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名词解释：1完善资本市场：又被称为“无摩擦资本市场”,是金融经济学家所假想出来的一种资本市场环境。
2有效市场：有效资本市场是证券价格能够全面、及时反映有关全部信息的证券市场。
3要求报酬率：又称必要报酬率，是投资者根据投资行为所承担风险程度的大小而主观确定的报酬率水平，是风险与收益权衡的结果。
4预期报酬率又称期望报酬率，是投资者综合各种可能的或然性对投资的收益水平所做的客观估计，是市场理性预测的结果。
5投资组合理论认为，若干种证券（资产）组成的投资组合，其收益是这些证券收益的加权平均数，但是其风险却不是这些证券风险的加权平均，是它所包含的各种资产的方差的加权平均数，再加上各种资产之间协方差的加权平均数的倍数。
6某种证券的期望收益=无风险资产收益率+证券的贝塔系数×风险溢价 这个公式被称为资本资产定价模型，或简称CAPM ,它表明某种证券的期望收益于该种证券的贝塔系数线性相关。
7市场组合是由资本市场上存在的全部风险资产按各自的市场价值占全部风险资产市场总价值的比重组成的组合（所有现存证券按照市场价值加权计算所得到的组合） 8企业价值：是指企业作为市场经济体制下具有一定生产经营功能的整体，市场对其潜在盈利能力和发展前景的评价与认同。
9综合资本成本又称加权平均资本成本，是指以各种资本占全部资本的比重为权数，对个别资本成本进行加权平均确定的。
10资本结构:是指企业各种资本的构成及其比例关系。
广义的资本结构是指企业全部资金（包括长期和短期资金）的构成及其比例关系，也叫资金结构。
狭义的资本结构仅指企业长期债务资本和权益资本(股本)的构成比例。
11无税MM 理论：命题一：总价值命题：杠杆公司的价值等同于无杠杆公司的价值。
命题二：风险补偿命题：股东的期望收益率随财务杠杆的增加而增加。
命题三：投资报酬率命题：内含报酬率大于综合资本成本，是投资决策的基本前提。
（在没有税收的世界中，公司价值与债务无关。
）12有税MM 理论：命题一：赋税节余命题：杆企业的价值等于同风险等级的无杠杆企业的价值加上赋税节余额，赋税节余额等于公司所得税率与负债额的乘积。
财务会计理论第4章有效证券市场4.1概述在这一章，我们将考虑证券市场中投资者之间的相互作用。
有效证券市场理论预言投资者之间的相互作用会导致证券价格呈现出一些有意义的特征。
究其本质来说，证券价格能“正确地反映”投资者的集体知识和信息处理能力。
价格参与这个机制的过程非常复杂，以至于难以为我们充分理解。
不过，这个过程的大致轮廓却很容易看出，我们也将集中精力讨论它。
证券市场的有效性给财务会计提供了许多重要的启示，其中一条便是直接导致了“充分披露”的概念。
有效性意味着证券市场所评价的不是信息披露的形式，而是所披露信息的实质内容。
这样，在脚注和补充报表中的披露与财务报表的披露同样有信息效力。
实际上，有效市场理论认为，会计正与其他信息渠道—例如新闻媒体、财务分析师甚至市场价格本身—相互竞争。
会计要想得以生存就必须为投资者传递相关、可靠、及时和符合成本效益原则的信息。
有效证券市场理论还提醒我们注意，会计之所以能够存在的理论上的基本原因，即信息不对称。
当某些证券市场的参与者比其他的人知道的更多时，证券市场中就会存在一种压力去寻找一种机制。
通过这种机制，拥有信息优势的投资者能够可靠地将他们所获知的信息传递给他人—如果他们愿意这样做的话；而处于信息劣势的投资者通过这个机制可以保护自己而不致为信息优势者所剥削。
“内部交易”就是类似的一个例子。
这样，我们就可以视会计为一种机制，它能够将相关的信息从公司内部传递给外部。
这不仅有助于投资者做出更好的决策，而且还可以通过促进证券市场的有效运作带来社会效益。
总的来说，财务会计准则制定组织已经接受了“充分披露”的方法。
为了对此予以解释，我们将从“信息观”的角度来考察近来两个相关的会计准则。
4.2 有效证券市场4.2.1 有效性的含义在第3章，我们研究了理性投资者的最优投资决策。
现在，我们将考虑当大量的理性投资者在证券市场上相互作用时会有什么情况发生。
我们所感兴趣的是参与市场交易的证券的市场价格特征，以及这些价格是如何为新的信息所影响。
盈余管理分析盈余管理分析摘要：盈余管理就是企业管理当局在遵循会计准则的基础上，通过对企业对外报告的会计收益信息进行控制或调整，以达到主体自身利益最大化的行为。
实施盈余管理主要有六种动因，两大类方法。
其本身具有四个特点。
可以通过加强研究合理规范来去弊存利。
关键词：盈余管理涵义动因方法特点一、盈余管理的涵义对于什么是盈余管理，至今并无定论。
美国会计学者斯考特（Scott）《财务会计理论》中指出:盈余管理是会计政策的选择具有经济后果的一种具体表现。
Paul M. Healy and James M.Wahlen(1999)提出:盈余管理使为了误导股东对公司潜在经济业绩的理解，或影响基于报告的会计数据的契约的结果，在编制财务报告和构造交易事项以改变财务报告时做出的判断过程. William J. Bruns， Kenneth A. Merchant认为:盈余管理包括会计操纵和经营操纵两个层面。
在会计政策许可的范围内，在构造业务交易和编制财务会计报告时作出职业判断和会计选择目前我国普遍认为:盈余管理就是企业管理当局为了自身的利益或为了使股东财富最大化的会计行为。
二、盈余管理的动因和条件1.盈余管理的根本原因是企业管理当局与利益相关者（包括股东、债权人、职工、客户等）之间利益的不一致。
.实施盈余管理主要有以下目的：一是管理当局完成委托代理契约;二是筹资目的，达到上市或配股的要求;三是合理避税;四是获取政治成本，使企业通过面临的与会计数据明显正相关的严格管制和监控;五是规避债务契约约束；六是企业高层管理人员的更迭。
2.盈余管理的条件:委托代理契约的不完全性(人们的认识水平，成本的约束等);会计准则，会计制度的不完善性(制度的空缺，可选择空间较大)，信息的不对称性，现行会计理论和会计方法的固有缺陷(如权责发生制的确认标准，重要性和稳健性原则应用，会计估计的大量存在等)三、盈余管理的方法盈余管理主要是借助于会计政策的选择来实现的，但又不仅限于会计方法。
CEO变更与盈余管理--基于PSM和DID方法的分析关健;段澄梦【摘要】Based on the data of A-share listed manufacturing companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2011 to 2015, this paper adopts propensity score matching and difference-in-difference methods, and compares and analyzes the earnings management differences of companies between CEO have and have not changed, to explore the net effect of CEO turnover on earnings management. The results indicate that the earnings management levels of companies with CEO have changed are higher than companies with CEO have not changed. The further study shows that the earnings management levels caused by CEO turnover are higher when CEO and the chairman changed together, and the CEO successor is from the outside of the company or the company is non-state-owned. Additionally, the num⁃ber of boards’meetings and a balanced concentrated ownership structure have some inhibitory effects on earnings management caused by CEO turnover.%文章以2011-2015年我国沪深两市A股制造业上市公司为样本，采用倾向得分匹配法和双重差分法，对比分析发生和未发生CEO变更公司的盈余管理差异，探讨CEO变更对盈余管理的“净效应”。
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Stiglitz, "On the Impossibility of Informationally EfficientMarkets," American Economic Review (1980), 393-408.*Diamond, D. and R. Verrecchia, "Information Aggregation in a Noisy Rational Expectations Economy," Journal of Financial Economics, (1981), 221-35.*Milgrom, P. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, (1981): 380-91.Grinblatt, M. and S. Ross, "Market Power in a Securities Market with Endogenous Information," Quarterly Journal of Economics, (1985), 1143-67.2. Financial Disclosure* Verrecchia, R. 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Stiglitz, "The Architecture of Economic Systems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies," American Economic Review (1986), 716-727Aoki, M. "Horizontal vs. Vertical Information Structure of the Firm," American Economic Review (1986), 971-983.Tirole, J. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization (1986), 181-214.Christensen, J. "Communication in Agencies," Bell Journal of Economics, (1981), 661-674.Grossman, S. and O. Hart, "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Horizontal Integration," Journal of Political Economy, (1986), 691-719.Mookherjee, D. "Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies (1984), 433-46.Demski, J. and D. Sappington, "Optimal Incentives with Multiple Agents," Journal of Economic Theory (1984), 152-71.Holmstrom, B. and J. Tirole, "The Theory of the Firm," in Handbook of Industrial Organization, 1990.Williamson, O. Markets and Hierarchies, 1975Williamson, O. 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Field Studies of Management Accounting*Baiman, S., D.F. Larcker, and M.V. Rajan, "Organizational Design for Business Units," Journal of Accounting Research, 33 (Autumn 1995): 205-231.Lee, C.J. “Financial Restructuring of State-owned Enterprises in China: The Case of Shanghai Sunve Co.” Accounting, Organization and Society, fo rthcoming.Part 3. Auditing and Accounting Regulation9. Role of Auditing*R.A. Dye, B.V. Balachandran, and R.P. Magee, "Contingent Fees for Audit Firms," Journal of Accounting Research, (1990), 239-266.*L. DeAngelo, "Auditor Independence, 'Low Balling,' and Disclosure Regulation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, (1981), 113-27.*Lee, C.J. and Z. Gu, " Low Balling, Legal Liability and Auditor Independence,” Accounting Review, 1998.Magee, R.P. and M. Tseng, "Audit Pricing and Independence," Accounting Review, (1990), 315-336.Datar, S., G.A. Feltham, and J.S. Hughes, "The Role of Audits and Audit Quality in Valuing New Issues," Journal of Accounting and Economics, (1991), 3-50.7Penno, M. "Auditing for Performance Evaluation," Accounting Review, (1990),520-536.Melumad, N.D. and L. Thoman, "On Auditors and the Courts in an Adverse Selection Setting," Journal of Accounting Research, (1990) 77-120.Baiman, S., J.H. Evans III, and N.J. Nagarajan, "Collusion in Auditing," Journal of Accounting Research, (1991), 1-18.10. Financial Accounting Standards*Dye, R. and R.E. Verrecchia, "Discretion vs. Uniformity: Choices Among GAAP," Accounting Review, July 1995, 389-415.Farrell, J. and G. Saloner, "Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation," Rand Journal of Economics. 16 (Spring 1985): 70-83.*Lev, B. "Toward a Theory of Equitable and Efficient Accounting Policy," Accounting Review, January 1988.11. The Market of CPAs*Dye, R. "Incorporation and the Audit Market," Journal of Accounting and Economics, 19 (1995): 75-114.*Lee, C.J., C. Liu, and T. Wang, “The 150 Hours Rule,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1999.Liu, C., C.J. Lee, and T. Wang, “Human Capital, Auditor Independence, and Legal Liability,” working paper.Riodan, M. and D. Sappington, "Information, Incentives, and Organizational Mode,"Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102 (1987): 243-264.*Gigler, F. and M. Penno, "Imperfect Competition in Audit Markets and its Effects on the Demand for Audit-Related Services," Accounting Review, 70 (April 1995):317-336.。
