《制定关于标准必要专利的欧盟方法》

总737期第三期2021年1月河南科技Henan Science and Technology标准涉及专利的处置规则分析张哲（中煤科工集团西安研究院有限公司，陕西西安710077）摘要：标准实施阶段，一些专利许可及收费的关键控制点主要在于标准制定时期可能纳入技术标准的一些专利和专利要求的披露、评估以及确认。

也就是说，专利定义、认定对技术标准确定及落实影响重大。

目前，我国一些专利研究的处置还存在一些问题。

人们应考察现有国际通用必要专利的定义和认定，分析必要专利及其权利要求，阐述专利判定要素中的技术、商业因素选取及所造成的影响。

总体来说，标准涉及专利的处置要符合国家标准涉及专利的处置规则要求。

关键词：标准；技术；必要专利；标准组织；规则中图分类号：G306文献标识码：A文章编号：1003-5168（2021）03-0140-03 Analysis of Disposal Rules for Standards Related to PatentsZHANG Zhe（Xi'an Research Institute of China Coal Technology and Industry Group Co.,Ltd.，Xi'an Shaanxi710077）Abstract:In the implementation stage of standards,the key control points of some patent licensing and charging mainly lie in the disclosure,evaluation and confirmation of some patents and patent requirements that may be includ⁃ed in the technical standards during the standard formulation period.In other words,the definition and identification of patent have a great impact on the determination and implementation of technical standards.At present,there are still some problems in the disposal of some patent research in China.People should examine the definition and deter⁃mination of the existing international general essential patents,analyze essential patents and their claims,and elabo⁃rate on the selection of technical and commercial factors in the patent judgment elements and their impact.In gener⁃al,the disposal of patents involved in standards must comply with the requirements of the national standards for dis⁃posal of patents.Keywords:standards；technology；essential patents；standards organization；rules近年来，技术标准知识产权层面有着众多课题研究，其已经逐步细化到标准中的必要专利及评估。

frand原则
所谓的FRAND原则是“Fair、Reasonable、Non-Discriminatory （公平、合理和非歧视）”的简称，常见于通信公司有关的标准必要专利（Standards Essential Patents，SEP）的诉讼中。

虽然标准组织确定了标准必要专利许可的FRAND条款，但只是一个大的原则，对于究竟如何理解公平、合理、无歧视却没有具体的解释，也无如何确定FRAND许可费率的实施指引。

例如，国际电信联盟政策没有规定如何确定RAND/FRAND条款，或法院应如何基于RAND/FRAND承诺裁决专利权人和潜在被许可人的争议。

反之，国际电信联盟政策包含了下面的免责申明：标准是由技术专家而非专利专家制定，于是他们未必很熟悉知识产权（比如专利）复杂的国际法律状况。

该组织不会在谈判许可或者解决专利纠纷方面的扮演任何角色，应由相关各方自行处理具体的专利事务，处理的方式可能因具体案例不同而不同。

欧盟委员会也在2017年的阐述欧盟标准必要专利的方法一文中提到，目前由于FRAND 的含义不清，存在不同的解释，使得授权受到阻碍，在估价原则上的争论尤其激烈。

因此，在确定FRAND专利许可费率问题上，专利权人和实施人基于各自的立场往往有不同观点，诉诸法院后，法官也难以直接根据标准组织的定义作为指引来解决纠纷。

1引言标准必要专利是指实施特定的技术标准而必须使用的专利。

在以移动通信产业为代表的新兴产业中，专利作为最重要的技术成果，引领着产业的发展。

将专利纳入技术标准成为推动产业发展的重要方式之一，也是企业在行业内争夺话语权的有力举措。

根据国家知识产权局知识产权发展研究中心2022年6月6日发布的报告显示，当前全球声明的5G 标准必要专利共21万件，涉及4.7万项专利族。

其中，中国声明1.8万项专利族，占比近40%，排名第一；华为公司声明5G 标准必要专利族6500余项，占比14%，全球居首。

中国的技术创新在全球5G 通信产业中的引领效应愈发抢眼。

由于标准必要专利对于标准实施的不可替代性以及专利权的私有性，专利权人为获取最大利益，可能会明知其专利即将被纳入标准，却隐瞒相关专利信息，使标准制定的组织者和标准实施者未能及时识别出标准中的专利，进而在标准实施过程中向实施者主张其专利权，并通过提起侵权诉讼或申请禁令救济的方式挟持标准的实施者，以索取高额的许可使用费[1]。

另一方面，标准必要专利权利人虽承诺在FRAND （公平、合理、无歧视）原则下对专利使用进行许可，但鉴于实施者和权利人立场的天然对立属性，双方可能对于许可条款产生争议，最终无法取得一致，在标准实施过程中往往产生许多诉讼案件，即便最终达成一致，在协商过程中也会产生较高的谈判成本[2]。

同时，权利人是否做到公平、合理、无歧视地进行许可的认定依据不明确，特别是许可费率的确定。

因此，标准必要专利的信息披露对于标准的实施来说具有重大影响。

在法律法规框架内，《国家标准涉及专利的管理规定（暂行）》（以下简称《管理规定》）规定：参与标准制定的组织或者个人未按要求披露其拥有的专利，违反诚实信用原则的，应当承担相应法律责任；对于涉及专利的国家标准批准发布之前，Research on Information Disclosure System of Standard Essential Patent under FRAND PrincipleZHANG Chenyu（Shanxi Provincial Inspection and Testing Center 〔Shanxi Provincial Institute of Standard Metrology Technology 〕，Taiyuan030006，China ）Abstract ：This paper analyzes the existing standard essential patent information disclosure system in China ，and under the FRAND principle ，puts forward suggestions on five aspects of information disclosure applicable objects ，information disclosure obligors ，information disclosure period ，information disclosure content and treatment of undisclosed information.The purpose of this paper is to provide reference for the improvement of China's standard essential patent information disclosure system by standardizing information disclosure behavior.Key words ：FRAND principle ；standard essential patent ；information disclosureFRAND 原则下标准必要专利信息披露制度研究张辰宇（山西省检验检测中心〔山西省标准计量技术研究院〕，山西太原030006）【摘要】本文对我国现有的标准必要专利信息披露制度进行了分析，并在FRAND 原则下，对信息披露适用对象、信息披露义务人、信息披露期间、信息披露内容及信息未披露的处理五个方面提出了建议，旨在通过规范信息披露行为，对完善我国标准必要专利信息披露制度提供参考。

中美贸易摩擦背景下涉及国家安全的知识产权面临的风险及对策建议 ●吴潇菲[内容提要] 随着国际形势的发展，知识产权早已和国家安全紧密不可分离。

近些年，我国有关国家安全的知识产权面临着前所未有的风险和挑战。

在中美贸易摩擦大背景下，我国知识产权遭遇美国的霸权和挑衅，企业“走出去”更加困难，知识产权对外转让难度持续升级。

同时我国内部涉及国家安全的知识产权相关问题也暴露出来，国防知识产权转化率偏低，知识产权制度上也存在风险。

因此提出了拥有和保护核心技术、规避海外知识产权风险、善用知识产权联盟与专业资源、应对中美贸易摩擦背景下的纠纷、严格管理涉及国家安全的知识产权对外转让、出台相关补充制度应对制度化风险等对策来帮助我国顺利通过“中美贸易摩擦”挑战，更快达到“知识产权强国”目标。

[关键词] 知识产权 国家安全 中美贸易摩擦 风险 制度化中图分类号：F742 文献标识码：A 文章编号：1003-0670（2020）11-0087-06知识产权是国家发展的战略性资源和国际竞争力的核心要素，知识产权保护全球化的趋势越来越明显，知识产权国际争端日益复杂和深化，世界各国均高度关注自身在国际知识产权保护领域的参与权、话语权和主动权。

一、涉及国家安全的知识产权相关风险（一）中美贸易摩擦下的知识产权风险美国为了维护其在知识产权市场的优势地位，利用各种手段，试图挤压、渗透和掌控我国的知识产权市场。

1.美国“301调查”。

2017年8月，美国总统特朗普以中国的法规、政策和行为“可能损害美国的知识产权、创新或者技术发展”为由，指示美国贸易代表办公室（USTR）对中国发起“301调查”。

美国“301报告”提出的四个方面的诘责：一是中国政府的产业政策致使外商在若干高技术领域不得不与中方合资，合资不可避免地导致外商技术流向中方实体，这无异于强迫外商向中国转让技术；二是中国政府未能根据TRIPS的要求，在技术许可事项上为外商提供国民待遇，反而实行内外有别的政策，对美国在华技术许可构成了歧视；三是“中国制造2025”将“支持企业在境外开展并购和股权投资”、“实施海外投资计划”，作为获取“中国制造2025”所需关键技术的政策手段；四是中国政府长期支持非法获取美国公司的商业秘密，并将其归纳通过网络入侵盗取机密信息、行政审批中的强制信息披露。

摘　要：近期，欧盟出台了《关于标准必要专利和修订（EU）2017/1001号条例的提案》，本文对该提案的发布背景和具体措施进行了分析，并围绕该提案对我国企业的影响、知识产权政策启示以及我国产业与企业应对进行了探讨。

该提案意图建立更具透明性、可预测性的体系以促进SEP许可，提出“建立职能中心”“确定总许可费率”“支持中小微企业”等措施。

提案虽加重了SEP权利人的负担，但对于我国为数众多的SEP实施者来说，有助于增强SEP许可中的透明性和可预测性。

我国政府、学者和产业界可以借鉴欧盟做法，研究这些措施在中国的可行性，提出符合我国利益与实际情况的方案，相关产业与企业应当积极研究草案内容，关注后续动态，充分利用规则。

关键词：标准必要专利，知识产权政策，欧盟提案DOI编码：10.3969/j.issn.1674-5698.2023.11.006Comment on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Standard Essential Patents and Amending Regulation (EU)2017/1001 and China’s ResponseJI Yu XING Yu * ZHENG Xuan（China Jiliang University ）Abstract: Recently, the European Union has issued the “Proposal on Standard Essential Patents and Amendment(EU) Regulation 2017/1001”. This paper analyzes the background and specific measures of the proposal, and explores the impact of the proposal on Chinese enterprises, the inspiration of intellectual property policies, and the response of Chinese industries and enterprises. The proposal aims to establish a more transparent and predictable system to promote SEP licensing, proposing measures such as “establishing functional centers”, “determining total licensing rates”, and “supporting small and medium-sized enterprises”. Although the proposal increases the burden on SEP rights holders, it helps to enhance transparency and predictability in SEP licensing for many SEP implementers in China. Our government, scholars, and industry can learn from the practices of the European Union,欧盟《关于标准必要专利和修订（EU）2017/1001号条例的提案》述评与我国应对冀 瑜 邢 禹* 郑 璇（中国计量大学）基金项目： 本课题受之江实验室开放项目“智能计算领域标准必要专利的导航策略研究”（项目编号：K2022NH0AB03） 和浙江省科技计划重点软科学研究项目“科技型中小企业知识产权证券化路径研究—以温州为例”（项目编 号：2021C25030）资助。

EUROPEANCOMMISSIONBrussels, 29.11.2017COM(2017) 712 finalCOMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIALCOMMITTEESetting out the EU approach to Standard Essential PatentsI NTRODUCTIONThe interplay between patents and standards is important for innovation and growth. Standards ensure that interoperable and safe technologies are widely disseminated among companies and consumers. Patents provide R&D with incentives and enable innovative companies to receive an adequate return on investments. Standards1frequently make reference to technologies that are protected by patents. A patent that protects technology essential to a standard is called a standard-essential patent (SEP). SEPs therefore protect technologies that are essential for complying with technical standards and for marketing products based on such standards.Standards support innovation and growth in Europe, in particular providing for interoperability of digital technologies that are the foundation of the Digital Single Market (DSM). For example, computers, smartphones or tablets connect to the internet or other devices via standardised technologies such as long-term evolution (LTE), WiFi, or Bluetooth, all of which are protected by SEPs. Without the widespread use of such standardised technologies, such interconnectivity would not be possible2.In the hyper-connected era, interconnectivity becomes even more crucial. A wide range of new products need to be interconnected, as to provide consumers with additional products and services (e.g. smart house appliances) and to create new business opportunities for European companies.The digitalisation of the economy creates great opportunities for EU industry. The estimated economic potential of IoT applications in devices for humans, homes, offices, factories, worksites, retail environments, cities, vehicles and the outdoors will be up to EUR 9 trillion per year by 2025 in developed countries3. The digitalisation of products and services can add more than EUR 110 billion in revenue to the European economy per year over the next five years4. The ability of connected devices and systems to work together is crucial for maximising this economic potential. Without interoperability, enabled by standards, 40 % of the potential benefits of IoT systems would not be reaped5.Without formal standardisation and SEPs, there would be, for example, no connected vehicles. Telediagnosis or remote operations with distant hospitals or to exchange patient information would not be possible either. Patent holders contribute technology for developing standards within standard developing organisations (SDOs). Once a standard is established and the holders of the SEPs have given a commitment to license them on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms, the technology included in the standard should be available to any potential user of the standard. Smooth licensing practices are therefore essential to guarantee fair, reasonable and non-1Regulation (EU) 1025/2012 on European standardisation defines the meaning of the terms “standard” and “technical specification”. In this document the term “standard” is used with both meanings for the sake of brevity.2 For instance, company X marketing residential alarm systems connected to the internet both via WiFi and LTE to provide consumers with enhanced security in case of power cut, would need a licence for these standardised technologies.3McKinsey, 2015. See also the objective set by President Juncker for 5G and the IoT in the State of the Union speech, 14.9.2016.4PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2015 and Boston Consulting Group, 2015. See also: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/digitising-european-industry#usefullinks5 See McKinsey (2015).discriminatory access to the standardised technologies and to reward patent holders so they continue to invest in R&D and standardisation activities. This in turn plays a prominent role in developing a connected society, where new market players outside the traditional ICT sectors (producers of household appliances, connected cars, etc.) need access to the standardised technology.The evidence however suggests that the licensing and enforcement of SEPs is not seamless and may lead to conflicts. Technology users accuse SEP holders of charging excessive licensing fees based on weak patent portfolios and of using litigation threats. SEP holders claim that technology users 'free ride' on their innovations and consciously infringe intellectual property rights (IPR) without engaging in good faith licensing negotiations6. Problems may be particularly acute when players coming from new industrial sectors who are unfamiliar with the traditional ICT business need access to standardised technologies. Disputes and delays in negotiations between technological users and holders may ultimately delay the widespread use of key standardised technologies. This can hamper the development of interconnected products in Europe, eventually affecting the competitiveness of the EU economy.In its April 2016 Communication on Standardisation Priorities for the Digital Single Market7, the Commission identified three main areas where the SEP licensing environment could be improved: opaque information on SEP exposure; unclear valuation of patented technologies reading on standards and the definition of FRAND; and the risk of uncertainty in enforcement of SEPs. In addition, the role of open source communities in the development of standards also should be assessed.There is therefore a need for a clear, balanced and reasonable policy for Standard Essential Patents in the EU with the aim of contributing to the development of the Internet of Things and harnessing Europe's lead role in in this context.Conflicting interests of stakeholders in certain SDOs may make it difficult for these organisations to provide effective guidance on such complex legal and intellectual property (IP) policy issues. Licensing platform initiatives in this area are still at an early stage and have not yet been adopted by implementers, who may well be hesitant given the uncertainty in the current SEP regulatory environment and who have little incentive to enter into a deal in this context.In addition, the standardisation of 5G and IoT is a global issue. Europe's industry retains a leading position in many sectors in global markets. The Commission notes the important role European standardisation plays in the global context8.The Commission therefore considers that there is an urgent need to set out key principles that foster a balanced, smooth and predictable framework for SEPs. These key principles reflect two main objectives: incentivising the development and inclusion of top technologies in standards, by preserving fair and adequate return for these contributions, and ensuring smooth and wide dissemination of standardised technologies based on fair access conditions. A balanced and successful policy on SEPs licensing should work to the benefit of start-ups in 6The economic stakes are very high: for example, the royalty income for 2G, 3G and 4G standards is approximately EUR 18 billion per year (CRA 2016).7The public consultation organised by the Commission in 2014 clearly shows divergent opinions on the challenges and solutions concerning the SEP environment. See http://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/newsroom/cf/itemdetail.cfm?item_id=7833.8 Patents declared to the ETSI represent 70% of worldwide SEPs (IPlytics, 2017).Europe and should serve all EU citizens by giving them access to products and services based on the best performing standardised technology.This Communication draws on the responsibility of all actors in the SEP licensing context, and all stakeholders are encouraged to contribute to making this framework work in practice. It is not intended to represent a statement of the law and is without prejudice to the interpretation of EU law by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). It does not bind the Commission as regards the application of EU rules on competition, and in particular Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).1.I NCREASING TRANSPARENCY ON SEP S EXPOSUREInformation on the existence, scope and relevance of SEPs is vital for fair licensing negotiations and for allowing potential users of a standard to identify the scale of their exposure to SEPs and necessary licensing partners. However, currently the only information on SEPs accessible to users can be found in declaration databases maintained by SDOs which may lack transparency. This situation makes licensing negotiations and the anticipation of risks related to SEPs particularly difficult to navigate for start-ups and SMEs. The primary purpose of declarations is to reassure an SDO and all third parties that the technology will be accessible to users, typically under a commitment to license under FRAND conditions.SDO databases may record tens of thousands of SEPs for a single standard, and this trend is growing9. The declarations are based on a self-assessment by the patent holder, and are not subject to scrutiny regarding the essentiality of the declared patent, which can evolve in the course of the standard adoption procedure. In addition, stakeholders report that even in concrete licensing negotiations licensors fail to substantiate their claims with more precise information. This is particularly unsatisfactory in the context of IoT where new players with little experience of SEPs licensing are continually entering the market for connectivity. The Commission therefore believes that measures, as outlined below, are needed to improve the information on SEPs.1.1.I MPROVING QUALITY AND ACCESSIBILITY OF INFORMATION RECORDED IN SDODATABASESThe Commission believes that SDOs should provide detailed information in their databases to support the SEP licensing framework. While SDO databases collect large amounts of declaration data10, they often do not provide user-friendly accessibility to interested parties, and lack essential quality features. The Commission therefore takes the view that the quality and accessibility of the databases should be improved11. First, data should be easily accessible through user friendly interfaces, both for patent holders, implementers and third parties. All declared information should be searchable based on the relevant standardisation projects, which may also require the transformation of historic data into current formats. Quality processes should eliminate also duplications and other obvious flaws. Finally, there should be links to patent office databases, including updates of patent status, ownership and its transfer. 9For instance, more than 23 500 patents have been declared essential to the Global System for Mobile Communication standard and the 3G or Universal Mobile Telecommunication System standards developed at the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). Such standard apply to all smartphones and devices having a mobile connection. For more figures, see 'Landscaping study on SEPs' IPlytics (2017) and 'Patents and Standards - A modern framework for IPR-based standardization' ECSIP (2014).10 Some SDOs require specific patent disclosures as they recognise their benefits, while others permit blanket declarations. This section of the Communication refers to SDOs with specific patent disclosure.11See for example the long running 'DARE' project to improve the ETSI’s database.Work on improving databases needs to be combined with a stricter scrutiny on compliance with declaration obligations as defined in current SDO policies to avoid incomplete declarations12.1.2.D EVELOPING AN INFORMATION TOOL TO ASSIST LICENSING NEGOTIATIONSThe Commission notes that the current declaration system in SDOs supports the technical standard setting process and is not geared towards future SEP licensing. However, it is clear that there are net benefits in extending the current practice and purpose of declarations and databases to the creation of new transparency tools which, without losing their main purpose, can greatly facilitate licensing negotiation. Proportionality considerations are essential in this context. Whilst excessive burdens for stakeholders should be avoided, it should be born in mind that in concrete licensing negotiations, patent holders necessarily have to invest in substantiating to SEP users why patents from the patent holders' portfolio are essential to the standard or how these patents are being infringed13. The Commission therefore believes that proposed incremental improvements with controlled costs can substantially reduce overall transaction costs during licensing negotiations as well as infringement risks, to benefit both parties in negotiations14.1.2.1.More up-to-date and precise declarationsDeclarations occur early on in the standardisation process, with normally no review later on. However, technical solutions proposed in standards negotiations evolve up until the final standard15 is agreed. While the majority of declarations concern patent applications, the patent claims under the final patent granted after adoption of the standard can differ considerably16, as their content may change during the granting process. Therefore, rightholders should review the relevance of their declarations at the time of adoption of the final standard (and subsequent significant revisions) and when a final granting decision on the patent is taken. Declarations should also include enough information to assess patent exposure. Patent holders should at least make reference to the section of the standard that is relevant to the SEP and to the link with the patent family. Declarations should also clearly identify a contact for the owner/licensor of the declared SEP.Finally, it should be noted that SEPs on key technologies are more frequently litigated17. Associated information is relevant for all interested licensees and can play a role in limiting the possibility of future litigation. SDOs should therefore provide the possibility and incentives for patent holders and technology users to report the case reference and main outcome of final decisions, positive or negative, on declared SEPs (including on essentiality and patent validity). As companies usually only litigate a few valuable patents within a portfolio, and both patent holders and users should have an interest in reporting decisions in their respective favour, the associated burden of this measure would be limited.12 For further details, please see the summary report of the public consultation organised by DG GROW in 2015. http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/14482/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/native.13 See CRA (2016).14 See section 3 below in relation to effective enforcement.15 For instance, a potential patent or patent application initially declared for a candidate technology may not be retained in the released standard, or the declared patent application may be revised during the granting process.16 For instance, 71% of SEPs declared at major SDOs (73% at the ETSI) are only granted after the standard has been released (IPlytics, 2017).17 See ECSIP (2014).1.2.2.Essentiality checksEvidence points to the risk of broad over-declarations and makes a strong case for more reliability with respect to SEP essentiality18. Stakeholders report that recorded declarations create a de facto presumption of essentiality in negotiations with licensees19. This scenario places a high burden on any willing licensee, especially SMEs and start-ups, to check the essentiality of a large number of SEPs in licensing negotiations.There is therefore a need for a higher degree of scrutiny on essentiality claims. This would require scrutiny being performed by an independent party with technical capabilities and market recognition, at the right point in time. Having said this, introducing such a scrutiny requirement to SEPs must be balanced against the cost20. However, an incremental approach, whereby scrutiny takes place at the request of either rightholders or prospective users, calibrating the depth of scrutiny and limiting checks to one patent within a family and to samples, could ensure the right cost-benefit balance of this measure21.1.2.3.Means of implementationWhile there are clear benefits to such increased transparency, the related burden needs to remain proportionate. Measures could therefore be extended gradually, and apply to new and key standards only, e.g. 5G.As a first step, stakeholders could be incentivised to value increased transparency, e.g. by way of certification that their declared SEP portfolios comply with transparency criteria. This certification could later be used in licensing negotiations and litigation. In addition, a recent study undertaken for the Commission suggests that SDOs may consider introducing (modest) fees for confirming SEP declarations after standard release and patent grants, to incentive SEP holders to revise and maintain only relevant declarations22.When considering essentiality checks, patent offices may well be natural candidates for exploiting synergies and reducing costs23. The Commission will support further analysis of their feasibility to ensure effective and proportionate solutions.Depending on the outcome of this project, an independent European body could be tasked to proceed with SEP essentiality assessment.18 See IPlytics (2017) and CRA (2016) and the summary of DG GROW public consultation on SEPs (2015).19 A number of studies on various key technologies suggests that when rigorously tested, only between 10% and 50% of declared patents are essential (CRA, 2016 and IPlytics, 2017).20 The cost of essentiality checks may be negligible compared to licensing revenues for key technologies (see CRA, 2016).21 For an analysis of cost and benefits, please see IPlytics (2017).22 See CRA (2016).23 See IPlytics (2017).2.G ENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR FRAND LICENSING TERMS FOR SEP SThe Commission considers that the parties are best placed to arrive at a common understanding of what are fair licensing conditions and fair rates, through good faith negotiations. Currently, licensing is hampered by unclear and diverging interpretations of the meaning of FRAND. The debate is particularly heated when it comes to valuation principles. Divergent views and litigation over FRAND licensing risk delaying the uptake of new technologies, standardisation processes and the roll-out of IoT in Europe. The Commission considers therefore that it is both necessary and beneficial to establish a first set of key signposts on the FRAND concept, so as to provide for a more stable licensing environment, guide parties in their negotiations and reduce litigation.The guiding elements set out below are based on the results of a public consultation24, analysis of best practices25, studies26, as well as national case law27. The Commission encourages stakeholders to engage in dialogue with each other and with the Commission, with the view to achieving further clarification and developing best practices. The Commission will monitor progress achieved and take complementary action on FRAND licensing, as needed.2.1.L ICENSING PRINCIPLESAs the CJEU has confirmed, an 'undertaking to grant licences on FRAND terms creates legitimate expectations on the part of third parties that the proprietor of the SEP will in fact grant licences on such terms'28.Both parties must be willing to engage in good faith negotiations, with the view to establishing licensing conditions that are fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory. Parties to a SEP licensing agreement, negotiating in good faith, are in the best position to determine the FRAND terms most appropriate to their specific situation.Efficiency considerations, reasonable licence fee expectations on both sides, the facilitation of the uptake by implementers to promote wide diffusion of the standard should be taken into account. It should be stressed in this respect that there is no one-size-fit-all solution to what FRAND is: what can be considered fair and reasonable differs from sector to sector and over time. For this reason, the Commission encourages stakeholders to pursue sectoral discussions with a view to establishing common licensing practices, based on the principles reflected in this Communication.The Commission considers that the following IP valuation principles should be taken into account:Licensing terms have to bear a clear relationship to the economic value of the patented technology. That value primarily needs to focus on the technology itself and in principle should not include any element resulting from the decision to include the technology in the standard.In cases where the technology is developed mainly for the standard and has little market value outside the standard, alternative evaluation 24 Public consultation on patents and standards: A modern framework for standardisation involving intellectual property rights.25 Licensing Terms of Standard Essential Patents: A Comprehensive Analysis of Cases, JRC 201726Study on Transparency, Predictability and Efficiency of SDO-based Standardization and SEP Licensing, Published on: 12/12/2016, (CRA study).27 See, in particular, Unwired Planet v. Huaweï [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat).28 Case C-170/13 Huawei Technologies, EU:C:2015:477, paragraph 53methods, such as the relative importance of the technology in the standard compared to other contributions in the standard, should be considered.∙Determining a FRAND value should require taking into account the present value added29of the patented technology. That value should be irrespective of the market success of the product which is unrelated to the patented technology.∙FRAND valuation should ensure continued incentives for SEP holders to contribute their best available technology to standards.∙Finally, to avoid royalty stacking, in defining a FRAND value, an individual SEP cannot be considered in isolation. Parties need to take into account a reasonable aggregate rate for the standard, assessing the overall added value of the technology30.The implementation of measures on SEP transparency can already support this objective. It can be addressed further, within the scope of EU competition law, by the creation of industry licensing platforms and patent pools, or based on indications by standardisation participants on the maximum cumulative rate that could be reasonably envisaged or expected.2.2.E FFICIENCY AND NON-DISCRIMINATIONThe non-discrimination element of FRAND indicates that rightholders cannot discriminate between implementers that are 'similarly situated'31.Given that FRAND is not one-size-fits-all, solutions can differ from sector to sector and depending on the business models in question.As mentioned above, FRAND negotiations imply good faith negotiations from both parties. Efficiency considerations can come into play as well. Transaction costs relating to the negotiation of a licence should be kept to the minimum necessary. Furthermore, in sectors where cross-licencing practices are widespread, efficiency gains related to such practices should be taken into account. These points need to be taken into account when assessing on a case by case basis whether a licensing offer is compatible with FRAND.In line with the approach presented above, the Commission considers that the same principles of efficiency support the practice of SEP portfolio licensing for products with global circulation32. As noted in a recent ruling33, a country-by-country licensing approach may not be efficient and may not be in line with a recognised commercial practice in the sector.2.3.P ATENT POOLS AND LICENSING PLATFORMS TO FACILITATE SEP LICENSINGThe creation of patent pools or other licensing platforms, within the scope of EU competition law, should be encouraged. They can address many of the SEP licensing challenges by offering better scrutiny on essentiality, more clarity on aggregate licensing fees and one-stop- shop solutions. For IoT industries, and particularly SMEs, newly exposed to SEP licensing disputes, this will bring more clarity to licensing conditions of SEP holders in a specific sector.29The present value is the value discounted to the time of the conclusion of the licence agreement. Allowing for the discounting over time is important against the backdrop of licence agreement running over several years in sometimes technologically fast moving business environments.30 On royalty stacking see CRA study.31 Unwired Planet v. Huaweï [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat).32However, FRAND licensing requires remuneration to be calculated in a manner that implementers wishing to develop a product for a specific, geographically limited area are not placed at a disadvantage.33 Unwired Planet v. Huaweï [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat).Measures to encourage the setting up of pools for key standardised technologies should be encouraged, e.g. facilitating access to pool management offers and technical assistance by SDO34. The Commission will consider further measures if these efforts are ineffective in IoT sectors.2.4.E XPLOITING AND DEEPENING FRAND EXPERTISEThere is a need to increase accessibility of experience, expertise and know-how around FRAND determination. Valuable insight has been gained and approaches developed from licensing agreements, mediations, arbitrations and court decisions over many years. Significant resources and efforts have been devoted to clarifying, analysing and valuing patents and technology. As there is no common repository for such expertise, work and research may be unnecessarily duplicated at serious cost to the parties involved. More accessible FRAND-related information could increase predictability for businesses such as IoT players, facilitate the licensing process in general and provide support and benchmarks in dispute settlement.The Commission will therefore set up an expert group with the view to gathering industry practice and additional expertise on FRAND licencing. In addition, the Commission will use all appropriate tools available to obtain further information to support its policy making with sufficient evidence.34For instance, the creation of pools may be encouraged by means of measures such as strengthening the relationship between SDOs and pools, providing incentives to participation and making universities and SMEs more aware of the advantages of becoming a licensor in a pool (ECSIP, 2015).3.A PREDICTABLE ENFORCEMENT ENVIRONMENT FOR SEP SDisputes on SEPs are an important factor in the licensing system when negotiations fail. A balanced and predictable enforcement environment has particularly positive effects on parties’ behaviour during negotiations, which in turn can speed up the spread of standardised technologies. IoT stakeholders report however that uncertainties and imbalances in the enforcement system have serious implications for market entry. SEPs show a higher degree of litigation than other patents35, which reinforces the need for a clear dispute framework in this area. While this Communication focuses on specific guidance on Standard Essential Patents, the Guidance on certain aspects of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the enforcement of intellectual property rights36 clarifies the IPRED regime more generally.The possibility to enforce is one of the key aspects of intellectual property rights37. The debate in the SEPs area has mainly focused on the availability of injunctive relief. Such relief aims to protect SEP holders against infringers unwilling to conclude a licence on FRAND terms. At the same time, safeguards are needed against the risk that good-faith technology users threatened with an injunction accept licensing terms that are not FRAND, or in the worst case, are unable to market their products (hold-ups).3.1.AVAILABILITY OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF UNDER THE H UAWEI VS ZTE JURISPRUDENCE In its Huawei judgment38, the CJEU established obligations applying to both sides of a SEP-licensing agreement, when assessing whether the holder of a SEP can seek an injunction against a potential licensee without being in breach of Article 102 TFEU. SEP holders may not seek injunctions against users willing to enter into a licence on FRAND terms, and the CJEU established behavioural criteria to assess when a potential licensee can be considered willing to enter into such a licence.The Commission considers that the elements below – which arise from national case-law in applying the Huawei judgment39, provide useful additional guidance for stakeholders.A number of courts have stressed that a prospective SEP licensee has to receive sufficiently detailed and relevant information to determine the relevance of the SEP portfolio and 35 ECSIP (2014).36COM(2017)70837Directive 2004/48/EC of 29.4.2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, pub. OJ L 195 of 2.6.2004, recital 338 Case C-170/13 Huawei Technologies, EU:C:2015:477.39 The CJEU held that Article 102 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that the proprietor of a patent essential to a standard established by a standardisation body, which has given an irrevocable undertaking to that body to grant a licence to third parties on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (‘FRAND’) terms, does not abuse its dominant position, within the meaning of that article, by bringing an action for infringement seeking an injunction prohibiting the infringement of its patent or seeking the recall of products for the manufacture of which that patent has been used, as long as:(1) prior to bringing that action, the proprietor has, first, alerted the alleged infringer of the infringement complained about by designating that patent and specifying the way in which it has been infringed, and, secondly, after the alleged infringer has expressed its willingness to conclude a licensing agreement on FRAND terms, presented to that infringer a specific, written offer for a licence on such terms, specifying, in particular, the royalty and the way in which it is to be calculated, and(2) where the alleged infringer continues to use the patent in question, the alleged infringer has not diligently responded to that offer, in accordance with recognised commercial practices in the field and in good faith, this being a matter which must be established on the basis of objective factors and which implies, in particular, that there are no delaying tactics.。

尽管欧洲电信标准协会(ETSI)成员认为应当重视知识产权的运用，但是ETSI并不审查知识产权是否有效或重要。

附件6（ the ETSI Rules of Procedure的附件6）也没有定义“基于公平、合理、不歧视（FRAND，即fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory）原则授予专利”的概念为何。

本案的争议及相关问题需要法院的初步裁决（preliminary ruling）。

华为技术有限公司（以下简称“华为”）是一家活跃在电信行业的跨国公司，此外，华为掌握了“在通信系统中建立同步信号的方法和设备”技术，由EPC缔约国的德意志联邦共和国授予的EP 2 090 050 B 1号专利。

2009年3月4日，华为告知ETSI该专利对“长期演进技术”（Long Term Evolution）标准起着实质性作用。

同时，华为具有基于FRAND原则许可第三方使用该专利的保证义务。

提请法院（the referring court）指出，该专利对“长期演进技术”标准来说至关重要，因为任何使用该标准的人都不可避免地使用该专利（该意见仅供参考）。

在2010年11月至2011年3月底之间，华为和中兴通讯股份有限公司（以下简称“中兴”）进行谈判，协商有关侵犯EP 2 090 050 B 1号专利和基于FRAND 条款授予这些产品专利许可的可能性。

中兴是一家活跃在电信行业的跨国公司集团，它在德国以给产品配备与前述标准相符的软件为市场目标。

华为表示，中兴应当支付专利许可费，而中兴意图寻求交叉许可协议。

但是，双方并未达成有关许可协议的合意。

尽管如此，中兴开拓根据“长期演进技术”标准运作产品的市场，并使用了EP 2 090 050 B 1号专利。

但中兴却未曾为其过去的使用行为付费，比如支付专利使用费或向华为提供其销售数据。

2011年4月28日，根据EPC第64条及德国《专利法》第139段，以及最近多次修改的2011年11月24日所颁布的法律的第13段，华为以专利侵权为由向中兴提起诉讼，欲寻求停止侵权禁令、提供销售数据、召回侵权产品及获得损害赔偿。

标准必要专利领域比例原则与FRAND承诺关于标准必要专利，在实务中“劫持”和“反劫持”的不当行为均大量出现，而又因标准必要专利本身所涉及的法律问题复杂且影响范围广泛，针对如何适用和限制禁令，才能平衡标准必要专利权人与标准实施者之间的利益的问题，理论和实务中均展开了广泛的探讨。

对标准必要专利禁令予以适当限制，其中一个重要的原因在于司法者认为标准必要专利蕴含着公共利益的部分需要予以保障，同时，对于非善意实施人，也需要保留禁令的威胁。

标准必要专利是一种“人为稀缺产品”，并非完全自由竞争的产品，在标准制定过程中排除了其他可替代技术的进入。

标准必要专利有利于行业标准化的实施，其在增强产品通用性、提升企业竞争水平并便利消费者使用方面发挥重要作用。

但是这些优势的发挥需建立在标准必要专利持有人对于所有真实希望使用该专利进行产品生产的厂家进行公平、合理授权的前提之上。

倘若标准必要专利持有人不公平或者拒绝授权，则有可能损害市场中的竞争。

禁令的滥用可能引起反竞争效果。

华为公司诉美国IDC公司案中，IDC公司要求华为公司支付远远高于其他公司许可费的高额标准必要专利许可费，并要求华为公司免费许可IDC公司使用华为的专利，在华为拒绝后请求禁令救济。

华为公司起诉的事由是IDC作为标准必要专利权人滥用其市场支配地位。

该案反应出，如果滥用禁令，会导致三个后果：1、专利劫持。

即利用专利的法定排他特性，赋予其强大市场力量，进行专利劫持。

2、危害市场竞争。

首先，收取高昂的许可费，增加市场竞争成本。

其次，采取歧视性许可条件，也破坏了市场竞争秩序。

3、阻碍技术创新。

一方面，排挤竞争对手，阻碍竞争性技术创新，影响技术市场健康发展。

另一方面，垄断技术研发，阻碍后续创新。

比例原则与FRAND承诺具有同样的目标。

FRAND原则是指公平、合理和无歧视，虽然被广泛采纳，但是具体含义模糊，在实务中的可实施性偏弱。

这引发标准必要专利权人和实施者关于确定许可费和许可条款方面的争议和纠纷；一定程度上限制了对专利劫持和反劫持行为的约束有效性,造成必要专利被滥用案件数量激增。

欧盟防伪指令2011-62-EU(中英文)2011年6月8日通过的欧洲议会和理事会指令2011/62/EU 就防止假药进入合法的供应链,修订指令2001/83/EC,该指令是人用药品的共同体法典欧洲议会和欧盟理事会.关于欧盟的运行条款,特别是条款114和条款168(4)的(C)点.关于欧洲共同体的提案.关于欧洲经济和社会委员会关于各区域委员会的意见.按照一般立法程序执行.鉴于以下内容:(1)欧洲议会和欧盟理事会指令2001/83/EC制定的关于，尤其是，在欧盟境内生产、进口、上市和销售的药品和活性成分的管理条例。

(2)在欧盟境内发现药品在同质性、历史和来源上的造假现象有惊人的增长。

这些假药通常包含不符合标准的或造假的组分，或缺少组分，或包括API 在内的组分的含量不准确，这些都将严重威胁到公众健康。

(3)以往的经验表明，这些假药仅能通过非法途径到达患者手中，而不是通过合法的供应链。

这威胁到人类健康并且可能导致病人丧失对合法供应链的的信任。

为了应对类似威胁的增长，应修订指令2001/83/EC。

(4)建立IMPACT（国际药品防伪工作组）的WHO也认识到了该威胁，IMPACT为国家立法机构起草了条例和规定来防止假药，并在2007年12月12日的IMPACT的全体大会中通过。

欧盟积极参与了AMPACT。

(5)为了将假药和非法药品以及侵权药品进行正确区分，必须对“假药”进行定义。

另外，不能将假药和由生产或销售错误引起的有质量缺陷的非专利药品混淆在一起。

为了确保指令的统一执行，应同时定义“活性成分”和“辅料”。

(6)根据指令2001/83/EC的规定，采购、储存、持有、供应或出口药品的人员只有获得分销授权才有资格从事相关活动。

但是，现在的药品销售网变的复杂，很多非必要的分销商也参与其中。

为了确保供应链的可靠性，药品立法机构应规定供应链中所有的角色。

这不仅包括批发商，不管他们是否处理了药品，还包括参与药品销售或采购但未亲自销售或采购药品或未亲自拥有和处理药品的经纪人。

国家市场监督管理总局关于《标准必要专利反垄断指引》的解读文章属性•【公布机关】国家市场监督管理总局•【公布日期】2024.11.08•【分类】法规、规章解读正文关于《标准必要专利反垄断指引》的解读为预防和制止经营者滥用标准必要专利排除、限制竞争行为，保护市场公平竞争，鼓励创新，提高经济运行效率，维护消费者利益和社会公共利益，市场监管总局印发了《标准必要专利反垄断指引》（以下简称《指引》）。

现就相关内容进行解读：一、必要性（一）保护市场公平竞争的迫切需要。

当前，标准必要专利许可实践覆盖无线通信、音视频、物联网等众多领域，许可主体趋向多元，许可模式日益复杂，在正常商业行为和反竞争行为之间存在模糊地带，增加了企业经营活动的不可预期性，也为反垄断监管执法带来挑战。

《指引》明确标准必要专利领域反垄断监管执法有关制度规则，加强信息披露、许可承诺、善意谈判等行为指引和高风险行为预防，有利于为广大经营者提供清晰明确的行为遵循，促进市场公平竞争，保护产业创新发展动力。

（二）细化反垄断制度规则的内在要求。

市场监管总局高度重视规制滥用知识产权排除、限制竞争行为，起草制定《国务院反垄断委员会关于知识产权领域的反垄断指南》、《禁止滥用知识产权排除、限制竞争行为规定》等，建立健全知识产权领域反垄断制度规则体系。

《指引》聚焦标准必要专利领域，对反垄断执法制度规则进一步细化，有利于增强制度针对性和可操作性，提升反垄断监管执法的稳定性和透明度，规范和引导行业公平竞争，形成鼓励创新的政策制度环境。

（三）顺应全球治理趋势的具体举措。

近年来，标准必要专利领域的公平竞争问题受到国内外高度关注，各国结合产业发展需求，制定出台有针对性的政策措施。

制定出台《指引》有利于主动顺应国际治理趋势和产业发展大势，推动健全我国标准必要专利治理体系，及时、准确、充分释放我国政府统筹保护知识产权和促进公平竞争的政策导向，推动打造统一规范有序、鼓励创新发展的市场环境，也有利于更好参与全球公平竞争治理，服务高水平对外开放，提升我国产业国际竞争力。

标准必要专利一、标准必要专利简介标准必要专利（standards-Essential Patents,SEP）目前尚无统一明确的定义，一般认为，如果技术标准的实施必须以侵害专利权为前提，则即使存在其他可以被纳入标准的技术，该专利对相关技术标准而言，就是必要的专利。

出于寻求因公共使用目的而进行的技术标准化和专利保护之间的平衡，标准化组织在其相关知识产权政策中，不仅要求标准参与者及时向标准化组织披露其拥有或者实际控制的专利，而且要求其承诺以公平（fair）、合理（reasonable）和非歧视（no-discriminatory）条件许可所有标准实施者利用其专利。

这就是通常所说的标准必要专利许可使用中标准必要专利权人必须遵守的“FRAND”原则。

标准的制定由标准化组织（standard setting organization，SSO）负责，标准化组织根据市场、成员的需求等，从成员提议的若干选项中选择特定的技术作为标准。

在标准化组织制定技术标准前，会向企业询问其是否具有预定标准相关的必要专利。

企业在认为自己持有该相关专利时，需要向标准化组织声明如何许可该专利，如果企业选择了不许可专利或者以非FRAND方式许可专利，那么该专利涉及的技术将不被标准化组织采纳；只有企业选择以FRAND方式许可专利时，标准化组织才会考虑将该专利所涉及的技术纳入到标准中。

标准化组织具有制定标准这一非常强大的力量，其标准一旦被市场认可往往为世界通用，实际上会造成垄断。

另外，也曾经发生过SEP的权利人不允许第三人使用其专利的情况。

为此，标准化组织都制定知识产权政策，其重要内容就是要求持有覆盖其标准的专利的成员以FRAND原则来对专利进行许可。

SEP与普通专利不同，是为了遵循标准并进入市场而无法绕开的专利。

因此，不同于普通专利许可双方的自由协商，SEP的许可应当遵循一些特殊的规则，比如低廉的许可费，对于所有被许可人以相同的条件许可、不能拒绝特定人的使用许可等。

新视点·专家视点·新视点·如何划定专利劫持与反向劫持的分界线文/马乐专利权与标准化结合带来专利劫持风险SEPs许可诉讼之所以广受关注，不仅因为涉诉双方往往都是科技领域巨头，争议标的额巨大，更是由于SEPs权人与实施人之间的利益平衡在全球范围内都是令法院感到棘手的问题。

众所周知，专利天然具有垄断性。

其排他性既是专利法赋予专利权人的“特权”，也是激励创新的必要手段。

因此，“技术专利化”是任何一个发明创造者都会追求的理性选择。

当申请人获得专利授权，尤其在一些科技密集型领域，下一步的目标就是“专利标准化”。

例如，智能手机作为科技密集型产品就是一个典型的专利与标准集合体。

一部手机可以包含成百上千个专利。

这些专利体现了发明者为解决不同技术问题而创造的智力成果。

尽管人们可选择的智能手机品牌和种类繁多，但是这些手机所包含的零部件及其操作方法又有很大共性。

这种共性既是为了满足手机软硬件适配性及兼容性需求，也是市场的选择。

如果某款手机无法接收到无线网络信号或者其操作系统无法供消费者下载安装常用的应用程序，便可能迅速被市场淘汰。

上述共性的实现就是通过标准完成，而标准的实施也意味着其中所包含专利的使用。

标准的确立使得相关市场的生产商只能选择标准所覆盖的专利技术，由此发生“技术锁定”。

实施者采用某标准进行生产、经营活动，往往会因为没有其他替代标准技术或者使用其他标准技术的成本过高，而不得不向SEPs权人请求获得授权。

专利权与标准化带来的技术锁定极大增强了SEPs权人在相关市场上的议价能力。

当双方无法就专利许可达成协议时，SEPs权人通过行使或威胁行使禁令救济请求权，即可以停止实施者的生产、经营活动，甚至可将其排除出相关市场。

标准实施者为了避免沉没成本，往往会接受SEPs权人提出的要求。

此时，SEPs权人出于经济学上的机会主义就会对实施者强求不合理的高价许可费或许可条件。

SEPs权人凭借这一市场优势获得的利润，不仅包括正常专利技术的合理使用费，还攫取了使用者沉没投资的一部分。

数据法案 frand原则英文回答：The Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) principle is a set of guidelines that governs the licensing of standard-essential patents (SEPs). SEPs are patents that cover technologies that are essential to the implementation of a technical standard. The FRAND principle requires that the owner of an SEP license the patent on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.The FRAND principle is based on the idea that the owner of an SEP has a duty to share the technology with others in order to promote the development of the standard. The principle also recognizes that the owner of an SEP is entitled to a fair return on their investment.The FRAND principle has been incorporated into the antitrust laws of many countries, including the United States and the European Union. In the United States, theFRAND principle is enforced by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). In the European Union, the FRAND principle is enforced by the European Commission.The FRAND principle has been the subject of much debate in recent years. Some companies have argued that the FRAND principle is too restrictive and that it stifles innovation. Others have argued that the FRAND principle is necessary to protect consumers from being overcharged for access to essential technologies.The FRAND principle is a complex issue with no easy answers. However, it is an important principle that helpsto ensure that the development of technical standards isfair and competitive.中文回答：公平、合理和非歧视 (FRAND) 原则是规范标准必要专利 (SEP) 许可的一套准则。

欧盟的标准必要专利提案
标准必要专利是指在制定产品或技术标准时必须使用的专利，
这些专利通常涉及到关键的技术或者标准的实施。

欧盟的标准必要
专利提案致力于解决标准必要专利的合理、公平和非歧视许可问题，以保障市场竞争的公平性和创新的推动力。

欧盟的标准必要专利提案包括以下几个关键方面：
1. 合理许可条件，欧盟提倡标准必要专利持有人以合理和公平
的条件向使用者授予许可，以确保市场上的公平竞争和技术创新。

2. 非歧视许可，标准必要专利持有人应该在合理的条件下向所
有使用者授予许可，不得歧视特定的使用者或者行业。

3. 专利滥用，欧盟的标准必要专利提案禁止专利持有人滥用其
专利权，例如通过拒绝许可或者恶意提高许可费用来限制市场竞争。

4. 争端解决机制，欧盟提倡建立有效的争端解决机制，以解决
标准必要专利许可和使用中的纠纷，保障各方的合法权益。

总之，欧盟的标准必要专利提案旨在建立一个公平、合理、透明的标准必要专利许可框架，促进技术创新和市场竞争，为欧盟内部和国际市场的发展提供良好的法律和制度保障。

标准必要专利全球性许可的管辖权比较发布时间：2021-11-24T07:30:15.845Z 来源：《中国经济评论》2021年第10期作者：陈文斌[导读] 标准必要专利是指标准实施人必然要使用的，且在技术层面或者商业层面没有其他可替代方案的专利技术。

[1]它的许可地域范围既是许可合同的必备条款之一，也是确定合理使用费的考量因素之一，还可能影响在竞争法层面关于专利权人是否因搭售或者捆绑销售而构成滥用市场支配地位的判定结果。

华东政法大学标准必要专利是指标准实施人必然要使用的，且在技术层面或者商业层面没有其他可替代方案的专利技术。

[1]它的许可地域范围既是许可合同的必备条款之一，也是确定合理使用费的考量因素之一，还可能影响在竞争法层面关于专利权人是否因搭售或者捆绑销售而构成滥用市场支配地位的判定结果。

可以说，标准必要专利许可的地域范围是专利权人和实施人拟通过谈判解决的重要内容。

在双方无法协商一致的情况下，由法院裁定哪一种许可的地域范围符合“公平、合理且无歧视”（FRAND）原则。

所谓FRAND原则，也称FRAND声明，是指标准必要专利权人向标准制定组织披露标准必要专利相关信息时，不可撤销地承诺将给予标准实施人FRAND许可。

实践中，标准必要专利许可的地域范围大致分为区域性和全球性两种类型，特别是与全球性许可范围有关的内容陆续出现在各国或地区性法律文件及司法判决中。

作为许可合同的主要条款之一，许可的地域范围首先应当由标准必要专利权利人与实施人在平等自愿的基础上进行协商。

如果双方同意就专利权人持有的在多个国家获得注册的标准必要专利组合签订许可合同，那么全球性许可范围受到合同法保护则毋庸置疑。

问题在于有些国家的法院在双方当事人对于许可的地理范围有争议的情况下，径直超越其司法管辖权范围认定FRAND许可的地域范围为全球，并在此基础上裁决使用费等许可条款。

然而，专利权具有地域性特征，它仅在申请并批准注册的国家或地区范围内有效，特定国家或地区的法院原则上只能对在其境内有效的专利侵权或许可纠纷进行裁决。