低碳经济论文_低碳经济国际合作博弈分析与机制研究

低碳经济论文：低碳经济国际合作博弈分析与机制研究【中文摘要】气候问题日益突出,使得低碳经济成为了国际社会政治、经济、外交上的焦点。

低碳经济的外部性决定了国际合作是其必然选择。

可是低碳经济中有关减排责任分担的争论阻碍了国际合作的推进。

发达国家坚持认为发展中国家应该与其一道承担减排限排责任。

而发展中国家坚持认为发达国家是气候问题的主要责任者,基于公平原则,他们应该率先减排,并向发展中国家提供资金和技术上的支持。

由于减排涉及经济发展方式的调整,成本巨大,将制约经济发展速度,对减排量的争论实质是对经济发展空间的争夺。

作为一种“生存权”“发展权”,关于碳排放权分配的争论已经演变为公平和效率之争。

从兼顾公平和效率角度出发,本文借助博弈论构建了“一个产权,两次分配”的碳排放量分配模型。

“一个产权”是指将全球碳排放量在各主权国家进行分配,界定各主权国家排放量限额,并将这种限额视为一种可以行使国家主权的“产权”。

这基于科斯定理,通过明晰产权能有效解决公共品供给不足的问题,实现资源的优化配置。

“两次分配”是指为兼顾公平和效率,对碳排放权进行两次分配。

第一次分配将基于公平原则,以考虑各国经济发展阶段的差异为前提,在保证经济发展优先需求的基础上合理分配全球碳排放权。

第二次分配则是以市场为主导的分配,以通过市场规律实现低碳经济全球资源的合理配置,实现减排成本的最小化。

“一个产权,两次分配”既满足了国家之间平等的生存权和发展权,又有效地提高了低碳经济的收益和降低了其成本。

但国际交往中较高的交易成本及国际监督机制的缺乏,决定了国际合作需要国际合作机制来保障。

基于此,本文构建了成本分担机制、选择性激励机制、碳交易机制和环境非政府组织参与机制。

成本分担机制基于公平提出了“谁排放谁承担”的原则,指出由于当前的气候问题主要是发达国家多年的工业化造成的,因此他们应该成为主要的成本承担者。

随着发展中国家温室气体排放量的激增,在兼顾其经济发展需要的同时,也应承担相应的减排责任。

选择性激励机制则以分析各主权国家的利益诉求为出发点,寻求有针对性的激励措施,以规范约束个体的行为,克服“搭便车”和个体机会主义倾向,促进合作并实现合作的稳定。

本文总结归纳了常用的三类激励措施：问题链、利益补偿机制、社会性激励机制。

“两次分配”中的第二次分配为碳市场的建立提供了理论基础。

本文在对现有碳市场体系分析的基础上,指出现有碳市场的分散性、独立性限制了资源的全球配置。

各国减排成本的巨大差异,使这种市场格局在短期内将维系。

对于现阶段碳市场交易机制的构建,我们应该的关注碳市场基本管理制度的完善,以为碳市场的全球融合奠定基础。

环境非政府组织以丰富的专业知识和全球化的网络资源,在国际问题中发挥着独特桥梁作用,不仅能为国际合作机制带来新思想,而且发挥着监督作用。

在低碳经济的国际合作中,他们以最大化人类共同利益为目标,突破了主权国家对个体短期经济利益的追求,必将有利于低碳经济国际合作的推进。

基于此,在低碳经济国际合作中,应该增强环境非政府组织的参与力度,以为低碳经济国际合作带来转机。

【英文摘要】With the climate problemmore and more severe, the low-carbon economy has become a focus in international politics, economy, and Foreign Affairs. Considering externalities of the low-carbon economy, international cooperation has become necessary. But the debate about emission-sharing obstructs the international cooperation. Developed countries insist that developing countries also should limit and reduce their emissions. The developing countries insist that developed countries should be primarily responsible for climate issues. Based on the principle of fairness, they should take the lead in emission reduction, and provide developing countries with financial and technical supports. Reduction will bring about adjustment of the existing economic mode, which will spend greatly and constrain economic growth. The debate on reduction is essentially the debate of economic development space. Considering emission as the right to subsistence and development, the debate on emission-sharing has evolved into dispute between fairness and efficiency.Considering both fairness and efficiency, this paper constructs the allocation model about carbon emission with game theory ---”A property, Two distributions”.”A property” refers todistribute global carbon emissions among countries, and define national emissions limits, making this limits as a can of “property.” This is based on the Coase Theorem. Clear property rights can effectively solve the problem of inadequate supply of public goods to achieve the optimal allocation of resources. “Two distributions” is to allocate the carbon emissions twice to achieve the balance between fairness and efficiency. In consideration of different stages in economic development among nations, the first distribution will launch on fairness to meet the priority of economic development. The second allocation will depend on the market in order to achieve the optimal allocation of global resources, minimizing the cost.”A property, two distributions” not only satisfies the equality on the right to subsistence and development, but also effectively improves the benefits of low carbon economy and reduce its costs. However, there has high transaction costs and lacks international monitoring mechanisms in the international community. So we should construct international cooperation mechanisms to achieve international cooperation. Based on this, we construct the cost-sharing mechanism, selective incentives mechanism, carbon tradingmechanism and participation mechanism for environmental non-governmental organizations. Cost-sharing mechanism follows “Who emits, Who bears” principle on fairness. Because the current climate problem is caused by the industrialization of the developed countries for many years, they should burden the major cost. As developing countries emit more and more greenhouse gas, they also should bear the corresponding responsibility for emissions reduction. Analyzing interest demands of different nations, selective incentive mechanism designs measures to inspire and constraint the individual behavior to conquer “free ride”and the tendency of individual opportunism. It will promote cooperation and keep cooperation stable. This article introduces three measures:Issue Linkage, Interest Compensation Mechanism, Social Incentive Mechanism.The second distribution in “Two Distributions” provides a theoretical basis for constructing carbon market. After analyzing the existing carbon market system, this paper points out that the dispersion of existing carbon markets impedes the global allotment of resources. Differences in reduction cost make the market pattern unchanged in the short term. At this stage, we should pay more attention toconsummating the basic management system of the carbon market, to lay the foundation for globalintegration.Environmental non-governmental organizations possess abundant professional knowledge and global resources. They play unique role in international issues. On the one hand, they bring new ideas for international cooperation mechanisms; on the other hand, they play a supervisory role. In the low-carbon economy, sovereign countries are committed to maximize individual interests, while they are committed to maximize the common interests of mankind, which will propel international cooperation. Based on this, in international cooperation of the low-carbon economy, we should actively provide opportunities for the environmental non-governmental organizations to participate in international cooperation.【关键词】低碳经济公平和效率成本分担机制选择性激励机制【英文关键词】low-carbon economy fairness and efficiency cost-sharing mechanism selective incentive mechanism【目录】低碳经济国际合作博弈分析与机制研究摘要6-8Abstract8-9第1章绪论12-241.1 选题背景12-131.2 国内外研究现状13-201.2.1 国际合作与国际合作机制的相关理论13-161.2.2 关于低碳经济国际合作的研究16-181.2.3 关于国际合作难点的研究18-201.3 本文的研究思路、方法与主要内容20-241.3.1 研究思路及方法20-211.3.2 研究内容21-24第2章低碳经济国际合作特征及利益冲突24-332.1 低碳经济国际合作现状24-252.2 低碳经济特征分析25-272.3 低碳经济博弈中的利益集团27-312.3.1 欧盟利益集团27-282.3.2 美国为首的伞形集团28-292.3.3 以中国为首的发展中大国29-302.3.4 小岛屿国家联盟30-312.4 不同集体利益诉求差异及其冲突31-33第3章低碳经济国际合作的博弈模型33-443.1 合作博弈分析34-373.1.1 引论34-353.1.2 困境的破解35-373.2 公平和效率之争:碳排放权的分配37-443.2.1 “一个产权,两次分配”37-383.2.2 碳排放权的初始分配模型38-403.2.3 碳排放权的第二次分配模型40-44第4章低碳经济国际合作机制44-584.1 低碳经济国际合作的基本原则454.2 成本构成及成本分担机制45-474.2.1 成本构成45-464.2.2 成本分担机制46-474.3 选择性激励机制47-504.3.1 引论47-484.3.2 各类激励机制48-504.4 碳市场与碳交易机制50-554.4.1 碳市场体系51-524.4.2 碳交易机制52-554.5 环境非政府组织及其参与机制55-564.5.1 环境非政府组织的作用554.5.2 环境非政府组织的参与机制55-564.6 本章小结56-58结论58-61致谢61-62参考文献62-66攻读硕士学位期间发表的论文66。