解读浑水关于分众传媒的报告

分众传媒分析报告1. 背景介绍分众传媒是一家中国领先的户外传媒公司，成立于2003年。

公司主要从事户外广告牌、公交车广告、电梯广告等传媒形式的销售和推广。

该公司在中国市场占据了重要地位，并且在海外也有一定的业务拓展。

本文将对分众传媒进行详细的分析，以深入了解该公司的业务模式、竞争优势和未来发展前景。

2. 业务模式分析分众传媒通过与房地产开发商、交通运输公司以及其他广告客户的合作，将广告牌、公交车广告等媒体资源出租或销售给客户。

该公司的主要收入来源是广告销售和租赁。

分众传媒通过自有媒体资源和与其他媒体资源提供商的合作，形成了庞大的户外媒体网络，为广告客户提供了广告展示的渠道。

3. 竞争优势分析分众传媒在中国的广告市场拥有一定的竞争优势。

其主要竞争优势包括： - 广告资源优势：分众传媒在全国范围内拥有大量的广告资源，包括广告牌、公交车广告等。

这些广告资源的分布广泛，能够覆盖到不同地区的潜在消费者。

- 客户合作关系：分众传媒与众多房地产开发商、交通运输公司以及其他广告客户建立了长期稳定的合作关系。

这些合作关系在一定程度上保证了公司的收入稳定性。

- 团队专业素质：分众传媒拥有一支经验丰富、专业素质高的团队。

他们具有市场调研、广告策划和销售等方面的专业知识和技能，能够为客户提供全方位的广告解决方案。

4. 市场前景展望分众传媒作为中国领先的户外传媒公司，未来的市场前景十分广阔。

以下是未来发展的几个趋势和机遇： - 数字化转型：随着科技的发展，传统户外广告正在逐渐数字化。

分众传媒可以通过数字化转型，为客户提供更加精准的广告投放和数据分析服务。

- 地理扩张：分众传媒在海外市场也有一定的业务拓展。

未来，公司可以继续在国内外市场扩大业务规模，进一步提高市场份额。

- 创新广告形式：随着人们对广告的接受度下降，创新广告形式将成为未来的发展趋势。

分众传媒可以通过开发新的广告形式，吸引更多广告客户并获得竞争优势。

5. 风险与挑战在市场发展过程中，分众传媒也面临一些风险和挑战： - 竞争加剧：随着市场的发展，竞争对手不断增多，市场竞争压力也越来越大。

分众传媒2019年财务分析综合报告分众传媒2019年财务分析综合报告一、实现利润分析2019年实现利润为234,816.5万元，与2018年的694,193.23万元相比有较大幅度下降，下降66.17%。

实现利润主要来自于内部经营业务，企业盈利基础比较可靠。

在营业收入大幅度下降的同时经营利润也大幅度下降，企业经营业务开展得很不理想。

二、成本费用分析2019年营业成本为664,960.41万元，与2018年的491,649.2万元相比有较大增长，增长35.25%。

2019年销售费用为225,625.59万元，与2018年的233,100.43万元相比有所下降，下降3.21%。

2019年在销售费用下降的同时营业收入却出现了更大幅度的下降，并引起营业利润的下降，企业市场销售形势迅速恶化，应当采取措施，调整销售战略或销售力量。

2019年管理费用为57,607.22万元，与2018年的41,219.72万元相比有较大增长，增长39.76%。

2019年管理费用占营业收入的比例为4.75%，与2018年的2.83%相比有所提高，提高1.91个百分点。

这在营业收入大幅度下降情况下常常出现，但要采取措施遏止盈利水平的大幅度下降趋势。

本期财务费用为-1,968.99万元。

三、资产结构分析2019年企业不合理资金占用项目较少，资产的盈力能力较强，资产结构合理。

从流动资产与收入变化情况来看，流动资产下降慢于营业收入下降，资产的盈利能力下降，与2018年相比，资产结构趋于恶化。

四、偿债能力分析从支付能力来看，分众传媒2019年是有现金支付能力的。

企业财务费用小于0或缺乏利息支出数据，无法进行负债经营风险判断。

五、盈利能力分析分众传媒2019年的营业利润率为19.50%，总资产报酬率为12.35%，内部资料，妥善保管第1 页共3 页。

做空机构浑水再发报告质疑分众周五大跌5%2012年01月07日05:33腾讯科技金铎我要评论(10)字号：T|T腾讯科技讯（金铎）北京时间1月7日消息，做空机构浑水（Muddy Waters Research）官网周五盘中放出一份针对分众传媒的最新报告，质疑分众从其员工手中购买一处位于俄罗斯和朝鲜交界处的人参种植园（“珲春盛泰人参种植有限公司”）的动机。

受此影响，分众传媒股价周五收盘下跌5.43%，报18.63美元，盘中跌幅一度达到8.5%。

做空机构浑水再发报告质疑（腾讯科技配图）浑水称，人参种植园的“献售股东”在将其转手给分众时，距离他们买下这座种植园仅5个月，而当中包括至少一名分众员工。

此外，种植园看上去没有任何运营，但最近却称实现了1500万美元营收、净利率高达48.9%。

浑水认为购买这座种植园的动机，并建议分众传媒的审计机构德勤（Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu）调查其中是否有不当行为。

盛泰人参种植有限公司注册办公室所在地（腾讯科技配图）分众传媒副总裁嵇海荣今日凌晨在微博上对此回应称：“浑水公司提出的猜疑，完全不符事实。

实际上是分众收购吉林一家加盟商叫吉林分众，吉林分众的股东在三年对价期间，去购买了一个在老少边穷地区享受很好税收优惠政策的种植公司并将业务改为LCD广告销售，之后这个公司作为吉林分众LCD业务的销售公司也成为分众的子公司”。

嵇海荣表示：“由这个公司来销售LCD广告可享受当地二年的特殊所得税优惠。

分众对吉林的整个业务收购三年总对价也就二三百万美元，三年结束后老股东之一的王峰(微博)还按此对价回购了百分之十五并继续在吉林分众担任股东及总经理。

分众下周会公告并充分地解答疑问。

”嵇海荣还表示，值得质疑的倒是浑水公司每次发报告之前一段时间总会有几家基金先知先觉地做空或购买大把看空期权，建议相关部门加以调查。

以下为报告全文：分众传媒收购位于俄罗斯和朝鲜边界的一家人参种植园表明，分众传媒的收购存在问题。

Note: You should assume we have a short position in FMCN as of this report – prior to reading this reportsee important disclaimer on the last page (page 9).FMCN: Reiterating Strong SellMuddy Waters, LLCFebruary 9, 2012 Muddy Waters was Right about FMCN’s LCD Network Overstatement;Independent Verification Counted Cardboard Posters Instead of LCDsWeak Attempt at Jedi Mind Trick ExposedIn our November 21, 2011 report on FMCN, we accused management of fraudulently overstating the size of its LCD Network. FMCN had previously defined the LCD Network as a “network of flat-panel television displays.” FMCN first vehemently denied our charges that it overstated the LCD Network size, and then independently “verified” that its previously reported number of 185,174 LCD Network displays was correct. However, over 30,500 of those “verified” displays are not LCD televisions at all – rather, they are mere cardboard posters. Not only does this mean that FMCN management was brazenly lying to investors in the wake of our report, but the lies sharply call into question the veracity of FMCN’s reported financials. We estimate that each LCD television generates monthly revenue seven times that of a cardboard poster. Separately, on November 29, 2011 we pointed out that FMCN had previously grossly lied about the size of its movie theater advertising network. FMCN’s recent attempt to explain away that lie is almost as ridiculous as its conflation of cardboard with LCDs. The implication for investors is that if the inputs to the financials (network sizes) are lies, then why wouldn’t the outputs (revenue and profit) also be lies? As the old saying goes, “garbage in, garbage out.”Muddy Waters was Right All AlongIndependent “verification” proves Muddy Waters was correct when we concluded FMCN lied about the size of its LCD Commercial Display Network. In order for FMCN to meet its disclosed numbers, it had to include approximately 30,500 cardboard posters in its LCD display network count. In other words, per FMCN’s own verified data, over 15% of FMCN’s LCD network consists not of LCDs – but of cardboard.FMCN’s prior disclosures on its network make no allowance for cardboard displays. FMCN wrote the following in its 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010 20-Fs:“Our L CD d isplay n etwork, w hich r efers t o o ur n etwork o f f lat-­‐paneltelevision d isplays p laced…”11 2010 20-F pp. 38-9, 2009 20-F p. 36, 2008 20-F p. 35, 2007 20-F p.33.FMCN has made it unambiguous that “LCD” means Liquid Crystal – not Light Cardboard – Display. At least that was the case before Muddy Waters exposed FMCN’s fraud.(Based on strong evidence Muddy Waters still believes FMCN separately double counted another 32,500 Digital 2.0 displays from the poster frame segment as “LCD 2.0 Digital Picture Screens” under the LCD Network segment in order to get to its “verified” number.)We reiterate. In order to rebut Muddy Waters’s conclusion that FMCN overstated the size of its LCD Commercial Display Network, FMCN had to include 30,500 of the cardboard objects shown in the below picture (from FMCN’s website):Therefore, even putting aside the issue of whether FMCN double-counted some (actual) LCDs, FMCN overstated the size of its LCD Commercial Display Network. Muddy Waters was correct from the beginning.FMCN attempted to pull a Jedi mind trick by referring to the roughly 30,500 cardboard posters as “LCD 1.0 picture frame devices.” It strikes us that only a management with a significant degree of contempt for its shareholders would attempt to pass off a piece of cardboard as an LCD television. However, this is the same management that: •told investors its movie theater network was 17.6x the number of movie theatersin existence in China. (We discuss management’s almost-as-ridiculousjustification for this lie infra.)•traded in and out of Allyes, causing substantial losses to shareholders while generating tens of millions in profit for insiders and their friends (explaining that such insider gains were necessary to incentivize management, including soon-to-join members).• claimed to have acquired six SMS advertising companies that it in fact did not.2•Took Olympus style acquisition write downs of $1.1 billion on $1.6 billion in acquisitions.FMCN’s management either believes that investors are stupid, or that its Jedi powers are overwhelming.Muddy Waters was 100% correct that FMCN deliberately overstated the size of its LCD network. In FMCN’s responses to our reports, FMCN management has purposely deceived shareholders and analysts by including cardboard posters in the LCD count. We intend to bring this outrage to the attention of the SEC, but in the meantime we suggest FMCN now describe this network in its filings and communications as the “LCD and Cardboard Display Network.”Hidden in Plain Sight – How FMCN Used Cardboard Posters to Make its LCD NumberRemember when we asked whether independent verification in China is better than toilet paper?3 FMCN has provided its own resounding response of “NO!”On January 6th, 2012 FMCN announced that Ipsos Marketing Company completed a full count of FMCN’s LCD display network, and that FMCN currently has 185,174 displays in the network.4The problem is that 30,542 of these LCD displays aren’t LCDs at all – they’re just simple cardboard posters. FMCN ludicrously labeled these posters “LCD 1.0 picture frame devices” in five of its responses to our first report.5 In addition to cardboard having no meaningful characteristics in common with an LCD,6 a cardboard poster can hardly be called a “device.”2 FMCN claimed to have acquired parties to VIE agreements with these handset advertisers, but for numerous reasons outlined in our November 21st report, this explanation does not hold water.3 MW December 9, 2011 report reiterating Strong Sell on FMCN.4 /phoenix.zhtml?c=190067&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1645519&highlight=5 2011: November 22 & 29, December 14 & 22; January 6, 2012.6 It’s arguably noteworthy that both contain carbon atoms.“When I use a word’” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather ascornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean –neither more nor less.”7On January 6, 2012, FMCN filed the 2nd amendment to its 2010 20-F. In the amendment, FMCN discusses the inclusion of the “LCD 1.0 picture frame devices” in its LCD network size count. FMCN then tells us in the amended 20-F that these are really just cardboard posters. There are numerous references to this surprising fact throughout the filing, but the most telling is:Advertisements on our poster frame network and LCD 1.0 picture frame deviceson our LCD display network consist of full-color glossy advertising postersdesigned and provided by our advertising clients.8Note that in the above disclosure, FMCN is stating that the “LCD display network” contains cardboard posters. In other words, FMCN has valmorphanized9 cardboard into LCD. Who does that???!!!FMCN’s excuse for why it gets to call cardboard by the name “LCD” is similarly laughable. FMCN claims it used the cardboard posters instead of LCDs in these 30,500 locations because adequate power to run LCD televisions was unavailable.10 (Interestingly this problem only occurs in the well-developed Tier 2 cities of Tianjin,7 Humpty Dumpty quote and illustration from Carroll, Lewis Through the Looking Glass (1872).8 2nd Amended 2010 20-F, filed January 20, 2012, p. 46.9 /define.php?term=valmorification10 2nd Amended 2010 20-F, filed January 20, 2012, p. 42, and see FMCN November 29, 2011 press releaseKunming, and Shijiazhuang,11 which have a combined population of 29.4 million12) Because these posters were installed by the LCD division, which really, really wanted to put TVs in there but (goshdarnit!) wasn’t able to, FMCN think it’s justifiable to label the posters “LCD 1.0” “devices” and include them in the LCD network count.FMCN missed its opportunity to make clear that it had cardboard posters in its LCD count prior to:•calling Muddy Waters’s conclusion that FMCN overstates its LCD Network size “unfounded”,13•spending shareholder money on two “verifications” of its LCD network size when management knew that at least 30,500 of the “LCDs” were really cardboard, and thus contradicted FMCN’s own well-established definition of “LCD”, and •threatening to sue Muddy Waters.14Putting the above behavior aside, FMCN’s purported reason for installing cardboard posters instead of LCD TVs (lack of adequate power) is obviously yet another lie.A 17-inch LCD consumes peak power of approximately 20 watts.15 A typical elevator will draw upward of 50,000 watts during operation.16 (20 watts is 0.04% of 50,000 watts.) Moreover, even a tiny elevator (5’ x 5’) would require a 40-watt light bulb to light its interior.17How on God’s great earth could FMCN not find adequate power for an LCD television in either the elevator or elevator lobby? Are these posters in mine shafts?It is unreasonable to believe that FMCN’s LCD division, with its expertise honed from installing and maintaining over 100,000 real LCDs, could not find power sources for 30,500 LCDs in three Tier 2 cities. The real reason FMCN counted 30,500 cardboard posters in the LCD network is that Muddy Waters caught the company with its pants down, and management is now trying to lie its way out of trouble.So yes, when an independent report (supposedly) verifying the size of a flat-panel television network includes over 30,500 cardboard posters in its count, the report’s contents are as valueless as non-commercial excrement. Excrement, along with a study concluding FMCN didn’t overstate its network size, is better contained in soft colorless toilet paper.11 /phoenix.zhtml?c=190067&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1634311&highlight=12 13 /phoenix.zhtml?c=190067&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1632858&highlight=14 See FMCN’s January 6th and 9th press releases explaining that its acquisition of a ginseng farm was nothing more than a (dodgy) tax shelter.15 /en_US/product-and-parts/detail.page?&LegacyDocID=MIGR-7193016 /downloads/10KTechGuide.pdf17 Assuming a lighting requirement of 15 lumens / sq. ft. (375 lumens), one would need a General Electric A15 incandescent 40-watt light bulb, which produces 415 lumens.We believe that the post-MW report conflation of cardboard with LCD amounts to securities fraud and a violation of GAAP segment reporting principles (carried over from SFAS 131) – we see no Humpty Dumpty defense available under 10(b)-5. In any event, those points are for Deloitte, the SEC, and courts hearing investor class actions to ultimately decide.Movie Theater Count – A Coverup Almost as RidiculousOn November 29, 2011, we showed that FMCN in 2007 and 2008 20-F filings claimed to have 27,164 movie theaters in its network when the potential size of the market (per government statistics) was only 1,545 theaters. In other words, FMCN claimed to have market share of 1,758.2%.Here is how FMCN worded (emphasis added) its obviously false movie theater count disclosure in 2008:The cost of revenue for our movie theater and traditional outdoor billboardnetwork increased 101% from $28.5 million in 2007 to $57.3 million in 2008. The increase is primarily attributable to:…3) increased leasing costs associated withtime we rent on movie theater screens as a result of an increase in the number oftheaters we lease in our network from 10,930 in 2007 to 27,164 in 2008. Following our exposure of this lie, here is management’s tortured attempt to explain it away:Prior to 2009, we calculated the size of its movie theater network by calculatingthe number of screens on which each of its advertisers had purchased advertising and then summing the screen count for each advertiser to produce an aggregatenumber of screens. 18Per this revisionist definition, management wants investors to believe that FMCN previously defined “theater” as Σ(customers x screens purchased).19 Oh but there would be so many questions unanswered if this were true! For instance, would there be a new “theater” each time a customer re-purchased time on the same screen; or, is each “theater” all customer-buys on that screen, and if so, over what period?Management offered this explanation because they twice assumed investors are stupid – first when FMCN claimed to have 27,164 theaters, and then when management thought it could redefine the plain English meaning of “theater.” Chairman Jiang, investors aren’t that stupid – if you occasionally took some buy-side investors’ questions on the earnings worship calls, you’d probably know that.2018 2nd Amended 2010 20-F, filed January 20, 2012, p. 43.19 We’re not 100% sure we understand how FMCN purports to have calculated “theaters” – trying to figure the equation out is a bit like trying to determine the GPS coordinates for Narnia.20 As we pointed out on p. 18 of our November 21, 2011 report, FMCN has not taken any buy-side questions since its Q1 2007 call.What These Lies Mean for Investors’ MoneySince our initial report, we’ve heard some investors and analysts downplay the significance of these lies,21 and instead dissemble by focusing on the great numbers FMCN is reporting. However, because the lies about the number of LCD televisions and movie theaters in the network were used to support growth in reported revenues and profits, one has to wonder whether reported numbers are real. This is particularly true because we estimate that the average LCD television generates monthly revenue seven times that of a cardboard poster. Why would FMCN lie about the inputs to the numbers without also lying about the outputs?Our concern about whether FMCN’s core business numbers are accurate is most acute because FMCN’s LCD and cardboard display network business is opaque in the two areas that matter most – advertisement ASPs and location lease costs.FMCN’s LCD and cardboard display network business model is highly opaque on the revenue side. FMCN’s rate card is irrelevant to the revenues that FMCN generates because most customers receive a substantial discount from the rate card. The problem is that it is impossible to independently determine the discount levels.In the course of our research, we determined that the minimum discount offered to customers for Tier 1 advertisements is approximately 65% off the rate card. We believe that there are customers that receive Tier 1 ad discounts of more than 90% off the rate card. Further, we found that the discounts on Tier 2 ads are greater than those of Tier 1. We also found that most Tier 3 and 4 ads are usually free.There is no way to independently determine the weighted average discount by tier. It is therefore impossible to independently determine FMCN’s ASP. You have to take management at its word. We don’t.The screen location lease costs vary widely, and it is impossible to independently verify FMCN’s reporting of these numbers. In our research of location costs in Shanghai Class A office buildings, we found that FMCN pays anywhere from approximately $50 (RMB 300) per screen per month to $1,500 (RMB 10,000) per screen per month. Presumably the screens in residential buildings cost less, but we found it difficult to develop a reliable blended estimate. Because screen location lease costs can vary by orders of magnitude between similar locations, they cannot be independently verified. Thus, you have to take management at its word. Again, we don’t.21 We heard one second hand account of a conversation between an investor and an analyst with a major bank. We were told that during the conversation, the analyst claimed to have previously noted that the theater count was implausible, yet the analyst never became concerned about FMCN as a result.This management has demonstrated time and again that it should not be taken at its word. Further, the over the top nature of these lies paints the picture of a management who views its investors and analysts as gullible and worthy of contempt. We believe that the opacity of FMCN’s business model offers far too great of an opportunity for this management, with its demonstrated track record of lying and self-dealing, to play games with the numbers.AcknowledgementWhile we were satisfied that FMCN was double-counting the LCD 2.0 Digital Picture Screens to make its reported LCD network screen count, we had not caught FMCN’s admission that it needed to count over 30,500 cardboard posters in order to make its number. (The key information was largely buried in the recently filed 2nd amendment to FMCN’s 2010 20-F.)The credit for this observation belongs to published author and Seeking Alpha contributor Matt Berry. (Interestingly, Mr. Berry’s book is a guide to righteous behavior. We have expressed a copy of Mr. Berry’s book to Chairman Jiang.)22In an article published on February 6th, Mr. Berry called FMCN out on the LCD screens and the ridiculous explanation the company offered for its movie theater lie. We were impressed by both Mr. Berry’s analysis and use of sarcasm – particularly in equating FMCN’s conflation of cardboard and LCDs to conflating Ferraris and bicycles. Mr. Berry, our hat is off to you.WARNING: A printout of this Report is not a CRT Display22 Mr. Berry authored The Mechanics of Virtue: A Cynic’s Guide to Righteous Behavior, CreateSpace (Dec. 2009).DisclaimerUse of Muddy Waters LLC’s research is at your own risk. You should do your own research and due diligence before making any investment decision with respect to securities covered herein. You should assume that as of the publication date of any report or letter, Muddy Waters, LLC (possibly along with or through our members, partners, affiliates, employees, and/or consultants) along with our clients and/or investors has a short position in the stock (and/or options of the stock) covered herein, and therefore stands to realize significant gains in the event that the price of stock declines. Following publication of any report or letter, we intend to continue transacting in the securities covered therein, and we may be long, short, or neutral at any time hereafter regardless of our recommendation. This is not an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any security, nor shall any security be offered or sold to any person, in any jurisdiction in which such offer would be unlawful under the securities laws of such jurisdiction. Muddy Waters, LLC is not registered as an investment advisor. To the best of our ability and belief, all information contained herein is accurate and reliable, and has been obtained from public sources we believe to be accurate and reliable, and who are not insiders or connected persons of the stock covered herein or who may otherwise owe any fiduciary duty or duty of confidentiality to the issuer. However, such information is presented “as is,” without warranty of any kind – whether express or implied. Muddy Waters, LLC makes no representation, express or implied, as to the accuracy, timeliness, or completeness of any such information or with regard to the results to be obtained from its use. All expressions of opinion are subject to change without notice, and Muddy Waters, LLC does not undertake to update or supplement this report or any of the information contained herein. Before viewing the contents of this report, you agree that any dispute arising from your use of this report or viewing the material herein shall be governed by the laws of the State of California, without regard to any conflict of law provisions. You knowingly and independently agree to submit to the personal and exclusive jurisdiction of the superior courts located within the State of California and waive your right to any other jurisdiction or applicable law, given that Muddy Waters, LLC has offices in California. The failure of Muddy Waters, LLC to exercise or enforce any right or provision of this disclaimer shall not constitute a waiver of this right or provision. You agree that regardless of any statute or law to the contrary, any claim or cause of action arising out of or related to use of this report or the material herein must be filed within one (1) year after such claim or cause of action arose or be forever barred.。

分众传媒主业经营现状及对浑水作空报告的再分析本文主要对分众传媒近几年尤其是回归A股后的经营情况、主营业务、业务模式进行深度分析，在次基础上，对2011年浑水作空公司的几方面原因进行再回顾，找到公司的投资价值及风险因素。

一、公司经营现状1.1 营收情况2015年公司实现营业收入86.27亿元，净利润33.89亿元，分别增长15.07%和40.35%，实现扣非后净利润30.69亿元，同比增长44.5%，超过2015年承诺业绩29.59亿元，经营性净现金流26.3亿元，ROE高达73.7%。

2016年上半年公司实现营业收入49.27亿元，同比增长22.40%；归母净利润19.01亿元，同比增长23.58%。

对于2015年年报，公司净利润增速高于收入增速，公司解释如下：从公司运营看，稳定及有经验的管理团队通过媒体资源的持续优化、媒体运营成本的有效控制和媒体运营效率的提升，实现在相对增长有限的成本下的媒体覆盖率和刊挂率稳步提升。

与此同时，由于公司旗下各媒体在市场份额上的处于主导地位，在主营业务成本最重要的构成部分媒体租赁成本上拥有很强的议价能力，因此运营成本上升幅度较为有限，低于营收增长速度，因此2015年净利润增长率40.35%高于主营业务收入的增长率15.07%。

简单理解就是公司各项成本控制较好，而刊挂率及媒体覆盖率提升，导致毛利率提升，净利润增速高于收入增速。

数据来源：公司公告按照2014 年我国全媒体渠道广告收入计算，分众传媒广告收入位列第6 位，仅次于BAT 和两大电视媒体平台（CCTV&湖南卫视）。

但从增速看，以BAT为代表的互联网广告增速较快，而以CCTV、湖南卫视为代表的电视广告增速较慢。

表1 各广告媒体营收TOP15（按2014 年排列；亿元）数据来源：各公司财报、中国广告协会、艾瑞、CTR1.2 营收结构公司主要产品为楼宇媒体（包含楼宇视频媒体和框架媒体）、影院银幕广告媒体、卖场终端视频媒体等。

分众传媒2020年三季度风险分析详细报告
一、负债规模测算
1.短期资金需求
该企业经营活动的短期资金需求为105,434.09万元，2020年三季度已经取得的短期带息负债为18,863.23万元。

2.长期资金需求
该企业长期投融资活动不存在资金缺口，并且可以提供794,288.34万元的营运资本。

3.总资金需求
该企业资金富裕，富裕688,854.25万元，维持目前经营活动正常运转不需要从银行借款。

4.短期负债规模
根据企业当前的财务状况和盈利能力计算，企业有能力偿还的短期贷款规模为808,321.52万元，在持续经营一年之后，如果盈利能力不发生大的变化，企业有能力偿还的短期贷款规模是1,360,887.04万元，实际已经取得的短期带息负债为18,863.23万元。

5.长期负债规模
按照企业当前的财务状况、盈利能力和发展速度，企业有能力在2年内偿还的贷款总规模为1,084,604.28万元，企业有能力在3年之内偿还的贷款总规模为1,222,745.66万元，在5年之内偿还的贷款总规模为1,499,028.42万元，当前实际的带息负债合计为98,157.42万元。

二、资金链监控
1.会不会发生资金链断裂
从当前盈利水平和财务状况来看，该企业不存在资金缺口。

如果当前盈利水平保持不变，该企业在未来一个分析期内有能力偿还全部负债。

该
内部资料，妥善保管第1 页共5 页。

浑水报告自媒体主讲人简介
【实用版】
目录
1.浑水报告的背景与意义
2.自媒体主讲人的简介
3.对浑水报告的评价与看法
正文
浑水报告是一份备受关注的报告，它揭示了一些公司财务造假的真相，对市场产生了深远的影响。

这份报告出自一位自媒体主讲人之手，他的身份和背景引发了人们的关注。

这位自媒体主讲人，他的名字并未在文本中提及，但他的经历和专业知识却让人印象深刻。

他有丰富的金融行业经验，对公司财务分析有着深入的理解和独到的见解。

他以自媒体的形式，向公众普及财务知识，帮助投资者识别风险，保护自己的权益。

浑水报告的出台，展示了这位自媒体主讲人的专业素养和责任感。

他的行为，对于维护市场的公正和公平，保护投资者的权益，起到了积极的作用。

他的行为，也得到了广大投资者的认可和支持。

然而，这位自媒体主讲人的行为，也引发了一些争议。

有人认为，他的行为侵犯了公司的隐私权，给公司带来了不必要的困扰。

但是，更多的人认为，他的行为是正义的，是在维护市场的公正和公平。

总的来说，这位自媒体主讲人的行为，是值得我们赞扬和学习的。

他的专业素养和责任感，为我们树立了一个好的榜样。

第1页共1页。