毕业设计外文翻译----投资项目管理的新模式
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本科毕业论文外文翻译外文译文题目:不确定条件下生产线平衡:鲁棒优化模型和最优解解法学院:机械自动化专业:工业工程学号: 201003166045学生姓名: 宋倩指导教师:潘莉日期: 二○一四年五月Assembly line balancing under uncertainty: Robust optimization modelsand exact solution methodÖncü Hazır , Alexandre DolguiComputers &Industrial Engineering,2013,65:261–267不确定条件下生产线平衡:鲁棒优化模型和最优解解法安库·汉泽,亚历山大·多桂计算机与工业工程,2013,65:261–267摘要这项研究涉及在不确定条件下的生产线平衡,并提出两个鲁棒优化模型。
假设了不确定性区间运行的时间。
该方法提出了生成线设计方法,使其免受混乱的破坏。
基于分解的算法开发出来并与增强策略结合起来解决大规模优化实例.该算法的效率已被测试,实验结果也已经发表。
本文的理论贡献在于文中提出的模型和基于分解的精确算法的开发.另外,基于我们的算法设计出的基于不确定性整合的生产线的产出率会更高,因此也更具有实际意义。
此外,这是一个在装配线平衡问题上的开创性工作,并应该作为一个决策支持系统的基础。
关键字:装配线平衡;不确定性; 鲁棒优化;组合优化;精确算法1.简介装配线就是包括一系列在车间中进行连续操作的生产系统。
零部件依次向下移动直到完工。
它们通常被使用在高效地生产大量地标准件的工业行业之中。
在这方面,建模和解决生产线平衡问题也鉴于工业对于效率的追求变得日益重要。
生产线平衡处理的是分配作业到工作站来优化一些预定义的目标函数。
那些定义操作顺序的优先关系都是要被考虑的,同时也要对能力或基于成本的目标函数进行优化。
就生产(绍尔,1999)产品型号的数量来说,装配线可分为三类:单一模型(SALBP),混合模型(MALBP)和多模式(MMALBP)。
金融体制、融资约束与投资——来自OECD的实证分析R.SemenovDepartment of Economics,University of Nijmegen,Nijmegen(荷兰内梅亨大学,经济学院)这篇论文考查了OECD的11个国家中现金流量对企业投资的影响.我们发现不同国家之间投资对企业内部可获取资金的敏感性具有显著差异,并且银企之间具有明显的紧密关系的国家的敏感性比银企之间具有公平关系的国家的低.同时,我们发现融资约束与整体金融发展指标不存在关系.我们的结论与资本市场信息和激励问题对企业投资具有重要作用这种观点一致,并且紧密的银企关系会减少这些问题从而增加企业获取外部融资的渠道。
一、引言各个国家的企业在显著不同的金融体制下运行。
金融发展水平的差别(例如,相对GDP的信用额度和相对GDP的相应股票市场的资本化程度),在所有者和管理者关系、企业和债权人的模式中,企业控制的市场活动水平可以很好地被记录.在完美资本市场,对于具有正的净现值投资机会的企业将一直获得资金。
然而,经济理论表明市场摩擦,诸如信息不对称和激励问题会使获得外部资本更加昂贵,并且具有盈利投资机会的企业不一定能够获取所需资本.这表明融资要素,例如内部产生资金数量、新债务和权益的可得性,共同决定了企业的投资决策.现今已经有大量考查外部资金可得性对投资决策的影响的实证资料(可参考,例如Fazzari(1998)、 Hoshi(1991)、 Chapman(1996)、Samuel(1998)).大多数研究结果表明金融变量例如现金流量有助于解释企业的投资水平。
这项研究结果解释表明企业投资受限于外部资金的可得性。
很多模型强调运行正常的金融中介和金融市场有助于改善信息不对称和交易成本,减缓不对称问题,从而促使储蓄资金投着长期和高回报的项目,并且提高资源的有效配置(参看Levine(1997)的评论文章)。
因而我们预期用于更加发达的金融体制的国家的企业将更容易获得外部融资.几位学者已经指出建立企业和金融中介机构可进一步缓解金融市场摩擦。
本科生毕业设计(论文)外文翻译外文题目:A Strategic Framework for Customer Relationship Management 译文题目:客户关系管理的战略框架学生姓名:专业:工业工程指导教师姓名:评阅日期:Adrian Payne & Pennie FrowA Strategic Framework for Customer RelationshipManagementOver the past decade, there has been an explosion of interest in customer relationship management (CRM) by both academics and executives. However, despite an increasing amount of published material, most of which is practitioner oriented, there remains a lack of agreement about what CRM is and how CRM strategy should be developed. The purpose of this article is to develop a process-oriented conceptual framework that positions CRM at a strategic level by identifying the key crossfunctional processes involved in the development of CRM strategy. More specifically, the aims of this article are•To identify alternative perspectives of CRM,•To emphasize the importance of a strategic approach to CRM within a holistic organizational context,•To propose five key generic cross-functional processes that organizations can use to develop and deliver an effective CRM strategy, and•To develop a process-based conceptual framework for CRM strategy development and to review the role and components of each process.We organize this article in three main parts. First, we explore the role of CRM and identify three alternative perspectives of CRM. Second, we consider the need for a cross-functional process-based approach to CRM. We develop criteria for process selection and identify five key CRM processes. Third, we propose a strategic conceptual framework that is constructed of these five processes and examine the components of each process.The development of this framework is a response to a challenge by Reinartz, Krafft, and Hoyer (2004), who criticize the severe lack of CRM research that takes a broader, more strategic focus. The article does not explore people issues related to CRM implementation. Customer relationship management can fail when a limitednumber of employees are committed to the initiative; thus, employee engagement and change management are essential issues in CRM implementation. In our discussion, we emphasize such implementation and people issues as a priority area for further research.CRM Perspectives and DefinitionThe term “customer relationship management” emerged in the information technology (IT) vendor community and practitioner community in the mid-1990s. It is often used to describe technology-based customer solutions, such as sales force automation (SFA). In the academic community, the terms “relationship marketing” and CRM are often used interchangeably (Parvatiyar and Sheth 2001). However, CRM is more commonly used in the context of technology solutions and has been described as “information-enabled relationship marketing” (Ryals and Payne 2001, p.3). Zablah, Beuenger, and Johnston (2003, p. 116) suggest that CRM is “a philosophically-related offspring to relationship marketing which is for the most part neglected in the literature,” and they conclude that “further exploration of CRM and its related phenomena is not only warranted but also desperately needed.”A significant problem that many organizations deciding to adopt CRM face stems from the great deal of confusion about what constitutes CRM. In interviews with executives, which formed part of our research process (we describe this process subsequently), we found a wide range of views about what CRM means. To some, it meant direct mail, a loyalty card scheme, or a database, whereas others envisioned it as a help desk or a call center. Some said that it was about populating a data warehouse or undertaking data mining; others considered CRM an e-commerce solution, such as the use of a personalization engine on the Internet or a relational database for SFA. This lack of a widely accepted and appropriate definition of CRM can contribute to the failure of a CRM project when an organization views CRM from a limited technology perspective or undertakes CRM on a fragmented basis.The definitions and descriptions of CRM that different authors and authorities use vary considerably, signifying a variety of CRM viewpoints. To identify alternativeperspectives of CRM, we considered definitions and descriptions of CRM from a range of sources, which we summarize in the Appendix. We excluded other, similar definitions from this list.Grabner-Kraeuter and Moedritscher (2002) suggest that the absence of a strategic framework for CRM from which to define success is one reason for the disappointing results of many CRM initiatives. This view was supported both by the senior executives we interviewed during our research and by Gartner’s (2001) research. Our next challenges were to identify key generic CRM processes using the previously described selection criteria and to develop them into a conceptual framework for CRM strategy development.Our literature review found that few CRM frameworks exist; those that did were not based on a process-oriented cross-functional conceptualization of CRM. For example, Sue and Morin (2001, p. 6) outline a framework for CRM based on initiatives, expected results, and contributions, but this is not process based, and “many initiatives are not explicitly identified in the framework.” Winer (2001, p. 91) develops a “basic model, which contains a set of 7 basic components: a database of customer activity; analyses of the database; given the analyses, decisions about which customers to target; tools for targeting the customers; how to build relationships with the targeted customers; privacy issues; and metrics for measuring the success of the CRM program.” Again, this model, though useful, is not a crossfunctional process-based conceptualization. This gap in the literature suggests that there is a need for a new systematic process-based CRM strategy framework. Synthesis of the diverse concepts in the literature on CRM and relationship marketing into a single, process-based framework should provide practical insights to help companies achieve greater success with CRM strategy development and implementation.Interaction ResearchConceptual frameworks and theory are typically based on combining previous literature, common sense, and experience (Eisenhardt 1989). In this research, weintegrated a synthesis of the literature with learning from field-based interactions with executives to develop and refine the CRM strategy framework. In this approach, we used what Gummesson (2002a) terms “interaction research.” This form of research originates from his view that “interaction and communication play a crucial role” in the stages of research and that testing concepts, ideas, and results through interaction with different target groups is “an integral part of the whole research process” (p. 345). The sources for these field-based insights, which include executives primarily from large enterprises in the business-tobusiness and business-to-consumer sectors, included the following:•An expert panel of 34 highly experienced executives;•Interviews with 20 executives working in CRM, marketing, and IT roles in companies in the financial services sector;•Interviews with six executives from large CRM vendors and with five executives from three CRM and strategy consultancies;•Individual and group discussions with CRM, marketing, and IT managers at workshops with 18 CRM vendors, analysts, and their clients, including Accenture, Baan, BroadVision, Chordiant, EDS, E.piphany, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Gartner, NCR Teradata, Peoplesoft, Oracle, SAP, SAS Institute, Siebel, Sybase, and Unisys;•Piloting the framework as a planning tool in the financial services and automotive sectors; and•Using the framework as a planning tool in two companies: global telecommunications and global logistics. Six workshops were held in each company.Process Identification and the CRM FrameworkWe began by identifying possible generic CRM processes from the CRM and related business literature. We then discussed these tentative processes interactively with the groups of executives. The outcome of this work was a short 170 / Journal of Marketing, October 2005 list of seven processes. We then used the expert panel of experienced CRM executives who had assisted in the development of the process selection schema to nominate the CRM processes that they considered important andto agree on those that were the most relevant and generic. After an initial group workshop, each panel member independently completed a list representing his or her view of the key generic processes that met the six previously agreed-on process criteria. The data were fed back to this group, and a detailed discussion followed to help confirm our understanding of the process categories.As a result of this interactive method, five CRM processes that met the selection criteria were identified; all five were agreed on as important generic processes by more than two-thirds of the group in the first iteration. Subsequently, we received strong confirmation of these as key generic CRM processes by several of the other groups of managers. The resultant five generic processes were (1) the strategy development process, (2) the value creation process, (3) the multichannel integration process, (4) the information management process, and (5) the performance assessment process.We then incorporated these five key generic CRM processes into a preliminary conceptual framework. This initial framework and the development of subsequent versions were both informed by and further refined by our interactions with two primary executive groups: mangers from the previously noted companies and executives from three CRM consulting firms. Participants at several academic conferences on CRM and relationship marketing also assisted with comments and criticisms of previous versions. With evolving versions of the framework, we combined a synthesis of relevant literature with field-based interactions involving the groups. The framework went through a considerable number of major iterations and minor revisions; the final version appears in Figure 2.This conceptual framework illustrates the interactive set of strategic processes that commences with a detailed review of an organization’s strategy (the strategy development process) and concludes with an improvement in business results and increased share value (the performance assessment process). The concept that competitive advantage stems from the creation of value for the customer and for the business and associated cocreation activities (the value creation process) is well developed in the marketing literature. For large companies, CRM activity will involvecollecting and intelligently using customer and other relevant data (the information process) to build a consistently superior customer experience and enduring customer relationships (the multichannel integration process). The iterative nature of CRM strategy development is highlighted by the arrows between the processes in both directions in Figure 2; they represent interaction and feedback loops between the different processes. The circular arrows in the value creation process reflect the cocreation process. We now examine the key components we identified in each process. As with our prior work, we used the interaction research method in the identification of these process components.客户关系管理的战略框架在过去的十年里,管理层和学术界对客户关系管理(CRM)的兴趣激增。
薪酬管理外文文献翻译The existence of an agency problem in a corporation due to the separation of ownership and control has been widely studied in literatures. This paper examines the effects of management compensation schemes on corporate investment decisions. This paper is significant because it helps to understand the relationship between them. This understandings allow the design of an optimal management compensation scheme to induce the manager to act towards the goals and best interests of the company. Grossman and Hart (1983) investigate the principal agency problem. Since the actions of the agent are unobservable and the first best course of actions can not be achieved, Grossman and Hart show that optimal management compensation scheme should be adopted to induce the manager to choose the second best course of actions. Besides management compensation schemes, other means to alleviate the agency problems are also explored. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest two ways for reducing the agency problem: competitive market mechanisms and direct contractual provisions. Manne (1965) argues that a market mechanism such as the threat of a takeover provided by the market can be used for corporate control. "Ex-post settling up" by the managerial labour market can also discipline managers and induce them to pursue the interests of shareholders. Fama (1980) shows that if managerial labour markets function properly, and if the deviation of the firm's actual performancefrom stockholders' optimum is settled up in managers' compensation, then the agency cost will be fully borne by the agent (manager).The theoretical arguments of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Haugen and Senbet (1981), and empirical evidence of Amihud andLev (1981), Walking and Long (1984), Agrawal and Mandelker (1985), andBenston (1985), among others, suggest that managers' holding of common stock and stock options have an important effect on managerial incentives. For example, Benston finds that changes in the value of managers' stock holdings are larger than their annual employment income. Agrawal and Mandelker find that executive security holdings have a role in reducing agency problems. This implies that the share holdings and stock options of the managers are likely to affect the corporate investment decisions. A typical management scheme consists of flat salary, bonus payment and stock options. However, the studies, so far, only provide links between the stock options and corporate investment decisions. There are few evidences that the compensation schemes may have impacts on thecorporate investment decisions. This paper aims to provide a theoretical framework to study the effects of management compensation schemes on the corporate investment decisions. Assuming that the compensation schemes consist of flat salary, bonus payment, and stock options, I first examine the effects of alternative compensation schemes on corporate investment decisions under all-equity financing. Secondly, I examine the issue in a setting where a firm relies on debt financing. Briefly speaking, the findings are consistent with Amihud and Lev's results.Managers who have high shareholdings and rewarded by intensive profit sharing ratio tend to underinvest.However, the underinvestment problem can be mitigated by increasing the financial leverage. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section II presents the model. Section HI discusses the managerial incentives under all-equity financing. Section IV examines the managerial incentives under debt financing. Section V discusses the empirical implications and presents the conclusions of the study.I consider a three-date two-period model. At time t0, a firm is established and goes public. There are now two kinds of owners in the firm, namely, the controlling shareholder and the atomistic shareholders. The proceeds from initial public offering are invested in some risky assets which generate an intermediate earnings, I, at t,. At the beginning, the firm also decides its financial structure. A manager is also hired to operate the firm at this time. The manager is entitled to hold a fraction of the firm's common stocks and stock options, a (where0<a<l), at the beginning of the first period. At time t,, the firm receives intermediate earnings, denoted by I, from the initial asset. At the same time, a new project investment is available to the firm. For simplicity, the model assumes that the firm needs all the intermediate earnings, I, to invest in the new project. If the project is accepted at t,, it produces a stochastic earnings Y in t2, such that Y={I+X, I-X}, with Prob[Y=I+X] = p and Prob[Y=I-X] = 1-p, respectively. The probability, p, is a uniform density function with an interval rangedfrom 0 to 1. Initially, the model also assumes that the net earnings, X, is less than initial investment, I. This assumption is reasonable since most of the investment can not earn a more than 100% rate of return. Later, this assumption is relaxed to investigate the effect of the extraordinarily profitable investment on the results. For simplicity, It is also assumed that there is no time value for the money and no dividend will be paid before t2. If the project is rejected at t,, the intermediate earnings, I, will be kept in the firm and its value at t2 will be equal to I. Effects of Management Compensation Schemes on Corporate Investment Decision Overinvestment versus UnderinvestmentA risk neutral investor should invest in a new project if it generates a positiexpected payoff. If the payoff is normally or symmetrically distributed, tinvestor should invest whenever the probability of making a positive earninggreater than 0.5. The minimum level of probability for making an investment the neutral investor is known as the cut-off probability. The project will generzero expected payoff at a cut-off probability. If the investor invests only in tprojects with the cut-off probability greater than 0.5, then the investor tendsinvest in the less risky projects and this is known as the underinvestment. Ifinvestor invests the projects with a cut-off probability less than 0.5, then tinvestor tends to invest in more risky projects and this is known as thoverinvestment. In the paper, it is assumed that the atomistic shareholders risk neutral, the manager and controlling shareholder are risk averse.It has been argued that risk-reduction activities are considered as managerial perquisites in the context of the agency cost model. Managers tend to engage in these risk-reduction activities to decrease their largely undiversifiable "employment risk" (Amihud and Lev 1981). The finding in this paper is consistent with Amihud and Lev's empirical result. Managers tend to underinvest when they have higher shareholdings and larger profit sharing percentage. This result is independent of the level of debt financing. Although the paper can not predict themanager's action when he has a large profit sharing percentage and the profit cashflow has high variance (X > I), it shows that the manager with high shareholding will underinvest in the project. This is inconsistent with the best interests of the atomistic shareholders. However, the underinvestment problem can be mitigated by increasing the financial leverage.The results and findings in this paper provides several testable hypotheses forfuture research. If the managers underinvest in the projects, the company willunderperform in long run. Thus the earnings can be used as a proxy forunderinvestment, and a negative relationship between earningsandmanagement shareholdings, stock options or profit sharing ratiois expected.As theunderinvestment problem can be alleviated by increasing the financialleverage, a positiverelationship between earnings and financial leverage isexpected.在一个公司由于所有权和控制权的分离的代理问题存在的文献中得到了广泛的研究。
南京理工大学泰州科技学院毕业设计(论文)外文资料翻译学院(系):商学院专业:会计学姓名:林晟学号: 0706130352外文出处: IGOR FILATOTCHEV. OwnershipConcentration,‘PrivateBenefits of Control’ and DebtFinancing[J].Journal of CorporationLaw,2004,Vol.29.No.4,719-734 附件:1.外文资料翻译译文;2.外文原文。
附件1:外文资料翻译译文审股权集中度,“控制权私人收益”和债务融资IGOR FILATOTCHEV摘要:基于快速成长的'法律和经济’文献,本文分析了主要所有者在以牺牲小股东利益而获取“控制权私人收益”的环境中进行债务融资的公司治理。
这表明,所有权集中是与作为一个公司的负债比率和衡量投资的财政资源的使用效率较低有关,而这并不取决于最大股东的身份,固定的具有支配权的股东可以串通股权持有者进行控股溢价。
这个结论的其中一个可能的结果就是债务市场的企业信贷压缩,这有转型期经济体的证据支持。
关键词:所有权,控制权收益,债务引言有一个大量研究金融经济学和战略管理的文献显示获得控制权私人收益的方式和数量与管理行为和企业业绩有关。
(Gibbs, 1993;Hoskisson et al., 1994;Jensen and Warner, 1988)然而,大多以往的研究集中于大型、公开的在传统的美国/英国公司控制模型的框架范围内分散所有权的上市公司,很少是关于所有权集中的公司治理(Holderness and Sheehan, 1988;Short,1994)。
快速成长的企业所有制结构的优化取决于“控制权私人收益”的水平。
(e.g., Bennedsen and Wol fenzon, 2000; Grossman and Hart, 1988;Harris and Raviv, 1988)。
华南理工大学广州学院本科生毕业设计(论文)翻译英文原文名Review of Vibration Analysis Methods for Gearbox Diagnostics and Prognostics中文译名对变速箱振动分析的诊断和预测方法综述学院汽车工程学院专业班级车辆工程七班学生姓名刘嘉先学生学号201130085184指导教师李利平填写日期2015年3月15日英文原文版出处:Proceedings of the 54th Meeting of the Society for Machinery Failure Prevention Technology, Virginia Beach,V A, May 1-4,2000,p. 623-634译文成绩:指导教师(导师组长)签名:译文:简介特征提取技术在文献中有描述;然而,大多数人似乎掩盖所需的特定的预处理功能。
一些文件没有提供足够的细节重现他们的结果,并没有一个全面的比较传统的功能过渡齿轮箱数据。
常用术语,如“残差信号”,是指在不同的文件不同的技术.试图定义了状态维修社区中的常用术语和建立所需的特定的预处理加工特性。
本文的重点是对所使用的齿轮故障检测功能。
功能分为五个不同的组基于预处理的需要。
论文的第一部分将提供预处理流程的概述和其中每个特性计算的处理方案。
在下一节中,为特征提取技术描述,将更详细地讨论每一个功能。
最后一节将简要概述的宾夕法尼亚州立大学陆军研究实验室的CBM工具箱用于齿轮故障诊断。
特征提取概述许多类型的缺陷或损伤会增加机械振动水平。
这些振动水平,然后由加速度转换为电信号进行数据测量。
原则上,关于受监视的计算机的健康的信息被包含在这个振动签名。
因此,新的或当前振动签名可以与以前的签名进行比较,以确定该元件是否正常行为或显示故障的迹象。
在实践中,这种比较是不能奏效的。
由于大的变型中,签名的直接比较是困难的。
相反,一个涉及从所述振动署名数据特征提取更多有用的技术也可以使用。
附件1(毕业设计一)材料科学与工程学院毕业实习环节外文翻译要求一、翻译论文的选择:1、与自己毕业设计相关的外文参考文献2、该译文可以作为设计论文中文献综述中的部分内容;3、原则上选取的英语原文不超过5页。
二、译文结构内容1、作者,英文原文题目,期刊名称,卷期号,年份,起止页码,2、文章题目,作者(保持英文,不需翻译),作者单位(英文不变)3、摘要,关键词4、正文部分:引言,试验过程,结果与讨论,结论,参考文献(保持原文状态)5、译文中的图标需要翻译,图可以复印后粘贴或扫描插入三、译文和原文统一装订在一起,独立与毕业论文一起上交四、几点附属说明1 文章所在期刊的期刊名及相关信息不要翻译。
2 文章的作者,作者的单位,地址,下注的通讯作者的情况,参考文献不要翻译。
3文章的题目,摘要,关键词,及正文都要按照原文的顺序来翻译。
4文章中图表翻译示例如下:此为翻译前的表格:此为翻译后的表格:表1 微波和常规方法加工的粉体金属样品的性能Table 1 Properties of microwave and conventionally processedpowdered metal samplesMW 代表微波烧结;conv代表常规方法。
大部分微波烧结的样品的断裂模量比常规方法烧结的要高。
许多微波烧结的样品的密度也是高于常规方法烧成的样品。
MW, microwave processed; conv., conventionally processed. Themodulus of rupture(MOR) of most microwave-processed samples ishigher than that of the conventional samples. The densities of manymicrowave-processed samples are also higher than those ofconventional samples.即表头和注释中英文都要。
南京理工大学紫金学院毕业设计(论文)外文资料翻译系:机械系专业:车辆工程专业姓名:宋磊春学号:070102234外文出处:EDU_E_CAT_VBA_FF_V5R9(用外文写)附件:1。
外文资料翻译译文;2.外文原文.附件1:外文资料翻译译文CATIA V5 的自动化CATIA V5的自动化和脚本:在NT 和Unix上:脚本允许你用宏指令以非常简单的方式计划CATIA。
CATIA 使用在MS –VBScript中(V5.x中在NT和UNIX3。
0 )的共用部分来使得在两个平台上运行相同的宏。
在NT 平台上:自动化允许CATIA像Word/Excel或者Visual Basic程序那样与其他外用分享目标。
ATIA 能使用Word/Excel对象就像Word/Excel能使用CATIA 对象。
在Unix 平台上:CATIA将来的版本将允许从Java分享它的对象。
这将提供在Unix 和NT 之间的一个完美兼容。
CATIA V5 自动化:介绍(仅限NT)自动化允许在几个进程之间的联系:CATIA V5 在NT 上:接口COM:Visual Basic 脚本(对宏来说),Visual Basic 为应用(适合前:Word/Excel ),Visual Basic。
COM(零部件目标模型)是“微软“标准于几个应用程序之间的共享对象。
Automation 是一种“微软“技术,它使用一种解释环境中的COM对象。
ActiveX 组成部分是“微软“标准于几个应用程序之间的共享对象,即使在解释环境里。
OLE(对象的链接与嵌入)意思是资料可以在一个其他应用OLE的资料里连结并且可以被编辑的方法(在适当的位置编辑).在VBScript,VBA和Visual Basic之间的差别:Visual Basic(VB)是全部的版本。
它能产生独立的计划,它也能建立ActiveX 和服务器。
它可以被编辑。
VB中提供了一个补充文件名为“在线丛书“(VB的5。
外文翻译(首页)学生姓名:刘勇专业:工程管理毕业设计(论文)题目:建设项目的管理模式译文题目:The model Of Construction project management译文来源及字符数:Successful Project Management 13875指导教师姓名:崔东红____指导教师评语:评阅日期:建设项目的管理模式项目各参与方的组织业主的高层管理设定总体方针,同时选择合适的组织来负责给定的项目任务。
在业主的方针中,会指出如何将项目生命周期中的任务划分给不同的组织,以及聘用什么样的专业人员。
业主高层管理所做出的决策也将对被选出进行项目管理的组织产生影响。
通常会有多种分解项目阶段的方法,其中最为典型的是:1.顺序划分,项目被划分成独立的几个阶段,各阶段按连续顺序进行。
2.平行划分,项目被划分成独立的几个部分,各部分同时进行。
3.交叉划分,项目阶段可以进行搭接。
例如,快速路径法的应用。
这里需要指出的是哪种分解方法更为有效,这完全取决于项目的具体情况。
在多数情况下,按顺序划分的方法更为普遍一些。
涉及项目管理的关键问题有:1.项目涉及多少个组织?2.各组织间的联系是什么?3.各组织何时介入项目?尽管由于业主和承包商之间所采用合同条件的不同,会产生很多种完成项目的组织形,但基本的形式只有两种,并按照下面的思路来划分。
1.独立型组织。
相对于业主,会出现咨询方或承包商等多种分别处理设计和施工任务的组织,涉及这种类型组织的典型例子有:设计和施工的传统顺序模式;专业化的建设项目管理模式。
2.集约型组织。
由不同组织组成一个单一联合体,以统一指令来承担设计和施工任务。
这里介绍两种极端的例子:业主自行建造项目,在这里所有工作均由业主内部部门处理;交钥匙项目,即合同的所有工作内容都交给一个卖方,由他负责向业主提交完工项目。
建设项目的管理组织形式可视具体情况而定。
一种情况是,项目所需人员由职能部门提供由专职项目经理领导直至项目结束,如图2-4所示。
A New Management Model of Governmental Investment Projects in ChinaCM is a construction model in which owners commit their project to construction manager to take charge of the whole management,including feasibility research,designing,procedure,construction,operation and so on.CM project manager has the right to pick up contractors and architects under the limitation of the contract.In China,Agent construction system is called Turnkey, and is a management model of engineering construction by means of consigning the project to specialized engineering management organization that is called agent owner, who is familiar to laws,regulations,and construction procurements.Agent owners are responsible for the control of investment management and construction of the project.After the project has been finished,agent owners will turn the project over to owners.In China,agent construction system specially applies in the area of governmental investment project.In the past.project construction adopted the conventional management models,such as part A—part B contract,headquarters,and infrastructure department and so on.These project management models brought about many deficiencies,such as non—professional management,overspending investment budget,and corruption phenomena,etc.But agent construction system can overcome these shortcomings. Agent construction system embodies the principle of fair, open and just for investors,deputy and user.It nails their rights and obligations down with contracts;the project is operated in the light of biding,contract,and supervision.Deputies can easily control the investment and scale of project.Moreover, agent construction system" can guarantee the quality of design and construction,and decrease the project cost,for deputies accumulate lots of experience in professional technology and management in practice for a long time.In short,because of the separation of construction,management and use,agent construction system makes for implementing the goal of financial mechanism,laws and market.It can stimulate deputies to control investment and improve quality.Furthermore,the specialized team has guaranteed the specialized levels of project construction and management.This agent construction system,a new management model of engineering construction ,is adapted to governmental investment project in China.With deepening of the reform,it is necessary that agent construction system is gradually popular in China. 2.Reviews on Experimental Practice of Agent Construction SystemAmong practical experiments of agent construction system,Shanghai an d Shenzhen are typical of experimental cities.In 1999,Shanghai PuDong Consultant Company was committed by Shanghai Planning Commission and wholly took charge of construct Shanghai fiscal project.It is the beginning of agent construction system in Shanghai.In December 2001,Shangha i municipality issued “suggestions on promoting the experience about reform of construction management system of governmental investment projects.”The issue focused on separating the function of govemental investment from investment management.It can radically change government furnctions.In addition,It is helpful to set up the own ers’ status of investment and promote the foundation of engineeringmanagement market.After the issue comissen to being,the owners’ status of investment for governmental investment project has been established.Under agent construction model,engineering management firms that act as agent owners accept the commission of government and manage the governmental investment projects. There are more than 20 provinces or cities to use agent construction system to construction governmental investment projects or public projects.In April 1998,Shanxi province founded a general construction management office to act for the owner of non-profit important project invested by government.Beijing issued “Management methods of age nt construction model for govermental investment project in Beijing” on March 1,2004.According to the situation,two groups of agent construction model have been formed.One is the Shenzhen model that the appointed organization takes on the owner and manager of project,which refers to Hongkong mode1.Another is the Shanghai model,which adopts active measures,cultivates many engineering management firms,and properly separates the function of owner from project management.3.Analysis oil the Problems Existing in the Course of Practice of Agent Construction Model3.1 The Kind,Qualification,Operation of Deputy Need to Be Clarified. First,the kind of deputy af fects the foundation of agent construction model’s regulations.As far as the present situation is concerned,there are three types of deputies,namely enterprise,public institution,government body.That different places adopt different types causes a confused situation and does harm to the operation of agent constructionmode1.Second,the qualification of deputies is different and needs to perfect again.Third,the operation mode is different.Some are that the deputies under owners’commission employ funds,and build and manage the project all over the whole process;Some are that the joint departments established by owners anddeputies construct and manage,and then appropriate funds.Finally, agent scope is too narrow.Agent construction model is limited to the public welfare project invested or dominated by government.3.2 Agent Construction Model lacks of Uniform RegulationFirst,deputies as the erectors and administrators of project needed to check budgets and ratify funds.Thus original financial application,compilation of budget,and appropriation of funds should harmonize between user and agency and renew regulation.Second,the host of financial management and accounting accounts is not clear.In the agent model,the project works in earlier stage maybe are finished by agencies;At one time,user purchases chief equipment by itself.Because user and agent both use funds,the problems come into being:who is the host of accounting,who should take charge of financial management,and who complete final accounts. Third,the standard of agencies’com issions hasn’t uniform regulation.Different places adopt different standards.Some determ ine the agencies’ comissions according to contractors’ administrative expenses;some adopt costs adding axes and proper profits;3.3 Agencies Are Weak and a Fair Agency Market Hasn’t Been FormedFirst,as a whole,the quality of agencies isn’t high.Many agencies transit from original construction units,engineering consulting firms,engineering supervisor firms,engineering procurement firms,so their economic strengths,stafs ’ quality, internal governance and so on can’t reach the request.Second,the number of agencies is not large.In fact,only when many agencies join it,a fair, effective agency market may be founded.But in our country, the number of qualified agencies is little and can’t meet the demand of market competition.4 . The Perfection of Regulation of Agent Construction SystemGovermment department should summarize the experimental experiences and set down the regulations to direct the operation of agent model in the kind,qualification,operation type,responsibilities,project scope,agent mode of agencies and so on.4.1 Type of Agent OrganizationsFrom the trend of development,the main type of agencies is enterprise.As far as status quo is concerned,government bodies in China are so over starfed that fiscal burden is too heavy.So the policy has been implemented in order to simplify the government departments and reduce the staftrimmer.If the type of agencies is government body or public institute,it deviates the policy of the govermment and aggravates the fiscal burden.Thus the chief type of agencies should be enterprises who self-operate and self-take on profits or loss.4.2 Qualification of Agent FirmsAgencies must be qualified engineering management firms and generally have some basic conditions as follows.First,they own the qualification of a level.Second,they have more than One year experience of engineering management,and have taken on the total management of a project which financial amount is over 100million RMB.Third,engineering management firms demand more registered capitals if they take on the larger investment projects. Fourth,the chief and technical principals should own higher qualification,the experiences and the capabilities of conduct,harmony, organization;or take charge of a project invested over 100 million RMB.Fifth,they have designated a numbers of professional certificates,including higher engineer, higher economist,registered cost engineer, registered structure engineer, registered supervision engineer and agency qualification.Further more,they have the capabilities of checking design,auditing budgets,supervising engineering quality and safety.4.3 Execution of Agent WorksBy now, the level of agencies is low on the whole.Most agencies can’t meet the required qualification,lack practical experiences of total management and conduction.In addition,we lack of laws and regulations about agent model,and the depth of external surveillance isn’t enough.Thus,we may adopt two kinds of ways in executing agent projects.One kind is dividing the project into two parts:site preparing works are consigned an agency to manage;construction works are consigned and other agency.Another kind is that total works are consigned an agency who has higher qualified engineering management firm to do.We should enhance the strength of engineering firm and promote the latter kind.4. 4 Scope of Agent ProjectAt present,the scope of agent project is narrower and only is limited to public welfare projects invested by government.So we need enlarge the scope of agent projects.Agent model is based on the theory of principal agent,restricts the behaviors of correlative attendees according to contracts,and makes their rights equal to the responsibilities.In fact,agent model only is a mode of engineering management. Many projects can utilize it,not only the non-profits governmental investment project.It is prescribed for ordinary non operation project to adoptagent model in “management methods of agent model for governmental investment project in Beijing”.中国的政府一种投资项目管理的新模式CM是业主向项目经理承诺到施工现场采取整体管理工作一个建筑模型,包括可行性研究,设计,程序,施工,运营等。