毕业论文外文翻译-优化资本结构：思考经济和其他价值

本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译Optimizing the capital structure: Finding the right balance betweendebt and equityJust over 50 years ago Miller and Modigliani (1958) showed that under a certain set of conditions—namely perfect capital markets with no taxes and agency conflicts—a firm’s capital structure is irrelevant to its valuation.Their results are controversial and have raised a large number of questions from academics and practitioners.This article summarizes the main issues underlying the choice by firms of an appropriate capital structure, taking into account their specific fundamentals as well as macroeconomic factors.It presents the benefits and costs of borrowing, describes how to assess these to arrive at the basic trade-off between debt and equity, and examines conditions under which debt becomes irrelevant.Types of FinancingThere are three financing methods that companies can use: debt, equity, and hybrid securities. This categorization is based on the main characteristics of the securities.Debt FinancingDebt financing ranges from simple bank debt to commercial paper and corporate bonds. It is a contractual arrangement between a company and an investor, whereby the company pays a predetermined claim (or interest) that is not a function of its operating performance, but which is treated in accounting standards as an expense for tax purposes and is therefore tax-deductible. The debt has a fixed life and has a priority claim on cash flows in both operating periods and bankruptcy. This is because interest is paid before the claims to equity holders, and, if the company defaults oninterest payments, it will be declared bankrupt, its assets will be sold, and the amount owed to debt holders will be paid before any payments are made to equity holders.Equity FinancingEquity financing includes owners’ equity, venture capital (equity capital provided to a private firm in exchange for a share ownership of the firm), common equity, and warrants (the right to buy a share of stock in a company at a fixed price during the life of the warrant). Unlike debt, it is permanent in the company, its claim is residual and does not create a tax advantage from its payments as dividends are paid after interest and tax, it does not have priority in bankruptcy, and it provides management control for the owner.Hybrid SecuritiesHybrid securities are securities that share some characteristics with both debt and equity and include, for example, convertible securities (defined as debt that can be converted into equity at a prespecified date and conversion rate), preferred stock, and option-linked bonds.The Irrelevance PropositionIn 1958 Modigliani and Miller demonstrated that, under a certain set of assumptions, the choice between any of these securities (referred to as capital structure or leverage) is not relevant to a company’s valuation.The assumptions include: no taxes, no costs of financial distress, perfect capital markets, no interest rate differentials, no agency costs (rationality), and no transaction costs. These assumptions are, in fact, the main drivers of capital structure and gave rise to the trade-off theory of leverage.The Trade-Off of DebtIn this so-called Miller–Modigliani framework, firms choose their optimal level of leverage by weighing the following benefits and costs of debt financing.Benefits of DebtThere are two main advantages of debt financing: taxation, and added discipline.Taxation: Since the interest on debt is paid before taxation, whereas dividends paid to equity holders are usually paid from profit after tax, the cost of debt issubstantially less than the cost of equity. This tax-deductibility of interest makes debt financing attractive. Suppose that the debt of a company is $100 million and the interest rate is 10%. Every year the company pays interest of $10 million. Suppose that the corporation tax rate is 30%. If the company does not pay tax, its interest will be $10 million and the cost of debt will be 10%. However, if the company is able to deduct the tax on this $10 million from its corporation tax payment, then the company saves $10 million × 30% = $3 million in tax payments per year, making the effective interest payment only $7 million. If the debt is permanent, every year the company will have a $3 million tax saving, referred to as a tax shield. We can compute the present value (PV) by discounting annual value by the cost of debt, as follows: PV of tax shield = kd × D × tckd = D × tcwhere kd is the cost of debt, D is the amount of debt, and the product of kd and D gives the amount of the interest charge. tc is the corporation tax rate. We simplify the ratio by kd to obtain the present value of the tax shield as the product of the amount of debt and the corporation tax rate. Thus, the value of a company that is financed with debt and equity (such a company is referred to “levered”) should be equal to its value if it is financed only with equity plus the present value of the tax shield. We can write this value as:Value of levered firm with debt D =Value of nonlevered firm + D × tcThese arguments suggest that the after-tax cost of debt can be computed as 10% × (1-30%) = 7%.Added discipline: In practice, the managers are not the owners of the company. This so-called separation of managers and stockholders raises the possibility that managers may prefer to maximize their own wealth rather that of the stockholders. This is referred to as the agency conflict. In general, debt may make managers more disciplined because debt requires a fixed payment of interest, and defaulting on such payments will lead a company to bankruptcy.Costs of DebtDebt has a number of disadvantages, including a higher probability of bankruptcy, an increase in the agency conflicts between managers and bondholders,loss of future financial flexibility, and the cost of information asymmetry.Expected bankruptcy cost. Given that debt holders can declare a company bankrupt if it defaults on its interest payment, companies that have a high level of debt are likely to have a high probability of facing such a default. This probability is also increased when a company is operating in a high business risk environment. Debt financing creates financial risk. Thus, companies that have high business risk should not increase their risk of default by taking on a high financial risk through their use of debt. Evidence indicates that much of the loss of value occurs not in the liquidation process but in the stage of financial distress, when the firm is struggling to pay its bills (including interest), even though it may not go on to be liquidated.Agency costs. These costs arise when a company borrows funds and the managers use the funds to finance alternative, usually more risky, activities than those specified in the borrowing contract to generate higher returns to stockholders. The greater the separation between managers and lenders, the higher the agency costs.Loss of future financing flexibility. When a firm increases its debt substantially, it faces difficulties raising additional debt. Companies that can forecast their future financing needs accurately can plan their financing better and may not raise additional funds randomly. In general, the greater the uncertainty about future financing needs, the higher the costs.Information asymmetry. When companies do not disclose information to the market, their information asymmetry will be high, resulting in a higher cost of debt financing.Redeployable assets of debt. Lenders require some sort of security when they fund a company. This security is referred to as collateral. Lenders accept assets that can be resold or redeployed into other activities, such as property (real estate), as collateral. In general, the lower the value of the redeployable assets of debt, the higher are the costs.Financing Choices and a Firm’s Life CycleAlthough companies may prefer to use internal financing to minimize the issuance (transaction) costs, the trend in financing depends critically on the firm’s lifecycle.Start-ups are small, privately owned companies. They are likely to be financed by owners’ funds and bank borrowings. Their funding needs are high, but their ability to raise external funding is limited because they do not have sufficient assets to offer as security to finance providers. They will try to seek private equity funding. Their long-term leverage is likely to be low as they are mainly financed with short-term debt.Expanding companies are those that have succeeded in attracting customers and establishing a presence in the market. They are likely to be financed by private equity and/or ventu re capital in addition to owners’ equity and bank debt. Their level of debt is low and they have more short-term than long-term debt in their capital structure.High-growth companies are likely to be publicly traded, with rapidly growing revenues. They will issue equity in the form of common stock, warrants, and other equity options, and probably convertible debt. They are likely to have a moderate leverage.Mature companies are likely to finance their activities by internal financing, debt, and equity. Their leverage is likely to be relatively high but will depend on the costs and benefits of debt and their fundamental factors, such as business risk and taxation.ConclusionThis article discussed the different financing methods companies can use and then argued that their choice depends on the costs and benefits of debt financing and the firm’s life cycle. For example, whereas startup companies are likely to be financed with private personal funds, making their leverage low, mature companies tend to have high leverage because they are able to mitigate the costs of debt and gain from the tax benefits. In addition to these factors, in practice firms may choose their financing mix by mimicking comparable firms, or they may adopt the average level of debt of all the companies in their industry. These methods are not highly recommendable as they may result in a suboptimal choice. In other cases they follow a financing hierarchy, where retained earnings are the preferred option, followed by external financing in the form of debt, and then equity. This preference is driven bythe transaction and monitoring costs.Making It HappenThe choice of financing is strategic and involves the following issues:• Both low- and high-debt financing are suboptimal. Companies should aim for the most advantageous level of debt financing, whereby the costs are minimized and the benefits are maximized.• The costs of debt include a greater probability of bankruptcy, an increase in the agency conflicts between managers and bondholders, a loss of future financial flexibility (including the availability of collateral assets), and information asymmetry costs.• The benefits relate mainly to tax shields and the added discipline to mitigate the agency conflicts between stockholders and managers.• This equilibrium applies primarily to mature companies. Start-ups and growth companies are likely to have lower leverage as their borrowing capacity is low. It also applies to companies that normally pay dividends and do not accumulate cash for reinvestment in order to avoid the need to raise external financing.• The recent financial crisis has highlighted another issue in debt financing, namely liquidity. Leverage concepts were developed mainly in times when debt financing was fully available. In the current credit crisis this is no longer the case. Companies therefore now have to pay an extra liquidity cost to raise additional capital. The question is whether this is a temporary situation or a permanent one, in which case debt will become more costly and leverage will be lower than in the past.• Another challenge of debt financing relates to the ethics of the use of excessive debt financing, particularly by financial institutions. Pettifor (2006) was able to foresee the current crisis, tracing debt financing back to early times and arguing that religions are against debt because it results in usury. She provides interesting arguments, challenging the whole structure of debt financing, payment of interest, and interest tax deductibility. Possibly a new structure of debt that is linked to the profitability of assets and incurs no interest will emerge from the current crisis.Source: Meziane Lasfer, 2009”Optimizing the Capital Structure: Finding the Right Balance between Debt and Equity”. http://www.qfin .优化资本结构：债务与权益之间找到恰当的平衡仅仅在50年前，米勒和莫迪利亚尼（1958）表明，在一组特定的条件下，即没有税收和代理冲突的完全资本市场，一个公司的资本结构与其估值无关。

本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文：Optimal Capital StructureReflections on Economic and Other ValuesOver the last few decades studies have been produced on the effect of other stake holders’ interests on capital structure. Well-known examples are the interests of customers who receive product or service guarantees from the company. Another area that has received considerable attention is the relation between managerial incentives and capital structure (Ibid.). Furthermore, the issue of corporate control 1 and, related, the issue of corporate governance , receive a lion’s part of the more recent academic attention for capital structure decisions.From all these studies, one thing is clear: The capital structure decision (or rather ,the management of the capital structure over time) involves more issues than the maximization of the firm’s market value alone. In this paper, we give an overview of the different objectives and considerations that have been proposed in the literature. We make a distinction between two bro adly defined situations. The first is the traditional case of the firm that strives for the maximization of the value of the shares for the current shareholders. Whenever other considerations than value maximization enter capital structure decisions, these considerations have to be instrumental to the goal of value maximization. The second case concerns the firm that explicitly chooses for more objectives than value maximization alone. This may be because the shareholders adopt a multiple stakeholders approach or because of a different ownership structure than the usual corporate structure dominating finance literature. An example of the latter is the cooperation, a legal entity which can be found, in among others, many European countries. For a discussion on why firms are facingmultiple goals, we refer to Hallerbach and Spronk 。

资本结构优化分析论文资本结构由长期债务、短期债务和股权资本组成，影响企业的经营效益、市场竞争力和风险承受能力。

合理的资本结构可以最大化企业价值，降低资本成本和风险，提高企业的经营效益和市场竞争力。

资本结构的优化分析可以从多个角度进行研究，包括资本结构的理论基础、资本结构的影响因素以及资本结构的实践应用等方面。

首先，资本结构的理论基础是资本结构理论。

常见的资本结构理论包括杜邦分析、财务杠杆理论和保守财务理论等。

杜邦分析是通过资本结构的三个基本要素（收益率、资产周转率和资本结构比例）来评估企业绩效。

财务杠杆理论认为，适度的债务融资可以降低资本成本，提高股东回报率。

保守财务理论则指出，企业应通过内部融资来避免或降低债务融资带来的风险。

其次，资本结构的影响因素是决定企业资本结构的关键因素。

影响资本结构的因素包括税收政策、法律环境、行业特征、公司规模以及市场情况等。

税收政策的变化可以影响债务融资的成本，进而影响企业的资本结构选择。

法律环境的差异也会对资本结构的选择产生影响。

行业特征以及公司规模等因素也会对资本结构产生一定的影响。

最后，资本结构的实践应用是指在实际经营过程中，企业如何根据自身情况进行资本结构的调整。

企业可以通过融资结构的调整来降低融资成本、改善财务状况，提高经营效益。

资本结构的调整可以包括增加债务融资比例、减少股权融资比例，或者进行股权重组等。

基于资本结构优化分析的实践应用可以帮助企业提出合理的资本结构调整方案，提高企业的财务状况和经营效益。

综上所述，资本结构优化分析对于企业的发展具有重要意义。

企业应该根据自身情况和市场需求，通过深入研究和实践应用，找到最佳的资本结构组合，以提高企业的财务状况和市场竞争力。

资本结构优化分析论文的研究内容可以从资本结构的理论基础、影响因素和实践应用等方面展开，以帮助企业进行资本结构优化的决策。

本科毕业设计（论文）中英文对照翻译(此文档为word格式,下载后您可任意修改编辑!)文献出处:Ashkanasy N M. The study on capital structure theory and the optimization of enterprise capital [J]. Journal of Management, 2016, 5(3): 235-254.原文The study on capital structure theory and the optimization ofenterprise capital structureAshkanasy N MAbstractIn this paper, corporate finance is an important content of modern enterprise management decision. Around the existence of optimal capitalstructure has been a lot of controversy. Given investment decisions, whether an enterprise to change its value by changing the capital structure and the cost of capital, namely whether there is a market make the enterprise value maximization, or make the enterprise capital structure of minimizing the cost of capital? To this problem has different answers in different stages of development, has formed many theory of capital structure.Key words: Capital structure; financial structure; Optimization; Financial leverage1 IntroductionIn financial theory, capital structure due to the different understanding of "capital" in the broad sense and narrow sense two explanations: one explanation is that the "capital" as all funding sources, the structure of the generalized capital structure refers to the entire capital, the relationship between the contrast of their own capital and debt capital, as the American scholar Alan c. Shapiro points out that "the company's capital structure - all the debt and equity financing; an alternative explanation is that if the" capital "is defined as a long-term funding sources, capital structure refers to the narrow sense of their own capital and long-term debt capital, and the tension and the short-term debt capital as the business capital management. Whether it is a broad concept ornarrow understanding of the capital structure is to discuss the proportion of equity capital and debt capital relations. 2 The capital structure theory Capital structure theory has experienced a process of gradually forming, developing and perfecting. First proposed the theory of American economist David Durand (David Durand) thinks that enterprise's capital structure is in accordance with the method of net income, net operating income method and traditional method, in 1958 di Gayle Anne (Franco Modigliani and Miller (Mertor Miller) and put forward the famous MM theory, created the modern capital structure theory, on this basis, the later generations and further put forward many new theory: 2.1 Net Income Theory (Net Income going) Net income theory on the premise of two assumptions --, investors with a fixed proportion of investment valuation or enterprise's net income. Enterprises to raise debt funds needed for a fixed rate. Therefore, the theory is that: the enterprise use of debt financing is always beneficial, can reduce the comprehensive cost of capital of enterprise. This is because the debt financing in the whole capital of enterprise, the bigger the share, the comprehensive cost of capital is more c lose to the cost of debt, and because the cost of debt is generally low, so, the higher the debt level, comprehensive capital cost is lower, the greater the enterprise value. When the debt ratio reached 100%, the firm will achieve maximum value.2.2 Theory of Net Operating Income (Net Operating Income going) Netoperating income theory is that, regardless of financial leverage, debt interest rates are fixed. If enterprises increase the lower cost of debt capital, but even if the cost of debt remains unchanged, but due to the increased the enterprise risk, can also lead to the rising cost of equity capital, it a liter of a fall, just offset, the enterprise cost of capital remain unchanged. Is derived as a result, the theory "" does not exist an optimal capital structure of the conclusion.2.3 Traditional Theory (Traditional going) Traditional theory is that the net income and net operating income method of compromise. It thinks, the enterprise use of financial leverage although will lead to rising cost of equity, but within limits does not completely offset the benefits of using the low cost of debt, so can make comprehensive capital cost reduction, increase enterprise value. But once exceed this limit, rights and interests of the rising cost of no longer can be offset by the low cost of debt, the comprehensive cost of capital will rise again. Since then, the cost of debt will rise, leading to a comprehensive capital costs rise more rapidly. Comprehensive cost of capital from falling into a turning point, is the lowest, at this point, to achieve the optimal capital structure. The above three kinds of capital structure theory is referred to as "early capital structure theory", their common features are: three theories are in corporate and personal income tax rate is zero under the condition of the proposed. Three theories and considering the capital structure of the dual effects of the cost of capital and enterprise value.Three theories are prior to 1958. Many scholars believe that the theory is not based on thorough analysis.3 Related theories3.1 Balance TheoryIt centered on the MM theory of modern capital structure theory development to peak after tradeoff theory. Trade-off theory is based on corporate MM model and miller, revised to reflect the financial pinch cost (also known as the financial crisis cost) and a model of agent cost.(1) the cost of financial constraints. Many enterprises always experience of financial constraints, some of them will be forced to go bankrupt. When the financial constraints but also not bankruptcy occurs, may appear the following situation: disputes between owners and creditors often leads to inventory and fixed assets on the material damaged or obsolete. Attorney fees, court fees and administrative costs to devour enterprise wealth, material loss and plus the legal and administrative expenses referred to as the "direct costs" of bankruptcy. Financial pinch will only occur in business with debt, no liability companies won't get into the mud. So with more debt, the fixed interest rate, and the greater the profitability of the probability of large leading to financial constraints and the cost of the higher the probability of occurrence. Financial pinch probability high will reduce the present value of the enterprise, to improve the cost ofcapital.(2) the agency cost. Because shareholders exists the possibility of using a variety of ways from the bondholders who benefit, bonds must have a number of protective constraint clauses. These terms and conditions in a certain extent constrained the legal management of the enterprise. Also must supervise the enterprise to ensure compliance with these terms and conditions, the cost of supervision and also upon the shareholders with higher debt costs. Supervise cost that agency cost is will raise the cost of debt to reduce debt interest. When the tax benefits and liabilities of financial constraints and agency costs when balance each other, namely the costs and benefits offset each other, determine the optimal capital structure. Equilibrium theory emphasizes the liabilities increase will cause the risk of bankruptcy and rising costs, so as to restrict the enterprise infinite pursuit of the behavior of tax preferential policies. In this sense, the enterprise the best capital structure is the balance of tax revenue and financial constraints caused by all kinds of costs as a result, when the marginal debt tax shield benefit is equal to the marginal cost of financial constraints, the enterprise value maximum, to achieve the optimal capital structure.3.2 Asymmetric Information TheoryAsymmetric Information and found)Due to the trade-off theory has long been limited to bankruptcy cost and tax benefit both conceptual framework, to the late 1970 s, the theory is centered on asymmetricinformation theory of new capital structure theory. So-called asymmetric information is in the information management and investors are not equal, managers than investors have more and more accurate information, and managers try to existing shareholders rather than new seeks the best interests of shareholders, so if business prospect is good, the manager will not issue new shares, but if the prospects, will make the cost of issuing new shares to raise too much, this factor must be considered in the capital structure decision. The significance of these findings to the enterprise's financial policy lies in: first it prompted enterprise reserve a certain debt capacity so as to internal lack of funding for new investment projects in the future debt financing. In addition, in order to avoid falling stock prices, managers often don't have to equity financing, and prefer to use external funding. The central idea is: internal financing preference, if you need external finance, preferences of creditor's rights financing. Can in order to save the ability to issue new debt at any time, the number of managers to borrow is usually less than the number of enterprises can take, in order to keep some reserves. Ross (s. Ross) first systematically introduce the theory of asymmetric information from general economics enterprise capital structure analysis, then, tal (e. Talmon), haeckel (Heikel) development from various aspects, such as the theory. After the 1980 s, thanks to the new institutional economics, and gradually formed a financial contract theory, corporate governance structure theory of capitalstructure theory, both of which emphasize enterprise contractual and incomplete contract, financial contract theory focuses on the design of optimal financial contract, and the arrangement of enterprise governance structure theory focuses on the right, focuses on the analysis of the relationship between capital structure and corporate governance.4 the capital structure theory of adaptability analysis On the one hand, capital structure theory especially the theory of modern capital structure is the important contribution is not only put forward "the existence of the optimal capital structure" this financial proposition, and that the optimal combination of the capital structure, objectively and make us on capital structure and its influence on the enterprise value have a clear understanding. The essence of these theories has direct influence and infiltrate into our country financial theory, and gives us enlightenment in many aspects: Because of various financing way, channel in financing costs, risks, benefits, constraints, as well as differences, seeking suitable capital structure is the enterprise financial management, especially the important content of financing management, must cause our country attaches great importance to the financial theory and financial practice. Capital structure decision despite the enterprise internal and external relationships and factor of restriction and influence, but its decision-making is the enterprise, the enterprise to the factors related to capital structure and the relationship between the quantitativeand qualitative analysis, discusses some principles and methods of enterprise capital structure optimization decision. Any enterprise capital structure in the design, all should leave room, maintain appropriate maneuver ability of financing, the financing environment in order to cope with the volatility and deal with unexpected events occur at any time. In general, businesses leverage ratio is high, has an adverse effect on the whole social and economic development, easily led to the decrease of the enterprise itself the economic benefits and losses and bankruptcies, deepen the entire social and economic development is not stable, increase the financial burden, cause inflation, not conducive to the transformation of industrial structure, and lower investment efficiency. Therefore, the enterprise capital structure should be in accordance with the business owners, creditors, and the public can bear the risk of the society in different aspects.译文资本结构理论与企业资本结构优化Ashkanasy N M摘要企业融资是现代企业经营决策的一项重要内容。

中英文对照外文翻译(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)The effect of capital structure on profitability : an empirical analysis of listed firms in Ghana IntroductionThe capital structure decision is crucial for any business organization. The decision is important because of the need to maximize returns to various organizational constituencies, and also because of the impact such a decision has on a firm’s ability to deal with its competitive environment. The capital structure of a firm is actually a mix of different securities. In general, a firm can choose among many alternative capital structures. It can issue a large amount of debt or very little debt. It can arrange lease financing, use warrants, issue convertible bonds, sign forward contracts or trade bond swaps. It can issue dozens of distinct securities in countless combinations; however, it attempts to find the particular combination that maximizes its overall market value.A number of theories have been advanced in explaining the capital structure of firms. Despite the theoretical appeal of capital structure, researchers in financial management have not found the optimal capital structure. The best that academics and practitioners have been able to achieve are prescriptions that satisfy short-term goals. For example, the lack of a consensus about what would qualify as optimal capital structure has necessitated the need for this research. A better understanding of the issues at hand requires a look at the concept of capital structure and its effect on firm profitability. This paper examines the relationship between capital structure and profitability of companies listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange during the period 1998-2002. The effect of capital structure on the profitability of listed firms in Ghana is a scientific area that has not yet been explored in Ghanaian finance literature.The paper is organized as follows. The following section gives a review of the extant literature on the subject. The next section describes the data and justifies the choice of the variables used in the analysis. The model used in the analysis is then estimated. The subsequent section presents and discusses the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, the last section summarizes the findings of the research and also concludes the discussion.Literature on capital structureThe relationship between capital structure and firm value has been the subject of considerable debate. Throughout the literature, debate has centered on whether there is an optimal capital structure for an individual firm or whether the proportion of debt usage is irrelevant to the individual firm’s value. The capital structure of a firm concerns the mix of debt and equity the firm uses in its operation. Brealey and Myers (2003) contend that the choice of capital structure is fundamentally a marketing problem. They state that the firm can issue dozens of distinct securities in countless combinations, but it attempts to find the particular combination that maximizes market value. According to Weston and Brigham (1992), the optimal capital structure is the one that maximizes the market value of the firm’s outstanding shares.Fama and French (1998), analyzing the relationship among taxes, financing decisions, and the firm’s value, concluded that the debt does not concede tax b enefits. Besides, the high leverage degree generates agency problems among shareholders and creditors that predict negative relationships between leverage and profitability. Therefore, negative information relating debt and profitability obscures the tax benefit of the debt. Booth et al. (2001) developed a study attempting to relate the capital structure of several companies in countries with extremely different financial markets. They concluded thatthe variables that affect the choice of the capital structure of the companies are similar, in spite of the great differences presented by the financial markets. Besides, they concluded that profitability has an inverse relationship with debt level and size of the firm. Graham (2000) concluded in his work that big and profitable companies present a low debt rate. Mesquita and Lara (2003) found in their study that the relationship between rates of return and debt indicates a negative relationship for long-term financing. However, they found a positive relationship for short-term financing and equity.Hadlock and James (2002) concluded that companies prefer loan (debt) financing because they anticipate a higher return. Taub (1975) also found significant positive coefficients for four measures of profitability in a regression of these measures against debt ratio. Petersen and Rajan (1994) identified the same association, but for industries. Baker (1973), who worked with a simultaneous equations model, and Nerlove (1968) also found the same type of association for industries. Roden and Lewellen (1995) found a significant positive association between profitability and total debt as a percentage of the total buyout-financing package in their study on leveraged buyouts. Champion (1999) suggested that the use of leverage was one way to improve the performance of an organization.In summary, there is no universal theory of the debt-equity choice. Different views have been put forward regarding the financing choice. The present study investigates the effect of capital structure on profitability of listed firms on the GSE.MethodologyThis study sampled all firms that have been listed on the GSE over a five-year period (1998-2002). Twenty-two firms qualified to be included in the study sample. Variables used for the analysis include profitability and leverage ratios. Profitability is operationalized using a commonly used accounting-based measure: the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to equity. The leverage ratios used include:. short-term debt to the total capital;. long-term debt to total capital;. total debt to total capital.Firm size and sales growth are also included as control variables.The panel character of the data allows for the use of panel data methodology. Panel data involves the pooling of observations on a cross-section of units over several time periods and provides results that are simply not detectable in pure cross-sections or pure time-series studies. A general model for panel data that allows the researcher to estimate panel data with great flexibility and formulate the differences in the behavior of thecross-section elements is adopted. The relationship between debt and profitability is thus estimated in the following regression models:ROE i,t =β0 +β1SDA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (1) ROE i,t=β0 +β1LDA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (2) ROE i,t=β0 +β1DA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (3)where:. ROE i,t is EBIT divided by equity for firm i in time t;. SDA i,t is short-term debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. LDA i,t is long-term debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. DA i,t is total debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. SIZE i,t is the log of sales for firm i in time t;. SG i,t is sales growth for firm i in time t; and. ëi,t is the error term.Empirical resultsTable I provides a summary of the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables for the sample of firms. This shows the average indicators of variables computed from the financial statements. The return rate measured by return on equity (ROE) reveals an average of 36.94 percent with median 28.4 percent. This picture suggests a good performance during the period under study. The ROE measures the contribution of net income per cedi (local currency) invested by the firms’ stockholders; a measure of the efficiency of the owners’ invested capital. The variable SDA measures the ratio of short-term debt to total capital. The average value of this variable is 0.4876 with median 0.4547. The value 0.4547 indicates that approximately 45 percent of total assets are represented by short-term debts, attesting to the fact that Ghanaian firms largely depend on short-term debt for financing their operations due to the difficulty in accessing long-term credit from financial institutions. Another reason is due to the under-developed nature of the Ghanaian long-term debt market. The ratio of total long-term debt to total assets (LDA) also stands on average at 0.0985. Total debt to total capital ratio(DA) presents a mean of 0.5861. This suggests that about 58 percent of total assets are financed by debt capital. The above position reveals that the companies are financially leveraged with a large percentage of total debt being short-term.Table I.Descriptive statisticsMean SD Minimum Median Maximum━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ROE 0.3694 0.5186 -1.0433 0.2836 3.8300SDA 0.4876 0.2296 0.0934 0.4547 1.1018LDA 0.0985 0.1803 0.0000 0.0186 0.7665DA 0.5861 0.2032 0.2054 0.5571 1.1018SIZE 18.2124 1.6495 14.1875 18.2361 22.0995SG 0.3288 0.3457 20.7500 0.2561 1.3597━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Regression analysis is used to investigate the relationship between capital structure and profitability measured by ROE. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results are presented in Table II. The results from the regression models (1), (2), and (3) denote that the independent variables explain the debt ratio determinations of the firms at 68.3, 39.7, and 86.4 percent, respectively. The F-statistics prove the validity of the estimated models. Also, the coefficients are statistically significant in level of confidence of 99 percent.The results in regression (1) reveal a significantly positive relationship between SDA and profitability. This suggests that short-term debt tends to be less expensive, and therefore increasing short-term debt with a relatively low interest rate will lead to an increase in profit levels. The results also show that profitability increases with the control variables (size and sales growth). Regression (2) shows a significantly negative association between LDA and profitability. This implies that an increase in the long-term debt position is associated with a decrease in profitability. This is explained by the fact that long-term debts are relatively more expensive, and therefore employing high proportions of them could lead to low profitability. The results support earlier findings by Miller (1977), Fama and French (1998), Graham (2000) and Booth et al. (2001). Firm size and sales growth are again positively related to profitability.The results from regression (3) indicate a significantly positive association between DA and profitability. The significantly positive regression coefficient for total debt implies that an increase in the debt position is associated with an increase in profitability: thus, the higher the debt, the higher the profitability. Again, this suggests that profitable firms depend more on debt as their main financing option. This supports the findings of Hadlock and James (2002), Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Roden and Lewellen (1995) that profitable firms use more debt. In the Ghanaian case, a high proportion (85 percent)of debt is represented by short-term debt. The results also show positive relationships between the control variables (firm size and sale growth) and profitability.Table II.Regression model results━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Profitability (EBIT/equity)Ordinary least squares━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Variable 1 2 3SIZE 0.0038 (0.0000) 0.0500 (0.0000) 0.0411 (0.0000)SG 0.1314 (0.0000) 0.1316 (0.0000) 0.1413 (0.0000)SDA 0.8025 (0.0000)LDA -0.3722(0.0000)DA -0.7609(0.0000)R²0.6825 0.3968 0.8639SE 0.4365 0.4961 0.4735Prob. (F) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ConclusionsThe capital structure decision is crucial for any business organization. The decision is important because of the need to maximize returns to various organizational constituencies, and also because of the impact such a decision has on an organization’s ability to deal with its competitive environment. This present study evaluated the relationship between capital structure and profitability of listed firms on the GSE during a five-year period (1998-2002). The results revealed significantly positive relation between SDA and ROE, suggesting that profitable firms use more short-term debt to finance their operation. Short-term debt is an important component or source of financing for Ghanaian firms, representing 85 percent of total debt financing. However, the results showed a negative relationship between LDA and ROE. With regard to the relationship between total debt and profitability, the regression results showed a significantly positive association between DA and ROE. This suggests that profitable firms depend more on debt as their main financing option. In the Ghanaian case, a high proportion (85 percent) of the debt is represented in short-term debt.译文加纳上市公司资本结构对盈利能力的实证研究论文简介资本结构决策对于任何商业组织都是至关重要的。

目录摘要 (1)一、财务管理的最优目标——企业价值最大化 (1)二、以企业价值最大化作为财务管理目标更符合我国国情 (2)三、资本结构理论与企业价值最大化 (3)(一)MM理论的发展阶段 (3)3.1.1最初的MM理论 (3)3.1.2修正的MM理论 (3)3.1.3米勒模型理论 (3)3.1.4权衡模型理论 (3)(二)资本结构理论对我们的启示 (4)3.2.1负债筹资是成本最低的筹资方式 (4)3.2.2成本最低的筹资方式未必是最佳筹资方式 (4)3.2.3最优资本结构是一种客观存在 (4)四、衡量资本结构重要指标——财务杠杆利益 (4)(一)提高企业的盈利能力 (5)(二)降低企业负债利率 (5)4.2.1经济周期因素 (5)4.2.2市场竞争环境因素 (5)4.2.3行业因素 (6)4.2.4预计的投资效益情况 (6)参考文献 (6)- 1 -摘要本文通过研究财务管理目标与资本结构理论的关系,对如何优化企业资本结构问题进行了探讨。

指出财务管理目标应为企业价值最大化,财务杠杆利益是衡量企业资本结构的重要指标,并在分析影响企业资本结构有关因素的基础上,对如何优化企业资本结构的问题提出了个人建议。

随着我国经济体制改革的不断深化,对企业财务管理体制的完善和发展提出了新的要求。

如何科学地设置财务管理最优目标,对于研究财务管理理论,确定资本的最优结构,有效地指导财务管理实践具有一定的现实意义。

本文拟从确定财务管理的最优目标出发,分析财务管理最优目标(企业价值最大化)与资本结构的关系,并运用资本结构的计量指标 (财务杠杆利益),对我国企业的负债经营状况进行分析研究。

【关键词】财务管理企业价值资本结构财务杠杆一、财务管理的最优目标——企业价值最大化财务管理目标是在特定的理财环境中通过组织财务活动,处理财务关系所要达到的目的。

比较具有代表性的财务管理目标主要有以下几种观点:企业利润最大化、股东财富最大化、企业价值最大化、企业经济效益最大化。

资本结构优化论文（独家整理6篇）标题1：资本结构对企业价值的影响资本结构是企业融资成本和财务风险的核心问题，企业通过调整资本结构来降低融资成本和财务风险，从而提高企业价值。

本文从企业财务风险和融资成本两个方面入手，对资本结构和企业价值之间的关系进行细致的阐述和分析。

首先，本文从理论上解释了资本结构对企业财务风险的影响，说明了资本结构越保守，企业的财务风险越小，但融资成本也越高。

反之，资本结构越倾向于股权融资，企业的财务风险越大，但融资成本也越低。

其次，本文结合实证研究，以市值为评估企业价值的标准，对我国上市公司的资本结构和企业价值之间的关系进行了实证检验。

实证结果表明，资本结构处于中等偏股权偏债务融资的上市公司，价值最高，而偏向股权融资或债务融资的公司价值较低。

综上所述，本文的研究结果可以为企业在资本结构决策上提供一定的参考。

企业可以根据自身经营状况、市场环境、融资需求等因素，选择最优的资本结构，以提高企业价值。

总结：资本结构对企业的影响是一个综合、长期的问题，企业应理性选择最优的资本结构，以获得经济效益的最大化。

标题2：股权融资与债务融资的利弊分析股权融资和债务融资是企业融资的两种常见方式。

股权融资是指企业向股东发行股票来筹集资金；债务融资是指企业通过向债权人发行债券或从银行获得贷款等方式来获得资金。

本文将从融资成本、财务风险、股东管理权等多个方面，对股权融资和债务融资的利弊进行深入分析。

首先，本文从融资成本出发，指出股权融资具有较高的融资成本，而债务融资具有相对较低的融资成本。

其次，本文从财务风险角度，说明股权融资具有较低的财务风险，而债务融资则存在着较高的财务风险。

再次，本文指出股权融资能够满足股东管理权的需求，而债务融资则不能。

最后，本文就股权融资和债务融资的利弊做了总结。

总体而言，股权融资和债务融资均有其利弊，企业应该根据自身情况和融资需求，权衡利弊，选择适合自身的融资方式。

总结：在实践中，股权融资和债务融资是企业融资的两种重要方式。

财务管理毕业论文外文文献及翻译核准通过，归档资料。

未经允许，请勿外传～LNTU Acc公司治理与高管薪酬:一个应急框架总体概述通过整合组织和体制的理论，本文开发了一个高管薪酬的应急办法和它在不同的组织和体制环境下的影响。

高管薪酬的研究大都集中在委托代理框架上，并承担一种行政奖励和业绩成果之间的关系。

我们提出了一个框架，审查了其组织的背景和潜在的互补性方面的行政补偿和不同的公司治理在不同的企业和国家水平上体现的替代效应。

我们还讨论了执行不同补偿政策方法的影响，像“软法律”和“硬法律”。

在过去的20年里，世界上越来越多的公司从一个固定的薪酬结构转变为与业绩相联系的薪酬结构，包括很大一部分的股权激励。

因此，高管补偿的经济影响的研究已经成为公司治理内部激烈争论的一个话题。

正如Bruce，Buck，和Main指出，“近年来，关于高管报酬的文献的增长速度可以与高管报酬增长本身相匹敌。

”关于高管补偿的大多数实证文献主要集中在对美国和英国的公司部门，当分析高管薪酬的不同组成部分产生的组织结果的时候。

根据理论基础，早期的研究曾试图了解在代理理论方面的高管补偿和在不同形式的激励和公司业绩方面的探索链接。

这个文献假设，股东和经理人之间的委托代理关系被激发，公司将更有效率的运作，表现得更好。

公司治理的研究大多是基于通用模型——委托代理理论的概述，以及这一框架的核心前提是，股东和管理人员有不同的方法来了解公司的具体信息和广泛的利益分歧以及风险偏好。

因此，经理作为股东的代理人可以从事对自己有利的行为而损害股东财富的最大化。

大量的文献是基于这种直接的前提和建议来约束经理的机会主义行为，股东可以使用不同的公司治理机制，包括各种以股票为基础的奖励可以统一委托人和代理人的利益。

正如Jensen 和Murphy观察，“代理理论预测补偿政策将会以满足代理人的期望效用为主要目标。

股东的目标是使财富最大化;因此代理成本理论指出，总裁的薪酬政策将取决于股东财富的变化。

外文翻译Capital Structure and Firm Performance Material Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve SystemAuthor: Allen N. BergerAgency costs represent important problems in corporate governance in both financial and nonfinancial industries. The separation of ownership and control in a professionally managed firm may result in managers exerting insufficient work effort, indulging in perquisites, choosing inputs or outputs that suit their own preferences, or otherwise failing to maximize firm value. In effect, the agency costs of outside ownership equal the lost value from professional managers maximizing their own utility, rather than the value of the firm.Theory suggests that the choice of capital structure may help mitigate these agency costs. Under the agency costs hypothesis, high leverage or a low equity/asset ratio reduces the agency costs of outside equity and increases firm value by constraining or encouraging managers to act more in the interests of shareholders. Since the seminal paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976), a vast literature on such agency-theoretic explanations of capital structure has developed (see Harris and Raviv 1991 and Myers 2001 for reviews). Greater financial leverage may affect managers and reduce agency costs through the threat of liquidation, which causes personal losses to managers of salaries, reputation, perquisites, etc. (e.g., Grossman and Hart 1982, Williams 1987), and through pressure to generate cash flow to pay interest expenses (e.g., Jensen 1986). Higher leverage can mitigate conflicts between shareholders and managers concerning the choice of investment (e.g., Myers 1977), the amount of risk to undertake (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976, Williams 1987), the conditions under which the firm is liquidated (e.g., Harris and Raviv 1990), and dividend policy (e.g., Stulz 1990).A testable prediction of this class of models is that increasing the leverage ratio should result in lower agency costs of outside equity and improved firm performance, all else held equal. However, when leverage becomes relatively high, further increases generate significant agency costs of outside debt – including higher expected costs of bankruptcy or financial distress – arising from conflicts between bondholders and shareholders.1 Because it is difficult to distinguish empiricallybetween the two sources of agency costs, we follow the literature and allow the relationship between total agency costs and leverage to be non-monotonic.Despite the importance of this theory, there is at best mixed empirical evidence in the extant literature (see Harris and Raviv 1991, Titman 2000, and Myers 2001 for reviews). Tests of the agency costs hypothesis typically regress measures of firm performance on the equity capital ratio or other indicator of leverage plus some control variables. At least three problems appear in the prior studies that we address in our application.First, the measures of firm performance are usually ratios fashioned from financial statements or stock market prices, such as industry-adjusted operating margins or stock market returns. These measures do not net out the effects of differences in exogenous market factors that affect firm value, but are beyond management’s control and therefore cannot reflect agency costs. Thus, the tests may be confounded by factors that are unrelated to agency costs. As well, these studies generally do not set a separate benchmark for each firm’s performance that would be realized if agency costs were minimized.We address the measurement problem by using profit efficiency as our indicator of firm performance. The link between productive efficiency and agency costs was first suggested by Stigler (1976), and profit efficiency represents a refinement of the efficiency concept developed since that time.2 Profit efficiency evaluates how close a firm is to earning the profit that a best-practice firm would earn facing the same exogenous conditions. This has the benefit of controlling for factors outside the control of management that are not part of agency costs. In contrast, comparisons of standard financial ratios, stock market returns, and similar measures typically do not control for these exogenous factors. Even when the measures used in the literature are industry adjusted, they may not account for important differences across firms within an industry –such as local market conditions – as we are able to do with profit efficiency. In addition, the performance of a best-practice firm under the same exogenous conditions is a reasonable benchmark for how the firm would be expected to perform if agency costs were minimized.Second, the prior research generally does not take into account the possibility of reverse causation from performance to capital structure. If firm performance affects the choice of capital structure, then failure to take this reverse causality into account may result in simultaneous-equations bias. That is, regressions of firmperformance on a measure of leverage may confound the effects of capital structure on performance with the effects of performance on capital structure.We address this problem by allowing for reverse causality from performance to capital structure. We discuss below two hypotheses for why firm performance may affect the choice of capital structure, the efficiency-risk hypothesis and the franchise-value hypothesis. We construct a two-equation structural model and estimate it using two-stage least squares (2SLS). An equation specifying profit efficiency as a function of the firm’s equity capital ratio and other variables is use d to test the agency costs hypothesis, and an equation specifying the equity capital ratio as a function of the firm’s profit efficiency and other variables is used to test the net effects of the efficiency-risk and franchise-value hypotheses. Both equations are econometrically identified through exclusion restrictions that are consistent with the theories.Third, some, but not all of the prior studies did not take ownership structure into account. Under virtually any theory of agency costs, ownership structure is important, since it is the separation of ownership and control that creates agency costs (e.g., Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet 1985). Greater insider shares may reduce agency costs, although the effect may be reversed at very high levels of insider holdings (e.g., Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988). As well, outside block ownership or institutional holdings tend to mitigate agency costs by creating a relatively efficient monitor of the managers (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1986). Exclusion of the ownership variables may bias the test results because the ownership variables may be correlated with the dependent variable in the agency cost equation (performance) and with the key exogenous variable (leverage) through the reverse causality hypotheses noted above.To address this third problem, we include ownership structure variables in the agency cost equation explaining profit efficiency. We include insider ownership, outside block holdings, and institutional holdings.Our application to data from the banking industry is advantageous because of the abundance of quality data available on firms in this industry. In particular, we have detailed financial data for a large number of firms producing comparable products with similar technologies, and information on market prices and other exogenous conditions in the local markets in which they operate. In addition, some studies in this literature find evidence of the link between the efficiency of firms and variables that are recognized to affect agency costs, including leverage andownership structure (see Berger and Mester 1997 for a review).Although banking is a regulated industry, banks are subject to the same type of agency costs and other influences on behavior as other industries. The banks in the sample are subject to essentially equal regulatory constraints, and we focus on differences across banks, not between banks and other firms. Most banks are well above the regulatory capital minimums, and our results are based primarily on differences at the margin, rather than the effects of regulation. Our test of the agency costs hypothesis using data from one industry may be built upon to test a number of corporate finance hypotheses using information on virtually any industry.We test the agency costs hypothesis of corporate finance, under which high leverage reduces the agency costs of outside equity and increases firm value by constraining or encouraging managers to act more in the interests of shareholders. Our use of profit efficiency as an indicator of firm performance to measure agency costs, our specification of a two-equation structural model that takes into account reverse causality from firm performance to capital structure, and our inclusion of measures of ownership structure address problems in the extant empirical literature that may help explain why prior empirical results have been mixed. Our application to the banking industry is advantageous because of the detailed data available on a large number of comparable firms and the exogenous conditions in their local markets. Although banks are regulated, we focus on differences across banks that are driven by corporate governance issues, rather than any differences in-regulation, given that all banks are subject to essentially the same regulatory framework and most banks are well above the regulatory capital minimums.Our findings are consistent with the agency costs hypothesis – higher leverage or a lower equity capital ratio is associated with higher profit efficiency, all else equal. The effect is economically significant as well as statistically significant. An increase in leverage as represented by a 1 percentage point decrease in the equity capital ratio yields a predicted increase in profit efficiency of about 6 percentage points, or a gain of about 10% in actual profits at the sample mean. This result is robust to a number of specification changes, including different measures of performance (standard profit efficiency, alternative profit efficiency, and return on equity), different econometric techniques (two-stage least squares and OLS), different efficiency measurement methods (distribution-free and fixed-effects), different samples (the “ownership sample” of banks with detailed ownership data and the “full sample” of banks), and the different sample periods (1990s and 1980s).However, the data are not consistent with the prediction that the relationship between performance and leverage may be reversed when leverage is very high due to the agency costs of outside debt.We also find that profit efficiency is responsive to the ownership structure of the firm, consistent with agency theory and our argument that profit efficiency embeds agency costs. The data suggest that large institutional holders have favorable monitoring effects that reduce agency costs, although large individual investors do not. As well, the data are consistent with a non-monotonic relationship between performance and insider ownership, similar to findings in the literature.With respect to the reverse causality from efficiency to capital structure, we offer two competing hypotheses with opposite predictions, and we interpret our tests as determining which hypothesis empirically dominates the other. Under the efficiency-risk hypothesis, the expected high earnings from greater profit efficiency substitute for equity capital in protecting the firm from the expected costs of bankruptcy or financial distress, whereas under the franchise-value hypothesis, firms try to protect the expected income stream from high profit efficiency by holding additional equity capital. Neither hypothesis dominates the other for the ownership sample, but the substitution effect of the efficiency-risk hypothesis dominates for the full sample, suggesting a difference in behavior for the small banks that comprise most of the full sample.The approach developed in this paper can be built upon to test the agency costs hypothesis or other corporate finance hypotheses using data from virtually any industry. Future research could extend the analysis to cover other dimensions of capital structure. Agency theory suggests complex relationships between agency costs and different types of securities. We have analyzed only one dimension of capital structure, the equity capital ratio. Future research could consider other dimensions, such as the use of subordinated notes and debentures, or other individual debt or equity instruments.译文资本结构与企业绩效资料来源: 联邦储备系统理事会作者：Allen N. Berger 在财务和非财务行业，代理成本在公司治理中都是重要的问题。

On Capital Structure and Maximum Enterprise ValueAbstract:The different arrangement of capital structure may exert direct influence on capital cost and the discount rate of the net flow of the future cash,finally giving impact on enterprise value and the optimization of property right structure.We should strengthen the effective restraint of debt to managers and make full use of the signal transmission function of enterprise capital structure to realize the optimization of capital structure and to promote the value increasing.Key words: enterprise value; Capital structure; company administrative structure. signal transmission function1.The relationship between the capital structure and enterprise value maximizationCapital structure refers to the enterprise all kinds of capital composition and proportion relationship. Theory of capital structure has some areas of controversy , summed up in the following three perspectives : The first is their own capital structure theory, the capital is only an idea is defined as the rights and interests capital source, namely the equity capital of the internal relationship between each component, truthfully to collect capital, capital reserve, the proportion of the relationship between retained earnings, this view is not common. The second view is long term capital structure theory, the idea that capital refers to the long-term capital of the enterprise, namely the equity capital and long-term debt capital. Short-term debt as working capital to deal with, do not belong to the category of capital structure research. The third kind of view is that all the capital structure theory, studies the enterprise all constitute the proportion of the capital structure of the relationships, relative to the second view, it includes not only the long-term capital (equity and debt capital) for a long time, will also be short-term debt capital is also included. Capital structure optimization is to point to through to the enterprise capital structure adjustment, make its capital structure tends to rationalization, to achieve the target process. Modern capital structure theory, capital structure optimization goal is tomaximize the enterprise value. The optimal capital structure should be at the lowest weighted average cost of capital is to make the enterprise the financing risk for maximum and minimum return on investment, so as to realize the enterprise value maximization of a kind of capital structure. At any time, the enterprise is the only capital structure, but at this moment if not the optimal capital structure, capital structure is the largest enterprise value has not come at this time. Only under the condition of the optimal capital structure, enterprise will achieve maximum value.Enterprise value is refers to the enterprise investor is expected from the enterprise to obtain the present value of future cash flows. The essence of which is the efficiency of the enterprise comprehensive embodiment. Capital structure refers to the enterprise the source of all kinds of long-term capital composition and proportion relationship, it is a main factor of the decision enterprise the overall cost of capital, and reflect the main measure of firm's financial risk. Different capital structure, will directly affect the cost of capital, and affect the discount rate of future cash flows discounted, impact on the enterprise value. The cost of capital is due to the use of enterprises and raise the cost of capital, is a long-term investment and enterprise assets remuneration obtained the basic return rate. Different will lead to the weighted average cost of capital structure is different, resulting in the different enterprise financing efficiency, and affect the long-term investment project and the benefit of the enterprise overall level and, in turn, affect the enterprise value. Liabilities have financial leverage effect, the expected return on assets is greater than the cost of borrowing rate under the premise of borrowing will increase earnings per share surplus, but at the same time because of the expected rate of return on assets is not stability, will lead to a surplus of volatility and increase the probability of bankruptcy, and causing financial risk. Different capital structure will lead to enterprise financial risk degree of difference and scientific capital structure policy should not only use financial leverage to increase surplus per share, also want to avoid debt brought about by the financial risk, in order to avoid the due cannot pay his debts and the enterprise bankruptcy, so that the loss of the enterprise value. Belong to the stakeholders in capital ownership, capital structure reflects the composition of the property. Under the modern enterprise system, property rightstructure is reasonable, involves which lead to the agency relationship is reasonable, and affect the enterprise production and operation mechanism is reasonable, for the enterprise can form an effective motivation mechanism, to promote the enterprise in a market economy cycle is crucial.Theoretical and empirical studies on the relationship between capital structure and value companies are more abundant. According to its history, can be on the relationship between capital structure and enterprise value research conclusion is summarized as follows:First, the capital structure is designed to achieve a specific form of corporate value and achieve ways to optimize the capital structure and financing decisions and increase the value of the company 's management is an important way . Corporate capital structure reasonable arrangement , one can take advantage of tax effect liabilities , reduce capital costs , improve capital efficiency, on the other hand you can optimize the company 's governance structure, reduce the potential cause greater risk among those within the company conflicts of interest costs and improve value creation -based implementation. In addition , Ross (1977) signaling theory suggests that managers of financing choices actually send signals to investors , corporate investors will share issue seen as a signal enterprise asset quality deterioration , while debt financing is good asset quality signal , so the enterprise value of a positive correlation with asset-liability ratio , the more high -quality companies , the higher the debt ratio . Debt to enterprise value has a positive correlation , play an active role in the enterprise.Second, the capital structure of the debt ratio is not as high as possible . Financial risks to improve the company's capital structure with gradual increases in the debt ratio , increased debt possibility of future cash flows is less than the expected value , which may result in bankruptcy costs , resulting in no less than the value of the company before the level of debt financing .Third, there is an optimal capital structure. When the debt continue to rise, bringing the marginal benefit and marginal risk balance, the enterprise value reaches the maximum capital structure is the optimal capital structure. Thus, in the company's capital structure decisions , in order to increase shareholder wealth,require the company has a high debt ratio ; But from the perspective of financial risk and creditors , the company's debt ratio will have a limit. Visible, capital structure decision problem is an optimization problem , that is, under certain financial risks and maximize the value of shareholders' creditors limit the company's wealth . Since the choice of capital structure but also by a variety of different factors , different industries, different enterprises and different periods of the same enterprise , and its optimal capital structure may be different.Our research methods on the theory of capital structure and corporate value diversity , conclusions are not consistent , the findings also have some different foreign . This was mainly caused by a number of factors, such as different levels of economic development , different levels of development of capital markets , as well as different cultures, legal environment and industry characteristics , etc. . Performance in China, due to the unique transition economy differs from the developed market economies of Western insiders control problems and underdeveloped capital markets, market manager , control of the market , making the company's capital structure decision is not based on considerations of maximizing the value of listed companies . As China's listed companies financing order in a certain period showed inconsistent with the financing order theory of the phenomenon , and its order of equity financing , short-term debt financing , long-term debt financing and internal financing .2.To set up the target capital structure factors should be consideredIn theory, any enterprise should exist the best capital structure. But, in practice, the enterprise is difficult to accurately determine the best point, needs to be studied in a careful analysis based on the factors that affect the enterprise capital structure optimization, to optimize the capital structure decision.(1) The economic cycle. Under the condition of market economy, any country's economic development in waves. Generally speaking, in a recession and depression stage, due to the objective economic recession, the majority of business is struggling, often troubled financial situation, or even worse. To this, enterprises should as far as possible compression in debt. In the economic recovery and prosperity stage, in general, because of the economic trough, market supply and demand rise, mostenterprises should according to the need to rapidly expand, does not give up in order to keep the cost of capital minimum good development opportunities.(2) The enterprise debt paying ability. Through to the enterprise original Indices such as current ratio, quick ratio, asset-liability ratio analysis, evaluating the debt paying ability of the enterprise. If the enterprise debt paying ability is quite strong, can increase the ratio of debt in capital structure properly, in order to give full play to financial leverage, the enterprise to increase profits. On the contrary, should not be excessive debt, and should be taken to issue stock and other equity capitalThe financing way.(3) The attitude held by the owners and operators. Attitude held by the owners and operators, including the owner and operator control of the enterprise and the attitude to risk, to a large extent determines the enterprise's capital structure. If don't want to lose control of the enterprise, owner and operator should choose debt financing. In addition, for more conservative and cautious, owner and operator of future economic pessimism, preference as far as possible the use of equity capital, debt ratio is relatively small; To dare to take risks, to economic development prospects are optimistic, and rich in the spirit of enterprise owners and operators, tend to use more debt financing, give full play to financial leverage.(4) The market competition environment. Even in the same enterprise of macroeconomic environment, because of their different market environment, its debt levels also should not treat as the same. If the enterprise industry competition degree is weak or in a monopoly position, sales will not happen problem, stable profit growth, can be appropriately increase the debt ratio; On the contrary, if the enterprise industry competition is stronger, due to its sales completely determined by the market, so should not be too much debt ways to raise money.(5) Enterprise profitability. If the enterprise's development and the management is extensive, will lead to lower corporate profitability, it is difficult to profitability through retained earnings or other capital to raise money, had to raise debt, this inevitably leads to more debt in the capital structure, this kind of enterprise financial risk should be paid attention to; For profitability strong enterprises, take the equity capital financing is relatively easy, this kind of enterprise financing channels andmeans of choice is bigger, can raise the funds required for the production development, can make low comprehensive cost of capital as much as possible.(6) The development degree of capital market. Capital market is a place for companies to raise capital, the perfect and development degree of the capital market, will to some extent, restricted enterprise's financing behavior and capital structure. For a long time, the indirect financing in the capital market in China accounts for absolute position, slow development of the securities market, a single cause enterprise financing way, heavy debt, with the deepening of financial reform in our country, the stock market will more and more important in national economy.3. Unreasonable capital structure, the influence on the enterprise value maximization3.1 The reason of unreasonable capital structure:3.1.1 The general reasonThe capital structure of listed companies in our country exists above the status duo, investigate its reason, mainly due to the special national conditions of our country. Our country is in economic transition period, namely in the planned economy to market economy transition period, we have their own special economic environment and economic operation characteristics. The securities market of our country is in such cases, and is driven by the government. The government is the original purpose of setting up a stock market for state-owned enterprises in trouble, help state-owned enterprises free from debt problems. So most of the listed company of our country is formed by the state-owned enterprise restructuring.3.1.2 The specific reasons(1) Imperfect capital market development. First of all, our country stock market the seller exists serious insufficient competition. Stock market of our country, the primary goal for the state-owned enterprises is in trouble, in order to achieve this goal, for quite a long time, the government listed companies to issue shares to planning, strong administrative system, the deeds of the strict quota control, and leaning to state-owned enterprises, makes our country of the seller of the stock market exists serious insufficient competition, and made many sub prime even inferior company is listed, the price of the stock due to limited supply, the price levelis generally high. Second, the imbalance in the structure of enterprise bond market development. The stock market and bond market rapid development and expanded sharply at the same time, the development of the enterprise bond market has not been due. Their own lack of issuing bonds. Fact between soft constraints in credit and equity markets are imperfect constraint mechanism to make enterprises always put bonds, the last of the financing order. Relevant state policy to a certain extent, to curb the development of corporate bond market. Due to the lagged development of enterprise bond market in China, hindered the conditional corporate bond issue, is not conducive to enterprise by raising the proportion of debt financing to establish reasonable financing structure.(2) The non-standard market operation mechanism. Equity financing is a kind of investors, financiers and market intermediary tripartite participation behavior. Corporate financing behavior if it fails to meet the basic requirement of capital optimization configuration, why in the stock market can freely be implemented? At the end of the day, the market operation mechanism of non-standard is the source of the listed companies malicious behavior encircling money outside. Because the market mechanism is not standard, makes the financiers are compliance through market investment behavior to give the profits of investors and intermediaries compliance and source of income.(3) Equity structure defects. China's capital market is one of the most important feature is the equity division, formed the state shares, legal person share, tradable shares and foreign shares a few fragmented markets to each other. The market, make the different between different shareholders interests demand, led to the actual control or major shareholders independent goes against the other shareholders standard of value pursuit, they do not necessarily put all focus on how to improve company's performance, because of rising corporate profits, the improvement of the financial indicators, through leverage reflects on the asset price negotiable, show the negotiable stock prices rise, so as to benefit the tradable shares directly. In China, the controlling shareholder in general are tradable shareholders, the shareholders didn't get the corresponding because of rising asset prices benefits, this is the institutional defects of inconsistency of value target.3.2 The unreasonable capital structure influence on the enterprise value maximization:3.2.1 The unreasonable capital structure leads to poor corporate governance structureThe capital structure influence the cost of capital not only, still affect shareholders, creditors and the agent that the distribution of residual claims and control of the enterprise, ultimately affect the efficiency of corporate governance, and corporate value. Different capital structure, enterprise's equity constitute different governance structure model is different, embodies the relationship of different stakeholders. Corporate governance is the enterprise operation mechanism of internal decision. Corporate governance is to improve the operating mechanism mainly reflected in the enterprise is effective. Corporate governance is a relationship of checks and balances, but its core lies in the effective operation of governance mechanism. And the key to the efficiency of enterprise operation mechanism at the operator's ability, motivation and binding is advantageous to the enterprise market value to improve the management decisions. Therefore, to perfect the corporate governance is the assurance of enterprise value maximization., from the viewpoint of the capital structure of our state-owned enterprises and state holding corporation governance structure, the prominent problem is that state-owned equity ratio is too high, the enterprise in different degree, subject to the government's administrative intervention, weaken the efficiency of production and operation of enterprises; Youngling of state-owned enterprise property rights, on the other hand, led to the decision-making and control of the substance to the excessive concentration of the enterprise operator, to form the enterprise "insider control" phenomenon, to make the operator or the autonomy in operation of the production cost is too expensive. Oneness property right structure caused the state-owned enterprise incentive and constraint mechanism is relatively weak, reduce the efficiency of the enterprise should have, limits the enterprise value maximization goal.3.2.2 High agency cost caused by unreasonable capital structureCorporate debt directly have a certain influence on agent's actions and decisions, which affect the market value of the enterprise. At present, our country there is adominant state-owned shares of listed companies, the owner absence, insider control, constraints, and poor incentive mechanism were the problem. Internal equity of listed companies in China the average ratio of 0.11% (0.074% stake of the members of the board, senior managers hold 0.036%), compared to 11.48% of the us internal shareholding proportion, nearly 100 times the gap. Chairman and chief executive of the listed companies in China with greater decision-making power to the company, is a has benefits at the expense of the interests of the shareholders, especially when the company's chairman and chief executive, taken by the same person, the situation is more serious. Shareholders of the company due to the existence of the above issues, the lack of effective monitoring, managers of the listed companies of constraint mechanism is not sound, insider control is quite serious. Serious insider control inevitably leads to the company's action more reflect the will of the managers, not the shareholders or owners will eventually. Thanks to debt financing will increase pressure on managers, and force it to work hard to avoid bankruptcy, managers from their own interests, will give up debt financing, choose equity financing. Equity constraint is relatively soft, however, high stake of capital structure can cause lack of supervision over corporate managers, corporate managers work hard pressure is insufficient, the final damage or the interests of the shareholders and creditors. And these are largely leads to agency costs increase and the decrease of the enterprise value.3.2.3 The signal transfer function of the capital structure of the failed to effectively useCapital structure as the solution to the problem of excessive investment and inadequate investment tools, cases, established in the investment capital structure can also be used as the transfer signal of corporate insiders private information. First that agent to change the capital structure ratio directly affect the investor to the enterprise value evaluation, that is, make the enterprise market value changes of variation of debt ratio. Investors have higher debt levels as a high quality of the signal, when enterprises to raise the debt, suggests that managers expected enterprise have a better business performance. And when the enterprise operating performance is low, have high marginal cost of enterprise bankruptcy wouldn't imitate increased more in highperformance of corporate debt. Second, in the valley and parr's model, assuming that the enterprise managers understand the investment income distribution function, and outside investors don't understand. Manager is a risk averse, and that the benefit of the enterprise management is market traders ownership share a function, so the higher the manager's stake, whereby the sending the signal, the better, the more likely it is to attract investors, and is beneficial to reduce the degree of information asymmetry, bring good benefits expected, increasing the market value of the enterprise. Most of China's enterprises are not good at using the signal transfer function to give useful information to the outside world, corporate executives stake is not much, and each year the amount of shares held by the little change, this will make investors lack of enterprise value judgment basis.3. optimize capital structure to promote the enterprise value maximizationCompanies need to be carried out in accordance with the enterprise value maximization goal of capital structure adjustment and optimization, the goal is to reshape the game interest subjects, to change the power and strategy space, in the hope of game equilibrium is Pareto improvement, concrete from the following several aspects.(1) improve enterprise ownership control structures, improve the internal governance structureCapital structure, corporate governance and corporate value is interlinked, enterprise value is the goal of financial management, capital structure is the foundation of the enterprise value maximization, and corporate governance is the company's steady operation and the guarantee of the enterprise value maximization. Modern corporate finance theory analysis shows that realize the goal of the company must improve the corporate governance mechanism, by optimizing the capital structure to improve corporate governance this purpose.Effective corporate governance structure is advantageous to the formation of the constraint by the relationship between the interests of all parties and incentive mechanism, to ensure the interests of all stakeholders, to maximize the enterprise value. The formation of the corporate governance structure and design, and is closely related to enterprise's capital structure. First of all, as a result of the configuration ofequity capital the basic motivations of the ownership of the control of enterprises, the rights and interests of different capital structure will affect the control of the enterprise, the influence on enterprise control goal and the principal goal of deviation degree, which leads to different enterprise efficiency; Second, the use of funds to creditors and creditors of creditor's rights and the maintenance of security measures to influence the level of agency costs, will affect the enterprise value. Therefore, the rights and interests of the enterprise capital structure is the basis of the formation of enterprise control, the composition of equity capital and debt capital is the root of shareholders and creditors' interest contradictions. The optimization of capital structure, must want to establish a reasonable proportion of corporate equity structure and forms the enterprise to seek to maximize the enterprise value of the agency relationship as the goal. To enhance the efficiency of China's enterprises to form in pursuit of the enterprise, make the enterprise value maximize governance structure, we must improve the structure of property right configuration of company governance, and strengthen the creditor as well.(2) Strengthen the debts of the business operators of effective constraintCapital structure not only reflects the business capital of different sources, it also affect the relations between the distribution of corporate power in various stakeholders, determines the restraint and incentive intensity of different interest subjects. Therefore, the efficiency of the capital structure to entrust - agent can play a role. In modern companies especially the listed company equity dispersion, by moderate debt will reduce the free-riding problem in a minority shareholder in the supervision of enterprises, to solve the problem of equity constraint is lax and insider control, etc. In addition debt will make manager to distribute free cash flow in a timely manner to investors rather than their profligacy, debt will also forced managers to sell non-performing assets and restrict manager is invalid but can increase the investment of power. When the debtor is unable to repay debts or enterprises need financing, the creditor will be investigating corporate balance sheets according to the debt contract, thus will enable the enterprise to reveal information about and supervision of the manager and make better. Reasonable capital structure can play an effective inhibition, excite the work enthusiasms of business operators,and constraints of the business operators, behavior, and can play a good governance effect, promote the enterprise value growth.(3) Establish a mechanism for dynamic optimization of capital structureAll enterprises to participate in market competition constantly seek ways to access to competitive advantage, but because of the incomplete information in the realistic economy, uncertainty and bounded rationality, makes it impossible for people to consider all the factors that affect the capital structure, grasp the "objective" unable to advance the law of economic activity, thus make the "optimal" capital structure decision. The capital structure decision not only is a necessary condition of maximizing the enterprise value, more important is the enterprise to constantly adjust the capital structure, to implement the strategy of the corresponding external competition. Enterprise products market is in constant change, due to the rapid changes in technology and market, enterprises face the environment full of uncertainty, enterprise's capital structure decision is not a choice question in advance, but in a complex and uncertain environment constantly searching, constantly adjust process. If companies ignore product market environment changes, stressed or focus on the so-called "optimal capital structure", may be lost of continuous competitive advantage.According to the situation of our country fully consider various factors, reasonable determine the best proportion of capital structure, and the best proportion of the capital structure is a dynamic rather than static. This requires our country enterprise in the financial management must be combined with the specific situation of the industry and your business, try to improve their capital structure of enterprise, also is in the whole capital of enterprise, how to determine the proportion of equity capital and debt capital, capital to make enterprise evenly weighted minimum, enterprises maximize shareholder wealth. For the management of the capital structure shall establish financial early warning system, take the corresponding strategies to adapt to the changes in the environment at the same time. In choosing financing tools, can use convertible preferred shares, redeemable preferred stock, convertible bonds and callable bonds have better elasticity financing tools, such as flexibility of capital structure.。