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2023年第09期《东塘等处调查》。
1930年11月上旬，毛泽东从峡江到吉安布置部队撤退，途经吉水县的东塘村、大桥村和吉安县的李家坊、西逸亭等地，利用吃饭、休息和夜宿的时间，了解村乡两级苏维埃政府在土地斗争中的组织和活动月21日，毛泽东对吉水县南区第八乡木口村调查后写的调查报告，全文约1700字。
针对该村当时一下杀掉7个反动分子，包括小地主、富农各3人，流氓1人的情况，毛泽东作出小地主、富农当土地革命深入时，有许多人会走告的油印单行本发给参加第二次全国苏维埃代表大会的代表。
单行本的题目是《乡苏工作的模范（一）——长冈乡》。
★（作者系江西省社会科学院历史研究所副研究员）责任编辑/陈影当年苏区遭重围，红军被迫大转移。
战士扛起枪，迈开腿，昼夜兼程，离开了革命根据地。
前方堵，后方追，天上还有轰炸机；山也高，水亦远，重重艰险路崎岖；风也狂，雨又急，一路未有停步时；来时路，问征程，何处才是目的地？目标选择已七次，每每被迫作放弃。
天于我不时，地于我不利，生死关头，革命前途可问谁？天佑我中华，历史选择了毛泽东。
一张旧报纸，伟人慧眼识玄机：在陕北，还有红军根据地，更有徐海东，对党忠诚不容疑，为解中央困，倾囊解燃眉，选择红军目的地，才有第八次。
中央红军，终于远征到吴起。
漫漫长征路，全凭红军两条腿，一路向前行，一首惊天动地诗：多少个冽冽寒夜，多少场潇潇风雨，多少回隆隆炮火，多少次重重包围。
一路爬冰卧雪，一路野菜充饥，一路忍受伤病，一路战斗不止。
冲过了大渡铁索，迈过了五岭逶迤，翻过了茫茫雪山，踏过了无边草地。
……这就是，长征精神，这就是，人类奇迹。
欲问长征何注释？毛泽东同志有定义：长征，是宣言书，长征，是宣传队，长征，是播种机，长征，是历史记录的第一次。
试问红军两万五千里，领路者何人？他就是，伟大的中国共产党！(作者系南昌市老年诗词学会副会长。
)责任编辑/黄敏慧红军不怕远征难□熊传伟Copyright ©博看网. All Rights Reserved.。
Deregulation and reform of rail in Australia:Some emerging constraintsSophia Everett *The Australian Centre for Integrated Freight Systems Management,Melbourne University,442Auburn Road,Hawthorn,Vic.3004,AustraliaReceived 24November 2004;revised 7August 2005;accepted 11August 2005Available online 7November 2005AbstractThe Australian Government over the last two decades has embarked on an intensive microeconomic reform program.Associated with this has been the deregulation of the rail sector.The mechanism of deregulation has been by vertically separating the below and above rail infrastructure and the creation of a number of rail access regimes.Evidence is emerging which indicates that the mechanism of deregulation is an impediment to the development of an integrated national network,the objective of deregulation and rail reform.This paper will discuss the mechanism of deregulation in Australia within the context of developments overseas.In particular it will discuss the development of a number of state specific rail access regimes and raise some problems and constraints being encountered in the reform process.The paper adds to a growing body of knowledge relating to infrastructure reform and deregulation and highlights some major constraints embedded in the model.The concluding section will discuss the relevance of past and current reform of Australian policies to rail policy makers outside Australia.q 2005Elsevier Ltd.All rights reserved.Keywords:Deregulation;Australia;Constraints1.IntroductionIn November 2002the Australian Commonwealth Govern-ment released its AusLink Green Paper (Auslink,2002)which is a blue print for a long-term National Land Transport Plan.AusLink’s subsequent White Paper outlines the proposal for an integrated land infrastructure network based on clear national objectives and priorities that focus on meeting the major transport challenges facing Australia (AusLink,2004).This development with a national focus has become an important aspect of government policy in recent times.The Auslink,2002strategy followed closely upon the release of the Review of the National Road Transport Commission Act 1991,which made the recommendation to the Australian Transport Council in August 2002that the National Road Transport Commission be replaced with a National Transport Commis-sion (NRTC,2003).This new authority,effective as from 1st January 2004,has the responsibility for national approaches to both road and rail and assist in the integration of what have hitherto been perceived as quite distinct modal entities.These developments are also consistent with the Common-wealth Government’s establishment in 1997of the AustralianRail Track Corporation (ARTC)with the responsibility for administering the interstate rail network and provide a ‘one stop shop’for rail access seekers under a deregulated rail model.These developments and strategies for rail reform more generally follow similar strategies implemented overseasNational land transport strategies,as those proposed in AusLink (Fig.1),demand not only the inclusion of rail,but of an integrated interstate rail network.It is within this sector that some constraints are now emerging which are likely to impede an effective national focus being realised.The striving for the development of a national network is not new and has been called for since the early 20th century.It has failed to eventuate for a number of reasons,which included initially the physical barriers as a result of gauge differences.Further barriers to the development of a national network in the past were also institutional and jurisdictional—railways were state government monopolies and operations were confined by the relevant state boundaries.Under this system,rail operators were unable,by legislation,to transport goods beyond state borders.1This impediment was resolved with the deregulation of the rail sector and the breaking up of state government monopolies.Arguably,with the deregulation of rail and the removal of the physical constraints,it would appearthatTransport Policy 13(2006)74–84/locate/tranpol0967-070X/$-see front matter q 2005Elsevier Ltd.All rights reserved.doi:10.1016/j.tranpol.2005.08.003*Tel.:C 61398103187;fax:C 61398103149.E-mail address:s.everett@.au.1The establishment of the National Rail Corporation in 1991constituted the joint venture between the Commonwealth Government and the state governments of Victoria and New South Wales and represented the first interstate rail operator.the implementation of an efficient national network would be feasible.This,to date,has not eventuated and appears unlikely in the near future.Deregulation of the rail sector is a direct result of National Competition Policy and the Hilmer recommendations (Hilmer,1993).The actual mechanism of deregulation,however,is itself creating a spate of new problems which are likely to lead to further impediments to the realisation of a national focus in the foreseeable future.This is a direct consequence of the mechanism of introducing competition into the rail sector by setting in place what are essentially state government determined and controlled access regimes each with a state focus,rather than promoting the national ‘one stop shop’envisaged for the ARTC (ARTC Annual Reports).This paper looks at the policy leading to the objective and development of a national and integrated land transport network and looks specifically at the role of the rail sector as an essential part of that network.The paper argues that despite the removal of former gauge differentiation and despite deregulation,it is the mechanism of deregulation itself,which is now creating a barrier to the effective implementation of a national network.2.Physical and legislative constraintsThe development of rail in Australia was undertaken by colonial and state governments and an artifact of this diversity in ownership are the differences in rail gauges (Blayney,1963).Australian colonial governments constructed their railways,asindicated in Fig.2,in three different gauges—broad,2narrow 3and standard.4New South Wales,Victoria and South Australia constructed their railway networks using the broad gauge although New South Wales converted to the standard gauge before the end of the 19th century.Queensland,Western Australia and Tasmanian Governments adopted the narrow gauge (Productivity Commission,1999).Over time,however,multiple gauges were used in most states.Indeed to this day New South Wales is the only Australian state with a single gauge for its entire network—all other mainland states,as indicated in Fig.2,have their railways constructed in three different gauges.In the early days of development problems associated with the gauge differences did not arise.Railways were developed exclusively for the intrastate movement of cargo and people and for linking the capital cities and ports with their hinterlands.Differences in gauges did not become a problem until the inter-war years when rail became a means of transporting supplies and goods (Blayney,1963)—and in order to undertake this task efficiently,uniformity,at least in what would in time become the interstate network,was required.It was not until the middle of the 20th century that serious efforts to standardise the gauges were undertaken.Initially state governments believed that all railway tracks shouldbeFig.1.AusLink road and rail network and major export ports.Source:Australian Government Australia’s Export Infrastructure Report to the Prime Minister by the Exports and Infrastructure Taskforce May 2005:12.2Broad gauge is 50300or 1600mm.3Narrow gauge is 30600or 1067mm.4Standard gauge is 40800or 1435mm.S.Everett /Transport Policy 13(2006)74–8475standardised but this lofty objective was amended to one in which capital cities only would be linked by a standard gauge.Appropriate action was subsequently undertaken and standard-isation of the track between Sydney and Melbourne was completed in 1962and by 1970the track from Sydney to Perth via Broken Hill had been standardised.Standardisation of the entire 8270km interstate network between Brisbane and Perth either via Broken Hill or via Sydney and Melbourne was not completed until 1995(AusLink,2004:8).The physical barrier was thus removed but a jurisdictional constraint persisted which restricted a national focus from developing.State government ownership and operation of the railways had led to the creation of state government monopolies and these monopoly positions were protected by legislation.This ensured that state government rail operations were confined and protected by state mercialisation in the rail sectorRail in Australia was developed and operated up to the 1990s initially by colonial and later by state governments and,like public utilities;governments had the responsibility of providing a social service to the public and the community.These services were frequently loss makers.While commercial part of the operation generally was relatively profitable in so far as managing to produce a working surplus covering operating expenses as well as making some contribution to capital costs,after the 1970this changed dramatically as annual deficits peaked at more than $2billion in 1988/89(Table 1).The greatest loss makers were the state rail systems of Victoria and New South Wales incurring jointly a deficit of $1.33billion in1993/94(HORSCCTMR 1998:110).This was slightly less than the national total of $1.43billion (Table 1).From the 1980s onwards dramatic changes were introduced into the rail sector which would lead ultimately to the transformation of the market structure and was part of government’s microeconomic reform policy.The introduction of reform was by way of a phased approach improving initially efficiency levels,raise productivity and impose a commercial focus on rail operators.The objective was to improve cost recovery,reduce day-to-day political interventioninFig.2.Standard gauge interstate rail network.Source:House of Representatives Standing Committee on Communications,Transport and Microeconomic Reform July 1998Canberra.Table 1Rail deficits in Australia 1980–1997Year Deficit ($million)1980–198********–198********–198312251983–198415441984–198515971985–198617241986–198717851987–198816951988–198920741989–199016651990–199117131991–199216601992–199315091993–199414331994–199516201995–199616231996–19971360Source:Sub 105.01,Submissions p.1545.House of Representatives Standing Committee on Communications,Transport and Microeconomic Reform July 1998Canberra.S.Everett /Transport Policy 13(2006)74–8476the operation and make managers more accountable for the performance of the enterprises.In New South Wales,for example,under the Transport Administration Act1988which came into effect in January1989,the State Rail Authority was required to operate in accordance with sound commercial principles under the direction of an independent Board which was responsible forfinancial operations and formulating business strategies(Transport Administration Act,1988).The second phase of reform involved major structural changes,with the exception of Queensland Rail,involved the dividing up of the rail organisations separating passenger from freight and infrastructure services and maintenance functions. In New South Wales,for example,the State Rail Authority was restructured in July1996into four corporatised business entities each with responsibilities for the movement of freight, passengers,infrastructure and maintenance services.In Victoria the restructuring of the Public Transport Corporation in1993/1994led to the creation offive business units and three commercial services groups.Activities such as cleaning and security were outsourced and the Rail Corporations Act1996 allowed for the establishment of V/Line Freight and the Victorian Rail Track Access with responsibility for train control and signaling operations on non-electrified intrastate track.In addition,labour market reform and downsizing was a major feature of rail reform and employment in the New South Wales freight sector alone was reduced by nearly60percent—from16,300in1989to7000in1996(Productivity Commission,1999).By2002this number had been further reduced when,immediately prior to privatisation,FreightCorp had reduced its numbers to less than2500(Productivity Commission,1999).Similarly,Queensland Rail reduced its numbers from approximately24,000in1990to less than 14,000in2002(Productivity Commission,1999)and is part of an ongoing reform process.4.Hilmer and National Competition PolicyAn essential feature of microeconomic reform has been the adoption of the Hilmer recommendations(Hilmer,1993)and the development,subsequently,of a National Competition Policy.Of particular significance to the rail sector,has been the breaking up of state government monopolies.Hilmer indicated that the introduction of effective competition into traditional markets supplied by public monopolies required more than the removal of regulatory restrictions on competition.He argued, indeed,that where the incumbentfirm had developed into an integrated monopoly during its period of protection from competition,structural reforms were required to dismantle excessive market power and increase the contestability of the market(Hilmer,1993:215).Some government instrumentalities posed particular pro-blems as their monopoly positions were deemed justifiable on the basis that they were natural monopolies.In that case it was deemed that a single provider was more efficient as it could provide the service more efficiently rather than have a duplication of infrastructure.He noted that in those instances there was a sound argument in favour of maintaining some essential infrastructure in the hands of a monopoly owner.It was argued,however,that considerable savings could be expected from separating the role of the owner of the infrastructure from that of the incumbent operator.In the case of rail this meant the vertical separation of the below rail5 and above rail6components,and while state governments retained ownership of the track and related infrastructure, competition would be introduced by removing the monopoly position of the incumbent operators and allow other operators access to the track.One important element which had to be overcome in establishing a more competitive framework was the fact that state governments were the owners of the track but were also service providers in the market with the potential to thwart competition.In order to prevent this from occurring access regimes were to be established which would provide the mechanism that would formally grant access to the track to access seekers(Hilmer,1993:215).Regulating access to rail infrastructure services was one way governments could ensure that rail operators had the right to seek access on terms and conditions that were equitable and competitive.Legislative changes to the Trade Practices Act 1974(TPA)were introduced with Part111A which established a legal regime to facilitate third party access to services deemed of national significance such as rail infrastructure (Healey,1996).5.Mechanism for gaining accessThe mechanism for gaining access,indicated in Fig.3,is extraordinarily complex and can be achieved in a number of ways:†Declaration of a service†An access undertaking†State regime deemed‘effective’A detailed description of the regimes will not be covered in this paper as they have been discussed elsewhere(Productivity Commission,2005;Productivity Commission,2001).The regimes differ both in terms of coverage—whether they are interstate or intrastate,and the provisions they contain. Furthermore,as rail infrastructure falls within state govern-ment jurisdictions,7each state has set in place its own access regime.In addition to all states having their own access regimes, they also have their own regulatory regimes as well as different pricing mechanisms.In the case of Victoria the Essential Services Commission(ESC),the successor of the Office of the Regulator General,is the regulator who must approve charges. 5Includes infrastructure such as track and signalling6Wagons,rolling stock etc.7The exception was National Rail Corporation which was a joint venture between the Commonwealth Government and the state governments of Victoria and NSW.S.Everett/Transport Policy13(2006)74–8477If disputes arise associated with access or pricing,for example, the matter is referred to the ESC,which can require that access to the service be granted.The Commission has the authority in that state to set the terms and conditions of access.It also must sanction pricing strategies and the decisions made are final and cannot be appealed(Productivity Commission, 2001:276).In addition,each state has implemented reform which has led to its state specific organizational structure,ownership, access providers and regulators(Table2).The governments of New South Wales access and Victoria have set in place a vertically separated duel system with different access providers depending whether access is sought to the interstate or intrastate network.The government of Queensland,on Fig.3.Alternate ways to seek access.Source:Productivity Commission Progress in Rail Reform Inquiry Report August1999.Table2State-based rail reform modelStructure Access provider RegulatorVictoria Vertically separated dualsystem ARTC interstate Pacific National intrastate Essential services commis-sionNSW Vertically separated dualsystem Rail Infrastructure Corporation intrastate ARTC Interstate Independent Pricing andRegulatory TribunalQueensland Vertically integrated QR Queensland CompetitionAuthorityWestern Australia Vertically separated ARG WA Rail Access RegulatorSouth Australia Vertically separated dualsystem ARTC interstate ARG intrastate Executive Director Depart-ment of TransportS.Everett/Transport Policy13(2006)74–84 78the other hand,has retained a vertically integrated system with QR being both the operator,the below track infrastructure owner and has established QR Network Access as the access provider.The regime in place in the state of Western Australia differs again with the implementation of a vertically separated structure with a single access provider,the Australian Railways Group,in place.6.Rail reform overseasReform in the Australian rail sector has by no means been an isolated case.As indicated in Table3Australia has followed to a lesser or greater extent reform developments and models adopted overseas.This section will discuss some of these similarities and dissimilarities.As noted in Table3track ownership has been retained by government in Argentina, Germany,the Netherlands and Sweden.In the case of Japan, government together with franchisees,have control of the track.In the case of Canada,Great Britain and the United States,on the other hand,ownership of the track,or below rail infrastructure,lies with the private sector.While Australia does not have a franchisee model for its rail, some interesting comparisons with overseas developments are evident.While Australia has retained below rail infrastructure in the hands of government,8operations with the exception of QR have been privatized.The franchisee model operating in the Argentina has introduced a not dissimilar model—the difference being rather than operations being undertaken by the private sector,the franchisee model means that private sector operators are undertaking these activities on behalf of government.Each franchise,as noted above,is operated by a private company for a thirty year period with the option of a ten year extension.Furthermore,a monopoly position is main-tained as franchisees have the exclusive right to the infrastructure and no other operator is permitted to carry freight in the relevant region without the permission of the franchisee(Productivity Commission1999:E3).A further condition is imposed on franchisees by Ferrocarrilles Argentinos(FA),the Argentinian railway,in relation to employing former FA staff.Although the franchisee has the right to determine numbers required,employment priority is given to former FA staff.In the case of Argentinian reform,the excess of labour,as was characteristic of the Australian rail network prior to reform,has been avoided(World Bank,1996).The model adopted in the Netherlands differs from that in place in Australia or Argentina.The Dutch rail network has been vertically separated into track and operations.Within this restructured system freight services operate as an independent entity.The below rail infrastructure is funded by government while private sector operators have entered the market albeit predominantly in the passenger side.In1998,however,while the Dutch Government had no plans to privatize its railways, the freight side of the operation was merged with the German freight business,DB Cargo(PCIbid:E15.6.1.Access to overseas networkMeans of gaining access among overseas nations also varies according to different jurisdictions.As noted above, the Argentinian model does not allow for competition among operators without the specific approval of the franchisee.The German model is a joint government/private sector model, which stipulates that all operators are required to pay access charges(Jahanshashi,1998).Despite the high access charges, however,these do not cover infrastructure costs(Jahanshashi, 1998).Indeed the OECD(1998)has suggested that the high access charges existing in Germany has discouraged the entry of private sector operators.Consequently few operators have entered the market in recent years—those that have entered the market are predominantly short haul operators (OECD,1998).In Great Britain,on the other hand,access to rail infrastructure is heavily regulated and negotiated directly between Railtrack and the operators.These agreements specify the route to be followed,the number and timetable of trains, equipment types,service standards and access charges.In those instances in which agreement cannot be reached,the Rail Regulator may intervene.The regulator also determines condition of track and level of investment(Kain1999).Table3Structure and ownership of overseas railwaysCountry Structure Train operator Track infrastructure Argentina Horizontally separated and vertically integrated Franchisees Government Canada Horizontally separated(by function)and verticallyintegrated with access for passenger servicesVarious privated Various privated Germany Horizontal and vertical separation of accounts Governments and various private Government Great Britain Horizontally and vertically separated Franchisees PrivateJapan Horizontally separated and vertically integrated withaccess for freight services Franchisees and government freightoperatorGovernment with franchisees havingcontrol of trackNetherlands Horizontally and vertically separated Government and various private GovernmentNew Zealand Horizontally and vertically integrated Private Government(leased for nominal rent) Sweden Horizontally and vertically separated Government and various private GovernmentUnited States Horizontally separated(by function)and verticallyintegrated with access for passenger servicesVarious private Various privateSource:Productivity Commission Progress in Rail Reform:Inquiry Report August1999:E2.8Although in some instances the operation and management of the track hasbeen leased to the incumbent operator in Victoria and Western Australia.S.Everett/Transport Policy13(2006)74–8479Access to the New Zealand track follows quite a different model with the New Zealand network characterized by a private sector monopoly with public ownership of the right of way.Following the sale of the freight arm of the operation in 1993to Tranzrail,that company entered a long-term agreement with the New Zealand government for use of the track. Tranzrail was subsequently sold to the Australian intermodal operator,Toll.Following deregulation in that country profits have risen,performance has improved and freight rates have decreased by approximately one quarter(Productivity Com-mission,1999:E3).Toll is the monopoly rail freight operator in New Zealand and this monopoly position is maintained and condoned by government on the condition that minimum volumes are met.The issue of a single operator dominating the market does not appear problematic as,arguably,with a strong road and coastal shipping network,competition from those sectors are considered sufficient to ensure efficiency in rail.It also is likely to discourage abuse of monopoly power.In the event that freight volumes fall below a critical level,however, the New Zealand Government has the right to allow access to other operators(Bollard and Pickford1995).6.2.Rationale for reformWhile the rationale for reform in Australia was predomi-nantly driven by inefficiencies and to reduce the large losses incurred by state government railways,particularly Victoria and New South Wales,reform overseas was driven by some notable different objectives.In Argentina,for example, problems in the rail industry were associated with a lack of commercial orientation and a run down network as a result of poorly targeted investment decisions.Reform in Canada,on the other hand,differed substantially from other countries in so far as it was initiated by industry in an endeavour to enhance efficiency,rather than government as occurred in Australia, New Zealand and Great Britain,for example.In Germany,not unlike Australia,reform was driven by a need to improve efficiency and to solve the debt problem faced by the rail industry.In Great Britain the push was driven by both government and industry.There was a need in Great Britain to reduce subsidies at a time when investments were required and the need to meet customer requirements.Reform in Japan,as in the case of Australia,was driven by a need to reduce growing government deficits.Former attempts by the Japanese government to control railway deficits had proved to be unsuccessful—these had reached US$13billion by1985and were no longer sustainable(Productivity Commission 1999:E3).The main objective of rail reform in New Zealand, not unlike port reform in that country,was to improve efficiency by way of privatisation both in the rail and port sectors.The belief,driven by New Right philosophy,that the private sector was inherently more efficient than the public sector,was deeply entrenched in both the New Zealand and the Australian psyche.Not surprisingly,privatisation of rail was considered the means of improving efficiency,reducing rail deficits,as well as making New Zealand exports more competitive with the reduction in rail freight rates.6.3.Impact of reform in AustraliaAs noted above the rationale behind rail reform in Australia was driven by the need to introduce competition into the rail sector.As noted above this was achieved by vertically separating below and above rail components—this was set in place in all states with the exception of Queensland.Vertical separation meant that below rail,or track and associated infrastructure,remained publicly petition in rail was introduced,however,with the deregulation of the above rail component.This effectively meant that competition occurred between operators seeking access to the government owned track.Deregulation meant also that the number of operators increased dramatically—from8to29by1999(Productivity Commission,1999).While this meant a significant increase in numbers,it is questionable whether this is sustainable over the long term.Robinson(2002)has rejected the notion that competition can necessarily be translated into an increase in numbers.He points out that an increase in numbers can in fact have anti competitive impacts if benefits of scale economies are absent.The OECD(2001)points out that this was the case in Great Britain where,during the early stages of privatisation parts of the network were split into numerous companies. When it came to selling these companies the main three freight companies could only be sold together to a single buyer which has since bought all the other freight services except containers and nuclear waste.This experience suggests that fragmentation went too far,and that the number of competing rail companies the market can support is small.Rationalisation of operations is also occurring in Australia where,at the present time,a small number of large companies, such as Pacific National,is taking over the smaller operations. Those smaller players that continue to exist have sought niche markets.Determining whether competition in rail has led to reduced freight rates has been difficult to establish conclusively as neither rail operators nor shippers are willing to divulge contractual arrangements.Anecdotal evidence obtained from mining companies in Central Queensland and the Hunter Valley in New South Wales suggests,however,that contest-ability in the market has led to a reduction in freight rates of some25percent(Confidential discussions).Measuring profitability in a meaningful way following deregulation is also difficult.With the exception of Queensland Rail,ownership and restructure has meant that the pre and post reform structures existing in all other states are not compatible—in all states with the exception of Queensland, state operations have been privatized.Prior to deregulation the state railways were infrastructure owners as well as sole operators-post deregulation,on the other hand,only Queensland Rail is a rail operator and a meaningful comparison can be undertaken only in that state.In all other states ownership of the track has been separated from the former government operations and there is little basis for comparison as we are dealing with incomparable business and ownership structures.Table4suggests,however,that sinceS.Everett/Transport Policy13(2006)74–84 80。
专题05 论述类文本阅读第3讲观点态度推断阅读下面的文字，完成下面小题。
现在我们来说中国民族革命营垒里的情形。
首先是红军的情形。
同志们，你们看，差不多一年半以来，中国的三支主力红军都在作阵地的大转移。
从去年八月任弼时同志等率领第六军团向贺龙同志的地方开始转移起，接着就是十月开始的我们的转移。
今年三月，川陕边区的红军也开始转移。
这三支红军，都放弃了原有阵地，转移到新地区去。
这个大转移，使得旧区域变为游击区。
在转移中，红军本身又有很大的削弱。
如果我们拿着整个局面中的这一方面来看，敌人是得到了暂时的部分的胜利，我们是遭遇了暂时的部分的失败。
这种说法对不对呢？我以为是对的，因为这是事实。
但是有人说（例如张国焘）：中央红军失败了。
这话对不对呢？不对。
因为这不是事实。
马克思主义者看问题，不但要看到部分，而且要看到全体。
一个虾蟆坐在井里说：“天有一个井大。
”这是不对的，因为天不止一个井大。
如果它说：“天的某一部分有一个井大。
”这是对的，因为合乎事实。
我们说，红军在一个方面（保持原有阵地的方面）说来是失败了，在另一个方面（完成长征计划的方面）说来是胜利了。
敌人在一个方面（占领我军原有阵地的方面）说来是胜利了，在另一个方面（实现“围剿”“追剿”计划的方面）说来是失败了。
这样说才是恰当的，因为我们完成了长征。
讲到长征，请问有什么意义呢？我们说，长征是历史纪录上的第一次，长征是宣言书，长征是宣传队，长征是播种机。
自从盘古开天地，三皇五帝到于今，历史上曾经有过我们这样的长征吗？十二个月光阴中间，天上每日几十架飞机侦察轰炸，地下几十万大军围追堵截，路上遇着了说不尽的艰难险阻，我们却开动了每人的两只脚，长驱二万余里，纵横十一个省。
请问历史上曾有过我们这样的长征吗？没有，从来没有的。
长征又是宣言书。
它向全世界宣告，红军是英雄好汉，帝国主义者和他们的走狗蒋介石等辈则是完全无用的。
长征宣告了帝国主义和蒋介石围追堵截的破产。
长征又是宣传队。
厨房是一个音乐厅小练笔200字3篇1、厨房是一个音乐厅小练笔200字厨房是一个音乐厅，当妈妈在里面煮饭时，便奏起了欢快的乐曲。
妈妈用刀切菜时，发出“咚咚”的响声，像击打架子鼓一样，真好听！妈妈炒菜时，油锅里发出“噼里啪啦”的声音，像放鞭炮一样，真热闹！妈妈用高压锅煮汤时，水蒸汽涌出，发出“哧哧”的声音，虽然很刺耳，但还是很动听！厨房真是一个美妙的音乐厅啊！2、厨房是一个音乐厅小练笔200字厨房是一个音乐厅，当妈妈拿来一个杯子和米袋开始舀米时，厨房的音乐便开始了。
杯子触碰到米发出沙沙的声音，那声音像冰雹打在屋檐上一样，杯子在袋子里舀米时不一样的深浅有不一样的声音，不一样的数量有不一样的声音。
妈妈走到水龙头前，端着一个盛着米的盆子放在洗菜池里，打开水龙头，水哗哗地流了出来，流在盆子里，妈妈洗好米开始煮饭了，接着妈妈拿来煎锅，把锅放在灶上，开火，倒油，打了一个蛋，蛋在锅里”滋滋”地响着，不时还有油”噼里啪啦”地蹦出来，好像存心想吓人一大跳。
厨房真是一个音乐多样，快乐的”音乐厅”！3、厨房是一个音乐厅小练笔200字厨房是一个音乐厅。
还没走进厨房，就先听见水“哗哗哗”的声音，就像壮观的瀑布的声音。
高压锅是个脾气暴躁的家伙。
每当饭熟了，它就发出“丝丝丝”的声音，好像在说：“主人，饭已经做好了，快来关火吧。
”如果你不及时留意，它就会溅得厨房到处都是，令人特别讨厌。
我们把目光转到抽油烟机。
打开它，只听见“隆隆隆”的声音，就像在说：“主人，我一定会把所有的油烟吸走的！”这声音充满力量。
当食物变凉了，我们就要使用微波炉来加热。
每当我们把食物放进微波炉里，并开始加热，就会发出“叮铃铃”的声音，这声音像一首欢快的乐曲，让人听了非常舒服。
