Relevance Theory*
DEIRDRE WILSON & DAN SPERBER
Abstract
This paper outlines the main assumptions of relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson 1985,
1995, 1998, 2002, Wilson & Sperber 2002), an inferential approach to pragmatics.
Relevance theory is based on a definition of relevance and two principles of relevance:
a Cognitive Principle (that human cognition is geared to the maximisation of
relevance), and a Communicative Principle (that utterances create expectations of
optimal relevance). We explain the motivation for these principles and illustrate their
application to a variety of pragmatic problems. We end by considering the implications
of this relevance-theoretic approach for the architecture of the mind.
1 Introduction
Relevance theory may be seen as an attempt to work out in detail one of Grice’s central claims: that an essential feature of most human communication, both verbal and non-verbal, is the expression and recognition of intentions (Grice 1989: Essays 1-7, 14, 18; Retrospective Epilogue). In developing this claim, Grice laid the foundations for an inferential model of communication, an alternative to the classical code model. According to the code model, a communicator encodes her intended message into a signal, which is decoded by the audience using an identical copy of the code. According to the inferential model, a communicator provides evidence of her intention to convey a certain meaning, which is inferred by the audience on the basis of the evidence provided. An utterance is, of course, a linguistically coded piece of evidence, so that verbal comprehension involves an element of decoding. However, the linguistic meaning recovered by decoding is just one of the inputs to a non-demonstrative inference process which yields an interpretation of the speaker's meaning.1
* A version of this paper will appear in L. Horn and G. Ward (eds.) Handbook of Pragmatics (Oxford: Blackwell), and a shortened version in Proceedings of the Tokyo Conference on Psycholinguistics 2002. We are grateful to Larry Horn, Tomoko Matsui, Yuji Nishiyama, Yukio Otsu and Gregory Ward for many valuable comments and suggestions.
1 On the distinction between decoding and inference, see Sperber & Wilson (1986a): §1.1-5, chapter 2. On the relation between decoding and inference in comprehension, see Blakemore (1987, this volume, forthcoming), Wilson & Sperber (1993), Wilson (1998), Carston (1998, 1999,
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speaker’s meaning on the basis of the evidence provided. The relevance-theoretic account is based on another of Grice’s central claims: that utterances automatically create expectations which guide the hearer towards the speaker’s meaning. Grice described these expectations in terms of a Co-operative Principle and maxims of Quality (truthfulness), Quantity (informativeness), Relation (relevance) and Manner (clarity) which speakers are expected to observe (Grice 1961, 1989: 368-72): the interpretation a rational hearer should choose is the one that best satisfies those expectations. Relevance theorists share Grice’s intuition that utterances raise expectations of relevance, but question several other aspects of his account, including the need for a Co-operative Principle and maxims, the focus on pragmatic processes which contribute to implicatures rather than to explicit, truth-conditional content, the role of deliberate maxim violation in utterance interpretation, and the treatment of figurative utterances as deviations from a maxim or convention of truthfulness.2 The central claim of relevance theory is that the expectations of relevance raised by an utterance are precise enough, and predictable enough, to guide the hearer towards the speaker’s meaning. The aim is to explain in cognitively realistic terms what these expectations of relevance amount to, and how they might contribute to an empirically plausible account of comprehension. The theory has developed in several stages. A detailed version was published in Relevance: Communication and Cognition (Sperber & Wilson 1986a, 1987a,b) and updated in Sperber & Wilson 1995, 1998a, 2002, Wilson & Sperber 2002. Here, we will outline the main assumptions of the current version of the theory and discuss some of its implications for pragmatics.
2 Relevance and cognition
What sort of things may be relevant? Intuitively, relevance is a potential property not only of utterances and other observable phenomena, but of thoughts, memories and conclusions of inferences. In relevance-theoretic terms, any external stimulus or internal representation which provides an input to cognitive processes may be relevant to an individual at some time. According to relevance theory, utterances raise expectations of relevance not because speakers are expected to obey a Co-forthcoming), Origgi & Sperber (2000), Wharton (2001, forthcoming), Breheny (2002), Recanati (2002a). On the role of demonstrative and non-demonstrative inference processes in comprehension, see Sperber & Wilson (1986a): §2.1-7, Sperber & Wilson (2002), Recanati (2002a), Carston (2002, forthcoming).
2 For early arguments against these aspects of Grice’s framework, see Sperber & Wilson (1981), Wilson & Sperber (1981). For discussion and further references, see below.
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Relevance operative Principle and maxims or some other specifically communicative convention, but because the search for relevance is a basic feature of human cognition, which communicators may exploit. In this section, we will introduce the basic cognitive notion of relevance and the Cognitive Principle of Relevance, which lay the foundation for the relevance-theoretic approach to pragmatics.
When is an input relevant? Intuitively, an input (a sight, a sound, an utterance, a memory) is relevant to an individual when it connects with background information he has available to yield conclusions that matter to him: say, by answering a question he had in mind, improving his knowledge on a certain topic, settling a doubt, confirming a suspicion, or correcting a mistaken impression. In relevance-theoretic terms, an input is relevant to an individual when its processing in a context of available assumptions yields a POSITIVE COGNITIVE EFFECT. A positive cognitive effect is a worthwhile difference to the individual’s representation of the world – a true conclusion, for example. False conclusions are not worth having. They are cognitive effects, but not positive ones (Sperber & Wilson 1995: §3.1-2).3 The most important type of cognitive effect achieved by processing an input in a context is a CONTEXTUAL IMPLICATION, a conclusion deducible from the input and the context together, but from neither input nor context alone. For example, on seeing my train arriving, I might look at my watch, access my knowledge of the train timetable, and derive the contextual implication that my train is late (which may itself achieve relevance by combining with further contextual assumptions to yield further implications). Other types of cognitive effect include the strengthening, revision or abandonment of available assumptions. For example, the sight of my train arriving late might confirm my impression that the service is deteriorating, or make me alter my plans to do some shopping on the way to work. According to relevance theory, an input is RELEVANT to an individual when, and only when, its processing yields such positive cognitive effects.4
3 The notion of a POSITIVE COGNITIVE EFFECT is needed to distinguish between information that merely SEEMS to the individual to be relevant and information that actually IS relevant. We are all aware that some of our beliefs may be false (even if we cannot tell which they are), and would prefer not to waste our effort drawing false conclusions. An efficient cognitive system is one which tends to pick out genuinely relevant inputs, yielding genuinely true conclusions. For discussion, see Sperber & Wilson (1995): §3.1-2.
4The notion of a COGNITIVE EFFECT (or CONTEXTUAL EFFECT) has been revised several times. For early accounts, see Wilson & Sperber (1981, 1986b). For the standard definitions, see Sperber & Wilson (1986a): §2.7, and especially footnote 26. For discussion of the deductive inferences involved in deriving cognitive effects, see Politzer (1990), Sperber & Wilson (1990a). For the notion of a positive cognitive effect, see Sperber & Wilson (1995): §3.1-2. We leave open the possibility that there may be still further types of positive cognitive effect (improvements in memory or imagination, for example (cf. Wilson & Sperber 2002)).
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Intuitively, relevance is not just an all-or-none matter but a matter of degree. There is no shortage of potential inputs which might have at least some relevance for us, but we cannot attend to them all. Relevance theory claims that what makes an input worth picking out from the mass of competing stimuli is not just that it is relevant, but that it is more relevant than any alternative input available to us at that time. Intuitively, other things being equal, the more worthwhile conclusions achieved by processing an input, the more relevant it will be. In relevance-theoretic terms, other things being equal, the greater the positive cognitive effects achieved by processing an input, the greater its relevance will be. Thus, the sight of my train arriving one minute late may make little worthwhile difference to my representation of the world, while the sight of it arriving half an hour late may lead to a radical reorganisation of my day, and the relevance of the two inputs will vary accordingly.
What makes an input worth picking out from the mass of competing stimuli is not just the cognitive effects it achieves. In different circumstances, the same stimulus may be more or less salient, the same contextual assumptions more or less accessible, and the same cognitive effects easier or harder to derive. Intuitively, the greater the effort of perception, memory and inference required, the less rewarding the input will be to process, and hence the less deserving of our attention. In relevance-theoretic terms, other things being equal, the greater the PROCESSING EFFORT required, the less relevant the input will be. Thus, RELEVANCE may be assessed in terms of cognitive effects and processing effort:
(1) Relevance of an input to an individual
a. Other things being equal, the greater the positive cognitive effects
achieved by processing an input, the greater the relevance of the input to
the individual at that time.
b. Other things being equal, the greater the processing effort expended, the
lower the relevance of the input to the individual at that time.
Here is a brief and artificial illustration of how the relevance of alternative inputs might be compared in terms of effort and effect. Mary, who dislikes most meat and is allergic to chicken, rings her dinner party host to find out what is on the menu. He could truly tell her any of three things:
(2) We are serving meat.
(3) We are serving chicken.
(4) Either we are serving chicken or (72 – 3) is not 46.
According to the characterisation of relevance in (1), all three utterances would be relevant to Mary, but (3) would be more relevant than either (2) or (4). It would be
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Relevance more relevant than (2) for reasons of cognitive effect: (3) entails (2), and therefore yields all the conclusions derivable from (2), and more besides. It would be more relevant than (4) for reasons of processing effort: although (3) and (4) are logically equivalent, and therefore yield exactly the same cognitive effects, these effects are easier to derive from (3) than from (4), which requires an additional effort of parsing and inference (in order to work out that the second disjunct is false and the first is therefore true). Thus, (3) would be the most relevant utterance to Mary, for reasons of both effort and effect. More generally, when similar amounts of effort are required, the effect factor is decisive in determining degrees of relevance, and when similar amounts of effect are achievable, the effort factor is decisive.
This characterisation of relevance is comparative rather than quantitative: it makes clear comparisons possible in some cases (e.g. (2)–(4)), but not in all. While quantitative notions of relevance might be worth exploring from a formal point of view5, it is the comparative rather than the quantitative notion that is likely to provide the best starting point for constructing a psychologically plausible theory. In the first place, it is highly unlikely that individuals have to compute numerical values for effort and effect when assessing relevance ‘from the inside’. Such computation would itself be effort-consuming and therefore detract from relevance. Moreover, even when individuals are clearly capable of computing numerical values (for weight or distance, for example), they generally have access to more intuitive methods of assessment which are comparative rather than quantitative, and which are in some sense more basic. In the second place, while some aspects of human cognitive processes can already be measured ‘from the outside’ (e.g. processing time) and others may be measurable in principle (e.g. number of contextual implications), it is quite possible that others are not measurable at all (e.g. strength of implications, level of attention). As noted in Relevance (124-32), it therefore seems preferable to treat effort and effect as non-representational dimensions of mental processes: they exist and play a role in cognition whether or not they are mentally represented; and when they are mentally represented, it is in the form of intuitive comparative judgements rather than absolute numerical ones. The same is true of relevance, which is a function of effort and effect.6,7
5 For some suggestions about how this might be done, see Sperber & Wilson (1986a): 124-32. Formal notions of relevance are currently being explored by Merin (1997), Blutner (1998) (which brings together ideas from Horn 1984, 1992, Levinson 1987, 2000, Hobbs et al. 1993, and Sperber & Wilson), van Rooy (1999, 2001). For some alternative notions of relevance, see references in Sperber & Wilson (1986b), Wilson (1999).
6 On the distinction between COMPARATIVE and QUANTITATIVE concepts, see Carnap (1950), Sperber & Wilson (1986a): 79-81, 124-32. On comparative and quantitative notions of relevance, see Sperber & Wilson (1986a): §§3.2, 3.5, 3.6. For some factors affecting comparative assessments of relevance, see Sperber & Wilson (1986a): §§3.2, 3.6, Sperber & Wilson (1996).
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Given the characterisation of relevance in (1), aiming to maximise the relevance of the inputs one processes is simply a matter of making the most efficient use of the available processing resources. No doubt this is something we would all want to do, given a choice. Relevance theory claims that humans do have an automatic tendency to maximise relevance, not because we have a choice in the matter – we rarely do – but because of the way our cognitive systems have evolved. As a result of constant selection pressure towards increasing efficiency, the human cognitive system has developed in such a way that our perceptual mechanisms tend automatically to pick out potentially relevant stimuli, our memory retrieval mechanisms tend automatically to activate potentially relevant assumptions, and our inferential mechanisms tend spontaneously to process them in the most productive way. Thus, while we are all likely to notice the sound of glass breaking in our vicinity, we are likely to attend to it more, and process it more deeply, when our memory and inference mechanisms identify it as the sound of our glass breaking, and compute the consequences that are likely to be most worthwhile for us. This universal tendency is described in the First, or Cognitive, Principle of Relevance (Sperber & Wilson 1995: §3.1-2):
(5) Cognitive Principle of Relevance
Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance.
It is against this cognitive background that inferential communication takes place.
3 Relevance and communication
The universal cognitive tendency to maximise relevance makes it possible, at least to some extent, to predict and manipulate the mental states of others. Knowing of your tendency to pick out the most relevant stimuli in your environment and process them so as to maximise their relevance, I may be able to produce a stimulus which is likely to attract your attention, to prompt the retrieval of certain contextual assumptions and to point you towards an intended conclusion. For example, I may leave my empty glass in your line of vision, intending you to notice and conclude that I might like another drink. As Grice pointed out, this is not yet a case of inferential communication because, although I did intend to affect your thoughts in
a certain way, I gave you no evidence that I had this intention. Inferential
7 It is sometimes suggested that the lack of a quantitative notion of relevance makes the theory untestable. In fact, there is now a considerable experimental literature on relevance theory, and many procedures for testing and manipulating effort, effect and relevance (see footnote 5 and §6 below.)
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Relevance communication is not just a matter of intending to affect the thoughts of an audience; it is a matter of getting them to recognise that one has this intention. When I quietly leave my glass in your line of vision, I am not engaging in inferential communication, but merely exploiting your natural cognitive tendency to maximise relevance.
Inferential communication – what relevance theory calls OSTENSIVE-INFERENTIAL COMMUNICATION for reasons that will shortly become apparent – involves an extra layer of intention:
(6) Ostensive-inferential communication
The informative intention:
a.
The intention to inform an audience of something.
The communicative intention:
b.
The intention to inform the audience of one’s informative intention.8
Understanding is achieved when the communicative intention is fulfilled – that is, when the audience recognises the informative intention. (Whether the informative intention itself is fulfilled depends on how much the audience trusts the communicator. There is a gap between understanding and believing. For understanding to be achieved, the informative intention must be recognised, but it does not have to be fulfilled.)
How does the communicator indicate to the audience that she is trying to communicate with them in this overt, intentional way? Instead of covertly leaving my glass in your line of vision, I might touch your arm and point to my empty glass, wave it at you, ostentatiously put it down in front of you, stare at it meaningfully, or say ‘My glass is empty’. More generally, ostensive-inferential communication involves the use of an OSTENSIVE STIMULUS, designed to attract an audience’s attention and focus it on the communicator’s meaning. Relevance theory claims that use of an ostensive stimulus may create precise and predictable expectations of relevance not raised by other stimuli. In this section, we will describe these expectations and show how they may help the audience to identify the communicator’s meaning.
8 This is the simpler of two characterisations of ostensive-inferential communication in Sperber & Wilson (1986a): 29, 58, 61. The fuller characterisation involves the notions of MANIFESTNESS and MUTUAL MANIFESTNESS. In particular, we argue that for communication to be truly overt, the communicator’s informative intention must become not merely manifest to the audience (i.e. capable of being recognised and accepted as true, or probably true), but mutually manifest to communicator and audience. On the communicative and informative intentions, see Sperber & Wilson (1986a): §1.9-12; on the notion of mutual manifestness, see Garnham & Perner (1990), Sperber & Wilson (1990a).
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The fact that ostensive stimuli create expectations of relevance follows from the definition of an ostensive stimulus and the Cognitive Principle of Relevance. An ostensive stimulus is designed to attract the audience’s attention. Given the universal tendency to maximise relevance, an audience will only pay attention to a stimulus that seems relevant enough. By producing an ostensive stimulus, the communicator therefore encourages her audience to presume that it is relevant enough to be worth processing. This need not be a case of Gricean co-operation. Even a self-interested, deceptive or incompetent communicator manifestly intends her audience to assume that her stimulus is relevant enough to be worth processing – why else would he pay attention?9 This is the basis for the Second, or Communicative, Principle of Relevance, which applies specifically to ostensive-inferential communication:
(7) Communicative Principle of Relevance
Every ostensive stimulus conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance.
The Communicative Principle of Relevance and the notion of OPTIMAL RELEVANCE (see below) are the key to relevance-theoretic pragmatics.
An ostensive stimulus, then, creates a PRESUMPTION OF RELEVANCE. The notion of optimal relevance is meant to spell out what the audience of an act of ostensive communication is entitled to expect in terms of effort and effect:
(8) Optimal relevance
An ostensive stimulus is optimally relevant to an audience iff:
a. It is relevant enough to be worth the audience’s processing effort;
b. It is the most relevant one compatible with communicator’s abilities and
preferences.
According to clause (a) of this definition of optimal relevance, the audience is entitled to expect the ostensive stimulus to be at least relevant enough to be worth processing. Given the argument of the last section that a stimulus is worth processing only if it is more relevant than any alternative input available at the time, this is not a trivial claim. Indeed, in order to satisfy the presumption of relevance conveyed by an ostensive stimulus, the audience may have to draw 9 For arguments against the view that co-operation in Grice’s sense is fundamental to communication, see Wilson & Sperber (1981), Sperber & Wilson (1986a): 161-2, Smith & Wilson (1992), Sperber (1994). For more general arguments that rationality in communication does not require co-operation in Grice’s sense, see Kasher (1976), Sperber (2000), Sperber & Wilson (2002).
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Relevance stronger conclusions than would otherwise have been warranted. For example, if you just happen to notice my empty glass, you may be entitled to conclude that I might like a drink. If I deliberately wave it about in front of you, you would generally be justified in drawing the stronger conclusion that I would like a drink. According to clause (b) of the definition of optimal relevance, the audience of an ostensive stimulus is entitled to even higher expectations than this. The communicator wants to be understood. It is therefore in her interest – within the limits of her own capabilities and preferences – to make her ostensive stimulus as easy as possible for the audience to understand, and to provide evidence not just for the cognitive effects she aims to achieve in her audience but also for further cognitive effects which, by holding his attention, will help her achieve her goal. For instance, the communicator’s goal might be to inform her audience that she has begun writing her paper. It may be effective for her, in pursuit of this goal, to volunteer more specific information and say, ‘I have already written a third of the paper.’ In the circumstances, her audience would then be entitled to understand her as saying that she has she has written only a third of the paper, for if she had written two thirds (say), she would normally be expected to say so, given clause (b) of the definition of optimal relevance.
Communicators, of course, are not omniscient, and they cannot be expected to go against their own interests and preferences in producing an utterance. There may be relevant information that they are unable or unwilling to provide, and ostensive stimuli that would convey their intentions more economically, but that they are unwilling to produce, or unable to think of at the time. All this is allowed for in clause (b) of the definition of optimal relevance, which states that the ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one (i.e. yielding the greatest effects, in return for the smallest processing effort) that the communicator is WILLING AND ABLE to produce (see Sperber & Wilson 1995: §3.3 and 266-78).
This approach sheds light on some cases where a communicator withholds relevant information, and which seem to present problems for Grice. Suppose I ask you a question and you remain silent. Silence in these circumstances may or may not be an ostensive stimulus. When it is not, we would naturally take it as indicating that the addressee was unable or unwilling to answer the question. If you are clearly willing to answer, I am entitled to conclude that you are unable, and if you are clearly able to answer, I am entitled to conclude that you are unwilling. When the silence is ostensive, we would like to be able to analyse it as merely involving an extra layer of intention, and hence as COMMUNICATING – or IMPLICATING – that the addressee is unable or unwilling to answer. Given the presumption of relevance and the definition of optimal relevance in (8), this is
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possible in the relevance-theoretic framework.10 In Grice’s framework, by contrast, the co-operative communicator’s willingness to provide any required information is taken for granted, and the parallels between ostensive and non-ostensive silences are lost. On a Gricean account, violation of the first Quantity maxim (‘Make your contribution as informative as required’) is invariably attributed to the communicator’s INABILITY – rather than UNWILLINGNESS – to provide the required information. Unwillingness to make one’s contribution ‘such as is required’ is a violation of the Co-operative Principle, and suspension of the Co-operative Principle should make it impossible to convey any conversational implicatures at all.11 We have argued that, although much communication is co-operative in the sense that the communicator is willing to provide the required information, co-operation in this sense is not essential for communication, as it is for Grice (for references, see footnote 9).
This relevance-theoretic account of cognition and communication has practical implications for pragmatics. As noted above, verbal comprehension starts with the recovery of a linguistically encoded sentence meaning, which must be contextually enriched in a variety of ways to yield a full-fledged speaker’s meaning. There may be ambiguities and referential ambivalences to resolve, ellipses to interpret, and other underdeterminacies of explicit content to deal with.12 There may be implicatures to identify, illocutionary indeterminacies to resolve, metaphors and ironies to interpret. All this requires an appropriate set of contextual assumptions, which the hearer must also supply. The Communicative Principle of Relevance and the definition of optimal relevance suggest a practical procedure for performing these subtasks and constructing a hypothesis about the speaker’s meaning. The hearer should take the linguistically encoded sentence meaning; following a path of least effort, he should enrich it at the explicit level and complement it at the implicit level until the resulting interpretation meets his expectation of relevance:
10 On the use of silence as an ostensive stimulus, see Morgan & Green (1987): 727, Sperber & Wilson (1987b): 746-7.
11 The analysis of scalar implicatures is another case where Gricean analyses tend to lose the symmetry between unwillingness and inability to provide relevant information. For discussion, see Sperber & Wilson (1995): 276-8, Green (1995), Matsumoto (1995), Carston (1995, 1998a), and §6 below. For experimental work, see Noveck (2001), Papafragou (2002, forthcoming).
12 For discussion and illustration, see Carston (this volume). On the notion of explicit content, see §4 below.
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Relevance
(9) Relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure
a. Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects: Test
interpretive hypotheses (disambiguations, reference resolutions,
implicatures, etc.) in order of accessibility.
b. Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied.
Given clause (b) of the definition of optimal relevance in (8), it is reasonable for the hearer to follow a path of least effort because the speaker is expected (within the limits of her abilities and preferences) to make her utterance as easy as possible to understand. Since relevance varies inversely with effort, the very fact that an interpretation is easily accessible gives it an initial degree of plausibility. It is also reasonable for the hearer to stop at the first interpretation that satisfies his expectations of relevance, because there should never be more than one. A speaker who wants her utterance to be as easy as possible to understand should formulate it (within the limits of her abilities and preferences) so that the first interpretation to satisfy the hearer’s expectation of relevance is the one she intended to convey.13 An utterance with two apparently satisfactory competing interpretations would cause the hearer the unnecessary extra effort of choosing between them, and the resulting interpretation (if there were one) would not satisfy clause (b) of the definition of optimal relevance.14
Thus, when a hearer following the path of least effort arrives at an interpretation that satisfies his expectations of relevance, in the absence of contrary evidence, this is the most plausible hypothesis about the speaker’s meaning. Since comprehension is a non-demonstrative inference process, this hypothesis may well be false; but it is the best a rational hearer can do.
13 Notice, incidentally, that the hearer’s expectations of relevance may be readjusted in the course of comprehension. For example, it may turn out that the effort of finding any interpretation
at all would be too great: as a result, the hearer would disbelieve the presumption of relevance and terminate the process, with his now null expectations of relevance trivially satisfied.
14 It is sometimes suggested (e.g. by Morgan and Green 1987: 726-7) that puns and deliberate equivocations present a problem for this approach. We would analyse these as cases of layering in communication, a widespread phenomenon which fits straightforwardly with our account. Just as the failure to provide relevant information at one level may be used as an ostensive stimulus at another, so the production of an utterance which is apparently uninterpretable at one level may be used as an ostensive stimulus at another (see Sperber & Wilson 1987b: 751, Tanaka 1992).
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4 Relevance and comprehension
In many non-verbal cases (e.g. pointing to one’s empty glass, failing to respond to a question), use of an ostensive stimulus merely adds an extra layer of intention recognition to a basic layer of information that the audience might have picked up anyway. In other cases (e.g. inviting someone out to a drink by pretending to raise a glass to one’s lips), the communicator’s behaviour provides no direct evidence for the intended conclusion, and it is only the presumption of relevance conveyed by the ostensive stimulus which encourages the audience to devote the necessary processing resources to discovering her meaning. Either way, the range of meanings that can be non-verbally conveyed is necessarily limited by the range of concepts the communicator can evoke in her audience by drawing attention to observable features of the environment (whether preexisting or produced specifically for this purpose).
In verbal communication, speakers manage to convey a very wide range of meanings despite the fact that there is no independently identifiable basic layer of information for the hearer to pick up. What makes it possible for the hearer to recognise the speaker’s informative intention is that utterances encode logical forms (conceptual representations, however fragmentary or incomplete) which the speaker has manifestly chosen to provide as input to the hearer’s inferential comprehension process. As a result, verbal communication can achieve a degree of explicitness not available in non-verbal communication (compare pointing in the direction of a table containing glasses, ashtrays, plates, etc., and saying, ‘My glass is empty’).
Although the decoded logical form of an utterance is an important clue to the speaker’s intentions, it is now increasingly recognised that even the explicitly communicated content of an utterance goes well beyond what is linguistically encoded.15 Grice talked of his Co-operative Principle and maxims mainly in connection with the recovery of implicatures, and he seems to have thought of them as playing no significant role on the explicit side. His few remarks on disambiguation and reference assignment – which he saw as falling on the explicit rather than the implicit side – suggest that he thought of them as determined by 15 By ‘explicitly communicated content’ (or EXPLICATURE), we mean a communicated proposition recovered by a combination of decoding and inference, which provides a premise for the derivation of contextual implications and other cognitive effects (Sperber & Wilson 1986a: 176-93, Carston this volume, forthcoming). Despite many terminological disagreements (see footnotes 23 and 24), the existence of pragmatic contributions at this level is now widely recognised (see e.g. Wilson & Sperber 1981, 1998, 2002, Kempson & Cormack 1982, Travis 1985, 2001, Sperber & Wilson 1986a: §4.2-3, Kempson 1986, 1996, Blakemore 1987, Carston 1988, 2000, 2002, forthcoming, Recanati 1989, 2002b, Neale 1992, Bach 1994a, 1994b, 1997, Stainton 1994, 1997, this volume, Bezuidenhout 1997, Levinson 2000, Fodor 2001).
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Relevance sentence meaning and contextual factors alone, without reference to pragmatic principles or speakers’ intentions,16 and many pragmatists have followed him on this. There has thus been a tendency, even in much of the recent pragmatic literature, to treat the ‘primary’ processes involved in the recovery of explicit content as significantly different from – i.e. less inferential, or less directly dependent on speakers’ intentions or pragmatic principles than – the ‘secondary’ processes involved in the recovery of implicatures.17
Relevance theory treats the identification of explicit content as equally inferential, and equally guided by the Communicative Principle of Relevance, as the recovery of implicatures. The relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure (‘Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects: test interpretive hypotheses in order of accessibility, and stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied.’) applies in the same way to the resolution of linguistic underdeterminacies at both explicit and implicit levels. The hearer’s goal is to construct a hypothesis about the speaker’s meaning which satisfies the presumption of relevance conveyed by the utterance. This overall task can be broken down into a number of sub-tasks:
(10) Sub-tasks in the overall comprehension process
a. Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about explicit content (in
relevance-theoretic terms, EXPLICATURES) via decoding, disambiguation,
reference resolution, and other pragmatic enrichment processes.
b. Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual
assumptions (in relevance-theoretic terms, IMPLICATED PREMISES).
c. Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual
implications (in relevance-theoretic terms, IMPLICATED CONCLUSIONS).
These sub-tasks should not be thought of as sequentially ordered. The hearer does not FIRST decode the logical form of the sentence uttered, THEN construct an explicature and select an appropriate context, and THEN derive a range of implicated conclusions. Comprehension is an on-line process, and hypotheses about explicatures, implicated premises and implicated conclusions are developed in
16 In his ‘Retrospective Epilogue’, and occasionally elsewhere, Grice seems to acknowledge the possibility of intentional pragmatic contributions to ‘dictive content’ (Grice 1989: 359-68). See Carston (forthcoming), Wharton (in preparation) for discussion.
17 On the distinction between primary and secondary pragmatic processes, see Breheny (2002), Recanati (2002a), Carston (this volume, forthcoming), Sperber & Wilson (2002). Some of the literature on generalised conversational implicature and discourse pragmatics tacitly invokes a similar distinction (cf. Hobbs 1985, Lascarides & Asher 1993, Lascarides, Copestake & Briscoe 1996, Levinson 2000). See also footnotes 23 and 24.
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parallel against a background of expectations (or anticipatory hypotheses) which may be revised or elaborated as the utterance unfolds.18 In particular, the hearer may bring to the comprehension process not only a general presumption of relevance, but more specific expectations about how the utterance will be relevant to him (what cognitive effects it is likely to achieve), and these may contribute, via backwards inference, to the identification of explicatures and implicated premises.19 Thus, each sub-task in (10a-c) above involves a non-demonstrative inference process embedded within the overall process of constructing a hypothesis about the speaker’s meaning.
To take just one illustration, consider the exchange in (11):
(11) a. Peter:Did John pay back the money he owed you?
Mary: No. He forgot to go to the bank.
b.
Table (12) below is a schematic outline of how Peter might use the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure to construct hypotheses about the explicatures and implicatures of Mary's utterance, 'He forgot to go to the bank.' Peter assumes in (12b) that Mary's utterance, decoded as in (12a), is optimally relevant to him. Since what he wants to know at this point is why John did not repay the money he owed, he assumes in (c) that Mary’s utterance will achieve relevance by answering this question. In the situation described, the logical form of the utterance provides easy access to the contextual assumption in (d) (that forgetting to go to the bank may prevent one from repaying money one owes). This could be used as an implicit premise in deriving the expected explanation of John’s behaviour, provided that the utterance is interpreted on the explicit side (via disambiguation and reference resolution) as conveying the information in (e): that John forgot to go to the BANK1. By combining the implicit premise in (d) and the explicit premise in (e), Peter arrives at the implicit conclusion in (f), from which further, weaker implicatures, including (g) and others, can be derived. The resulting overall interpretation satisfies Peter's expectations of relevance:
18 See, for example, Sperber & Wilson (1986a): §4.3-5, esp. pp 204-208, Wilson & Sperber (2002).
19 A hearer's expectations of relevance may be more or less sophisticated. In an unsophisticated version, presumably the one always used by young children, what is expected is actual optimal relevance. In a more sophisticated version (used by competent adult communicators who are aware that the speaker may be mistaken about what is relevant to the hearer, or in bad faith and merely intending to appear relevant), what is expected may be merely attempted or purported optimal relevance. Adult communicators may nevertheless expect actual optimal relevance by default. Here we will ignore these complexities, but see Sperber (1994), Wilson (2000), and §5 below.
Relevance Theory 263
(12)
(a) Mary has said to Peter, ‘He x forgot to go to the BANK 1 /
BANK 2.’
[He x = uninterpreted pronoun]
[BANK 1 = financial institution]
[BANK 2 = river bank]
Embedding of the decoded (incomplete)
logical form of Mary’s utterance into a description of Mary’s ostensive behaviour. (b) Mary’s utterance will be optimally relevant to Peter. Expectation raised by recognition of Mary's ostensive behaviour and acceptance of the presumption of relevance it conveys.
(c) Mary's utterance will achieve relevance by explaining why John has not repaid the money he owed her. Expectation raised by (b), together with the fact that such an explanation would be most relevant to Peter at this point.
(d) Forgetting to go to the BANK 1may make one unable to repay the money one owes.
First assumption to occur to Peter which, together with other appropriate premises,
might satisfy expectation (c). Accepted as an implicit premise of Mary's utterance.
(e) John forgot to go to the BANK 1. First enrichment of the logical form of Mary's utterance to occur to Peter which might combine with (d) to lead to the
satisfaction of (c). Accepted as an
explicature of Mary’s utterance.
(f) John was unable to repay Mary the money he owes because he forgot to go to the BANK 1. Inferred from (d) and (e), satisfying (c) and accepted as an implicit conclusion of Mary’s utterance.
(g) John may repay Mary the money he owes when he next goes to the BANK 1. From (f) plus background knowledge. One of several possible weak implicatures of Mary’s utterance which, together with (f),
satisfy expectation (b).
264Deirdre Wilson & Dan Sperber
On this account, explicatures and IMPLICATURES (i.e. implicit premises and conclusions) are arrived at by a process of mutual parallel adjustment, with hypotheses about both being considered in order of accessibility.20
This schematic outline of the comprehension process is considerably oversimplified.21 In particular, it omits a range of lexical-pragmatic processes which contribute in important ways to the construction of explicatures. Consider the word bank in (11b). In interpreting this utterance, Peter would probably take Mary to be referring not just to a banking institution but to a specific type of banking institution: one that deals with private individuals, and in particular, with John. Unless the denotation of bank is narrowed in this way, the explicit content of Mary’s utterance will not warrant the conclusion in (12f), which is needed to satisfy Peter’s expectation of relevance. (It is hard to see how the fact that John had forgotten to go to the World Bank, say, or the European Investment Bank, might explain his failure to repay the money he owed.) By the same token, in interpreting the phrase go to the bank, he would take Mary to be referring not merely to visiting the bank but to visiting it in order to get money, and, moreover, to get money in the regular way (legally, rather than, say, by robbing the bank). Unless the explicit content of the utterance is narrowed in this way, it will not warrant the conclusion in (12f), which is needed to satisfy Peter’s expectation of relevance.
Some of these stereotypical narrowings have been described in the pragmatic literature as generalised conversational implicatures, and analysed as default interpretations, derivable via default rules.22 Despite the richness and subtlety of 20 For expository purposes, we have chosen an example in which the linguistic content of the discourse, and in particular the preceding utterance (‘No’), creates a fairly precise expectation of relevance, allowing the interpretation process to be strongly driven by expectations of effect. In an indirect answer such as (ib), where the linguistic form of the utterance is compatible with two different lines of interpretation, considerations of effort, and in particular the accessibility of contextual assumptions capable of yielding the expected conclusions, play a more important role. In a discourse-initial utterance such as (ii), or in a questionnaire situation, considerations of effort are likely to play a decisive role in narrowing down the possible lines of interpretation:
(i) a. Peter: Did John pay back the money he owed?
b. Mary: He forgot to go to the bank.
(ii) He forgot to go to the bank.
21 For one thing, we have used English sentences to represent the assumptions and assumption schemas that Peter entertains at different stages of the comprehension process, which we assume he does not represent in English but in some conceptual representation system or language of thought. We have also left aside semantic issues such as the analysis of the definite article and definite descriptions (e.g. the bank).
22 See for example Horn (1984, 1992), Levinson (1987, 2000), Hobbs et al. (1993), Lascarides, Copestake & Briscoe (1996), Lascarides & Copestake (1998), Blutner (1998, 2002).
265
Theory
Relevance much of the literature on generalised conversational implicature, relevance theory takes a different approach, for two main reasons. In the first place, as noted above, it treats lexical narrowing as a type of pragmatic enrichment process which contributes to explicatures rather than implicatures.23 Like all enrichment processes, lexical narrowing is driven by the search for relevance, which involves the derivation of cognitive effects, and in particular of contextual implications. By definition, a contextual implication must follow logically from the explicatures of the utterance and the context. Sometimes, as in (11b), in order to yield an expected implication, the explicit content of the utterance must be enriched to a point where it warrants the expected conclusion. In any framework where implicated conclusions are seen as logically warranted by explicit content, there is thus good reason to treat lexical narrowings as falling on the explicit rather than the implicit side.24
In the second place, lexical narrowing is a much more flexible and context-dependent process than appeals to generalised implicature or default interpretations suggest. Barsalou (1987, 1992) surveys a wide range of experimental evidence which shows that even apparently stereotypical narrowings of terms such as bird, animal, furniture, food, etc. vary considerably across situations, individuals and times, and are strongly affected by discourse context and considerations of
23 As noted above (footnote 15), there is some debate about how the explicit–implicit distinction should be drawn (see, for example, Horn 1992, Sperber & Wilson 1986a: §4.1-4, Wilson & Sperber 1993, Bach 1994a,b, 1997, Levinson 2000, Carston 2002, this volume, forthcoming). The issue is partly terminological, but becomes substantive when combined with the claim that explicit and implicit communication involve distinct pragmatic processes (as it is in much of the literature on generalised implicatures: e.g. Levinson 2000).
24 Levinson (2000: 195-6) discusses a number of possible criteria for distinguishing explicatures from implicatures, provides arguments against each, and concludes that the distinction is unjustified. But there is no reason to expect a criterion to be provided for each theoretical distinction. (We would not expect the defenders of a distinction between generalised and particularised implicatures to provide a criterion, although we would expect them to characterise these notions clearly and provide sound supporting evidence.) Our notion of an explicature is motivated, among other things, by embedding tests which suggest that certain pragmatic processes contribute to truth-conditional content, while others do not (Wilson & Sperber 1986a: 80, 2002). The allocation of pragmatically inferred material between explicatures and implicatures is constrained, on the one hand, by our theoretical definitions of explicature and implicature (Sperber & Wilson 1986a:182), and, on the other, by the fact that the implicated conclusions which satisfy the hearer’s expectations of relevance must be warranted by the explicit content of the utterance, together with the context. For further discussion, see Sperber & Wilson (1986a): §4.3, Sperber & Wilson (1998a), Carston (1995, 1998, 2000, this volume), Wilson & Sperber (1998, 2002). For some experimental work, see Gibbs & Moise (1997), Matsui (1998, 2000), Nicolle & Clark (1999), Wilson & Matsui (2000), Noveck (2001), Papafragou (2002, forthcoming).
266Deirdre Wilson & Dan Sperber
relevance. In Barsalou’s view, his results are best explained by the assumption that lexical items give access not to ready-made prototypes (assignable by default rules) but to a vast array of encyclopaedic information which varies in accessibility from occasion to occasion, with different subsets being selected ad hoc to determine the occasion-specific interpretation of a word. On this approach, bank in (11b) might be understood as conveying not the encoded concept BANK1 but the related concept BANK*, with a more restricted encyclopedic entry and a narrower denotation, constructed ad hoc for this particular occasion.
In Barsalou’s view, the construction of ad hoc concepts is affected by a variety of factors, including context, the accessibility of encyclopedic assumptions and considerations of relevance. However, he makes no concrete proposal about how these concepts might be derived, and in particular about how the construction process is triggered and when it stops. The relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure may be seen as a concrete hypothesis about how such a flexible, relevance-governed lexical interpretation process might go. The hearer treats the linguistically encoded word meaning (e.g. BANK1 in (11b)) as no more than a clue to the speaker’s meaning. Guided by his expectations of relevance, and using contextual assumptions made accessible by the encyclopedic entry of the linguistically encoded concept (e.g. that forgetting to go to the bank where one keeps one’s money may make one unable to repay money one owes), he starts deriving cognitive effects. When he has enough effects to satisfy his expectations of relevance, he stops. The results would be as in (12) above, except that the contextual assumption in (d), the explicature in (e) and the implicatures in (f) and (g) would contain not the encoded concept BANK1 but the ad hoc concept BANK*, with a narrower denotation, which would warrant the derivation of the cognitive effects required to satisfy the hearer’s expectations of relevance.
The effect of such a flexible interpretation process may be a loosening rather than a narrowing of the encoded meaning (resulting in a broader rather than a narrower denotation). This is another way in which lexical pragmatic processes differ from default, or stereotypical, narrowing. Clear cases of loosening include the use of a prominent brand name (e.g. Hoover, Xerox, Kleenex) to denote a category which also contains items from less prominent brands; other good examples are approximations based on well-defined terms such as square, painless or silent, but the phenomenon is very widespread. Consider bank in (11b). Given current banking practice, the word may sometimes be loosely used to denote a category containing not only banking institutions but also the automatic cash dispensers found in supermarkets and stations. Indeed, in order to satisfy his expectations of relevance in (11b), Peter would probably have to take it in this way (i.e. to mean, roughly, ‘bank-or-cash-dispenser’). (If John regularly gets his money from a cash dispenser, the claim that he forgot to go to the BANK1, might be strictly speaking false, and in any case would not adequately explain his failure to repay Mary.)
267
Theory
Relevance Thus, bank in (11b) might be understood as expressing not the encoded concept BANK1, but an ad hoc concept BANK**, with a broader denotation, which shares with BANK1 the salient encyclopedic attribute of being a place one goes to in order to access money from one’s account. The interpretation of a quite ordinary utterance such as (11b) might then involve both a loosening and a narrowing of the encoded meaning.
Loose uses of language present a problem for Grice’s framework. Strictly speaking, faces are not square, rooms are generally not silent, and to describe them as such would violate his maxim of truthfulness (‘Do not say what you believe to be false’). However, these departures from truthfulness do not fall into any of the categories of maxim-violation recognised by Grice (Grice 1989: 30). They are not covert violations, like lies, designed to deceive the hearer into believing what was said. They are not like jokes and fictions, which suspend the maxims entirely. Given their intuitive similarities to metaphor and hyperbole, it might be tempting to analyse them, like tropes, as overt violations (floutings) of the maxim of truthfulness, designed to trigger the search for a related implicature (in this case, a hedged version of what was said). The problem is that these loose uses of language would not be generally perceived as violating the maxim of truthfulness at all. They do not have the striking quality that Grice associated with floutings, and which he saw as resulting in figurative or quasi-figurative interpretations. While we are all capable of realising on reflection that they are not strictly and literally true, these departures from truthfulness pass unattended and undetected in the normal flow of discourse. Grice’s framework thus leaves them unexplained.25
Loose uses of language are not the only problem for Grice’s maxim of truthfulness. There are questions about how the maxim itself is to be understood, and a series of difficulties with the analysis of tropes as overt violations of the maxim (for detailed discussion, see Wilson & Sperber 2002). Notice, too, that the intuitive similarities between loose talk, metaphor and hyperbole cannot be captured within this framework, since metaphor and hyperbole are seen as overt violations of the maxim of truthfulness, while loose uses of language are not. We
25 Since lexical loosening is widely acknowledged as one of the factors driving semantic change, it might be argued that from a synchronic point of view, these are simply cases of polysemy. However, we are interested in the pragmatic micro-processes underlying these semantic changes, and we will largely abstract away from the question of whether Hoover, or square, or silent has acquired an extra stable sense. Notice, though, that the variation in interpretations of a word such as square or silent applied to different objects in different circumstances is so great as to make purely semantic or default-pragmatic explanations seem unfeasible (for discussion, see Searle 1979, 1980, Horn 1984, Lakoff 1987, Franks & Braisby 1990, Sweetser 1990, Hobbs et al. 1993, Bach 1994a,b, 1997, Recanati 1995, Carston 1997, 1998, this volume, forthcoming, Sperber & Wilson 1998a, Traugott 1998, Wilson 1998, Lasersohn 1999, Asher & Lascarides 2001, Papafragou 2000, Wilson & Sperber 2002).
268Deirdre Wilson & Dan Sperber
have argued that the best solution is to abandon the maxim of truthfulness and treat whatever expectations of truthfulness arise in utterance interpretation as resulting not from an independent maxim, norm or convention of truthfulness, but as by-products of the more basic expectation of relevance. On this approach, loose talk, metaphor and hyperbole involve no violation of any maxim, but are merely alternative routes to achieving optimal relevance. Whether an utterance is literally, loosely or metaphorically understood will depend on the mutual adjustment of context, context and cognitive effects in the effort to satisfy the hearer’s overall expectation of relevance.26
To illustrate this unified approach, consider the exchange in (13):
(13) a. Peter: What do you think of Martin’s latest novel?
Mary: It puts me to sleep.
b.
In Grice’s framework, Mary’s utterance in (13b) should have three distinct interpretations: as a literal assertion, a hyperbole or a metaphor.27 Of these, Peter should test the literal interpretation first, and move to a figurative interpretation only if the literal interpretation blatantly violates the maxim of truthfulness. Yet there is now a lot of experimental evidence suggesting that literal interpretations do not have to be tested and rejected before figurative interpretations are considered;28 indeed, in interpreting (13b), it would probably not even occur to Peter to wonder whether Mary literally fell asleep.
The relevance-theoretic analysis takes these points into account. In the first place, there is no suggestion that the literal meaning must be tested first. As with bank in (11b), the encoded conceptual address is treated merely as a point of access to an ordered array of encyclopedic information from which the hearer is expected to select in constructing a satisfactory overall interpretation. Whether this interpretation is literal or loose will depend on which types of information he selects. In processing (13b), Peter will be expecting to derive an answer to his
26 For early arguments against the maxim of truthfulness, see Wilson & Sperber (1981). For detailed critiques of frameworks based on maxims or conventions of truthfulness, discussion of some existing accounts of loose use, and justification of an alternative, relevance-theoretic account, see Wilson & Sperber (2002). For experimental evidence, see Matsui (1998, 2000), Wilson & Matsui (2000), van der Henst, Carles & Sperber (forthcoming).
27 For Grice, metaphor and hyperbole involve different types of interpretation process, and may indeed be mutually exclusive: see Grice (1989): 34.
28 See, for example, Gibbs (1994), Noveck, Bianco & Castry (2001), Glucksberg (2001). Glucksberg’s view that the interpretation of metaphor involves the construction of a broader category than the one determined by the encoded meaning fits well with our analysis based on loose use.
管理学的发展史 关键字：管理理论泰勒法约尔工人个人战略管理 摘要：本文介绍了西方管理学的发展历史，从19世纪到现在，管理理论的发展和一些科学的管理理论。 自古以来，管理活动伴随着人类社会活动的始终。有例为证，被誉为古代世界七大奇迹之一的巴比伦空中花园闻名于世，同样闻名于世的还有《汉穆拉比法典》，当时的古巴比伦国王汉穆拉比在法典中，针对各种职业﹑各种层面上的人员，从责﹑权﹑利等方面出发，制定了282条法律，作为管理国家的制度。内容涉及人民生产生活的许多方面。这使得巴比伦成为当时管理最完善的帝国。而公元前5世纪的《孙子兵法》则因为探索战略的一般规律被认为是最早、最系统的战略管理学著作。古埃及﹑古罗马﹑古希腊﹑古代中国都创建出了管理体系管理制度，总结出管理智慧。 第一次工业革命以后，机器劳动代替手工劳动使得社会生产力得到了空前的发展，伴随着组织运作所要求的连续性﹑规范性﹑精确性导致的管理难度逐渐加大，管理成本上升，管理不善导致企业倒闭的例子的增多，一些人开始真正重视管理理论的研究，但主要局限于工厂内部的运作问题，并没有全面推广，直到美国铁路的大兴修建，这种情况才发生变化。 19世纪40年代末，美国铁路企业因为铁路的建设的热潮而成长起来，为了满足庞大的资金需求，股份制的出现使企业规模突破了个人资本量的限制，企业规模日益扩张，内部结构日益复杂，现代职业经理阶层应运而生。在19世纪末期和20世纪初期，美国人泰勒开始思考如何使用秒表研究来提高工作效率，同时法国人法约尔也在思考组织管理活动的普遍性和独立的规律，这标志着传统管理学的诞生。在过去的这100年中，管理已经从一种虚幻的的非正式的活动，发展成为一个独立的科学目录，人们不仅认识到管理活动几乎存在于所有的人类组织和人类有组织的活动中，而且从各种可能的角度、采用各种可能的方法对管理活动和问题进行规范分析和研究。由于管理科学知识被广泛地用于指导管理实践，从而管理效率被大幅度地提高，管理科学化进程不断被推进，管理学的知识体系不断地扩张发展。所以很多人说，刚刚过去的20世纪是管理的世纪。经过整整一百年的发展，管理学已经发展成为具有庞大知识体系和复杂分支的学科，在人类文明进程和智慧宝库中占有了不可或缺的地位。 在管理学快速发展的过程中，管理理论经历了从古典管理理论阶段（早期管理阶段）、到行为科学阶段（传统管理阶段），再到管理理论阶段，出现了许多不同的学派，例如社会系统学派、决策理论学派、管理过程学派、系统管理学派、经验主义学派、管理科学学派、经理角色学派、权变理论学派等，完善了庞大的
关联理论 1.关联理论的形成 莫里斯（Morris）把语用学看成是探讨语言符号与符号使用者关系的学科，格赖斯（Grice）、奥斯汀（Austin）等人认为符号信息和交际意图有关系，是由推理支撑的超符号关系。斯波伯（Sperber）和威尔逊（Wilson）逐渐把语言超符号关系的研究引入了认知的轨道，于1986年出版了一本题为《关联性：交际与认知》（Relevance:Communication and Cognition)的专著，提出了与交际和认知有关的关联理论(relevance theory)，1995年，他们又推出了第二版。它是近几年来在西方语用学界有较大影响的认知语用理论。 2. 关联理论的两个原则 第一个原则（认知原则）：认为人们的认知倾向于同最大关联相吻合。第二个原则（交际原则）：交际行为都应该设想为它本身具有最佳关联。认知作为一个心理术语，涉及人对信息的选择、接收、处理、理解和储存的能力和过程，关联则涉及到一个省力问题，就语言交际而言，处理最关联的信息是一个自动倾向，语用者总是能够或自然地在所得信息和此间支出的努力两者之间取得最佳平衡，从而获得最佳信息效应。她们提出的关联理论就是基于这种生物心理性质的“经济原则”，把关联定义为认知关联（人的认知倾向于最大程度地增加关联）和交际关联（交际行为所传递的是最佳关联的假设）。 3.关联理论的观点 关联理论认为，语言符号的运作或语言交际，从认知角度出发，把语境定义为“一个心理结构体”，它是受话者头脑中关于世界的一系列假设，不仅包括交际的具体环境和上下文的信息，还包括对未来的期待、总体文化概念以及受话者对说话人心智状态的判断等，这些都对话语的理解起重要作用。在语言交际中，受话者对世界的假设以概念表征的形式储存在大脑中，构成用来处理新信息的认知语境。 关联理论认为，话语的关联程度依赖于语境效果和处理努力，语境效果与关联成正比，处理能力与关联成反比。并将把处理努力理解为认知语言环境所消耗的脑力，关联性越强，话语就越直接，认知所消耗的脑力越小，给受话者带来的
西方管理理论的发展历史对我们的启示 李雪妮10108086003 在西方管理理论的发展历史中，有两点转变特别值得我们注意，一是管理理论的人性假设基础，也就是说在管理理论所研究的管理对象是什么样的人，一是文化，包括企业文化、民族文化、潮流文化等，尤其是民族文化在西方管理理论的发展历史中所起到的关键作用。鉴于此，本文将西方管理理论对我们的启示分为两个大板块：人性假设的演变历史对我们的启示以及中西方的文化差异所启发的管理创新。 启示一：以人为本——西方管理理论中人性假设的演变及其启示人性假设是西方管理思想的发展基石和演化线索，我们可以从西方管理理论的发展历史中人性假设的演变里获得一些启示。 西方管理思想史上先后出现了六种主要的人性假设，即“工具人”、“经济人”、“社会人”、“自我实现人”、“复杂人”和“道德人”。 1.“工具人”假设。前泰勒时代，生产的社会化程度不高，管理范围往往只限于家庭或手工业作坊。与之相适应，这一时期形成了一种基于“工具人”假设至上的管理模式，这种管理模式以主要用暴力取得绝对集权、组织结构简单、经验管理、以维护自身的权威与地位的稳定为管理的首要目标。 2.“经济人”假设。“经济人”假设起源于享乐主义哲学和劳动分工的经济理论，认为人的一切行为都是最大限度地满足自己的私利，为了争取最大的经济利益，工作动机就是为了获得经济报酬。 3.“社会人”假设。“社会人”又称社交人，是人际关系学家埃尔顿·梅奥根据霍桑实验的结果于1933年在其发表的《工业文明的人类问题》一书提出的。“社会人”假设理论认为人是有感情的社会性动物，是社会关系的产物，人不仅是经济的，还是社会的，满足人的社会需要比满足人的经济物资需要更能调动人的生产积极性。 4.“自我实现人”假设。这种人性假设是于20世纪四五十年代由美国心理学家马斯洛提出。该假设认为所谓自我实现是指人都需要发挥潜力，表现自己的才能，只有人的潜力充分发挥出来，人才会感到最大满足。 5.“复杂人”假设。随着社会的进步，在新的管理环境下，原有的管理理论
管理学的发展历程 管理学的发展，可以简略分为三个阶段： 1）古典管理 2）现代管理 3）当代管理 1. 古典管理理论 1.1科学管理 弗莱德里克？泰勒，科学管理之父”，把管理看作科学并且强调管理者作用的第一人。 泰勒以降低成本和提高生产力为目的，分析了工作任务，并以科学的方法进行了实验，从而开创了工业管理的新纪元。 科学管理理论不仅仅促进了传统工业的发展，并且为西方的组织结构设定了一个文化基础，同时也为组织行为学研究奠定了基础。 1.1.1任务管理法 科学管理理论认为，管理者首先要做的是分析工作任务，着重解决三个问题： 1）要做什么 2）怎样去做 3）何时以及用多长时间去做。 管理者的一切努力都是为解决这三个问题，这就是为什么科学管理理论也被称为任务管理法。 1.1.2行为指导 泰勒把某一特定工作分成两个部分，被管理者要做的工作以及管理者要做的工作。为了找出管理某项工作的科学方法，泰勒需要事先调查以建立一个实施的样本，调查包含以下五个步骤： 1）找到适合完成这一特定工作的适量的工作者 2）仔细研究并分清每一个工作者的具体工作环节，以及他们完成相应环节所需使用的工具 3）用秒表记录下他们做每一个工作环节的具体时间，选择其中最快的方法 4）去掉那些错误的、节奏慢的、无用的步骤 5）最终整理出一套最快最好的工作流程和最适用的工具 泰勒的目的是让管理者努力把工作任务分成相对明确环节的同时，用可以量化的标准对各个 环节进行控制。管理工作就是监控所有的环节。 此外，泰勒注意到要了解工作者的期望值，并且要提供培训使他们适应并满足他们所做的工 作。科学管理理论的奖励机制与工作者完成的工作有关，因而工人也可以获得更高的工资。 泰勒认为，在科学管理理论下，与培训教师合作融洽的员工有机会获得个人的发展，当所有的问题由他单独面对时，他会比在没有接受训练的情况下做得好”。科学管理理论在本质 上是重新协调员工能力的一种方式。 1.1.3工作定量系统
话语标记语 Discourse Markers 主要内容 一、话语标记语的界定及识别 二、话语标记语的名称 三、话语标记语的研究角度 四、研究派别及国内外部分研究 五、总结 1.话语标记语的定义及特征 1.1 话语标记语的定义 话语标记语是说话人为了引导和制约听话人正确理解话语而选择的语言标记。它是一种常见的话语现象，是一些在交际中具有一定语用功能的词语或结构。 话语标记语这一说法是由Schiffrin提出的，即“标记话语单元序列关系的独立的语言成分”。 冉永平(2003) :英语中well, oh, you know, you see, I mean, that is to say, in other words, as I said 等和汉语中“你知道”、“大家知道”、“我的意思是”、“也就是说”等是言语交际中常见的话语表达形式，我们统称为“话语标记语”（discourse markers） 1.2 话语标记语的特征 从形式上看，话语标记语主要由以下三种语言单位充当:①词，如:now，well，like，anyway，so等;②短语，如:in other words，in addition to，in short，after all等;③句子，如: you know, I think，you see，that is to say等。 从词尾变化上看，像介词、冠词一样，它是固定的语言形式，没有性、数、格的变化。如: like不会被说成likes，liked等; that is to say不会变成复数形式those are to say。 从位置上看，大多数话语标记语位于它们所连接的两个句子之间，即位于第二个分句的句首，有时也会夹在一句话中间。 John ca n’t go. And Mary can’t go either. We were late in getting up. Anyway, we attended the lecture on time. (3) A: Susan’s not coming today. B: After all, Tom’s in town. (4) A: I hope you manage to do some work today. B: Oh, I have been work ing. I’m working on Sandy’s talk. I mean, my talk in Sandy’s class. (5) Rose: You like this woman. You used her several times.
传统意义的语境包括范围很广，涉及到语言的上下文、时间、话题、说话方式、人际关系、人对世界的知识、人际间的相互了解、文化社会等。随着认知科学的兴起，很多语言学家把客观世界中种种制约话语的因素定格在人的认知的前提之下，让主观的认知统揽全局，把语境对话语的制约看成是与交际者的智力、性格、情感、信念、意图等相互作用的结果，客观的语境因素只有通过认知的过滤才能对话语的生成和理解产生作用，语言学家提出了认知语境的概念。传统语境与认知语境概念的根本区别：传统语境概念认为，理解话语的语境，一般说来是事前固定的，理解话语靠的是语言的解码。而认知语境概念认为理解话语要看语境，而语境同样要在语用的一般原则下形成假设，通过心理认知的过程，形成新的语境，从而揭示话语明说的内容和暗含的内容。 认知结构也称作背景知识，是人类对世界的假设和概念的一种内在的认知能力。受话者对世界的假定以概念的表征储存在大脑中，构成一个人的认知环境，一个人的认知环境是一系列可以映现的事实或假设的集合，认知环境包括各种各样的信息，这些信息构成一个理解话语的潜在的认知环境。说话人的话语信息与受话人的认知图式相匹配，达到知识共享，给隐含的推理提供证据，否则意图传递受挫，交际无法进行。 认知语境是社会心理性质的，因为在具体语言使用过程中所涉及到的情景知识（具体场合）、语言上下文知识（工作记忆）和背景知识（知识结构）三个语用范畴所构成的认知环境是社会中人所共享的东西。尽管人际的差异肯定存在，但是相似却是主流，否则人际间的交往就难以进行。认知语境又代表着社会团体所共有的集体意识，这种共有的集体意识在个人的知识结构里以“社会表征”(social representation)的方式储存下来，以协调人际间的行为和语言使用，使之适合社会、文化和政治环境。 莫里斯（Morris）把语用学看成是探讨语言符号与符号使用者关系的学科，格赖斯（Grice）、奥斯汀（Austin）等人认为符号信息和交际意图有关系，是由推理支撑的超符号关系。斯波伯（Sperber）和威尔逊（Wilson）逐渐把语言超符号关系的研究引入了认知的轨道。提出了“关联理论”。并且提出了关联理论两个原则。第一个原则（认知原则）认为人们的认知倾向于同最大关联相吻合。关联理论的第二个原则（交际原则）：交际行为都应该设想为它本身具有最佳关联。这两个原则突显了语境的重要性。 斯波伯和威尔逊的关联理论推理是福多认知模块论的改版，包括涉及一系列假设，命题或意象构成的表征（representations）的感知系统和涉及若干演绎逻辑运算（computations）规则处理系统。认知模块论认为，人的大脑是一个能形成和转换心理表征的原则运算系统，语言就是该系统的操作对象之一，而语言使用涉及到语言系统和其他心理表征以及运算系列的相互作用。 福多（J.Fodor）在他的《心理的模块性》（modularity of mind）中把心、脑从功能的角度划分为两个非常不同的部分——输入系统和中心系统，输入系统（最典型的是知觉系统和语言系统）的功能是将器官的功能所受刺激的信息转化为对外部对象的表征，使之成为适合于中心系统能加以处理的信息；而中心系统的功能则是专司推理、思维、和信念的高级处理系统。福多没有给出模块的定义，但是提供了构成一个模块的一组确定的标准。其中有两个重要的标准——领域特殊性和信息封闭性，其中领域特殊性是一个模块只处理与其特定的功能相适应的内容特殊化的信息。模块作为特殊化的“计算”机制，它只是计算那些受约束的“自下而上”的特定输入。仅仅关注与其特殊处理能力关联的信息。还有一个重要的标准是“信息封闭”（informational encapsulated）,也称为“认知的不可入性”（cognitive impenetrability），这是一个系统为“模块”的关键特性。模块除了它们自己专有的信息源之外不能利用其他任何东西。一个加工系统为模块，则它必须独立于主体背景的方式加工它的输入，也就是说它是封闭的。 斯波伯和威尔逊的关联理论认为，语言符号的运作或语言交际，不是Shannon和Weaver在1949年提出的“信息入码—信号—传递途径—接收—信息解码”的单一模式。她们从认知的角度出发，把语境定义为“一
战略管理理论的发展历史 了解+评价观点和核心思想 初次提出 战略管理一词最初是由美国学者安索夫于1976年在其所著《从朕略计划走向战略管理》一书中提出的。 早期战略思想阶段——迈克尔波特的竞争战略理论 在此阶段,虽没有出现完整的战略理论体系,但已产生了很精彩的战略思想,美国哈佛大学的迈克尔·波特教授对此作了精辟的概括,。 主要观点/主要内容 波特的竞争战略波特的竞争战略理论可以从五个方面理解：五力模型、三大战略、价值链、钻石体系、产业集群。 1、五力模型在其经典著作《竞争战略》中，他提出了行业结构分析模型，即所谓的“五力模型”，认为决定企业获利能力的首要因素是“产业吸引力”，企业在拟定竞争战略时，必须深入了解决定产业吸引力的竞争法则。竞争法则可以用五种竞争力来具体分析：行业现有的竞争状况、供应商的议价能力、客户的议价能力、替代产品或服务的威胁、新进入者的威胁。这五大竞争驱动力，决定了企业的盈利能力，并指出公司战略的核心应在于选择正确的行业，以及行业中最具有吸引力的竞争位置。 2、三大战略迈克尔·波特教授的竞争战略理论，企业的利润将取决于五力模型共同作用的结果。波特总结出了三种具有卓越成效的通用战略，即成本领先战略、差异化战略、业务聚焦战略，并指出了三大战略与五种竞争力量的关系，为企业制定战略提供了线路。 3、价值链价值链就是一套分析优势来源的基本工具。它可将企业的各种活动以价值传递的方式分解开来，借以了解企业的成本特性，以及现有与潜在的差异化来源。企业的各种活动既是独立的，也是互相联结的。企业应该根据竞争优势的来源，并透过了解组织结构与价值链、价值链内部的联结，以及它与供应商或营销渠道间的联结关系，制定一套适当的协调方式，而根据价值链需要设计的组织结构，有助于形成企业创造并保持竞争优势的能力。 4、钻石体系在企业竞争的成功上，国家扮演了重要的角色。因此，波特将他的研究更延伸到了国家竞争力上。针对这个主题，波特提出“钻石体系”（又称菱形理论）的分析架构。他认为可能会加强本国企业创造竞争优势的速度。包括：1、生产要素2、需求状况/3、企业的战略、结构和竞争对手/4、相关产业和支持产业表现。 钻石体系是一个动态的体系，它内部的每个因素都会相互拉推影响到其它因素的表现，同时，政府政策、文化因素和领导魅力等都会对各项因素产生很大的影响，如果掌握这些影响因素，将能形成国家的竞争优势。 5、产业集群区域的竞争力对企业的竞争力有很大的影响，波特通过对10个工业化国家的考察发现，产业集群是工业化过程中的普遍现象，在所有发达的经济体中，都可以明显看到各种产业集群。产业集群是指在特定区域中，具有竞争与合作关系，且在地理上集中，有交互关联性的企业、专业化供应商、服务供应商、金融机构、相关产业的厂商及其他相关机构等组成的群体。不同产业集群的纵深程度和复杂性相异。许多产业集群还包括由于延伸而涉及到的销售渠道、顾客、辅助产品制造商、专业化基础设施供应商等，政府和其他提供专业化培训、信息、研究开发、标准制定等的机构，以及同业公会和其他相关的民间团体。因此，产
[摘要]《武林外传》是近年来的热播电视剧, 该文将运用关联理论, 从语境的转变、听话者对说话者语意的故意曲解及其认知的局限三个方面阐述剧中幽默言语产生的内在原因。最后得出结论: 剧中的幽默言语并不仅是制笑机制, 更是一种体现作者交际意图的言语行为, 属语用范畴。 [关键词]幽默关联武林外传 1. 引言古装情景喜剧《武林外传》是由北京联盟影业投资有限公司于2005 年拍摄完成的。自2006 年春节前在央视八套首播以来,收视率一路飘红, 其中的经典台词在百度上可搜索出227000 项词条之多。它主要讲述了七侠镇同福客栈中发生的故事。客栈掌柜佟湘玉一口陕西方言, 为人善良却又小气抠门;“关中大侠”吕轻侯是一个不懂武功且书呆子气十足的穷酸秀才; 店小二白展堂虽享有“盗圣”称号却胆小如鼠; 一心想锄强扶弱、劫富济贫的郭芙蓉简直是古代版的野蛮女友。客栈中的这些性格迥异的人物引出了一连串戏谑生动、引人入胜的故事。该剧的幽默言语究竟有着怎样的魅力, 让喜欢它的人趋之若骛、奉若至宝? 本文试透过幽默言语的表层结构, 运用关联理论, 从语境、推理及认知三个方面来阐述该剧幽默言语的产生,探究其言语之所以博得笑声的内在理论根据。 2. 关联理论与幽默从日常生活方面来看, 幽默可以使我们获得的愉悦, 心情得到放松。从语用角度来说, 幽默是一种特殊的言语交际。语言本身并不幽默, 只有当其与具体语境、以及听者在认知过程中所做的推理相结合, 方能产生幽默效果。也就是说, 听话者感兴趣的是说话者的言外之意、
弦外之音。正如B lakemo re 所说:“事实上, 听话者很多时候注意的是言语意义而非字面意义。” 关联理论是关于言语交际方面的理论, 是Sperber 和W il2son (1986) 在Grice 的关系准则上发展起来的。关联理论包含认知原则和交际原则。认知原则认为“人类认知总倾向于最大关联”。即听者总是倾向于付出尽可能小的努力来获得最大的语境认知效果。而交际原则是指“每一个明示的交际行为都意味着该行为具有最佳关联性”, 即说话人表明说话意图, 听者付出充分有效的努力获得最佳的语境认知效果。人们交际的目的是寻求最佳关联, 而非最大关联。从关联理论的视角来看, 幽默效应来自最大关联与最佳关联间的反差。这也就是说, 由于“听话者在理解话语时可以假设话语总是最佳关联的”所以当听话者付出努力去寻找关联时,由于认知惰性及“省力原则”, 他尽可能少地付出认知努力获得了最大关联, 第一轮的推理过程到此结束。此时, 听话者认为言语已具有最佳关联, 但其实只是最大关联。之后, 这个最大关联将会被说话者进一步明示的交际意图所打破, 使听话者最初认定的关联一下子失效, 迫使听话者对说话者的意图再一次进行识别, 再一次付出努力, 最终寻找到最佳关联。正是这种最大关联与最佳关联间的反差, 导致了幽默言语的产生。反差越大, 在听话者认知上造成的落差越大, 越能出其不意, 幽默效果也就会越强。 3. 关联理论与《武林外传》中的幽默言语下面将运用关联理论, 从社交语境、听话者的推理及其认知三个方面来阐述《武林外传》中幽默言语的产
从关联理论解读翻译策略 摘要:关联理论认为话语的理解是一种包含示意和推理两方面的认知过程,听话人根据说话人的示意行为,结合语境假设,求得语境效果而获取说话人的交际意图,翻译也研究语言理解和语言表达。由于关联理论把翻译看作是一个交际过程,故译者应充分考虑译语环境下译文读者的认知能力,视具体情况采用顺应译语文体规约的归化策略或保留原文特色的注释性异化策略,以帮助译文读者找到原文与译文语境之间的最佳关联,达到最佳交际效果。 关键词:关联理论;最佳关联;语境;翻译 翻译是一种语言使用和交际活动,和日常语言活动所不同的只是它涉及到两种语言(始发语和目的语),是一种语际信息交流。翻译研究则是探讨译者解读原文、在译文中重构原文意义的学问。两者有着共同的研究对象,即语言理解和语言表达。所不同者,前者更重视口语交际及其动态特点,而后者所关心的是文本和书面语言。但是这种差异性并不妨碍翻译理论研究者借鉴语用学理论来探讨翻译活动。[1]近年来,语用学的众多理论被应用在翻译研究上,如Austin的言语行为理论、Grice的合作原则、Leech的礼貌原则、和Dawkins的模因论等对翻译研究都有极大的启示。我们不妨结合近年来语用学研究中的一大热点:关联理论,从认知的角度探讨关联理论如何指导译者选择恰当的应用翻译策略。 能否达成!互明(mutuallymanifest),达成了!互明就能获取!最佳语境效果,在信息和语境之间找到!最佳关联(optimalrelevance)。Sperber和Wilson认为交际中每一个人的认知环境由三种信息组成:逻辑信息(logicalinformation),百科信息(encyclopedicinformation),和词语信息(lexicalinformation)。上述三种信息组成的认知环境因人而异,对话语的推理自然就会得出不同的结果。因此,为达到交际成功,!互明成为关键,表现为交际双方对认知环境中的事实[3]127 或假设在心理上能否做出共同的认知和推断。以下母女两人的对话可以更清楚地说明这一点: Mother:Wouldyouliketogoshoppingwithmenow?Daughter:I?mwatching!Friends .Mother:What? Whencanyougowithme?Daughter:Mum,IsaidI?mstillwatchingTV.Mother:Then,whenwillitbeover? Daughter:Mygod! 女儿没有直接以yes或no来回答母亲的问话,而是采用了间接的答话方式。这里母亲不理解女儿的原因明显在于母亲的认知环境中没有!Friends 是一部情景连续喜剧并且女儿十分爱看这一语境信息,由此导致女儿意欲传递的信息意图!No,Idon?twanttogoshoppingnow. 并没能成功地传达给母亲。这一例子说明,交际成功与否并不仅仅取决于听话人能否解码,而更主要取决于交际者意欲传递的信息意图是否成功地示意给了交际对象,取决于交际对象是否选择了 [4]41正确的语境信息。所以,交际过程不仅仅是单纯的编码- 一、关联理论 Sperber和Wilson首先提出颇具影响力的关联理论(RelevanceTheory)。他们在批判地继承以互知(mutualknowledge)为理论依据的代码模式的基础上提出了交际的推理模式,将语用学研究的重点从话语的产出转移到话语的理解,指出语言交际是一个认知推理的互明过程,对话语的理解就是一种认知活动。 具体来说,关联理论把话语的理解看作是一种包含!示意(ostentation)和!推理(inference)两方面的认知过程(cognitiveprocess),是一个涉及信息意图和交际意图的示意推理过程(ostensive-inferentialprocess)。所谓!示意,是指说话人把信息意图展示出来这一过程,而所谓!推理,则指听话人根据说话人的示意行为,结合语境假设,求得语境效果而获取说话人的交际意图这一过程。 演绎推理的重要依据就是获取信息和语境的最佳关联
西方管理思想的发展历程与 人类的管理活动具有悠久的历史，形成了丰富的管理思想。西方管理思想是人类管理思想不断发展的结晶，在管理思想史上 具有重要的地位。考察西方管理思想的演变历程，有利于我们从中正确地吸收和消化西方先进的管理思想，实现我国管理科学的 跨越式发展。 1传统管理阶段 人类最早的管理活动是从原始家庭组织开始的，随着人类实践活动的不断扩展，社会组织结构也从简单到复杂不断发展，管理活动也随之扩展到社会各个领域。18世纪60年，以英国为 代表的西方国家开始了第一次产业革命，人们开始把科学思想运 用到管理过程中，出现了一批卓有贡献的思想家、经济学家和管理学家，进入了传统管理阶段，其代表人物有亚当斯密、查尔 斯巴贝奇和罗伯特欧文等。 (1)亚当斯密的劳动分工观点和经济人观点。斯密在17 7 6年发表《国富论》，认为劳动分工能带来劳动生产率的提高，并提出了经济人观点，认为人们在经济行为中追求的完全是私人利益。 (2)查尔斯巴贝奇的作业研究和报酬制度。巴贝奇183 2年发表《论机器与制造业的经济》，认为要提高工作效率，必须仔细研究工作方法，同时还提出了一种工资加利润的分配制度，为现代劳动工资制度的发展和完善做出了重要贡献。
(3)罗伯特欧文的人事管理。欧文提出要缩短工人的劳动 时间、提高工资、改善住房，并在自己的企业进行改革试验证明：重视人的作用、尊重人的地位可以使工厂获得更大利润。 在传统管理阶段，管理基本上处于积累经验阶段，为后来泰勒等人创立科学管理体系打下基础，开始从经验管理向科学管理的过渡。 2古典管理理论阶段 古典管理理论产生于19世纪末至20世纪20年代，该学派把管理分为三个主要职能———计划、组织、控制。古典管理理论主要包括科学管理理论和古典组织理论。 2．1 科学管理理论 这个管理学派认为可以从“科学”的观点去分析所干的工作和对劳动进行监督，通过客观事实分析并利用从经验中得到的数据应能找到进行工作的最好办法。 (1)泰勒的科学管理理论。泰勒1911年出版《科学管理原理》，奠定了科学管理理论的基石。其理论主要包括以下6 个方面：确定合理的工作标准；工作方法标准化；合理配备工人；差别计件工资制；实行职能工长制；例外管理。 (2)莉莲吉尔布雷思和弗兰克吉尔布雷思简化工作的原则。吉尔布雷思夫妇在动作研究和劳动简化方面取得了重大突破，并总结出了劳动中许多特征不同的分动作，提高了劳动效率。 3) 甘特工作计划的原则。甘特的贡献主要有：甘特图表、任务 奖金制度、非金钱因素论。甘特还认为，提高效率的最重要源泉是管理人员的工作方法而不是劳动者。
论话语标记语的功能与分类 摘要：话语标记语是一种新的词类，跟传统词类相比，它不表达 真值语义关系，只传达程序意义，具有“句法上的可选择性，交际中的不可或缺性”。本文尝试着从话语的三大要素——发话者、受话者及话语出发，对话语标记语的功能及分类进行初步的论述。 关键词：话语标记语；语用功能；分类 话语标记语（DMs）是一种常见的语言现象，它频繁出现在文学 作品、戏剧、影视和日常对话中，最近几十年得到了蓬勃发展。 一话语标记语的概念 话语标记语不属于任何传统词类，而是一种新的词类。传统语法词类中的词或词组都可能弱化成话语标记语，比如说连词（例如：不过，and, but, so等），副词（如:毕竟，那么，当然，well, therefore 等），感叹词（如：哎呀，嗯，oh, ah等），代词（这个，那个等），词组（如：as a result, on the contrary等），甚至小句（如：你知道，别说，you know, I mean等）。它与传统词类的区别在于话语标记语不 传达主题或语义所指含义，只传达程序意义。因此，话语标记语不充 当任何句子成分，可以归为虚词。 学者们，如Schiffrin（1987）、Blackmore（1987,2002）、Hōlker （1991）、Briton（1996）、Fraser（1990,1998）等，都对话语标记语
进行了深刻的研究。但其研究思路、研究视角各不相同，对于话语标 记语的定义、分类、功能等很难达成一致的看法，但话语标记语的一 些基本特征却是无可争议的，主要表现在以下几点： 1．话语标记语具有“句法上的可选择性，交际中的不可或缺性”； 2．话语标记语不表达真值语义关系，但对组织语篇和话语理解 有较大影响； 3．每一个话语标记语都具有多功能性，而其具体功能都是基于语境限定的。 笔者认为，话语标记语是一种特殊的开放性的新词类。按照语法功能分，属于虚词。与其他虚词不同的是：首先，话语标记语是一种 开放性的词类，而其它虚词是封闭性的；其次，除叹词和拟声词外， 其它虚词都有语法意义，其运用往往会牵涉到整个句子的结构，影响到整个句子的意思，而话语标记语没有语法意义，不影响句子结构， 但具有语用意义。因此，话语标记语也只能从语用功能出发，对其进 行研究探讨。 二话语标记语的功能 到目前为止，话语标记语的研究主线是其语用功能，不同语言之间的话语标记语的对比与翻译研究也应从语用功能着手。 Quirk认为，话语标记语在文本结构中起双重作用，即：给读者
Vol.31No.3 M ar.2010 第31卷第3期2010年3月赤峰学院学报（汉文哲学社会科学版） Journal of Chifeng University （Soc.Sci ）从关联理论看软新闻编译 张 锦 （西北师范大学 外国语学院，甘肃兰州 730070；河西学院英语系，甘肃 张掖 734000） 摘要： 编译是软新闻翻译的必要手段。本文结合实例，在关联理论框架内对软新闻编译进行解析，一方面旨在证明软新闻编译的合理性，另一方面是为软新闻翻译提供一个新的视角。 关键词：软新闻；编译；关联理论；添加；删减；译意；重构中图分类号：H315.9 文献标识码：A 文章编号：1673-2596（2010）03-0155-03 随着国际间对外传播活动的不断深入,软新闻 已成为世界各国宣传其社会和文化的窗口,其翻译的重要性日益凸显。软新闻自身独特的文体特点与对外传播的特殊目的及要求，决定了其翻译必须采取不同于其他文体的方法。大量成功的译例表明，“编译（adaption ）”这种反传统的译法已经作为一种主要的翻译手段，在软新闻翻译中得到了普遍的应用。本文拟从关联理论的角度对软新闻编译中一些常用的翻译方法展开解析，旨在彰显软新闻编译的合理性及关联理论对软新闻翻译的解释力和指导意义，希望能对软新闻翻译工作有所启发和裨益。 一、软新闻及其编译的必然性 软新闻在国外又被称作大众新闻，兴起于20-30年代的美国，是伴随新闻事业由早期商业报刊向大众化报业的发展而兴盛起来的一种新闻风 格。[1] “软新闻”相对于“硬新闻”而言，指那些人情味较浓，写得轻松活泼，易于引起受众感官刺激和阅读、视听兴趣，能产生“即时报酬”效应的新闻，社会新闻大致属于这类新闻。而与之相对的“硬新闻”是指题材较为严肃，着重于思想性、指导性和知识性的政治、经济、科技新闻，受众在阅读或视听这类新闻时只能产生“延缓报酬”效应。[2]软新闻以其突出的接近性、娱乐性和趣味性，吸引了众多的注意力，成为新闻改革后媒体竞争的重点。 软新闻作为新闻文体的一个分支,必然具备新闻的文体的以下特点：（1）用词新颖，精巧别致；（2） 句式多样，富于弹性；（3 ）巧用时态，布局呼应；（4）频繁使用被动语态，重点突出；（5）结构合理，层次分明；（6）善用修辞，讲究效果。[3]当然，它还具有其自身的一些特点：（1）在内容上，以反映社会、文化、生活、精神、道德等为主；（2）在写作动机上，以调动读者的阅读兴趣为目的；（3）在表现手法上，则讲求 轻松活泼和人情味。[4] 我们知道，软新闻翻译是为了 传播本国文化、增进其他国家对其了解而进行的信 息传递过程。为了使软新闻翻译在目标语中能够取得和原语中同样的传播效果及功能，译者需要针对软新闻自身的文体特点和翻译目的，考虑用适合于目标语读者的语言把原文的信息重新表达出来。由于汉、英两民族在语言系统、文化背景、意识形态、审美情趣等方面的差异,这种重新表达有时需要改变原语新闻的词法、句法甚至篇章结构，有时需要补偿或删减信息才能吸引读者，保证交际的顺利进 行，因而从严格意义上讲，这种翻译只能称为 “编译”。而另一方面，大量成功的译例表明，增删、重构等编译手段解决了因文化差异等因素而影响宣传效应的问题,在实践中收到了意想不到的效果,因此是必要的，受到了广大软新闻翻译工作者的青睐。如果能为软新闻翻译中的编译找到一个合理的理论依据，将其纳入一个成熟的理论体系来审视的话，则对软新闻翻译实践更具有启发和指导意义，还能为之建立一个完善的译文评价体系。在这一点上，关联理论给我们提供了一个很好的平台。 二、软新闻编译的理论依据―关联理论 关联理论是Sperber 和Wilson 在其合著的《关 联:交际与认知》一书中提出的涉及交际与认知的语用学理论。[5]他们认为,语言的交际是一个明示———推理过程，而不是传统交际理论的编码———解码过程。明示和推理是交际过程中的两个方面。从说话人的角度来说，交际是一种明示过程，即把信息意图明白地展现出来；而从听话人的角度来说，交际是一种推理过程，推理就是根据说话人的明示行为(话语等)，结合语境假设，求得语境效果，从而获得说话人的交际意图。而推理的依据就是关联。关联理论中的关联并不是一个绝对值,而是一个相对的概念。关联性的强弱取决于认知努力和语境效果。在同等条件下,认知努力越小,语境效果越 155--
《翻译与关联——认知与语境》总结 关联理论（Relevane Theory）最早是由Dan Sperber和Deirdre Wilson在《关联性：交际与认知》一书中提出来的，他们的学生Ernst-August Gutt根据关联理论对翻译进行了研究，并在五年后出版了《翻译与关联：认知与语境》（Translation and Relevace: Cognition and Context）。格特在此书中率先将关联理论应用于翻译研究中，并指出翻译是一种言语交际行为，是与大脑机制密切联系的推理过程。它不仅涉及语码，更重要的是根据动态的语境进行动态的推理，而推理所依据的就是关联性。作为交际的翻译，在对源语理解和翻译的过程中，人们对语码的选择所依赖的也是关联性。该书集中体现了格特的理论，他在关联理论的基础框架内探讨了翻译研究中颇具争议又引人注目的重要问题，既为翻译理论研究者深入清晰地阐述了观点，又为实践者提供了明确的指导。 该书一共有七章，在第一章开头的部分，格特首先引用Steiner，Levy，Kelly，Wilss等人的观点，指出当今翻译研究的现状是“mass of uncoordinated statements”，接着并给出了几点可能的原因；之后又对Hofmann，Wilss，Schulte 等人提出的“multidisciplinary scientific methodology research”这一新方案进行了批判，并进一步给出了当今翻译研究现状混乱不堪的三个根本原因：1. The risk of (multidisciplinary) disintegration. There is a question whether a comprehensive account of translation in the form of a coherent and homogeneous theory can ever be achieved. 2. The problem of determining the domain of the theory. Krings (1986) comments that the notion of translation is used to refer to a variety of rather different phenomena. There have been three major lines of approach to this issue: shared intuitions; definition; culture-oriented——但是这三种方法均存在明显的缺陷。紧接着，格特又批判了Toury 的观点：“the overall CONCEPT OF TRANSLATION underlying the corpus”。因为这一观点的结果是：the culture-specific approach does not really resolve the problem of defining the theoretical domain: either it leads to the abolition of the intercultural study of translation or it does in fact rely on non-culture-specific criteria for determining its domain.3. The problem of evalution and decision-making. 此处，格特还批判了Steiner，Newmark等人的观点，同时还挑战了Nida 的对等理论。另外，作者提出了两个问题：1）the problem of
西方行政学理论的发展历程 美国学者W·威尔逊1887年发表的《行政学之研究》标志着西方公共行政学的诞生，西方行政学至今已有百余年的历史。在这一个多世纪的发展和演变过程中，西方行政学者针对复杂多变的社会现实与行政现象，提出了不同的观点和主张，形成了众多的理论流派，行政学也发展成一门具有高度理论综合性和最具实践性的学科。一百多年来，行政学发展迅速，内容庞杂，流派众多，但在其发展中却始终贯穿着一条深层的主线——合法性和合理性的趋向。西方行政学主要有三个基本阶段。 西方行政学发展的第一阶段。 从19世纪末到20世纪三四十年代，其主要代表人物是威尔逊、古德诺、韦伯、法约尔和怀特等人。这一时期的主要贡献是确立了行政学的学科地位并使其理论化和系统化。这一时期的行政学家继承了早期行政学的基本信念，认为“真正的民主与真正的效率是统一的”，经济和效率是行政管理的基本准则。将官僚制度及其组织和管理问题作为研究重点，力图通过对行政现象的科学分析，发现行政管理的原则和规律，并尝试着为行政学确立一个基本的理论模式和学科体系。泰勒的科学管理理论和法约尔的行政管理理论以及韦伯的官僚制理论、都在行政学理论体系的形成过程中起到了重要作用。 威尔逊：行政学创始人，《行政学研究》，主张政治与行政分离，建立一门独立的行政学科；? 古德诺：美行政学家，《政治与行政》，对政治与行政的分离理论作了进一步发挥；法约尔：法管理学者，〈一般管理原理〉，提出了一般管理的一些基本原理（十四管理原则） 韦伯，官僚制理论的奠基人，〈论官僚制〉；
怀特：撰写第一本行政学教科书〈行政学导论〉； 古利克：从分工与整合、全体与部分关系入手提出了分工的局限性和工作协调的重要性，对公共行政作综合研究； 厄威尔：对行政管理的原则进行了归纳和概括，与古利克合着〈行政科学论文集〉；福莱特：创立了动态管理理论，为正统行政学向行为主义行政学的过渡架设了桥梁。 西方行政学的产生和发展是与西方的科学管理运动密切相关的，在某种意义上说，正是科学管理运动的兴起，才促成了西方行政学的形成和兴盛。可见，西方行政学在提出和创立阶段就具有科学化和合理化的因素。1912年泰勒出版了着名的《科学管理》一书，在书中他强调应当实施新的科学化的管理方法和制度，“向管理要效率”并进而提出了着名的科学管理理论。因此，我们说，在某种意义上，正是泰勒的科学管理理论在西方行政学上的运用，“使其在一开始就具有了科学化和合理化的色彩”。然而，理论总是在发展变化的，迟早会与时代和生产力的发展显现出不相适合的地方。尽管泰勒的科学管理理论具有科学性和合理性的一面，但是因其研究的是作业现场的操作效率问题，这就使其理论不可避免的缺乏“一般性”的特征。 继泰勒之后，法约尔受到科学管理原理思想的影响，同时又改进了泰勒看待管理问题的角度，进一步将管理定义为“就是实行计划、组织、指挥、协调和控制”，他还确定了14条管理原则和管理五要素说。其理论不仅是用于企业界，而且被政府管理机关所普遍采用，正因为法约尔理论具有的“一般性”，使他成为“直到本世纪上半叶为止，欧洲贡献给管理运动的最杰出的人物”。但是，他在“管人”的问题上，同泰勒一样主张以纪律进行经常性的监督，所以他的组织理论也没有摆脱“机械模式”。 20世纪三十年代德国的社会学家马克斯·韦伯创立了官僚制的组织理论，这使他
2013年11月 第6期浙江外国语学院学报JOUＲNAL OF ZHEJIANG INTEＲNATIONAL STUDIES UNIVEＲSITY November 2013No．6 收稿日期：2013－09－10 基金项目：国家社会科学基金项目（13BYY007）；教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目（11YJA740125） 作者简介：徐蕾（1991－），女，浙江余杭人，杭州市余杭区闲林小学教育集团教师；周明强（1956－），男，浙江安吉人，浙江外国语学院中国语言文化学院教授，文学博士。 汉语话语标记语“等于说”的语用功能 徐蕾1，周明强 2（1.杭州市余杭区闲林小学教育集团，浙江杭州311121； 2.浙江外国语学院中国语言文化学院，浙江杭州310012） 摘 要：“等于说”是具有明显的语用功能的话语标记语，它在语篇连贯和人际认知方面 都有特定的功能。在语篇连贯方面，视“等于说”出现位置的不同，分别具有延续和转换话轮的功能；在引导人们理解话语意义方面，“等于说”具有详述解释和话题化的语用功能。在人 际认知方面 ，“等于说”具有强化和监控认知语境的功能，视听说双方对背景信息掌握情况的不同，“等于说”可采用不同的话语标记语使用模式。 关键词：话语标记语 ；“等于说”；话题化；语用功能中图分类号：H14文献标识码：A 文章编号：2095－2074（2013）06－0009－07 日常口语交际过程的随意性、交际双方的互动性、语境假设具有的动态性，造成了语言表达的不 连贯性和不完整性。因而说话人常常要根据语境的动态变化、 听话人的认知心理有意识地选择简单的话语表达式、语音停顿等语用机制来辅助完成理想的表达。话语标记就是这类语用机制中的一种。“从交际功能上说，它能提供理解说话者与命题内容之间关系的信息，引导和制约听话人对话语的意 义作出正确理解。”［1］研究话语标记在话语表达中所发挥的特有的语用功能，对于揭示交际主体的认 知心理轨迹， 还原话语的实际语用含义有着重要的意义。“等于说”就是具有这种语用功能的一种话语标记语。廖秋忠早在1992年论述换言连接成分定义时，就对“等于说”“换句话说”等话语标记语有 过讨论，认为这类连接成分主要是用来“明确表达语言片段之间在语义上的种种传承关系”［2］，可见 “等于说”作为话语标记语早就引起了学者的注意。但是，对“等于说”作为话语标记语的语用功能，到目前为止，很少有人再作进一步的深入讨论。本文从语用的角度对汉语话语标记语“等于说”展开 讨论，考察话语标记语“等于说”的基本特征、使用模式，以及在语篇连贯和人际认知方面所发挥的语 用功能。 一、“等于说”的基本特征 吕叔湘在《现代汉语八百词》中将“等于”［3］168和“说”［3］510均定为动词，“等于说”就是由两个动词 凝固而成的短语形式。在两个动词凝聚成短语的过程中，“等于”和“说”的意义都随之消失，并不表 示实际的意义。在自然口语中，“等于说”已经不再单纯地表示逻辑语义关系，而只用作辅助小句或段 落的衔接，出现了弱化现象，其作用类似一个连词。例如①： （1）后来到初一，等于说獉獉獉 五年级到六年级呀之间，六年级根本没上，直接上的初一。（摘自国家语