For release on delivery
7:15 p.m. EDT
April 11, 2012
The Economic Outlook and Monetary Policy
Remarks by
Janet L. Yellen
Vice Chair
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
At the
Money Marketeers of New York University
New York, New York
April 11, 2012
I appreciate the opportunity to speak with you this evening. The Money Marketeers are renowned for their keen interest in the economy and monetary policy. With that in mind, I’ll describe how my views concerning the stance of monetary policy relate to my assessment of the economic outlook. As you know, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) issued statements following its January and March meetings indicating that it “currently anticipates that economic conditions--including low rates of resource utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over the medium run--are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through late 2014.”
I agreed with those judgments and, in my remarks tonight, I’ll explain my views and describe some of the analytical tools that I use in making such policy decisions. I will also discuss the conditional nature of the Committee’s policy stance. Let me emphasize at the outset that the remainder of my remarks reflect my own views and not those of others in the Federal Reserve System.1
The Labor Market and the Economic Outlook
I will start by describing current conditions and key features of the economic outlook that influence my views on the appropriate stance of monetary policy. To summarize, the labor market has shown welcome signs of improvement. Even so, the economy remains far from full employment. Furthermore, the improvement in labor market conditions has outpaced the seemingly moderate growth of output. Looking ahead, significant headwinds are likely to continue to restrain aggregate spending, and progress in closing the remaining employment gap is likely to be quite gradual. Apart
1 I appreciate assistance from members of the Board staff--James Clouse, William English, Michael Leahy, David Lebow, Andrew Levin, Andrea Lowe, Steven Meyer, and David Reifschneider--who contributed to the preparation of these remarks.
from sizable increases in gasoline prices, inflation has been subdued in recent months. While the jump in energy prices is pushing up inflation temporarily, I anticipate that subsequently inflation will run at or below the Committee’s 2 percent objective for the foreseeable future. Let’s examine the economic outlook in greater detail before considering how that outlook shapes my views on appropriate policy.
Starting with the labor market, as I mentioned, there have been encouraging signs of improvement in recent months. The unemployment rate had hovered around 9 percent for much of last year but moved down in the fall and averaged 8-1/4 percent in the first three months of this year, about 1-3/4 percentage points lower than its peak during the recession. And even though the latest employment report was somewhat disappointing, private sector payrolls expanded, on average, by about 210,000 per month in the first quarter, up from gains averaging around 150,000 per month during most of 2011. Other labor market indicators have shown similar improvement.
This news is certainly welcome, yet it must be kept in perspective. Our economy is recovering from the steepest and most prolonged economic downturn since the 1930s, and these job gains still leave us far short of where we need to be. The level of private payrolls remains nearly 5 million below its pre-recession peak, and the unemployment rate stands well above levels that I, and most analysts, judge as normal over the longer run.
Figure 1 shows the unemployment rate together with the outlook of professional forecasters from last month’s Blue Chip survey.2 The solid blue line shows the Blue
2 The Blue Chip survey provides forecasts on a quarterly basis only through the end of 2013. To construct quarterly forecasts for 2014, we interpolate the annual projections reported in the March survey. According
Chip consensus and the blue shading denotes the range between the top 10 and bottom 10 projections of forecasters in the March Blue Chip survey. The figure also shows the central tendency of the unemployment projections that my FOMC colleagues and I made at our January meeting: Those projections reflect our assessments of the economic outlook given our own individual judgments about the appropriate path of monetary policy. As in the Blue Chip consensus outlook, FOMC participants’ projections indicate that unemployment will decline gradually from current levels. Included in the figure as well is the central tendency of FOMC participants’ estimates of the longer-run normal unemployment rate, which ranges from 5.2 percent to 6 percent. The unemployment rate is expected to remain well above its longer-run normal value over the next several years.
As you know, economic forecasts always entail considerable uncertainty. Figure 2 illustrates the degree of uncertainty surrounding projections of unemployment. The gray shading denotes a model-based 70 percent confidence interval for the unemployment rate, based on the sorts of shocks that have hit the economy over the past 40 years.3 Judging from historical experience, the consensus projection could be quite far off, in either direction. That said, the figure also shows that labor market slack at present is so large that even a very large and favorable forecast error would not change the conclusion that slack will likely remain substantial for quite some time.
to the April edition of the Blue Chip survey, which was released yesterday, “The con sensus outlook for U.S. economic growth this year and next underwent minimal change over the past month.”
3The forecast confidence interval is generated using stochastic simulations of the Federal Reserve staff’s FRB/US model. Specifically, a baseline is constructed centered on the midpoint of the central tendency of the FOMC’s projections released in January, and then the model is repeatedly simulated with shocks drawn randomly for the set of historical disturbances experienced over the period from 1968 to 2011. Similar estimates of forecast confidence intervals would be obtained if the intervals were instead constructed using the actual historical forecasting errors of private forecasters; for further discussion, see Table 2 of the FOMC’s Summary of Ec onomic Projections.
Some observers question just how large the shortfall from full employment really is and hence worry that further increases in aggregate demand could push up inflation. Their concern is that a large part of the rise in unemployment since 2007 is structural rather than cyclical. I agree that the magnitude of structural unemployment is uncertain, but I read the evidence as supporting the view that the bulk of the rise in unemployment that we saw in recent years was cyclical, not structural in nature. Assessments concerning the degree of slack in the labor market are highly relevant to an evaluation of the appropriate stance of policy, so I’d like to review my reasoning in some detail.
First, the fact that the rise in unemployment was quite widespread across industry and occupation groups casts doubt on the hypothesis that there has been an unusually large mismatch between the types of job vacancies and the types of workers available to fill them. Certainly, job losses in the construction sector and in financial services were particularly sharp--not surprising given the collapse in the housing market and in the financial sector that we saw in 2008--but so were losses in manufacturing and other highly cyclical industries that typically are hit especially hard in recessions. Indeed, measures of the dispersion of employment changes across industries did not increase more than past experience would have predicted given the depth of the recession.
Some commentators have noted that “house lock”--the reluctance or inability of homeowners to sell in a declining price environment or when underwater on their mortgages--may be preventing people from moving to find available jobs in new locations. However, evidence from migration patterns suggests that house lock is not having a significant effect on the level of structural unemployment. While migration within the United States has been trending down for some time, the reduction in mobility
during the recession was not greater for homeowners than for renters, nor was it especially pronounced for areas where housing prices have declined the most and so where house lock would likely be most prevalent.4
Finally, I do not interpret data suggesting an outward shift in the Beveridge curve as providing much evidence in favor of an increase in structural unemployment. The Beveridge curve plots the relationship between unemployment and job vacancies. Cyclical variations in aggregate demand tend to move unemployment and job vacancies in opposite directions, whereas structural shifts would be expected to move vacancies and unemployment in the same direction. For instance, a structural mismatch between businesses’ hiring needs and the skills of unemployed workers would tend to push up the level of vacancies for a given level of unemployment. Figure 3 plots the co-movement of unemployment and job vacancy rates since 2007.5 Consistent with a substantial decline in aggregate demand, followed by some modest recovery, movements in unemployment and vacancies since 2007 display a predominantly inverse relationship. However, figure 3 shows that as job vacancies have risen during the recovery, unemployment has declined by less than might have been expected based on the relationship that prevailed during the contraction. This outcome has led some to suggest that the Beveridge curve has shifted outward, reflecting an increase in the extent of job mismatch. In my view, a portion of this apparent outward shift in the Beveridge curve reflects increases in the maximum duration of unemployment benefits, which have been important in buffering the effects of 4 See Raven Molloy, Christopher L. Smit h, and Abigail Wozniak (2011), “Internal Migration in the United States,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2011-30 (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, May), https://www.doczj.com/doc/1213688999.html,/pubs/feds/2011/201130/201130pap.pdf.
5 The measure of job vacancies shown in figure 3 is derived from indexes of help-wanted advertising published by the Conference Board. Print and online indexes are combined as in Regis Barnichon (2010), “Building a Composite Help-Wanted Index,” Economics Letters, vol. 109 (December), pp. 175-78.
the weak labor market on workers and their families. The influence of these benefits will dissipate as they are phased out and the economy recovers. In addition, loop-like movements around the Beveridge curve are common during recoveries. Vacancies typically adjust more quickly than unemployment to changes in labor demand, causing counterclockwise movements in vacancy-unemployment space that can look like shifts in the Beveridge curve. Figure 4 plots the relationship seen during and after the 1973 and 1982 recessions alongside the current episode. As can be seen, such counterclockwise movements also occurred during these two earlier deep recessions.6
While I do not see much evidence of any significant increase in structural unemployment so far, I am concerned that structural unemployment could increase over time if the labor market heals too slowly--a phenomenon known as hysteresis. An exceptionally large fraction of those now unemployed--more than 40 percent--have been out of work for six months or more. My concern is that individuals with such long unemployment spells could become less employable as their skills deteriorate and as they lose their connections to the labor market. This outcome does not appear to have occurred in the wake of previous U.S. recessions, but the fraction of the unemployed who have been out of work for a long period is much higher now than it has been in the past. To date, I have not seen evidence that hysteresis is occurring to any substantial degree. For example, the probability of finding a new job has not deteriorated more for individuals experiencing a long-term bout of unemployment relative to those facing
6 See John Lindner and Murat Tasci (2010), “Has the Beveridge Curve Shifted?”Economic Trends (Cleveland: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, August),
https://www.doczj.com/doc/1213688999.html,/research/trends/2010/0810/02labmar.cfm; and Rob Valletta and Katherine Kuang (2010), “Is Structural Unemployment on the Rise?”FRBSF Economic Letter 2010-34 (San Francisco: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, November),
https://www.doczj.com/doc/1213688999.html,/publications/economics/letter/2010/el2010-34.html.
shorter spells. Nonetheless, the risk that continued high unemployment could eventually lead to more-persistent structural problems underscores the case for maintaining a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy.
Putting all the evidence together, I see no good reason to doubt that our nation’s high unemployment rate indicates a substantial degree of slack in the labor market. Moreover, while I recognize the significant uncertainty surrounding such forecasts, I anticipate that growth in real gross domestic product (GDP) will be sufficient to lower unemployment only gradually from this point forward, in part because substantial headwinds continue to restrain the recovery.
One headwind comes from the housing sector, which has typically been a driver of business cycle recoveries. We have seen some improvement recently, but demand for housing is likely to pick up only gradually given still-elevated unemployment, uncertainties over the direction of house prices, and mortgage credit availability that seems likely to remain very restricted for all but the most creditworthy buyers. When housing demand does pick up more noticeably, the huge overhang of both unoccupied dwellings and homes in the foreclosure pipeline will likely allow demand to be met for a time without a sizable expansion in homebuilding.
A second headwind comes from fiscal policy. State and local governments continue to face extremely tight budget situations in light of the weak economy, depressed home prices, and the phasing out of federal stimulus grants, though overall tax revenues have been improving and that should continue as the economy expands further. At the federal level, stimulus-related policies are scheduled to wind down, while both real
defense and nondefense purchases are expected to decline over the next several years under the spending caps put in place last year.
A third factor weighing on the outlook is the sluggish pace of economic growth abroad. Strains in global financial markets have eased somewhat since late last year, an improvement that reflects in part policy actions taken by European authorities. Nonetheless, risk premiums on sovereign debt and other securities are still elevated in many European countries, while European banks continue to face pressure to shrink their balance sheets, and concerns about the outlook for the region remain. A further slowdown in economic activity in Europe and in other foreign economies would inhibit U.S. export growth.
For these reasons, I anticipate that the U.S. economy will continue to recover only gradually and that labor market slack will remain substantial for a number of years to come.
One consideration that further complicates this outlook is the inconsistency between recent movements in economic growth and employment: Unemployment has declined significantly over the past year even though growth appears to have been only moderate. This unanticipated decline in the unemployment rate presents something of a puzzle, and it creates uncertainties for the outlook and policy.
To illustrate this puzzle, figure 5 plots changes in the unemployment rate against real GDP growth--a simple portrayal of the relationship known as Okun’s law. It is evident from the figure that 2011 is something of an outlier, with the drop in the unemployment rate last year much larger than would seem consistent with real GDP growth below 2 percent. One possibility, highlighted by Chairman Bernanke in a recent
speech, is that last year’s decline in unemployment represents a catch-up from the especially large job losses during late 2008 and 2009.7 According to this hypothesis, employers slashed employment especially sharply during the recession, perhaps out of concern that the contraction could become even more severe; in particular, the figure shows that in 2009, the unemployment rate rose by considerably more than the decline in GDP would have suggested. Then, last year, employers may have become confident enough in the recovery to increase hiring and relieve the unsustainable strain that the earlier cutbacks had placed on their workforces. I think the evidence is consistent with this hypothesis, and I have incorporated it into my own modal forecast.
If last year’s Okun’s law puzzle was largely the result of such a catch-up in hiring, I would expect progress on the unemployment front to diminish unless the pace of GDP growth picks up. After all, catch-up can go on for only so long. Of course, there are other conceivable explanations for this puzzle, including some that would point to a faster decline in unemployment in coming years. For example, GDP could have risen more rapidly over the past year than current data indicate. It will be important to pay close attention to indicators of both the labor market and GDP to try to gauge the likely pace of improvement in economic activity going forward and, hence, the appropriate stance of monetary policy over time.
Let me now turn to inflation. Overall consumer price inflation has fluctuated quite a bit in recent years, largely reflecting movements in prices for oil and other commodities. For example, inflation moved up in the first part of 2011 as a rise in the
7See Ben S. Bernanke (2012), “Recent Developments in the Labor Market,” speech delivered a t the National Association for Business Economics Annual Conference, Washington, March 26,
https://www.doczj.com/doc/1213688999.html,/newsevents/speech/bernanke20120326a.htm.
price of oil and other commodities fed through to gasoline prices, and, to a lesser extent, to prices of other goods and services. Then inflation subsided after commodity prices came off their peaks. More recently, prices of crude oil, and thus of gasoline, have turned up again. But smoothing through these fluctuations, inflation as measured by the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index averaged 2 percent over the past two years. Using the price index excluding food and energy--another rough way to abstract from transitory fluctuations--inflation averaged about 1-1/2 percent over the past two years. These rates are lower than the inflation rates that were seen prior to the recession, and they are at or below the FOMC’s long-run goal of 2 percent inflation.
In my view, the subdued inflation environment largely reflects two factors. First, the substantial slack in the labor market has restrained inflation by holding down labor costs. Second, and of critical importance, longer-term inflation expectations have been remarkably stable. Like many other observers, I was concerned that inflation expectations might move lower during the recession, driving down both wages and prices in a self-reinforcing spiral. The Federal Reserve acted forcefully to resist such an outcome and, fortunately, that destructive dynamic did not take hold. Indeed, the stability of expectations has meant that the price increases driven by costs of oil and other commodities have had only temporary effects on the rate of inflation. Although firms passed higher input costs into their prices when they could do so, those one-time price increases have not led to an expectations-driven process that might have resulted in persistently higher inflation.
The same key factors that have kept core inflation subdued provide the rationale for my inflation forecast. I anticipate that slack in the labor market will continue to
restrain growth in labor costs and prices. And, given the stability of inflation expectations, I expect that the latest round of gasoline price increases will also have only a temporary effect on overall inflation. Indeed, if crude oil prices were to follow the downward-sloping path implied by current futures contracts, energy costs would serve as a restraining influence on overall inflation over the next several years. Figure 6 presents the central tendency of FOMC participants’ pr ojections of inflation at the time of our January meeting. Most expected inflation to be at, or a bit below, our long-run objective of 2 percent through 2014; most private forecasters also appear to expect inflation by this measure to be close to 2 percent.8 As with unemployment, uncertainty around the inflation projection is substantial.
Benchmarks for Assessing Monetary Policy: Optimal Control
As I indicated at the outset of my remarks, I supported the Committee’s statements in January and March pertaining to the stance of monetary policy. I will now explain the rationale for my judgments, and I will describe some of the tools that I use to make such assessments. I consider it essential, in making judgments about the stance of policy, to recognize at the outset the limits of our understanding regarding the dynamics of the economy and the transmission of monetary policy. Because I see no magic bullet for determining the “right” stance of policy, I commonly consider a number of different approaches.
One approach I find helpful in judging an appropriate path for policy is based on optimal control techniques. Optimal control can be used, under certain assumptions, to 8 The Blue Chip survey reports inflation forecasts for the consumer price index (CPI), not the PCE price index. However, the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) provides forecasts for both inflation measures, and we use the projected spreads between the measures reported in the 2012Q1 release of the SPF (together with historical data) to convert the March Blue Chip CPI forecasts to a PCE basis.
obtain a prescription for the path of monetary policy conditional on a baseline forecast of economic conditions. Optimal control typically involves the selection of a particular model to represent the dynamics of the economy as well as the specification of a “loss function” that represents the social costs o f deviations of inflation from the Committee’s longer-run goal and of deviations of unemployment from its longer-run normal rate. In effect, this approach assumes that the policymaker has perfect foresight about the evolution of the economy and that the private sector can fully anticipate the future path of monetary policy; that is, the central bank’s plans are completely transparent and credible to the public.9
To show what an optimal control approach might have called for at the time of the January FOMC meeting, figure 7 depicts a purely illustrative baseline outlook constructed using the distribution of FOMC participants’ projections for unemployment, inflation, and the federal funds rate that we published in January. Here, the baseline paths for unemployment and inflation track the midpoint of the central tendency of the Committee’s projections through 2014. The unemployment rate gradually converges to around 5-1/2 percent--roughly the midpoint of the central tendency of participants’ long-run projections of these factors--and inflation converges to the Committee’s longer-run goal of 2 percent. The baseline path for the funds rate stays near zero through late 2014 and then rises steadily back to the long-run value expected by most participants. While this path is consistent with the January and March statements, I hasten to add that both
9The assumption of perfect foresight or “certainty equivalence” is commonly used in practice but is not an intrinsic feature of optimal control techniques. Indeed, the fully optimal policy under uncertainty involves the specification of a complete set of state-contingent policy paths.
the assumed date of liftoff and the longer-run pace of tightening are merely illustrative and are not based on any internal FOMC deliberations.10
Given this baseline, one can then employ the dynamics of one of the Federal Reserve’s economic models, the FRB/US model, to solve for the optimal funds rate path subject to a particular loss function.11 Such a policy involves keeping the funds rate close to zero until late 2015. This highly accommodative policy path generates, according to the FRB/US model, a notably faster reduction in unemployment than in the baseline outlook. In addition, the inflation rate runs close to the FOMC’s longer-run goal of 2 percent over coming years. According to the specified loss function, and in my opinion, this economic outcome would be more desirable than the baseline. One reason this exercise generates a better outcome is because it assumes that the Federal Reserve’s inflation objective is fully credible--that is, all households and businesses fully understand the Federal Reserve’s goals and believe that policymakers will follow the optimal policy designed to meet those goals. This belief ties down longer-term inflation expectations in the model even while it allows the lower interest rate to spur faster growth in output and employment.
While optimal control exercises can be informative, such analyses hinge on the selection of a specific macroeconomic model as well as a set of simplifying assumptions that may be quite unrealistic. I therefore consider it imprudent to place too much weight 10In these simulations, the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet is assumed t o evolve in accordance with the exit strategy principles that the FOMC adopted at its June 2011 meeting.
11This procedure involves two steps. First, the FRB/US model’s projections of real activity, inflation, and interest rates are adjusted to replicate the baseline forecast values reported in figure 7. Second, a search procedure is used to solve for the path of the federal funds rate that minimizes the value of a loss function. The loss function is equal to the cumulative sum from 2012:Q2 through 2025:Q4 of three factors--the (discounted) squared deviation of the unemployment rate from 5-1/2 percent, the squared deviation of overall PCE inflation from 2 percent, and the squared quarterly change in the federal funds rate. The third term is added to damp quarter-to-quarter movements in interest rates.
on the policy prescriptions obtained from these methods, so I simultaneously consider other approaches for gauging the appropriate stance of monetary policy.
Alternative Benchmarks for Monetary Policy: Simple Rules
An alternative approach that I find helpful in evaluating the stance of policy is to consult prescriptions from simple policy rules. Research suggests that these rules perform well in a variety of models and tend to be more robust than the optimal control policy derived from any single macroeconomic model.12 Of course, a wide variety of simple rules have been proposed in the academic literature, and their policy implications can differ significantly depending on the particular specification. Moreover, given our statutory mandate of maximum employment and price stability, it seems reasonable to focus on rules that mirror these two objectives by prescribing how the federal funds rate should be adjusted in response to two gaps: the deviation of inflation from its longer-run goal and the deviation of unemployment from my estimate of its longer-run normal rate. In my view, rules specified along these lines can serve as useful benchmarks for gauging the stance of policy and for communicating with the public about the rationale for our policy decisions.
Indeed, in the statement on longer-run goals and policy strategy that the FOMC issued in January, we underscored our commitment to following a “balanced approach” in promoting our dual objectives. The commitment to a balanced approach has crucial implications when it comes to choosing sensible benchmarks from among the many alternative policy rules. In particular, any benchmark rule should conform to the so-
12See the discussion in John B. Taylor and John C. Williams (2011), “Simple and Robust Rules for Monetary Policy,” in Benjamin M. Friedman and Michael Woodford, eds., Handbook of Monetary Economics, vol. 3B, (San Diego: North Holland), pp. 829-60.
called Taylor principle, which states that, other things being equal, a central bank should respond to a persistent increase in inflation by raising nominal short-term interest rates by more than the increase in inflation so that the real rate of interest rises, thereby helping to bring inflation back down. Moreover, I think it is essential that policy rules incorporate a sufficiently strong response to resource slack, typically either the output gap or the unemployment gap, to help bring the economy back toward full employment expeditiously.
John Taylor has proposed two simple and well-known policy rules along these lines. The rule that Taylor proposed in 1993 incorporates a fairly modest response to economic slack. Later, in a 1999 study, he considered a variant of that rule that was twice as responsive to slack.13 Taylor himself continues to prefer his original rule, which I will refer to as the Taylor (1993) rule. In my view, however, the later variant--which I will refer to as the Taylor (1999) rule--is more consistent with following a balanced approach to promoting our dual mandate. Importantly, because of the stabilizing effects of the Taylor principle, both the Taylor (1993) and Taylor (1999) rules imply that inflation returns over time to the longer-run goal of 2 percent.14
13See John B. Taylor (1993), “Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, vol. 39 (December), pp. 195-214,
https://www.doczj.com/doc/1213688999.html,/~johntayl/Onlinepaperscombinedbyyear/1993/Discretion_versus_Policy_Rules_in_Pract ice.pdf ; and John B. Taylor (1999), “A Historical Analysis of Monetary Policy Rules,” in John B. Taylor, ed., Monetary Policy Rules, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp. 319-341,
https://www.doczj.com/doc/1213688999.html,/~johntayl/Onlinepaperscombinedbyyear/1999/An_Historical_Analysis_of_Monetary_P olicy_Rules.pdf.
14 The intercept term in each rule reflects the assumption of a constant value of 2 percent for the equilibrium real federal funds rate. Thus, if the economy’s true equilibrium real funds rate deviated systematically from that value, the intercept term would need to be adjusted to ensure that the inflation rate converged over time to its longer-run goal.
Figure 8 shows the projected paths for the federal funds rate called for by these
two policy rules, along with the optimal control path that I presented earlier.15 These projections are constructed using the FRB/US model, conditioned on the same illustrative baseline outlook that I used a moment ago. The Taylor (1993) rule calls for the federal funds rate to begin rising in early 2013, whereas the Taylor (1999) rule has its liftoff in early 2015, a lot closer to the optimal control path. A sizable literature has examined the performance of simple rules like these by conducting stochastic simulations with a range
of economic models. Many studies, including Taylor’s own analysis, suggest that the Taylor (1999) rule generates considerably less variability in real activity and only slightly more variability in inflation than his original rule.16 Given the differential responses to economic slack across these two rules, this finding is hardly surprising, but it is a key reason why I consider the Taylor (1999) rule to be a more suitable guide for Fed policy.
While the Taylor (1999) rule can serve as a useful policy benchmark, its prescriptions fail to take into account some considerations that I consider important in the current context. In particular, this rule does not fully take into account the implications
of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates and hence tends to understate the rationale for maintaining a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy under present circumstances.
15 In these simulations, the Taylor (1993) rule is defined as R
= 2 + πt + 0.5(πt- 2) + 0.5Y t, while the Taylor
t
(1999) rule is defined as R t = 2 + πt + 0.5(πt- 2) + 1.0Y t. In these expressions, R is the federal funds rate, π
is the percent change in the headline PCE price index from four quarters earlier, and Y is the output gap. The output gap in turn is approximated using Okun’s law; specifically, Y t = 2.3(5.6-U t), where 2.3 is the estimated value of the Okun’s law coefficient and 5.6 is the assumed value of the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment, or NAIRU.
16See John B. Taylor (1999), “Introduction,” in John B. Taylor, ed., Monetary Policy Rules (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp. 1-14,
https://www.doczj.com/doc/1213688999.html,/~johntayl/Onlinepaperscombinedbyyear/1999/Introductory_Remarks_on_Monetary_Pol icy_Rules.pdf.
Importantly, resource utilization rates have been so low since late 2008 that a variety of simple rules have been calling for a federal funds rate substantially below zero, which of course is not possible. Consequently, the actual setting of the target funds rate has been persistently tighter than such rules would have recommended. T he FOMC’s unconventional policy actions--including our large-scale asset purchase programs--have surely helped fill this “policy gap” but, in my judgment, have not entirely compensated for the zero-bound constraint on conventional policy. In effect, there has been a significant shortfall in the overall amount of monetary policy stimulus since early 2009 relative to the prescriptions of the simple rules that I’ve described.
Analysis by some of my Federal Reserve colleagues suggests that monetary policy can produce better economic outcomes if it commits to making up for at least some portion of the cumulative shortfall created by the zero lower bound--namely, by maintaining a highly accommodative monetary policy for longer than a simple rule would otherwise prescribe.17 This consideration is one important reason that the optimal control simulation generates a more accommodative path than the Taylor (1999) rule.
Risk-management considerations strengthen the case for maintaining a highly accommodative policy stance longer than might otherwise be considered appropriate. In particular, the FOMC has considerable latitude to withdraw policy accommodation if the economic recovery were to proceed much faster than expected or if inflation were to come in higher. In contrast, if the recovery faltered or inflation drifted down, the Committee could provide additional stimulus using its unconventional tools, but doing so involves costs and risks. Given the unprecedented nature of the current economic
17 See David Reifschneider and John C. Willams (2000), “Three Lessons for Monetary Policy in a Low-Inflation Era,”Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, vol. 32 (November), pp. 936-66.
situation and the limits placed on conventional policy by the zero lower bound on interest rates, these issues of risk management take on special importance.
More broadly, these considerations help illustrate why it would be imprudent to adhere mechanistically to the prescriptions of any single policy rule. Such rules can serve as useful benchmarks for facilitating monetary policy deliberations and communications, but a dose of good judgment will always be essential as well. Uncertainty and Policy Conditionality
The policy prescriptions I’ve discussed thus far are conditioned on an illustrative baseline forecast for unemployment and inflation. Because any economic forecast is inherently uncertain, the FOMC’s forward policy guidance states explicitly that the Committee “currently anticipates” that economic conditions are likely to warrant such a stance of policy. The guidance does not state that the Committee will keep the funds rate exceptionally low until at least late 2014. I’d consider it completely appropriate to modify the specification of the forward guidance in response to significant changes in the economic outlook.
Potential modifications of the forward guidance can be illustrated by showing how the Taylor (1999) rule responds to two different shifts in the outlook. Figure 9 shows one scenario in which the recovery turns out to be unexpectedly strong, with the unemployment rate reaching 6 percent by the end of 2014 and inflation moving a little above 2 percent later in the decade. It also shows a second scenario in which the recovery is unexpectedly weak, with the unemployment rate remaining above 8 percent until early 2014. In this scenario, inflation stays persistently below 2 percent. In the stronger scenario, the Taylor (1999) rule calls for the liftoff from the zero lower bound to
move forward to the beginning of 2014. In that event, of course, the FOMC would not only raise the federal funds rate sooner than our current guidance suggests but would also begin to remove other forms of accommodation and draw down the balance sheet sooner than in the baseline. In contrast, in the weaker scenario, the Taylor (1999) rule calls for the liftoff to be delayed until the first half of 2016. The model’s recommendation for a later liftoff in this scenario could alternatively provide an argument for additional policy accommodation through other means, including additional asset purchases.
The current economic outlook is associated with significant risks in both directions. In particular, we know that recoveries from financial crises are commonly prolonged, and I remain concerned that the headwinds that have been restraining the recovery could lead to a longer period of sluggish growth and high unemployment than is embodied in the consensus forecasts. One specific risk is that elevated uncertainty about prospective fiscal policy adjustments could weigh on the spending plans of households and businesses. In addition, it’s conceivable that the European situation could deteriorate and prompt a significant increase in global financial market stress. Such developments would likely have substantial adverse effects on U.S. economic activity and inflation.
Potential upside surprises to the outlook include the possibility that the recovery has greater underlying momentum than is incorporated in consensus forecasts. As I noted, the decline we’ve seen in the unemployment rate could conceivably indicate that GDP has been rising significantly faster than now estimated. Alternatively, the
2020年中国货币政策 2017年中国货币政策或收紧 自10月1日人民币正式入篮至今，人民币不断贬值，甚至打响7.0保卫战。正值人民币大幅贬值之际，加上PPI快速回升，2017 年货币政策或面临进一步边际收紧压力。 昨日美元一度突破102，创十三年半新高，自11月9日特朗普 获胜以来，美元已涨逾5%。随着美元大涨，除了人民币大幅贬值外，印度卢比、土耳其里拉、菲律宾比索等新兴市场货币均纷纷惨烈下跌。 其中，印度卢比和土耳其里拉兑美元均创历史新低。为了应对本国货币大幅贬值，土耳其央行周四意外宣布加息，将基准回购利率 上调50个基点至8%，隔夜贷款利率上调25个基点至8.5%，随后土 耳其里拉短线拉涨近400点。 华创证券首席债券分析师屈庆认为，相对其他国家通过加息应对货币贬值，中国或面临货币政策进一步边际收紧压力。 虽然中国央行维持2.25%的7天逆回购利率没有变，但实际上市 场的回购利率是不断上行的，在人民币贬值压力进一步加大的情况下，未来货币政策没有放松的可能，仍将面临边际上的收紧压力。 另外，屈庆预计11月CPI同比小幅回升至2.2%，PPI或环比继 续上升，对应PPI同比将大幅回升至2.5%左右，明显超出市场预期。 那么，货币政策究竟更关注CPI还是PPI? 屈庆称，自2012年以来，央行的货币政策是更注重PPI。 从央行货币政策的角度来看，由于过去的周期当中，CPI和PPI 的变化较为同步，很难判断央行的货币政策究竟是更侧重CPI还是PPI，或是两者兼顾。但是在2012年以来的货币政策宽松周期中，CPI波动并不明显，PPI的持续负增长无疑是推动央行货币政策持续
全球嘹望 目 73 主持人：张 林 着金融市场逐步企稳，美国经济 复苏迹象显现，美联储正考虑逐 步退出危机期间推出的量化宽松货币政策。美联储货币政策的变动，将会通过溢出效应间接影响到中国宏观经济金融的运行。决策当局需要对此作出前瞻性的政策调整，降低这种变动对中国经济运行带来的负面影响。 短期国际资本流动可能发生逆转 在美联储量化宽松货币政策的作用下，联邦基金利率处于历史低位，美元呈贬值趋势。美元走弱使得人民币面临较大的升值压力。2009年3月下旬以来，境内外远期市场人民币逐步走强。10月20日1年期人民币预期升值幅度一度接近2.5%和4.0%的年内最高点，至10月末分别回落至0.8%和2.6%。基于人民币升值预期、中美利差倒挂和中国经济企稳回升的良好预期，2009年短期国际资本呈现出加速流入中国的态势。按照错误与遗漏的方法测算，2009年上半年短期国际资本流入额为228亿美元；按照残差法的测算，这一数字达452亿美元。 未来一段时间里，短期国际资本流入中国的趋势仍将延续。首先，随着美国大型金融机构“去杠杠化”进程的结束，美联储向金融市场注入的大量流动性，会通过各种渠道流向包括中国在内的新兴市场国家。其次，在一系列刺激性政策的推动下，中国经济已企稳回暖。发达国家在2010年上半年仍将处于重建库存的阶段，中国出口有望稳步回升，经济复苏的步伐也将快于其他国家。再者，目前美国联邦基金利率已降至接近零利率的水平，短期内美联储加息的可能性不大，中美利差倒 挂的局面仍将维持。最后，美联储量化宽 松货币政策削弱美元长期信用，全球金融 市场企稳使得美元作为避险工具的作用下 降。 然而，随着美国经济步入持续复苏轨 道，通货膨胀预期将会抬头，美联储必将 逐步退出量化宽松货币政策，从而推升美 国金融市场的利率水平。这将使使部分套 利交易平仓和美元走强，一些投机性资金 将流出中国，造成资产价格的波动，给中 国的金融稳定带来威胁。上世纪90年代初 期，美联储和日本央行因经济陷入衰退而 大幅下调利率，导致1991～1995年的美元 贬值和日元套利交易兴起。而同期东亚国 家利率明显高于美国和日本，短期国际资 本纷纷流入东亚国家，助推这些国家的资 产泡沫。1994年初美国启动加息周期， 1995年初美元止跌回升，加上随后美国因 IT革命进入快速增长阶段，大量资金开始 流出东亚国家，导致东亚国家的泡沫破裂 并爆发金融危机。 人民币汇率调整进退两难 量化宽松货币政策加大了美元汇率的 波动，增加了人民币汇率机制改革的难 度。2005年7月21日汇率形成机制改革以 来，人民币汇率水平和波动幅度都发生了 明显变化。然而，从2008年7月～2009年 3月，金融危机急剧恶化，避险情绪升温， 国际金融机构和企业纷纷将资金撤回美国 或兑换成美元资产，导致美元对主要货币 汇率保持升值，人民币重归盯住美元的汇 率制度。2009年3月下旬，美国量化宽松 货币政策的推出导致美国通胀预期上升、 国债融资风险增加和美元融资套利交易活 跃，加上全球经济反弹使得美元作为避险 工具的需求大大减弱，以美元资产保值的 资金重新追逐高收益资产，美元呈贬值趋 势，使得人民币有效汇率持续贬值。根据 国际清算银行的数据，2009年前3个月， 人民币名义有效汇率和实际有效汇率各升 值4.09%和2.92%，此后人民币汇率随美 元走弱，连续7个月呈贬值态势，名义有 效汇率和实际有效汇率各贬值9.17%和 7.67%。 在美元贬值和短期国际资本涌入的背 景下，人民币将再次陷入缓慢升值还是大 幅升值的尴尬选择。如果采取大幅升值策 略，人民币汇率很可能出现超调，资金流 向逆转的风险很大，或者是大幅升值以后 如果没有升到位，可能还会有下一次的升 值预期，造成过多的投机性资金流入。无 论是哪一种情形，都会造成资金大进大 出，产生宏观金融风险。如果采取慢速升 值，货币当局需要面对投机性资金流入、 资产价格泡沫浮现和通胀预期升温带来的 严重挑战。笔者认为，在当前国际经济环 境仍然存在不确定性、出口尚未得到实质 性恢复的情况下，人民币兑美元的汇率很 可能在2010年上半年维持不变。其后，当 确信中国出口好转和经济持续复苏后，人 民币进入温和、渐进和可控的升值通道。 一旦美联储逐步退出量化宽松货币政 策，美元贬值的趋势将出现反转。根据历 史经验，美联储加息周期的启动往往带来 美元的走强。1994年美联储将基准利率迅 速从3%开始升息，并在1995年中期维持 在6%左右的高位后，美元指数迅速上升。 2004年中期美联储开始加息，到2005年 12月13日共加息8次，美元对欧元、日元 美联储货币政策变化对中国的影响■ 谭小芬 随
美国的发展及其货币政策。 1.美国的货币制度 （一）美国的中央银行 美国联邦储备系统是美国的中央银行，成立于1913年12月23日，主要职责是保障美国货币和金融体系的安全、灵活和稳定。 《美国联邦储备法》规定，成员银行需向联邦储备银行缴纳相当于其资本和盈余总和的6％数量的资本。联邦储备银行则被要求每年向其成员银行支付其缴入资本的6％的红利，通常每年分两次支付。截止2006年12月31日，联邦储备银行的注册资本为135.36亿美元，占其总资本的51.2％。 根据1913年的《联邦储备法》规定，美国在12个主要城市设立储备银行，成为联储体系的组成部分。这12家地区储备银行的职责包括为其成员银行进行支票交换、回收损毁货币并发放新币、对合并申请进行评估、向该区的成员银行投放贴现贷款、审查属于联邦储备成员的州立银行、就地方银行和经济状况提出分析和报告，以及进行一般的银行与经济研究并出版部分刊物。 联邦储备理事会是联邦储备系统中的重要组成部分。理事会由七位理事组成。他们均由美国总统任命并经参议院确认，任期14年。联邦储备理事会办公地点设在华盛顿，通常每周会晤若干次商讨与货币政策和银行监管有关的问题。 （二）美元 美元硬币由美国财政部发行，币值有1美分、5美分、10美分、25美分、50美分和1美元六种；美元纸币由美国联邦储备系统发行，面额为1美元、2 美元、5美元、10美元、20美元、50美元和100美元七种。 二、美国的货币政策 （一）货币政策目标 根据《美国联邦储备法》，美国的货币政策目标是控制通货膨胀，促进充分就业。目前，美联储货币政策的操作目标是联邦基金利率。 美国联邦基金利率是指美国同业拆借市场的利率，其最主要的是隔夜拆借利率。这种利率的变动能够敏感地反映银行之间资金的余缺，美联储瞄准并调节同业拆借利率就能直接影响商业银行的资金成本，并且将同业拆借市场的资金余缺传递给工商企业，进而影响消费、投资和国民经济。 （二）美国货币政策的决定 联邦公开市场委员会是美联储系统中最重要的货币政策制定部门。其由7 位联邦储备理事会成员以及5位地区储备银行行长组成，其中纽约联邦储备银行行长为固定成员。一般来说，联邦储备理事会主席任联邦公开市场委员会主席，纽约联邦储备银行行长任副主席。委员会通常每五到八星期在华盛顿会晤一次，对具体货币政策操作进行投票。联邦公开市场委员会的政策指令及会议概要于会后六周对外公开。
中国货币政策有效性 摘要：货币政策作为国家宏观调控经济的重要手段，在整个国民经济宏观调控体系中居于十分重要的地位。货币政策有效性对于我国货币政策的制定和国民经济的健康发展具有十分重要的作用。中国社科院财经战略研究院5日发布《中国宏观经济运行报告(2014-2015)》指出，新常态下的中国经济宏观调控必须坚持多目标的“区间调控”、“定向调控”和“结构调控”，一方面要保就业、稳增长、防风险、稳物价；另一方面也要调结构、惠民生、促改革。这份逢年底发布的年度报告提出，面对经济下行压力，2015年中国经济宏观调控政策应坚持实施“新常态下的新对策”，在潜在增长率下移、去产能、去杠杆的过程中，确保经济运行在合理区间。 5日召开的中央政治局会议提出，2015年中国经济要主动适应经济发展新常态，保持经济运行在合理区间，继续实施积极的财政政策和稳健的货币政策。而货币政策作为国家宏观调控政策的一部分，其有效性却仍有争议。 1.货币政策 狭义的货币政策是指中央银行为实现其特定的经济目标而采用的各种控制和调节货币供应量或信用量的方针和措施的总称，包括信贷政策、利率政策和外汇政策。广义的货币政策则是指政府、中央银行和其他有关部门所有有关货币方面的规定和采取的影响金融变量
的一切措施。 而两者的不同主要在于后者的政策制定者包括政府及其他有关部门，他们往往影响金融体制中的外生变量，改变游戏规则，如硬性限制信贷规模，信贷方向，开放和开发金融市场。前者则是中央银行在稳定的体制中利用贴现率，准备金率，公开市场业务达到改变利率和货币供给量的目标。中国实行的是:稳健的货币政策和积极的财政政策。 2.稳健的货币政策 稳健的货币政策是具有中国特色的一种提法，它讲的是制定货币政策的指导思想和方针，它不同于经济学教科书关于货币政策操作层面的提法(如“宽松的”、“中性的”或“紧缩的”货币政策)。稳健的货币政策与稳定币值目标相联系，它包含既防止通货紧缩又防止通货膨胀两方面的要求，它\不妨碍根据经济形势需要对货币政策实行或扩张、或紧缩的操作。 1998年以来实行稳健的货币政策取得了巨大的成功。主要表现在四个方面：一是货币信贷总量平稳增长。1998～2001年，广义货币供应量增幅基本控制在14%～15%之间，与过去一些年代货币和信贷大起大落相比，近几年我们终于把货币信贷的增长调控得比较平稳了。二是信贷结构有了大幅度的调整。在一系列信贷政策的推动下，个人住房贷款、基础设施贷款和农业贷款比重大幅度上升，在当年贷款新增额中上述三项贷款大体占七成，信贷结构的这种调整有力促进了国民经济结构的调整。三是保持了国内金融稳定和人民币汇率的稳
1、近几年中国货币政策的走向是怎样的？如何评价我国货币政策的实施效果？ （1）货币政策走向： 2005年—2016年间我国基本上采取了比较稳定的货币政策，2005年—2016间，我国采取的货币政策主要有以下措施： 灵活开展公开市场操作； 发挥利率杠杆的调控作用，稳步推进利率市场化； 稳步推进金融企业改革； 完善人民币汇率形成机制，加快外汇管理体制改革，促进国际收支基本平衡； 以上是国家常用的基本货币政策操作措施，同时也通过对经济运行情况及趋势变化适时作出调整。 2005—2006年，我国采取实施稳健的货币政策； 2007年，货币政策从“稳健”转为“从紧”； 2008年—2010年，受国际金融危机影响，我国经济形势严峻，为适应形势变化，采取了适度宽松的货币政策； 2011年—2014年，我国经济稳步增长，继续实施稳健的货币政策； 2015年—2016年，为适应经济发展新常态，坚持稳中求进的总基调，继续实施稳健的货币政策。 （2）实施效果评价： A、货币政策工具的实施效率仍有待提高 面对全球性金融危机，存款准备金工具失效，2007年-2008年央行下调各金融机构的存款准备金率，效果并不明显。2010年10月、12月上调基金率，但抑制不了物价的上涨。但我国不断坚持对货币政策工具的创新与运用，在现今全球经济发展的背景下也取得了一定成果，所以应提高其利用率。 B、货币政策传导机制不畅通 利率机制是最主要的货币政策传导机制，由于我国利率市场起步晚，市场化程度不高，不能够很好地反映出货币资金的供求状况，从而也影响了其他货币政策工具的运用。
C、货币政策灵活性不够 当前，全球经济很大程度受到美国经济变化影响。在经济全球化浪潮中，中国应保持货币政策松紧的灵活性，在制定货币政策的时候，考虑美元这个强势货币的政策取向，而不是由于美联储加息或降息而使得自身陷入被动。 因此，应对各种政策工具进行互补创新，加快利率市场化改革，在稳定国内物价水平的同时稳定人民币汇率，加快人民币国际化，以使其更加适应经济的多变性。
一、引言 货币政策最终目标的选择一直是理论界与实际工作部门关注的一个重要问题，一般包括物价稳定、充分就业、经济增长和国际收支平衡四个部分。它们虽然分别表示了一个经济体内外部的最优均衡状态，但是之间存在冲突，如物价稳定与充分就业目标在短期内相冲突，这导致了经济体需要对其货币政策的最终目标进行选择。货币目标制度一般包括以单一目标值和多重目标制。单一目标制为货币学派所推崇，弗里德曼认为多重目标难以兼顾，易引起政策的过度调整；而凯恩斯学派则认为多重的权衡性货币目标制度能更好地解决错综复杂的经济问题。我国现在实行“保持货币币值的稳定，并以此促进经济增长”的货币政策目标制度。 近几年来，次贷危机造成全球金融海啸，对我国的经济产生重大冲击，使我国的政策方向由控制通胀的紧缩型转变为刺激经济增长的宽松型政策；而随着美国量化宽松政策的启动，国际市场中大量流动性涌入中国，对中国造成输入性通胀压力，同时由于国内货币供给量的剧增，我国的通胀率一度远超3%-3.5%的警戒区间，货币政策再次进入紧缩阶段。在复杂的国际国内经济金融形式下，研究货币政策最终目标的选择具有十分重要的意义。本文将首先对货币最终目标的含义及各目标之间的具体关系与存在冲突进行介绍，然后会结合我国的经济现状分析现行的货币政策目标制度并用VEC模型检验两个最终目标之间的关系，并提出当今经济环境下应当选择的货币政策目标。 二、文献综述及我国现状 货币政策目标及其制度的选择一直受到理论界的密切关注。货币主义学派支持货币中性论，即货币政策的扩张和紧缩仅仅能影响通货膨胀率的波动而对产出和就业产生系统性的影响。因此，货币主义学派主张采用通货膨胀率作为货币政策调控的长期目标。而凯恩斯学派则持相反意见，他们认为经济现象错综复杂，现实社会中的经济问题也往往是多方面的，单一的货币政策目标难以兼顾，多重的货币政策目标能够更好的解决经济问题。 国内，不少学者就我国货币政策目标的选择进行了研究。在单一目标与多目标制之争方面，谢平（2000）、宋海林和刘澄（2003）等就认为多目标约束的货币政策“要求过高”，“货币政策无论短期好还是长期都应该坚持稳定物价的单一目标”。而周俊（2002）提出根据我国政治经济形式及当前的经济任务，我国应采用多重货币政策目标，即以币值稳定与经济增长为主。何运信与曾令华（2004）则依据总供给曲线特征进行实证分析，由于正斜率总供给曲线的存在及该曲线的不稳定性及其测度上的不确定性，货币政策需要盯住通货膨胀与经济增长双重目标，而不能只注重物价稳定的单一目标。 就具体的货币政策目标选择方面，卢宝梅（2008）提出，我国应改变长期以来偏重经济增长目标而忽视价格稳定目标的政策导向，建立起灵活的通货膨胀目标制的货币政策。陈之荣（2009）则提出在金融危机的影响下，中国货币政策的调控重点应当着眼于保证经济的平稳增长，同时也应预防扩张政策可能引发的通货膨胀风险。徐茂魁（2010）通过VAR模型及脉冲响应模型证明中国以信贷扩张为主的货币政策比货币供应量为主货币政策更能有效地带动中国经济增长，并带来更小的通货膨胀，因此，在后金融危机时代，中国可以继续适度实施适度宽松的货币政策，但要更加注重货币政策的运用。由此可见，在不同的经济金融形势下，中央银行应采取不同的货币政策目标。
一．中国当前的货币政策 中国经济走出2008年下半年以来的经济危机困境之后，希望通过货币政策转变，来转变经济增长方式、调整经济结构来寻找新的、持久的经济增长动力。也就是说，政府希望为中国经济重新寻找新的经济增长点，控制物价水平再上涨、有效地管理通货膨胀预期、遏制资产价格快速上升。这几年通过下调存款准备金率，贷款基准利率等政策，中国经济发展呈现稳中有进的良好态势，消费需求稳定，固定资产投资较快增长，物价涨幅总体回落，就业形势基本稳定，消费平稳增长，投资增长较快，进出口结构化，农业生产再获丰收，工业生产增速稳回升。 从宏观上来说，2013年至今，我国实行的货币政策呈现“精准定位，稳中有进”的发展态势。实施稳健的货币政策，保证了货币政策的连续性和稳定性，有利于促进经济增长、稳定物价和防范金融风险，其重要作用主要体现在以下几个方面：一是健全了宏观经济政策的框架，持续发挥货币政策对市场经济的调节作用，完善了货币政策传导机制，加强了金融监管与货币政策的协调；二是促进金融资源优化配置，其政策内容满足了国家重点在建续建项目的资金需求，拓宽了实体经济融资的渠道，降低了其融资的成本，促进了资本市场的稳定健康发展；三是守住了不发生系统性和区域性金融风险的底线，引导金融机构稳健经营，加强了对局部和区域性风险以及金融机构表外业务风险的监管，提高了金融支持经济发展的可持续性。 13—15年，中国人民银行坚持稳中求进的工作总基调，继续实施稳健的货币政策，不放松也不收紧银根；根据外汇流入、货币信贷增长等形势变化，适时适度进行预调微调。政府方面也审时度势，出台了一系列强化市场、放松管制、改善供给的措施，这些措施对于释放经济活力，促进社会公平，构建和谐社会方面产生了积极深远的影响。总体来看，稳健货币政策的有效实施，金融运行总体平稳，较好地完成了每年年初确定的经济发展目标和物价调控目标。具体措施如下： 1.灵活开展公开市场操作 （1）灵活开展公开市场双向操作。中国人民银行在加强对流动性供求分析监测的基础上，科学把握公开市场操作方向、力度和节奏，根据流动性管理需要灵活开展公开市场操作，适时适度进行流动性双向调节，促进银行体系流动性平稳运行。 B、保持公开市场操作利率大体稳定。在国际金融形势复杂、流动性供求方向多变的情况下，公开市场操作加强与其它货币政策工具的协调配合，保持操作利率大体稳定，有效引导市场预期。 C、适时开展中央国库现金管理操作。持续开展国库现金管理商业银行定期存款业务 2.适时开展常备借贷便利操作 中国人民银行开展了常备借贷便利操作，接受高等级债券和优质信贷资产等合格抵押品，向贷款符合国家产业政策和宏观审慎要求、有利于支持实体经济、总量和进度比较稳健的金融机构提供了流动性支持；对流动性管理出现问题的机构，也视情况采取了相应措施提供流动性支持，维护金融稳定。 3发挥差别准备金动态调整机制的逆周期调节作用 中国人民银行继续运用差别准备金动态调整机制加强宏观审慎管理。根据国内外经济金融形势变化以及金融机构稳健性状况和信贷政策执行情况，对差别准备金动态调整机制的有关参数进行调整，引导信贷平稳适度增长，增强金融机构抗风险能力，并持续支持金融机构加大对小微企业、“三农”及中西部欠发达地区等薄弱环节和领域的信贷支持。 4加强窗口指导和信贷政策引导 中国人民银行进一步完善宏观信贷政策指导，发挥货币政策工具、宏观审慎政策工
我国货币政策工具及其效果评价 08金融3班08050315 钱晨 摘要：制定和实施货币政策，对国民经济实施宏观调控，是中央银行的基本职责之一。货币政策作为宏观经济间接调控的重要手段，在整个国民经济宏观调控体系中居于十分重要的地位货币政策目标的选择、决策程序的科学合理和政策工具的正确使用是货币政策作用有效发挥的重要前提。在本文中，我们将讨论我国当前货币政策面临的主要问题，了解当前的货币政策目标和为实现目标使用的货币政策工具，以及对政策的效果评价 关键字：货币政策货币政策工具汇率利率政策效果 正文：货币政策指中央银行为实现既定的目标运用各种工具调节货币供应量来调节市场利率，通过市场利率变化来改变民间资本投资，影响总需求进而影响宏观经济运行的各种方针措施。 当前,我国金融经济的总体运行态势是好的,但由于正处于市场化改革的特殊历史时期,一些不良因素和倾向值得警惕。货币政策面临着巨大挑战和严俊考验。当前货币政策存在的主要问题是汇率和货币政策独立性之间存在冲突,以及多重因素导致的人民币升值压力加大。目前我国正处于金融业对外开放、金融机构健全性改革以及汇率、利率和资本市场等市场化改革齐头并进的特殊历史时期,金融经济运行的总体态势是好的,但是有些不良因素和倾向也值得警惕,包括国际热钱大量流入、人民币升值预期强烈、流动性过剩、贷款增长偏快以及房地产价格居高不下等。货币政策面临着巨大挑战和严峻考验。 我国当前货币政策的面临的主要问题 （一）汇率稳定和货币政策独立性之间存在冲突 一方面,为了保持人民币汇率稳定,央行试图使人民币与美元利率之间保持一定的差距,这样不但可以减小“热钱”的套利空间,还可以鼓励国内资金外流,进而减轻本币升值压力;另一方面,国内流动性过剩,信贷增速偏快,直接导致了固定资产投资增长过快,房地产、部分能源和原材料市场价格偏高。经济形势本身要求提高利率,紧缩流动性。当前这种格局符合“蒙代尔三角”的描述:一个国家在资本自由流动、汇率稳定和保持货币政策独立性之间只能三取其二。就国内已经大量涌入的热钱数量来看,资本管制的效力有限,我国存在实际上的资本自由流动,因此,汇率稳定和保持货币政策独立性这两者从理论上讲不能同时作为货币政策目标,但实际上央行却一直在努力三者兼得,这使货币政策回旋空间十分狭窄。上半年央行的货币政策思路是在尽量不提高利率(特别是存款利率)的前提下,通过公开市场业务、提高存款准备金率和窗口指导来紧缩流动性,以达到同时稳定利率和汇率的目的。 （二）多重因素导致人民币升值压力加大 在汇率和利率这一对矛盾中,汇率处于主导地位。对人民币升值原因的深入探讨应该作为对当前货币政策进行深入研究的逻辑起点。归纳起来,人民币升值的主要原因有以下三点: 第一,经济全球化和国际产业转移。第二,国内资金缺少国际投资出口。第三,多种预期因素导致热钱涌入。 面对我国货币政策所存在的问题，要调整货币政策以完成我国当前的货币政策目标，宏观经济的四大目标我们已经了解，即：经济增长、增加就业、物价稳定及国际收支平衡。
背景资料:中国历年货币政策演变 货币政策演变 1997年 亚洲金融危机之后，开始实行稳健的货币政策。 2003年 稳健货币政策内涵开始发生变化，适当紧缩银根，多次上调存款准备金率和利率。 2007年6月13日 国务院召开常务会议，货币政策开始“稳中适度从紧”。 2007年12月5日 中央经济工作会议要求实行从紧的货币政策。 2008年11月5日 国务院常务会议要求实行积极的财政政策和适度宽松的货币政策。2009年7月23日 中共中央政治局召开会议，继续实施积极的财政政策和适度宽松的货币政策。 2009年12月5日至7日 中央经济工作会议提出，继续实施积极的财政政策和适度宽松货币政策。 2010年3月5日 政府工作报告指出，2010年继续实施积极的财政政策和适度宽松的货币政策。
2010年7月22日 中共中央政治局召开会议，强调继续实施积极的财政政策和适度宽松的货币政策。 2010年12月3日 政治局会议，提出实施积极的财政政策和稳健的货币政策。 历年货币政策回顾 2010-12-07 16:51:30 评论()条随时随地看新闻1997年亚洲金融危机，之后为应对当时的严峻经济形势，中国开始实行稳健的货币政策。 1998年－2002年中国面临通缩压力，货币政策趋向是增加货币供应量。 2003年－2007年为控制经济增长过快，稳健的货币政策内涵开始发生变化，适当紧缩银根，多次上调存款准备金率和利率。 2007年底中央经济工作会议将2008年宏观调控的首要任务定为“两个防止”：防止经济增长由偏快转为过热、防止价格由结构性上涨演变为明显通货膨胀。会议要求实行从紧的货币政策。 2008年7月至2008年底面对国际金融危机加剧、国内通胀压力减缓
美国货币政策分析 美国货币政策概述 美国货币政策的实质是服务于本国经济,美联储深刻理解美国资产泡沫是美国多年扩张的货币造成的,主观上希望泡沫永远不会破裂,另一方面通过微调美国经济、消化历史包袱。美国的货币政策的制定和执行职责,长期以来由美国的中央银行即美国联邦储备委员会(简称美联储,FRS)承担。货币政策是美国调控国民经济和社会发展的主要宏观政策工具。美国法律规定,货币政策的目标是实现充分就业并保持市值的稳定,创造一个相对稳定的金融环境。在货币政策执行过程中,美联储积极运用有关金融工具以尽量减少利率和货币信贷量的变化,努力达到兼顾“充分就业、市值稳定”的两大目标的目的。随着市场经济的成熟和发展,美联储货币政策在宏观调控经济方面发挥了日益重要的作用。美国经历了数次的金融危机,而因为1907年一个特别严重危机,1913年国会通过了《联邦储备法》,建立起了联邦储备银行。今天,美联储的金融体系更广泛,而不仅仅是在确保其金融稳定上。 为了解决银行挤兑问题,为美国担任中央银行,在私人利益之间和政府集中责任之间取得平衡的银行,为了监督和规范银行业金融机构,美国联邦储备局召开会议。为了保护消费者的信贷权利要管理国家的货币供给。 通过货币政策来实现有时是相互冲突的,目标的管理该国的货币供应量实现有时是相互冲突的,货币政策的目标是充分就业、稳定的价格,包括预防通货膨胀或通货紧缩温和长期利率为维持金融体系的稳定,遏制了系统性风险的金融市场为美国政府和外国官方机构提供金融服务,以存款机构,在经营国家的支付系统方面扮演一个重要角色为方便各地区的交流付款以应付当地的流动资金需求为了加强美国在世界经济地位。 二战后美国货币政策传导机制的发展
我国目前的货币政策及未来趋势 货币政策是国家为实现特定的宏观经济目标而采取控制和调节货币供应量的方针政策的总称。为实现货币政策目标所运用的调控手段一般包括：再贴现率、存款准备金率、公开市场业务、直接信用控制等。 近三年来, 人民币汇率经历了一轮又一轮的升值争论。最近, 外界对人民币升值的压力又在不断升级。当前我国面临两大压力，一是通货膨胀的压力，二是信贷紧缩的压力。从外部来看，全球经济缓慢复苏使得外需逐步增加，通胀的压力需要退出宽松的货币政策，然而，若时机把握不当，又将会导致热钱的流入，从而进一步给我国的物价及人民币升值带来压力。从国内来看，低端市场上劳动力价格的走高，工资的增长，以及货币的过量发行，都进一步推动了通货膨胀。 信贷规模的急速扩充, 未找到投资出口的资金流向资产市场, 形成大量的购买力, 国内资产泡沫严重。然而，信贷扩张的短期性导致商业银行面临在信贷紧缩情况下企业无法偿还的风险，后果是，资产泡沫破灭后，商业银行的资产结构恶化，进而冲击金融市场的稳定性。在考虑作为短期应对危机的信贷扩张策略的退出时，我们又面临与通胀相类似的两难的困境，即一方面，国内资产尤其是房地产价格的持续升温需要紧缩信贷；另一方面，信贷的紧缩会抑制市场需求导致资产供给的大幅下跌，资产价格的控制会引发企业资金周转困难问题，长期来看，将带来“多米诺效应”。因此，原先适度宽松的货币政策已不再适用于我国。 当前为了更好的应对全球经济危机，我国提出了实施稳健的货币政策的方法，取代了持续两年之久的适度宽松的货币政策。实施稳健的货币政策，是我国中央相应部门综合分析国内外形势后作所出的重要决策，使经济工作的“稳增长”取代了之前我国经济工作的“保增长”。与适度宽松的货币政策相比，稳健的货币政策是一种可根据经济形势变化进行微调以保持经济平衡的货币政策，它是介于宽松和从紧之间的一种中间状态。 我国通过控制货币供给等各项措施，来影响市场上的资金流动，进而起到释放经济信号、熨平经济波动的作用。货币政策的目标是保持货币币值的稳定、并以此
最佳答案、美国财政政策及其在宏观调控中的应用 美国的联邦政府财政政策主要由财政部起草，总统府的管理与预算办公室(OMB)也参与制定预算、税收和财政等政策。美国运用财政政策调控的经验： 1、主要运用税收手段进行调节。每当经济萧条时，为了刺激经济发展，美国政府就实施减税政策，减税的手段包括降低税率和缩小税基(如提高起征点、增加免税额等)。里根执政的20世纪80年代，为了刺激经济发展，实施了大幅度减税措施；小布什执政以来，先后在2001年和2003年两次提出了以减税为核心的经济刺激计划，按照该计划，美国10年内的减税总额高达15000亿美元。每当经济增长过快出现过热苗头时，为了抑制经济过热或减少财政赤字，政府就实施增税政策，增税的手段包括提高税率或扩大税基(如降低税收起征点、减少或取消免税额)。克林顿执政时期，为减少政府财政赤字，保证美国经济长期稳定增长，曾将应纳税收入在14万美元以上的夫妻联合申报家庭(单身纳税人应税收入在11.5万美元以上)的边际税率从31%提高到36%，同时规定应税收入超过25万美元以上的部分适用39.6%的最高边际税率。此外，为了支持某个产业发展，美国也会制定相应的税收优惠政策。但是美国政府通常不用税收优惠来招商引资。 2、严格依法管理财政预算。美国的联邦财政预算由总统府的管理与预算办公室负责编制，报经国会批准。财政预算经国会批准后，财政部可根据经济情况进行微调，但是财政预算支出结构的任何调整都由国会决定，无权变更。 3、政府对发行国债持审慎态度。美国政府对发债很审慎，主要根据财政收支预期进行，每年三月份公布政府的发债情况。美国决定发债是自动形成的，经济好时政府就少发债；经济不好时政府就多发债。不管政策制定者的意图如何，当政府财政紧张时，总统必然要求发债，国会只要求财政部为满足一定支出而融资，而不管采用什么手段。 4、财政政策长期发挥作用。在美国，不管是增税、减税还是调整预算收支的规模和结构，都要启动繁琐、严格的司法程序，必须经国会审批。因此，美国财政政策是长期的供给型政策。
论中国当前货币政策 一、货币政策最终目标 货币政策最终目标，一般有四个：稳定物价、充分就业、促进经济增长和平衡国际收支等 1、稳定物价稳定物价目标是中央银行货币政策的首要目标，而物价稳定的实质是币值的稳定。所谓币值，原指单位货币的含金量，在现代信用货币流通条件下，衡量币值稳定与否，已经不再是根据单位货币的含金量；而是根据单位货币的购买力，即在一定条件下单位货币购买商品的能力。它通常以一揽子商品的物价指数，或综合物价指数来表示。目前各国政府和经济学家通常采用综合物价指数来衡量币值是否稳定。物价指数上升，表示货币贬值；物价指数下降，则表示货币升值。稳定物价是一个相对概念，就是要控制通货膨胀，使一般物价水平在短期内不发生急剧的波动。 2、充分就业所谓充分就业目标，就是要保持一个较高的、稳定的水平。在充分就业的情况下，凡是有能力并自愿参加工作者，都能在较合理的条件下随时找到适当的工作。充分就业，是针对所有可利用资源的利用程度而言的。但要测定各种经济资源的利用程度是非常困难的，一般以劳动力的就业程度为基准，即以失业率指标来衡量劳动力的就业程度。所谓失业率，指社会的失业人数与愿意就业的劳动力之比，失业率的大小，也就代表了社会的充分就业程度。失业，理论上讲，表示了生产资源的一种浪费，失业率越高，对社会经济增长越是不利，因此，各国都力图把失业率降到最低的水平，以实现其经济增长的目标。 3、经济增长所谓经济增长就是指国民主产总值的增长必须保持合理的、较高的速度。目前各国衡量经济增长的指标一般采用人均实际国民主产总值的年增长
率，即用人均名义国民主产总值年增长率剔除物价上涨率后的人均实际国民生产总值年增长率来衡量。政府一般对计划期的实际GNP增长幅度定出指标，用百分比表示，中央银行即以此作为货币政策的目标。 4、国际收支平衡所谓国际收支平衡目标，简言之，就是采取各种措施纠正国际收支差额，使其趋于平衡。因为一国国际收支出现失衡，无论是顺差或逆差，都会对本国经济造成不利影响，长时期的巨额逆差会使本国外汇储备急剧下降，并承受沉重的债务和利息负担；而长时期的巨额顺差，又会造成本国资源使用上的浪费，使一部分外汇闲置，特别是如果因大量购进外汇而增发本国货币，则可能引起或加剧国内通货膨胀。当然，相比之下，逆差的危害尤甚，因此各国调节国际收支失衡一般着力于减少以致消除逆差。 二、货币政策工具 货币政策工具是中央银行为达到货币政策目标而采取的手段。一般而言，为实现既定的货币政策目标，中央银行一般需要通过货币政策工具的运作，调节货币供应量，实现宏观经济调控目的。因此，货币政策工具在货币政策贯彻和目标实现中起着至关重要的作用。在我国，货币政策从直接调控方式转向间接调控方式，中国人民银行可以运用的货币政策工具主要有以下五种，其作用与意义如下：①公开市场业务：运用国债、政策性金融债券等作为交易品种，主要包括回购交易、现券交易和发行中央银行票据，调剂金融机构的信贷资金需求。②存款准备金：通过调整存款准备金率，影响金融机构的信贷资金供应能力，从而间接调控
美国应对金融危机的货币政策效果分析 摘要：在此次金融危机中，美国采取了一系列的货币政策措施进行拯救国内经济，其中不仅有常规的措施也应用了许多创新的货币政策工具，通过应用这些措施所取得的效果进行分析，观察这些货币政策的长期意义和趋势对于我国的货币政策机制的改革和深化具有重要的现实意义和参考价值。 关键字：美国金融危机货币政策效果分析启示 引言 美国的金融体系为美国经济的繁荣发展做出了巨大贡献，但是实践证明这个体系太不稳固、太过脆弱，每过几年就遭遇危机，不动产市场和信贷市场繁荣一段时间后，紧接着就是泡沫和紧缩。过度创新和复杂性压倒了这个体系的平衡，这个体系鼓励了短期利益的谋取而忽略了长期利益的培植。应该看到越来越多的信用工具给美国创造的巨大利益，但这些利益转瞬又因为金融体系对消费者的保护失败而灰飞烟灭，让美国民众陷入了他们无法理解也无力承受的债务困境，并且因从事这些金融活动能获得巨额回报又引发了大规模的金融欺诈，在该体系的监管内外又产生了大量杠杆信贷和风险【1】。危机不断，但每次危机过后美国政府的救市措施却备受关注，其中也不乏借鉴意义。 自2007年8月美国的次贷危机全面爆发以来，美国政府就采取一系列措施进行应对。美联储作为美国金融市场的监管部门就一直对美国的金融市场采取着积极的干预政策。其中在比较极端的措施上，美联储主导了摩根大通对贝尔斯登的收购，并提出了对投资银行等非银行机构监管扩权的诉求，同时又直接推动对美国两大房地产公司——“房地美”和“房利美”的救助计划，直至奥巴马政府在与国会的妥协下出台的7000亿美元大规模救市计划。在货币政策方面，美联储主要采取了以流动性注入为主的扩张性政策。美联储在推行这项措施之时创造性的拓展了货币政策工具和应用途径，从而也增强了其政策效果。那么现在就让我们来看一下，美联储具体的货币政策措施。 一，美国在次贷危机下的货币政策操作 （一）美联储的传统货币政策
中国货币政策的有效性分析 【摘要】货币政策有效性问题一直以来都是国内外学者研究宏观经济学的重点与热点。改革开放以来,我国的经济高速发展,世界瞩目。中国能够长期保持高增长的速度,通货膨胀又不特别明显,货币政策功不可没。但近几年来,我们明显感觉到货币政策的操作难度加大,货币政策的效果也趋于不明显,这也招致了不少学者的批判。批判显然不是最好的武器!发现问题,研究问题,解决问题是学者的本分。这也是笔者写作的目的所在。同样作为中央银行货币政策“三大法宝”之一的法定存款准备金制度,近年来对于其作用在理论界引起了不小的争论。存款准备金作为货币政策工具的作用有逐渐弱化的趋势,一些西方发达国家或纷纷取消存款准备金制度,或用其它政策工具代替存款准备金进行货币调控,但在我国,却频频使用这一被称为“巨斧”的货币政策工具。因此,研究探讨关于我国存款准备金制度及其政策效应问题,有助于加深人们对中国货币政策调整中许多现实问题的认识,有助于弄清影响存款准备金作用效果的体制性和制度性问题,从而为我国存款准备金制度的改革把握方向。基于以上分析,本文以我国中央银行法定存款准备金率的调整来分析中国货币政策有效性作为研究对象。在前人的研究成果和对国内外货币政策实践把握的基础上,立足于中国货币政策有效性的现实,运用规范分析和实证分析,定性与定量相结合等研究方法,对中国货币政策有效性问题从理论到实践、从抽象到具体做了系统分析。论文力图通过对中国货币政策实施的有效性进行实证分析,在此基础上着重从货币的内生性方面分析影响我国货币政策有效性的因素,最终提出提高我国货币政策有效性的建议。 【关键词】货币政策；有效性；法定存款准备金率 2003年以来，我国GDP增长率连续五年超过10%。但是，在经济高速发展的同时，通货膨胀一直持续急升，继2007年我国消费者物价指数(CPI)同比增长4.8%后，2008年第一季度我国CPI同比增长8%。中国政府已经将治理通货膨胀视为宏观经济第一要务。这次的通货膨胀主要表现在：⑴构成CPI的八大商品类别看，上涨幅度较大的主要是食品类价格。2006年以来，国际粮食价格全线上涨，大部分农作物的价格、涨幅均达到近十年来的最高水平。⑵随着次级债危机影响的不断扩散，美元持续贬值，导致以美元计价的国际石油、有色金属等能源和基础产品
谈货币政策效果与我国金融市场的完善 摘要：我国针对经济过热采取的紧缩性货币政策没有取得预期效果的主要原因有：货币市场中利率未能完全市场化，导致货币政策传导机制受阻；外汇市场中大量外汇储备的存在和大量国际游资的涌入，对我国货币政策独立性产生冲击；资本市场中公开市场不完善等。为完善金融市场，发挥货币政策调控宏观经济的效果，应将sHIBOR作为新基准利率逐步完善；建立国际游资准入制度；放松人民币汇率管制；开放公开市场业务，充分利用国债市场；加强证监会和行业自律组织作用等。 关键词：货币政策；宏观调控；公开市场；金融市场；基准利率 随着我国市场经济体制的建立和逐步完善，国家宏观调控的角色也越来越重要。几年来，作为宏观调控手段之一的货币政策曾多次被搬上经济舞台，但是效果却总是不尽如人意，究其原因，是货币政策的实施缺乏一个完善的金融市场为依托。本文通过对我国最近几年货币政策效果的分析，来透视我国金融市场中存在的问题，并提出相关解决方案。 一、对我国近年来实施的货币政策及其效果的分析 近几年，俗称“三驾马车”的投资、出口和消费是拉动我国经济增长的三大原动力。到20XX年，我国进出口增长速度达％，总额实现21 670亿美元；其中出口增长26％，达12210亿美元，进口增长20％，达9460亿美元，全年实现贸易顺差2750亿美元。居民消费价格涨幅也逐月走高，农产品价格飙涨，直接导致消费物价指数(CPI)自3月份起涨幅连续9个月超过央行设定的3％警戒线；8月份后连续4个月超过6％，通货膨胀压力进一步加大。股市行情更是波澜壮阔。沪深股指连创新高，总市值亦快速增长。两年前上证指数在1000点的时候，两市总市值不过3万亿元，仅两年，总市值增长10倍。针对当时这种经济形势，我国货币当局立即采取了紧缩性的货币政策。仅20XX年就加息六次，提高存款准备金率十次；20XX年又四次提高法定存款准备金率，到20XX年5月20日，法定存款准备金率已提高到％。20XX年第六次加息时。存款基准利率已提高到％，一年期基准贷款利率已提高到％。然而，货币政策效果却不如人意：一方面，众所周知，股价与市场利率成反比。然而20XX年我国屡次提高利率，股价不降反而不断飙升；另一方面。我国的通货膨胀压力也没有得到有效的缓解，反而不断恶化。到20XX年1月份，居民消费价格总水平同比上涨％；从20XX年7
2017中国货币政策分析 [2017中国货币政策] 货币政策是指中央银行为实现既定的目标，运用各种工具调节货币供应量来调节市场利率，通过市场利率的变化来影响民间的资本投资，影响总需求来影响宏观经济运行的各种方针措施。以下是小编为您整理的2017中国货币政策，希望对您有帮助。 2017中国货币政策如下 一、公开市场业务 在多数发达国家，公开市场操作是中央银行吞吐基础货币，调节市场流动性的主要货币政策工具，通过中央银行与指定交易商进行有价证券和外汇交易，实现货币政策调控目标。中国公开市场操作包括人民币操作和外汇操作两部分。 外汇公开市场操作1994年3月启动，人民币公开市场操作1998年5月26日恢复交易，规模逐步扩大。 1999年以来，公开市场操作已成为中国人民银行货币政策日常操作的重要工具，对于调控货币供应量、调节商业银行流动性水平、引导货币市场利率走势发挥了积极的作用。 二、存款准备金政策 存款准备金是指金融机构为保证客户提取存款和资金清算需要而准备的资金，金融机构按规定向中央银行缴纳的存款准备金占其存款总额的比例就是存款准备金率。存款准备金制度是在中央银行体制下建立起来的，世界上美国最早以法律形式规定商业银行向中央银行缴存存款准备金。 存款准备金制度的初始作用是保证存款的支付和清算，之后才逐渐演变成为货币政策工具，中央银行通过调整存款准备金率，影响金融机构的信贷资金供应能力，从而间接调控货币供应量。 1998年存款准备金制度改革
经国务院同意，中国人民银行决定，从1998年3月21日起，对存款准备金制度进行改革，主要内容有以下七项： (一)将原各金融机构在人民银行的准备金存款和备付金存款两个帐户合并，称为准备金存款帐户。 (二)法定存款准备金率从13%下调到8%。准备金存款帐户超额部分的总量及分布由各金融机构自行确定。 (三)对各金融机构的法定存款准备金按法人统一考核。法定准备金的交存分以下情况： 1.中国工商银行、中国农业银行、中国银行、中国建设银行、中国农业发展银行、中信银行、中国光大银行、华夏银行、中国投资银行、中国民生银行的法定存款准备金，由各总行统一存入人民银行总行。 2.交通银行、广东发展银行、招商银行、上海浦东发展银行、福建兴业银行、海南发展银行、烟台住房储蓄银行、蚌埠住房储蓄银行的法定存款准备金，由各总行统一存入其总行所在地的人民银行分行。 3. 各城市商业银行的法定存款准备金，由其总行统一存入当地人民银行分行。 4. 城市信用社(含县联社)的法定存款准备金，由法人存入当地人民银行分、支行。农村信用社的法定存款准备金，按现行体制存入当地人民银行分、支行。 5.信托投资公司、财务公司、金融租赁公司等其他非银行金融机构的法定存款准备金，由法人统一存入其总部所在地的人民银行总行(或分行)。 6. 经批准，已办理人民币业务的外资银行、中外合资银行等外资金融机构，其人民币法定存款准备金，由其法人(或其一家分行)统一存入所在地人民银行分行。 (四)对各金融机构法定存款准备金按旬考核。 1. 各商业银行(不含城市商业银行)和中国农业发展银行，当旬第五日至下旬第四日每日营业终了时，各行按统一法人存入的准备金存款余额，与上旬末该行全行一般存款余额之比，不低