpose of their money laundering legislation.Article 14 – Account offencesEach Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as offences liable to criminal or other sanctions under its domestic law the following acts or omissions, when committed intentionally, in order to commit, conceal or disguise the offences referred to in Articles 2 to 12, to the extent the Party has not made a reservation or a declaration: a creating or using an invoice or any other accounting document or record containing false or incomplete information;b unlawfully omitting to make a record of a payment.Article 15 – Participatory actsEach Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law aiding or abetting the commission of any of the criminal offences established in accordance with this Convention.Article 16 – ImmunityThe provisions of this Convention shall be without prejudice to the provisions of any Treaty, Protocol or Statute, as well as their implementing texts, as regards the withdrawal of immunity. Article 17 – Jurisdiction1 Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish jurisdiction over a criminal offence established in accordance with Articles2 to 14 of this Convention where:a the offence is committed in whole or in part in its territory;b the offender is one of its nationals, one of its public officials, or a member of one of its domestic public assemblies;c the offence involves one of its public officials or members of its domestic public assemblies or any person referred to in Articles 9 to 11 who is at the same time one of its nationals.2 Each State may, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification,acceptance, approval or accession, by a declaration addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, declare that it reserves the right not to apply or to apply only in specific cases or conditions the jurisdiction rules laid down in paragraphs 1 b and c of this article or any part thereof.3 If a Party has made use of the reservation possibility provided for in paragraph 2 of this article, it shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish jurisdiction over a criminal offence established in accordance with this Convention, in cases where an alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him to another Party, solely on the basis of his nationality, after a request for extradition.4 This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised by a Party in accordance with national law.Article 18 – Corporate liability1 Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that legal persons can be held liable for the criminal offences of active bribery, trading in influence and money laundering established in accordance with this Convention, committed for their benefit by any natural person, acting either individually or as part of an organ of the legal person, who has a leading position within the legal person, based on:– a power of representation of the legal person; or– an authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal person; or– an authority to exercise control within the legal person;as well as for involvement of such a natural person as accessory or instigator in the above-mentioned offences.2 Apart from the cases already provided for in paragraph 1, each Party shall take the necessary measures to ensure that a legal person can be held liable where the lack of supervision or control by a natural person referred to in paragraph 1 has made possible the commission of the criminal offences mentioned in paragraph 1 for the benefit of that legal person by a natural person under its authority.3 Liability of a legal person under paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not exclude criminal proceedings against natural persons who are perpetrators, instigators of, or accessories to, the criminal offences mentioned in paragraph 1.Article 19 – Sanctions and measures1 Having regard to the serious nature of the criminal offences established in accordance with this Convention, each Party shall provide, in respect of those criminal offences established in accordance with Articles2 to 14, effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions and measures, including, when committed by natural persons, penalties involving deprivation of liberty which can give rise to extradition.2 Each Party shall ensure that legal persons held liable in accordance with Article 18, paragraphs 1 and 2, shall be subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal or non-criminal sanctions, including monetary sanctions.3 Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to enable it to confiscate or otherwise deprive the instrumentalities and proceeds of criminal offences established in accordance with this Convention, or property the value of which corresponds to such proceeds.Article 20 – Specialised authoritiesEach Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to ensure that persons or entities are specialised in the fight against corruption. They shall have the necessary independence in accordance with the fundamental principles of the legal system of the Party, in order for them to be able to carry out their functions effectively and free from any undue pressure. The Party shall ensure that the staff of such entities has adequate training and financial resources for their tasks. Article 21 – Co-operation with and between national authoritiesEach Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to ensure that public authorities, as well as any public official, co-operate, in accordance with national law, with those of its authorities responsible for investigating and prosecuting criminal offences:a by informing the latter authorities, on their own initiative, where there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the criminal offences established in accordance with Articles 2 to 14 has been committed, orb by providing, upon request, to the latter authorities all necessary information.Article 22 – Protection of collaborators of justice and witnessesEach Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to provide effective and appropriate protection for:a those who report the criminal offences established in accordance with Articles 2 to 14 or otherwise co-operate with the investigating or prosecuting authorities;b witnesses who give testimony concerning these offences.Article 23 – Measures to facilitate the gathering of evidence and the confiscation of proceeds1 Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary, including those permitting the use of special investigative techniques, in accordance with national law, to enable it to facilitate the gathering of evidence related to criminal offences established in accordance with Article2 to 14 of this Convention and to identify, trace, freeze and seize instrumentalities and proceeds of corruption, or property the value of which corresponds to such proceeds, liable to measures set out in accordance with paragraph3 of Article 19 of this Convention.2 Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to empower its courts or other competent authorities to order that bank, financial or commercial records be made available or be seized in order to carry out the actions referred to in paragraph 1 of this article.3 Bank secrecy shall not be an obstacle to measures provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article.Chapter III – Monitoring of implementationArticle 24 – MonitoringThe Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) shall monitor the implementation of this Convention by the Parties.Chapter IV – International co-operationArticle 25 – General principles and measures for international co-operation1 The Parties shall co-operate with each other, in accordance with the provisions of relevant international instruments on international co-operation in criminal matters, or arrangements agreed on the basis of uniform or reciprocal legislation, and in accordance with their national law, to the widest extent possible for the purposes of investigations and proceedings concerning criminaloffences established in accordance with this Convention.2 Where no international instrument or arrangement referred to in paragraph 1 is in force between Parties, Articles 26 to 31 of this chapter shall apply.3 Articles 26 to 31 of this chapter shall also apply where they are more favourable than those of the international instruments or arrangements referred to in paragraph 1.Article 26 – Mutual assistance1 The Parties shall afford one another the widest measure of mutual assistance by promptly processing requests from authorities that, in conformity with their domestic laws, have the power to investigate or prosecute criminal offences established in accordance with this Convention.2 Mutual legal assistance under paragraph 1 of this article may be refused if the requested Party believes that compliance with the request would undermine its fundamental interests, national sovereignty, national security or ordre public.3 Parties shall not invoke bank secrecy as a ground to refuse any co-operation under this chapter. Where its domestic law so requires, a Party may require that a request for co-operation which would involve the lifting of bank secrecy be authorised by either a judge or another judicial authority, including public prosecutors, any of these authorities acting in relation to criminal offences.Article 27 – Extradition1 The criminal offences established in accordance with this Convention shall be deemed to be included as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between or among the Parties. The Parties undertake to include such offences as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty to be concluded between or among them.2 If a Party that makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another Party with which it does not have an extradition treaty, it may consider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition with respect to any criminal offence established in accordance with this Convention.3 Parties that do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognise criminal offences established in accordance with this Convention as extraditable offences between themselves.4 Extradition shall be subject to the conditions provided for by the law of the requested Party or by applicable extradition treaties, including the grounds on which the requested Party may refuse extradition.5 If extradition for a criminal offence established in accordance with this Convention is refused solely on the basis of the nationality of the person sought, or because the requested Party deems that it has jurisdiction over the offence, the requested Party shall submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution unless otherwise agreed with the requesting Party, and shall report the final outcome to the requesting Party in due course.Article 28 – Spontaneous informationWithout prejudice to its own investigations or proceedings, a Party may without prior request forward to another Party information on facts when it considers that the disclosure of such information might assist the receiving Party in initiating or carrying out investigations or proceedings concerning criminal offences established in accordance with this Convention or might lead to a request by that Party under this chapter.Article 29 – Central authority1 The Parties shall designate a central authority or, if appropriate, several central authorities, which shall be responsible for sending and answering requests made under this chapter, the execution of such requests or the transmission of them to the authorities competent for their execution.2 Each Party shall, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, communicate to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe the names and addresses of the authorities designated in pursuance of paragraph 1 of this article.Article 30 – Direct communication1 The central authorities shall communicate directly with one another.2 In the event of urgency, requests for mutual assistance or communications related thereto may be sent directly by the judicial authorities, including public prosecutors, of the requesting Party to such authorities of the requested Party. In such cases a copy shall be sent at the same time to the central authority of the requested Party through the central authority of the requesting Party.3 Any request or communication under paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article may be made through the International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol).4 Where a request is made pursuant to paragraph 2 of this article and the authority is not competent to deal with the request, it shall refer the request to the competent national authority and inform directly the requesting Party that it has done so.5 Requests or communications under paragraph 2 of this article, which do not involve coercive action, may be directly transmitted by the competent authorities of the requesting Party to the competent authorities of the requested Party.6 Each State may, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, inform the Secretary General of the Council of Europe that, for reasons of efficiency, requests made under this chapter are to be addressed to its central authority. Article 31 – InformationThe requested Party shall promptly inform the requesting Party of the action taken on a request under this chapter and the final result of that action. The requested Party shall also promptly inform the requesting Party of any circumstances which render impossible the carrying out of the action sought or are likely to delay it significantly.Chapter V – Final provisionsArticle 32 – Signature and entry into force1 This Convention shall be open for signature by the member States of the Council of Europe and by non-member States which have participated in its elaboration. Such States may express their consent to be bound by:a signature without reservation as to ratification, acceptance or approval; orb signature subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, followed by ratification, acceptance or approval.2 Instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited with the Secretary General of the Council of Europe.3 This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of a period of three months after the date on which fourteenth States have expressed their consent to be bound by the Convention in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1. Any such State, which is not a member of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) at the time ofratification, shall automatically become a member on the date the Convention enters into force.4 In respect of any signatory State which subsequently expresses its consent to be bound by it, the Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of a period of three months after the date of the expression of their consent to be bound by the Convention in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1. Any signatory State, which is not a member of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) at the time of ratification, shall automatically become a member on the date the Convention enters into force in its respect.Article 33 – Accession to the Convention1 After the entry into force of this Convention, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, after consulting the Contracting States to the Convention, may invite the European Community as well as any State not a member of the Council and not having participated in its elaboration to accede to this Convention, by a decision taken by the majority provided for in Article 20d of the Statute of the Council of Europe and by the unanimous vote of the representatives of the Contracting States entitled to sit on the Committee of Ministers.2 In respect of the European Community and any State acceding to it under paragraph 1 above, the Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of a period of three months after the date of deposit of the instrument of accession with the Secretary General of the Council of Europe. The European Community and any State acceding to this Convention shall automatically become a member of GRECO, if it is not already a member at the time of accession, on the date the Convention enters into force in its respect.Article 34 – Territorial application1 Any State may, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, specify the territory or territories to which this Convention shall apply.2 Any Party may, at any later date, by a declaration addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, extend the application of this Convention to any other territory specified in the declaration. In respect of such territory the Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of a period of three months after the date of receipt of such declaration by the Secretary General.3 Any declaration made under the two preceding paragraphs may, in respect of any territory specified in such declaration, be withdrawn by a notification addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe. The withdrawal shall become effective on the first day of the month following the expiration of a period of three months after the date of receipt of such notification by the Secretary General.Article 35 – Relationship to other conventions and agreements1 This Convention does not affect the rights and undertakings derived from international multilateral conventions concerning special matters.2 The Parties to the Convention may conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements with one another on the matters dealt with in this Convention, for purposes of supplementing or strengthening its provisions or facilitating the application of the principles embodied in it.3 If two or more Parties have already concluded an agreement or treaty in respect of a subject which is dealt with in this Convention or otherwise have established their relations in respect of that subject, they shall be entitled to apply that agreement or treaty or to regulate those relations accordingly, in lieu of the present Convention, if it facilitates international co-operation.。

欧洲联盟（英文名称：European Union；法文名称：Union européenne），简称欧盟（EU），总部设在比利时首都布鲁塞尔，是由欧洲共同体（European Community，又称欧洲共同市场）发展而来的，主要经历了三个阶段：荷卢比三国经济联盟、欧洲共同体、欧盟。

其实是一个集政治实体和经济实体于一身、在世界上具有重要影响的区域一体化组织。

1991年12月，欧洲共同体马斯特里赫特首脑会议通过《欧洲联盟条约》，通称《马斯特里赫特条约》（简称《马约》）。

1993年11月1日，《马约》正式生效，欧盟正式诞生。

欧盟简介欧盟现有27个成员国，人口5亿，GDP14.5万亿美元。

欧盟的宗旨是“通过建立无内部边界的空间，加强经济、社会的协调发展和建立最终实行统一货币的经济货币联盟，促进成员国经济和社会的均衡发展”，“通过实行共同外交和安全政策，在国际舞台上弘扬联盟的个性”。

欧盟的盟旗是蓝色底上的十二星旗，普遍说法是因为欧盟一开始只有12个国家，代表了欧盟的开端。

实际上这个十二星旗代表的是圣母玛利亚的十二星冠，寓意圣母玛利亚将永远保佑欧洲联盟。

欧盟27国总面积432.2万平方公里。

成立与发展欧洲统一思潮存在已久早在中世纪就已经出现。

中世纪时期的法兰克帝国和神圣罗马帝国等都将欧洲许多地区统一在其疆域之内。

1453年，拜占庭帝国首都君士坦丁堡被奥斯曼帝国攻破后，波西米亚国王就于1646建议，欧洲基督教国家应该组成联盟，对抗奥斯曼帝国的扩张。

1776年，美国独立战争爆发，当时就有欧洲人设想欧洲仿效美利坚合众国，建立欧洲合众国。

19世纪初，拿破仑·波拿巴在大陆封锁期间实行关税同盟，该关税同盟对今天欧盟的建立发展有着不可磨灭的作用。

在第二次世界大战后欧洲统一思潮进入高潮。

1946年9月，英国首相丘吉尔曾提议建立“欧洲合众国”。

1950年5月9日，法国外长罗伯特·舒曼提出欧洲煤钢共同体计划（即舒曼计划），旨在约束德国。

EUROPEAN COMMISSIONBrussels, 11.10.2011COM(2011) 635 final2011/0284 (COD)Proposal for aREGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCILon a Common European Sales Law{SEC(2011) 1165 final}{SEC(2011) 1166 final}EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM1. CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL•Grounds for and objectives of the proposalDifferences in contract law between Member States hinder traders and consumers who want to engage in cross-border trade within the internal market. The obstacles which stem from these differences dissuade traders, small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) in particular, from entering cross border trade or expanding to new Member States' markets. Consumers are hindered from accessing products offered by traders in other Member States.Currently, only one in ten of Union traders, involved in the sale of goods, exports within the Union and the majority of those who do only export to a small number of Member States. Contract law related barriers are one of the major factors contributing to this situation. Surveys1 show that out of the range of obstacles to cross-border trade including tax regulations, administrative requirements, difficulties in delivery, language and culture, traders ranked contract-law-related obstacles among the top barriers to cross-border trade.The need for traders to adapt to the different national contract laws that may apply in cross-border dealings makes cross-border trade more complex and costly compared to domestic trade, both for business-to-consumer and for business-to-business transactions.Additional transaction costs compared to domestic trade usually occur for traders in cross-border situations. They include the difficulty in finding out about the provisions of an applicable foreign contract law, obtaining legal advice, negotiating the applicable law in business-to-business transactions and adapting contracts to the requirements of the consumer's law in business-to-consumer transactions.In cross-border transactions between a business and a consumer, contract law related transaction costs and legal obstacles stemming from differences between different national mandatory consumer protection rules have a significant impact. Pursuant to Article 6 of Regulation 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I),2 whenever a business directs its activities to consumers in another Member State, it has to comply with the contract law of that Member State. In cases where another applicable law has been chosen by the parties and where the mandatory consumer protection provisions of the Member State of the consumer provide a higher level of protection, these mandatory rules of the consumer's law need to be respected. Traders therefore need to find out in advance whether the law of the Member State of the consumer's habitual residence provides a higher level of protection and ensure that their contract is in compliance with its requirements. The existing harmonisation of consumer law at Union level has led to a certain approximation in some areas but the differences between Member States' laws remain substantial. In e-commerce transactions, traders incur further contract law related costs which stem from the need to adapt the business's website to the legal requirements of each Member State where they direct their activity.1Eurobarometers 320 on European contract law in business-to-business transactions of 2011, p. 15 and Eurobarometer 321 on European contract law in consumer transactions of 2011, p. 19.2OJ L 177, 4.7.2008, p. 6.In cross-border transactions between traders, parties are not subject to the same restrictions on the applicable law. However, the economic impact of negotiating and applying a foreign law is also high. The costs resulting from dealings with various national laws are burdensome particularly for SME. In their relations with larger companies, SME generally have to agree to apply the law of their business partner and bear the costs of finding out about the content of the foreign law applicable to the contract and of complying with it. In contracts between SME, the need to negotiate the applicable law is a significant obstacle to cross-border trade. For both types of contracts (business-to-business and business-to-consumer) for SME, these additional transaction costs may even be disproportionate to the value of the transaction. These additional transaction costs grow proportionately to the number of Member States into which a trader exports. Indeed, the more countries they export to, the greater the importance traders attach to differences in contract law as a barrier to trade. SME are particularly disadvantaged: the smaller a company's turnover, the greater the share of transaction costs. Traders are also exposed to increased legal complexity in cross-border trade, compared to domestic trade, as they often have to deal with multiple national contract laws with differing characteristics.Dealing with foreign laws adds complexity to cross-border transactions. Traders ranked the difficulty in finding out the provisions of a foreign contract law first among the obstacles to business-to-consumer transactions and third for business-to-business transactions.3 Legal complexity is higher when trading with a country whose legal system is fundamentally different while it has been demonstrated empirically that bilateral trade between countries which have a legal system based on a common origin is much higher than trade between two countries without this commonality.4Thus, differences in contract law and the additional transaction costs and complexity that they generate in cross-border transactions dissuade a considerable number of traders, in particular SME, from expanding into markets of other Member States. These differences also have the effect of limiting competition in the internal market. The value of the trade foregone each year between Member States due to differences in contract law alone amounts to tens of billions of Euros.The missed opportunities for cross-border trade also have a negative impact upon European consumers. Less cross-border trade, results in fewer imports and less competitiveness between traders. This can lead to a more limited choice of products at a higher price in the consumer's market.While cross-border shopping could bring substantial economic advantages of more and better offers, the majority of European consumers shop only domestically. One of the important reasons for this situation is that, because of the differences of national laws consumers are often uncertain about their rights in cross-border situations. For example, one of their main 3Eurobarometer 320 on European contract law in business-to-business transactions of 2011, p. 15 and Eurobarometer 321 on European contract law in consumer transactions of 2011, p. 19.4 A. Turrini and T. Van Ypersele, Traders, courts and the border effect puzzle, Regional Science andUrban Economics, 40, 2010, p. 82: "Analysing international trade across OECD countries we show that controlling for countries specific factors, distance, the presence of common border and common language […], similar legal systems have a significant impact on trade […]. If two countries share common origins for their legal system, on average they exhibit trade flows 40% larger."concerns is what remedies they have when a product purchased from another Member State is not in conformity with the contract. Many consumers are therefore discouraged to purchase outside their domestic market. They miss out on opportunities in the internal market, since better offers in terms of quality and price can often be found in another Member State.E-commerce facilitates the search for offers as well as the comparison of prices and other conditions irrespective of where a trader is established. However, when consumers try to place orders with a business from another Member State, they are often faced with the business practice of refusal to sell which is often due to differences in contract law.The overall objective of the proposal is to improve the establishment and the functioning of the internal market by facilitating the expansion of cross-border trade for business and cross-border purchases for consumers. This objective can be achieved by making available a self-standing uniform set of contract law rules including provisions to protect consumers, the Common European Sales Law, which is to be considered as a second contract law regime within the national law of each Member State.Traders should be able to apply the Common European Sales Law in all their cross-border dealings within the European Union instead of having to adapt to different national contract laws, provided that the other party to the contract agrees. It should cover the full life cycle of a contract and thus comprise most of the areas which are relevant when concluding cross-border contracts. As a result, the need for traders to find out about the national laws of other Member States would be limited to only some, much less important, matters which are not covered by the Common European Sales Law. In business-to-consumer transactions there would be no further need to identify the mandatory consumer protection provisions in the consumer's law, since the Common European Sales Law would contain fully harmonised consumer protection rules providing for a high standard of protection throughout the whole of the European Union. In cross-border transactions between traders, negotiations about the applicable law could run more smoothly, as the contracting parties would have the opportunity to agree on the use of the Common European Sales Law – equally accessible to both of them – to govern their contractual relationship.As a direct consequence, traders could save on the additional contract law related transaction costs and could operate in a less complex legal environment for cross-border trade on the basis of a single set of rules across the European Union. Thus, traders would be able to take better advantage of the internal market by expanding their trade across borders and, consequently, competition in the internal market would increase. Consumers would benefit from better access to offers from across the European Union at lower prices and would face fewer refusals of sales. They would also enjoy more certainty about their rights when shopping cross-border on the basis of a single set of mandatory rules which offer a high level of consumer protection.General contextWith its Communication of 2001,5 the Commission launched a process of extensive public consultation on the fragmented legal framework in the area of contract law and its hindering effects on cross-border trade. In July 2010, the Commission launched a public consultation by publishing a 'Green Paper on policy options for progress towards a European contract law for 5COM (2001) 398, 11.7.2001.consumers and businesses'6 (Green Paper), which set out different policy options on how to strengthen the internal market by making progress in the area of European contract law.In response to the Green Paper, the European Parliament issued a Resolution on 8 June 2011 in which it expressed its strong support for an instrument which would improve the establishment and the functioning of the internal market and bring benefits to traders, consumers and Member States' judicial systems.The Commission Communication 'Europe 2020'7 recognises the need to make it easier and less costly for traders and consumers to conclude contracts with partners in other Member States, notably by making progress towards an optional European contract law. The Digital Agenda for Europe8 envisages an optional instrument in European contract law to overcome the fragmentation of contract law and boost consumer confidence in e-commerce.•Existing provisions in the area of the proposalThere are significant differences between the contract laws in the Member States. The Union initially started to regulate in the field of contract law by means of minimum harmonisation Directives adopted in the field of consumer protection law. The minimum harmonisation approach meant that Member States had the possibility to maintain or introduce stricter mandatory requirements than those provided for in the acquis. In practice, this approach has led to divergent solutions in the Member States even in areas which were harmonised at Union level. In contrast, the recently adopted Consumer Rights Directive fully harmonises the areas of pre-contractual information to be given to consumers, the consumer's right of withdrawal in distance and off-premises contracts, as well as certain aspects of delivery of goods and passing of risk.In respect of relations between traders, the Union has regulated the area of combating late payments by setting up rules on minimum interest rates. At international level, the Vienna Convention on International Sales of Goods (the Vienna Convention) applies by default whenever the parties have not chosen to apply another law. The Vienna Convention regulates certain aspects in contracts of sales of goods but leaves important matters outside its scope, such as defects in consent, unfair contract terms and prescription. Further limitations to its applicability arise as not all Member States have signed the Vienna Convention9 and there is no mechanism which could ensure its uniform interpretation.Some Union legislation is relevant for both business-to-consumer and business-to-business relations. The E-commerce Directive10 contains rules on the validity of contracts concluded by electronic means and on certain pre-contractual requirements.In the field of private international law, the Union has adopted instruments on choice of law, in particular Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6COM (2010) 348 final, 1.7.2010.7The Single Market Act, COM (2011) 206 final, 13.4.2011, p. 19, and the Annual Growth Survey, Annex 1, progress report on Europe 2020, COM (2011) 11 - A1/2, 12.1.2010, p. 5, also mention the initiative on European contract law.8COM (2010) 245 final, 26.8.2010, p. 13.9Exceptions are the UK, Ireland, Portugal and Malta.10Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, OJ L 178, 17.7.2000, p. 1-16.17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I)11, and, in relation to pre-contractual information duties, Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II)12. The first of those instruments sets out rules for determining the applicable law in the area of contractual obligations and the second in the field of non-contractual obligations, including those which arise from pre-contractual statements.The Rome I Regulation and Rome II Regulation will continue to apply and will be unaffected by the proposal. It will still be necessary to determine the applicable law for cross-border contracts. This will be done by the normal operation of the Rome I Regulation. It can be determined by the parties themselves (Article 3 of the Rome I Regulation) and, if they do not do so, this will be done on the basis of the default rules in Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation. As regards consumer contracts, under the conditions of Article 6(1) of the Rome I Regulation, if the parties have not chosen the applicable law, that law is the law of the habitual residence of the consumer.The Common European Sales Law will be a second contract law regime within the national law of each Member State. Where the parties have agreed to use the Common European Sales Law, its rules will be the only national rules applicable for matters falling within its scope. Where a matter falls within the scope of the Common European Sales Law, there is thus no scope for the application of any other national rules. This agreement to use the Common European Sales Law is a choice between two different sets of sales law within the same national law and does therefore not amount to, and must not be confused with, the previous choice of the applicable law within the meaning of private international law rules.Since the Common European Sales Law will not cover every aspect of a contract (e.g. illegality of contracts, representation) the existing rules of the Member State's civil law that is applicable to the contract will still regulate such residual questions.Under the normal operation of the Rome I Regulation there are however restrictions to the choice of law for business-to-consumer transactions. If the parties choose in business-to-consumer transactions the law of another Member State than the consumer's law, such a choice may under the conditions of Article 6(1) of the Rome I Regulation not deprive the consumer of the protection of the mandatory provisions of the law of his habitual residence (Article 6 (2) of the Rome I Regulation). The latter provision however can have no practical importance if the parties have chosen within the applicable national law the Common European Sales Law. The reason is that the provisions of the Common European Sales Law of the country's law chosen are identical with the provisions of the Common European Sales Law of the consumer's country. Therefore the level of the mandatory consumer protection laws of the consumer's country is not higher and the consumer is not deprived of the protection of the law of his habitual residence.•Consistency with the other policies and objectives of the UnionThis proposal is consistent with the objective of attaining a high level of consumer protection as it contains mandatory rules of consumer protection from which the parties cannot derogate 11OJ L 177, 4.7.2008, p. 6.12OJ L 199, 31.7.2007, p. 40.to the detriment of the consumer. Furthermore, the level of protection of these mandatory provisions is equal or higher than the current acquis.The proposal is also consistent with the Union policy of helping SME benefit more from the opportunities offered by the internal market. The Common European Sales Law can be chosen in contracts between traders where at least one of them is an SME, drawing upon the Commission Recommendation 2003/36113 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises while taking into account future developments.Finally, the proposal is consistent with the international trade policy of the Union, in that it does not discriminate against parties from third countries who could also choose to apply the Common European Sales Law as long as one party to the contract is established in a Member State.This proposal is without prejudice to future Commission initiatives concerning the liability for infringements of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, for example relating to the competition rules.2. RESULTS OF CONSULTATIONS WITH THE INTERESTED PARTIES AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS•Consultation of interested partiesWith the publication of the Green Paper, the Commission launched an extensive public consultation which closed on 31 January 2011. In response to the Green Paper consultation, the Commission received 320 replies from all categories of stakeholders from across the Union. Many respondents saw value in Option 1 (publication of the results of the Expert Group) and Option 2 (a toolbox for the Union legislator). Option 4 (an optional instrument of European contract law) received support either independently or in combination with a toolbox from several Member States as well as other stakeholders; provided that it fulfilled certain conditions, such as a high level of consumer protection, and clarity and user-friendliness of the provisions. One of the main concerns in the stakeholders' responses to the Green Paper was the lack of clarity in relation to the substantive content of a possible European contract law instrument. The Commission addressed this concern by giving stakeholders the opportunity to comment on the Feasibility Study developed by the Expert Group on a European contract law.The Green Paper responses also expressed preferences for the material scope of the instrument. As a result, the proposal focuses on contracts for the sale of goods.By a Decision of 26 April 2010,14 the Commission set up the Expert Group on European contract law. This Group was tasked with developing a Feasibility Study on a possible future European contract law instrument covering the main aspects which arose in practice in cross-border transactions.A key stakeholder group (businesses and consumer associations, representatives of the banking and insurance sectors and of the legal professions of lawyers and notaries) was set up in September 2010 with the purpose of giving practical input to the Expert Group on the user-13OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, p. 36.14OJ L 105, 27.4.2010, p. 109.friendliness of the rules developed for the Feasibility Study. The Feasibility Study was published on 3 May 2011 and an informal consultation was open until 1 July 2011. •Impact AssessmentThe Impact Assessment (IA) analysed the seven policy options set out in the Green Paper; the IA Report contains the full description and analysis of these options.These options were: the baseline scenario (no policy change), a toolbox for the legislator, a Recommendation on a Common European Sales Law, a Regulation setting up an optional Common European Sales Law, a Directive (full or minimum harmonisation) on a mandatory Common European Sales Law, a Regulation establishing a European contract law and a Regulation establishing a European Civil Code.On a comparative analysis of the impacts of these options, the IA Report arrived at the conclusion that the options of an optional uniform contract law regime, a full harmonisation Directive and a Regulation establishing a mandatory uniform contract law regime would meet the policy objectives. While the latter two would considerably reduce transaction costs for traders and offer a less complex legal environment for those wishing to trade cross-border, these options would however also create a considerable burden for traders as those who only traded domestically would also need to adapt to a new legislative framework. The costs attached to familiarise themselves with such a new mandatory law would be particularly significant when compared to an optional uniform contract law regime, because they would impact upon all traders. An optional uniform contract law regime would on the other hand only create one-off costs for those traders wishing to use it for their cross-border trade. The establishment of an optional uniform contract law regime was therefore reasoned to be the most proportionate action as it would reduce transaction costs experienced by traders exporting to several Member States and give consumers more product choice at a lower price. It would also, at the same time increase the level of consumer protection offered to consumers who shopped across a border thereby creating confidence as they would experience the same set of rights across the Union.3. LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSAL•Summary of the proposed actionThe Proposal provides for the establishment of a Common European Sales Law. It harmonises the national contract laws of the Member States not by requiring amendments to the pre-existing national contract law, but by creating within each Member State's national law a second contract law regime for contracts covered by its scope that is identical throughout the European Union and will exist alongside the pre-existing rules of national contract law. The Common European Sales Law will apply on a voluntary basis, upon an express agreement of the parties, to a cross-border contract.•Legal basisThis proposal is based on Article 114 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).The proposal provides for a single uniform set of fully harmonised contract law rules including consumer protection rules in the form of a Common European Sales Law which is to be considered as a second contract law regime within the national law of each Member State available in cross-border transactions upon a valid agreement by the parties. This agreement does not amount to, and must not be confused with, a choice of the applicable law within the meaning of private international law rules. Instead, this choice is made within a national law which is applicable according to the private international law rules.This solution has as its objective the establishment and the functioning of the internal market. It would remove obstacles to the exercise of fundamental freedoms which result from differences between national laws, in particular from the additional transaction costs and perceived legal complexity experienced by traders when concluding cross-border transactions and the lack of confidence in their rights experienced by consumers when purchasing from another EU country - all of which have a direct effect on the establishment and functioning of the internal market and limit competition.In accordance with Article 114 (3) TFEU, the Common European Sales Law would guarantee a high level of consumer protection by setting up its own set of mandatory rules which maintain or improve the level of protection that consumers enjoy under the existing EU consumer law.•Subsidiarity principleThe proposal complies with the subsidiarity principle as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).The objective of the proposal – i.e. to contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market by making available a voluntary uniform set of contract law rules – has a clear cross-border dimension and cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States in the framework of their national systems.As long as differences of national contract laws continue to create significant additional transaction costs for cross-border transactions, the objective of completing the internal market by facilitating the expansion of cross-border trade for traders and cross-border purchases for consumers cannot be fully achieved.By adopting un-coordinated measures at the national level, Member States will not be able to remove the additional transaction costs and legal complexity stemming from differences in national contract laws that traders experience in cross-border trade in the EU. Consumers will continue to experience reduced choice and limited access to products from other Member States. They will also lack the confidence which comes from knowledge of their rights.The objective of the proposal could therefore be better achieved by action at Union level, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. The Union is best placed to address the problems of legal fragmentation by a measure taken in the field of contract law which approximates the rules applicable to cross-border transactions. Furthermore, as market trends evolve and prompt Member States to take action independently, for example in regulating the emerging digital content market, regulatory divergences leading to increased transaction costs and gaps in the protection of consumers are likely to grow.•Proportionality principleThe proposal complies with the principle of proportionality as set out in Article 5 TEU.The scope of the proposal is confined to the aspects which pose real problems in cross-border transactions and does not extend to aspects which are best addressed by national laws. In respect of the material scope, the proposal contains provisions regulating the rights and obligations of the parties during the life-cycle of the contract, but it does not touch for example, upon the rules on representation which are less likely to become litigious. In terms of territorial scope, the proposal covers cross-border situations where the problems of additional transactions costs and legal complexity arise. Finally, the personal scope of the proposal is limited to transactions where the internal market problems are mainly found, i.e. business-to-business relations where at least one of the parties is an SME and business-to-consumer relations. Contracts concluded between private individuals and contracts between traders none of which is an SME are not included, as there is no demonstrable need for action for these types of cross-border contracts. The Regulation leaves Member States two options: to decide to make the Common European Sales Law also available to parties for use in an entirely domestic setting and to contracts concluded between traders neither of which is an SME.The proposal is a proportionate action, when compared to other possible solutions analysed, because of the optional and voluntary nature of the Common European Sales Law. This means that its application is dependent upon an agreement by the parties to a contract whenever it is jointly considered beneficial for a particular cross-border transaction. The fact that the Common European Sales Law represents an optional set of rules applying only in cross-border cases means also that it can lower barriers to cross-border trade without interfering with deeply embedded national legal systems and traditions. The Common European Sales Law will be an optional regime in addition to pre-existing contract law rules without replacing them. Thus the legislative measure will only go as far as necessary to create further opportunities for traders and consumers in the single market.•Choice of instrumentsThe instrument chosen for this initiative is a Regulation on an optional Common European Sales Law.A non-binding instrument such as a toolbox for the EU legislator or a Recommendation addressed to Member States would not achieve the objective to improve the establishment and functioning of the internal market. A Directive or a Regulation replacing national laws with a non-optional European contract law would go too far as it would require domestic traders who do not want to sell across borders to bear costs which are not outweighed by the cost savings that only occur when cross-border transactions take place. In addition, a Directive setting up minimum standards of a non-optional European contract law would not be appropriate since it would not achieve the level of legal certainty and the necessary degree of uniformity to decrease the transaction costs.4. BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONAfter the adoption of the proposal, the Commission will set up a database for the exchange of information concerning final judgments referring to the Common European Sales Law or any other provision of the Regulation, as well as relevant judgements of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The costs associated with this data-base are likely to grow as more final。

欧盟的投票规则欧盟（European Union）是由28个成员国组成的政治和经济联盟，成立于1993年。

作为一个多国家组织，欧盟内部的决策和投票过程非常重要。

为了确保公平和合理，欧盟采取了一套严格的投票规则。

欧盟的投票规则基于“多数原则”。

这意味着在做出决策时，需要获得多数成员国的支持。

根据《里斯本条约》，大多数决策需要获得成员国三分之二的支持。

然而，对于某些特定议题，例如税收和外交政策等，需要获得所有成员国的一致同意。

为了确保投票的公正性和透明度，欧盟采用了“无记名投票”的方式。

这意味着每个成员国的投票结果是保密的，以避免任何不必要的压力和干扰。

此外，欧盟的投票结果也会在公开的会议上进行公布，以确保成员国和公众对决策结果有清晰的了解。

为了使投票结果更具合法性和代表性，欧盟采用了“加权表决”的方法。

根据成员国的人口和经济实力，给予不同的权重。

较大的国家有更多的投票权，以确保他们的利益得到充分的考虑。

这种方法旨在平衡各成员国之间的力量，并促进欧盟内部的团结和合作。

欧盟还鼓励成员国在做出重要决策之前进行广泛的协商和讨论。

通过与各成员国和利益相关方的交流，可以更好地理解和解决各方的关切和利益冲突。

这种合作和协商的精神有助于促进欧盟内部的一致性和共识。

尽管欧盟的投票规则旨在确保公正和合理，但在实践中仍然存在一些挑战和争议。

一些人认为加权表决不公平，因为它使较大的国家拥有更多的权力，而忽视了较小国家的利益。

此外，由于成员国的政治和经济利益的差异，达成一致可能需要很长时间。

欧盟的投票规则是一个复杂而关键的议题。

它直接影响着欧盟内部的决策和合作。

通过采取多数原则、无记名投票、加权表决以及广泛的协商，欧盟试图确保决策的合法性和代表性，以促进成员国之间的团结和合作。

然而，投票规则的公正性和有效性仍然是一个持续的讨论和探索的议题，以确保欧盟的发展和繁荣。

THE PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAWcompleted and revised version 1998European Union Commission on Contract Law欧洲合同法原则CHAPTER 1 - GENERAL PROVISIONS第一章一般规定Section 1 - Scope of the Principles第一节本原则的适用范围Article 1.101- Application of the Principles第1:101条：本原则的适用(1) These Principles are intended to be applied as general rules of contract law in the European Communities.（一）本原则拟作为合同法的一般规则在欧洲共同体适用。

(2) These Principles will apply when the parties have agreed to incorporate them into their contract or that their contract is to be governed by them.（二）如果当事人已约定将本原则订入其合同或者其合同受本原则的规制，本原则即予适用。

(3) These Principles may be applied when the parties: (a) have agreed that their contract is to be governed by ‘general principles of law’, the ‘lex mercatoria’ or the like; or (b) have not chosen any system or rules of law to govern their contract.（三）当事人于符合下列条件时，可适用本原则：1.约定其合同受“法的一般原则”、“商人法”或类似者之规制时；或者2.没有选择任何法律制度或者法律规则规制其合同。

欧洲联盟法名词解释
欧洲联盟（European Union，简称EU）是一个由欧洲国家组
成的政治经济一体化组织。

其目标是促进成员国之间的经济合作、政治合作和社会合作，以实现持久和平、繁荣和发展。

以下是一些欧洲联盟法的名词解释：
1. 欧洲联盟条约（Treaty of European Union）：也称为马斯特
里赫特条约，是欧洲联盟的基本法律文件，规定了欧盟的目标、原则、决策程序和机构等。

2. 欧洲联盟法（European Union law）：欧洲联盟的法律体系，由欧盟法律法规和欧盟法院的判决构成。

这些法律适用于欧盟的成员国，对成员国的法律具有直接效力。

3. 欧洲联盟法庭（Court of Justice of the European Union，简称CJEU）：欧洲联盟的司法机构，负责解释和适用欧盟法律、
处理成员国和欧盟机构之间的纠纷。

它由欧洲联盟法院和欧洲联盟普通法院组成。

4. 欧洲联盟内市场（Internal Market of the European Union）：
指欧洲联盟成员国之间的自由贸易区，保障了货物、人员、服务和资本的自由流动。

它是欧盟的核心政策之一，旨在促进成员国之间的经济一体化。

5. 欧洲联盟委员会（European Commission）：欧洲联盟的执
行机构，负责制定欧盟法律和政策、监督成员国的履约情况，
并管理欧盟的预算和资金。

这些名词是欧洲联盟法中常用的一些概念，它们在欧盟的决策和司法过程中起到重要的作用。

I(Acts whose publication is obligatory)COUNCIL REGULATION(EC)No1/2003of16December2002on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles81and82of the Treaty(Text with EEA relevance)THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,and in particular Article83thereof,Having regard to the proposal from the Commission(1),Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament(2),Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee(3),Whereas:(1)In order to establish a system which ensures that competition in the common market is notdistorted,Articles81and82of the Treaty must be applied effectively and uniformly in the Commu-nity.Council Regulation No17of6February1962,First Regulation implementing Articles81and 82(*)of the Treaty(4),has allowed a Community competition policy to develop that has helped to disseminate a competition culture within the Community.In the light of experience,however,that Regulation should now be replaced by legislation designed to meet the challenges of an integrated market and a future enlargement of the Community.(2)In particular,there is a need to rethink the arrangements for applying the exception from the prohi-bition on agreements,which restrict competition,laid down in Article81(3)of the Treaty.Under Article83(2)(b)of the Treaty,account must be taken in this regard of the need to ensure effective supervision,on the one hand,and to simplify administration to the greatest possible extent,on the other.(3)The centralised scheme set up by Regulation No17no longer secures a balance between those twoobjectives.It hampers application of the Community competition rules by the courts and competi-tion authorities of the Member States,and the system of notification it involves prevents the Commission from concentrating its resources on curbing the most serious infringements.It also imposes considerable costs on undertakings.(4)The present systemshould therefore be replaced by a directly applicable exception systemin whichthe competition authorities and courts of the Member States have the power to apply not only Article81(1)and Article82of the Treaty,which have direct applicability by virtue of the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities,but also Article81(3)of the Treaty.(1)OJ C365E,19.12.2000,p.284.(2)OJ C72E,21.3.2002,p.305.(3)OJ C155,29.5.2001,p.73.(*)The title of Regulation No17has been adjusted to take account of the renumbering of the Articles of the EC Treaty, in accordance with Article12of the Treaty of Amsterdam;the original reference was to Articles85and86of the Treaty.(4)OJ13,21.2.1962,p.204/62.Regulation as last amended by Regulation(EC)No1216/1999(OJ L148,15.6.1999,p.5).(5)In order to ensure an effective enforcement of the Community competition rules and at the sametime the respect of fundamental rights of defence,this Regulation should regulate the burden of proof under Articles81and82of the Treaty.It should be for the party or the authority alleging an infringement of Article81(1)and Article82of the Treaty to prove the existence thereof to the required legal standard.It should be for the undertaking or association of undertakings invoking the benefit of a defence against a finding of an infringement to demonstrate to the required legal stan-dard that the conditions for applying such defence are satisfied.This Regulation affects neither national rules on the standard of proof nor obligations of competition authorities and courts of the Member States to ascertain the relevant facts of a case,provided that such rules and obligations are compatible with general principles of Community law.(6)In order to ensure that the Community competition rules are applied effectively,the competitionauthorities of the Member States should be associated more closely with their application.To this end,they should be empowered to apply Community law.(7)National courts have an essential part to play in applying the Community competition rules.Whendeciding disputes between private individuals,they protect the subjective rights under Community law,for example by awarding damages to the victims of infringements.The role of the national courts here complements that of the competition authorities of the Member States.They should therefore be allowed to apply Articles81and82of the Treaty in full.(8)In order to ensure the effective enforcement of the Community competition rules and the properfunctioning of the cooperation mechanisms contained in this Regulation,it is necessary to oblige the competition authorities and courts of the Member States to also apply Articles81and82of the Treaty where they apply national competition law to agreements and practices which may affect trade between Member States.In order to create a level playing field for agreements,decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices within the internal market,it is also necessary to determine pursuant to Article83(2)(e)of the Treaty the relationship between national laws and Community competition law.To that effect it is necessary to provide that the application of national competition laws to agreements,decisions or concerted practices within the meaning of Article 81(1)of the Treaty may not lead to the prohibition of such agreements,decisions and concerted practices if they are not also prohibited under Community competition law.The notions of agree-ments,decisions and concerted practices are autonomous concepts of Community competition law covering the coordination of behaviour of undertakings on the market as interpreted by the Community Courts.Member States should not under this Regulation be precluded from adopting and applying on their territory stricter national competition laws which prohibit or impose sanc-tions on unilateral conduct engaged in by undertakings.These stricter national laws may include provisions which prohibit or impose sanctions on abusive behaviour toward economically depen-dent undertakings.Furthermore,this Regulation does not apply to national laws which impose crim-inal sanctions on natural persons except to the extent that such sanctions are the means whereby competition rules applying to undertakings are enforced.(9)Articles81and82of the Treaty have as their objective the protection of competition on the market.This Regulation,which is adopted for the implementation of these Treaty provisions,does not preclude Member States from implementing on their territory national legislation,which protects other legitimate interests provided that such legislation is compatible with general principles and other provisions of Community law.In so far as such national legislation pursues predominantly an objective different from that of protecting competition on the market,the competition authorities and courts of the Member States may apply such legislation on their territory.Accordingly,Member States may under this Regulation implement on their territory national legislation that prohibits or imposes sanctions on acts of unfair trading practice,be they unilateral or contractual.Such legisla-tion pursues a specific objective,irrespective of the actual or presumed effects of such acts on competition on the market.This is particularly the case of legislation which prohibits undertakings from imposing on their trading partners,obtaining or attempting to obtain from them terms and conditions that are unjustified,disproportionate or without consideration.(10)Regulations such as19/65/EEC(1),(EEC)No2821/71(2),(EEC)No3976/87(3),(EEC)No1534/91(4),or(EEC)No479/92(5)empower the Commission to apply Article81(3)of the Treaty by Regulation to certain categories of agreements,decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices.In the areas defined by such Regulations,the Commission has adopted and may continue to adopt so called‘block’exemption Regulations by which it declares Article81(1)of the Treaty inapplicable to categories of agreements,decisions and concerted practices.Where agree-ments,decisions and concerted practices to which such Regulations apply nonetheless have effects that are incompatible with Article81(3)of the Treaty,the Commission and the competition authori-ties of the Member States should have the power to withdraw in a particular case the benefit of the block exemption Regulation.(11)For it to ensure that the provisions of the Treaty are applied,the Commission should be able toaddress decisions to undertakings or associations of undertakings for the purpose of bringing to an end infringements of Articles81and82of the Treaty.Provided there is a legitimate interest in doing so,the Commission should also be able to adopt decisions which find that an infringement has been committed in the past even if it does not impose a fine.This Regulation should also make explicit provision for the Commission's power to adopt decisions ordering interim measures,which has been acknowledged by the Court of Justice.(12)This Regulation should make explicit provision for the Commission's power to impose any remedy,whether behavioural or structural,which is necessary to bring the infringement effectively to an end,having regard to the principle of proportionality.Structural remedies should only be imposed either where there is no equally effective behavioural remedy or where any equally effective beha-vioural remedy would be more burdensome for the undertaking concerned than the structural remedy.Changes to the structure of an undertaking as it existed before the infringement was committed would only be proportionate where there is a substantial risk of a lasting or repeated infringement that derives from the very structure of the undertaking.(13)Where,in the course of proceedings which might lead to an agreement or practice being prohibited,undertakings offer the Commission commitments such as to meet its concerns,the Commission should be able to adopt decisions which make those commitments binding on the undertakings mitment decisions should find that there are no longer grounds for action by the Commission without concluding whether or not there has been or still is an mit-ment decisions are without prejudice to the powers of competition authorities and courts of the Member States to make such a finding and decide upon the mitment decisions are not appropriate in cases where the Commission intends to impose a fine.(1)Council Regulation No19/65/EEC of2March1965on the application of Article81(3)(The titles of the Regulationshave been adjusted to take account of the renumbering of the Articles of the EC Treaty,in accordance with Article 12of the Treaty of Amsterdam;the original reference was to Article85(3)of the Treaty)of the Treaty to certain cate-gories of agreements and concerted practices(OJ36,6.3.1965,p.533).Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC)No1215/1999(OJ L148,15.6.1999,p.1).(2)Council Regulation(EEC)No2821/71of20December1971on the application of Article81(3)(The titles of theRegulations have been adjusted to take account of the renumbering of the Articles of the EC Treaty,in accordance with Article12of the Treaty of Amsterdam;the original reference was to Article85(3)of the Treaty)of the Treaty to categories of agreements,decisions and concerted practices(OJ L285,29.12.1971,p.46).Regulation as last amended by the Act of Accession of1994.(3)Council Regulation(EEC)No3976/87of14December1987on the application of Article81(3)(The titles of theRegulations have been adjusted to take account of the renumbering of the Articles of the EC Treaty,in accordance with Article12of the Treaty of Amsterdam;the original reference was to Article85(3)of the Treaty)of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements and concerted practices in the air transport sector(OJ L374,31.12.1987,p.9).Regulation as last amended by the Act of Accession of1994.(4)Council Regulation(EEC)No1534/91of31May1991on the application of Article81(3)(The titles of the Regula-tions have been adjusted to take account of the renumbering of the Articles of the EC Treaty,in accordance with Article12of the Treaty of Amsterdam;the original reference was to Article85(3)of the Treaty)of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements,decisions and concerted practices in the insurance sector(OJ L143,7.6.1991,p.1).(5)Council Regulation(EEC)No479/92of25February1992on the application of Article81(3)(The titles of the Regu-lations have been adjusted to take account of the renumbering of the Articles of the EC Treaty,in accordance with Article12of the Treaty of Amsterdam;the original reference was to Article85(3)of the Treaty)of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements,decisions and concerted practices between liner shipping companies(Consortia)(OJ L55,29.2.1992,p.3).Regulation amended by the Act of Accession of1994.(14)In exceptional cases where the public interest of the Community so requires,it may also be expe-dient for the Commission to adopt a decision of a declaratory nature finding that the prohibition in Article81or Article82of the Treaty does not apply,with a view to clarifying the law and ensuring its consistent application throughout the Community,in particular with regard to new types of agreements or practices that have not been settled in the existing case-law and administrative prac-tice.(15)The Commission and the competition authorities of the Member States should form together anetwork of public authorities applying the Community competition rules in close cooperation.For that purpose it is necessary to set up arrangements for information and consultation.Further modal-ities for the cooperation within the network will be laid down and revised by the Commission,in close cooperation with the Member States.(16)Notwithstanding any national provision to the contrary,the exchange of information and the use ofsuch information in evidence should be allowed between the members of the network even where the information is confidential.This information may be used for the application of Articles81and 82of the Treaty as well as for the parallel application of national competition law,provided that the latter application relates to the same case and does not lead to a different outcome.When the infor-mation exchanged is used by the receiving authority to impose sanctions on undertakings,there should be no other limit to the use of the information than the obligation to use it for the purpose for which it was collected given the fact that the sanctions imposed on undertakings are of the same type in all systems.The rights of defence enjoyed by undertakings in the various systems can be considered as sufficiently equivalent.However,as regards natural persons,they may be subject to substantially different types of sanctions across the various systems.Where that is the case,it is necessary to ensure that information can only be used if it has been collected in a way which respects the same level of protection of the rights of defence of natural persons as provided for under the national rules of the receiving authority.(17)If the competition rules are to be applied consistently and,at the same time,the network is to bemanaged in the best possible way,it is essential to retain the rule that the competition authorities of the Member States are automatically relieved of their competence if the Commission initiates its own proceedings.Where a competition authority of a Member State is already acting on a case and the Commission intends to initiate proceedings,it should endeavour to do so as soon as possible.Before initiating proceedings,the Commission should consult the national authority concerned.(18)To ensure that cases are dealt with by the most appropriate authorities within the network,a generalprovision should be laid down allowing a competition authority to suspend or close a case on the ground that another authority is dealing with it or has already dealt with it,the objective being that each case should be handled by a single authority.This provision should not prevent the Commis-sion from rejecting a complaint for lack of Community interest,as the case-law of the Court of Justice has acknowledged it may do,even if no other competition authority has indicated its inten-tion of dealing with the case.(19)The Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions set up by Regulation No17has functioned in a very satisfactory manner.It will fit well into the new system of decentralised application.It is necessary,therefore,to build upon the rules laid down by Regulation No17,while improving the effectiveness of the organisational arrangements.To this end,it would be expedient to allow opinions to be delivered by written procedure.The Advisory Committee should also be able to act as a forumfor discussing cases that are being handled by the com petition authorities of the Member States,so as to help safeguard the consistent application of the Community competition rules.(20)The Advisory Committee should be composed of representatives of the competition authorities ofthe Member States.For meetings in which general issues are being discussed,Member States should be able to appoint an additional representative.This is without prejudice to members of the Committee being assisted by other experts from the Member States.(21)Consistency in the application of the competition rules also requires that arrangements be estab-lished for cooperation between the courts of the Member States and the Commission.This is rele-vant for all courts of the Member States that apply Articles81and82of the Treaty,whether applying these rules in lawsuits between private parties,acting as public enforcers or as review courts.In particular,national courts should be able to ask the Commission for information or for its opinion on points concerning the application of Community competition law.The Commission and the competition authorities of the Member States should also be able to submit written or oral observations to courts called upon to apply Article81or Article82of the Treaty.These observa-tions should be submitted within the framework of national procedural rules and practices including those safeguarding the rights of the parties.Steps should therefore be taken to ensure that the Commission and the competition authorities of the Member States are kept sufficiently well informed of proceedings before national courts.(22)In order to ensure compliance with the principles of legal certainty and the uniform application ofthe Community competition rules in a system of parallel powers,conflicting decisions must be avoided.It is therefore necessary to clarify,in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice, the effects of Commission decisions and proceedings on courts and competition authorities of the Member mitment decisions adopted by the Commission do not affect the power of the courts and the competition authorities of the Member States to apply Articles81and82of the Treaty.(23)The Commission should be empowered throughout the Community to require such information tobe supplied as is necessary to detect any agreement,decision or concerted practice prohibited by Article81of the Treaty or any abuse of a dominant position prohibited by Article82of the Treaty.When complying with a decision of the Commission,undertakings cannot be forced to admit that they have committed an infringement,but they are in any event obliged to answer factual questions and to provide documents,even if this information may be used to establish against them or against another undertaking the existence of an infringement.(24)The Commission should also be empowered to undertake such inspections as are necessary to detectany agreement,decision or concerted practice prohibited by Article81of the Treaty or any abuse ofa dominant position prohibited by Article82of the Treaty.The competition authorities of theMember States should cooperate actively in the exercise of these powers.(25)The detection of infringements of the competition rules is growing ever more difficult,and,in orderto protect competition effectively,the Commission's powers of investigation need to be supple-mented.The Commission should in particular be empowered to interview any persons who may be in possession of useful information and to record the statements made.In the course of an inspec-tion,officials authorised by the Commission should be empowered to affix seals for the period of time necessary for the inspection.Seals should normally not be affixed for more than72hours.Offi-cials authorised by the Commission should also be empowered to ask for any information relevant to the subject matter and purpose of the inspection.(26)Experience has shown that there are cases where business records are kept in the homes of directorsor other people working for an undertaking.In order to safeguard the effectiveness of inspections, therefore,officials and other persons authorised by the Commission should be empowered to enter any premises where business records may be kept,including private homes.However,the exercise of this latter power should be subject to the authorisation of the judicial authority.(27)Without prejudice to the case-law of the Court of Justice,it is useful to set out the scope of thecontrol that the national judicial authority may carry out when it authorises,as foreseen by national law including as a precautionary measure,assistance from law enforcement authorities in order to overcome possible opposition on the part of the undertaking or the execution of the decision to carry out inspections in non-business premises.It results from the case-law that the national judicial authority may in particular ask the Commission for further information which it needs to carry out its control and in the absence of which it could refuse the authorisation.The case-law also confirms the competence of the national courts to control the application of national rules governing the implementation of coercive measures.(28)In order to help the competition authorities of the Member States to apply Articles81and82ofthe Treaty effectively,it is expedient to enable themto assist one another by carrying out inspections and other fact-finding measures.(29)Compliance with Articles81and82of the Treaty and the fulfilment of the obligations imposed onundertakings and associations of undertakings under this Regulation should be enforceable by means of fines and periodic penalty payments.To that end,appropriate levels of fine should also be laid down for infringements of the procedural rules.(30)In order to ensure effective recovery of fines imposed on associations of undertakings for infringe-ments that they have committed,it is necessary to lay down the conditions on which the Commis-sion may require payment of the fine from the members of the association where the association is not solvent.In doing so,the Commission should have regard to the relative size of the undertakings belonging to the association and in particular to the situation of small and medium-sized enterprises.Payment of the fine by one or several members of an association is without prejudice to rules of national law that provide for recovery of the amount paid from other members of the association.(31)The rules on periods of limitation for the imposition of fines and periodic penalty payments werelaid down in Council Regulation(EEC)No2988/74(1),which also concerns penalties in the field of transport.In a system of parallel powers,the acts,which may interrupt a limitation period,should include procedural steps taken independently by the competition authority of a Member State.To clarify the legal framework,Regulation(EEC)No2988/74should therefore be amended to prevent it applying to matters covered by this Regulation,and this Regulation should include provisions on periods of limitation.(32)The undertakings concerned should be accorded the right to be heard by the Commission,thirdparties whose interests may be affected by a decision should be given the opportunity of submitting their observations beforehand,and the decisions taken should be widely publicised.While ensuring the rights of defence of the undertakings concerned,in particular,the right of access to the file,it is essential that business secrets be protected.The confidentiality of information exchanged in the network should likewise be safeguarded.(33)Since all decisions taken by the Commission under this Regulation are subject to review by theCourt of Justice in accordance with the Treaty,the Court of Justice should,in accordance with Article229thereof be given unlimited jurisdiction in respect of decisions by which the Commission imposes fines or periodic penalty payments.(34)The principles laid down in Articles81and82of the Treaty,as they have been applied by Regula-tion No17,have given a central role to the Community bodies.This central role should be retained, whilst associating the Member States more closely with the application of the Community competi-tion rules.In accordance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality as set out in Article 5of the Treaty,this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve its objec-tive,which is to allow the Community competition rules to be applied effectively.(35)In order to attain a proper enforcement of Community competition law,Member States shoulddesignate and empower authorities to apply Articles81and82of the Treaty as public enforcers.They should be able to designate administrative as well as judicial authorities to carry out the various functions conferred upon competition authorities in this Regulation.This Regulation recog-nises the wide variation which exists in the public enforcement systems of Member States.The effects of Article11(6)of this Regulation should apply to all competition authorities.As an excep-tion to this general rule,where a prosecuting authority brings a case before a separate judicial(1)Council Regulation(EEC)No2988/74of26November1974concerning limitation periods in proceedings and theenforcement of sanctions under the rules of the European Economic Community relating to transport and competi-tion(OJ L319,29.11.1974,p.1).authority,Article11(6)should apply to the prosecuting authority subject to the conditions in Article 35(4)of this Regulation.Where these conditions are not fulfilled,the general rule should apply.In any case,Article11(6)should not apply to courts insofar as they are acting as review courts.(36)As the case-law has made it clear that the competition rules apply to transport,that sector shouldbe made subject to the procedural provisions of this Regulation.Council Regulation No141of26 November1962exempting transport from the application of Regulation No17(1)should therefore be repealed and Regulations(EEC)No1017/68(2),(EEC)No4056/86(3)and(EEC)No3975/87(4) should be amended in order to delete the specific procedural provisions they contain.(37)This Regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particularby the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.Accordingly,this Regulation should be interpreted and applied with respect to those rights and principles.(38)Legal certainty for undertakings operating under the Community competition rules contributes tothe promotion of innovation and investment.Where cases give rise to genuine uncertainty because they present novel or unresolved questions for the application of these rules,individual undertakings may wish to seek informal guidance from the Commission.This Regulation is without prejudice to the ability of the Commission to issue such informal guidance,HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:CHAPTER IPRINCIPLESArticle1Application of Articles81and82of the Treaty1.Agreements,decisions and concerted practices caught by Article81(1)of the Treaty which do not satisfy the conditions of Article81(3)of the Treaty shall be prohibited,no prior decision to that effect being required.2.Agreements,decisions and concerted practices caught by Article81(1)of the Treaty which satisfy the conditions of Article81(3)of the Treaty shall not be prohibited,no prior decision to that effect being required.3.The abuse of a dominant position referred to in Article82of the Treaty shall be prohibited,no prior decision to that effect being required.(1)OJ124,28.11.1962,p.2751/62;Regulation as last amended by Regulation No1002/67/EEC(OJ306,16.12.1967,p.1).(2)Council Regulation(EEC)No1017/68of19July1968applying rules of competition to transport by rail,road andinland waterway(OJ L175,23.7.1968,p.1).Regulation as last amended by the Act of Accession of1994.(3)Council Regulation(EEC)No4056/86of22December1986laying down detailed rules for the application of Arti-cles81and82(The title of the Regulation has been adjusted to take account of the renumbering of the Articles of the EC Treaty,in accordance with Article12of the Treaty of Amsterdam;the original reference was to Articles85 and86of the Treaty)of the Treaty to maritime transport(OJ L378,31.12.1986,p.4).Regulation as last amended by the Act of Accession of1994.(4)Council Regulation(EEC)No3975/87of14December1987laying down the procedure for the application of therules on competition to undertakings in the air transport sector(OJ L374,31.12.1987,p.1).Regulation as last amended by Regulation(EEC)No2410/92(OJ L240,24.8.1992,p.18).。

欧盟法与欧洲人权法欧盟法（European Union Law）和欧洲人权法（European Human Rights Law）是欧洲法律体系中的两个重要组成部分。

欧盟法是指用于调整欧盟成员国之间关系的法律规则和原则，而欧洲人权法则是保护欧洲人民基本权利的法律框架。

本文将就欧盟法与欧洲人权法的关系进行分析，并探讨二者之间的协调与冲突。

一、欧盟法的特点与原则欧盟法是由欧盟成员国共同创立和制定的一系列法律规则。

其特点主要体现在以下几个方面：1. 优先效力：欧盟法在欧盟成员国内具有优先于国内法律的效力。

这意味着，在欧盟法与国内法产生冲突时，欧盟法应当优先适用。

2. 直接适用性：欧盟法具有直接适用于欧盟成员国的特点，即在欧盟法规定的范围内，欧盟法规定的权利和义务直接适用于各成员国。

3. 成员国之间的相互承认原则：欧盟法要求各成员国在相互间承认和执行对方国家的法律和判决，以加强各成员国之间的合作与团结。

欧盟法的原则主要包括：欧盟的有限授权原则、合作原则、比例原则、优先权原则等。

这些原则旨在保障欧盟的权力机关行使权力的合法性，并确保欧盟法的一致性和稳定性。

二、欧洲人权法的发展与保护范围欧洲人权法是为保障欧洲人民的基本权利而建立的法律框架。

其主要发展经历了欧洲人权公约的制定与签署，以及欧洲人权法院的建立与发展。

欧洲人权法的保护范围包括但不限于以下权利：1. 生命权：保障个人的生存权和禁止任意剥夺生命的权利。

2. 自由权：包括人身自由、思想信仰自由、言论自由、结社自由等。

3. 平等权：禁止任何形式的歧视和不平等对待。

4. 个人隐私权：保护个人的隐私和家庭生活等。

5. 公正审判权：确保个人在受到法律制裁时能够享受公正的审判和辩护权利。

欧洲人权法通过建立欧洲人权法院来负责人权案件的审理和解决纠纷。

欧洲人权法院的裁决对欧洲成员国具有约束力。

三、欧盟法与欧洲人权法的关系欧盟法与欧洲人权法之间存在着相互关联和相互影响的关系。