Cognitive Linguistics and linguistic typology
Johan van der Auwera and Jan Nuyts
University of Antwerp
0. Introduction
This chapter looks into the relations between Cognitive Linguistics and linguistic typology. The first half of the chapter offers a ‘neutral’ characterization of the field of linguistic typology. Linguistic typology is defined as a cross-linguistic, descriptive as well as explanatory enterprise devoted to the unity and diversity of language with respect to linguistic form or the relation between linguistic form and meaning or function. The second half is devoted to an exploration of the relations between linguistic typology and Cognitive Linguistics. It is argued that the two strands are eminently compatible, that there is work that illustrates this, but also that most cognitive linguists and typologists nevertheless work in different spheres. In a first section we discuss the difficulty of applying typology’s sampling method in Cognitive Linguistics. In a second one, we focus on the typologists’ prime orientation on grammar and their hesitation to relate their strictly speaking linguistic generalizations to wider cognitive concerns.
1. What is linguistic typology?
The term ‘linguistic typology’ is rather general. It could be taken to mean no more than the investigation of linguistic types. Linguistic types appear when the linguist has classified linguistic
entities in virtue of a similarity. In this sense, any linguistic discipline counts as typology. In morphology, for instance, prefixes and suffixes can be said to be entities of the same type, called ‘affixes’; and affixes and roots or stems are also entities of the same type, called ‘morphemes’. In sociolinguistics, most Australian languages and most native American languages are of the same type: they are all threatened languages. Or in historical linguistics one can say that Norwegian and Danish are languages of the Germanic type. In reality, however, the term ‘linguistic typology’ is used in a narrower way. Although, in part as a result of the generality of the literal meaning just described, there are various controversies as to its exact nature, the definition in (1) captures at least its most central concerns.
(1) Linguistic typology is a cross-linguistic (a) description (b) and explanation (c) of the unity
and diversity of languages (d) with respect to linguistic form (e) or the relation between linguistic form and meaning/function (f).
In the above definition, six features are singled out. We will discuss them in some detail.
Saying that linguistic typology should be cross-linguistic—feature (a)—means that observations should be based on a wide variety of languages. In principle, one cannot do typology on the basis of one language, not even if the language is a conglomerate of divergent dialects. Also, in studies of only a handful of languages one does not usually speak about ‘typology’, but about ‘contrastive linguistics’. The languages selected should furthermore constitute a sample. The size of the sample (which can vary considerably—cf. the 22 languages of Xrakovskij ed. 2001 on imperatives to the 272 of Siewierska 1999 on verbal agreement) is geared towards being representative of the variation in the totality of the world’s language. Of course, representative-ness is not solely a matter of sample size. Typologists now have increasingly better methods to
control for genetic or areal bias—i.e. the danger of taking too many languages of (respectively) the same family or the same area—and even for typological bias—i.e. the danger of taking too many languages of which it is already known that they are typologically similar (see Dryer 1999; Rijkhoff & Bakker 1998; Croft 2003: 19-28).
As to feature (b), typologists first of all need to describe the facts. This is less obvious than it may sound, however. Descriptions are based on analytic concepts, which are unavoidably inspired by theories. Hence no description can be fully theory-independent. This is a matter of degree, however. In extreme cases, descriptions can vary tremendously, to the point even of being incomprehensible to any but linguists of the same theoretical persuasion. Since typological descriptions should be useful to linguists of diverse theoretical orientations, however, it is essential to reduce their theory-dependence as much as possible. A version of this aim for neutrality coupled to an aversion to the current proliferation of linguistic theories has been called “basic linguistic theory” by Dixon (1997: 128-135).
Before we turn to feature (c), concerning explanation, let us clarify what it is that should be described. Feature (d) states that typologists are looking for the unity and diversity of languages. Typologists describe how languages differ, but at the same time also how they are similar or even identical, relative to one or more parameters. Features characterizing all languages are called ‘universals’. There are what may be called ‘absolute universals’, which apply to all languages, as illustrated in (2), and there are non-absolute or ‘statistical’ universals, which hold true of most languages, as illustrated in (3).
(2) a.All languages have nouns and verbs. (Whaley 1997: 59)
b.All languages have stops. (Maddieson 1984: 39)
(3)Most languages have either an SOV or an SVO basic word order. (Tomlin 1986: 22)
The universals in (2) and (3) make a claim about a property that does not depend on any other property of language, i.e. they are not ‘conditional’ or—the preferred term—not ‘implicational’. But there are also implicational universals, and it is these that have been most prominent in the last few decades. They too, can be absolute or statistical. (4) gives examples of absolute implicational universals.
(4) a.If a language has a dominant VSO word order, it will have prepositions. (Greenberg
1963: 78)
b.If a language has NP internal agreement, then the agreement features may include case,
but not person. (Lehmann 1988: 57)
Particularly interesting about an implicational universal is that it does not only tell us about unity but also about diversity. (4a), for instance, implies three subsets of possible languages:
(5) a.dominant VSO order and prepositions
b.no dominant VSO order and prepositions
c.no dominant VSO order and no prepositions
In logical terms, this kind of universal is a material implication. There are three situations that make it true: antecedent true and consequent true; antecedent false and consequent true; antecedent false and consequent false. Hence postulating this kind of universal goes hand in hand with a classification of languages. An implicational universal does rule out one situation, of
course, viz. that of a true antecedent and a false consequent. Thus, (4a) rules out the combination in (5d).
(5) d.dominant VSO order and no prepositions
Actually, typologists now believe that languages of type (5d) do exist, after all (see Song 2001: 46). This means that the universal in (4a) is statistical only and, in fact, the more typical universal has now become the statistical one (Dryer 1998). Of course, this observation in no way diminishes the value of the universal. On the contrary, typologists must now explain both the very strong tendency to rule out (5d), as well as the fact that some languages can nevertheless withstand this tendency.
This takes us to feature (c) of the definition in (1), viz. explanation. Do typologists also attempt to explain the regularities they observe? They do, but in some corners of linguistics their explanations are taken to be of negligible or insufficient quality. The reason is that explanation requires a theory, and not all theories are compatible. As stated before, most typological descriptions aim to be relatively theory-neutral and to offer ‘descriptive’ or ‘empirical’observations, of the kind in (2)-(4). These generalizations can then serve as input for various theories. In a simple world, then, the typologists could be deliverers of data, and it is up to theoreticians to explain these. But in the actual world, the division of labor is not that simple. In modern typology, most typologists attempt to explain the data themselves, and this part of the work is not theory-neutral at all. In terms of the current sharp division in linguistics between
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formalist and functionalist paradigms, typologists tend to be functionalists. As a consequence, the non-typological theoretician of the functionalist brand will usually not only appreciate the data from the typologist, but also his/her theoretical considerations. But the formalist non-
typological theoretician will usually at best be grateful for the data but feel free to neglect the typologist’s theory.
What can a ‘typological explanation’ be, then? Let us first discuss two features which it should not have, at least not according to many typologists: it cannot rely on ‘genetic inheri-tance’, and it cannot be ‘areal’. Both elements require some elaboration.
First, saying that typological explanation cannot rely on ‘genetic inheritance’ means that a similarity between languages cannot be accounted for by simply referring to the hypothesis that they inherited it from a common ancestor language. (Note that this only concerns genetic inheritance per se, and not genetic/diachronic explanation in general—see below). For example, part of the reason why both modern Danish and modern Dutch have two types of preterite—with a dental suffix or with a stem vowel change—is that the parent language had them too. Or, most Tibeto-Burman languages are verbfinal and postpositional, and they may have inherited this from Proto-Sino-Tibetan (DeLancey 1987: 806). But of course, these observations as such cannot be the whole story, for languages do also easily discard part of their inheritance, viz. through language change. The essential question is: why do languages (ancestors and inheritors) have such features, and why did they or did they not keep them in diachronic change?
We are touching here upon the issue of the borderline between linguistic typology and historical linguistics. Languages obviously change in a relatively orderly fashion, and so one can study types of language change. Does this fall within the purview of typology, or should one keep this as part of the subject-matter of historical linguistics? Both views are represented in the literature. The main spokesman for ‘diachronic typology’ is Croft (1990: 203-245, 2003: 212-279). Most typologists, however, do not use this terminology. Instead, they see typology as relevant for historical linguistics, but prefer to talk in terms of an application of typology to the concerns of the historical linguist (e.g. Comrie 1981: 194-218; Song 2001: 297-317). And they
also accept the relevance of historical linguistics to the concerns of the typologist. In particular, they allow regularities of linguistic change as explanatory of synchronic universals. Heine (1997), for instance, in a typological study of the expression of possession, explains much of the synchronic variation in his data diachronically: the attested expression types are stages of
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universal grammaticalization chains. (See also Svorou 1994, this volume.) Second, at least according to many typologists, typological explanation should not be ‘areal’. In an areal explanation, a similarity between languages is hypothesized to be due to contact between them, often through bilingualism. In the Balkans, Romanian, Bulgarian, Macedonian, Albanian, and Greek either have no infinitives at all or do not make much use of them. This feature is not due to inheritance, but probably results from contact convergence. There are several other features of this kind that characterize the Balkan languages, e.g. the postposed definite article or the pronominal doubling of objects. One could say that these features define a ‘Balkan language type’, and since Trubetzkoy (1930) the name for this kind of clustering is Sprachbund. Now, since a Sprachbund can be said to define a type of language, it is no surprise that one finds the term ‘areal typology’ employed in this connection. But not everybody favors this term, the reason being that linguistic typology in general is definitionally devoted to the study of all the languages of the world. Nevertheless, the employment of the term ‘areal typology’is on the increase, no doubt because typologists are becoming increasingly aware of the importance of contact as a source of explaining similarity (see Dryer 1989; Nichols 1992; witness also the resurrection of Whorf’s 1941 ‘Standard Average European’—Haspelmath 2001).
If genetic inheritance and contact interference may be excluded as typological explanations, what factors can be used then to explain similarities and differences and be considered typological? We can distinguish two types: internal and external ones. An internal explanation accounts for linguistic properties with reference to other linguistic properties. For instance, if a
language has ‘object-verb’ (OV) as its unmarked word order, one may want to explain this with the following set of assumptions: (i) many elements of grammar are either heads or dependents, (ii) in the relation between a verb and its objects, the objects are dependents and the verb is the head, and (iii) in that language, heads generally or always follow dependents, i.e. it has a dependent-head order.
Any explanation may itself be in need of explanation, however, and that is where external explanation comes in, i.e. explanation in terms of non-linguistic factors. For example, assuming that the above internal explanation is correct, one should ask why languages would prefer dependent-head orders or, the opposite, head-dependent orders. Two types of answers have been offered in this connection. A first type refers to our genetic make-up—the approach defended by generative linguists. Thus, Kayne (1994) takes the VO order to be innate. This explanation is external since the genetic make-up of the human being is not itself a linguistic property. In the second type of answer, a preference for dependent-head or head-dependent ordering is related to language processing: consistency in this ordering pattern may be argued to make the language easier to produce and to comprehend (e.g. Dryer 1992; Hawkins 1994). Again, one can push the explanation further and ask why word order consistency should be easier from a processing point of view. Ultimately, the reference must again be to genes, the ones that are responsible for the human language processor, but these genes are typically not taken to be inherently linguistic.3 Typology describes and explains unity and diversity of languages, but unity and diversity in what? Features (e) and (f) of our definition in (1) characterize two possible answers. One possibility is that the typologist only studies form—feature (e). The typologist can thus study the phonetic inventories of languages. The description and explanation of nasal vowels, for instance, may well go on in complete abstraction from issues of meaning or function. The other possibility is that the typologist studies both form and meaning/function—feature (f). Quantitatively, this
orientation characterizes the bulk of modern typology. Relative clauses, tense-aspect-modality marking, comparatives, or number—to name just a few examples—are topics which have engaged the typologists in both matters of meaning/function and of form (see e.g. Lehmann 1984; Dahl 1985; Corbett 2001). In this kind of study, it is typically the (grammatical) meaning or function which defines the topic of investigation. For example, one first describes the role of relative clauses, and one then tries to find out what the strategies are which languages employ to realize this meaning/function in their grammar. But to some extent the alternative perspective is possible, too. One can, for instance, define the verb-initial sentence format and then go on to study its semantic/functional potential across languages. The problem is that the formal definition of the verb-initial sentence presupposes that one knows what a verb is, and this problem must ultimately bring in semantic/functional considerations again (cf. Croft 2003: 17-18 on the distinction between what he calls ‘external’ and ‘derived structural’ definitions).
At this point it is useful to come full circle and return to the notion of ‘type’, which we started out with. Many people will associate linguistic typology with an attempt to classify languages. In fact, historically, linguistic typology started as a discipline about ‘language types’—more specifically morphological types, aiming to classify languages as fusional, agglutinative or isolating. Yet, the foregoing exposition has been, and current linguistic typology generally is, about ‘types’ of strategies or expressive devices which languages use to realize certain grammatical functions: types of relativization strategies, types of tense-aspect-modality systems, types of expressions of comparison, and so on. Did typology change its agenda? Not really. For any one grammatical function, languages may use more than one ‘type’ of strategy. Thus a language may have both prenominal and postnominal relative clauses, for instance. Or, in terms of basic word orders, a language may exhibit both an SVO and an SOV pattern. But it is of course also possible that a language only allows one type of strategy, or that there is a reason for
considering one type as the unmarked one. To that extent, the language as such can be said to be of a certain type, say the prenominal relative type or the SVO type. This demonstrates how easy it is to go from statements about strategies or expression types to statements about language types (see also Whaley 1997: 8).
2. Linguistic typology and Cognitive Linguistics
As explicated in full length elsewhere in this volume, Cognitive Linguistics (in the narrow sense, as a specific part of the wider field of cognitively oriented linguistics) can be characterized as a (conglomerate of more or less closely associated) theoretical perspective(s) on language, which assume(s) a functional perspective on language, and which aim(s) to discover the cognitive principles and systems behind language use, both regarding language structure and regarding semantic/conceptual structure (with a focus on the latter). If one compares this characterization with the description of the field of linguistic typology in section 1 above, it is clear that these two branches of linguistics are, in principle, highly compatible. Still, to a considerable extent the two ‘live their own life’, at least in part due to practical circumstances and/or differences in their research interests. Relations and divergences between them can be considered at two levels: the methodological level and the theoretical level.
2.1. The methodological level: The use of typological data
As appears from section 1, linguistic typology involves a method of sample-based data collection.
Nothing in Cognitive Linguistics bars the use of such data. On the contrary, since a considerable portion of what cognitive linguists are investigating concerns notions and principles which are assumed or hypothesized to be essential parts of our conceptual and/or linguistic apparatus (metaphor, mental spaces, frames and constructions, etc.), it is crucial to test their universality and variability against the facts of a representative sample of the world’s languages (or rather, the linguistic behavior of users of a representative sample of languages from all over the world). In practice, however, the use of truly typological data by cognitive linguists is rare (exceptions aside, see below). Surely, some of the notions figuring centrally in Cognitive Linguistics have been applied to individual languages other than English, including typologically unrelated ones—cf., e.g., Alverson (1994), Emanatian (1995), Goddard (1996), or Yu (1998) on (aspects of) metaphor theory, or Casad and Langacker (1985), Poteet (1987), Tuggy (1988), Langacker (1998), on aspects of Langacker’s (1987, 1991) Cognitive Grammar; and see also some contributions in Hiraga et al. (1999) and in Casad and Palmer (2003). But, according to the norms of current typological linguistics, to the extent that this research compares languages, it typically counts as cross-linguistic rather than as typological.
But some work in Cognitive Linguistics does count as typology. The best illustration is 4
Talmy’s (2000). Throughout his work, Talmy makes frequent reference to different languages. (His PhD-thesis—Talmy 1972—already involved a detailed comparison of semantic notions in English and Atsugewi, an Indian language of Northern California. Correspondingly, his work has been taken very seriously by typologists, witness among others his 1978a, b contributions to the seminal series Universals of human language edited by Greenberg.) For typologists the best-known part of it concerns his distinction between two ‘types’ of languages in terms of how they express event structure, viz. ‘verb-framed’ vs. ‘satellite-framed’ languages (Talmy 1985, 1991). This distinction, originally developed in order to account for differences in the expression of
motion events, has been extended later to cover other types of events as well. But let us—for the sake of simplicity—confine the presentation to motion events here. In strongly simplified terms,5 if (a path of) motion is expressed jointly with a further specification of its circumstances or properties, such as its cause or manner, then languages can do two things. Verb-framed languages express the motion itself in the main verb, and express the additional property in a satellite (or what others would call an adverbial constituent) attached to the clause; satellite-framed languages, on the other hand, will express the motion itself in a satellite (often with the help of an adposition expressing motion), and will express the additional property in the main verb. Consider Talmy’s (2000, vol. 2: 223-224) original example in (6), comparing English as a moderate example of a satellite-framed language and Spanish as a good example of a verb-framed language.
(6) a.English:
The bottle floated out.
b.Spanish:
La botella salió flotando.
In the English example, the satellite out expresses the motion (the path), and the main verb expresses the manner of the motion. In Spanish, on the other hand, the main verb expresses the motion (again the path), and the manner is expressed in a satellite (here a gerund). Talmy himself illustrated this difference by means of several languages, and its typological relevance has been worked out further by other researchers, esp. by Slobin (1996a, b, 2003) (and see Pederson this volume on its implications for the linguistic relativity hypothesis).6
One of the reasons why typological research in Cognitive Linguistics is rare, however, is no
doubt the fact that existing grammars and grammatical descriptions of languages—which constitute an important source of information for current typological research—do not offer information on many of the conceptual semantic notions central to cognitive linguistic theorizing. Consequently, a typological investigation of these notions has to start with the bare essentials of collecting first-hand information on the languages in one’s sample, and even if this concerned only a dozen of them, this would be an enormous undertaking, let alone if one wanted to work according to the tendency in current typological linguistics to aim for samples of several hundred languages. So it appears unavoidable to first have an intensive phase of systematic comparative or cross-linguistic research, in which the primary data for different singular languages are collected, before a truly typological approach to the notions at stake will be feasible.7
2.2. The theoretical level: The presence of explicit cognitive concerns
Since both cognitive linguists and (most) typologists take a functionalist perspective on their subject matter, there is no principled incompatibility between them at this level either. There is a difference between them, however, in terms of their ‘cognitive concerns’. Few typologists will deny that the notions they use in their accounts of the typological data—especially the semantic or functional ones—are relevant for cognitive theorizing, and at least have the potential to be cognitively plausible. They would furthermore accept that an external explanation referring to language processing or language acquisition can be called ‘cognitive’ as well. The point is, though, that most typologists are interested only in the linguistic aspects of their findings, and do not wish or dare to make explicit claims about or arguments for how they ought to be incorporated in a cognitive theory, nor try to relate them to non-linguistic dimensions of human
cognition.
This ‘cognitive modesty’ of most typologists no doubt has to do with the fact that they have their roots in ‘traditional’ functionalist theories of grammar—e.g. in various streams of the functionalist ‘underground’ in the North American linguistics of the mid to late 20th Century, or in traditional schools in European functionalism—which (at least originally) had no cognitive ambitions. Surely, some cognitive linguistic notions—and the corresponding cognitive linguistic way of thinking about the phenomena involved—have made their entrance in the theoretical considerations of certain typologists, but on the whole, typologists do not often draw on cognitive linguistic theories. And this, in turn, is no doubt related to the ‘topical orientation’ of current typological research. As indicated in section 1, current typology is predominantly concerned with describing and explaining structural (grammatical) phenomena in languages, such as word order, relativization strategies, or morphosyntactic or morphological phenomena such as tense-aspect-modality marking, and these are issues which are much more central to traditional functionalist theories than to (most) theories of the cognitive linguistic brand. Or at least, such phenomena have received much more attention in the former than in the latter: in principle, of course, the more grammar oriented branches of Cognitive Linguistics—such as Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar, or (the cognitively oriented versions of) Construction Grammar—offer a framework in which all these phenomena can be described and explained as well. Maybe, the latter are simply too ‘young’ to have been able to substantially influence linguistic typology yet—and this may obviously change in the future. In fact, in the recent literature there are already signs of developments in that direction, among others in the work of Heine, and even more so in the Radical Construction Grammar of Croft’s (2001) (and see also Helmbrecht 1997).
Thus, Heine has adopted the cognitive linguistic notion of ‘event schemas’ and has developed it into an influential ‘explanatory tool’ for typological analysis. Perhaps the best illustration is
his work on possession (Heine 1997). One cross-linguistically frequent strategy to express that ‘X possesses Y’ is to say that ‘Y is at X’s place’, or to use a construction that historically derives from the latter. Russian is a case in point.
(7)U menja kniga.
at me book
‘I have a book.’
‘Y is at X’s place’ is the “event schema”. For Heine (1997: 225) event schemas “are part of the universal inventory of cognitive options to humans”. As such they assume a wider relevance than just a linguistic one: “they appear to be but one manifestation of a more general cognitive mechanism that is recruited for understanding and transmitting experience” (Heine 1997: 222).
One of the notions central to Croft’s Radical Construction Grammar is that of the ‘semantic map’. The idea comes from typology, but as the title of the introduction to this volume suggests, it appeals to cognitivists other than Croft as well. A brief discussion of this notion will allow us to clarify the difference between an innocuous and an outspoken cognitive perspective on typology.
Semantic maps have become an increasingly important tool for representing essential typological facts, viz. cross-linguistic similarity and difference. The essential idea underlying the semantic map model is that linguistic elements are similar because the meanings or functions they encode are similar. Consider the sentences in (8), and more particularly the meanings of the modal verb must.
(8) a.To get to the garden you must go through the kitchen.
b.Mary must be home now.
(8a) expresses a ‘situational necessity’: there is something in the situation, viz. the design of the house, that necessitates a walk through the kitchen to achieve the goal of reaching the garden.(8b) expresses a strong inference or (near) certainty. ‘Situational necessity’ and strong inference or (near) certainty are by no means the same concepts, yet they are related. For a strong inference or (near) certainty is also a kind of necessity, even if in a different sphere, viz. an ‘epistemic’ or ‘inferential’ (or ‘evidential’) one: there is evidence which necessitates the speaker of (8b) to believe that Mary is home now (in ‘logical’ terms: the premisses are sufficient relative to the conclusion, and the conclusion is necessary relative to the premisses). Clearly, in English the 8auxiliary must can be used for both kinds or dimensions of necessity. In the Tungusic language Evenki, however, this is not the case: it has a marker for situational necessity, viz. the suffix -mAchin , and another one for epistemic necessity, viz. the suffix -nA .
(9) a. Minggi girki -v
ilan -duli chas -tuli suru -mechin -
in.my friend -1SG.POSS three -PROL hour -PROL go.away -SITNEC -
3SG ‘My friend must go/leave in three hours.’
b. Su tar asatkan -me sa:-na -
s.
you that girl -ACC.DEF know -EPISTNEC -
2PL
‘You must know that girl.’
(Nedjalkov 1997: 264, 265, 269)
We now have a mini-typology of languages: there are two types, viz. those that have a grammatical form that can express both situational and epistemic necessity, and those that do not
have such a form. We also have a mini-map.
(10)situational necessity——epistemic necessity
Situational and epistemic necessity occupy two distinct points in what could be called ‘semantic space’. But these points are related: hence the connecting line. On this map we can plot the meanings of English must and of Evenki -mAchin and -nA.
(11)situational necessity——epistemic necessity
must
(12)situational necessity——epistemic necessity
-mAchin-nA
The criterion for assigning a separate position to situational and epistemic necessity on the map is inherently cross-linguistic. If all modal necessity markers in all languages were like English must, the semantic map would feature only ‘necessity’ as such. It is only because there is at least one language that has separate grammatical forms for situational vs. epistemic necessity that the two deserve a separate position. Of course, even for English must, linguists may be convinced that situational and epistemic necessity describe two different meanings of must, and that English must is polysemous (e.g. Palmer 1979). But there are also linguists that claim that English must has the same meaning in (8a) as in (8b) and that the difference is only pragmatic and concerns different functions or uses (e.g. Perkins 1983). For semantic map making, polysemy vs. monosemy decisions are irrelevant: the polysemist will consider the map in (10) as showing
two separate meanings, and the monosemist two uses of the same meaning, yet they can collaborate in their typology.
The field of modality is, of course, much more complex than shown in (10) to (12). The more complete map has to relate necessity to possibility, it has to introduce additional types of modality and/or distinguish subtypes of situational and epistemic modality (e.g. the ‘obligation’use of English must), it has to account for intermediary values in some of the modality types (e.g. degrees of epistemic probability), and it also has to relate the modal concepts to non-modal ones (a proposal for a more complete map is made in van der Auwera and Plungian 1998). Whatever the complexity of the resulting map, however, the strategies that languages use to encode the meanings or uses have to cover contiguous portions of the map. This has been called the ‘adjacency requirement’ (van der Auwera and Plungian 1998: 111-114) or ‘connectivity hypothesis’ (Croft 2001: 96). Consider the abstract maps in (13).
(13) a.meaning/use 1meaning/use 2meaning/use 3
b.meaning/use 1meaning/use 2meaning/use 3
c.meaning/use 1meaning/use 2meaning/use 3
The constellations in (13a) and (13b) are predicted to be possible, and the one in (13c) is taken to be impossible. If a marker can be used for two meanings or uses that are not contiguous, it must also be usable for any intermediate meaning or use. It it in part because of their strong predictive power and their falsifiability that typologists have grown to like them.9 Despite the success of the semantic map idea, it is of interest to note that their ontological
status is not quite clear. Strikingly, the maps are not always simply called ‘semantic’ (as in Kemmer 1993, 2003; Stassen 1997; van der Auwera & Plungian 1998; Haspelmath 2003). In
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Haspelmath (1997), they are called ‘implicational’, in Kortmann (1997) ‘cognitive’, in Anderson (1986) ‘mental’, and in Croft (2001, 2003) ‘conceptual’ (in the latter with the further complication that he calls ‘spaces’ what are here called ‘maps’ and that he reserves the term ‘map’ for any construction-specific region of the map). For some linguists, the choice for a more cognitive rather than a more linguistic label does not matter much. For instance, Kortmann’s ‘cognitive maps’ lie within ‘semantic space’ and he would not mind the term ‘polysemy chains’(Kortmann 1997: 177) either. Conversely, the use of the more linguistic terminology may go hand in hand with a cognitive perspective. Kemmer (2003: 90), for instance, who sticks to the ‘semantic map’ label, proposes to call the enterprise involving them ‘cognitive typology’, and the categories which she proposes are supposed to be not only fundamental for linguistic semantics but to pertain to “deeper levels of conceptualization”. For this reason she is also interested in non-linguistic evidence, such as found in the the behavior of pre-linguistic infants (Kemmer 2003: 98). The same perspective is embraced by Croft (2001: 105): “conceptual space [i.e. the totality of semantic maps] presents a universal structure of conceptual knowledge for communication in human beings” or again, “a geography of the human mind, which can be read in the facts of the world’s languages in a way that the most advanced brain scanning techniques cannot ever offer us” (Croft 2001: 364). But—in line with our earlier characterization of their
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position—most typologists would not go that far. From their point of view, a semantic map pictures the universal space that linguistic forms move around in, according to certain rules. It is not excluded that one needs these semantic maps for characterizing (other aspects of) human cognition, but hypothesizing a semantic map is neither in need of evidence to that effect, nor necessarily relevant for modeling cognition. An excellent illustration of this position is Stassen’s
(1997: 578), regarding his semantic map of intransitive predication: according to him, this map is “a general semantic ‘topography’or ‘layout’, which is universal, and somehow anchored in human cognition” (italics ours). Or to illustrate the issue with a concrete example: We have mentioned above that the semantic map of modal necessity is indifferent as to the issue of whether a modal auxiliary such as must is monosemous or polysemous. For cognitive modeling, however, this issue—and the related one of the mental status for the speaking subject of the meanings featured on the map—is very relevant. But the semantic map of modality does not offer any arguments to resolve this dispute, nor is it affected by the latter’s outcome.
3.Conclusion
Cognitive Linguistics and linguistic typology are beyond any doubt mutually compatible fields of inquiry, both with respect to method and theoretical asumptions. Still, to a considerable extent they remain separated strands on the linguistic scene. On the one hand, Cognitive Linguistics rarely uses the ‘typological method’, no doubt to a large extent because of the unavailability of the relevant types of data and the difficulties involved in getting at them. On the other hand, linguistic typologists are often ‘cognitive agnosticists’, possibly because of typology’s focus on grammar and because it is hard enough to achieve valid generalizations over the enormous range of facts from the languages of the world. As recent developments demonstrate, however, there is every reason to expect a closer collaboration between the two fields in the future.
一、认知语言学的起源 二、主要内容 19 世纪末20 世纪初,当心理学从哲学中分离出来成为一门独立的实验学科之时,语言的认知研究便已开始。1987年是认知语言学正式的诞生年,虽然此前已有一些零星的文章预示着一种新的语言学理论即将诞生。但是一般认为,这一年出版的Lakoff“Women, Fire ,and Dangerous Things”和Langacker“Foundations of Cognitive Grammar”标志着认知语言学作为一种独立语言学理论的诞生。认知语言学研究的主要代表人物是Langacker，Lakoff，Jackendoff, Taylor 和Talmy等人。 认知语言学包括认知音系学、认知语义学、认知语用学等分支，研究内容广，覆盖面大，概括起来主要有以下几点：一、范畴化与典型理论 语言学在方法论和本质上都与范畴化(categorization)紧密相关。范畴化能力是人类最重要的认知能力之一,是“判断一个特定的事物是或不是某一具体范畴的事例”(Jackendoff , 1983∶77) 。 Labov和Rosch对范畴的研究，打破了范畴的“经典理论”或称“亚里士多德理论”一统天下的局面。“经典理论”认为:范畴是由必要和充分特征联合定义的;特征是二分的;范畴有明确的边界;范畴内的所有成员地位相等。这一理论却
受到了认知科学的有力挑战。Rosch 还提出了“典型理论”(prototype theory) ,认为大多数自然范畴不可能制定出必要和充分的标准,可以公认为必要的标准往往不是充分的;一个范畴的成员之间的地位并不相同,典型成员具有特殊的地位,被视为该范畴的正式成员,非典型成员则根据其与典型成员的相似程度被赋予不同程度的非正式成员地位。例如,在“鸟”范畴内“知更,鸟”常被视为典型成员,而“企鹅”、“驼鸟”等则为非典型成员。当然，一个范畴的典型成员会因不同的人、文化、地理位置而有所不同,但一个范畴中总有典型的。 典型理论对认知科学最有价值的贡献在于它把注意力集中在内部结构上,集中在范畴具有“核心”和“边缘”这个事实上。目前,它已用于语音、句法、词义、语用、语言习得、失语症等方面的研究,并取得了可喜的成绩。 二、概念隐喻 隐喻的认知研究可追溯到18 世纪。约在1725 年,意大利哲学家和修辞学家G. Vico就发现了隐喻的认知功能,后在其《新科学》一书中阐述了其认知观点。然而,把隐喻的研究纳入认知语言学领域的重要标志却是Lakoff &Johnson （1980）。认知语言学家认为,比喻性语言与非比喻性语言本质上无甚差别;日常语言中充满了隐喻,完全不带隐喻的句子大概只占极少数。隐喻是“我们对抽象范畴进行概念化的有
走进认知语言学 摘要：认知语言学是近年来语言学的研究热点，它是在新的哲学观和认知观基础上，以人们对世界的经验和对世界进行感知和概念化的方法来研究语言的新兴语言学科。本文从认知语言学的产生发展、定义、基本假设、基本理论和研究方法五个方面浅谈了对该理论的认识和理解。 关键词：认知；认知语言学；现代汉语 语言是人类最重要的交际工具和进行思维的工具，为了让语言更好的为人类的交际活动服务，我们必须要研究语言，从不同的角度研究语言，运用各种各样的理论和方法来研究它的方方面面，这是一个漫长而艰难的过程。作为一名在读的汉语言文字学专业的研究生，我需要掌握各种语言理论知识，不仅要了解旧的语言理论，更要关注最新的学术问题，为以后的现代汉语的学习研究打下扎实的理论基础。在语言理论的课堂上，我第一次认识、了解了一种新的语言理论——认知语言学。 一、我对认知语言学的认识 认知语言学是从二十世纪六十年代产生，经过了七八十年代的发展，形成的一个系统而完整的理论体系。认知语言学理论的产生与当时科学理论的大背景是一致的。随着计算机时代的到来，认知科学应运而生，它是一门综合学科，涉及计算机自然语言理解、人工智能语言学、心理学、系统论等多种学科，这其中也包括了认知语言学。 （一）认知语言学的产生与发展 认知语言学发端于20世纪70年代，自80年代中期以来，它的研究范围已扩展到了语言学的各个领域。认知语言学最初是针对“语义”的研究提出来的。美国生成学派以Langacker为首的语义学家们认为语义部分才是句法生成的基础,他们从底层语义关系的研究中得出结论，认为自然语言的句法不是自主的，不能独立于语义，而语义也不能独立于人的认知。至此,他们摆脱了乔姆斯基的句法形式研究，走上了认知语言学的道路，成为了认知语言学的奠基人。
陈忠著 , 《认知语言学研究》 , 2005年 , 第1页 第一章认知语言学概说 第一节认知语言学的理论主张及其背景 20世纪80年代兴起于欧美，并以1989在德国杜伊斯堡召开的第一届国际认知语言学会议为准，标志着认知语言学正式成立。 认知语言学的哲学基础和理论主张与结构主义相对立，是通过对结构主义的反叛而建立发展起来的。 认知语育学研究的代表人物主要有： G.Lokoff；R．W Langacker ；C．Fillmore；M.Johnson； R．TayIor；Haiman，M．John；D．Geeraerts；P．Kay等。 戴浩一1985《时间顺序和汉语的语序原则》、1990《以认知为基础的汉语功能语法争议》；谢信一1991《汉语中的时间和意象》；沈家煊1995《“有界”与“无界”》、1999《转指和转喻》、1993《句法的象似性问题》；张敏l 998《认知语言学与汉语名词短语》；石毓智《语法的认知语义基础》，赵艳芳2001《认知语言学理论》；袁毓林1995《词类范畴的家族相似性》。 认知语自学的理论主张与结构主义和生成语法相对立。认知语言学的语言观是建立在经验主义或称为非客观主义哲学基础之上的。认知语言学认为，抽象的心智活动不能脱离身体经验和形体。认知结构与身体经验密切相关，并且以感知、动觉、经验为基础，思维具有想象性。概念要么来源于经验，要么通过隐喻、转喻和意象发展而来；思维具有完形件和整体性；语言符号不是直接对应于客观世界．而是与用科学概念结构保持一致。 关于语言能力的问题，认知诺言学认为，语言能力是人的一般认知能力的一个组成部分，语言不是自足的封闭系统。一方面语言的编码和解码过程以认知为基础，另一方面，语言在结构方面也参照人类概念知识、身体经验和话语功能。换言之，语言无论是在意义上还是在结构形式上，都是建立在人类概念知识、身体经验和话语功能基础之上的。语言不能脱离人类概念知识、身体经验和话语功能而独立运作。 就语义而言，用真值条件的形式逻辑描写语义是不够的，语义和使用者的知识系统密不可分。语义描写必须参照开放的知识系统。 语言知识和非语言知识之间没有绝对而明确的界限。语言能力跟一般认知能力是分不开的。 从语言内部层面来看，认知语言学认为，句法不是自足、自主的形式系统，句法跟词汇互参互动，相互制约，相互依存。不存在一个可以脱离语义、词汇意义独立运转的独立的句法系统。 关于句法是不是自足、自主的形式系统，这是认知语言学和结构主义语言学争执的焦点。以生成语法为代表的极端形式主义观点的基本主张，是句法自主论。该观点把句法看做是自主的系统．可以脱离语义独立运作。并且认为语百符号的编码具有任意性。 关于语吉符号有没有任意性的问题，历来颇有争议。索绪尔把符号内部的所指和能指之间的关系界定为任意性结合，但是大量的语言事实都对语言符号任意性这一观点提出了挑战。如：“大小、长短、左右、前后、高低”合乎正常范式和语感，而x“小大、短长、右左、后的、低高”却不正常。在“量级”表达形式方面，高量级和低量级之间往往不对称、不均衡，因此“量级”范畴的编码并不是任意的。在这种不对称、不均衡的背后，是认知动因在起制约作用。 无论是“量级”、空间、时间关系，还是其他方面，也无沦是汉语还是英语，语言都不是任意进行编码的。而且编码的依据也不是仅仅根据句法规则。
国内外认知语言学研究综述 摘要：认知语言学是20世纪70年代在认知科学的基础上发展起来的一个语言学流派。80到90年代，诞生于美国的认知语言学，迅速影响到其他国家，并被越来越多的语言学学者所接受和采纳。国内语言学界自90年代开始接触认知语言学之初，就发现其在解决汉语具体问题上的可适用性，从而越来越多地关注这一学派的动向。三十年来，国内学者在这一领域也做出了许多贡献，同时也有很多不足的地方。此文主要就认知语言学在中国的发展情况进行介绍，同时简单回顾认知语言学的发展历程和主要理论方法。 关键词：认知语言学，国内研究，国外研究，综述 认知是当今人类最感兴趣的课题之一，因为它关系到我们对人类思维过程的破译，因此越来越多的学者投入认知科学的研究。随着结构主义学派和转换生成语言学派的学者们在语言学各领域研究的深入，他们越来越发觉自身理论和方法的局限，为了解决现有理论方法力所不及的问题，学者们开始寻求新的办法。认知科学无疑给语言学家们指明了一条道路。乔姆斯基的转换生成语言学就已经在语言学研究中加入了认知概念，他认为语言是认知系统的一部分。认知与语言学的结合是不可避免的一种趋势，当这种趋势越来越显露，认知语言学的出现也就成为了必然。20世纪70年代诞生于美国的认知语言学，从80到90年代开始迅速影响到其他国家，其发展势头大有成为继结构主义学派和转换生成学派之后又一个在语言学史上具有重大历史意义的学派，在21世纪成为占主导地位的显学。国内语言学界和外语界从90年代开始陆续引进认知语言学派的一些理论和方法。三十年来，认知语言学在中国的发展也是势如破竹，几乎所有语言学的刊物中都会有相关论文。国内学者在这一领域都做出了许多贡献，特别是用认知语言学理论来解释汉语中的具体问题方面。但是也存在着明显的不足，如最主要的是重理论引进和解释，轻创新。 一、何为认知语言学？ 最早提出“认知语言学”这一术语的是Sidney Lamb，他在1971年就在论文中采用这一术语，并将其解释为：“用以指真正研究大脑中的语言，语言与心智、神经之间的关系。”对于认知语言学的界定，学者们从一开始就有所争议。于是跟其他的学科一样，学者们一般使用狭义和广义来区别不同的观点。认知语言学理论家Tayler（2002）在术语上用以区别狭义和广义的认知语言学的办法是：将狭义的认知语言学用“Cognitive Linguistics”表示，而将广义的认知语言学用“cognitive linguistics”表示。显然作为心理学家的Sidney Lamb 的观点是广义的。在语言学领域里的讨论，一般都是从狭义的角度。国内学者王寅（2007）将狭义的认知语言学可以定义为：“坚持体验哲学观①，以身体经验和认知为出发点，以概念、结构和意义研究为中心，着力寻求语言事实背后的认知 ①王寅在《Lakoff和Johnson的体验哲学》文中提到，“Lakoff认为认知语言学的哲学基础既不是经验主义，又不是理性主义，而是体验哲学。”
一词多义的认知语言学解读 【摘要】一词多义现象在很多人类语言中普遍存在，是人类对社会不断认知发展的结果,体现了人类认知发展的过程。本文从认知语言学视角出发，应用原型范畴理论论对这一语言现象进行分析和研究，以期待对认知语言学中相关理论加以进一步掌握并对现实存在的语言现象进行分析。典型范畴理论,及其典型范畴理论下的隐喻和转喻机制对一词多义现象进行了初步探讨。根据典型范畴理论,语义范畴也是由多个不同义项组成的,各个义项地位不同,具有典型的义项和边缘义项之分,其各个义项之间呈现出家族相似性;其中,隐喻和转喻在语义拓展中起到了重要的作用。 【关键词】一词多义；原型范畴理论；原型；认知语言学；原型理论；隐喻理论；转喻理论 世界各种语言中普遍存在一词多义现象，这是一个一直为语言学家所关注的问题。亚里士多德曾经说过：“由于名称和词语的数量是有限的，而事物是无限的，因此，同一词语，同一名称不可避免地会有许多意义。”一词多义现象是一个单一的语言形式具有两种或两种以上密切相关意义的聚合。传统的语言理论从索绪尔符号理论到现代的各种语义理论，都不能回答为什么会产生一词多义现象及各种词义之间的关系，并没有把握一词多义现象的全部和本质，未能对此现象作出充分的解释。认知科学的发展使我们可以从语言的外部世界来解释一词多义形成的原因。认知语言学的发展，尤其是原型范畴理论的提出，更使得我们可以从新的视角来分析和探究词的多义现象。认知语言学的相关理论能对一词多义现象做出科学、合理的解释，认知语言学理论认为一词多义现象就是通过人类认知手段由一个词的中心意义或基本意义向其他意义延伸的过程，是人类认知范畴和概念化的结果。根据典型范畴理论,语义范畴也是由多个不同义项组成的,各个义项地位不同,具有典型的义项和边缘义项之分,其各个义项之间呈现出家族相似性;且语义范畴由典型义项为中心向边缘义项成放射状辐射,其中,隐喻和转喻在语义拓展中起到了重要的作用。下面我们将运用认知语言学的观点，通过语义学的语义变化理论和认知语言学的原型范畴理论、隐喻认知理论等对一词多义这一语言现象进行分析和阐释。 一、一词多义与原型理论 （一）一词多义
认知语言学是语言学中的一种新范式, 它包含许多不同的理论、方法及研究课题。认知语言学肇始于20 世纪70 年代, 80 年代中期以后其研究范围扩展到了语言学中的许多领域, 如句法、意义、音系以及语篇等。其成熟的重要标志是1989 年春在德国杜伊斯堡召开的第一次国际认知语言学会议以及1990 年出版的5认知语言学6杂志。自诞生之日起, 认知语言学就把自己置于认知科学这一大学科中, 与哲学、心理学、人类学、计算机科学以及神经科学等结下了不解之缘, 并逐渐成为当代语言学中的一门显学。 在过去20 多年里, 认知语言学研究在几个重要领域里已卓有成效, 如范畴化、概念隐喻、转喻、多义性、拟象性以及语法化等( 参见文旭1999, 2001) 。尽管认知语言学家内部在具体方法、感兴趣的课题、研究的切入点等方面还存在一些差别, 但他们的研究目标和基本原则有许多共同之处。为了进一步理解并准确把握这一新的认知范式, 本文拟对认知语言学的研究目标、基本原则、研究方法作一些解释与探讨。认知语言学的研究目标 语言是人类表达观念和思想的最明确的方式之一。从/ 表达观念和思想0的角度来研究人类语言, 这种观点就是通常所说的/ 认知观0。这种观点认为, 语言是认知系统的一部分, 而认 知系统由感知、情感、范畴化、抽象化以及推理等组成。这些认知能力与语言相互作用并受语言的影响, 因此从某种意义上来说, 研究语言实际上就是研究人类表达或交流观念和思想的方式。 当代语言学的一个基本特点就是对认知现实主义( cognitive realism) 的承诺, 即确认语言是一种心理或认知现象。语言学诸多门派都以探索隐藏在大脑中具有普遍性的人类语言机制作为终极目标, 换句话说, 语言分析的目的不只是描写人们的语言行为, 而是解释引起语言行为的心理结构和心理过程, 揭示语言行为背后内在的、深层的规律。像乔姆斯基、杰肯道夫(R. Jackendoff) 、兰格克(R. Langacker) 、雷科夫(G. Lakoff) 、比尔沃思(M. Bierwisch ) 以及赫德森(R. Hudson) 这些代表不同理论方法的语言学家, 他们的研究都具有这一目的。如果仅从这一目的来看, 那么乔姆斯基的生成语法、杰肯道夫的概念语义学、赫德森的词语法(word gram2 mar) 与兰格克、雷科夫等人的认知语言学是完全一致的, 这样他们的理论似乎可以合法地称为/ 认知语言学0。然而/ 认知的承诺0只是一个纲领性的东西, 它本身对语言理论的具体研究原则和方法并不起支配作用, 对语言描写的内容和形式也未作具体的要求。因此, 尽管乔姆斯基的生成语法、杰肯道夫的概念语义学、赫德森的词语法与兰格克、雷科夫等人的认知语言学都许下认知的承诺, 但前者与后者代表的却是两个极端, 所以前者也就不属于今天公认的认知语言学。 认知语言学主要包括雷科夫、兰格克、菲尔莫(C. Fillmore) 、约翰逊(M. Johnson) 、杰拉茨(D. Geeraerts) 、福科尼耶(G. Fauconnier) 以及塔尔米(L. Talmy) 等人的语言学理论或方法。它认为自然语言是人类心智的产物, 其组织原则与其他认知领域中的组织原则没有差别。语言作为人类认知的一个领域, 与其他认知领域密切相关, 并且本身也是心理、文化、社会、生态等因素相互作用的反映。语言结构依赖并反映概念的形成过程, 而概念的形成过程又以我们自身的经验为基础, 即是说, 语言不是一个由任意符号组成的系统, 其结构与人类的概念知识、身体经验以及话语的功能相关, 并以它们为理据。语言单位( 如词、短语、句子) 是通过范畴化来实现的, 而范畴化通常以典型( prototype) 为基础, 并且涉及隐喻和转喻过程。语言单位的意义以身体经验为基础, 其描写需参照相关的认知结构, 如通俗模型( folk models) 、文化模型( cultural models) 以及认知模型( cognitive models) 。把语言使用置于人类经验基础之上的最重要结果之一, 就是要首先强调意义的研究。正如维尔茨比卡(Wierzbicka 1988: 1) 指出: / 语言是一个整合的系统, 在这个系统中一切都通力协作, 传递意义) ) ) 词、语言结构以及言外手段( 包括语调) 。0费斯米尔( Fesmire 1994: 150) 也指出, 认知语言学摆脱了主流生成语言学的传统, / 尽力解决人类是如何理解自己世界的意义这一问题0, 并且把自己/ 置于人类经验这一潮流中, 而不是纯粹的形式王国里0, 因此, 认知语言学/ 发展了一套人类理解的生态理论0。简言之, / 认知语言学明确地承诺要把意义的身体维度、文化维度以及想象维度( imaginative dimension) 结合起来0。很明显, 意义是认知语言学研究的重要内容, 而隐喻就成了认知语言学研究的焦点。语言学也就不再是对语言内部特征的一种自足的解释, 而是揭示和解释人类认知的一种有力工具。 据上论述, 我们大致可明确认知语言学的研究目标: 寻找不能脱离形体的概念知识的经验证据, 探索概念系统、身体经验与语言结构之间的关系以及语言、意义和认知之间的关系, 即所谓的/ 关系问题0( the relationship question) , 发现人类认知或概念知识的实际内容, 从而最终揭示人类语言的共性、语言与认知之间的关系以及人类认知的奥秘。显然, 认知语言学的这一宏伟目标与当今人类最感兴趣的四大课题之一/ 揭示人类智能的奥秘0完全一致。 三、认知语言学的理论原则 认知语言学中虽有不同的理论方法, 但它们在很大程度上是相互一致的, 具有共同的理论原则。兰格克( 1987: 2) 曾把认知语言学的理论原则概括为三个重要主张: 第一, 语义结构并不是普遍的, 在很大程度上因语言而异。语义结构建立在约定俗成的意象( conventional image) 基础之上, 其描写与知识结构有关。第二, 语法或句法并不构成一个自主的表征形式层次, 相反, 语法实际上具有符号性, 存在于语义结构的规约符号化中。第三, 语法与词汇之间没有意义上的区别。词汇、形态和句法形成一个符号结构的连续统, 这些符号结构虽因不同的参数有别, 但可以任意划分为不同的成分。雷科夫从更基本的层次阐述了认知语言学的理论原则。不过, 他是用/ 承诺0 ( commit2 ments) 来谈的。他( 1990: 3) 认为, 认知语言学有 两个根本承诺: 第一, 概括的承诺: 对支配人类语言各个方面的一般原则进行描写; 第二, 认知的承诺: 从语言学以及其他学科出发, 使对语言的解释与有关心智和大脑的一般知识一致。当然, 兰格克和雷科夫提出的理论原则只代表两家之言, 并未囊括认知范式中所有的基本原则。笔者认为, 至少有六个基本原则可以把认知语言学中的不同理论方法联系起来: 1) 概念语义原则 意义等同于概念化( conceptualization) , 即心理经验的各种结构或过程, 而不是可能世界中的真值条件: 一个表达式的意义就是在说话人或听话人的大脑里激活的概念, 更为具体地说, 意义存在于人类对世界的解释中, 它具有主观性, 体现了以人类为宇宙中心的思想, 反映了主导的文化内涵、具体文化的交往方式以及世界的特征。这一原则表明, 意义的描写涉及词与大脑的关系, 而不是词与世界之间的直接关系。 2) 百科语义原则 词及更大的语言单位是进入无限知识网络的入口。对一个语言表达式的意义要进行全面的解释, 通常需要考虑意象( 视觉的和非视觉的) 、隐喻、心理模型以及对世界的朴素理解等。因此, 一个词的意义单靠孤立的词典似的定义一般来说是不能解决问题的, 必须依赖百科知识方可达到目的。 3) 典型范畴原则 范畴并不是由标准) 属性模型( criterial2at2 tribute models) 定义的, 也不是由必要和充分特征定义的(Lakoff 1987; Taylor 1989) ; 相反, 范畴是围绕典型、家族成员相似性, 范畴中各成员之间的主观关系组织起来的。 4) 语法性判断的渐进原则 语法性判断涉及范畴化。一个话语的语法性或可接受性并不是二分的, 即要么可接受, 要么不可接受, 而是渐进的。因此, 语法性判断是渐进的, 并且同语境、语义以及语法规则密切相关。认知语言学家并不像生成语法学家那样, 要把语法写成是一部生成一种语言中所有并且是唯一合乎语法的句子那样的语法, 因为语法性判断具有渐进性、可变性以及语境的依赖性, 要实现生成语法学家所期望的目标显然十分艰难。 5) 语言与其他认知机制相关原则 认知语言学之所以为认知语言学, 是因为它要在一般的认知中寻找语言现象的类似物。认知语言学家积极吸收心理学关于人类范畴化、注意以及记忆等的研究成果来丰富自己的理论, 从而使认知语言学更加具有活力。由此可见, 语言与其他认知机制具有密切的关系。
赵彦春论语：认知语言学的认知范畴 赵彦春论语：认知语言学的认知范畴应该说，是认知语言学把范畴问题推到了学术的前沿。认知语言学摈弃经典范畴理论而推崇原型范畴理论。经典范畴理论与原型范畴理论各有其哲学上的依托。谈经典范畴理论，可以抛开原型范畴理论，但谈原型范畴理论就必须参照经典范畴理论，因为它是在颠覆后者的基础上建立起来的。经典范畴理论自然是以西方古典哲学，即客观主义哲学为依托的。古典哲学的基本观点可以概括为：理性是抽象的，是脱离肉体的，是直义的（literal），命题具有客观性，非真即假。概念和推理是超拔的，即它们都超越任何生物体的身体局限性。概念和推理，尽管可能体现于人体、其他生物，乃至机器，但它们却抽象地存在着，独立于任何特定的体验。亚里士多德的范畴理论完全体现了这些特点。亚里士多德一语道破天机：“范畴是抽象的容器”。与此相应，范畴的基本点便是范畴成员享有共同的特征，可归纳为三点：（1）范畴成员独立于范畴建构者的身体本身，即独立于经验；（2）范畴本质中没有融入莱考夫等人所说的想象机制，如隐喻、转喻、意象等；（3）范畴成员之间体现出由充要条件所决定的边界清切性。作为古典哲学的对立面，莱考夫和约翰逊（Lakoff & Johnson 1980）提出了与原型范畴理论相融合的体验哲学。体验哲学的基本
点可以概括为：理性以肉体为基础，是想象性的，以隐喻、转喻和意象为核心；想象机制是范畴建构的核心。与之相应，原型范畴理论的基本点便是：范畴中存在可以称作原型的最佳样本（best examples），而这些样本取决于以下因素：（1）感知、肌动、文化；（2）隐喻、转喻、意象。经典范畴理论和原型范畴理论，既然基于两种根本对立的哲学观，自然也就体现出认识论和方法论的对立。莱考夫（Lakoff 1987：xvi）认为前者是错误的，指出：“关于心智的错误观念已伴随我们两千多年了，必须加以改正。”（It is vital that the mistaken views about the mind that have been with us for two thousand years be corrected.）而且，“观念的转变会带来一系列的转变：这是一个蕴含其他变化的变化：真理、知识、意义、理性，甚至语法观念的变化。”（It is a change that implies other changes: changes in the concepts of truth, knowledge, meaning, rationality -- even grammar.）范畴问题的研究，经历了从经典范畴理论到原型范畴理论的发展过程，但愿这是人类理性的提升。如果不是提升，那么它会给我们什么启示呢？莱考夫曾形象地将经典范畴理论的实质 概括为容器，这与亚里士多德“范畴是抽象的容器”之论在字面上倒显得十分契合，但意向却是相反的。莱考夫的意思是：经典范畴理论中的范畴像一个容器，具备定义性特征的个体就放在里边，不具备的就放在外边。他认为经典范畴理论并
认知语言学 一、教学目的和要求 本课程是语言学及应用语言学专业硕士研究生的学位基础课。本课程通过介绍国外认知语言学的基本理论和分析方法，使硕士研究生了解当代语言研究中功能学派的基本语言观，学会在句法、语义分析的基础上通过心理认知角度来解释语言现象的能力，为学位论文的撰写打下坚实的基础。本课程在硕士研究生第二学年的第一学期开设。教学上主要采取课堂讲授的方法，每次课后安排一定的时间答疑并进行课堂讨论。 二、基本教学内容 1、什么是认知语言学 （1）认知语言学的兴起 （2）认知语言学的特征 （3）认知语言学的观念 2、范畴化问题（上） （1）概念范畴的本质属性 （2）范畴化的原型理论 （3）基本层次概念 3、范畴化问题（下） （1）认知模式与范畴化 （2）词语的多义范畴 （3）语言客体的范畴化 4、概念隐喻和隐喻概念系统（上） （1）Lakoff的“隐喻认知观” （2）概念隐喻的典型实例分析 5、概念隐喻和隐喻概念系统（下） （1）结构隐喻 （2）方位隐喻 （3）本体隐喻 6、意象和意象图式（上） （1）Langacker的“意象” （2）“意象”的典型实例分析 7、意象和意象图式（下） （1）Johnson和Lakoff的“意象图式” （2）“意象图式”的界定 8、关于语言符号的任意性和象似性 （1）索绪尔关于“语言符号任意性”的观点
（2）功能学派关于“句法象似性”的观念 9、复杂性象似动因 （1）形容词的“级” （2）名词的“数” （3）偏正结构 10、独立性象似动因 （1）关于“名词融合”的问题 （2）关于“独立事件编码为独立子句”的倾向 11、次序象似动因 （1）时间顺序原则（PTS） （2）时间范围原则（PTSC） 12、对称象似动因 （1）语言的线性原则和对称表达 （2）对称象似动因的实例分析 13、重叠象似动因 （1）词语重叠的象似动因 （2）动词拷贝的象似动因 14、动因的竞争及象似性的减损 （1）象似原则和经济原则的竞争 （2）动因竞争的典型实例分析 15、认知语言学与汉语研究（上） （1）常规关系与认知化 （2）词类范畴的家属相似性 16、认知语言学与汉语研究（下） （1）“有界”与“无界” （2）空间范畴与空间关系 三、主要教学参考书 F.Ungerer and H.J.Schmid著，陈治安、文旭导读《认知语言学入门》，外语教学与研究出版社，2001年。 刘润清、胡壮麟《认知语言学概论》，外语教学与研究出版社，2001年。 束定芳主编《语言的认知研究》，上海外语教育出版社，2004年。 张敏《认知语言学与汉语名词短语》，中国社会科学出版社，1998年。 石毓智《语法的认知语义基础》，江西教育出版社，2000年。 四、授课教师：吴为善 五、总学时：54学时
1. 语言的认知研究与认知语言学 语言认知研究的历史可以追溯到很久以前，但是认知语言学的兴起却是最近20年的事。语言的认知研究可以分为两个方面：一个方面是基于心理学的研究(the psychological approach)，一个方面是基于语言学的研究(the linguistic approach)。基于心理学的研究注重语言的感知、语言理解、记忆、注意力、推理等方面的问题，而基于语言学的研究则比较注重语言的形式类、语言符号的意义、形式和意义之间的操作、意义-概念与外部世界的联系等方面的问题。 语言的认知研究涉及到的一个根本问题就是语言是什么的问题以及语言以什么样的方式和结构存在的问题。 心智之外，因此可以作为一个纯客观的研究对象来对待；另一类认为语言与人的心智有一种互相依存的关系，语言不是一种纯粹客观的现象，因此研究语言必须与语言所赖以存在的心智联系在一起。什么是语言？这个问题看似简单，实际上是语言学领域一个根本性的问题。语言学不像别的学科，研究对象很明确，语言学的研究对象一直与别的学科有粘连。如果研究对象不确定的话，一切都会成为问题。索绪尔在讲到语言学的材料和任务时，开宗明义地说：“语言学的材料首先是由人类言语活动的一切表现构成的”关于语言是什么的问题不同的人有不同的看法，这些看法基本上可以区分为两大类：一类认为语言是一种客观现象，它独立于人的认识主体，那么人类言语活动的表现应该包括哪些内容呢？当然首先就是语言本身，因为人类言语活动是建立在语言基础上的，没有语言什么都谈不上。所以还是应该首先回答什么是语言这个最根本的问题。迄今为止，各种语言学的著作和非语言学的著作对“语言”做过几十种界定，因为观察角度不同，“横看成岭侧成峰”。对什么是语言进行界定可以有不同的视角，从语言的自然属性上说，语言是一套符号系统；从语言的社会属性上说，语言是社会的交际工具；从语言的心理属性上说，语言是思维的工具。索绪尔注意到了语言学研究对象的多面性，认为语言学与其他学科不同的地方在于它的研究对象的多重属性。如果把语言看成是人类言语活动本身，那么语言学的研究对象就应该是动态的言语过程；如果把语言看成是静态的符号系统，那么语言研究的对象就应该是静态的语言现象。麻烦的是这种现象不纯粹是自然现象，它又是社会的产物，它是在社会中形成的并在社会中运用的。如何才能找到语言学完整的研究对象呢？因为我们无论从那一方面去着手解决问题，“任何地方都找不着语言学的完整对象；处处都会碰到这样一种进退两难的窘境：要么只执著于每个问题的一个方面，冒着看不见上述二重性的危险；要么同时从几个方面去研究言语活动，这样，语言学的对象就是乱七八糟的一堆离奇古怪、彼此毫无联系的东西。” 索绪尔很明确地提出我们“一开始就站在语言的阵地上，把它当作言语活动的其它一切表现的准则。” 索绪尔强调要把“语言”和“言语”分开，语言学的研究对象是语言本身。他说：“语言这个对象在具体性上比之言语毫不逊色，这对于研究特别有利。” 作这样的区分十分有利于语言学研究对象的确定，而且把言语活动的复杂性也揭示出来了。 关于语言是以什么样的方式和结构存在的问题，我们必须追寻语言证据存在的处所，也就是说，我们必须了解语言在哪儿。语言是一种心理符号，它已特定的方式与人类的心智和人类生存的外部环境处于一种共生的状态中。而心智和人类生存的外部环境都与人类的认知能力有关。语言的认知研究就是一种语言学和心理学在理解人类概念结构方面的统合。人类的语言在结构上对应以下一些范畴： 1.概念结构(the conceptual structure) 2.外部世界(the world) 3.知识系统(the knowledge system)
认知语言学
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近年来,认知语言学已经成为国内外学者研究语言学的重点，认知语言学能很好地解释一些其他语言学理论无法解释的语言现象。认知语言学反映了人类认知过程。英语倒装句作为复杂的语言学现象引起很多语言学家的关注。各种不同的语法学派,语言学家和学者在不同的方面做出了很多贡献，但是由于这一复杂的句法特征,很多研究不能系统地解释倒装句。本文以象似性理论为认知原理,对英语倒装句中全部倒装,部分倒装及修辞性倒装进行解释,认为象似性尤其是接近象似性原则和顺序原则是形成倒装的主要原因。 关键字:象似性；倒装句；象似性原则
倒装句作为一种语法形式,是当今语言学研究的一个重要内容。传统理论对倒装的研究忽视了语言外部的因素，未重视认知对语序的制约作用，研究不够全面。 本文以认知理论为基础,对英语倒装句进行分析研究，以象似性原理为理论为依据,对英语中的不同倒装现象进行了分析和解释。在对句首倒装成分做出解释的基础上,本文对倒装句中动词全部活部分出现于主语之前的情况进行了解释，认为邻近象似性是英语倒装句中动词或全部或部分地随着突显成分提到主语之前的原因。 2 文献综述 国内外学者对认知语言学的研究做出了很多贡献，如王寅著的《认知语言学》,赵艳芳的《认知语言学概论》,Ｌackoff. G& M. Ｊｏhnｓon’s MetaphorｓWe Lｉｖｅby等等。所以，以期刊、论文方式讨论倒装句的研究出了许多成果。传统研究主要是从修辞、句法、语用和语篇的角度进行的。徐盛桓，以语料统计为依据,研究英语倒装句，认为倒装是为实现句中各种成分的信息状态合理分布的调节装置,通过调节，使语句的成分有恰当的错位,达到全息的语用目的。余笑,从Ｖerschuｅｒn提出的语用综观说出发，探讨英语和汉语中倒装语序的语用功能。发现英汉倒装语序均具有焦点分离突出和情景设定的功能。 而从认知语言学角度研究英语倒装句日益增多。杨壮春,用射体（tｒaｊｅctory)－界标(landmarｋ)理论从认知的角度对倒装句的焦点突显功能作出解释，认为倒装句是该理论在语言学中的现实化,它把“射体-界标”转化为“界标－射体”结构形成句末焦点,以使人们注意的焦点落在新信息上，从而达到英语倒装句的凸显效果。更多的是以图形与背景理论为视角,对英语倒装句的焦点凸显功能进行重新阐释，认为英语倒装句符合图形-背景理论中的凸显原则,如王冰营，吕娜;刘先清；王海欧等。 用传统的修辞、句法、语用和语篇的角度进行的分析有其自身的缺陷,仅仅将倒装句认为是一种表示强调手段的句子。而用图形与背景理论分析可以解决为什么句子应该倒装即英语倒装句起始部分的问题,但是却解决不了为什么动词或者功能词应该放在主语前面这样的问题。象似性作为认知语言学中重要的概念，可以进一步研究英语倒装句中的问题。 3倒装句 英语句子的正常语序是主语位于谓语之前,然后是宾语或表语或其他句子成分。如果将全部谓语或谓语的一部分,或将宾语、表语、宾语补足语提到主语之前，就称为倒装语序（Inｖertｅd Ｏrｄer)。
2004年9月 第36卷 第5期 外语教学与研究(外国语文双月刊) For eign L anguage T eaching and Research(bimonthly) Sept.2004 Vol.36No.5 认知文体学 语篇分析中的语言与认知 介绍 重庆大学 刘国辉 E.Semino&J.Culpeper(eds.).2002.Cognitive Stylistics Language and Cognition in Tex t A nalysis.Amsterdam/Philadelphia:John Benjamins Publishing Com pany.Xvi+ 333pp. 一 认知文体学 语篇分析中的语言与认知 由英国兰卡斯特大学两位学者Semino和Culpeper主编并作序,汇集12位作者在认知语体方面的最新研究成果而成。其目的是展现认知文体学的研究现状和文体学今后的发展方向。 认知文体学作为一种研究视角,既新也旧。旧是因为文体学一直关注语篇与读者的语篇解读,语言形式与效果的关系。比如M ukar ovsky(1970)的 前景化 理论(F oregrounding theor y)在当代英美文体学的发展过程中就起过重要作用,它特别关注语言选择和语言模式的认知效果。不过,认知文体学与传统的文体学还是有所不同。一般来说,传统文体学倾向于用语言理论或框架来解释或预测语言材料的解读,而认知文体学则关注语言分析或语言形式选择的认知结构和认知过程,这就为语篇及其解读的关系提供了更系统、更详尽的描述。 二 该书前三章涉及认知语言学的一些核心概念在特定具体语篇中的应用。在第一章,Cr aig Hamilton阐释了 概念整合 或 复合 理论如何解释隐喻、类比和讽喻在Christine de P izan15世纪的语篇T he Book of the City of L adies中的运用。他的分析系统地解释了读者对这本书的直觉理解,以及不同历史时期和不同文化群对此解读的相同性和差异性。最后,他声称: 今天很多学者都明白文学批评需要转向认知,以免它成为一种完全伪造而又无意义的事业。 他还说,像 女性读者 和 性别记忆 等时髦概念缺乏合适的科学基础。第二章,M arg ar et F reeman认为对思维和语言体验认知的关注必然导致语篇,尤其诗歌物理结构形态的重新评估。他分析了Emily Dickinson原创的两首诗歌手稿,由于多次印刷,评论家认为它们已经模糊不清了。他展现了人们如何用认知手法来获得这两篇文章的合适解读,以及Dickinson个人概念宇宙中的知识域和概念隐喻。他强调: 认知诗学有较强的解释力在于它能够解释语篇意义的产生和合适理解。 第三章,Yanna Popova讨论了Henry James的T he Fig ure in the Carpet,这个故事有歧义,引起了文学批评者的不同解读。Popova在此并不是想解歧,而是想利用认知语言学概念来洞察歧义存在的原故所在。她还考察了James神话大约三十个不同的版本,并分析了其中的两种主要解读。她认为利用认知语言学方法可以区分基本的 原型 解读和其它非基本的解读,即解读的变异。这些不同的解读并非同样可以接受,因此她提出: 在解读理论中需要提出一个介于多元化和客观存在之间的中间地带。 第四章到第八章是认知语言学理论和其它理论方法的折中应用。同时第七章和第八章还指出了认知语言学范式的不足。第四章Peter Stockw ell分析了M il ton四首不同篇章结构的商籁体,从指示语、句法结构、否定以及概念隐喻、吸引(attraction)、分心(distr ac 398
浅谈认知语言学 发表时间：2018-10-22T16:13:42.363Z 来源：《语言文字学》2018年第10月作者：封锋林聖典肖冲 [导读] 认知语言学对于语言学教学具有重大影响和意义，它体现人们对于语言的认知能力，有助于人们对语义的理解。 武警警官学院四川成都 610213 摘要：认知语言学对于语言学教学具有重大影响和意义，它体现人们对于语言的认知能力，有助于人们对语义的理解。框架语义学，作为认知语言学的重要分支，它从语境的角度解释词汇的含义，是人们理解词义的重要联系和过渡过程。然而，人们对于该理论的了解和认识并不多，关注并深入研究该理论的学者也屈指可数。本文对于框架语义学的核心思想、哲学基础、理论目标、理论方法及其在应用中的作用和影响有所探析，同时，对其所得到的评价及几点不足也有所提及。 关键词:认知语言学; 社会语言学; 社会认知语言学 1认知语言学理论概述 虽然语言普遍地只是被看作是人类之间一种交流的工具，但是其认知能力和方法尤为关键，它也是连接各类语言学之间的一个锁链。一个人的认知能力和方法，可以体现出其心理活动以及周围的环境特征。认知语言学的理论方法有很多种分支和分类，例如认知语义学、框架语义学、认知语法、构式语法等。 对于认知语言学的基本思想，乔姆斯基（Chomsky）提出了几个基本假设。其一，语言是一个自足的系统，它具有数学的特征，其自足性使其可以基本脱离范围更广的认知系统加以研究。其二，语法（尤其是句法）是语言结构的一个独立部分，与词汇和语义有着根本的区别。其三，如果意义在语法分析范围内，那么，最恰当的描述方法是通过建立在真值条件基础上的某种形式逻辑[1]。 在认知语言学中，人们对于语义的理解极其重要。正如《认知语言学杂志》（Journal of Cognitive Linguistics）在1990年首刊编者按中所述，认知语言学的研究路向将语言视为“组织、处理、传达信息的工具”，即语言最重要的是语义。所以，语言研究的认知方法主要侧重于语义。其中，框架语义学虽然并不算其分支中最热门的理论，但是，它在理解语义中的作用和影响同样不可忽视。 2框架语义学的基本理论 2.1核心思想 在人们理解词汇和句子的过程中，即在理解一个概念结构中的任何一个概念时，必须以理解它所适应的整个结构为基础，理解它所存在的概念结构，当这样一个概念结构中的一个概念被置入一个文本或交谈环境中时，该概念结构中其他所有概念都自动被激活。那么，基于对框架语义学的应用，人们在词语所激活的语义框架中理解词语的意义，并且，通过对真实场景的反复体验，人们会在大脑中形成一种意象图式[3]。因此，框架是人们在大脑中形成的一种框架概念结构，是一种相对抽象的结构[4]。 2.2哲学基础 框架语义学是由菲尔莫尔最早提出的自然语言语义学的一个具体路向[5]，并以经典主义哲学及皮亚杰（J.Piaget）的楗构论为思想基础。同时，语义又是非自主的，是和经验紧密结合的，那么，语义是以经验为基础的[6]。所以，框架语义学又属于经验主义语义学（empirical semantics）的范畴，它源自经验语义学传统，而不是形式语义学（formal semantics），它与经验之间相互联系，并不代表割裂[7]。因此，框架语义学是以经典主义哲学、建构论以及经验主义为哲学基础的语言学理论思想。 2.3理论目标 框架语义学作为一种理论思想，为词义的研究提供了一种具体且便捷的方式，也为描述新词语创生、旧词添加新义，以及将语篇中各成分的意义组配成语篇整体意义的原则提供了一种有效的方法[8]。因此，框架语义学的理论目标就是在结合语境以及相关背景知识的同时，帮助人们理解词义、句义以及语篇的含义。 2.4理论方法 菲尔莫尔认为，框架语义学中的“框架”并非是在现实中的实体，而是一个概念意识上的原型，它可以充分解释真实情景与词语使用之间相互适应的复杂性，并且受到特定语境的影响[9]。因为语义会随着环境的变化而变化，那么，如果要理解一个单词的含义，就要运用联想的方法，进而掌握与这个单词有关的知识，了解与之相关的同一框架或交替框架的词汇的含义，并且熟悉其语境，理解一个框架中相互联系的概念的含义。 在借助于框架语义学理解语义的过程中，许多多义词都可适用于多个不同的框架，同样的，一种事实经常可以在不同的框架中进行阐述，一个情景可以用两种相对立的方式框定[10]。因此，语言的框架结构还应该是灵活可变的。 3框架语义学在教学中的作用及影响 框架语义学主要是描述语义和句式结构的理论，其应用主要集中在对于意义的研究，尤其是在词汇语义研究方面。例如，陈勇提出，在框架理论的指导下，词汇的同义现象应被分为框架之间的同义、同一框架内的同义这两种情况。而李春华和李勇忠则从认知功能的角度出发，以理想化的认知模型为基础，系统分析了框架转化在建构意义中的重要作用。另一方面，毛海燕以汉语框架网络知识库为基础，研究英汉词汇对比的程序和方式，构建了一个特殊的词汇语义对比模型，并且对该模型进行了一定程度的尝试性应用[11]。类似这类研究都使框架语义学对于语义理解的意义显得尤为重要，使人们对于框架语义学的理解更为深刻，也为语言学中语义语境方面的研究提供了重要的启发意义。 在阐释词汇、句法和语义现象的同时，框架语义学在编撰字典和创新语料库等方面也有所运用，同时，它还有助于第一语言习得、外语学习和外语教学。双语框架语料库可被用于课堂教学过程中，学生学习单词及其语义框架。而语义框架提供的背景知识可以提高学生学习单词及其他新知识的效率。教师则可使用语料库里的有关信息来编写练习，以弥补教学软件的不足。框架语义学作为认知语义学的一部分，是人们理解词义的过渡和桥梁，它以概念框架结构为基础，使人们在理解及表达语义的同时，对其框架中相互联系的概念、范畴及背景知识也有所了解。 4结语 认知语言学框架内的术语研究是一个全新的研究领域，这一领域已开始被冠之以专名“认知术语学”。[10]认知术语学是术语学与认知语言学相结合的产物，其中需要探讨和解决的问题还有很多。比如说，不同类型思维活动之间、某一知识领域概念的不同发展阶段之间存在