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Advances in Clinical Medicine 临床医学进展, 2023, 13(2), 2083-2092 Published Online February 2023 in Hans. https:///journal/acm https:///10.12677/acm.2023.132291腺苷激活A 1与A 2A 受体诱导睡眠的研究进展蒋单栋1，俞 盈2，任思齐3，邹 莹4，么春艳2*1杭州医学院临床医学院，浙江 杭州 2杭州医学院食品科学与工程学院，浙江 杭州3杭州医学院药学院，浙江 杭州4浙江中医药大学附属第二医院，浙江 杭州收稿日期：2023年1月14日；录用日期：2023年2月8日；发布日期：2023年2月16日摘 要睡眠–觉醒是一个涉及多系统、多中枢的生理过程，这一变化过程可通过脑内多种神经递质和内源性睡眠物质共同作用而实现。

作为一种核苷，腺苷是目前发现的最强的内源性促眠物质之一，激活A 1和A 2A 受体诱导睡眠，其中又以A 2A 受体占主导作用，A 1受体在不同脑区表现出区域特异性。

作为中枢腺苷受体拮抗剂，咖啡因通过纹状体伏隔核壳区的A 2A 受体发挥觉醒效能。

为更好地理解腺苷对睡眠的调节机制以及为新型失眠药的研发提供思路，本文对腺苷的代谢和睡眠稳态、A 1、A 2A 受体对睡眠调节作用的差异、咖啡因与A 2A 受体的关系等内容进行了系统描述。

关键词腺苷，睡眠，咖啡因，腺苷A 1受体，腺苷A 2A 受体Advances in Sleep Induction by Adenosine Activation of A 1 and A 2A ReceptorsShandong Jiang 1, Ying Yu 2, Siqi Ren 3, Ying Zou 4, Chunyan Yao 2*1School of Clinical Medicine, Hangzhou Medical College, Hangzhou Zhejiang 2Institute of Food Science and Engineering, Hangzhou Medical University, Hangzhou Zhejiang 3School of Pharmacy, Hangzhou Medical College, Hangzhou Zhejiang 4The Second Affiliated Hospital of Zhejiang Chinese Medical University, Hangzhou Zhejiang Received: Jan. 14th , 2023; accepted: Feb. 8th , 2023; published: Feb. 16th , 2023*通讯作者。

三菱PLC A系列模块A3ACPU (30K+30K)步,2048I/O,高性能(0.15us/步) A3ACPUP21 A3ACPU 带MELSECNET Ⅱ 光缆链路A3ACPUR21 A3ACPU 带MELSECNET Ⅱ 同轴电缆链路A2ACPU-S1 14K步,1024 I/O 点,高性能A2ACPUP21-S1 A2ACPU-S1 带MELSECNET Ⅱ 光缆链路A2ACPUR21-S1 A2ACPU-S1 带MELSECNET Ⅱ 同轴电缆链路A2ACPU 14K步,512 I/O,高性能A2ACPUP21 A2ACPU 带MELSECNET Ⅱ 光缆链路A2ACPUR21 A2ACPU 带MELSECNET Ⅱ 同轴电缆链路A3NCPU (30K+30K)步,2048 I/O 点A3NCPUP21 A3NCPU 带MELSECNET Ⅱ 光缆链路A3NCPUR21 A3NCPU 带MELSECNET Ⅱ 同轴电缆链路A2NCPU-S1 14K步,1024 I/O 点A2NCPUP21-S1 A2NCPU-S1 带MELSECNET Ⅱ 光缆链路A2NCPUR21-S1 A2NCPU-S1 带MELSECNET Ⅱ 同轴电缆链路A2NCPU 14K步,512 I/O 点A2NCPUP21 A2NCPU 带MELSECNET Ⅱ 光缆链路A2NCPUR21 A2NCPU 带 MELSEC NET Ⅱ 同轴电缆链路A1NCPU 6K步,256 I/O 点A1NCPUP21 A1NCPU 带MELSECNET Ⅱ 光缆链路A1NCPUR21 A1NCPU 带MELSECNET Ⅱ 同轴电缆链路A0J2HCPU 8K步,480 I/O 点,1.25us/步A0J2HCPUP21 8K步,480 I/O 点光缆链路A0J2HCPUR21 8K步,480 I/O 点同轴电缆链路A0J2HCPUP21-S3A0J2HCPU-DC24[主基板]A32B 主基板带:CPU ,2 I/O 和电源插槽A35B 主基板带:CPU ,5 I/O 和电源插槽A38B 主基板带:CPU ,8 I/O 和电源插槽A52B 扩展基板带:2 I/O 插槽A55B 扩展基板带:5 I/O 插槽A58B 扩展基板带:8 I/O 插槽A62B 扩展基板带:2 I/O 电源插槽A65B 扩展基板带:5 I/O 电源插槽A68B 扩展基板带:8 I/O 电源插槽[电源]A61P 输入:AC 110/240V 输出 :DC 5V 8AA62P 输入:AC 110/240V 输出 :DC 5V 5A,DC 24V 0.8A A63P 输入:DC 24V 输出 :DC 5V 8A 7,690A65P 输入:AC 110/240V 输出 :DC 5V 2A,DC 24V 1.5AA66P 输入:AC 110/240V 输出 :DC 24V 1.2AA68P 输入:AC 110/240V 输出 :DC 1.5V[内存卡]A3NMCA-0 内存卡没有内存, USE 4K RAM IC 3,080A3NMCA-2 内存卡 16KB RAM 3,230A3NMCA-4 内存卡 32KB RAM 4,040A3NMCA-8 内存卡 64KB RAM 7,290A3NMCA-16 内存卡 128KB RAM 9,710A3NMCA-24 内存卡 192KB RAM 12,140A3NMCA-40 内存卡 320KB RAM 16,180A3NMCA-56 内存卡 448KB RAM 20,230[内存]4KRAM 4K步内存 (A1N, A3NMCA-0) 1,08016KRAM 16K步 RAM 2,1804KROM 4K步 EP-ROM (A1N, A3NMCA-0) 8108KROM 8K步 EP-ROM 1,35016KROM 16K步 EP-ROM 2,03016KHROM 16K步 EP-ROM 用于 AD57(S1/S2), AD58 2,030 16KQROM EP-ROM 内存+B213 2,0304KEROM EP-ROM 内存 1,35064KWROM 56KB 内存用于 AD51H, AD57G 1,210128KWROM 128KB 内存用于 AD51H, AD57G 1,600256KWROM 256KB 内存用于 AD51H, AD57G 2,010[输入模块]AX10 16 点. AC 100V, 10mA 2,840AX11 32 点. AC 100V, 10mA 4,940AX20 16 点 AC 200V, 10mA 3,400AX21 32 点 AC 200V, 10mA 5,670AX40 16 点 DC 12/24V, 漏型输入 (4/10mA) 2,670AX41 32 点 DC 12/24V, 漏型输入 (4/10mA) 4,210AX41-S1 32 点 DC 12/24V, 漏型输入 (4/10mA), 高速 4,37 0AX42 64 点 DC 12/24V, 漏型输入 (3/7mA)AX42-S1 64 点 DC 12/24V, 漏型输入 (3/7mA), 高速AX50-S1 16 点 DC 48V, 漏型/源型输入 (4mA)AX60-S1 16 点 DC 100/110/125V, 漏型/源型输入(2mA) AX70 16 点 DC 5/12/24V, 漏型/源型输入(2mA)AX71 32 点 DC 5/12/24V, 漏型/源型输入(3.5/2/4.5mA) AX80 16 点 DC 12/24V, 源型输入(4/10mA)AX80E 16 点 DC 12/24V, 源型输入(4/10mA), 高速AX81 32 点 DC 12/24V, 源型输入(4/10mA)AX82 64 点 DC 12/24V, 源型输入(8/7mA)[输出模块]AY10 16 点继电器输出 , 2AAY10A 16 点继电器输出 , 2A (独立共同端) AY11 16 点继电器输出 , 2A 3,480AY11A 16 点继电器输出 ,2A (独立共同端)AY11E 16 点继电器输出 2A (保险共同端)AY13 32 点继电器输出 2AAY13E 32 点继电器输出 2A (保险共同端)AY22 16 点可控硅输出 2AAY23 32 点可控硅输出 0.6AAY40 16 点 DC 12/24V 晶体管漏型输出 0.1A 3,080 AY40A 16 点 DC 12/24V 晶体管漏型输出 0.3A (独立共同端)AY40P 16 点 DC 12/24V 晶体管漏型输出 0.1A (短路保护)AY41 32 点 DC 12/24V 晶体管漏型输出 0.1A 3,890AY41P 16 点 DC 12/24V 晶体管漏型输出 0.1A (短路保护)AY42 64 点 DC 12/24V 晶体管漏型输出 0.1A 5,430AY42-S1 64 点 DC 12/24V 晶体管漏型输出 0.1A (高速) 5,670AY42-S3 64 点 DC 12/24V 晶体管漏型输出 0.1A (保险共同端)AY50 16 点 DC 12/24V 晶体管漏型输出 0.5A 3,400AY51 32 点 DC 12/24V 晶体管漏型输出 0.5A 4,450AY51-S1 32 点 DC 12/24V 晶体管漏型输出 0.3A 4,860AY60 16 点 DC 12/24/48V 晶体管源型输出 2AAY60E 16 点 DC 12/24/48V 晶体管源型输出 0.5AAY60S 16 点 DC 24/48V 晶体管漏型输出用于 TTL 和 CMOS, 2AAY70 16 点 DC5/12V 晶体管漏型输出用于 TTL 和 CMOS 16 mAAY71 32 点 DC5/12V 晶体管漏型输出用于 TTL 和 CMOS 1 6mAAY72 64 点 DC 5/12V 晶体管漏型输出用于 TTL 和 CMOS, 16mAAY80 16 点 DC 12/24V 晶体管源型输出, 0.5A 3,890 AY81 32 点 DC 12/24V 晶体管源型输出, 0.5A 5,260 AY81EP 32 点 DC 12/24V 晶体管源型输出, 0.8A 7,310带短路保护AY82EP 64 点 DC 12/24V 晶体管源型输出, 0.1A 7,200 带短路保护A42XY 64 点输入, 64 点漏型输出, DC 12/24V, 55/180m A 6,880AH42 32 点输入, 32 点漏型输出, DC 12/24V 5,340[模拟信号模块]A68AD A/D 转换器 :8通道, 4~20mA,或 -10V~+10V 11,330A68ADN A/D 转换器 :8通道, 4~20mA,或 -10V~+10V (HIGH RESOLU TION) 11,330A616AD A/D 转换器 :16通道, 4~20mA,或 -10V~+10V 20,230A60MX MLTIPLEXER UNIT :16通道,非隔离 13,760A60MXR MLTIPLEXER UNIT :16通道,ISOLATED MERCURY 继电器输出A616TD 热电偶 CONERTER UNIT :16 通道 20,230A60MXT 热电偶多路复用器:16 通道 22,660A68DAV D/A 转换模块 :8 通道, 电压输出 17,990A68DAI-S1 D/A 转换模块 :8 通道 17,990A62DA D/A 转换模块 :2 通道,4~20mA OR -10V~+10VA62DA-S1 D/A 转换模块 :2 通道,4~20mA ,0~20mA OR -10V~+11V A616DAV D/A 转换模块 :16 通道,电压输出 28,780A616DAI D/A 转换模块 :16 通道,电流输出 28,780AC12MX 连接电缆用于多路复用器 (1.2m 长) 970A68RD3N 热电偶输入单元 :PT100,3线型 11,330A68RD4N 热电偶输入单元 :PT100,4线型。

ov ervie wIn datacenters worldwide it is common practice to hard-code passwords and user IDs in applications and scripts. Auditors and IT groups knowingly allow application-to-application (A2A) passwords and user IDs to remain shared among administrators, developers and contractors.This practice is starting to change. Leading IT organizations are now recognizing and resolving the risks of unmanaged and exposed passwords lurking in their datacenters. The increasing frequency and growing impact of insider attacks, as well as more demanding regulatory compliance requirements, means organizations can no longer ignore this known risk. They must address the threat hiding in plain sight.Hard-coded passwords also cost time and money. A simple password change requires companies to update and redeploy applications, which may cause synchronization problems and server outages. Multiply these issues across hundreds or thousands of servers and applications, and an organization may have tens or even hundreds of thousands of unmanaged passwords, creating huge costs and risks.This paper reviews the security risks associated with hard-coded passwords and will help organizations to:Gain insight into the security vulnerability that lies on everyserverLearn why IT organizations struggle with access controls in thedatacenterMaster the security challenges beyond access controlsLearn how to secure the datacenter through applicationpassword managementDiscover solutions for secure centralized passwordmanagement for application serversthe securit y vulneraBilit y on e v ery serv erGenerally companies have invested a great deal of time, money, and effort in deploying network perimeter defenses and User Identity Management policies and solutions. The goal being to ensure the security of corporate resources. However, these essential expenditures do not address threats from internal sources. More than half of the list of published US Department of Justice cases on computer fraud have been perpetrated by disgruntled or former employees.1The pressing need to address User Identity Management has deflected attention from another common practice surrounding user IDs and passwords, the practice of hard-coding them into applications so that an application-to-application or application-to-database connection can be established.Unlike a human, an application lacks the ability to enter a password through a keyboard or authenticate using a second factor token. Applications must therefore authenticate using a stored password. Typically, these passwords are hard-coded into the application or script, or are stored in a configuration file.Research shows that 90% of application authentication in a datacenter remains password-based. Considering that thesehard-coded passwords are “in the clear”, are known by many, and are rarely changed, organizations should be concerned about the risks associated with this practice.When assessing the effort required to reduce the risks associated with hard-coded passwords, ask the following key questions: How many server scripts and applications hosted in yourenterprise datacenters use hard-coded user IDs and passwords to access other server applications?Does your organization require that the same security practicesbe applied to the passwords hard-coded within applications, as must be applied to users’ passwords?When was the last time that all of your application-to-applicationpasswords were changed?How many developers know the passwords to your databaseand application servers?Are all passwords changed when a developer leaves theorganization, or after a contractor leaves at the conclusion of a project?the thre at hiding in pl ain sight: hard-coded application passwordsThe most common reason that application-to-application passwords are not being changed regularly and often is, quite simply, cost. The human cost to maintain and redeploy the hundreds or thousands of applications that contain hard-coded passwords grows unsustainably as the number of passwords and applications grows. Furthermore, the cost of server or application outages caused by unsynchronized or incorrectly changed passwords can exceed the cost of changing the passwords in the first place.Eliminating hard-coded application passwords may seem like a simple problem to solve, but it raises many new security challenges when one considers the potential insider threats that could compromise an organization’s systems.The next sections describe the security building blocks and approach needed to remediate the issue of Application Password Management while increasing operational efficiencies and uptime, reducing the risk of credential breaches, and tightening audit compliance and control.account t y pesThe figure below shows the three account types found on a network and the characteristics of user IDs and passwords in each. Malicious insiders target elevated privileged accounts—which include unattended application-to-application accounts—because these accounts give greater access to systems and data.l egisl ation pressure on cio s and audi-torsIndustry and government legislation such as Payment Card Industry, FISMA, Sarbanes-Oxley, HIPAA, and others require changes in how organizations run. Auditors are interpreting the applicable legislation to establish the policies and practices to which their organizations must adhere. Cost has not been an accepted reason for failing to comply with a particular piece of legislation. Company CIOs know that their application-to-application passwords are not being secured or changed, are known to developers and contractors, and are visible in plain text inside of scripts, applications, and configuration files across all of the servers within their datacenter. A CIO is responsible for the Internal Controls for Financial Reporting as they relate to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and is required to sign off on Section 404. Knowing all of this, how can he or she sign off?The auditor interprets all applicable legislation and compares the intent of those documents with the organization’s policies and procedures. Most organizations are tired of having the legislative hammer poised over their heads; however, the daunting prospect of having to publicly disclose any lapses in security or of being tried in a court of law, and the risk of losing revenue and customers has driven the procurement of security solutions to the top of the IT spending list. Companies have now seen firsthand the significant consequences that can result from not implementing these types of solutions. On January 8, 2010, Heartland Payment Systems agreed to a settlement of $60 million payable to Visa for credit and debit cardholder losses resulting from a data breach in 2008. Additionally, the Ponemon Institute’s annual study reported that the average total cost of a data breach topped $200 per customer record in 2009, and overall organization cost per incident climbed to $6.75 million.While most forms of legislation provide general guidance, few—if any—explicitly state the mechanisms to achieve compliance or conformance. It is hard for an auditor to review and interpret the specific details of each of the legislative documents that may affect a business. Establishing the practices that cost-effectively allow an organization to gain compliance is even harder. It is important for the audit community to raise the awareness of this potential threat.Hard-coded application passwords are legacy problems, yet developers continue to hard-code application passwords into new applications. Why?The main reason is that cost-effective, efficient, secure, commercially-supported solutions to the application-to-application password management challenge did not exist until recently.struggling with access controls inthe datacent erToday, most applications rely on the “trusted network” of an organization to control who or what has access to maintain or execute the applications resident on their servers. The trusted network is the internal network of an organization that employees and contractors authenticate to in order to complete the tasks associated with their role. Few organizations have protected their internal networks beyond using operating system file access controls.Considering that an internal threat comes from a person who has, or had access to the internal network, companies are now beginning to realize that they also have had the time to plan an attack, understand the value of their objective, know the systemic defenses and reporting mechanisms, and enjoy a presumption of innocence because they are an “insider”.It has been shown that internal attacks, while fewer in number, are far more financially damaging than external attacks. Of the listed Department of Justice computer fraud cases that were perpetrated by insiders, most included the exploitation of weak, unchanging passwords on servers to which the insiders had some level of access—because they were members of the trusted network.Even Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) systems are challenged by unattended applications. PKI systems must protect the private keys used to authenticate, authorize, and digitally sign. But how does an unattended application protect its private keys stored on disk? With a password! And this password is typically embedded into the application or script, or is stored in a configuration file—completely defeating the purpose of using a PKI for strong authentication. In this case, security becomes a “chicken and egg” issue: How are private keys protected while in use in memory by an unattended application? The answer is they aren’t. While PKI is an elegant solution for strong authentication, digital signatures, and non-repudiation, it suffers many challenges in an unattended environment that is subject to internal attack.To effectively solve the password management challenge an organization needs to first eliminate the passwords from the scripts and applications that use them. To do this they need to establish a central location from which scripts and applications are able to retrieve passwords when needed. An important benefit of using a central password repository is it provides a single point of control over the release policies for passwords. This was not possible before. Clearly, strong security techniques are needed to protect the passwords stored in the central repository. Data encryption is not enough. An attacker will attempt to monitor server memory or breach the software libraries that contain or utilize the keying material, to decrypt the data in the repository. Techniques to hide keys and algorithms are essential to a secure password management solution.It’s also vital to secure the end points of connections to the central repository. As these end points are expected to operate unattended, it is not enough to rely on physical security alone. The end points must be capable of protecting their identities, protecting the keying materials used during cryptographic operations, and detecting attempts to tamper with scripts and applications that execute upon them.securit y chall enges Be yond access controlsFor a system to have the confidence needed to release a critical credential (such as a password) to an unattended application, and be resistant to both external and internal threats, it must be capable of application self-authentication and systemic self-protection. Just like the human biometric which uniquely identifies a person, there are many runtime environmental details that can be collected during application execution.Combining these application “biometrics” with cryptographic techniques delivers a means to authenticate and authorize the release of critical credentials to uniquely identifiable and registered applications. This “biometric” comparison of an application against the authenticated application’s profile can be used to also ensure that the calling application has not been altered.This validation ensures that credentials are not disclosed inappropriately.securit y requirements for password managementBy combining security techniques with best security practices, it is possible to outline the specific security requirements of a centralized password management system for unattended servers and applications. They are:Central server authenticationClient/agent authenticationProtected central repositorySession and message-level encryptionTamper-resistant libraries and applicationsServer scope controlSecure local cachingProtected keying materialsBuilding Blocks of an effec tiv e pass-word management syst emThe next sections describe the security techniques companies should apply together to achieve the security requirements listed above. IntegrIty VerIfIcatIonThrough integrity verification, the centralized password manager determines that the calling application, as well as the password management system, remain as originally developed and deployed. Verification techniques check components statically on-disk and dynamically in-memory. Calling applications must prove their integrity before the centralized password manager releases a credential.fIngerprIntIngA server’s fingerprint is a unique “biometric” element produced from a combination of hardware characteristics like CPU serial numbers, network IDs and other items. By dynamically calculating the fingerprint of the computer executing a script or application, a centralized password management system can validate the physical machine identity of the credential requestor. By registering all requestors to the system, the fingerprint becomes a critical factor in controlling the scope of authenticating servers.VaLIdated cryptographyPasswords and encryption keys must be protected from unauthorized disclosure, and validated cryptographic modules ensure that this is done securely. Any weaknesses in the means used to protect these critical credentials potentially exposes the entire enterprise to attack right where it is most vulnerable. By employing validated encryption mechanisms, these critical components of an agency’s information security architecture are provided with assured protection from any possible unauthorized disclosure.transformatIonsCode transformations are mathematical transforms that are applied to data flow and control flow within a program to hide the original information and algorithms. The technique prevents reverse-engineering and creates interdependencies and complexity that prevent tampering. Impact on performance and code expansion is acceptable.renewabILItyThis security technique contributes to the overall effectiveness and security of the password management solution by limiting the lifetime of critical elements of the system. Limiting the lifetime of these elements shortens the amount of time that an attacker has to successfully breach the component before it is replaced.Automated renewability is applied to:passwords.Renewing passwords frequently is a significant step toward enhanced data protection. For years, organizations have pressured users to renew their passwords while rarely changing hard-coded passwords in scripts and applications. Improvingsecurity requires a centralized password manager thatautomates the renewal and retrieval of long, strong and random passwords for datacenter applications.repository encryption Keys. In addition to renewing passwords, it is important to renew key materials used to protect those passwords while they are statically stored in a repository.A centralized password manager must allow customer-controlledregular and ad-hoc repository key renewals.session authentication Keys.To gain access to the repository, it is important to control and renew the authentication keys used by the connecting client agents. A centralized password manager must allow customer-controlled regular and ad-hoc renewals of SSL client private keys.message encryption Keys.Building on repository keyrenewals, it also is important to renew individual keys used totransmit information securely between the centralized password manager and its connecting agents.agent software renewal.Each of the thousands of application servers in a datacenter will run a copy of the software, whichvalidates the integrity of the requesting application. Updatingeach of these servers to distribute maintenance patches, updates and upgrades is an essential maintenance function of anyproduction environment. Any system to manage A2A passwords must include a software renewal mechanism that allowscustomer-controlled, automated (or manual) patching of theagent software.agent secure cache renewal.Maintaining a secure local cache of retrieved passwords greatly improves performance and contributes to a high-availability design. However, as passwords are changed, the cached information must be renewedautomatically.The combination of the above security techniques delivers a comprehensive approach to the secure management and release of the elevated privilege account passwords that protect access to an organization’s most critical data. Managing these passwords proactively gives a reasonable assurance that a company can promptly detect and prevent any unauthorized acquisition, use or disposition of sensitive data in the datacenter.summaryIn most organizations, the presence of unmanaged and exposed passwords and the resulting insider threat has not yet been a security focal point. But increasing instances of insider attacks, the higher impact of such attacks, and increasing compliance requirements are forcing organizations to address the issue.Traditional security approaches to these insider threats have proven to be inadequate and ineffective. Only through secure centralized password management is an organization able to effectively address these threats and deliver on compliance requirements, while permitting insiders to remain productive. Centralized password management requires a combination of both centralized access control and robust technology for application-level security.The risk of a credential breach is dramatically reduced when scripts and applications can gain run-time access to the validated accounts and passwords that they need to execute without divulging those accounts and passwords to developers, or hard-coding the passwords in scripts and applications. The approach also eliminates costly application maintenance and outages when passwords need to be changed. Furthermore, the approach reduces the cost of changing passwords to the point that frequent and regular password changes are easily affordable, which in turn greatly reduces risk. The secure local caching of application user IDs and passwords achieves execution performance which is nearly equal to that of hard-coded application passwords. Automated cache expiry enables frequent password changes and eliminates the problem of stale cached passwords.。

有关发射标识的资料发射类别之信号如下：A1A —经启闭键控未经声频调制之电报；A1B —经自动接收、未使用调制副载波之调幅电报；A1D —未使用调制副载波、具双边带之调幅资料传送；A2A —经一个或数个调制声频之启闭键控之电报，或经调幅发射之启闭键控之电报；A2B —经自动接收；具调制副载波之启闭键控之调幅电报；A2D —使用调制副载波、具双边带之调幅资料传送；A3C —直接或经已调频副载波、具主载波调制之调幅传真；A3E —具双边带之调幅电话；C3F —具残馀边带之调幅电视；F1A —在某一时间，由两个频率之一发射、未经声频调制、经频率变化处理之电报；F1B —经自动接收、未使用调制副载波之调频电报；F1D —未使用调制副载波之调频资料传送；F2A —经调频声频之启闭键控之电报，或经调频发射之启闭键控之电报（特殊情况为未经处理之调频发射）；F28 —经自动接收、具调制副载波之启闭键控之调频电报；F2D —使用调制副载波之调频资料传送；F3C —经直接调制于载波频率之调频传真；F3E —调频电话；F3F —调频电视；G1D —未使用调制副载波之调相资料传送；G2D —使用调制副载波之调相资料传送；G3C —调相传真；G3E —调相电话；G3F —调相电视；J1D —具单边带及抑制载波使用调制副载波之调幅资料传送；J2A —具单边带及抑制载波、经多个调制声频之启闭键控或经一调幅发射机之启闭键控之电报；J2B —经自动接收，具单边带、抑制载波及调制副载波之启闭键控之调幅电报；J2D —具单边带及抑制载波、且未使用调制副载波之调幅资料传送；J3C —具单边带及抑制载波之调幅传真；J3E —具单边带及抑制载波之调幅电话；J8E —具独立边带之调幅电话；K1A —未经声频调制、经脉冲传送之载波之启闭键控之电报；K2A —经一个或数个调制声频之启闭键控之电报，或经脉冲传送之已调制载波之启闭键控电报（特殊情况为由脉冲传送之未经处理之已调载波）；K3E —脉冲调制电话；R3C —具单边带及缩减载波之调幅传真；R3D —具单边带及缩减载波之调幅资料传送；R3E —具单边带及缩减载波之调幅电话。

通讯手册注释1.除非另有标示，所列频率为地面收发频率。

例如：3947/59表示沿航路的发射和接收频率。

注有（R）或（T）表示仅为接收或仅为发射频率。

2.由于指点标的频率为75兆赫，所以此频率不标出。

3.仅标出选择的甚高频频率。

4.NDB（无方向性无线电信标台）的发射：NDB发射标有A1A、A2A等是为了让使用者能正确接收它的发射。

如果一个NDB标有A1A或NONA1A表示未调幅发射，需要一个内装振荡器的接收机以便能生成音频信号。

总的说来这叫作BFO（拍频振荡器）。

必须将此BFO接通才能接收A1A或NONA1A的发射，但是这会根据机载设备的不同而异。

其它种类的收讯机可能有CW位，在接收A1A或NONA1A时使用，有的收讯机有VOICE位，在接收A2A和无线电话时须放此位。

当正在发射NDB识别信号时，关断BFO（或在VOICE位）应能收到像Non A2A的多路发射，但是在发射识别信号的间歇期间为了正确调谐应接通BFO。

5.除非另有声明，否则均为世界协调时。

HJ-从日出至日落。

HN-从日落至日出。

捷克斯洛伐克，德国、意大利、马耳他、英国以及法国民用设施：HJ-日出前30分钟至日落后30分钟HN-日落后30分钟至日出前30分钟法国民用设施：（S）夏日时4月至九月。

（W）冬日时10月至3月。

法国军用设施：HJ-（夏）06-1530，公休日按要求。

HJ-（冬）SR+30分钟-SS+45分钟。

HN-以上规定以外的时间。

6.除非另有说明，航向为磁航向。

处于进近中心线上的设备仅标出距离。

7.除非另有声明，ACC频率为高低空服务。

8.通常列出供飞行中使用的一个台以上的气象情报广播服务，并且在发射台站的ACC频率下面列出详细资料并且各台站下面列出本台的详细资料。

空对空特高频通信当飞机在远洋区上空飞行时和/或在加勒比/南美以及北大西洋区域飞行时，用于机组间互相交换飞行情报的频率已被分配为：加勒比/南美——130.55北大西洋——131. 8太平洋——123.45这些频率的目的不是为了辅助那些通常用于位置报告和飞行活动情报的空/地频率。

常见的加密解密算法⽹络中传输敏感信息的时候通常会对字符串做加密解密处理1.Base64位加密（可加密解密）最简单的加密⽅式，没有密钥，这种⽅式只要让别⼈拿到你的密⽂，就可以直接解密，只能⽤来迷惑，⼀般情况下不单独使⽤，因为真的并没有什么卵⽤~可以和其他加密⽅式混合起来，作为⼀层外部包装。

import base64data = "abc"#加密m = Base64.encodestring(data)print m #得到⼀个base64的值#解密date = Base64.decodestring(m)2.MD5加密（加密不可逆）MD5的全称是Message-Digest Algorithm 5（信息-摘要算法）。

128位长度。

⽬前MD5是⼀种不可逆算法。

具有很⾼的安全性。

它对应任何字符串都可以加密成⼀段唯⼀的固定长度的代码。

（⼩贴⼠：为啥MD5加密算法不可逆呢~ 按道理来说有加密⽅式，就会有解密⽅式呀？因为MD5加密是有种有损的加密⽅式，⽐如⼀段数据为'123'，我在加密的时候，遇到1和3都直接当做是a，加密后变成了'a2a'，所以解密的时候就出现了4种组合'323''121''123''321'，数据⼀多，⾃然找不到原始的数据了，当然这种⽅式加密的密⽂也不需要解密，需要的时候直接发送原始密⽂就好了~只是看不到密⽂原本的内容）import hashlibimport base64data1 = "abc"data2 = 'def'hash = hashlib.md5()#多个⽂件多次加密hash.update(data1)hash.update(data2)value = hash.digest()print repr(value) #得到⼀个⼆进制的字符串print hash.hexdigest() #得到⼀个⼗六进制的字符串print base64.encodestring(value) #得到base64的值3.sha1加密（加密不可逆）SHA1的全称是Secure Hash Algorithm(安全哈希算法) 。

干扰素与的区别干扰素是人和动物细胞受到合适的刺激时产生的一种微量的、具有高度生物学活性的糖蛋白，一般分为型和Ⅱ型。

Ⅰ型干扰素包括α和β是由白细胞和成纤维细胞产生，Ⅱ型干扰素，又称γ或免疫干扰素是由有丝分裂原刺激淋巴细胞产生。

α是人体抵抗病毒和细菌侵袭的重要蛋白质，当人体受到病毒感染时，机体内就会产生大量的干扰素。

当你得流感时，你就会感受到干扰素的存在，感冒时的发烧、关节痛、全身肌肉酸痛症状就是由于流感病毒感染后，体内产生了大量干扰素蛋白质引起的。

α按氨基酸序列的不同，α可分为、、等。

临床上用于治疗乙肝和丙肝的干扰素都是基因工程生产的干扰素蛋白质。

我们谈干扰素与的区别时，指的是两种蛋白质的区别。

干扰素和干扰素是干扰素的两种类型，分别由干扰素基因和干扰素基因产生。

干扰素与蛋白的不同，根本上，是由于两种干扰素的基因不同。

研究表明，干扰素基因是我们人类本身就有的基因，通过对人的干扰素基因分析后发现，人体内没有找到干扰素基因，这就意味着干扰素蛋白质是我们人类本来就有的“天然干扰素”，而干扰素是人本来没有的，是“外来的蛋白质”。

这种基因上的差别有什么意义呢？我们知道，免疫系统最重要功能就是区分什么是“自我的”，什么是“外来的”。

当免疫系统认为是自我的蛋白质时，不进行攻击，相安无事。

但是当免疫功能认为是“外来”的蛋白质时，就会把它当做敌人发起攻击，动员免疫细胞，产生出抗体去中和“外来的蛋白质”。

干扰素基因是人本来就有的基因，治疗乙肝时，当干扰素蛋白（如，甘乐能）注射入人体后，人体认为是“自我”的蛋白，不会产生中和抗体进行中和。

与此相反，由于人本来没有干扰素基因，当干扰素被注射入人体后，免疫系统会认为干扰素是“外来”的蛋白质，从而发动攻击，结果产生“中和抗体”，对体内的干扰素蛋白进行结合和中和，导致治疗无效或治疗一段进度有效后疾病再次复发。

蛋白质由氨基酸组成，多个氨基酸连接起来就成为蛋白质。

如果把氨基酸比做一个一个珍珠，那么蛋白质可以简单地比喻为一串珍珠项链。

腺苷及腺苷受体在炎症反应中的作用【关键词】腺苷腺苷受体炎症腺苷作为一种内源性嘌呤核苷，在生理和病理条件下都具有重要作用。

在炎症反应中，腺苷是一种重要的内源性信号转导分子，其作用机制十分复杂。

腺苷聚集在炎症部位，其作用主要是通过激活并结合与G蛋白偶联的腺苷受体（adenosine receptors，ARs）介导的。

目前，已成功克隆出四种腺苷受体，分别是A1、A2A、A2B、A3腺苷受体。

腺苷结合的受体亚型不同，所产生的生理效应也不同。

现就腺苷及腺苷受体在炎症反应中的作用作一综述。

1 腺苷及腺苷受体腺苷是腺嘌呤核苷酸的前体和代谢产物。

腺苷的诸多生理作用，如在炎症反应、凝血过程、缺血再灌注以及多种神经递质的释放中的重要调节作用等等都是通过腺苷受体介导的。

腺苷受体属G-蛋白偶联受体超家族，包括7个跨膜结构，在人体组织中分布广泛，不同种属或者同一种属的不同器官、不同组织、不同细胞，腺苷受体的表达和亲和力都是不同的，除了分布的细胞类型不同外，还包括对相偶联的G-蛋白的敏感性和磷酸化能力的不同[3]。

目前已发现腺苷受体有4种亚型,并已被成功克隆，分别是A1、A2A、A2B、A3腺苷受体。

A1受体与Gi/G0蛋白偶联，A3受体与Gi蛋白偶联，抑制腺苷酸环化酶（adenylate cyclase，AC)的活性，减少环1-磷酸腺苷（cAMP）的水平；A2A、A2B与Gs蛋白偶联，激活AC 的活性，增加cAMP的水平。

低浓度的腺苷即可激活A2A受体，而只有较高浓度的腺苷才能激活A2B受体，提示在生理状态下基础水平的腺苷主要激活A2A受体，当腺苷水平上升超过生理水平或达到病理水平时A2B受体才被激活[1]。

2 腺苷与炎症反应在生理状态下，胞内外的腺苷浓度很低，由于存在高效的失活机理，都低于1～2umol/L,在各种应激情况下（如炎症、缺血、缺氧、创伤、疼痛等），腺苷浓度大幅度上升（如缺血时可升高1000倍之多）[1]。

A2C电商模式典型案例电子商务有很多种不同的形式，比如B2B、B2C、C2C等，考虑到农村电子商务参与人的特殊情况，按照买卖的双方是直接参与还是通过代理人来参与电子商务的流程中，将农村电子商务分为三种模式：A2A（agent to agent）、A2C(agent to consumer)、C2C(consumer to consumer)。

（一） A2A模式（agent to agent）这里的A2A，是agent to agent的简写形式，这里的A指代理人，而A2A是指电子商务中的生产者和消费者都通过代理人来参与电子商务过程。

应用这种模式的比较出名的是“兰田模式”。

兰田模式是以“世纪之村”电子商务平台为基础的运作模式。

这种模式主要由平台企业、信息员、销售商和釆购商四方参与，兰田集团公司作为最主要的平台企业，负责电子商务平台的构建和运营，负责交易规则的制定和完善，负责代销代购渠道的建立和管理。

而信息员则负责买卖信息的发布，促进买卖活动的成功，一般多由拥有上网能力的农产品商人或者农资商人充当，作为农户与平台、消费者与平台、生产商与平台之间联系的桥梁，是形式中的代理人。

生产农副产品的农户或者合作社、提供农资的生产商或者经销人作为销售商，通过信息员（可以是专门的信息员，也可以自己申请成为信息员）发布自己的供货消息，农产品商家、需要农资的普通农户或者合作社作为采购商则通过信息员购买所需商品。

由上述案例，可知A2A模式的农村电子商务的主要流程如下图所示：（二） A2C模式(agent to consumer)这里的A2C，是agent to consumer的简写形式，是指在电子商务市场中，生产者或者销售者通过代理人与消费者之间产生营销关系的一种电子商务模式。

A2C的A指的是代理人，C指的是个人消费者。

近年来，涉农产品网络经销商在农产品产地大量涌现，他们在淘宝等综合性电子商务平台上开设店铺，从农户或者农业生产合作社手中收购农副产品作为自己的货源。

欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁氉氉氉氉引文格式：高莎，沈玺．腺苷Ａ２Ａ受体（Ａ２ＡＲ）拮抗剂ＺＭ２４１３８５对视网膜脱离动物模型视网膜光感受器细胞的保护作用［Ｊ］．眼科新进展，２０２２，４２（７）：５１０ ５１３，５１９．ｄｏｉ：１０．１３３８９／ｊ．ｃｎｋｉ．ｒａｏ．２０２２．０１０４【实验研究】腺苷Ａ２Ａ受体（Ａ２ＡＲ）拮抗剂ＺＭ２４１３８５对视网膜脱离动物模型视网膜光感受器细胞的保护作用△高　莎　沈　玺欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁欁氉氉氉氉作者简介：高莎（ＯＲＣＩＤ：００００ ０００２ ４１６８ ２４８８），女，１９８７年１０月出生，上海人，博士。

研究方向：玻璃体视网膜疾病。

Ｅ ｍａｉｌ：ｇａｏｓｈａ＿１３４３＠１２６．ｃｏｍ通信作者：沈玺（ＯＲＣＩＤ：００００ ０００１ ９６６９ ６５２１），男，１９７０年１２月出生，上海人，博士，教授，主任医师。

研究方向：玻璃体视网膜疾病。

Ｅ ｍａｉｌ：ｃａｒｌ＿ｓｈｅｎ２００５＠１２６．ｃｏｍ收稿日期：２０２２ ０１ ２９修回日期：２０２２ ０４ ２７本文编辑：董建军△基金项目：国家自然科学基金项目（编号：８１９７０８０５）作者单位：２０００２５　上海市，上海交通大学医学院附属瑞金医院眼科【摘要】　目的　探讨腺苷Ａ２Ａ受体（Ａ２ＡＲ）拮抗剂ＺＭ２４１３８５对视网膜脱离（ＲＤ）动物模型视网膜光感受器细胞的保护作用。

方法　选取健康雄性ＳＰＦ级Ｃ５７ＢＬ／６Ｊ小鼠４８只作为研究对象。

将实验小鼠随机分为对照＋二甲基亚砜（ＤＭＳＯ）组、对照＋ＺＭ２４１３８５组、ＲＤ＋ＤＭＳＯ组、ＲＤ＋ＺＭ２４１３８５组，每组１２只。

ＲＤ模型建立后，实验小鼠立即腹腔注射ＺＭ２４１３８５（３ｍｇ·ｋｇ－１，剂量不超过０．２ｍＬ）或同体积ＤＭＳＯ，连续给药３ｄ。

腺苷在肾小管不同部位的功能关于《腺苷在肾小管不同部位的功能》，是我们特意为大家整理的，希望对大家有所帮助。

腺苷是体内重要的局部代谢物质, 在心肌、骨骼肌和肾脏血流量的调节中发挥重要作用。

肾内的腺苷存在于肾内上皮细胞的胞质和细胞间隙中, 在能量供应(如盐的转运和缺血) 时腺苷大量产生, 它可以激活细胞膜上的腺苷受体来影响肾血管, 肾小球和肾小管的功能。

腺苷对于水, 盐的代谢调控, 除了间接通过对肾素的分泌, 肾小球滤过率, 和血液动力的作用, 还可以直接作用于肾小管上皮细胞。

腺苷的这些作用是通过与其受体特异性结合而实现的。

可见, 肾内腺苷和其受体在肾脏中具有重要的调节作用。

一、肾内腺苷的来源肾内多个部位均能合成并释放腺苷, 游离状态下腺苷的半衰期很短, 这是由于红细胞的摄取作用[1]。

正常生理条件下, 肾脏中的腺苷绝大部分存在于细胞内, 2%~5%的腺苷存在于细胞外, 例如小管液和肾间质中。

细胞内的腺苷主要由S-腺苷同型半胱氨酸水解酶通过水解S-腺苷同型半胱氨酸产生。

细胞外的腺苷来源有两种:一是由细胞内的腺苷通过易化扩散的形式转运到细胞外;另外一种是由细胞产生的ATP﹑ADP﹑c AMP转化形成。

细胞内腺苷的浓度与机体能量代谢状态有关。

在正常生理状态时, 腺苷的浓度较低, 一般为nM级;而在缺血缺氧等异常条件下, 可以达到μM级。

最近研究发现组织非特异性的碱性磷酸酶(TNAP) 抑制剂可以减少腺苷的生成, 人类重组的碱性磷酸酶会促进ATP、ADP向腺苷转化[2]。

同时, 盐饮食的变化也会影响肾内腺苷的分泌[3]:低盐饮食时, 肾内腺苷会明显降低;而高盐饮食条件下其浓度会升高。

二、腺苷的受体类型与分布腺苷在机体发挥作用主要是通过与其相应受体结合, 改变第二信使系统活性来调节胞内蛋白激酶信号通路及下游靶基因的表达。

腺苷受体是G蛋白偶联受体, 主要有A1、A2a、A2b 和A3四种类型, 在肾脏均有表达。