Policy Reforms Affecting Agricultural Incentives:Much Achieved,Much Still
Needed
Kym Anderson
For decades,earnings from farming in many developing countries have been depressed by a pro-urban bias in own-country policies,as well as by governments of richer countries favoring their farmers with import barriers and subsidies.Both sets of policies reduce national and global economic welfare and inhibit agricultural trade and economic growth.They almost certainly add to inequality and poverty in developing countries, since three-quarters of the world’s billion poorest people depend on farming for their live-lihood.During the past two decades,however,numerous developing country governments have reduced their sectoral and trade policy distortions,while some high-income countries also have begun reducing market-distorting aspects of their farm policies.The author surveys the changing extent of policy distortions to prices faced by developing-country farmers over the past half century,and provides a summary of new empirical estimates from a global economy-wide model that yield estimates of how much could be gained by removing the interventions remaining as of2004.The author concludes by pointing to the scope and prospects for further pro-poor policy reform in both developing and high-income countries.JEL codes:F13,F14,Q17,Q18
For many decades agricultural protection and subsidies in high-income(and some middle-income)countries have been depressing international prices of farm products,which lowers the earnings of farmers and associated rural businesses in developing countries(Johnson1991;Tyers and Anderson1992).Those policies almost certainly add to inequality and poverty,since three-quarters of the world’s poorest people depend directly or indirectly on agriculture for their main income (World Bank2007).Currently less than15million relatively wealthy farmers in developed countries,with an average of almost80hectares per worker,are being The World Bank Research Observer
#The Author2009.Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/THE WORLD BANK.All rights reserved.For permissions,please e-mail:journals.permissions@https://www.doczj.com/doc/f69893681.html, doi;10.1093/wbro/lkp014Advance Access publication November9,200925:21–55
helped at the expense of not only consumers,taxpayers,and producers of other tradables in those rich countries but also the majority of the1.3billion relatively impoverished farmers and their large families in developing countries who,on average,have to earn a living from just2.5hectares per worker.
But in addition to this external policy in?uence on rural poverty,the govern-ments of many developing countries have directly taxed their farmers over the past half-century.A well-known and often-cited example is the taxing of exports of plantation crops in post-colonial Africa(Bates1981).Furthermore,many developing countries in the1960s and1970s chose also to pursue an import-substituting industrialization strategy,predominantly by restricting imports of manufactures.As Krueger,Schiff,and Valde′s(1988,1991)showed in their seminal multi-country study,this indirectly taxed other tradable sectors in those developing economies,including agriculture.
Thus the price incentives facing farmers in many developing countries have been depressed by both own-country and other countries’farm,food,and trade policies.I will survey the extent to which government policies at home and abroad have distorted prices faced by developing-country farmers over the past half-century.I begin with a brief examination of the methodology required to measure the extent of own-country distortions to farmer incentives.I then survey analyses of the effects of those agricultural and trade policies on incentives over time,focusing on the worsening of that situation between the1950s and early 1980s and on the progress that has been made over the25years since then.
Notwithstanding recent reforms,many price distortions remain in the agricul-tural sector of both developing and high-income countries.I provide a summary of new empirical estimates from a global economy-wide model that indicate how much could be gained by removing the interventions remaining as of2004.
I conclude by pointing to the scope and prospects for further pro-poor policy reform in both developing and high-income countries.
National Distortions to Incentives:Basic Theory1
Bhagwati(1971)and Corden(1997)de?ne the concept of a market policy distor-tion as something that governments impose to create a gap between the marginal social return to a seller and the marginal social cost to a buyer in a transaction. Such a distortion creates an economic cost to society which can be estimated using welfare-measuring techniques such as those pioneered by Harberger (1971).As Harberger notes,this focus allows a great simpli?cation in evaluating the marginal costs of a set of distortions:changes in economic costs can be evalu-ated by taking into account the changes in volumes directly affected by such dis-tortions,ignoring all other changes in prices.In the absence of divergences such 22The W orld Bank Research Observer,vol.25,no.1(February2010)
as externalities,the measure of a distortion is the gap between the price paid and the price received,irrespective of whether the level of these prices is affected by the distortion.2
Importantly,the total effect of distortions on the agricultural sector will depend not just on the size of the direct agricultural policy measures,but also on the magnitude of distortions generated by direct policy measures altering incentives in non-agricultural sectors.It is relative prices,and hence relative rates of government assistance,that affect producers’incentives.In a two-sector model an import tax has the same effect on the export sector as an export tax: the Lerner(1936)Symmetry Theorem.This carries over to a model that has many sectors,and is unaffected if there is imperfect competition domestically or internationally or if some of those sectors produce only non-tradables (Vousden1990,pp.46–7).The Symmetry Theorem is therefore also relevant for considering distortions within the agricultural sector.In particular,if import-competing farm industries are protected,for example via import tariffs,this has similar effects on incentives to produce exportables as does an explicit tax on agricultural exports;and if both measures are in place,this is a double imposition on farm exporters.
Direct Agricultural Distortions
Consider a small,open,perfectly competitive national economy with many ?rms producing a homogeneous farm product with just primary factors.In the absence of externalities,processing,producer-to-consumer wholesale plus retail marketing margins,exchange rate distortions,and domestic and international trading costs,that country would maximize national economic welfare by allow-ing the domestic producer and consumer prices of that product to both equal E times P,where E is the domestic currency price of foreign exchange and P is the foreign currency price of this identical product in the international market.That is,any government-imposed diversion from those two equalities,in the absence of any market failures or externalities,would be welfare-reducing for that small economy.
Price-distorting Trade Measures at the National Border.The most common distortion is an ad valorem tax on competing imports(usually called a tariff),t m.Such a tariff on imports is the equivalent of a production subsidy and a consumption tax, both at rate t m.If that tariff on the imported primary agricultural product is the only distortion,its effect on producer incentives can be measured as the nominal rate of assistance(NRA)to farm output conferred by border price support(NRA BS), which is the unit value of production at the distorted price,less its value at the Anderson23
undistorted free market price,expressed as a fraction of the undistorted price:3
NRA BS?E?Pe1tt mTàE?P
E?P
?t me1T
The effect of that import tariff on consumer incentives in this simple economy is to generate a consumer tax equivalent(CTE)on the agricultural product for?nal consumers:
CTE?t me2TThe effects of an import subsidy are identical to those in equations(1)and(2)for an import tax,but t m in that case would have a negative value.
Governments sometimes also intervene with an export subsidy s x(or an export tax,in which case s x would be negative).If that were the only intervention,then:
NRA BS?CTE?s xe3T
Domestic Producer and Consumer Price-distorting Measures.Some governments provide a direct production subsidy for farmers,s f(or production tax,in which case s f is negative,including via informal taxes in kind by local and provincial governments).In that case,if only this distortion is present,the effect on producer incentives can be measured as the nominal rate of assistance to farm output con-ferred by domestic price support(NRA DS),which is as above except s f replaces t m or s x,but the CTE in that case is zero.Similarly,if the government just imposes a consumption tax c c on this product(or consumption subsidy,in which case c c is negative),the CTE is as above except c c replaces t m or s x,but the NRA DS in that case is zero.
The combination of domestic measures and border price support provides the following total rate of assistance to output,NRA o,and total consumer tax equival-ent,CTE:
NRA o?NRA BStNRA DSe4T
CTE?NRA BStc te5TWhat if the Exchange Rate System Is also Distorting Prices?Should a multi-tier foreign exchange rate regime be in place,then another policy-induced price wedge exists.A simple two-tier exchange rate system creates a gap between the price received by all exporters and the price paid by all importers for foreign cur-rency,changing both the exchange rate received by exporters and that paid by importers from the equilibrium rate E that would prevail without this distortion in the domestic market for foreign currency(Bhagwati1978).This requires
24The W orld Bank Research Observer,vol.25,no.1(February2010)
controls by the government on current account transfers.In the past it was common for exporters to be required to surrender their foreign currency earnings to the central bank for exchange to local currency at a low of?cial rate,which is equivalent to a tax on exports to the extent that the of?cial rate is below what the exchange rate would be in a market without government intervention.That implicit tax on exporters reduces their incentive to export and hence the supply of foreign currency?owing into the country.With less foreign currency,demanders are willing to bid up its purchase price,providing a potential rent for the govern-ment which can be realized by auctioning off the limited supply of foreign cur-rency extracted from exporters,or by creating a legal secondary market.Either mechanism will create a gap between the of?cial and parallel rates(Dervis,de Melo and Robinson1981).
If the government chooses to allocate the limited foreign currency to different groups of importers at different rates,that is called a multiple exchange rate system.Some lucky importers may even be able to purchase it at the low of?cial rate.The more that is allocated and sold to demanders whose marginal valuation is below the equilibrium rate,the greater the unsatis?ed excess demand and hence the stronger the incentive for an illegal or“black”market to form,and for less-unscrupulous exporters to lobby the government to legalize the secondary market for foreign exchange and to allow exporters to retain some fraction of their exchange rate earnings for sale in the secondary market.Such a right given to exporters to retain and sell a portion of foreign exchange receipts would increase their incentives to export,and thereby reduce the shortage of foreign exchange and hence the secondary market exchange rate(Tarr1990;Martin 1993).
For present purposes,what matters is that,where a country has distortions in its domestic market for foreign currency,the exchange rate relevant for calculat-ing the NRA o or the CTE for a particular tradable product depends,in the case of a dual exchange rate system,on whether the product is an importable or an exportable one,while in the case of multiple exchange rates it depends on the speci?c rate applying to that product each year.The precise way in which that can be handled is detailed in Anderson and others(2008).
What if Farm Production Involves not just Primary Factors but also Intermediate Inputs?Where intermediate inputs are used in farm production,any taxes or sub-sidies on their production,consumption,or trade would alter farm value added and thereby also affect farmer incentives.Sometimes a government will have directly offsetting measures in place,such as a domestic subsidy for fertilizer use by farmers but also a tariff on fertilizer imports.In other situations there will be farm input subsidies but an export tax on the?nal product.In principle all these items could be brought together to calculate an effective rate of direct assistance Anderson25
to farm value added.The nominal rate of direct assistance to farm output,NRA o, is a component of that,as is the sum of the nominal rates of direct assistance to all farm inputs,call it NRA i.Where there are signi?cant distortions to input costs, their ad valorem equivalent can be accounted for by summing each input’s NRA times its input–output coef?cient to obtain the combined NRA i,and adding that to the farm industry’s nominal rate of direct assistance to farm output,NRA o,to get the total nominal rate of assistance to farm production,NRA.
What about Post-farmgate Costs?If a state trading corporation is charging exces-sively for its marketing services and thereby lowering the farm-gate price of a product,for example as a way of raising government revenue in place of an expli-cit tax,the extent of that excess is treated as if it were an explicit tax.
Some farm products,including some that are not internationally traded,are inputs into a processing industry that may also be subject to government inter-ventions.In that case the effect of those interventions on the price received by farmers for the primary product also needs to be taken into account.
The Mean and Variance of Agricultural NRAs.When it comes to averaging across countries,each polity is an observation of interest,so a simple average is mean-ingful for the purpose of political economy analysis.But if one wants a sense of how distorted agriculture is in a group of countries,a weighted average is needed. The weighted average NRA for covered primary agriculture can be generated by multiplying each primary industry’s share of production(valued at the farm-gate equivalent undistorted prices)by its corresponding NRA and adding across indus-tries.The overall sectoral rate,NRAag,also could include actual or assumed infor-mation for the non-covered commodities and,where it exists,the aggregate value of non-product-speci?c assistance to agriculture.A weighted average can be gen-erated also for just the tradables part of agriculture—including those industries producing products such as milk and sugar that require only light processing before they can be traded—by assuming that its share of non-product-speci?c assistance equals its weight in the total.Call that NRAag t.
In addition to the mean,it is important to provide also a measure of the dis-persion or variability of the NRA estimates across the covered products.The cost of government policy distortions to incentives in terms of resource misallocation tends to increase as the degree of substitution in production increases(Lloyd 1974).In the case of agriculture which involves the use of farm land that is sector-speci?c but transferable among farm activities,the greater the variation of NRAs across industries within the sector,the higher will be the welfare cost of those market interventions.A simple indicator of dispersion is the standard devi-ation around the weighted mean of industry NRAs within the agricultural sector. 26The W orld Bank Research Observer,vol.25,no.1(February2010)
Trade Bias in Agricultural Assistance.A trade bias index is also needed to indicate the changing extent to which a country’s policy regime has an anti-trade bias within the agricultural sector.This is important because,as mentioned above,the Lerner(1936)Symmetry Theorem demonstrates that a tariff assisting import-competing farm industries has the same effect on farmers’incentives as if there were a tax on agricultural exports;and,if both measures are in place,this is a double imposition on farm exporters.The higher is the nominal rate of assistance to import-competing agricultural production(NRAag m)relative to that for expor-table farm activities(NRAag x),the more incentive producers in that subsector will have to bid for mobile resources that would otherwise have been employed in export agriculture,other things being equal.
Indirect Agricultural Assistance or Taxation via Non-agricultural Distortions
In addition to direct assistance to,or taxation of,farmers,the Lerner(1936) Symmetry Theorem further demonstrates that their incentives are also affected indirectly by government assistance to non-agricultural production in the national economy.The higher is the nominal rate of assistance to non-agricul-tural tradables production(NRAnonag t),the more incentive producers in other tradable sectors will have to bid up the value of mobile resources that would otherwise have been employed in agriculture,other things being equal.If NRAag t is below NRAnonag t,one might expect there to be fewer resources in agriculture than there would be under free market conditions in the country,notwithstand-ing any positive direct assistance to farmers,and conversely.
One way to capture this is to calculate a Relative Rate of Assistance,RRA, de?ned as:
RRA?
1tNRAag t
1tNRAnonag t
à1
e6T
Since an NRA cannot be less than21if producers are to earn anything,neither can an RRA.This measure is a useful indicator for providing international comparisons over time of the extent to which a country’s policy regime has an anti-or pro-agricultural bias.
National Distortions to Farmer Incentives:The Evolution
of Policies
Before turning to the contemporary(post-World W ar II)situation,it would be insightful to examine brie?y the long history of government intervention in
Anderson27
international markets for farm products by today’s advanced economies,since similar political economy forces may in?uence policy choices in later-developing countries.Attention then turns to the price-distorting policies of developing countries since the1950s as they became independent from their colonial masters. The Long History in High-income Countries,Brie?y
Britain was the?rst country to have an industrial revolution.Prior to that revolu-tion—from the late1100s to the1660s—Britain used export taxes and licenses to prevent domestic food prices from rising excessively.But during1660–90a series of Acts gradually raised food import duties(making imports prohibitive under most circumstances)and reduced export restrictions on grain.These pro-visions were made even more protective of British farmers by the Corn Laws of 1815.True,the famous repeal of the Corn Laws in the mid-1840s heralded a period of relatively unrestricted food trade for Britain,4but then agricultural pro-tection returned in the1930s and steadily increased over the next?ve decades.
Similar tendencies have been observed in many other West European countries, although on the Continent the period of free trade in the19th century was con-siderably shorter,and agricultural protection levels during the past150years have been somewhat higher on average than in Britain.Kindleberger(1975) describes how the19th-century free-trade movements in Europe re?ected the national economic,political,and sociological conditions of the time.Agricultural trade reform was less dif?cult for countries such as Britain with overseas terri-tories that could provide the metropolis with a ready supply of farm products.The fall in the price of grain imports from America in the1870s and1880s provided a challenge for all,however.Denmark coped well by moving more into livestock production to take advantage of cheaper grain.Italians coped by sending many of their relatives to the New World.Farmers in France and Germany successfully sought protection from imports,however,and so began the post-Industrial Revolution growth of agricultural protectionism in densely populated countries. Meanwhile,tariffs on West European imports of manufactures were progressively reduced after the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade(GATT)came into force in the late1940s,thereby adding to the encouragement of agricultural relative to manufacturing production(Lindert1991;Findlay and O’Rourke2007).
Japan provides an even more striking example of the tendency to switch from taxing to increasingly assisting agriculture relative to other industries.Its industri-alization began later than in Europe,after the opening up of the economy follow-ing the Meiji Restoration in1868.By1900Japan had switched from being a small net exporter of food to becoming increasingly dependent on imports of rice (its main staple food and responsible for more than half the value of domestic food production).This was followed by calls from farmers and their supporters for 28The W orld Bank Research Observer,vol.25,no.1(February2010)
rice import controls.Their calls were matched by equally vigorous calls from manufacturing and commercial groups for unrestricted food trade,since the price of rice at that time was a major determinant of real wages in the non-farm sector. The heated debates were not unlike those that led to the repeal of the Corn Laws in Britain six decades earlier.In Japan,however,the forces of protection tri-umphed,and a tariff was imposed on rice imports from1904.That tariff then gradually rose over time,raising the domestic price of rice to more than 30percent above the import price during World War I.Even when there were food riots because of shortages and high rice prices just after that war,the Japanese government’s response was not to reduce protection but instead to extend it to its colonies and to shift from a national to an imperial policy of rice self-suf?ciency.That involved accelerated investments in agricultural development in the colonies of Korea and Taiwan behind an ever-higher external tariff wall that by the latter1930s had driven imperial rice prices to more than60percent above those in international markets(Anderson and Tyers1992).After the Paci?c War ended and Japan lost its colonies,its agricultural protection growth resumed and spread from rice to an ever-wider range of farm products.
The other high-income countries were settled by Europeans relatively recently and are far less-densely populated.They therefore have had a strong comparative advantage in farm products for most of their history following Caucasian settle-ment,and so have felt less need to protect their farmers than Europe or north-east Asia.Indeed Australia and New Zealand until the late20th century tended—like developing countries—to adopt policies that discriminated against their farmers(Anderson,Lloyd and MacLaren2007).
Developing Countries since the1950s
In the Republic of Korea and Taiwan,China in the1950s,as in many newly independent developing countries,initially adopted an import-substituting indus-trialization strategy which harmed agriculture.But in those two economies that policy was replaced in the early1960s with a more neutral trade policy that resulted in very rapid export-oriented industrialization.That development strategy in those densely populated economies imposed competitive pressure on the farm sector which,just as in Japan in earlier decades,prompted farmers to lobby(suc-cessfully,as it happened)for ever-higher levels of protection from import protec-tion(Anderson and Hayami1986,ch.2).
Many less-advanced and less-rapidly growing developing countries not only adopted import-substituting industrialization strategies in the late1950s or early 1960s(Little,Scitovsky,and Scott1970;Balassa and Associates1971)but also imposed direct taxes on their exports of farm products.The latter practice was especially rife in Africa(Bates1981).It was common in the1950s and1960s, Anderson29
and in some cases even in the1970s and1980s,also to use dual or multiple exchange rates so as to tax indirectly both exporters and importers(Bhagwati 1978;Krueger1978).This added to the anti-trade bias of developing countries’trade policies.That policy history is now well known,and has been documented extensively in previous surveys(for example Krueger1984).
Less well-known is the extent to which many emerging economies have belatedly followed the examples of Korea and Taiwan in abandoning import-substitution and opening their economies.Some(for example Chile)started in the 1970s,while others(for example India)did not do so in a sustained way until the 1990s.Some have adopted a very gradual pace of reform,with occasional rever-sals,while others have moved rapidly to open markets.Some have reduced export taxes but simultaneously raised import barriers.And some have adopted the rheto-ric of reform but in practice have done little to free up their economies.To get a clear sense of the overall impact of these reform attempts,there is no substitute for empirical analysis that quanti?es over time the types of indicators raised in the theory section above.Building on recent work by the International Food Policy Research Institute(IFPRI)and the OECD(Orden and others2007;OECD2007),a World Bank project recently undertook such analysis,to which we now turn. National Distortions to Farmer Incentives:Empirical Estimates
post-World War II
After post-World W ar II reconstruction,Japan continued to raise its agricultural pro-tection,just as had been happening in Western Europe,but to even higher levels. Domestic prices exceeded international market prices for grains and livestock pro-ducts in both Japan and the European Community in the1950s,but by less than40 percent.By the early1980s the difference was more than80percent for Japan but was still around40percent for the EC—and was still close to zero for the agricul-tural-exporting rich countries of Australasia and North America(Anderson and Hayami1986,table2.5).Virtually all of that assistance to Japanese and European farmers in that period was due to restrictions on imports of farm products.
Since1986the OECD(2008)has been computing annual producer and consu-mer support estimates by member countries.For the OECD member countries as a whole,producer support rose between1986–88and2005–07in US dollar terms (from$239to$263billion)but has come down when expressed as a share of support-inclusive returns to farmers(from37to26percent).Because of some switching of support instruments,including switching to measures that are based on non-current production or on long-term resource retirement,the share of that assistance provided via market price support measures has fallen from three-quar-ters to one-half.When the PSE payment is expressed as a percentage of undistorted
30The W orld Bank Research Observer,vol.25,no.1(February2010)
prices to make it an NRA,the NRA fall is from59to35percent between1986–88and2005–07(OECD2008).This indicator suggests high-income country pol-icies have become considerably less trade–distorting,at least in proportional terms,even though farmer support in high-income countries has continued to grow in dollar terms because of growth in the value of their farm output.
As for developing countries outside north-east Asia,the main comprehensive set of pertinent estimates over time is for the period just prior to when reforms became widespread.They were generated as part of a major study of18developing countries from the1960s to the mid-1980s by Krueger,Schiff,and Valde′s(1988, 1991).That study by the World Bank,whose estimates are summarized in Schiff and Valde′s(1992),shows that the depression of incentives facing farmers has been due only partly to various forms of agricultural price and trade policies, including subsidies to food imports.Much more important in many cases have been those developing countries’non-agricultural policies that hurt their farmers indirectly.The two key ones have been manufacturing protectionism(which attracts resources from agriculture to the industrial sector)and overvalued exchange rates(which attract resources to sectors producing non-tradables,such as services).That indirect impact was negative for all four groups of countries shown in table1,whereas the impact of direct agricultural policies was negative only for the two lowest-income country groups.In addition to the total assistance being more negative the poorer the country group,table1also reveals that it is lower for producers of exportables than for the subsector focused on import-com-peting farm products,suggesting a strong anti-trade bias for the sector as a whole.
Since there were no comprehensive multiregion studies of the Krueger,Schiff, and Valde′s type for developing countries that monitored progress over the sub-sequent reform period,5a new study was recently launched by the World Bank aimed at?lling this lacuna.The new study covers not only41developing countries but also14European transition economies as well as20high-income countries.The results from that study6do indeed reveal that there has been a substantial reduction in distortions to agricultural incentives in developing countries over the past two to three decades.They also reveal that progress has not been uniform across countries and regions,and that—contrary to some earlier claims(for example from Jensen,Robinson,and Tarp2002)—the reform process is far from complete.In particular,many countries still have a wide dis-persion in NRAs for different farm industries and in particular have a strong anti-trade bias in the structure of assistance within their agricultural sector;and some countries have“overshot”in the sense that they have moved from having an average rate of assistance to farmers that was negative to one that is positive, rather than stopping at the welfare-maximizing rate of zero.Moreover,the var-iance in rates of assistance across commodities within each country,and in aggre-gate rates across countries,remains substantial;and the beggar-thy-neighbor Anderson31
practice of insulating domestic markets from international food price ?uctuations continues,thereby exacerbating that volatility .
The global summary of those new results is provided in ?gure 1.It reveals that the nominal rate of assistance (NRA)to farmers in high-income countries rose steadily over the post-World War II period through to the end of the 1980s,apart from a small dip when international food prices spiked around 1973–74.After peaking at more than 50percent in the mid-1980s,the average NRA for high-income countries has fallen a little,depending on the extent to which one believes some new farm programs are “decoupled”in the sense of no longer in?uencing production decisions.For developing countries,too,the average NRA for agricul-ture has been rising,but from a level of around 225percent during the period from the mid-1950s to the early 1980s to a level of nearly 10percent in the ?rst half of the present decade.Thus the global gross subsidy equivalent of those rates of assistance have risen very substantially in constant (2000)US dollar terms,from close to zero up to the mid-1970s to more than $200billion per year at the farm gate since the mid-1990s (?gure 2).
When expressed on a per farmer basis,the gross subsidy equivalent (GSE)varies enormously between high-income and developing countries.In 1980–84the GSE in high-income countries was already around $8,000and by 2000–04it had risen to $10,000on average (and $25,000in Norway ,Switzerland,and Japan),or $13,500when “decoupled”payments are included.By contrast,the GSE in developing economies was –$140per farmer in the ?rst half of the 1980s,which is a non-trivial tax when one recalls that at that time the majority Table 1.Direct and Indirect Nominal Rates of Assistance to Farmers in 18Developing Countries,1960to mid-1980s (percent)
Country group
Direct
assistance Indirect assistance Total assistance a Assistance to agric.export subsector a Assistance to agric.import-competing subsector a Very low income
223229252249211Low income
212224236240213Lower middle
income
021*********Upper middle
income
24214102115Unweighted
sample average
2822223023529a Total assistance is the weighted average of assistance to the agricultural subsectors producing exportables,importables,and non-tradables (the latter not shown above).
Source :Anderson (forthcoming a),summarized from estimates reported in Schiff and Valde
′s (1992,tables 2.1and 2.2).
32The W orld Bank Research Observer ,vol.25,no.1(February 2010)
Figure1.Nominal Rates of Assistance to Agriculture in High-income and European Transition Economies and in Developing Countries,1955to2004(percent,weighted averages,with“decoupled”payments included in the dashed higher income countries line)
Source:Anderson(2009).
Figure2.Gross Subsidy Equivalent of NRAs in High-income and European Transition Economies and in Developing Countries,1960to2007(constant2000US$billion)
Source:Anderson(2009).
Anderson33
of these people’s households were surviving on less than$1a day per capita.By 2000–04they received on average around$50per farmer(Anderson2009,ch.
1).While this represents a major improvement,it is less than1percent of the support received by the average farmer in high-income countries.
The developing economies of Asia—including Korea and Taiwan,which were both very poor at the start of the period—have experienced the fastest transition from negative to positive agricultural https://www.doczj.com/doc/f69893681.html,tin American economies?rst increased their taxation of farmers but gradually moved during the mid-1970s to the mid-2000s from around220percent to5percent.Africa’s NRAs were similar though slightly less negative than those of Latin America until the latter 1980s,before they fell back to27percent(implying a gross tax equivalent per farmer of$6).In Europe’s transition economies farmer assistance fell to almost zero at the start of their transition from socialism in the early1990s;but since then,in preparation for EU accession or because of booms in exports of raw materials for energy production,assistance has gradually increased to nearly 20percent,or$550per farmer(Anderson2009,ch.1).
The developing country average NRA also conceals the fact that the exporting and import-competing subsectors of agriculture have very different NRAs. Figure3reveals that while the average NRA for exporters in developing countries has been negative throughout(coming back from250percent to almost zero in 2000–04),the NRA for import-competing farmers in developing countries has ?uctuated around a trend rise from10and30percent(and it even reached 40percent in the years of low international prices in the mid-1980s).Having increased in the1960s and1970s,the anti-trade bias within agriculture for developing countries has diminished considerably since the mid-1980s,but the NRA gap between the two subsectors still averages around20percentage points.
That anti-trade bias means that the rates of assistance are not uniform across commodities,which indicates that the resources that are being used within the farm sector are not being put to their best use.The extent of that extra inef?ciency,over and above that due to too many or too few resources in aggregate in the sector,is indicated by the standard deviation of NRAs among covered products in each focus country.This dispersion index has?uctuated between43and60percent throughout the past?ve decades,with no discernible trend(Anderson2009,table1.6).Figure4 shows that rice,sugar,and milk(the rice pudding ingredients)are by far the most assisted farm industries in both high-income and developing countries.Beef and poultry meat have the next highest NRAs in high-income countries followed by cotton—while in developing countries cotton has the lowest(most negative)NRA.
A further decomposition of the developing countries’NRAs worth commenting on is the contribution to them from trade policy measures at each country’s border as distinct from domestic output or input subsidies or taxes.Often political attention is focused much more on direct domestic subsidies or taxes than on 34The W orld Bank Research Observer,vol.25,no.1(February2010)
trade measures,because those ?scal measures are made so transparent through the annual budgetary scrutiny process,whereas trade measures are reviewed only infrequently and are far less transparent,especially if they are not in the simple form of ad valorem tariffs.That attention would appear to be misplaced,however,because between 80and 90percent of the NRA for developing country agriculture (not including non-product-speci?c support,which is very minor)comes from border measures such as import tariffs or export taxes (Anderson 2009,ch.1).The improvement in farmers’incentives in developing countries is understated by the above NRAag estimates,because those countries have also reduced
their Figure 3.Nominal Rates of Assistance to Exportable,Import-competing,and All Covered Agricultural Products,a High-income and Developing Countries,1955to 2007(percent)a
Covered products only .The total also includes non-tradable goods.
Note :The sloped straight line is an ordinary least squares regression trend line over the period shown.Source :Anderson (2009).Anderson 35
assistance to producers of non-agricultural tradable goods,most notably manufac-turers.The decline in the weighted average NRA for the latter,depicted in ?gure 5,was clearly much greater than the increase in the average NRA for trad-able agricultural sectors for the period to the mid-1980s,consistent with the
?nding of Krueger,Schiff,and Valde
′s (1988,1991).For the period since the mid-1980s,changes in both sectors’NRAs have contributed almost equally to the improvement in farmer incentives.The Relative Rate of Assistance,captured in equation (6)above,provides a useful indicator of relative price change:the RRA for developing countries as a group went from 246percent in the second half of the 1970s to 1percent in the ?rst half of the present decade.This increase (from a coef?cient of 0.54to 1.01)is equivalent to an almost doubling in the relative price of farm products,which is a huge change in the fortunes of developing country farmers in just a generation.This is mostly because of the changes in Asia,but even for Latin America that relative price hike is one-half,while for Africa that indicator improves by only one-eighth (?gure 6).
One of the main contributors to the Asian changes is China,and a non-trivial part of its reform came through reducing its overvalued of?cial exchange rate.There,as in some other developing countries,the distortion in the domestic market for foreign currencies was gradually reduced in an indirect way ,namely ,by allowing exporters to sell an increasing share of their foreign currency earn-ings on a higher-priced secondary market.This lowered the trade tax equivalent of that distortion over time,and hence its impact on the NRA for farm and
non-Figure 4.Nominal Rates of Assistance,Key Covered Products,High-income and Developing Countries,1980–84and 2000–04(percent)
Source :Anderson and Valenzuela (2008),based on estimates reported in the project’s national country studies.36The W orld Bank Research Observer ,vol.25,no.1(February 2010)
Figure 6.Relative Rates of Assistance to Tradables,a Asia,Africa and Latin America,1965to 2004(percent)
a
Five-year weighted averages with value of production at undistorted prices as weights.In Asia,estimates for China pre-1981are based on the assumption that the nominal rate of assistance to agriculture and non-agricultural tradables,and hence the RRA in those earlier years,were the same as the average NRA estimates for China in 1981–89.
Source :Anderson
(2009).Figure 5.Nominal Rates of Assistance to Agricultural and Non-agricultural Sectors and Relative Rate of Assistance,a Developing Countries,1965b to 2004(percent,weighted averages)
a
The RRA is de?ned as 100*[(100tNRAag t )/(100tNRAnonag t )21],where NRAag t and NRAnonag t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors,respectively .b Assumes China’s NRA values pre-1981were the same as in 1981–84.
Source :Anderson (2009).Anderson 37
farm sectors,depending on the changing extent to which they are net-exporting or net-importing sectors.The impact of China’s dual exchange rate system is shown in table 2:it made the RRA estimates about one-?fth larger in the mid-1980s,but that difference gradually fell to zero by the mid-1990s.
Finally ,even though the developing country average agricultural NRA and RRA are now close to zero,and those for high-income countries have been moving towards zero since the late 1980s,there remains a huge spectrum of national averages (?gure 7).This suggests there is still a great deal to be gained through inter-national relocation of farm production between countries.That possibility ,together with the possibility of gains from reducing the dispersion between product NRAs within countries,can best be explored with the use of a global economy-wide model.Attention thus now turns to estimates of the market,welfare and distributional effects of the distortions to agricultural incentives that remain in both high-income and poorer countries.This is done using a global model calibrated to 2004.
Market,Welfare,and Distributional Effects of Remaining Trade-distorting Policies
The new World Bank distortion estimates summarized above and available in downloadable detail (Anderson and Valenzuela 2008)show that while average Table 2.Impact of Exchange Rate Distortions on Nominal Rates of Assistance to Agricultural Relative to Non-agricultural Industries,China,1981to 2004(percent)
1981–841985–891990–941995–992000–05
Including exchange rate distortions
NRA,all agric.products (excl.NPS)
247.6237.9217.2 3.5 2.0Trade bias index,all agric.a
25025522321527Relative rate of assistance,RRA b
260.6249.9231.123.0 1.3Ignoring exchange rate distortions c
NRA,all agric.products (excl.NPS)
234.9227.1211.6 3.5 2.0Trade bias index,all agric.a
23323821321527Relative rate of assistance,RRA b
252.2241.0226.523.0 1.3a Trade bias index is 100*[(1tNRAag x )/(1tNRAag m )–1],where NRAag m and NRAag x are the average percentage NRAs for the import-competing and exportable parts of the agricultural sector.
b The RRA is de?ned as 100*[(100tNRAag t )/(100tNRAnonag t )21],where NRAag t and NRAnonag t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors,respectively .
c Here is shown how the average NRAag ,trade bias index,an
d RRA would b
e affected i
f the distortions in the market for foreign currency ,as captured by the methodology outlined in Anderson and others (2008),are ignored.
NPS:non-product-speci?c assistance.
Source :Summarized from Huang and others (2009).
38The W orld Bank Research Observer ,vol.25,no.1(February 2010)
distortions facing developing country farmers are now much less than in earlier decades,nonetheless there remains a considerable range of distortions,including a strong anti-trade bias in agricultural policies for many countries.Furthermore,non-agricultural protectionism is still rife in some developing countries
and Figure 7.Cross-country Dispersion of NRA (All Agriculture Products,including NPS)and RRA,2000–04(percent)
Source :Anderson and V alenzuela (2008),based on estimates reported in the project’s national country studies.Anderson 39
agricultural supports are still substantial in high-(and some middle-)income countries.
This section addresses two questions:To what extent are government trade and subsidy policies still reducing farm incomes in developing countries and thereby prolonging inequality across countries in farm household incomes?And are those policy-induced price distortions depressing value added more in primary agricul-ture than in the rest of the economy of developing countries,thereby potentially raising inequality and poverty within those countries?With farm incomes well below non-farm incomes in most developing countries,and with agriculture there being intensive in the use of unskilled labor,policies that lower agricultural rela-tive to non-agricultural value added,and wages for the unskilled relative to skilled wages and capital earnings,would tend to exacerbate inequality and poverty.
Answers to these two questions are provided in Anderson,Valenzuela,and van der Mensbrugghe(forthcoming).They?rst draw on the above-mentioned new database of distortions to agricultural markets in developing countries to amend the latest Global Trade Analysis Project(GT AP)protection database(pre-release Version7.5,which refers to2004).7They then employ that amended database in a global computable general equilibrium model(L INKAGE—see van der Mensbrugghe2005)to assess how agricultural markets,factor prices,and value added in agriculture versus non-farm sectors would change if all such distortion-ary policies were removed(holding aggregate government taxes and spending constant by use of a lump-sum consumption tax).The comparative static results (assuming full adjustment)are presented?rst for the key regions of the world, beginning with national economic welfare where the impact of agricultural versus non-farm policies is highlighted.8While no-one anticipates a move to com-pletely free markets in the near future,the analysis serves as a benchmark to suggest what is at stake in terms of further reforms,either unilaterally or via World Trade Organization(WTO)rounds of multilateral trade negotiations.It also provides a better indication of agricultural comparative advantages in different parts of the world than is available by looking at actual trade and self-suf?ciency indicators in the current distortion-ridden situation.
According to the amended dataset,the average import-weighted applied tariff for agriculture and lightly processed food in2004was11percent for high-income countries and14percent for developing countries,while for non-farm goods it was7percent for developing countries and just1percent for high-income countries.Export subsidies for farm products exist for a few high-income regions,and export taxes are still in place in a few developing countries(notably Argentina since late2001).Production subsidies and taxes also are much less prevalent than import tariffs,even though they include,in the case of developing 40The W orld Bank Research Observer,vol.25,no.1(February2010)
外文翻译 原文 World Trade and International Trade Material Source:https://www.doczj.com/doc/f69893681.html, Author: Ted Alax In today’s complex economic world, neither individuals nor nations are self-sufficient. Nations have utilized different economic resources; people have developed different skills. This is the foundation of world trade and economic activity. As a result of this trade and activity, international finance and banking have evolved. For example, the United States is a major consumer of coffee, yet it does not have the climate to grow any or its own. Consequently, the United States must import coffee from countries (such as Brazil, Colombia and Guatemala) that grow coffee efficiently. On the other hand, the United States has large industrial plants capable of producing a variety of goods, such as chemicals and airplanes, which can be sold to nations that need them. If nations traded item for item, such as one automobile for 10,000 bags of coffee, foreign trade would be extremely cumbersome and restrictive. So instead of batter, which is trade of goods without an exchange of money, the United State receives money in payment for what it sells. It pays for Brazilian coffee with dollars, which Brazil can then use to buy wool from Australia, which in turn can buy textiles Great Britain, which can then buy tobacco from the United State. Foreign trade, the exchange of goods between nations, takes place for many reasons. The first, as mentioned above is that no nation has all of the commodities that it needs. Raw materials are scattered around the world. Large deposits of copper are mined in Peru and Zaire, diamonds are mined in South Africa and petroleum is recovered in the Middle East. Countries that do not have these resources within their own boundaries must buy from countries that export them. Foreign trade also occurs because a country often does not have enough of a particular item to meet its needs. Although the United States is a major producer of sugar, it consumes more than it can produce internally and thus must import sugar.
企业物流外包外文翻译文献 (文档含英文原文和中文翻译) 物流外包——确保一个组织竞争优势的一种手段 摘要 物流方式表明将交付供应链中的独立单位整合成一个统一的系统的目标，完成结果所需的时间和资源的损失降到最小的材料和信息流动的直接管理。 一个最新方法的实施为公司的物流管理提供更多的成效，这个方法就是外包。物流外包带来诸多好处，如：减少库存、减少订单的交货时间、提高运输质
量、扩大生产的灵活性、降低生产成本和加速资金周转等。这保证了较低的生产成本和更好的质量交付，这是一个决定性的竞争优势。物流外包的应用有利于资源的合理配置，这是公司拥有的独特的竞争优势。 因此，物流外包将作为一种手段应用于公司的物流运输中，以确保一个组织的竞争优势。 关键词：外包，物流，供应商 1.简介 竞争优势，与不断增长的全球化和创新，开始逐渐失去其创意和新的竞争优势，在前端的灵活性，订单到交货时间减少，可靠的高质量的交付，和选择的机会。在竞争领域，厂家的能力加入其生产过程和系统的规划与个人消费者的喜好，将是一个的决定性的因素。只有通过建立灵活的生产管理系统，与个别客户订单问题的解决方案才是可能的。企业为什么要搞物流外包?它的紧迫性在哪里?物流外包与传统意义上的外委、外协有何本质区别?我们的企业离物流外包还远吗?这不仅是理论界要回答的问题，更是企业界应认真思考的问题。谈到物流外包必定涉及供应链和第三方的发展，涉及到现代物流的发展方向，更涉及企业的核心竞争力。理论界对这一点的认识显得有些浮躁，而企业对此的认识比较滞后。目前大多数企业守候在自营物流那片天地，真正搞物流外包的不到20%，并且不规范、不系统。尽管现在物流炒得很热，但企业对物流外包重要性的认识依然很浅。调查表明，湖南有82%的企业对现代物流的认识模糊，大多把货物运输或货代等同于现代物流;有54%的企业至今未有发展物流的计划或设想，更没有把重构内部供应链和发展物流外包提上议事日程，看来还需要更多的示范、引导，更多的宣传、培训和更多的市场培育。 首先，它需要的新的或最新的概念，如CFM（以客户为中心的制造），SCM（供应链管理），基于相同的概念作为企业资源规划（ERP），客户关系管理技术，生产管理的实施（客户关系管理）等，也将要求供应处理，物流中介机构的互动为基础的生产和有效的分配同步。 其次，它在微观和宏观层面上是一个必要的优化运输系统。复杂的运输基础设施的发展是基于标准化的商品，货物，运输方式，装卸货物，交货速度，拓宽道路和铁路网络，完善的售后服务维修。 第三，信息交流起着越来越重要的作用。工业企业在信息领域的互动，使信息可以以正确的形式被查阅，在合适的时间，通过正确的当局和真实类型，防止
数据库管理系统的介绍 Raghu Ramakrishnan1 数据库（database,有时拼作data base）又称为电子数据库，是专门组织起来的一组数据或信息，其目的是为了便于计算机快速查询及检索。数据库的结构是专门设计的，在各种数据处理操作命令的支持下，可以简化数据的存储，检索，修改和删除。数据库可以存储在磁盘，磁带，光盘或其他辅助存储设备上。 数据库由一个或一套文件组成，其中的信息可以分解为记录，每一记录又包含一个或多个字段（或称为域）。字段是数据存取的基本单位。数据库用于描述实体，其中的一个字段通常表示与实体的某一属性相关的信息。通过关键字以及各种分类（排序）命令，用户可以对多条记录的字段进行查询，重新整理，分组或选择，以实体对某一类数据的检索，也可以生成报表。 所有数据库（最简单的除外）中都有复杂的数据关系及其链接。处理与创建，访问以及维护数据库记录有关的复杂任务的系统软件包叫做数据库管理系统（DBMS）。DBMS软件包中的程序在数据库与其用户间建立接口。（这些用户可以是应用程序员，管理员及其他需要信息的人员和各种操作系统程序）。 DBMS可组织，处理和表示从数据库中选出的数据元。该功能使决策者能搜索，探查和查询数据库的内容，从而对在正规报告中没有的，不再出现的且无法预料的问题做出回答。这些问题最初可能是模糊的并且（或者）是定义不恰当的，但是人们可以浏览数据库直到获得所需的信息。简言之，DBMS将“管理”存储的数据项，并从公共数据库中汇集所需的数据项以回答非程序员的询问。 DBMS由3个主要部分组成：（1）存储子系统，用来存储和检索文件中的数据；（2）建模和操作子系统，提供组织数据以及添加，删除，维护，更新数据的方法；（3）用户和DBMS之间的接口。在提高数据库管理系统的价值和有效性方面正在展现以下一些重要发展趋势； 1.管理人员需要最新的信息以做出有效的决策。 2.客户需要越来越复杂的信息服务以及更多的有关其订单，发票和账号的当前信息。 3.用户发现他们可以使用传统的程序设计语言，在很短的一段时间内用数据1Database Management Systems( 3th Edition ),Wiley ,2004, 5-12
(文档含英文原文和中文翻译) 中英文对照外文翻译 基于拉格朗日乘数法的框架结构合理线刚度比的研究 【摘要】框架结构是一种常见的多层高层建筑结构；列的合理线刚度比研究是框架结构优化设计中的一个重要方面。本论文研究合理线刚度比时，框架梁、柱的
侧移刚度根据拉格朗日乘数法结构优化的理论和在框架梁、柱的总物质的量一定的前提下，取得最高值。与传统的估计方法和试算梁柱截面尺寸不同，梁、柱的合理的截面尺寸可以在初步设计阶段由派生的公式计算。这种方法不仅作为计算框架梁、柱的截面尺寸基础，确认初步设计阶，而且也被用做类似的结构梁柱合理线刚度比研究的参考。此外，在调整帧梁、柱的截面尺寸的方法的基础上，降低柱的轴向的压缩比，从而达到剪切压缩比和提高结构的延展性。 【关键词】拉格朗日数乘法框架结构刚度比截面尺寸 1 引言 在混凝土框架结构初步设计的期间，通常，框架梁截面高度通过跨度来估算，和截面宽度根据高宽比估算; 框架柱的截面尺寸是根据柱轴压缩的支持柱的面积的比率估算[1]。然而，在估计过程中，初步设计阶段中的一个重要的链，未考虑到柱侧移刚度的影响[2]。列侧移刚度越大，结构层间位的刚度越大，剪切型框架结构的层间位移将越较小。所以，总结构越小的侧向位移将减少地震灾害[3] 所造成的损失。论文的核心是如何得到列侧移刚度的最大值。 同时，列侧移刚度的值与框架梁-柱线刚度直接相关。本论文的目的是为了得到一个合理的框架梁 - 柱的线刚度比，在某个控制范围内获得列侧移刚度的最大值。 计算列横向位移的方法有两种方法：刚度拐点点法和修改拐点法。拐点的方法假定关节的旋转角度为0（当梁柱线性刚度比是大于或等于3时，柱的上端和下端的关节的旋转角度可以取为0，因为它实际上是相当小），即梁的弯曲刚性被视为无穷大。拐点的方法主要是应用于具有比较少层的框架结构。但对于多层、高层框架结构，增加柱截面会导致梁柱线刚度比小于3，在水平荷载作用下，框架结构的所有关节的旋转角度的横向位移会发生不可忽视。因此，一位日本教授武藤提出修改拐点法[4]，即D-值方法。本文采用D-值列侧移刚度的计算法，因为它着重于多层、高层框架结构。 少数在国内外对框架梁柱合理线刚度比的研究，只有梁七黹，源于列侧移刚度的计算方法，比D-值法更加应用广泛；申得氏指出在多层、高层框架结构的柱侧向刚度计算中存在的问题，补充和修改底部和顶部层的列侧向刚度计算公式;
银行英语： 出口信贷 export credit 出口津贴 export subsidy 商品倾销 dumping 外汇倾销 exchange dumping 优惠关税 special preferences 保税仓库 bonded warehouse 贸易顺差 favorable balance of trade 贸易逆差 unfavorable balance of trade 进口配额制 import quotas 自由贸易区 free trade zone 对外贸易值 value of foreign trade 国际贸易值 value of international trade 普遍优惠制 generalized system of preferences-GSP 最惠国待遇 most-favored nation treatment-MFNT -------------------价格条件 ---------------------- 价格术语trade term (price term) 运费freight 单价 price 码头费wharfage 总值 total value 卸货费landing charges 金额 amount 关税customs duty 净价 net price 印花税stamp duty 含佣价price including commission 港口税portdues 回佣return commission 装运港portof shipment 折扣discount,allowance 卸货港port of discharge 批发价 wholesale price 目的港portof destination 零售价 retail price 进口许口证inportlicence 现货价格spot price 出口许口证exportlicence 期货价格forward price 现行价格（时价）current price prevailingprice 国际市场价格 world (International)Marketprice 离岸价（船上交货价）FOB-free on board 成本加运费价（离岸加运费价） C&F-cost and freight 到岸价（成本加运费、保险费价） CIF-cost,insurance and freight --------------------交货条件 ---------------------- 交货delivery 轮船steamship(缩写S.S) 装运、装船shipment 租船charter (the chartered shep) 交货时间 time of delivery
物流规划中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)
设施规划 引言 设施规划在过去的十年间已经被赋予了全新的意义。在过去，设施规划一般被认为是一门科学。而在当今竞争激烈的全球市场，设施规划成为了一种策略。政府、教育机构和企业已经不再单独相互竞争，现在这些实体或企业将彼此联合为合作企业、组织协会，并最终合成为供应链，将客户纳入到整个供应链过程以保持竞争力。 这些年来设施规划问题一直是一个热门话题。尽管它已拥有很悠久的历史，但在目前的出版物、会议以及研究中，设施规划仍是最受欢迎的科目之一。设施规划的处理已经从清单式或者菜单式的方法发展到了高度复杂的数学建模。在本文中，我们使用了一个实用的设施规划方法，其利用了实证以及同时包含传统和现代概念的分析方法。值得提及的是，在本文中拥有很广泛的设施规划应用示例。例如，这本书的内容可以适用于一个新医院,一个装配部门,一个已有的仓库,或者一个机场的行李部的规划。无论问题是发生在医院、生产工厂、配送中心、机场、零售商店、学校、银行、还是办公室或者这些设施的任何部分；无论是在一个发达国家的现代化设施还是在一个发展中国家的过时设施中，本文给出的材料在进行规划时都非常有用。重要的是要认识到现代设施规划中将设施当作是一个动态的实体，一个成功的设施规划方案的关键因素是其适应性以及适合全新应用的能力。 设施规划的定义 当今的设施规划必须能够帮助组织实现供应链的优越性。实现供应链的优越性是一个有六个步骤、或者说六个等级的过程。一如既往，这些步骤与优越性、可见性、协同性、综合性、敏捷性等联系在一起。 当一家公司最大化供应链的各个功能（采购-制造-运输-储存-销售），个体部门（如金融、市场营销、销售、采购、信息技术、研发、生产、分配和人力资源等部门）的目标就是要成为公司最好的部门。组织的有效性不是重点，每个组
车辆在线诊断和实时预警系统的发展 摘要：开发车载诊断（OBD）系统的目的是为了正确诊断、检测车辆的系统错误及故障。OBD产生预警信号传递给车辆的操作者以及维修工程师。然而，一旦警告信号产生，大多数操作者不知道采取什么行动。数据采集要依靠维修工程师使用专用工具。基于这样的实际需求，本文提出了一种新的车辆在线诊断和实时早期预警系统，以获取OBD的信号，并传送到通过GPRS移动通信维修中心的服务器立即采取行动。本文就硬件和软件在初步设计和实施方面进行了讨论和测试。拟议系统的测试功能满足了现在对汽车系统的日益上升的要求。 关键词：OBD系统 G3技术预警系统 1 简介 现代汽车配备的微处理器或微机检测所有子系统数据从而实现控制和诊断。车载诊断系统（OBD）[1]被标准地定义一个为使维护工程师了解车辆内部数据情况的，与外部世界沟通的接口。OBD是一个在完整的监控系统中通过传感器和控制引擎连接驱动器和其他子系统的设备。此外，一些硬件和软件的设计支持OBD 的显示和记录。 OBD的概念最初是在1984年的加州讨论的，然后于1988年进入汽车的一个子系统。被称为OBD I的第一标准,包含了基本的功能：指示灯，诊断故障码（DTC）的存储和显示。然而，不同的公司设计了不同接口插座，代码和功能，给维修工程师带来了混乱。1988年，在加利福尼亚州提出了OBD II。汽车工程师协会（SAE）为OBD II提出了一个标准的规范，这是被环境保护署（EPA）和加州空气资源委员会（CARB）所承认的。从1996年起，所有车辆的生产按要求必须装备OBD II。SAE-J1962，[2]，SAE-J2012[3] SAE-J1850[4]已经为OBD II的安装发布了标准和规范。所有车辆制造商必须遵循制定标准和规范的这些文件，通过使用统一的接口连接器来设计检测仪器。本文把我们的测试集中在OBD II上，随后简单地描述OBD。到今天为止， OBD启动时微处理器内存将存储诊断故障代码，并显示
JG02 Unified Serial No. from Data Centre: Customs Export Declaration Form of the People’s Republic of China
Customs Declaration Form 报关单 An exporter has to apply to the customs for declaration of the commodity before the shipment. The customs officer will sign on the customs declaration form and release the goods if the goods are up to the requirement. 出口方必须在装运前对出口货物进行报关，如果货物符合要求，海关官员就签署报关单对货物进行放行。 The person who asks for declaration is required to be qualified, that is to say, he/she should have the certificate of customs declaration. The examination is held by the General Administration of Customs of 申请报关的人要求具备资质，就是说他或她应有报关证。考试由中华人民共和国海关部署举行。 The customs declaration form is in different colors, for example: the white one is made out for general trade and the pink one is used for processing trade. The contents of these documents are similar. We take the specification of an export customs declaration form for general trade as an example to show the method of making out the document. 报关单有不同颜色，如白色报关单按一般贸易缮制，粉红色报关单用于加工贸易。这些单据的内容相似。我们以一般贸易的出口货物报关单的内容为例介绍该单据的缮制方法。 The Main Contents and Notes of Customs Declaration Form： 报关单的主要内容及注释： 1. 预录入编号：No. of Pre-record It is given by the customs while the exporter is applying to customs. It is given by computers automatically. 出口方申请报关时由海关给的编号，是由计算机自动编制的。 2. 海关编号：No. of Customs It is given by the computer system automatically or given by the custom officer. 由计算机系统自动编制或由海关人员给出。 3. 出口口岸：Port of Export It refers to the name and code of the customs at final port of export. 指最后口岸的海关名称及代码。 说明：若出口货物在设有海关的发运地办理报关手续，出口口岸仍应填写出境口岸的名称。如在深圳办理报关手续，陆路运输至上海出境的货物，其出口口岸为上海。同时加注关区代码。 4. 备案号：record number for checking It refers the number of “Register Manual” or the number of “Certificate of Paid or Free Tax” 指《登记手册》编号或《征免税证明》编号。 5. 出口日期：Date of Export It refers to the date of shipment. It is the applied date of departure of the vessel. 指发运日期，也就是船申报出境的日期。 6. 申报日期：Date of Application It is the date that the exporter applies for declaration. 指出口方向海关申报出境的日期。 7. 经营单位：Executive company Fill in the company’s name who signs and executes the S/C in Chinese, (generally refers to the exporter), and the customs code of the company. 用中文填写签订和执行合同的公司(一般指出口人)名称及经营单位代码。 说明：如果总公司签订合同，由分公司执行，则填分公司名称。出口企业间相互代理，以代理方为经营单位。注意填写全称，注明经营单位代号，该代号是出口企业办理海关注册登记时，海关设置的编码，共10位数字。 8. 运输方式：Mode of Transportation It refers to the final departure mode of transportation , such as sea, road, railway and air, etc. 指货物出境的最后运输方式，如江海、公路、铁路及航空等。 9. 运输工具名称Name of Transportation Tool It refers to the name of departure tool of transportation (for example, sea for vessel and number of voyage, railway for the number of train and air for the number of flight). 指货物出境的运输工具名称(如江海填船名及航次，铁路填车次，航空填航班号)。
第三方物流问题战略外文翻译文献 (文档含英文原文和中文翻译) 我国第三方物流中存在的问题、原因及战略选择 【摘要】我国物流业发展刚刚起步，第三方物流的理论和实践等方面都比较薄弱。本文指出我国第三方物流存在的问题在于国内外第三方物流企业差距、物流效率不高、缺乏系统性管理、物流平台构筑滞后、物流管理观念落后等。分析了产生上述问题的原因，并提出了精益物流、中小型第三方物流企业价值链联盟、大型第三方物流企业虚拟化战等三种可供选择的第三方物流企业发展战略。【关键词】第三方物流；精益物流战略；价值链联盟；虚拟化战略 1引言 长期以来，我国国内企业对采购、运输、仓储、代理、包装、加工、配送等
环节控制能力不强，在“采购黑洞”、“物流陷井”中造成的损失浪费难以计算。因此，对第三方物流的研究，对于促进我国经济整体效益的提高有着非常重要的理论和实践意义。本文试图对我国策三方物流存在的问题及原因进行分析探讨，并提出第三方物流几种可行的战略选择。 2 我国第三方物流业存在的主要问题 (一)我国策三方物流企业与国外第三方物流企业的差距较大，具体表现在以下几个方面： 1、规模经济及资本差距明显。由于国外的大型第三方物流企业从全球经营的战略出发，其规模和资本优势是毫无疑问的，尤其初创时期的我国策三方物流业，本身的规模就很小，国外巨头雄厚的资本令国内企业相形见绌。 2、我国策三方物流业企业提供的物流服务水准及质量控制远不如国外同行。当国内一些企业还在把物流理解成“卡车加仓库“的时候，国外的物流企业早已完成了一系列标准化的改造。同时，国外的物流组织能力非常强大，例如德国一家第三方物流公司，公司各方面的物流专家遍布欧洲各地。如果有客户的货物需要经达不同的国家，那么欧洲各地的这些专家就在网上设计出一个最佳的物流解决方案。这种提供解决方案的能力就是这第三方物流公司的核心能力，而不像国内公司号称拥有多少条船，多少辆车。 3、我国加入 WTO 后物流产业的门槛降低。在物流服务业方面：我国承诺所有的服务行业，在经过合理过渡期后，取消大部分外国股权限制，不限制外国服务供应商进入目前的市场，不限制所有服务行业的现有市场准入和活动。同时在辅助分销的服务方面也作出了类似的承诺。这些方面的限制将在以后 3—4 年内逐步取消，在此期间，国外的服务供应商可以建立百分之百的全资拥有的分支机构或经营机构，国内物流服务业将直面国际竞争。 (二)资源浪费严重，第三方物流效率不高。 从微观上看，由于受计划经济体制的影响，长期以来许多企业，尤其是国有企业走的是“大而全”、“小而全”的路子，它们拥有自己的仓库、车队、甚至远洋船队，造成物流过程的大量浪费，具体表现为仓库的闲置，物流业经营分散，组织化程度低，横向联合薄弱。而能够提供一体化、现代化、专业化、准时化、高效服务的第三方物流企业则很少。从宏观上看第三方物流未能跟上经
数据库外文参考文献及翻译 数据库外文参考文献及翻译数据库管理系统——实施数据完整性一个数据库，只有用户对它特别有信心的时候。这就是为什么服务器必须实施数据完整性规则和商业政策的原因。执行SQL Server的数据完整性的数据库本身，保证了复杂的业务政策得以遵循，以及强制性数据元素之间的关系得到遵守。因为SQL Server的客户机/服务器体系结构允许你使用各种不同的前端应用程序去操纵和从服务器上呈现同样的数据，这把一切必要的完整性约束，安全权限，业务规则编码成每个应用，是非常繁琐的。如果企业的所有政策都在前端应用程序中被编码，那么各种应用程序都将随着每一次业务的政策的改变而改变。即使您试图把业务规则编码为每个客户端应用程序，其应用程序失常的危险性也将依然存在。大多数应用程序都是不能完全信任的，只有当服务器可以作为最后仲裁者，并且服务器不能为一个很差的书面或恶意程序去破坏其完整性而提供一个后门。SQL Server使用了先进的数据完整性功能，如存储过程，声明引用完整性（DRI），数据类型，限制，规则，默认和触发器来执行数据的完整性。所有这些功能在数据库里都有各自的用途;通过这些完整性功能的结合，可以实现您的数据库的灵活性和易于管理，而且还安全。声明数据完整性声明数据完整原文请找腾讯3249114六,维-论'文.网 https://www.doczj.com/doc/f69893681.html, 定义一个表时指定构成的主键的列。这就是所谓的主键约束。SQL Server使用主键约束以保证所有值的唯一性在指定的列从未侵犯。通过确保这个表有一个主键来实现这个表的实体完整性。有时，在一个表中一个以上的列（或列的组合）可以唯一标志一行，例如，雇员表可能有员工编号（ emp_id ）列和社会安全号码（ soc_sec_num ）列，两者的值都被认为是唯一的。这种列经常被称为替代键或候选键。这些项也必须是唯一的。虽然一个表只能有一个主键，但是它可以有多个候选键。 SQL Server的支持多个候选键概念进入唯一性约束。当一列或列的组合被声明是唯一的， SQL Server 会阻止任何行因为违反这个唯一性而进行的添加或更新操作。在没有故指的或者合适的键存在时，指定一个任意的唯一的数字作为主键，往往是最有效的。例如，企业普遍使用的客户号码或账户号码作为唯一识别码或主键。通过允许一个表中的一个列拥有身份属性，SQL Server可以更容易有效地产生唯一数字。您使用的身份属性可以确保每个列中的值是唯一的，并且值将从你指定的起点开始，以你指定的数量进行递增（或递减）。（拥有特定属性的列通常也有一个主键或唯一约束，但这不是必需的。）第二种类型的数据完整性是参照完整性。 SQL Server实现了表和外键约束之间的逻辑关系。外键是一个表中的列或列的组合，连接着另一个表的主键（或着也可能是替代键）。这两个表之间的逻辑关系是关系模型的基础;参照完整性意味着这种关系是从来没有被违反的。例如，一个包括出版商表和标题表的简单的select例子。在标题表中，列title_id （标题编号）是主键。在出版商表，列pub_id （出版者ID ）是主键。 titles表还包括一个pub_id列，这不是主键，因为出版商可以发布多个标题。相反， pub_id是一个外键，它对应着出版商表的主键。如果你在定义表的时候声明了这个关系， SQL Server由双方执行它。首先，它确保标题不能进入titles表，或在titles表中现有的pub_id无法被修改，除非有效的出版商ID作为新pub_id出现在出版商表中。其次，它确保在不考虑titles表中对应值的情况下，出版商表中的pub_id的值不做任何改变。以下两种方法可
毕业设计(论文)外文资料翻译 系：机械工程系 专业：土木工程 姓名： 学号： 外文出处：Design of prestressed (用外文写) concrete structures 附件： 1.外文资料翻译译文；2.外文原文。
附件1：外文资料翻译译文 8-2简支梁布局 一个简单的预应力混凝土梁由两个危险截面控制：最大弯矩截面和端截面。这两部分设计好之后，中间截面一定要单独检查，必要时其他部位也要单独调查。最大弯矩截面在以下两种荷载阶段为控制情况，即传递时梁受最小弯矩M G的初始阶段和最大设计弯矩M T时的工作荷载阶段。而端截面则由抗剪强度、支承垫板、锚头间距和千斤顶净空所需要的面积来决定。所有的中间截面是由一个或多个上述要求，根它们与上述两种危险截面的距离来控制。对于后张构件的一种常见的布置方式是在最大弯矩截面采用诸如I形或T形的截面，而在接近梁端处逐渐过渡到简单的矩形截面。这就是人们通常所说的后张构件的端块。对于用长线法生产的先张构件，为了便于生产，全部只用一种等截面，其截面形状则可以为I形、双T形或空心的。在第5 、 6 和7章节中已经阐明了个别截面的设计，下面论述简支梁钢索的总布置。 梁的布置可以用变化混凝土和钢筋的办法来调整。混凝土的截面在高度、宽度、形状和梁底面或者顶面的曲率方面都可以有变化。而钢筋只在面积方面有所变化，不过在相对于混凝土重心轴线的位置方面却多半可以有变化。通过调整这些变化因素，布置方案可能有许多组合，以适应不同的荷载情况。这一点是与钢筋混凝土梁是完全不同的，在钢筋混凝土梁的通常布置中，不是一个统一的矩形截面便是一个统一的T形，而钢筋的位置总是布置得尽量靠底面纤维。 首先考虑先张梁，如图 8-7，这里最好采用直线钢索，因为它们在两个台座之间加力比较容易。我们先从图（a）的等截面直梁的直线钢索开始讨论。这样的布置都很简单，但这样一来，就不是很经济的设计了，因为跨中和梁端的要求会产生冲突。通常发生在跨度中央的最大弯矩截面中的钢索，最好尽量放低，以便尽可能提供最大力臂而提供最大的内部抵制力矩。当跨度中央的梁自重弯矩M G相当大时，就可以把c.g.s布置在截面核心范围以下很远的地方，而不致在传递时在顶部纤维中引起拉应力。然而对于梁端截面却有一套完全不同的要求。由于在梁端没有外力矩，因为在最后的时刻，安排钢索要以c.g.s与 c.g.c在结束区段一致，如此同样地获得克服压力分配的方法。无论如何，如果张应力在最后不能承受，放置 c.g.s.
跨境电商外文文献综述 (文档含英文原文和中文翻译) 译文: 本地化跨境电子商务的模型 摘要 通过对国际供应链的B2B电子商务交易量的快速增长和伊朗快速增加的跨境交易业务，跨境电商过程的有效管理对B2B电子商务系统十分重要。本文对局部模型的结构是基于B2B电子商务的基础设施三大层，消息层、业务流程层和内容层。由于伊朗的电子商务的要求，每一层的需要适当的标准和合适的方案的选择。当电子文件需要移动顺利向伊朗，建议文件的标准为文件内容支持纸质和电子文件阅读。验证提出的模型是通过案例研究方法呈现一到四阶段的情景。本文试图通过交换商业文件在贸易过程中这一局部模型，实现在全球电子贸易供应链更接近区域单一窗口建设的关键目标。 关键词：电子商务;跨境贸易;电子文档管理;国际供应链
1.简介 电子商务是关于在互联网或其他网络电子系统购买和销售产品或服务。术语B2B（企业对企业），描述了企业间的电子商务交易，如制造商和批发商，或批发商和零售商之间。本文的研究目标是上两个不同国家贸易商之间的通信。今天的世界贸易组织的主要目标之一是建立区域单一窗口，可以提高世界各地的贸易便利化。建立区域单一窗口需要跨境海关，可以有效地交换贸易文件。因此，首先，简化跨境贸易文件的关键在于朝着国家单一窗口移动。然后，区域单一窗口可以授权国家之间的通信。电子商务模型是基于三个主要逻辑层的研究。这三个层消息传输层，业务处理层和内容层。本文的局部模型是一种能够自动交换读取文件的过程。通过与东亚和中东国家的建立区域单一窗口可以在将来得到改善的更多的互操作性，从而建立伊朗国家单一窗口 在本文的第二部分讨论引进国际供应链中的跨境B2B模式所需的基本概念和标准。第三部分介绍在大的模型中引入的组件功能和范围。第四部分讨论了B2B交易层模型的定位，最后结束本文。 2.背景 在本节中，除了了解B2B电子商务在伊朗的情况，还有参考模型的背景等概念以及讨论B2B电子商务跨境模式的本土化。 2.1 B2B电子商务在伊朗 如今伊朗在贸易进程的变现是一个关键的贸易成功点。伊朗和许多其他国家接壤，它的进口和出口过程可以通过公路，铁路，海上和空中的方式来完成。因此，这个国家的中部和战略作用，使得它在亚洲和中东地区货物运输的主要贸易点。今天，在伊朗海关几乎所有的贸易过程通过纸质表格完成，由商务部提供的电子服务仅限于谁该国境内交易的商人。今天，伊朗海关几乎所有的贸易流程都是通过纸质表格来完成的，商务部给出的电子服务只限于该国的商人。介绍了模型试图简化在伊朗交易的跨境电子商务供应链交换电子文件的过程。这里提到的一些系统，由商务部在伊朗的电子服务被提及：进口订单管理系统。贸易统计制度。伊朗法典伊朗。这些电子系统的主要使用，以促进在伊朗贸易过程。这里提到的系统作为独立的贸易者可与建议本文模型在未来的作用。在亚洲的区域性单
中英文资料外文翻译文献 我国第三方物流中存在的问题、原因及战略选择 熊卫 【摘要】我国物流业发展刚刚起步，第三方物流的理论和实践等方面都比较薄弱。本文指出我国第三方物流存在的问题在于国内外第三方物流企业差距、物流效率不高、缺乏系统性管理、物流平台构筑滞后、物流管理观念落后等。分析了产生上述问题的原因，并提出了精益物流、中小型第三方物流企业价值链联盟、大型第三方物流企业虚拟化战略等三种可供选择的第三方物流企业发展战略。 【关键词】第三方物流；精益物流战略；价值链联盟；虚拟化战略 1引言 长期以来，我国国内企业对采购、运输、仓储、代理、包装、加工、配送等环节控制能力不强，在“采购黑洞”、“物流陷井”中造成的损失浪费难以计算。因此，对第三方物流的研究，对于促进我国经济整体效益的提高有着非常重要的理论和实践意义。本文试图对我国策三方物流存在的问题及原因进行分析探讨，并提出第三方物流几种可行的战略选择。 2我国第三方物流业存在的主要问题 (一)我国策三方物流企业与国外第三方物流企业的差距较大，具体表现在以下几个方面： 1、规模经济及资本差距明显。由于国外的大型第三方物流企业从全球经营的战略出发，其规模和资本优势是毫无疑问的，尤其初创时期的我国策三方物流业，本身的规模就很小，国外巨头雄厚的资本令国内企业相形见绌。 2、我国策三方物流业企业提供的物流服务水准及质量控制远不如国外同行。当国内一些企业还在把物流理解成“卡车加仓库“的时候，国外的物流企业早已完成了一系列标准化的改造。同时，国外的物流组织能力非常强大，例如德国一家第三方物流公司，公司各方面的物流专家遍布欧洲各地。如果有客户的货物需要经达不同的国家，那么欧洲各地的这些专家就在网上设计出一个最佳的物流解决方案。这种提供解决方案的能力
英文翻译 数据库管理系统的介绍 Raghu Ramakrishnan 数据库（database,有时被拼作data base）又称为电子数据库，是专门组织起来的一组数据或信息，其目的是为了便于计算机快速查询及检索。数据库的结构是专门设计的，在各种数据处理操作命令的支持下，可以简化数据的存储、检索、修改和删除。数据库可以存储在磁盘、磁带、光盘或其他辅助存储设备上。 数据库由一个或一套文件组成，其中的信息可以分解为记录，每一条记录又包含一个或多个字段（或称为域）。字段是数据存取的基本单位。数据库用于描述实体，其中的一个字段通常表示与实体的某一属性相关的信息。通过关键字以及各种分类（排序）命令，用户可以对多条记录的字段进行查询，重新整理，分组或选择，以实体对某一类数据的检索，也可以生成报表。 所有数据库（除最简单的）中都有复杂的数据关系及其链接。处理与创建，访问以及维护数据库记录有关的复杂任务的系统软件包叫做数据库管理系统（DBMS）。DBMS软件包中的程序在数据库与其用户间建立接口。（这些用户可以是应用程序员，管理员及其他需要信息的人员和各种操作系统程序）DBMS可组织、处理和表示从数据库中选出的数据元。该功能使决策者能搜索、探查和查询数据库的内容，从而对正规报告中没有的，不再出现的且无法预料的问题做出回答。这些问题最初可能是模糊的并且（或者）是定义不恰当的，但是人们可以浏览数据库直到获得所需的信息。简言之，DBMS将“管理”存储的数据项和从公共数据库中汇集所需的数据项用以回答非程序员的询问。 DBMS由3个主要部分组成：（1）存储子系统，用来存储和检索文件中的数据；（2）建模和操作子系统，提供组织数据以及添加、删除、维护、更新数据的方法；（3）用户和DBMS之间的接口。在提高数据库管理系统的价值和有效性方面正在展现以下一些重要发展趋势： 1.管理人员需要最新的信息以做出有效的决策。 2.客户需要越来越复杂的信息服务以及更多的有关其订单，发票和账号的当前信息。
Strategic transformations in Danish and Swedish big business in an era of globalisation, 1973-2008 The Danish and Swedish context In the difficult inter-war period, a state-supported, protected home market orientation had helped stabilise both Denmark’s and Sweden’s economies, but after WorldWar II priorities changed. Gradually and in accordance with the international economic development, restrictions on foreign trade were removed, and Danish and Swedish industry was exposed to international competition. As a consequence, several home market oriented industries –such as the textile and the shoe industry –were more or less outperformed, while in Sweden the engineering industry soon became the dominant leader of Swedish industry, with companies such as V olvo, Ericsson, Electrolux, ASEA and SKF. In the Danish case, the SMEs continued to be dominant but in combination with expanding export oriented industrial manufacturers such as Lego, Danfoss, Carlsberg and the shipping conglomerates ok and A.P. moller-Marsk. In Sweden and Denmark stable economic growth continued into the 1970s, but due to the problems during the oil crises, the economies came into fundamental structural troubles for the first time since World War II. In the beginning this was counteracted by traditional Keynesian policy measures. However, because of large budget deficits, inflation and increasing wages, both the Danish economy from 1974 and the Swedish economy from 1976 encountered severe problems. Towards the late 1970s Denmark’s and Sweden’s economic policies were thus increasingly questioned. It was clear that Keynesian policy could not solve all economic problems. Expansive fiscal policies in terms of continued deficits on the state budget could not compensate for the loss of both national and international markets and step by step the Keynesian economic policy was abandoned. The increased budget deficit also made it difficult for the state to support employment and regional development. These kinds of heavy governmental activities were also hardly acceptable under the more market oriented policy that developed first in Great Britain and the USA, but in the 1980s also in Denmark and Sweden (Iversen & Andersen, 2008, pp. 313–315; Sjo¨ gren, 2008, pp. 46–54). These changes in political priorities were especially noticeable in the financial market. After being the most state regulated and coordinated sector of the economy since the 1950s, then between 1980 and 1985 the Danish and Swedish financial markets underwent an extensive deregulation resulting in increased competition. Lending from banks and other credit institutes was no longer regulated, and neither were interest rates. The bond market was also opened as the issuance of new bond loans was deregulated in Sweden in 1983. When the control of foreign capital flows was liberalised in the late 1980s the last extraordinary restriction was now gone. Together with the establishment of the new money market with options and derivates, this opened up to a much larger credit market and the possibility for companies to finance investments and increase business domestically as well as abroad (Larsson, 1998, pp. 205–207). Another important part of the regulatory changes in the early 1980s were new rules for the Copenhagen and Stockholm stock exchanges. Introduction on the stock exchange was made much