The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society

Rent-Seeking and CorruptionHolger SiegUniversity of PennsylvaniaOctober 1, 2015CorruptionIIne ciencies in the provision of public goods and servicesarise due to corruption and rent-seeking of public o cials.IPolitical corruption is the use of legislated powers bygovernment o cials for illegitimate private gainencourages corruptionIGreed or narrowly de ned interests by those in powercombined with lack of information and legal protectionof those who are hurt creates corruption.IForms of corruption vary, but include bribery, extortion,cronyism, nepotism, patronage, graft, and embezzlement.IWhile corruption may facilitate criminal enterprise suchas drug tra cking, money laundering, and human tracking, it is not restricted to these activities.2010 Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International/wikipedia/commons/f/f7/World_Map_Index_of_perception_of_corruption_2010.svg10/28/10 10:46 AMRent-Seeking BehaviorIRent-seeking is an attempt to derive economic rent bymanipulating the social or political environment in whicheconomic activities occur, rather than by adding value.IAn example of rent-seeking is to create and sustain articial monopolies in an economy.ITaxi medallions or liquor licenses are commonexamples of rent-seeking in cities.IRent-seeking may be initiated by government agentssoliciting bribes or other favors from the individuals or rms.IThese rms then gain from having special economic privileges,which opens up the possibility of exploitation of the consumer.A Rent-Seeking Game: All-Pay AuctionILet us consider a game with two players.IThey can both win a prize that is worth V dollars.IThe prize is awarded to the player that spends the highestamount on bribes, lobbying, etc, i.e. to the highest bidder.ILet B i denote the amount of bribes o ered by player i.IThe expected pay-o s for player 1 areE (U1) =80:5V B1ifB1= B2(1)<V B1if B1> B2 B1if B1< B2:IThe pay-o s for player 2 are similar to the ones of player 1.IThe pay-o s to the corrupt o cial are B1 + B2.Pure Strategies: Leap-froggingISuppose the optimal strategy for player 1 is B1 = B.IIf player 2 will play B2 = B + , then player 2 will the prizefor sure and the pay-o s are:E (U1)=B(2)E (U2)=V B(3)IThat cannot be an equilibrium since player 1 is better of ifshe would bit B1 = B + 2 .IYou always want to leap-frog your competitor.I(Plot the Pay-o function and show that it is not continuous!)No Equilibrium in Pure StrategiesIWe have shown that any pure strategies, B1 and B2 in [0;V ), cannot be an equilibrium.IWhat about B1 = V = B2 ?IThen the pays-o s are:E (U1) = E (U2)=0:5 V V =0:5 V < 0(4)IThat cannot be an equilibrium since both player wouldbe better o bidding 0. (Why?)Mixed StrategiesIIn a mixed strategy equilibrium we use a randomizationdevice to select an optimal strategy.IExample: In Rock-Paper-Scissors you want to play eachaction with probability 1/3.IIn most sports, such as football, baseball, tennis, weuse mixed strategies to keep the opponent guessing.INote that we cannot bid less than zero and we will neverbid more than V . (Why?)IHence we can restrict attention to those strategies thatassign positive probabilities to the range [0; V ].Constructing a Mixed Strategy EquilibriumISuppose both players use a strategy that assigns equal probability to each value in the interval [0; V ]:f (B) =1 (5)We need to verify that there are no incentives to deviate from this strategy.IConsider a pure strategy for player 1, i.e a bribe equal to B . She wins the bidding context if she outbids player 2:B1BPr (B 2 B ) = Z 0dx == F (B ) (6) V V IThe expected pay-o for player 1 is then:B B B(V B ) (1)B =V B = 0 (7)V V V IPlayer 2 thus uses the randomization device to make sure that player 1 will always receive a zero pay-o in equilibrium.More than two playersINote that the strategy above is no longer optimal whenwe add a third player.IWith three players the probability of winning is 1/3.IHence the expected prize is V3 .IThe cost of playing the mixed strategy is V2 .IConsequently, we need to adjust the strategy to give less weight to higher values of bribes. (Why?)The All-Pay Auction with n PlayersIWe will construct construct a symmetric equilibrium.ISuppose you bid B .IThe probability of beating one other player is F (B ).IThe probability of beating (n 1) players is F (B )n1.IThe expected pay-o must be zero:V F (B )n1B = 0(8)which implies thatF (B ) =V1(9)BComplete DissipationIIn the two player game the expected bribe is V2perperson. Hence the expected total bribe is V .IIn the n player game the expected total bribe is Vn , andhence the expected total bribe is also V .IAs long as the number of players is at least two, we nd that the total expected bribes equal the value of the prize that is to be obtained.IFrom a social perspective, there is nothing to be gainedfrom the existence of the prize. The corrupt o cial is the only one bene ting from its existence, even if there are only asmall number of players that compete for the prize.The Rise and Decline of Cities and Nations IMancur Olson (1982) traced the historic consequences ofrent seeking in "The Rise and Decline of Nations."IAs a country or a city becomes increasingly dominatedby organized interest groups, it loses economic vitalityand falls into decline.ICountries, that have a collapse of the political regime andthe interest groups that have coalesced around it, canradically improve productivity and increase income becausethey start with a clean slate in the aftermath of the collapse.IExamples are Germany and Japan after World War II, orthe PR of China after the death of Mao.INew coalitions form over time, once again shackling societyin order to redistribute wealth and income to themselves.IHowever, social and technological changes mayweaken the establishment and allow for social change.Policy ImplicationsIWe need outside means to control a government andpotential corruption.IElections, political competition among elites and parties,independent courts, and other institutions can createchecks and balances.IFiscal competition and mobility creates incentives forlocally elected leaders to control corruption.IFiscal competition also provides voters to withbenchmarks to evaluate the performance of the rulingelite (yardstick competition.)IEconomic development can empower agents who mayultimately take control of the government into their ownhands. Think of the U.S. Declaration of Independence).。

2008年12月大学英语四级考试听力真题及答案Part III Listening ComprehensionSection ADirections: In this section, you will hear 8 short conversations and 2 long conversations. At the end of each conversation, one or more questions will be asked about what was said. Both the conversation and the questions will be spoken only once. After each question there will be a pause. During the pause, you must read the four choices marked A),B),C)and D),and decide which is the best answer. Then mark the corresponding letter on Answer Sheet 2 with a single line through the centre.注意：此部分试题请在答题卡2上作答。

11.A) Only true friendship can last long.B) Letter writing is going out of style.C) She keeps in regular touch with her classmates.D) She has lost contact with most of her old friends.12. A) A painter. C) A porter.B) A mechanic. D) A carpenter.13. A) Look for a place near her office. C) Make inquiries elsewhere.B) Find a new job down the street. D) Rent the $600 apartment.14.A) He prefers to wear jeans with a larger waist.B) He has been extremely busy recently.C) He has gained some weight lately.D) He enjoyed going shopping with Jane yesterday.15.A)The woman possesses a natural for art.B) Women have a better artistic taste than men.C) He isn’t good at abstract thinking.D) He doesn’t like abstract paintings.16.A) She couldn’t have left her notebook in the library.B) she may have put her notebook amid the journals.C) she should have made careful notes while doing reading.D) she shouldn’t have read his notes without his knowing it.17. A)she wants to get some sleep C) she has a literature class to attendB) she needs time to write a paper D)she is troubled by her sleep problem18.A)He is confident he will get the job.B)His chance of getting the job is slim.C)It isn’t easy to find a qualified sales manager.D)The interview didn’t go as well as he expected.Questions 19 to 21 are based on the conversation you have just heard.19.A)He can manage his time more flexibly.B)He can renew contact with his old friends.C)He can concentrate on his own projects.D)He can learn to do administrative work.20.A)Reading its ads in the newspapers.B)Calling its personnel department.C)Contacting its manager.D)Searching its website.21.A)To cut down its production expenses.B)To solve the problem of staff shortage.C)To improve its administrative efficiency.D)To utilize its retired employees’resources.Questions 22 to 25 are based on the conversation you have just heard.22.A)Buy a tractor.B)Fix a house.C)See a piece of property.D)Sing a business contract.23.A)It is only forty miles form where they live.B)It is a small one with a two-bedroom house.C)It was a large garden with fresh vegetables.D)It has a large garden with fresh vegetables.24.A)Growing potatoes will involve less labor.B)Its soil may not be very suitable for corn.C)It may not be big enough for raising corn.D)Raising potatoes will be more profitable.25 A)FinancesB)EquipmentC)LaborD)ProfitsSection BDirections: In this section, you will hear 3 short passages. At the end of each passage, you will hear some questions. Both the passage and the questions will be spoken only once. After you hear a question, you must choose the best answer from the four choices marked A), B), C) and D).Then mark the corresponding letter on Answer Sheet 2 with a single line through the centre.Passage One26 A)To introduce the chief of the city’s police forceB)To comment on a talk by a distinguished guestC)To address the issue of community securityD)To explain the functions of the city council27 A)He has distinguished himself in city managementB)He is head of the International Police ForceC)He completed his higher education abroadD)He holds a master’s degree in criminology28 A)To coordinate work among police departmentsB)To get police officers closer to the local peopleC)To help the residents in times of emergencyD)To enable the police to take prompt action29 A)PopularB)discouragingC)effectiveD)controversialPassage Two30 A)people differ greatly in their ability to communicateB)there are numerous languages in existenceC)Most public languages are inherently vagueD)Big gaps exist between private and public languages31 A)it is a sign of human intelligenceB)in improves with constant practiceC)it is something we are born withD)it varies from person to person32 A)how private languages are developedB)how different languages are relatedC)how people create their languagesD)how children learn to use languagePassage Three33 A)she was a tailorB)she was an engineerC)she was an educatorD)she was a public speaker34.A)Basing them on science-fiction movies.B) Including interesting examples in themC) Adjusting them to different audiencesD) Focusing on the latest progress in space science35.A) Whether spacemen carry weaponsB) How spacesuits protect spacemenC) How NASA trains its spacemenD) What spacemen cat and drinkSection CDirections : In this section .you will hear a passage three time. When the passage is read for first time, you should listen carefully for its general idea. when the passage is read for the first time, you are required to fill in the blanks numbered from 36to43 with the exact words you have just heard. For these blanks, you can either use the exact words you have just heard or write down the main points in your own words Finally, when the passage is read for the third time, you should check what you have written.注意：此部分试题请在答题卡2上作答。

传播政治经济学常用学术用语中英文1.供给和需求(Supply and Demand)- The principle of supply and demand determines the equilibrium price of a good or service.-供给与需求的原理决定了商品或服务的均衡价格。

2.边际效应(Marginal Effect)- Marginal effect refers to the change in the outcome resulting from a one-unit change in an independent variable.-边际效应是指独立变量的一单位变化所引起的结果变化。

3.地租(Rent)- Rent is the payment made to the owner of a property or resource for its use.-地租是用于租赁房地产或资源的产权所有人的支付。

4.货币供应(Money Supply)- Money supply refers to the total amount of money in circulation within an economy.-货币供应指的是经济体内流通的总货币数量。

5.资本积累(Capital Accumulation)- Capital accumulation refers to the growth of a nation's stock of capital goods, such as factories, machinery, and infrastructure.-资本积累指的是一个国家资本货物库存的增长，如工厂、机械和基础设施等。

6.社会福利(Social Welfare)- Social welfare refers to the well-being and quality of life of individuals within a society.-社会福利指的是一个社会中个体的福祉和生活质量。

政治关联英文文献索引1.T he stock market implication of political connections: evidence from firms' dividend policy 政治关系的证券市场含义：来自公司股利政策的证据（Cao et al.2012）2.C orporate ownership, corporate governance reform and timeliness of earnings: Malaysian evidence公司所有权、公司治理改革与盈余及时性：马来西亚的证据3.P olitical connections, bank deposits, and formal deposit insurance: Evidence from an emerging economy政治关系、银行存款与正式的存款保险：来自新兴经济体的证据（June 18, 2013）4.P olitical connections and investment efficiency: Evidence from Chinese listed private firms 政治关系与投资效率：来自中国民营上市公司的证据（August 27, 2013）5.T he Political Determinants of the Cost of Equity: Evidence from Newly Privatized Firms权益资本成本的政治因素：来自刚刚私有化公司的证据（August 2008）6.C ronyism and Capital Controls: Evidence from Malaysia任人唯亲与资本管制：来自马来西亚的证据7.Capital Structure and Political Patronage: Evidence from China资本结构与政治庇护：来自中国的证据8.P olitical Connection and Government Patronage：Evidence from Chinese Manufacturing Firms政治关联与政府赞助：来自中国制造业企业的证据9.P olitical Connections and Firm V alue: Evidence from the Regression Discontinuity Design of Close Gubernatorial Elections政治关联与公司价值：来自临近州长竞选的不连续回归设计的证据10.How does state ownership affect tax avoidance? Evidence from China国家所有权如何影响避税？来自中国的证据11.Do Strong Corporate Governance Firms Still Require Political Connection? And Vice V ersa公司治理强的企业仍然需要政治关系吗？反之亦然12.Political Connections and Preferential Access to Finance: The Role of Campaign Contributions政治关联与优先获得融资：竞选捐款的作用13.Political Connections and the Cost of Equity Capital政治关联与权益资本成本（Boubakri et al. January 2012）14.The Impact of Political Connections on Firms' Operation Performance and Financing Decisions政治关联对公司经营业绩及融资决策的影响（Boubakri et al. November 29, 2011）15.Political Connections and the Cost of Bank Loans政治关系与银行贷款成本（Houston et al. February 15, 2012）16.Politicians and the IPO Decision: The impact of impending political promotions on IPO activity in China政治家与IPO决策：即将来临的政治晋升对中国IPO活动的影响17.Accounting Conservatism and Bankruptcy Risk会计稳健性与破产风险（Biddle et al. October 7, 2013）18.Accounting Conservatism and its Effects on Financial Reporting Quality:A Review of the Literature会计稳健性及其对影响财务报告质量：文献综述（September 9, 2011）19.Conservatism, Disclosure and the Cost of Equity Capital稳健性、披露与权益资本成本（Artiach et al. January 2012）20.Does Access to Finance Lower Firms’ Cost of Capital? Empirical Evidence from International Manufacturing Data获得融资降低了企业的资本成本吗？来自国际制造业数据的实证证据21.Political connections, founding family ownership and leverage decision of privately owned firms政治关联、创始家族所有权与私有企业杠杆决策22.The Impact of Political Connectedness on Firm V alue and Corporate Policies: Evidence from Citizens United政治关系对公司价值及公司政策的影响：来自美国公民的证据23.The Quality of Accounting Information in Politically Connected Firms政治关联企业的会计信息质量24.The political economy of corporate governance, cost of equity, and earnings quality: evidence from newly privatized firms公司治理的政治经济、权益资本成本与盈余质量：来自刚刚私有化公司的证据25.Do Political Connections Help Firms Gain Access to Bank Credit in Vietnam政治关系帮助越南企业获得银行信贷吗？26.Firm performance effects of nurturing political connections through campaign contributions通过竞选捐款培育政治关系的公司绩效效应27.The Chrysler Effect: The Impact of the Chrysler Bailout on Borrowing Cost克莱斯勒效应：克莱斯勒救助对借贷成本的影响28.Politically connected firms in Poland and their access to bank financing波兰的政治关联企业及他们获得银行融资29.Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts政治关系与企业救助30.The characteristics of politically connected firms政治关联企业的特征31.Rent Seeking Incentives, Political Connections and Organizational Structure: Empirical Evidence from Listed Family Firms in China寻租动机、政治关系与组织结构：来自中国上市家族企业的经验证据32.The V alue of Connections In Turbulent Times: Evidence from the United States在动荡的时代关系价值：来自美国的证据33.Malaysian Capital Controls: Macroeconomics and Institutions马来西亚的资本控制：宏观经济和制度34.Rent Seeking and Corporate Finance: Evidence from Corruption Cases寻租与公司融资：腐败案件的证据35.Political Motivation, Over-investment and Firm Performance政治动机、过度投资与公司绩效36.Political connections and earnings quality: evidence from malaysia政治关系与盈余质量——来自马来西亚的证据37.Political Connections and Minority-Shareholder Protection: Evidence from Securities-Market Regulation in China政治关系与少数股东保护：来自中国证券市场监管的经验证据38.Accounting Conservatism, Corporate Governance and Political Influence: Evidence from Malaysia会计稳健性、公司治理与政治影响：来自马来西亚的证据39.Internationalization and Capital Structure: Evidence from Malaysian Manufacturing Firm国际化和资本结构：来自马来西亚制造企业的证据40.Firm size and corporate financial leverage choice in a developing economy Evidence from Nigeria企业规模和企业财务杠杆的选择：来自尼日利亚发展中经济的证据41.Ownership and the V alue of Political Connections: Evidence from China所有权和政治关系的价值：来自中国的证据42.Ownership Types, CEO and Chairman Political Connections, and Long-run Post-IPO Performance: Evidence from China所有权类型、CEO和董事长的政治联系与IPO后长期绩效：来自中国的证据43.Theoretical Investigation on Determinants of Government-Linked Companies Capital Structure关于政府联系公司资本结构的影响因素的理论研究44.Auditor Choice in Privatized Firms: Empirical Evidence on the Role of State and Foreign Owners私有化企业的审计师选择：来自国家和外国所有者作用的经验证据45.The Political Economy of Residual State Ownership in Privatized Firms: Evidence from Emerging Markets私有化企业中剩余政府所有权的政治经济：从新兴市场的证据46.Political Connections and the Process of Going Public: Evidence from China政治关系和上市的过程：来自中国的证据47.Public policy, political connections,and effective tax rates: Longitudinal evidence from Malaysia公共政策、政治关系与有效税率：来自马来西亚的纵向证据48.Why do countries adopt International Financial Reporting Standards为什么各国采用国际财务报告准则49.Political Relationships, Global Financing and Corporate Transparency政治关系、全球融资与公司透明度50.Politically Connected CEOs and Corporate Outcomes: Evidence from France政治关系的首席执行官和公司的结果：来自法国的证据51.Corporate Lobbying, Political Connections, and the Bailout of Banks公司游说、政治关系与银行救助52.Corruption, Political Connections, and Municipal Finance腐败、政治关系与城市金融53.Political connections, corporate governance and preferential bank loans政治联系、公司治理与优惠的银行贷款54.Politically connected firms: an international event study政治关系的企业：一个国际事件研究55.Politicians at work：The private returns and social costs of political connections政客们在工作：私人收益与政治关系的社会成本56.Political Connection, Financing Frictions, and Corporate Investment: Evidence from Chinese Listed Family Firms政治联系、融资摩擦与企业投资——来自中国上市家族企业的证据57.The Role Political Connections Play in Access to Finance:Evidence from Cross-Listing 政治关系在获得融资中发挥的作用：来自交叉上市的证据58.Auditor Choice in Politically Connected Firms政治关联公司的审计师选择59.Financial liberalization, financing constraints and political connection: evidence from Chinese firms金融自由化、融资约束与政治联系：来自中国上市公司的经验证据60.Effects of Financial Liberalization and Political Connection on Listed Chinese Firms' Financing Constraints金融自由化与政治关系对中国上市公司融资约束的影响61.Auditor Tenure, Non-Audit Services and Earnings Conservatism: Evidence from Malaysia审计任期，非审计服务与盈余稳健性——来自马来西亚的证据62.Political Connections of Newly Privatized Firms新私有化企业的政治关系63.Social network, entertainment expenditures and bank lending decisions: Evidence from China’s nonSOE firms社会网络、娱乐支出和银行贷款决策：来自中国非国有企业的证据64.Bank connection, corruption and collateral in China银行联系、腐败和担保：来自中国的证据65.Red Capitalists: Political Connections and Firm Performance in China红色资本家：政治关系与中国公司的业绩66.Political connections, bank deposits, and formal deposit insurance: Evidence from an emerging economy政治关系、银行存款与正式存款保险：来自新兴经济体的证据67.Executive’s former banking experience, entertainment expenditures and bank lending decisions: Evidence from China’s non-SOE firms执行官以前的银行业经验、娱乐支出与银行信贷决策：来自中国的非国有企业的证据68.The effect of political connections on the level and value of cash holdings: International evidence政治关联对现金持有水平及其价值的影响：国际证据69.The Effect of Political Influence and Corporate Transparency on Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence From Indonesian Listed Companies政治影响力与企业透明度对企业绩效的影响：来自印尼股票上市公司的经验证据70.Going Public Process and Political Connections: Evidence from an Emerging Market上市过程与政治联系：来自新兴市场的证据71.Do IPOs Reduce Firms’ Cost of Bank Loans? Evidence from ChinaIPO降低企业的银行贷款成本？来自中国的证据72.Public governance and corporate finance: Evidence from corruption cases公共治理与公司融资：腐败案件的证据73.Dividends, ownership structure and board governance on firm value: empirical evidence from malaysian listed firms股利、股权结构和董事会治理与公司价值：来自马来西亚上市公司的经验证据74.Management Quality and the Cost of Debt: Does Management Matter to Lenders管理质量和债务成本：管理对贷款人重要吗75.Do Educational Ties with Politicians Increase Agency Problems教育与政客联结增加代理问题吗76.Red Capitalists: Political Connections and the Growth and survival of Start-up Companies in China红色资本家：政治关系、成长和中国创业企业的生存77.The Impact of Legal and Political Institutions on Equity Trading Costs: A Cross-Country Analysis法律和政治制度对股票交易成本的影响：一个跨国家分析78.Expropriation of minority shareholders in politically connected firms政治关系企业中侵占小股东利益79.The Political Economy of Residual State Ownership in Privatized Firms: Evidence from Emerging Markets私有化企业中剩余政府所有权的政治经济：来自新兴市场的证据80.Does Financial Globalization Discipline Politically Connected Firms金融全球化约束政治关联的企业吗81.Audit fees in malaysia: does corporate governance matter马来西亚的审计费用：公司治理重要吗82.The Costs of Political Influence: Firm-Level Evidence from Developing Countries政治影响的成本：来自发展中国家的企业层面的证据83.Corporate social responsibility disclosure and its relation on institutional ownership企业社会责任披露及其与机构所有权的关系84.Political Connections and the Process of Going Public: Evidence from China政治关系和上市过程：来自中国的证据85.The Economic Benefits of Political Connections in Late Victorian Britain英国维多利亚时代后期政治关系的经济效益86.Corporate Cash Holdings, Board Structure, and Ownership Concentration: Evidence from Singapore企业现金持有量、董事会结构与股权集中度：来自新加坡的证据Political Uncertainty and Corporate Investment Cycles政治的不确定性与企业投资周期The Chinese Corporate Savings Puzzle: A Firm-Level Cross-Country Perspective中国公司储蓄的困惑：一个企业层面跨国家的视角Chinese firms’ political connection, ownership, and financing constraints中国企业的政治联系，、所有权与融资约束Political Relations and Overseas Stock Exchange Listing: Evidence from Chinese StateownedEnterprises政治关系和海外证券交易所上市：来自中国国有企业的证据Determinants and Effects of Corporate Lobbying企业游说的影响因素及影响Tunneling or Propping: Evidence from Connected Transactions in China隧道还是支持：来自中国关联交易的证据Sheltering Corporate Assets from Political Extraction保护公司资产从政治的提取Bank Power and Cash Holdings: Evidence from Japan银行权利与现金持有：来自日本的证据OLIGARCHIC FAMIL Y CONTROL, SOCIAL ECONOMIC OUTCOMES, AND THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT寡头的家族控制、社会的经济成果与政府质量Government Ownership and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the EU政府所有权与公司治理：来自欧盟的证据The Political Economy of Financial Systems金融体系的政治经济Escaping Political Extraction: Political Participation, Institutions, and Cash Holdings in China逃避政治的提取：政治参与、制度与中国的现金持有The value of local political connections in a low-corruption environment地方政治关系在低的腐败环境中的价值Retained State Shareholding in Chinese PLCs: Does Government Ownership Reduce Corporate Value中国上市公司保留的国有股：政府所有权降低企业价值吗Ownership Structure, Institutional Development, and Political Extraction: Evidence from China所有权结构、制度发展与政治提取：来自中国的证据How Do Agency Costs Affect Firm Value? Evidence from China代理成本如何影响公司价值吗？来自中国的证据Corporate Lobbying and Financial Performance公司游说与财务绩效Rights Issues in China as Evidence for the Existence of Two Types of Agency Problems中国人权问题作为两类代理问题存在的证据Auditor Choice in Politically Connected Firms政治关联公司的审计师选择（Journal of Accounting Research，V ol. 52 No. 1 March 2014）Transparency in Politically Connected Firms: Evidence from Private Sector Firms in China政治关联公司的透明度：来自中国私营公司的证据Capital Structure and Political Patronage: Evidence from China资本结构与政治赞助：来自中国的证据Competitive Pressure and Corporate Policies竞争压力与公司政策Political Capital and Moral Hazard1政治资本与道德风险The Effects of Government Quality on Corporate Cash Holdings政府质量对企业现金持有量的影响Corruption in Developing Countries腐败在发展中国家Large investors, capital expenditures, and firm value: Evidence from the Chinese stock market大投资者、资本支出与企业价值：来自中国证券市场的经验证据Firm Investment & Credit Constraints in India, 1997 – 2006: A stochastic frontier approach印度公司的投资与信贷约束，1997–2006：随机前沿方法State Ownership, Soft-Budget Constraint and Cash Holdings:Evidence from China’s Privatized Firms政府所有权、软预算约束与现金持有：来自中国私有化企业的证据Why Do Firms Hold Less Cash为什么公司持有更少的现金Directors’ Political Conn ections and Compliance with Board of Directors Regulations: The Case of S&amp;P/Tsx 300 Companies董事会的政治关系和董事会遵守：标准普尔/ TSX 300公司为例Political Connection and Firm Value政治联系与企业价值The Impact of Political Connectedness on Firm Value and Corporate Policies: Evidence from Citizens United政治关系对公司价值和公司政策的影响：来自美国公民的证据The Impact of Political Connectedness on Cash Holdings: Evidence from Citizens United政治关系对现金持有的影响：来自美国公民的证据Political power and blood-related firm performance政治权力与有血缘关系的公司绩效Politically-Connecte d Boards and the Structure of Chief Executive Officer Compensation Packages in Taiwanese Firms政治关联董事会和台湾公司CEO薪酬结构Government Ownership and Agency Problems in Equity Offerings in China政府所有权与中国股票发行的代理问题Political Uncertainty and Accounting Conservatism: Evidence from the U.S. Presidential Election Cycle 政治不确定性与会计稳健性：来自美国总统选举周期的证据Effect of political uncertainty and corporate investment cycles in Nepal政治不确定性对尼泊尔企业投资周期的影响CEOs’ Connectedness, Social Capital, and Corporate InvestmentCEO关联、社会资本与企业投资Sovereign Wealth Funds and Politically Connected Firms主权财富基金与政治关联企业Political reforms and family-related firm performance政治改革与家族企业绩效Family connections in a low-corruption environment: Evidence from revised municipality borders在一个较低的腐败环境中家族联系：来自修订市边界的证据Does Political Uncertainty Affect Capital Structure Choices政治不确定性影响资本结构的选择吗Corporate Political Connections and Tax Aggressiveness企业政治关系与税收激进性Executive Compensation vis-à-vis Firm Performance: Identifying Future Research Agenda经理薪酬相对于公司绩效：识别未来的研究议程，Does Organizational-level Affiliation of Internal Audit Influence Corporate Risk-Taking? -Evidences from Chinese Listed Companies内部审计风险水平影响企业组织的联系吗？——来自中国股票上市公司的证据Principal-Principal Conflicts under Weak Institutions: A Study of Corporate Takeovers in China较弱制度下的委托代理冲突：中国公司并购的研究Earnings Management Practices Between Government Linked and Chinese Family Linked Companies 政府关联公司与中国家族关联企业之间的盈余管理实践Managerial Agency Costs of Socialistic Internal Capital Markets: Empirical Evidence from China社会主义内部资本市场的经理人代理成本：来自中国的经验证据Firm Size, Sovereign Governance, and Value Creation公司规模、主权治理与价值创造Bank firm relationship and firm performance under a state-owned bank system: evidence from China银企关系与企业国有银行制度下的绩效：来自中国的证据Excess control rights and corporate acquisitions超额控制权与公司并购Bank loan and the agency costs of debt in indonesia; free cash flows and managerial perks perspective 银行贷款和印度尼西亚债务的代理成本：自由现金流与管理津贴的视角CEO Compensation and Political ConnectednessCEO薪酬与政治关联Enterprises, Political Connections and Public Procurement at a Time of Landmark企业、政治关系与公共采购：一次具有里程碑意义的The Political Determinants of the Cost of Equity: Evidence from Newly Privatized Firms股权成本的政治因素：来自刚刚私有化的公司的证据Managerial Attributes and Executive Compensation管理者特征与高管薪酬An Empirical Investigation into the Political Economy of the Firm in a Globalizing World Economy: How Domestic Political Connections Affect Cross-listing Choices实证研究在全球化的世界经济的坚定的政治经济：国内政治关系如何影响交叉上市的选择Capital Markets and Capital Allocation:Implications for Economies of Transition资本市场与资本配置：经济转型的影响Responding to Financial Crisis: The Rise of State Ownership and Implications for Firm Performance应对金融危机：国家所有权上升对企业绩效的影响Influential ownership and capital structure有影响力的所有权与资本结构The Strategic Role Firms’ Political Connections Play in Access to Finance: Coercion of Domestic Banks or Implicit Property Rights Protections企业政治关系在获得融资中的战略作用：国内银行或隐含产权保护的强制手段Corporate Bailouts: the Role of Costly External Finance and Operating Performance企业救助：昂贵的外部融资的作用与经营绩效Do Political Connections Matter? Empirical Evidence from Listed Firms in Pakistan政治联系重要吗？来自巴基斯坦上市公司的经验证据Tycoons Turned Leaders: Market Valuation of Political Connections富豪转身领导：政治联系的市场价值Political Contributions and CEO Pay政治捐款和首席执行官工资Valuing Changes in Political Networks: Evidence from Campaign Contributions to Close Congressional 重视政治网络的变化：从运动的贡献接近国会的证据Corruption in state asset sales – Evidence from China国有资产销售中的腐败–来自中国的证据Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics投资者保护与利益集团政治Privatization, Large Shareholders’ In centive to Expropriate, and Firm Performance私有化、大股东掠夺激励与公司绩效Advances in Measuring Corruption in the Field腐败测量领域的进展Macroeconomic Conditions and the Puzzles of Credit Spreads and Capital Structure宏观经济条件、信用利差的困惑与资本结构Family Ownership and the Cost of Under Diversification家族所有权与多元化的成本Political Geography and Corporate Political Strategy政治地理学与企业政治策略Evidence on the existence and impact of corruption in state asset sales in China中国国有资产出售中腐败现象的存在及影响的证据Stock versus cash dividends: signaling or catering股票与现金股利：信号或宴会The impact of corruption on state asset sales – Evidence from China腐败对国有资产出售的影响-来自中国的证据Executive Compensation and CEO Equity Incentives in China’s Listed Firms高管薪酬与中国上市公司首席执行官的股权激励Political Constraints, Organizational Forms, and Privatization Performance:Evidence from China政治约束、组织形式与民营化绩效：来自中国的证据State Ownership, Political Institutions, and Stock Price Informativeness: Evidence from Privatization政府所有权、政治制度与股价信息含量：来自私有化的证据Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets: A Survey新兴市场的公司治理：文献综述Politically Connected Boards and Top Executive Pay In Chinese Listed Firms1.Political connection and leverage: Some Malaysian evidence2.Do political connections affect the role of independent audit committees and CEO Duality? Someevidence from Malaysian audit pricing3.Board, audit committee and restatement-induced class action lawsuits4.The Political Determinants of the Cost of Equity: Evidence from Newly Privatized Firms5.The impact of political connections on firms’ operating performance and financing decisionsernment Connections and Financial Constraints：Evidence from a Large Representative Sampleof Chinese Firms7.Listing approach, political favours and earnings quality: Evidence from Chinese family firms8.Political connections and tax-induced earnings management: evidence from China9.Ownership Concentration, State Ownership, and Effective Tax Rates: Evidence from China's ListedContext: European Evidence10.Impact of financial reporting quality on the implied cost of equity capital: Evidence from theMalaysian listed firms公允价值会计准则在新兴市场实施的挑战：来自中国采用国际财务报告准则的证据制度环境、政治关系与融资约束——来自中国民营企业的证据（March 1, 2012）政治关联、终极控制人性质与权益资本成本政治关联、盈余质量与权益资本成本政治联系、市场化进程与权益资本成本——来自中国民营上市公司的经验证据政府干预、政治关联与权益资本成本民营企业的政治关联能降低权益资本成本吗。

Development of Public management theoryBureaucracy management:The classic oneA Several theorists bridged the gap between strictly private and public sector management.One good example is Max Weber exploring sociologist,who explored the ideal bureaucracy(n官僚主义)in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.Bureaucratic Theory was developed by a German Sociologist and political economist Max Weber(1864-1920).According to him, bureaucracy is the most efficient form of organization.The organization has a well-defined line of authority.It has clear rules and regulations which are strictly followed.According to Max Weber, there are three types of power in an organization:[1]Traditional Power,[2]Charismatic(adj.领袖魅力的)Power,and[3]Bureaucratic Power or Legal Power.The characteristics or features of Bureaucratic Organisation.B Weber admired bureaucracy for its trustworthiness.The bureaucracy was constituted by a group of professional,ethical public officials.These servants dedicate themselves to the public in return for security of job tenure(长期任职)among the many advantages of public employment.There is a high degree of Division of Labour and Specialisation as well as a defined Hierarchy (n.层级,阶级)of Authority.There are well defined Rules and Regulations which follows the principle of Rationality,Objectively and Consistency.There rules cover all the duties and rights of the employees.These rules must be strictly followed.Selection and Promotion is based on Technical qualifications.There are Formal and Impersonal relations among the member of the organisation.Interpersonal relations are based on positions and not on personalitics (n.个性品质)．C Bureaucratic organisation is criticised because of the following reasons:Bureaucratic organisation is a very rigid(adj.僵硬的,死板的)type of organisation.Too much emphasis on rules and regulations which are rigid and inflexible.It does not give importance to human relations. No importance is also given to informal groups which nowadays play an importantrole in all business organizations.Yet,too much importance is given to the technical qualifications of the employees for promotion and transfers.Dedication(n.奉献)and commitment of the employee is not considered.It is suitable for government organizations.It is also suitable for organisations where change is very slow.There will be unnecessary delay in decision-making due to formalities and rules（礼节和规则）.It is appropriate for static organizations.There is difficulty is coordination（n.协调）and communication.Management:A consolidated disciplineD Herbert Simon,Chester Barnard,and Charles Lindblom are among the first of those recognized as early American public administrators.These men ushered in an era(时代)during which the field gained recognition as independent and unique,despite its multidisciplinary（多学科的）nature. Simon contributed theoretical separation to discern management,decisions based upon objectively determined facts.Simon developed other relevant theories as well.Similar to Lindblom’s subsequently discussed critique of comprehensive rationality（合理性）,Simon also taught that a strictly economic man,one who maximizes returns or values by making decisions based upon complete information in unlimited time,is unrealistic.Instead,most public administrators use a sufficient amount of information to make a satisfactory decision:,they “satisfice.”(v.追求最低的满意度)In decision-making,Simon believed that agents face uncertainty about the future and costs in acquiring information in the present.These factors limit the extent to which agents can make a fully rational decision,thus they possess only"bounded rationality"and must makedecisions by"satisficing,"or choosing that which might not be optimal(adj.最佳的)but which will make them happy enough."Rational behavior,in economics,means that individuals maximizes his utility function（效益，功能)under the constraints(n.约束，限制)they face(e.g., their budget constraint,limited choices,...)in pursuit of their self-interest.Chester Barnard was also one of the watershed scholars.Barnard published.“The Economy of Incentives”(1938),in an attempt to explain individual participation(n.参与)in an organization. Barnard explained organizations as systems of exchange.Low-level employees must have more incentive(n.激励)to remain with the organization for which they exchange their labor and loyalty. The organization(and higher level employees)must derive sufficient benefit from its employees to keep them.The net pull of the organization is determined by material rewards,environmental conditions,and other intangibles(n.无形因素）like recognition.He gives great importance to persuasion,much more than to economic incentives.He described four general an four specific incentives including Money and other material inducements;Personal non natural opportunities for distinction;Desirable physical conditions of work;Ideal benefaction,such as pride of workmanship etc.A new humanist era:Rethinking power and managementG Humanists embrance a dynamic(adj.动态的)concept of an employee and management techniques.This requires a theoretical shift away（变化，偏离）from the idea that an employee is a cog in the industrial machine.Rather,employees are unique individuals with goals,needs, desires,etc.H The humanist era ushered in other possible interpretations of such topics as power and management.One of the most significant was Douglas McGregor's“Theory X and Theory Y.”McGregor's work provided a basis for a management framework(n.框架),a structure upon whose rungs the classic and new-aged management might be hung.First,commonly held by early management theorists,Theory X begins with the assumption(n.假设，前提).that humans possess an inherent aversion to work.Employees must therefore be coerced and controlled if management expects to see results.Further,lazy humans prefer direction bordering micromanagement whenever possible.I Theory Y is much more compatible with the humanist tradition.This begins with the assumption that work is as natural for humans as rest or play.Further,employees will direct and control themselves as they complete objectives(完整的目标).Humans learn naturally and seek responsibility.Consequently,managers need only to steer employees in a cooperative manner toward goals that serve the organization.There is room for many to create and share power.J The Z-Organization can be thought of as a complimentary(adj.赠送的，免费的)third element to McGregor's dichotomy（二分法）.Z-organizations are a Japanese organizational model.Similar to Theory-Y management,Z organizations place a large degree of responsibility upon the employees.Further,relatively low-level employees are entrusted with the freedom to be creative,“wander around the organization”and become truly unique,company-specific employees. However,employees achieve only after"agreeing on a central set of objectives and ways of doing business"In Z Organizations,decision-making is democialic and participatory（民主的，参与的). Despite the many advantages of this organizational model,there are several draw-backs.These include the depredation of a large professional distance-de-personalization is impossible in Z-organizations.Since,in reality,there is high percentage of workers would like work for the financial return than the job objectives.A high level of（自律，自我约束)is also necessary.Questions14-21Choose Two appropriate letters and fill in boxes14-15.What are the features and advantages for Bureaucratic Management?A There are equal opportunities coming from little hierarchy of authority among companies.B employees'promotion can be much fairer which is based on job duties not on characters.C employees enjoy a greater freedom of duties than their strict right.D Selection and Promotion is based on mastery of new technology.E These employees can dedicate themselves to the public for stability of a long term job. Choose Two appropriate letters and fill in boxes16-17.What are the limitations for the ideas of Bureaucratic Management?A Commitment of the employee is not taken into consideration enough.B There is difficulty in decision-making based on formalities and rules.C Employees are casually oragnised as no importance is given to formal groups.D There is difficulty in enforcement of rules and regulationsE It is not applicable to dynamic organisations where change is very fast.Choose Two appropriate letters and fill in boxes18-19.What are the aims of management as Douglas McGregor's work of the“Theory V.”A Employees must be coerced and controlled if management expects to see results.B Employees has natural tendency for rest or play.C Humans will not automatically seek responsibility.D managers may guide employees in a cooperative manner toward objectivesE There is little room for manager to designate or share his power.Choose Two appropriate letters and fill in boxes20-21.What are the limitations for the“Theory Z.”A decision-making is democratic and participatory.B organization mode has mlacrent design fault.C not all employee set higher interest in the job than that of wagesD Personalization remains un-eliminated in organizations.E self-discipline is an unnecessary quality.Questions22-26Use the information in the passage to match the people(listed A-E)with opinions or deeds below Write the appropriate letters A-E in boxes22-260n your answer sheet.NB Some people may match more than one ideasA Mark weberB McGregorC Herbert SimonD Chester BarnardE Charles Lindblom22Employees like to follow professional,ethical public officials to secure a job.23Highly effective can be achieved only after“agreeing on a core of objectives andmethod of doing things.24Managers need to take the employees'emotional feeling,besides the material rewards,into incentives system.25Individuals can maximize their self-interest when all the budget and choices are utilised well 26The assumption that humans possess a natural dislike to work who ought to be forced and controlled.Answer Keys14-15B EB段第二行到第三行“there servants dedicate themselves to the public in return for security of job tenure”servant和employee同意替换，job tenure和for stability of a long term job同意替换。

制度经济学经典文献英文文章制度经济学是一个广泛的领域，有许多经典文献和英文文章可供参考。

以下是一些制度经济学的经典英文文献：1. The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith: This book, published in 1776, is the foundational text of economics and a starting point for the study of institutional economics. Smith’s work considers the nature and causes of wealth accumulation and how institutions shape economic behavior.2. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization by Max Weber: This book, published in 1922, is a foundational text in sociology and economics that explores the role of institutions in organizing economic life. Weber’s work considers the nature and causes of formal organization and the relationship between economic and political power.3. The Constitution of Liberty by Friedrich Hayek: This book, published in 1960, is a foundational text in the field of Austrian economics that explores the role of institutions in supporting individual freedom and the operation of markets. Hayek’s workconsiders the nature and causes of knowledge and spontaneous order and their relationship to the rule of law.4. The New Institutional Economics by Oliver E. Williamson: This book, published in 1981, is a foundational text in the field of new institutional economics that explores the role of institutions in shaping economic rela tionships and performance. Williamson’s work considers the nature and causes of transaction costs and their relationship to organizational form and governance.5. Invisible Hands: Self-Organization and the Political Economy of Markets by Donald MacKenzie: This book, published in 2008, is a foundational text in the field of economic sociology that explores the role of institutions in shaping market outcomes. MacKenzie’s work considers the nature and causes of self-organization and the relationship between micro-level behavior and macro-level outcomes.这些文献只是制度经济学领域的一小部分，但它们都是经典之作，对于理解制度经济学的基本概念和理论有着重要的贡献。