巴塞尔协议III 文档

巴塞尔协议III1. 简介巴塞尔协议III （Basel III）是国际货币基金组织（IMF）和金融稳定理事会（FSB）于2010年共同制定的一项全球金融监管准则。

该协议旨在改善金融机构的资本充足性、风险管理能力和监管措施，以提高全球金融体系的韧性和稳定性。

2. 背景巴塞尔协议III的制定是对2008年全球金融危机的一项应对措施。

在危机爆发之后，全球金融体系遭受严重冲击，许多金融机构陷入困境，导致金融市场的不稳定性和信用风险的增加。

为了防止类似危机再次发生，国际监管机构开始重新审视金融监管框架，并决定加强监管要求。

3. 主要内容巴塞尔协议III的主要内容包括以下几个方面：3.1 资本要求协议规定了金融机构必须具备一定比例的核心资本和附属资本。

核心资本包括普通股和可新增的优先股，而附属资本则包括永续债券和优先债券等。

要求金融机构的资本充足率达到一定水平，以应对风险的发生。

3.2 流动性要求协议要求金融机构具备一定水平的稳定的流动性储备，以防止在短期内无法满足客户的提款需求。

金融机构需要根据其资产负债表的风险特征，制定相应的流动性风险管理计划，并向监管机构进行报告。

3.3 杠杆率要求协议引入了杠杆率要求，以限制金融机构的借贷杠杆比例。

借贷杠杆比例是指金融机构在资本不足情况下能够借入的资金数量。

通过限制杠杆率，可以减少金融机构的风险敞口，降低金融市场的不稳定性。

3.4 市场风险要求协议要求金融机构根据其市场风险敞口的大小，为市场风险保留足够的资本。

市场风险是指金融机构在金融市场上投资所面临的价值损失风险，包括利率风险、股票价格波动风险等。

4. 实施日期与影响巴塞尔协议III的实施日期为2013年1月1日。

该协议对全球金融机构的运营方式和风险管理产生了重大影响。

实施巴塞尔协议III的结果，各国金融监管机构纷纷加强了对金融机构的监管力度，要求金融机构提高核心资本和流动性水平，限制杠杆率，并建立更为严格的市场风险管理要求。

巴塞尔协议3全文介绍巴塞尔协议3（Basel III）是一个国际上的银行监管规范，旨在增强银行的资本充足性和抵御金融风险的能力。

该协议于2010年12月由巴塞尔银行监管委员会发布，是对前两个巴塞尔协议（巴塞尔协议1和巴塞尔协议2）的进一步改进和完善。

背景巴塞尔协议3的制定是对全球金融危机的应对措施之一。

全球金融危机爆发后，许多银行陷入资本不足的困境，无法应对金融市场的风险。

因此，国际社会开始呼吁改革银行监管制度，以防范未来类似的金融危机。

巴塞尔协议3作为回应，采取了一系列措施来强化银行资本和风险管理。

核心要点1. 资本要求巴塞尔协议3规定了更严格的资本要求，以确保银行有足够的资本来应对损失。

首先，对风险加权资产计量的方法进行了改进，旨在更准确地反映银行资产的风险水平。

其次，规定了更高的最低资本要求，包括最低的核心一级资本比率和总资本比率。

2. 流动性风险管理巴塞尔协议3要求银行制定和实施更加严格的流动性风险管理政策。

银行需要具备足够的流动性资产，以应对紧急情况下的资金需求。

此外，银行还需要进行定期的压力测试，以确保其流动性风险管理措施的有效性。

3. 杠杆比率巴塞尔协议3引入了杠杆比率作为一种更简单的资本要求衡量指标。

杠杆比率是银行核心一级资本与风险敞口的比例。

该指标旨在衡量银行的杠杆风险水平，以防止过度借贷。

4. 缓冲储备巴塞尔协议3要求银行建立缓冲储备，以应对经济衰退期间的损失。

缓冲储备由国际流动性缓冲储备和资本缓冲储备两部分组成。

国际流动性缓冲储备用于应对流动性风险，而资本缓冲储备用于应对信用风险。

影响巴塞尔协议3的实施对金融体系和全球经济有着重要的影响。

首先，它有助于提高银行的资本充足性和稳定性，减少金融风险，防止金融危机的发生。

其次，巴塞尔协议3的推行可能会导致银行的成本上升，因为它要求银行持有更多的资本和流动性资产。

但与此同时，这也可以促使银行更加谨慎和适度的风险管理，从而提高整个金融体系的稳定性。

The Basel III Capital Framework:a decisive breakthroughHervé HannounDeputy General Manager, Bank for International Settlements1BoJ-BIS High Level Seminar onFinancial Regulatory Reform: Implications for Asia and the PacificHong Kong SAR, 22 November 2010IntroductionTen days ago, the Basel III framework was endorsed by the G20 leaders in South Korea. Basel III is the centrepiece of the financial reform programme coordinated by the Financial Stability Board.2 This endorsement represents a critical step in the process to strengthen the capital rules by which banks are required to operate. When the international rule-making process is completed and Basel III has been implemented domestically, we will have considerably reduced the probability and severity of a crisis in the banking sector, and by extension enhanced global financial stability.The title of my intervention, “The Basel III Capital Framework: a decisive breakthrough”, sounds like a military metaphor, which may be surprising in the context of a speech on banking regulation. But indeed, the supervisory community had to fight a fierce battle to require more capital and less leverage in the financial system in the face of significant resistance from some quarters of the banking industry.I will highlight nine key breakthroughs in Basel III, from a focus on tangible equity capital to a reduced reliance on banks’ internal models and a greater focus on stress testing, that will increase the safety and soundness of banks individually and the banking system more broadly.1This speech was prepared together with Jason George and Eli Remolona, and benefited from comments by Robert McCauley, Frank Packer, Ilhyock Shim, Bruno Tissot, Stefan Walter and Haibin Zhu.2Basel III: towards a safer financial system, speech by Mr Jaime Caruana, General Manager of the BIS, at the 3rd Santander International Banking Conference, Madrid, 15 September 2010Restricted3Thirty years of bank capital regulation11/2010G20 endorsement of Basel III06/2004Basel II issued 12/1996Market risk amendmentissued 07/1988Basel Iissued 01/2019Full implementation of Basel III12/1997 Market risk amendmentimplemented 12/1992Basel I fullyimplemented 12/2009Basel III consultative document issued 12/2006Basel II implemented 07/2009Revised securitisation & trading book rulesissued 12/2007Basel II advanced approaches implemented 01/2013Basel III implementation begins12/2011Trading book rules implementedTo understand the importance of the Basel III reforms and where we are headed in terms of capital regulation, I think it is instructive if we briefly look back to see where we have come from.Basel I, the first internationally agreed capital standard, was issued some 22 years ago in 1988. Although it only addressed credit risk, it reflected the thinking that we continue to subscribe to today, namely, that the amount of capital required to protect against losses in an asset should vary depending upon the riskiness of the asset. At the same time, it set 8% as the minimum level of capital to be held against the sum of all risk-weighted assets.Following Basel I, in 1996 market risk was added as an area for which capital was required. Then, in 2004, Basel II was issued, adding operational risk, as well as a supervisory review process and disclosure requirements. Basel II also updated and expanded upon the credit risk weighting scheme introduced in Basel I, not only to capture the risk in instruments and activities that had developed since 1988, but also to allow banks to use their internal risk rating systems and approaches to measure credit and operational risk for capital purposes. What could more broadly be referred to as Basel III began with the issuance of the revised securitisation and trading book rules in July 2009, and then the consultative document in December of that year. The trading book rules will be implemented at the end of next year and the new definition of capital and capital requirements in Basel III over a six-year period beginning in January 2013. This extended implementation period for Basel III is designed to give banks sufficient time to adjust through earnings retention and capital-raising efforts.Restricted5The Basel III reform of bank capital regulationCapital ratio =Capital Risk-weighted assets Enhancing risk coverage ●Securitisation products●Trading book●Counterparty credit riskNew capital ratios●Common equity●Tier 1●Total capital●Capital conservation buffer Raising the quality of capital ●Focus on common equity ●Stricter criteria for Tier 1●Harmonised deductions from capital Macroprudential overlay Mitigating procyclicality●Countercyclical bufferLeverage ratio Mitigating systemic risk(work in progress)●Systemic capitalsurcharge for SIFIs●Contingent capital●Bail-in debt●OTC derivativesIn my remarks today I will try to illustrate the fundamental change introduced by Basel III, that of marrying the microprudential and the macroprudential approaches to supervision. Basel III builds upon the firm-specific, risk based frameworks of Basel I and Basel II by introducing a system-wide approach. I will structure my remarks around these two approaches and, in so doing, will demonstrate how Basel III is BOTH a firm-specific, risk based framework and a system-wide, systemic risk-based framework.I. Basel III: a firm-specific, risk-based frameworkLet us look first at the microprudential, firm-specific approach, and consider in turn the three elements of the capital equation: the numerator of the new solvency ratios, ie capital, the denominator, ie risk-weighted assets, and finally the capital ratio itself.A. The numerator: a strict definition of capitalRegarding the numerator, the Basel III framework substantially raises the quality of capital. Basically, in the old definition of capital, a bank could report an apparently strong Tier 1 capital ratio while at the same time having a weak tangible common equity ratio. Prior to the crisis, the amount of tangible common equity of many banks, when measured against risk-weighted assets, was as low as 1 to 3%, net of regulatory deductions. That’s a risk-based leverage of between 33 to 1 and 100 to 1. Global banks further increased their leverage by infesting the Tier 1 part of their capital structure with hybrid “innovative” instruments with debt-like features.In the old definition, capital comprised various elements with a complex set of minimums and maximums for each element. We had Tier 1 capital, innovative Tier 1, upper and lower Tier 2, Tier 3 capital, each with their own limits which were sometimes a function of other capital elements. The complexity in the definition of capital made it difficult to determine what capital would be available should losses arise. This combination of weaknesses permitted tangible common equity capital, the best form of capital, to be as low as 1% of risk-weighted assets.In addition to complicated rules around what qualifies as capital, there was a lack of harmonisation of the various deductions and filters that are applied to the regulatory capital calculation. And finally there was a complete lack of transparency and disclosure on banks’ structure of capital, making it impossible to compare the capital adequacy of global banks.As we learned again during the crisis, credit losses and writedowns come directly out of retained earnings and therefore common equity. It is thus critical that banks’ risk exposures are backed by a high-quality capital base. This is why the new definition of capital properly focuses on common equity capital.The concept of Tier 1 that we are familiar with will continue to exist and will include common equity and other instruments that have a loss-absorbing capacity on a “going concern” basis,3 for example certain preference shares. Innovative capital instruments which were permitted in limited amount as part of Tier 1 capital will no longer be permitted and those currently in existence will be phased out.Tier 2 capital will continue to provide loss absorption on a “gone concern” basis1 and will typically consist of subordinated debt. Tier 3 capital, which was used to cover a portion of a bank’s market risk capital charge, will be eliminated and deductions from capital will be harmonised. With respect to transparency, banks will be required to provide full disclosure and reconciliation of all capital elements.The overarching point with respect to the numerator of the capital equation is the focus on tangible common equity, the highest-quality component of a bank’s capital base, and therefore, the component with the greatest loss-absorbing capacity. This is the first breakthrough in Basel III.B. The denominator: enhanced risk coverageRegarding the denominator, Basel III substantially improves the coverage of the risks, especially those related to capital market activities: trading book, securitisation products, counterparty credit risk on OTC derivatives and repos.In the period leading up to the crisis, when banks were focusing their business activities on these areas, we saw a significant increase in total assets. Yet under the Basel II rules, risk-weighted assets showed only a modest increase. This point is made clear in the following chart showing the increase in both total assets and risk-weighted assets for the 50 largest banks in the world from 2004 to 2010. This phenomenon was more pronounced for some countries and regions than for others.3Tier 1 capital is loss-absorbing on a “going concern” basis (ie the financial institution is solvent). Tier 2 capital absorbs losses on a “gone concern” basis (ie following insolvency and upon liquidation).Restricted9I. Firm specific framework (microprudential)B. The denominator: enhanced risk coverage1. From 2004 to 2009, total assets at the top 50 banks have increased at a more rapid pace than risk weighted assets2. The need to monitor the relationship between risk weighted assets and total assets which varies greatly across countriesand underscores the importance of consistent implementation of theglobal regulatory standards across jurisdictionsFor global banks the enhanced risk coverage under Basel III is expected to cause risk-weighted assets to increase substantially. This, combined with a tougher definition and level of capital, may tempt banks to understate their risk-weighted assets. This points to the need in future to monitor closely the relationship between risk-weighted assets and total assets with a view to promoting a consistent implementation of the global capital standards across jurisdictions.Risk weighting challengesLet me now focus for a moment on the challenges of getting the risk weights right in a risk-based framework.Many asset classes may appear to be low-risk when seen from a firm-specific perspective. But we have seen that the system-wide build-up of seemingly low-risk exposures can pose substantial threats to broader financial stability. Before the recent crisis, the list of apparently low-risk assets included highly rated sovereigns, tranches of AAA structured products, collateralised repos and derivative exposures, to name just a few. The leverage ratio will help ensure that we do not lose sight of the fact that there are system-wide risks that need to be underpinned by capital.The basic approach of the Basel capital standards has always been to attach higher risk weights to riskier assets. The risk weights themselves and the methodology were significantly enhanced as we moved from Basel I to Basel II, and they have now been further refined under Basel III. Nonetheless, as the crisis has made clear, what is not so risky in normal times may suddenly become very risky during a systemic crisis. Something that looks risk-free may turn out to have rather large tail risk.Focusing a bit more on exposures with low risk weights, let me cite a few examples to illustrate the difficulty of getting the risk weights correct.Sovereigns: the sovereign debt crisis of 2010 has shown that the zero risk weightassumption for AAA and AA-rated sovereigns under the standardised approach of Basel II did not account for the dramatic deterioration in the fiscal and debt positionsof major advanced economies. These exposures are still considered as low-risk but certainly not totally risk-free.∙ OTC derivatives (under CSAs) and repos: the Lehman and Bear Stearns failuresdemonstrated that the very low capital charge on OTC derivatives and repos did not capture the systemic risk associated with the interconnectedness and potential cascade effects in these markets.∙ Senior tranches of securitisation exposures: financial engineering produced AAA-rated tranches of complex products, such as the super-senior tranches of ABS CDOs. These proved much more risky than what would be expected from a AAA exposure. The preferential risk weight of 7% for those super-senior tranches was too low, and the risk weight has now been raised to 20%.For assets with medium risk weights, one could cite the following examples: ∙ Residential mortgages: 35% risk weight under the standardised approach. For highest-quality mortgages: 4.15% risk weight (IRB approach)∙ Highly rated corporates: 20% risk weight under the standardised approach. For best-quality corporates: 14.4% risk weight (IRB approach)∙ Highly rated banks: 20% risk weight (standardised approach)For assets with high risk weights, the following examples can be considered:∙ HVCRE (high volatility commercial real estate)∙ Mezzanine tranches of ABS/CDOs∙ Hedge fund equity stakes: 400% risk weight ∙ Claims on unrated corporates: 100% risk weight Restricted3I. Firm specific framework (microprudential)●●B. The denominator: risk weighting challengesWeak correlation between risk-weights and crisis-related losses Low risk-weights may have contributed to the build-up of system wide risksThe chart above shows how different asset classes fared during the crisis. Relative to their Basel II risk weights, equity stakes in hedge funds, claims on corporates and some retailexposures experienced modest losses during the crisis. By contrast, mortgages, highly rated banks, AAA-rated CDO tranches and sovereigns inflicted rather heavy losses on banks. These cases show that there is a rather weak correlation between risk weights and crisis-related losses during periods of system-wide stress. Moreover, we have also discovered that low risk weights can lead to an excessive build-up of system-wide risks. Recognising this problem, the Basel Committee has now introduced a backstop simple leverage ratio, which will require a minimum ratio of capital to total assets without any risk weights. I will come back to this later.The trading book and securitisationsTwo areas the crisis has revealed as needing enhanced risk coverage are the trading book and securitisations. Here capital charges fell short of risk exposures. Basel II focused primarily on the banking book, where traditional assets such as loans are held. But the major losses during the 2007–09 financial crisis came from the trading book, especially the complex securitisation exposures such as collateralised debt obligations. As shown in the table below, the capital requirements for trading assets were extremely low, even relative to banks’ own economic capital estimates. The Basel Committee has addressed this anomaly.Restricted15Trading assetsand marketriskcapitalrequirements¹The revised framework now requires the following:∙Introduction of a 12-month stressed VaR capital charge; ∙Incremental risk capital charge applied to the measurement of specific risk in credit sensitive positions when using VaR; ∙Similar treatment for trading and banking book securitisations; ∙Higher risk weights for resecuritisations (20% instead of 7% for AAA-rated tranches); ∙ Higher credit conversion factors for short-term liquidity facilities to off-balance sheetconduits and SIVs (the shadow banking system); andMore rigorous own credit analyses of externally rated securitisation exposures with less reliance on external ratings.As a result of this enhanced risk coverage, banks will now hold capital for trading book assets that, on average, is about four times greater than that required by the old capital requirements. The Basel Committee is also conducting a fundamental review of the market risk framework rules, including the rationale for the distinction between banking book and trading book. This is the second Basel III breakthrough: eradicate the trading book loophole, ie eliminate the possibility of regulatory arbitrage between the banking and trading books.Counterparty credit risk on derivatives and reposThe Basel Committee is also strengthening the capital requirements for counterparty credit risk on OTC derivatives and repos by requiring that these exposures be measured using stressed inputs. Banks also must hold capital for mark to market losses (credit valuation adjustments – CVA) associated with the deterioration of a counterparty’s credit quality. The Basel II framework addressed counterparty credit risk only in terms of defaults and credit migrations. But during the crisis, mark to market losses due to CVA (which actually represented two thirds of the losses from counterparty credit risk, only one third being due to actual defaults) were not directly capitalised.C. Capital ratios: calibration of the new requirementsWith a capital base whose quality has been enhanced, and an expanded coverage of risks both on- and off-balance sheet, the Basel Committee has made great strides in strengthening capital standards. But in addition to the quality of capital and risk coverage, it also calibrated the capital ratio such that it will now be able to absorb losses not only in normal times, but also during times of economic stress.To this end, banks will now be required to hold a minimum of 4.5% of risk-weighted assets in tangible common equity versus 2% under Basel II. In addition, the Basel Committee is requiring a capital conservation buffer – which I will discuss in just a moment – of 2.5%. Taken together, this means that banks will need to maintain a 7% common equity ratio. When one considers the tighter definition of capital and enhanced risk coverage, this translates into roughly a sevenfold increase in the common equity requirement for internationally active banks. This represents the third breakthrough.Restricted18I. Firm-specific framework (microprudential)C. Capital ratio: the new requirementsIncreases under Basel III are even greater when one considersthe stricter definition of capital and enhanced risk-weighting10.588.567.02.54.5Basel IIINewdefinition andcalibration Equivalent to around 2% for an average international bank underthe new definition Equivalent to around 1% for an averageinternational bank under the new definition Memo:842Basel II RequiredMinimum Required Minimum Required Conservationbuffer Minimum Total capital Tier 1 capital Common equityCapital requirementsAs a percentageof risk-weightedassets Third breakthrough: an average sevenfold increase in the common equityrequirements for global banksThis higher level of capital is calibrated to absorb the types of losses associated with crises like the previous one.The private sector has complained that these new requirements will cause them to curtail lending or increase the cost of borrowing. In an effort to address some of the industry’s concerns, the Basel Committee has agreed upon extended transitional arrangements that will allow the banking sector to meet the higher capital standards through earnings retention and capital-raising.The new standards will take effect on 1 January 2013 and for the most part will become fully effective by January 2019.D. Capital conservationA fourth key breakthrough of Basel III is that banks will no longer be able to pursue distribution policies that are inconsistent with sound capital conservation principles. We have learned from the crisis that it is prudent for banks to build capital buffers during times of economic growth. Then, as the economy begins to contract, banks may be forced to use these buffers to absorb losses. But to offset the contraction of the buffer, banks could have the ability to restrict discretionary payments such as dividends and bonuses to shareholders, employees and other capital providers. Of course they could also raise additional capital in the market.In fact, what we witnessed during the crisis was a practice by banks to continue making these payments even as their financial condition and capital levels deteriorated. This practice, in effect, puts the interest of the recipients of these payments above those of depositors, and this is simply not acceptable.To address the need to maintain a buffer to absorb losses and restrict the ability of banks to make inappropriate distributions as their capital strength declines, the Basel Committee will now require banks to maintain a buffer of 2.5% of risk-weighted assets. This buffer must be held in tangible common equity capital.As a bank’s capital ratio declines and it uses the conservation buffer to absorb losses, the framework will require banks to retain an increasingly higher percentage of their earnings and will impose restrictions on distributable items such as dividends, share buybacks and discretionary bonuses. Supervisors now have the power to enforce capital conservation discipline. This is a fundamental change.II. Basel III: A system-wide, systemic risk-based frameworkOverviewReturning to the theme of my discussion, Basel III is not only a firm-specific risk-based framework, it is also a system-wide, systemic risk-based framework. The so-called macroprudential overlay is designed to address systemic risk and is an entirely new way of thinking about capital.This new dimension of the capital framework consists of five elements. The first is a leverage ratio, a simple measure of capital that supplements the risk-based ratio and which constrains the build-up of leverage in the system. The second is steps taken to mitigate procyclicality, including a countercyclical capital buffer and, although outside a strict discussion of capital, efforts to promote a provisioning framework based upon expected losses rather than incurred losses. The third element of the macroprudential overlay is steps to address the externalities generated by systemically important financial institutions through higher loss-absorbing capacity. The fourth is a framework to address the risk arising from systemically important markets and infrastructures. In particular, I am referring to the OTC derivatives markets. And finally, the macroprudential overlay aims to better capture systemic risk and tail events in the banks’ own risk management framework, including through risk modelling, stress testing and scenario analysis.ratioA. LeverageIn the lead up to the crisis many banks reported strong Tier 1 risk based ratios while, at the same time, still being able to build up high levels of on and off balance sheet leverage.In response to this, the Basel Committee has introduced a simple, non-risk-based leverage ratio to supplement the risk-based capital requirements. The leverage ratio has the added benefit of serving as a safeguard against model risk and any attempts to circumvent the risk-based capital requirements.The leverage ratio will be a measure of a bank’s Tier 1 capital as a percentage of its assets plus off balance sheet exposures and derivatives.For derivatives, regulatory net exposure will be used plus an add-on for potential future exposure. Netting of all derivatives will be permitted. In so doing, the Basel Committee has successfully solved the difficulty resulting from the divergence between the main accounting frameworks. (Bank leverage is significantly lower under US GAAP than under IFRS due to the netting of OTC derivatives allowed under the former. Given that banks may hold offsetting contracts, US GAAP allows banks to report their net exposures while IFRS does not allow netting. As a result, the size of a bank‘s total assets can vary significantly based on the treatment of this one accounting item.)The leverage ratio will also include off-balance sheet items in the measure of total assets. These off-balance sheet items, including commitments, letters of credit and the like, unless they are unconditionally cancellable, will be converted using a flat 100% credit conversion factor.To highlight the importance of the leverage ratio we need look no further than the increase in total assets in the years leading up to the crisis versus the increase in risk-weighted assets. It is obvious that balance sheets were being leveraged, but the risk-based framework failed tocapture this dynamic, as suggested by the following chart depicting risk-weighted and totalassets for the top 50 banks.Restricted5II. System-wide approach (macroprudential)A. Leverage ratiothe importance of the banking sector building up additional capital defences in periods where the risks of system-wide stress are growing markedly.While some in the financial community are sceptical about the usefulness of a leverage ratio, the Basel Committee’s Top-down Capital Calibration Group recently completed a study that showed that the leverage ratio did the best job of differentiating between banks that ultimately required official sector support in the recent crisis and those that did not.This leads me to the fifth breakthrough: Basel III is a framework that remains risk-based but now includes – through the Tier 1 leverage ratio – a backstop approach that also captures risks arising from total assets. The risk-based and leverage ratios reinforce each other.For all of these reasons, public policymakers and legislators must resist the intense lobbying effort of the industry to water down the leverage ratio to merely a Pillar 2 instrument. Giving in to this lobbying would increase the exposure of taxpayers to future bank failures and hurt long-term growth over a full credit cycle since sustainable credit growth cannot be achieved through excessive leverage.B. Countercyclical capital bufferWe have learned that procyclicality, which is inherent in banking, has exacerbated the impact of the crisis. While we will not eliminate cyclicality, what we would like to do is prevent its amplification through the banking sector, particularly that caused by excessive credit growth. This can be achieved through the new countercyclical capital buffer.As the volume of loans grows, if asset price bubbles burst or the economy subsequently enters a downturn and loan quality begins to deteriorate, banks will adopt a very conservative stance when it comes to the granting of new credit. This lack of credit availability only serves to exacerbate the problem, pushing the real economy deeper into trouble with asset prices declining further and the level of non-performing loans increasing further. This in turn causes bank lending to become scarcer still. These interactions highlights of stress, but it helps to ensure that by leading to the build-up of ed in each of the jurisdictions in which the bank has credit exposures.th breakthrough in Basel III.As you know, there is considerable work being done by the Financial Stability Board on how tions, ework for identifying SIFIs and a study of the magnitude of se to the global financial ically infrastructures. This is clearly illustrated ring and trade reporting on OTC derivatives. Derivative counterparty credit exposures to central counterparty clearing The countercyclical capital buffer not only protects the banking sector from losses resulting from periods of excess credit growth followed by period credit remains available during this period of stress. Importantly, during the build-up phase, as credit is being granted at a rapid pace, the countercyclical capital buffer may cause the cost of credit to increase, acting as a brake on bank lending.Each jurisdiction will monitor credit growth in relation to measures such as GDP and, using judgment, assess whether such growth is excessive, there system-wide risk. Based on this assessment they may put in place a countercyclical buffer requirement ranging from 0 to 2.5%. This requirement will be released when system-wide risk dissipates.For banks that are operating in multiple jurisdictions, the buffer will be a weighted average of the buffers appli To give banks time to adjust to a buffer level, jurisdictions will preannounce their countercyclical buffer decisions by 12 months.The introduction of a countercyclical capital charge to mitigate the procyclicality caused by excessive credit growth is the six C. Systemically important financial institutions: additional loss-absorbing capacityto design the best framework for the oversight of systemically important financial institu or SIFIs.4 It is broadly recognised that systemically important banks should have loss-absorbing capacity beyond the basic Basel III standards. This can be achieved by a combination of a systemic capital charge, contingent bonds that convert to equity at a certain trigger point and bail-in debt.Although the work on SIFIs is incomplete at this time, the Basel Committee has committed to complete by mid-2011 a fram additional loss absorbency that global systemically important banks should have. Also by mid-2011, the Basel Committee will complete its assessment of going-concern loss absorbency in some of the various contingent capital structures.What is clear, and this is the seventh breakthrough, is that SIFIs need higher loss-absorbing capacity to reflect the greater risks that they po system. A systemic capital surcharge is the most straightforward, but not the only way to achieve this.D. Systemically important markets and infrastructures (SIMIs): the case of OTCderivativesJust as there are systemically important financial institutions, there are also system important markets and systemically important market by the case of OTC derivatives. In particular, the Lehman failure demonstrated that the very low capital charge on OTC derivatives did not capture the systemic risk associated with the interconnectedness and potential cascade effects in these markets.To address the problem of interconnectedness as it relates to derivatives, the Basel Committee and Financial Stability Board have endorsed central clea4 Reducing the moral hazard posed by systemically important financial institutions , FSB Recommendations and Time Lines, 20 October 2010.。

巴塞尔协议三简介巴塞尔协议三（Basel III）是国际上普遍接受的金融监管框架，旨在加强银行体系的抗风险能力和稳定性。

该协议于2010年由巴塞尔银行监督委员会（BCBS）发布，并于2013年开始逐步实施。

本文将介绍巴塞尔协议三的背景、主要内容以及对金融体系的影响。

背景巴塞尔协议三是巴塞尔银行监督委员会继巴塞尔协议一（Basel I）和巴塞尔协议二（Basel II）之后制定的金融监管框架。

巴塞尔协议一于1988年发布，主要针对资本充足率进行规定，强调了资本的重要性。

巴塞尔协议二于2004年发布，重点放在了市场风险和信用风险的监管上。

然而，在全球金融危机爆发后，巴塞尔协议二被认为存在着某些缺陷，因此，巴塞尔银行监督委员会开始制定更为严格的巴塞尔协议三。

主要内容巴塞尔协议三主要包括以下几个方面的内容：1. 资本要求巴塞尔协议三对银行的资本要求进行了进一步的加强。

其中，核心资本充足率要求银行至少有4.5%的比例，而资本充足率要求银行至少有8%的比例。

此外，协议还规定了逆周期缓冲区和系统重要性附加的资本要求，以提高银行应对风险的能力。

2. 流动性要求巴塞尔协议三增加了对银行流动性的要求。

银行需要满足净稳定资金比例（NSFR）和流动性覆盖率（LCR）的指标，以确保银行在流动性紧缩时仍能够履行支付义务。

3. 风险管理和监管工具巴塞尔协议三进一步完善了风险管理和监管工具。

协议要求银行建立更为有效的风险管理体系，并对市场风险、信用风险、操作风险等进行更为细致的监管。

4. 审慎性巴塞尔协议三强调了银行的审慎性。

协议要求银行对于重大交易和风险暴露进行更为深入的审慎评估并制定相应的应对措施，以降低风险。

对金融体系的影响巴塞尔协议三的实施对金融体系产生了深远的影响：1.提高了银行的抗风险能力。

通过加强资本要求和流动性要求，巴塞尔协议三使得银行更加稳健，并能够更好地应对金融风险。

2.改进了风险管理和监管工具。

协议要求银行建立更为有效的风险管理体系，加强了对市场风险、信用风险和操作风险的监管，提高了金融体系的稳定性。

最新巴塞尔协议3全文央行行长和监管当局负责人集团1宣布较高的全球最低资本标准国际银行资本监管改革是本轮金融危机以来全球金融监管改革的重要组成部分。

9月12日的巴塞尔银行监管委员会央行行长和监管当局负责人会议就资本监管改革一些关键问题达成了共识。

这些资本监管改革措施一旦付诸实施将对全球银行业未来发展产生重大的影响。

一、会议的基本内容作为巴塞尔银行监管委员会中的监管机构，央行行长和监管当局负责人集团在2010年9月12日的会议上2，宣布加强对现有资本金要求的持续监管，并对在2010年7月26日达成的协议进行充分认可。

这些银行资本改革措施和全球银行业流动性监管标准的推行，履行了全球金融改革核心议程的诺言，并且将在11月份韩国首尔召开的G20领导峰会上提交。

巴塞尔委员会一揽子改革中，普通股（含留存收益，下同）将从2%增至4.5%。

另外，银行需持有2.5%的资本留存超额资本以应对未来一段时期对7%的普通股所带来的压力。

此次资本改革巩固了央行行长和监管当局负责人在7月份达成的关于强化资本约束和在2011年底前提高对市场交易、衍生产品和资产证券化的资本需要。

此次会议达成了一个从根本上加强全球资本标准的协议。

这些资本要求将对长期的财政稳定和经济增长有重大的贡献。

安排资本监管过渡期将使银行在满足新的资本标准的同时，支持经济复苏。

更强的资本定义，更高的最低资本要求和新的超额资本的结合将使银行可以承受长期的经济金融压力，从而支持经济的增1央行行长和监管当局负责人集团是巴塞尔委员会中的监管机构，是由成员国央行行长和监管当局负责人组成的。

该委员会的秘书处设在瑞士巴塞尔国际清算银行。

2巴塞尔银行监督委员会提供了有关银行监管合作问题的定期论坛。

它旨在促进和加强全球银行监管和风险管理。

长。

二、增加的资本要求（一）最低普通股要求。

根据巴塞尔委员会此次会议达成的协议，最低普通股要求，即弥补资产损失的最终资本要求，将由现行的2%严格调整到4.5%。

巴塞尔协议III巴塞尔协议III(The Basel III Accord)目录• 1 什么是巴塞尔协议III• 2 巴塞尔协议III的出台• 3 巴塞尔协议III的主要内容• 4 巴塞尔协议III对中国银行业的影响• 5 相关条目什么是巴塞尔协议III《巴塞尔协议》是国际清算银行(BIS)的巴塞尔银行业条例和监督委员会的常设委员会———“巴塞尔委员会”于1988年7月在瑞士的巴塞尔通过的“关于统一国际银行的资本计算和资本标准的协议”的简称。

该协议第一次建立了一套完整的国际通用的、以加权方式衡量表内与表外风险的资本充足率标准，有效地扼制了与债务危机有关的国际风险。

[编辑]巴塞尔协议III的出台巴塞尔协议一直都秉承稳健经营和公平竞争的理念，也正因为如此，巴塞尔协议对现代商业银行而言显得日益重要，已成为全球银行业最具有影响力的监管标准之一。

新巴塞尔协议也即巴塞尔协议II经过近十年的修订和磨合于2007年在全球范围内实施，但正是在这一年，爆发了次贷危机，这次席卷全球的次贷危机真正考验了巴塞尔新资本协议。

显然，巴塞尔新资本协议存在顺周期效应、对非正态分布复杂风险缺乏有效测量和监管、风险度量模型有内在局限性以及支持性数据可得性存在困难等固有问题，但我们不能将美国伞形监管模式的缺陷和不足致使次贷危机爆发统统归结于巴塞尔新资本协议。

其实，巴塞尔协议在危机中也得到了不断修订和完善。

经过修订，巴塞尔协议已显得更加完善，对银行业的监管要求也明显提高，如为增强银行非预期损失的抵御能力，要求银行增提缓冲资本，并严格监管资本抵扣项目，提高资本规模和质量；为防范出现类似贝尔斯登的流动性危机，设置了流动性覆盖率监管指标；为防范“大而不能倒”的系统性风险，从资产规模、相互关联性和可替代性评估大型复杂银行的资本需求。

如上所述，自巴塞尔委员会2007年颁布和修订一系列监管规则后，2010年9月12日，由27个国家银行业监管部门和中央银行高级代表组成的巴塞尔银行监管委员会就《巴塞尔协议Ⅲ》的内容达成一致，全球银行业正式步入巴塞尔协议III时代。

巴塞尔协议Ⅲ》2010年9月12号，巴塞尔银行监管委员会管理层会议在瑞士举行，27个成员国的中央银行代表就加强银行业监管的《巴塞尔协议III》达成一致。

该改革方案主要涉及最低资本要求水平，包括将普通股比例最低要求从2%提升至4.5%，建立2.5%的资本留存缓冲和0%~2.5%的逆周期资本缓冲。

最新通过的《巴塞尔协议Ⅲ》受到了2008年全球金融危机的直接催生，该协议的草案于去年提出，并在短短一年时间内就获得了最终通过，并于此后的11月在韩国首尔举行的G20峰会上获得正式批准实施。

虽然目前全球主要银行资本充足率基本符合巴塞尔协议III的要求，但由于巴塞尔协议III对于资本金的计算有新的规定，包括中国在内的全球银行资本充足率将因此下降，部分欧美银行或面临资本短缺。

协议对世界范围内银行的资本充足率、普通股和资本缓冲作出了较为详细的规定及过渡期安排，大部分符合此前业内人士的预期。

协议规定，全球各商业银行5年内必须将一级资本充足率的下限从现行要求的4%上调至6%，过渡期限为2013年升至4.5%，2014年为5.5%，2015年达6%。

同时，协议将普通股最低要求从2%提升至4.5%，过渡期限为2013年升至3.5%，2014年升至4%，2015年升至4.5%。

截至2019年1月1日，全球各商业银行必须将资本留存缓冲提高到2.5%。

另外，协议维持目前资本充足率8%不变；但是对资本充足率加资本缓冲要求在2019年以前从现在的8%逐步升至10.5%。

最低普通股比例加资本留存缓冲比例在2019年以前由目前的3.5%逐步升至7%。

此次协议对一级资本提出了新的限制性定义，只包括普通股和永久优先股。

会议还决定各家银行最迟在2017年底完全接受最新的针对一级资本的定义。

在最低资本金比率方面,草案规定,商业银行的普通股最低要求将从目前的2%提升至4.5%,也就是所谓的"核心"一级资本比率,另外还需要建立2.5%的资本留存缓冲和零至2.5%的"逆周期资本缓冲"。

杨琨：巴塞尔协议III是办好贸易银行的基础杨琨：巴塞尔协议III是办好贸易银行的基础名人演讲稿杨琨：巴塞尔协议III是办好贸易银行的基础贸易银行基础办好III塞尔协议杨琨今天我们这个专场是讲巴塞尔协议，安排得也很好，有监管部分的领导，有专家学者，还有国际的金融同业。

我作为中国一家大型银行的高管，天天从事的都是非常具体的经营工作，所以说我就想通过我自己的工作体会，讲一讲巴塞尔协议，特别是巴塞尔协议III 对中国贸易银行有一种甚么样的影响。

大家知道，我们这家银行往年7月份实现了自己的IPO，在上海、香港两个资本市场同步发行，一共融了211亿美金，据了解当时是创造了一个发行的记录。

股改以后的资本大大充实，我们又相应的依照资本市场的要求调剂了机构、职员、业务的经营架构，开始了由形似向神似的转换。

假如说为了IPO，我们不能不做一些必要的包装，但是实现IPO以后还是静下心来，完全依照上市公司的要求打造我们自己。

往年底的年报已向大家公布了，完全符合银监会的监管要求，所有的效益指标，也大大超过了我们在招股说明书中的承诺。

大家也了解了，两个资本市场，通过我们股票的价格，也给了我们一个很好的体现。

但是这家银行在股改上市之前，应当说和巴塞尔协议没甚么关系的。

往年，我们在有关部分的大力支持下，在我们高管团队的带领下，实现了自己的IPO。

对这么一家古老的银行，特别是在计划经济时代转换到市场经济时代的一家银行来讲，应当是一个洗心革面的大变化。

上市以后，不但从资本市场的反束缚，到金融监管部分对我们的监管准则，到我们高管和我们自己的员工，都牢固的建立了一个办上市银行、办大型优秀上市银行的指导思想。

目前的经营计划，首先要考虑银监会对我们各项监管指标怎样样能够实现。

例如，我的资本束缚，假如存在题目的时候，可能我安排年度计划的时候，更多的向各个一级分行下达一些对资本消耗小的业务。

而资本消耗大的业务由我们总行相干部分进行集中控制，乃至最好发展一些中间业务，由于它对资本没有消耗。

《巴塞尔协议iii》的主要内容《巴塞尔协议III》是国际上重要的金融监管协议，主要目的是强化银行业的稳定性，防止金融系统的崩溃，保护金融市场的健康发展。

本文将从背景、目标、主要内容和指导意义四个方面生动、全面地介绍《巴塞尔协议III》。

首先，让我们从背景开始。

《巴塞尔协议III》是国际货币基金组织和巴塞尔银行间清算银行共同发起的一项国际金融监管协议。

该协议是对《巴塞尔协议I》（1988年）和《巴塞尔协议II》（2004年）的修订和补充，旨在应对2008年金融危机后的金融体系风险与挑战。

其次，让我们了解一下《巴塞尔协议III》的目标。

《巴塞尔协议III》的主要目标是通过建立更为严格的监管标准，提高银行的资本充足率并降低银行的风险敞口，从而增强金融系统的稳定性。

这既可保障银行自身，也有助于降低金融危机对实体经济的冲击。

接下来，让我们来看一下《巴塞尔协议III》的主要内容。

首先，协议规定了银行应保持的核心资本充足率、一级资本充足率和总资本充足率的要求。

其次，协议规定了针对信贷、市场风险和操作风险的监管要求和资本计量方法。

此外，协议还规定了银行应对系统重要性的监管要求，并推行了逆周期资本缓冲安排来应对金融周期的影响。

最后，让我们总结一下《巴塞尔协议III》的指导意义。

首先，该协议加强了金融监管，提高了银行业的资本充足率，降低了银行的风险敞口，从而提升了金融体系的韧性和稳定性。

其次，协议的推行对于金融市场的健康发展具有重要意义，可防止金融危机的发生，保护了投资者的利益。

此外，协议加强了银行对系统重要性的监管，有助于避免“大而不倒”现象的发生，减少了金融风险的传染性。

总之，作为国际金融监管领域的重要里程碑，《巴塞尔协议III》通过加强银行的资本充足率和风险监管，提升了金融体系的稳定性和抗风险能力。

这项协议的推行对于金融市场的健康发展和保护投资者利益具有重要意义。

相信随着协议的不断完善和落实，国际金融体系将更加稳健和可持续发展。

巴塞尔协议3
巴塞尔协议3（Basel III）是一项由巴塞尔银行监管委员会制定的国际银行监管框架，旨在加强全球银行业的资本和流动性规定，以强化金融体系的稳定性。

巴塞尔协议3于2010年12月发布，是对巴塞尔协议1和2的修订和加强。

它主要针对三个方面进行了改进：
1. 资本要求：巴塞尔协议3增加了银行的资本要求，以确保银行拥有足够的资本来抵御风险。

新的资本要求包括基本资本率、资本缓冲区和总资本率等指标。

银行需要提高自己的资本储备，以应对潜在的风险。

2. 流动性要求：巴塞尔协议3引入了新的流动性要求，要求银行根据其资产和负债的流动性特征来管理其流动性风险。

它要求银行拥有足够的流动性资产，以应对紧急情况和市场冲击。

3. 杠杆率：巴塞尔协议3引入了新的杠杆率要求，要求银行在不考虑风险权重的情况下，维持一定的资本储备。

这
有助于防止银行通过高风险激进行为来获取利润，从而增
加金融体系的稳健性。

巴塞尔协议3的实施对全球银行业产生了广泛的影响。

它
有助于提高银行的资本充足率和流动性，减少系统性风险，增强金融体系的稳定性。

然而，一些人认为，巴塞尔协议3的实施对一些中小型银行和新兴市场银行来说可能是一项
挑战，因为它增加了它们的资本和流动性要求。