盈余管理：一种普遍现象[外文翻译]

本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译外文题目Earnings Management under German GAAP versus IFRS 外文出处 European Accounting Review外文作者 Tendeloo, B.V., and Vanstraelen, A原文：Earnings Management under German GAAP versus IFRS AbstractThis paper addresses the question whether voluntary adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is associated with lower earnings management. Ball et al. (Journal of Accounting and Economics, 36(1–3), pp. 235–270, 2003) argue that adopting high quality standards might be a necessary condition for high quality information, but not necessarily a sufficient one. In Germany, a code-law country with low investor protection rights, a relatively large number of companies have chosen to voluntarily adopt IFRS prior to 2005. We investigate whether German companies that have adopted IFRS engage significantly less in earnings management compared to German companies reporting under German generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), while controlling for other differences in earnings management incentives. Our sample, consisting of German listed companies, contains 636 firm-year observations relating to the period 1999–2001. Our results suggest that IFRS-adopters do not present different earnings management behavior compared to companies reporting under German GAAP. These findings contribute to the current debate on whether high quality standards are sufficient and effective in countries with weak investor protection rights. They indicate that voluntary adopters of IFRS in Germany cannot be associated with lower earnings management.1. IntroductionThe International Accounting Standards (IAS), now renamed as International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), have been developed to harmonize corporate accounting practice and to answer the need for high quality standards to be adopted inthe world’s major capital markets.Ball et al. (2003) argue that adopting high quality standards might be a necessary condition for high quality information, but not necessarily a sufficient one. This paper contributes to this debate by examining whether the adoption of high quality standards like IFRS is associated with high financial reporting quality. In particular, we question whether IFRS a re sufficient to override managers’ incentives to engage in earnings management and affect the quality of reported earnings.Previous research provides evidence that the magnitude of earnings management is on average higher in code-law countries with low investor protection rights, compared to common-law countries with high investor protection rights (Leuz et al., 2003). Hence, to assess whether firms that report under IFRS can be associated with higher earnings quality we focus on Germany, which is a code-law country with relatively low investor protection rights (La Portal et al.,2000). Moreover, a relatively large number of German companies have already voluntarily chosen to adopt IFRS prior to 2005. This allows a comparison between companies that have adopted IFRS versus companies that report under domestic generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).The results of our research show that IFRS do not impose a significant constraint on earnings management, as measured by discretionary accruals. On the contrary, adopting IFRS seems to increase the magnitude of discretionary accruals. Our results further suggest that companies that have adopted IFRS engage more in earnings smoothing, although this effect is significantly reduced when the company has a Big 4 auditor. However, hidden reserves, which are allowed under German GAAP to manage earnings, are not entirely picked up by the traditional accruals measures. When hidden reserves are taken into consideration, our results show that IFRS-adopters do not present different earnings management behavior compared to companies reporting under German GAAP. Hence, our results indicate that adopters of IFRS cannot be associated with lower earnings management. This finding suggests that the adoption of high quality standards is not a sufficient condition for providing high quality information in code-law countries with low investor protection rights.The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant literature and provide the theoretical background of the paper. Section 3 provides an overview of the German accounting system. In Section 4, we formulate the research hypotheses. Section 5 describes the research design. The results of thestudy are presented in Section 6. Finally, in Section 7, we summarize our results, discuss the implications and limitations of our analysis and give suggestions for further research.2. Previous Literature2.1. Adoption of International Accounting StandardsThe International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), which was established in 1973 and now renamed as the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), aims to achieve uniformity in the accounting standards used by businesses and other organizations for financial reporting around the world (IASB website). The benefits of the adoption of international accounting standards are considered to be the following. First, it should improve the ability of investors to make informed financial decisions and eliminate confusion arising from different measures of financial position and performance across countries, thereby leading to a reduced risk for investors and a lower cost of capital for companies. Second, it should lower costs arising from multiple reporting. Third, it should encourage international investment. Finally, it should lead to amore efficient allocation of savings worldwide (Street et al., 1999).The original International Accounting Standards were mostly descriptive in nature and contained many alternative treatments. Because of this flexibility and a continuing lack of comparability across countries, the standards came under heavy criticism in the late 1980s. In response to this criticism, the IASC started the Comparability Project in 1987. The revised standards, which became effective in 1995, substantially reduced the alternative treatments and increased the disclosure requirements (Nobes, 2002). In July 1995, the IASC and the International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO) agreed to a list of accounting issues that needed to be addressed for obtaining IOSCO’s endorsement of the standards. The subsequent Core Standards Project led again to substantial revisions of IAS. In May 2000, the IASC received IOSCO’s endorsement subject to ‘reconciliation where necessary to address subst antive outstanding issues at a national or regional level’ (IOSCO Press Release, 17 May 2000). The Core Standards Project has brought a wider recognition to IAS around the world. For example, the European Parliament has issued a regulation (1606/2002/EC) requiring all EU listed companies to prepare consolidated financial statements based on InternationalAccounting Standards by 2005. In a number of countries, including Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italyand Switzerland, companies were already permitted to prepare consolidated financial statements under IFRS (or US GAAP) prior to 2005.Since German accounting standards and disclosure practices have been criticized in the investor community (Leuz and Verrechia, 2000), a relatively large number of German firms have adopted international accounting standards such as IFRS or US GAAP. This switch is thought to represent a substantial commitment to transparent financial reporting for the following two reasons. First, IFRS adoption itself might effectively enhance financial reporting quality. Second, firms which adopt IFRS or US GAAP might do so because they have higher incentives to report transparently, such as high financing needs. In this case, IFRS serves as a proxy for a credible commitment to higher quality accounting. A study conducted by Dumontier and Raffournier (1998) with Swiss data reveals that early adopters of IFRS ‘are larger, more internationally diversified, less capital intensive and have a more diffuse ownership’. They argue that the decision t o apply IFRS is primarily influenced by political costs and pressures from outside markets. Murphy (1999) also used Swiss data to study the determinants of the adoption of IFRS. She found that companies that adopt IFRS have a higher percentage of foreign sales and a higher number of foreign exchange listings. El-Gazzar et al. (1999) found the same relationships using data from various countries. In addition, they concluded that being domiciled in an EU country and having a lower debt to equity ratio is positively associated with the adoption of IFRS. Other determinants of the adoption of international standards mentioned in the literature include a high profitability, the issuance of equity during the year of adoption, domestic GAAP differing significantly from IFRS or US GAAP and, related to the latter, being domiciled in a country with a bank-oriented financial system (Ashbaugh, 2001; Cuijpers and Buijink, 2003).Not all companies that seek the international investment status that comes with the adoption of IFRS are, however, willing to fulfill all of the requirements and obligations involved. According to a study by Street and Gray (2002) there is a significant non-compliance with IFRS in 1998 company reports, especially in the case of IFRS disclosure requirements. With the revision of IAS 1, effective for financial statements covering periods beginning on or after 1 July 1998, financial statements are prohibited from noting compliance with International Accounting Standards ‘unless they comply with all the requirements of each applicable Standard and each applicable Interpretation of the Standing Interpretations Committee’.All companies included in our IFRS sample mention IFRS compliance in their financial statements after the revised IAS 1 became effective. Nevertheless, adopters of IFRS that appear to be fully compliant might as well be falsely signaling to be of high quality. Ball et al. (2000) argue that firms’ incentives to comply with accounting standards depend on the penalties assessed for non-compliance.When costs of complying to IFRS are viewed to exceed the costs of noncompliance, substantial non-compliance will continue to be a problem. While the main objective of adopting IFRS is considered to be enhancing the quality of the information provided in the financial statements, Ball et al. (2003) further suggest that adopting high quality standards might be a necessary condition for high quality information but not a sufficient condition. If the adoption of IFRS cannot be associated with significantly higher financial reporting quality, IFRS adoption cannot serve as a signaling instrument for a credible commitment to higher quality accounting. This study addresses this issue empirically.2.2. Earnings Management: Incentives and ConstraintsOne way of assessing the quality of reported earnings is examining to what extent earnings are managed, with the intention to ‘either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend o n reported accounting numbers’ (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Incentives for earnings management, either through accounting decisions or structuring transactions, are ample. Managers may be inclined to manage earnings due to the existence of explicit and implic it contracts, the firm’s relation with capital markets, the need for external financing, the political and regulatory environment or several other specific circumstances (Vander Bauwhede, 2001).A number of studies suggest that the quality of reported financial statement information is in large part determined by the underlying economic and institutional factors influencing managers’ and auditors’ incentives. According to Ball et al. (2000) the demand for accounting income differs systematically between common-law and code-law countries. In common-law countries, which are characterized by arm’s length debt and equity markets, a diverse base of investors, high risk of litigation and strong investor protection, accounting information is designed to meet the needs of investors. In code-law countries, capital markets are less active. Investor protection is weak, litigation rates are lower and companies are more financed by banks, other financial institutions and the government, which results in less need for publicdisclosure. Accounting information is therefore designed more to meet other demands, including reduction in political costs and determination of income tax and dividend payments (Ball et al., 2000; La Portaet al., 2000). Leuz et al. (2003) show that earnings management is more prevalent in code-law countries compared to common-law countries. The benefits (e.g.enhanced liquidity) of engaging in earnings management appear to outweigh the costs (e.g. litigation) more in countries with weak investor protection rights. Firms which adopt IFRS, however, can be expected to have incentives to report investor-oriented information and thus engage significantly less in earnings management than non-adopters. On the other hand, low enforcement and low litigation risk might encourage low quality firms to falsely signal to be of high quality by adopting IFRS. This study addresses the question whether adoption of IFRS is associated with lower earnings management in Germany, which La Porta et al. (2000) classify as a country with low investor protection rights.Accounting rules can limit a manager’s ability to distort reported earnings. But the extent to which accounting rules influence reported earnings and curb earnings management depends on how well these rules are enforced (Leuz et al., 2003). Apart from clear accounting standards, strong investor and creditor protection requires a statutory audit, monitoring by supervisors and effective sanctions.A number of studies have shown that Big 4 auditors constitute a constraint on earnings management (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1991, 1994; Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999; Gore et al., 2001). However, the results of Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2002) and Francis and Wang (2003) document that the constraint constituted by a Big 4 auditor on earnings management is not uniform across countries. Street and Gray (2002) find support for the fact that being audited by a large audit firm is also positively associated with IFRS compliance, both in the case of disclosure requirements as in the case of measurement and presentation requirements. In this respect, we question whether adoption of IFRS by a company has a stronger effect on the quality of earnings of that company when audited by a Big 4 audit firm.Source: Tendeloo, B.V. and Vanstraelen, A. Earnings management under German GAAP versus IFRS [J]. European Accounting Review, 2005, 14(1): 155-180.译文：德国公认会计准则与国际财务报告准则下的盈余管理摘要：这篇论文阐述的问题是盈余管理的降低是否与国际财务报告准则（IFRS）的自愿采用有关。

一、盈余管理定义：美国会计学者斯考特（Scott）：盈余管理是会计政策的选择具有经济后果的一种具体表现。

他认为，只要企业的管理人员有选择不同会计政策的自由，他们必定会选择使其效用最大化或使企业的市场价值最大化的会计政策，这就是所谓的盈余管理。

美国著名会计学者Schiper：为了获得某种私人利益（而并非仅仅为了中立地处理经营活动），对外部财务报告进行有目的的干预。

Hedy和Wahlen于1999年对盈余管理所作出的解释：当管理者在编制财务报告和构建经济交易时，运用判断改变财务报告，从而误导一些利益相关者对公司根本经济收益的理解，或者影响根据报告中会计数据形成的契约结果，盈余管理就产生了。

综合：第一，盈余管理的主体是企业的管理当局。

企业管理当局，无论是董事会、总经理还是高级管理人员，他们作为企业信息的加工者和披露者，有权利选择会计政策和方法，有权利变更会计估计，有权利安排交易发生的时间和方式等。

而信息的不对称和信息披露的不完全为他们进行盈余管理提供了条件。

第二，在盈余管理的过程中，企业管理当局是有目的、有意地选择对自身有利的会计政策或交易安排，即管理当局是有意图的。

第三，管理当局进行盈余管理的目的在于获得自身利益。

虽然盈余管理的直接结果是使得一些利益相关者对企业的经济收益产生误解，但其最终目的是使得自身利益最大化。

二、盈余管理的方法(一)变更会计政策会计政策的变更是最常见也是最原始的盈余管理方法。

固定资产折旧方法、存货计价方法、长期投资核算方法、无形资产核算方法、递延资产核算方法、产品开发费用核算方法、养老金核算方法的选用及变更都能对会计收益数额产生一定的影响。

尽管会计政策的变更为会计准则所允许，但通过会计政策的变更来操纵报告利润的行为受到公众甚至企业经理最多的反感。

许多声誉卓著的大公司已很少采用这类方法来进行利润管理。

(二)应计项目管理对应计资产和应计负债的不合理确认和对费用的不合理递延是盈余管理的另一种常用方法。

企业盈余管理的文献综述企业盈余管理是指企业通过核算处理和调整财务报表上的盈余，以达到一定的目标或满足特定的需求。

它是企业财务管理的重要组成部分，对于企业的经营和发展起着重要的作用。

本文将综述一些关于企业盈余管理的文献，包括其定义、目标、方法和影响等方面的研究。

关于企业盈余管理的定义，文献中给出了不同的解释。

根据Brigham和Ehrhardt （2013）的观点，企业盈余管理是指企业通过调整营业收入和费用的计提方式，使得财务报表上的利润更好地符合预期的情况。

而Scott（2013）则将企业盈余管理定义为一种利用会计方法和政策来调整财务报表上的利润和盈余水平的行为。

在企业盈余管理的目标方面，不同的文献提出了不同的观点。

根据Roychowdhury （2006）的研究，企业盈余管理的主要目标是为了提高企业的股价和市值，从而为股东创造经济利益。

而Zang（2012）则认为，企业盈余管理的目标是为了满足不同内外部利益相关者的需求，包括股东、管理层、债权人等。

在企业盈余管理的方法方面，文献中提出了多种不同的方法。

其中一种常见的方法是调整盈余的计提时间和计提规模。

Watts和Zimmerman（1986）的研究发现，在公司退出IPO （首次公开募股）后，会计师会通过调整计提方式和时间，来降低盈余的波动性，并提高股价表现。

另一种方法是通过调整会计政策和估计来管理盈余。

企业可以选择更加保守的会计政策和估计，以降低盈余风险和波动性（Healy和Wahlen，1999）。

企业盈余管理对企业的影响也是研究的重要方面。

文献中发现，企业盈余管理既有可能带来正面影响，也有可能带来负面影响。

一方面，企业通过盈余管理可以使财务报表更准确地反映企业的经营情况和财务状况，提高财报的可靠性，有助于投资者和利益相关者做出更好的决策（Healy和Palepu，2001）。

过度的盈余管理可能会导致信息不对称和不可靠的财报，降低投资者对企业的信任度（Graham，2004）。

盈余管理和盈利质量外文文献及翻译摘要从犯罪现场调查员的视角来看盈余管理的检测，启蒙了早期对盈余管理的研究和它的近亲：盈利质量。

Ball和Shivakumar的著作（2008在会计和经济学杂志上出版的《首次公开发行时的盈利质量》）和Teoh et al .的著作(1998在金融杂志53期上刊登的《盈利管理和首次公开发行后的市场表现》)被用来阐释将犯罪现场调查的七个部分应用于盈利管理的研究。

关键词:市场效率盈余管理盈利质量会计欺诈1、引言在诸多会计和金融的研究课题中,可能没有比盈余管理更具有刺激性的议题。

为什么?我认为这是因为这个主题明确涉及了潜在的不法行为、恶作剧、冲突、间谍活动以及一种神秘感。

正如Healy和Wahlen在1999年(Schipper在1989也下过类似的定义)定义道:“盈余管理的发生是在管理者针对财务报表和交易建立，运用判断力来改变财务报告之时。

盈余管理要么会在公司潜在的经营表现上误导一些利益相关者，要么影响合同结果，这取决于会计报告数字。

”简而言之，有人做伤害别人的事情。

审计人员、监管机构、投资者和研究者们试图找到这些违法者并解开这个谜团,而这个谜团可能会演变成涉及欺诈(或犯罪,在此使用解决犯罪谜团的隐喻)的事件。

如果我们将盈余管理看成是一个潜在的欺诈性(犯罪性)活动,那么我们可以在利用比解决神秘谋杀案的福尔摩斯,或犯罪现场调查(CSI)更现代的条件下，考虑对盈余管理的探查。

这样的调查涉及到以下七个要素：一场犯罪是否已经实施，嫌疑人的责任，使用的凶器,犯罪活动的受害者,犯罪的动机，开展行动的机会和替代性解释。

替代性解释是指除了欺诈或犯罪活动，整个事件的起因。

这个起因能够证实在目击证据的基础上得出欺诈或犯罪的结论将是错误的。

我在讨论破解盈余管理的谜团的各种要素时，所举的例子主要来自Ball和Shivakumar(2008)和Teoh et al.(1998)。

(这些要素显然是相互关联的,以下的讨论中也有一些不可避免的重复)。

盈余管理(Earning Management)就是企业管理盈余管理。

盈余管理就是企业管理当局在遵循会计准则的基础上。

通过对企业对外报告的会计收益信息进行控制或调整。

以达到主体自身利益最大化的行为。

中文名,盈余管理。

目的,达到主体自身利益最大化的行为。

基础,企业管理当局在遵循会计准则。

广泛研究,国外经济学和会计学。

概念。

盈余管理是目前国外经济学和会计学广泛研究的课题。

对盈余管理的概念会计学界存在着诸多不同意见。

从以下两个权威性的定义可以看出盈余管理的基本涵义。

一是美国会计学家斯考特认为。

盈余管理是指"在GAAP允许的范围内。

通过对会计政策的选择使经营者自身利益或企业市场价值达到最大化的行为。

另一方面是美国会计学家凯瑟琳·雪珀认为。

盈余管理实际上是企业管理人员通过有目的地控制对外财务报告过程。

以获取某些私人利益的"披露管理"。

根据以上两个权威性的定义。

可以看出。

盈余管理主要具备这样一些涵义：第一。

盈余管理的主体是企业管理当局。

它包括经理人员和董事会。

尽管经理人员和董事会进行盈余管理的动机并不完全一致。

但他们对企业会计政策和对外报告盈余都有重大影响。

企业盈余信息的披露由他们各自作用的合力所决定。

第二。

盈余管理的客体是企业对外报告的盈余信息%20。

在雪珀的定义中。

盈余管理不仅仅指对会计收益的调整和控制。

而且包括对其他会计信息的披露的管理。

但是对会计收益以外的财务数据的操纵并不具有普遍的意义。

它所具有的经济后果相对而言要小得多。

如果将其纳入盈余管理的范畴反而会影响对盈余管理本质的把握。

第三。

盈余管理的方法是在GAAP允许的范围内综合运用会计和非会计手段来实现对会计收益的控制和调整。

它主要包括会计政策的选用。

应计项目的管理。

交易时间的改变。

交易的创造等。

第四。

盈余管理的目的是盈余管理主体自身利益的最大化。

其中又包括管理人员自身利益的最大化和董事会成员所代表的股东利益的最大化。

目录一、绪言 (3)（一）课题背景及意义 (3)（二）文献综述及简要评析 (3)（三）研究方法 (4)（四）论文研究思路与框架 (4)二、盈余管理概念 (3)（一）概念 (3)（二）用途 (5)（三）动机 (5)1.根本目的 (5)2.具体目标 (6)三、中国远洋盈余管理的手段 (6)（一）中国远洋公司背景简介 (6)（二）利用关联方交易 (6)1.关联购销 (6)2.费用分担 (7)3.资产变更 (9)（三）利用收入、费用的确认 (10)1.利用收入的确认 (10)2.利用费用的确认 (9)（四）其他方式 (9)1.利用会计政策的变更 (9)2.利用资产重组 (9)四、盈余管理行为产生的作用 (11)（一）积极作用 (11)（二）消极作用 (12)1.对中国远洋自身发展的影响 (12)2.对债权人和投资者决策的影响 (12)3. 对会计信息以及会计准则的影响 (12)五、对中国远洋盈余管理的建议 (13)（一）完善激励与约束机制 (13)（二）强化董事会的决策职能 (13)结论 (14)参考文献 (14)摘要在世界经济不断进步和我国改革开放不断深入大背景下，企业盈余管理问题愈发突出。

我国上市公司利用盈余管理来实现自己的想法，但是盈余管理会对会计信息的真实性造成不同程度的偏差，而投资者进行投资决策所依据的最直观最权威的数据就是会计信息，会计信息的真实与否决定了投资者的投资方向是否正确。

综合所述缘由，对上市公司限制和规范盈余管理已成为社会的必要需求。

盈余管理是一把双刃剑，适度使用会使企业获得诸多好处，反之则造成消极的影响。

本文首先描述并界定盈余管理概念，经过了解研究我国上市公司中国远洋控股股份有限公司后阐述中国远洋盈余管理的相关内容分析得出其盈余管理具有两面性，最后对其消极方面及我国上市公司的盈余管理提出了我的对策及建议以达到最小影响和最大规范。

关键词：盈余管理；上市公司；治理对策AbstractThe earnings management of China's listed companies has become more and more prominent with the continuous progress of the world economy and the deepening of China's economic system reform. Use of earnings management of listed companies in China to implement their own ideas, but earnings management will cause different degree of deviation to the authenticity of accounting information, and investors make investment decisions based on the most intuitive the most authoritative data is the accounting information, accounting information true or not determines the investor's investment direction is correct. Based on the above reasons, it is necessary for the society to restrict and standardize earnings management for listed companies. Earnings management is a double-edged sword, moderate use will makethe enterprise to obtain many benefits, otherwise it will cause negative impact. This paper describe and define the concept of earnings management, through understanding the Chinese listed companies after China COSCO holdings co LTD. China ocean surplus management related content analysis of the earnings management has two sides, the last of the negative aspects and the earnings management of listed companies in our country my countermeasures and Suggestions were put forward in order to achieve the minimum impact and maximum specification.Key words:Earnings management；Listed company；Countermeasures for harnessing一、绪言（一）课题背景及意义我国上市公司的盈余管理问题在世界经济不断进步和我国经济体制改革不断深入的同时愈发突出。

盈余管理文献综述【摘要】自20世纪80年代以来，西方会计学界与我国学者开始陆续致力于盈余管理的研究，随着资本市场的不断完善，投资者对于上市公司财务报表的真实性和可靠性的要求也不断增高。

近年来，伴随着美国安然事件，世通，施乐的财务舞弊案件以及我国银广夏事件，最近的万福生科财务造假等层出不穷的财务舞弊，投资者对于会计信息质量的要求不断升高，而会计信息质量往往与盈余管理关系密切。

【关键词】盈余管理，动机，经济后果，资本市场一、盈余管理文献综述(一)国外盈余管理研究现状西方会计学界对盈余管理的研究开始较早，加上证券市场产生较早且发展相较中国更成熟完善，各类财务数据更易获取，加之盈余管理在企业中存在普遍性，故盈余管理问题一直是西方学者会计研究的重点之一。

1。

1.盈余管理（Earnings management）的概念及评价第一，schipper(1998)将盈余管理定义为：“有目的地干预对外财务报告程序，目的是为了获取一些私人利益”；Healy&Wahlen（1999）对其的定义为：盈余管理发生在管理当局运用职业判断编制财务报告和通过规划交易以及变更财务报告时，旨在误导那些以公司的经济业绩为基础的利益关系人的决策或者影响那些以会计报告数字为基础的契约的后果；Scott（2000）同样认为，盈余管理是管理当局利用会计选择权（包括会计政策选择权和会计估计权）来扩大自己的效用或公司价值的行为。

这些都是从盈余管理的动机角度来定义盈余管理的，从这些定义可以看出他们认为盈余管理是管理当局为企业或自己牟利而采取的一种欺骗公众的行为。

第二，从盈余信息的真实性和盈余管理的合法性角度定义。

Goel&Thakor （2003）以及Levill认为所有赢余管理都具有欺诈性，盈余管理就是使有关盈余的报告反映管理当局期望的盈余水平，并不是一个企业真实业绩的表现，由此从报表上反映的盈余信息质量不高，他们对盈余管理持否定的意见；Marin(2000)认为，通过盈余管理形成的会计报表信息虽然缺乏真实性但也有合理和可利用的，不是一种欺诈性的报告，盈余管理是一种超越真实性报告与欺诈性报告边缘的行为或现象。

企业盈余管理的文献综述1. 引言1.1 引言背景企业盈余管理作为财务管理领域中的重要内容，一直备受学者和实践者们的关注。

在日益激烈的市场竞争环境下，企业需要有效地管理自身盈余水平，以保持竞争力并实现可持续发展。

盈余管理不仅仅是一种财务管理手段，更是企业治理和战略决策的重要组成部分。

随着全球化经济的发展以及科技的不断进步，企业盈余管理面临着越来越多的挑战和机遇。

在这样的背景下，对企业盈余管理的研究变得尤为重要。

通过深入探讨企业盈余管理的定义、影响因素、方法，以及对企业价值和股东利益的影响，我们可以更好地理解企业盈余管理对企业发展的意义和影响。

1.2 研究目的企业盈余管理的研究目的是为了深入探讨企业在盈余管理方面的行为和策略，揭示其背后的动机和影响因素。

通过研究企业盈余管理的实践和效果，可以帮助了解企业为何选择进行盈余管理、如何进行盈余管理以及盈余管理对企业价值和股东利益的影响。

研究企业盈余管理还可以为监管部门提供参考，制定更有效的监管政策，防范潜在的财务舞弊行为。

通过深入探讨企业盈余管理的研究目的，可以帮助完善理论模型和分析框架，提高对企业财务决策的理解和预测能力，为投资者、管理者和监管部门提供更为科学的决策依据。

企业盈余管理研究的研究目的是为了推动企业财务管理领域的进步和发展，促进企业运营的健康稳定和可持续发展。

1.3 研究意义企业盈余管理的研究可以为企业提供更有效的财务管理策略。

通过深入了解企业盈余管理的定义、影响因素和方法，企业管理者可以更好地制定盈余管理策略，提高企业财务绩效，增加股东价值。

对企业盈余管理的研究有助于揭示企业经营行为中的潜在风险和问题。

通过分析企业盈余管理对企业价值和股东利益的影响，可以发现企业在盈余管理方面存在的问题和风险，为监管部门和投资者提供参考，促进企业合规经营。

企业盈余管理的研究也有助于促进财务信息透明度和信息披露的规范。

深入了解企业盈余管理对企业财务报告的影响，有助于提高财务信息的可信度和透明度，减少信息不对称，维护市场秩序。

盈余管理一、盈余管理的概念美国会计学家凯瑟琳（Katherine.Schipper）认为盈余管理实际上是企业管理人员通过有目的的控制对外财务报告的过程，以获取某些私人利益的“披露管理”。

美国会计学家斯考特（William.K.Scott）认为盈余管理是指在GAAP允许的范围内，通过对会计政策的选择是经营者自身利益或（和）企业市场价值达到最大化的行为。

二、盈余管理的定义企业管理层在公认会计准则、会计制度及有关财务会计法允许的范围内，利用会计政策的可选择性和交易规划等手段，有意识地调节或控制企业的盈余，使会计报表数据达到预期的满意效果，以达到自身利益最大化或企业价值最大化的行为。

三、特征1.盈余管理的主体是企业管理当局2.盈余管理的客体是企业对外报告的盈余信息3.盈余管理不会增减社会的实际盈余4.盈余管理的目的既明确又复杂四、盈余管理与会计造假的区别1、主体不同盈余管理主体是企业管理当局，包括经理人员和董事会。

会计造假主体则可能是企业管理当局，但绝大多数是个别高级管理人员。

2、法律法规的认可不同盈余管理在法律法规允许的范围内进行，是通过选择有利于自身利益的相应会计政策来进行会计处理。

会计造假则是采用违法违规手段来改变企业盈余信息，导致会计信息严重失实。

3、手段不同盈余管理是在会计法律法规和准则允许的范围内，主要针对会计政策的变更和对会计核算上需要估算的项目进行调整，来达到修正企业盈余的目的。

会计造假则以不合法手段来粉饰企业财务报表。

4、目的不同盈余管理的目的是，管理者为满足股东财富最大化的要求，合理避税节税，使自己的管理业绩和管理才能得到认可等，其受益者通常是企业管理当局、股东、公司员工。

会计造假的目的是以损害大多数股东和其他信息使用者的利益为代价，实现企业经营管理者的不当获利。

5、影响范围不同盈余管理只会影响实际盈余在不同会计期间的反映和公布，影响的是会计数据，尤其是会计报表中的报告盈余，而不是实际盈余。

研发费用资本化和盈余管理：以意大利上市公司为例摘要：研发费用的资本化一直以来都是个有争议的会计问题，因为资本化处理极易受到盈余管理动因的影响。

以选取的意大利上市公司样本为例，本研究探讨企业研发费用资本化的决策是否会受到盈余管理动机的制约。

因为意大利会计准则允许将研发费用资本化，所以意大利公司的案例提供了根本性的研究方向，使我们可以利用回归模型来验证所提出的合理假设。

研究表明，企业确实倾向于通过费用资本化来达到利益最大化的目的，但以资本化降低违反债务契约风险的假设是不成立的。

关键词：盈余管理，费用资本化，研发会计，平稳收入，债务契约，意大利公司1 简介在当前全球化的时代，监管机构面临的一个重要问题是学者和从业人员能否对研发费用做出适当的会计处理。

在国际会计准则（IASB，2004）第38号“无形资产”中，讨论了研发费用的会计处理方法。

在第54章标准中规定，没有经过调查的无形资产研究费用是不能被确认为资产的，这类研发支出应在其发生时确认为费用。

至于企业开发阶段的费用，在国际会计准则第38号第57段指出，当且仅当企业可证明以下所有各项时，开发活动（或内部项目开发阶段）产生的无形资产才可予确认：（1）无形资产的成功开发在技术上是可行的；（2）有意完成该无形资产并使用或销售它；（3）有能力使用或销售该无形资产；（4）该无形资产可以产生可能的未来收益；（5）为完成该无形资产的开发，并使用或销售该无形资产，有足够的技术、资金和其他资源的支持；（6）对归集于该无形资产开发阶段的支出，能够可靠的计量。

虽然国际会计准则第38条允许公司将开发费用资本化，但由于研发过程中所固有的主观性，管理者有权决定是否满足国际会计准则第38条的条件。

从本质上讲，国际会计准则第38条赋予管理者在开发费用方面有相当大的灵活性。

美国会计准则对这一问题有严格的规定，在财务会计准则（FASB，1974）第2号“研发费用”中要求所有的研发费用在当期列为支出。

专业的论文在线写作平台浅析盈余管理内容摘要：盈余管理就是企业管理当局在遵循会计准则的基础上，通过对企业对外报告的会计收益信息进行控制或调整，以达到主体自身利益最大化的行为。

实施盈余管理主要有六种动因，两大类方法。

其本身具有四个特点。

可以通过加强研究合理规范来去弊存利。

关键词：盈余管理涵义动因方法特点abstract: earnings management means to control or adjust the information of the financial income in the report in order to maximize the interest. the aims are to obtain the private benefit. mainly there are six kinds of motivations, two types of methods to reach the purpose of earning management. it has four characteristics. we can stress its reasonable study to keep advantages instead of disadvantages. key words: earningsmanagement meaning motivations measures characteristic 盈余管理研究在国外会计学界只有20年左右的历史。

在我国随着证券市场的建立与发展它也刚刚开始凸现。

对于这样一个毁誉参半、人喜人忧的新问题，笔者试述自己的一些观点。

一、盈余管理的涵义对于什么是盈余管理，至今并无定论。

美国会计学者斯考特（scott）《财务会计理论》中指出:盈余管理是会计政策的选择具有经济后果的一种具体表现。

paul m. healy and james m.wahlen(1999)提出:盈余管理使为了误导股东对公司潜在经济业绩的理解,或影响基于报告。

盈余管理：一种普遍现象[外文翻译]外文翻译Earnings Management：A Perspective Material Source: Managerial Finance Author:Messod D.Beneish Abstract An issue central to accounting research is the extent to which managers alter reported earnings for their own benefit. In the 1970s and early 1980s, a large number of studies investigated the determinants of accounting choice. These studies provided evidence consistent with managers’ incentives to choose beneficial ways of reporting earnings in regulatory and contractual contexts (see Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983, and Watts and Zimmerman, 1986 for reviews of these studies). Since the mid-1980s studies of managerial incentives to alter earnings have focused primarily on accruals.I trace the explosive growth in accrual-based management research to three likely causes. First accruals are the principal product of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and if earnings are managed it is more likely that the earnings management occurs on the accrual rather than the cash flow component of earnings. Second, studying accruals reduces the problems associated with the inability to measure the effect of various accounting choices on earnings (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). Third，if earnings management is an unobservable component of accruals, it is less likely that investors can unravel the effect of earnings management on reported earnings.The main challenge faced by earnings management researchers is that academics, like investors, are unable to observe, or for that matter, measure the earnings management component of accruals. Indeed, managerial accounting actionsintended to increase compensation, avoid covenant default, raise capital, or influence a regulatory outcome are largely unobservable. Consequently, prior work has drawn inferences from joint hypotheses that test both incentives to manage earnings as well as the construct validity of the various accrual models which are used to estimate managers’ accounting discretion. Because extant models of expected accruals provide imprecise estimates of managerial discretion, questions have been raised about whether the unobservable earnings management actions do in fact occur.Notwithstanding research design problems, a variety of evidence suggestive of earnings management has accumulated. In Section 2, I raise three general questions about earnings management: What is it? How frequently does it occur? How do researchers estimate earnings management? Prior investigations of managerial incentives to alter earnings typically fall in three categories, namely studies that examine the effect of contracts in accounting choices, and studies that examine the incentive effects associated with the need to raise external financing. Rather than discussing the evidence along those lines, I have chosen to present the evidence depending on the direction of the incentive context. Thus, I summarize in Sections 3 and 4, what is known about incentives to increase and decrease earnings. In Section 5, I discuss evidence on incentive contexts that provide incentives either to increase or to decrease earnings, and in Section 6, I present conclusions and suggestions for future work.2. Earnings Management2.1 DefinitionsNotice the plural: It reflects my view that academics have no consensus on what is earnings management. There have been atleast three attempts at defining earnings management:(1) Managing earnings is “the process of taking deliberate steps within the constraints of generally accepted accounting principles to bring about a desired level of reported earnings.” (Davidso n, Stickney and Weil, 1987,cited in Schipper，1989).(2) Managing earnings is “a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain (as opposed to say，merely facilitating the neutral operati on of the process).” (Schipper, 1989).(3) “Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.” (Healy and Wahlen, 1999).A lack of consensus on the definition of earnings management implies differing interpretations of empirical evidence in studies that seek to detect earnings management，or to provide evidence of earnings management incentives. It is thus useful to compare the above three definitions.All three definitions deal with actions management undertaken within thecontext of financial reporting - including the structuring of transactions so that a desired accounting treatment applies (e.g. pooling, operating leases). However, the second definition also allows earnings management to occur via timing real investment and financing decisions. If the timing issue delays or accelerates a discretionary expenditure for a very short period of time around the firm’s fiscal year, I envision timing real decisions as a means of managing earnings. A problem with the seconddefinition arises if readers interpret any real decisions - including those implying that managers forego profitable opportunities –as earnings management. Given the availability of alternative ways to manage earnings, I believe it is implausible to call earnings management a deviation from rational investment behavior. This reflects my view that earnings management is a financial reporting phenomenon.There are two perspectives on earnings management: the opportunistic perspective holds that managers seek to mislead investors, and the information perspective, first enunciated by Holthausen and Leftwich (1983), under which managerial discretion is a means for managers to reveal to investors their private expectation s about the firm’s future cash flows. Much prior work has predicated its conclusions on an opportunistic perspective for earnings management and has not tested the information perspective.2.2 Incidence of earnings managementIf one believes former SEC Chairman Levitt (1998), earnings management is widespread, at least among public companies, as they face pressure to meet analysts’ expectations. Earnings management is also widespread if one relies on analytical arguments. For example, Bagnoli and Watts (2000) suggest that the existence of relative performance evaluation leads firms to manage earnings if they expect competitor firms to manage earnings. Similar prisoner’s dilemma-like arguments for the existence of earnings management appear in Erickson and Wang (1999) in the context of mergers and Shivakumar (2000) in the context of seasoned equity offerings.At the other extreme, we can only be certain that earnings have indeed been managed, when the judicial system, in casesthat are brought by the SEC or the Department of Justice, resolves that earnings management has occurred. While it is likely that earnings management occurs more frequently than is observed from judicial actions, it is not clear to me that earnings management is pervasive: it seems implausible that firms face the same motivations to manage earnings over time. As later discussed, much of the evidence of earnings management is dependent on firm performance, suggesting that earnings management is more likely to b e present when a firm’s performance is either unusually good or unusually bad.3. Evidence of Income Increasing Earnings ManagementI discuss four sources of incentives for income increasing earnings management:(1) debt contracts, (2) compensation agreements, (3) equity offerings, (4) insider trading. The first two sources have been hypothesized in prior positive accounting theory research and the last two sources are explicitly described as reasons behind earnings overstatement in the SEC’s accounting enf orcement actions, and have been investigated in recent research.3.1 Debt CovenantsDebt contracts are an important theme in financial accounting research as lenders often use accounting numbers to regulate firms’ activities,e,g. by requiring that certain performance objectives be met or imposing limits to allowed investing and financing activities.The linkage between accounting numbers and debt contracts has been used in studies investigation (i) why economic consequences are observed when firms comply with mandated, or voluntarily make, accounting changes that have no cash flow impact，(ii) the determinants of accounting choice andmanagers’ exercise of discretion over accounting estimates that impact net income. The assumption is that debt covenants provide incentives for managers to increase earnings either to reduce the restrictiveness of accounting based constraints in debt agreements or to avoid the costs of covenant violations.The results of economic consequences studies have generally been mixed and researchers recently turned to investigating accounting choice in firms that experience actual technical default (Beneish and Press, 1993, 1995; Sweeney, 1994; Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994；and De Angelo, De Angelo and Skinner, 1994). The idea is to increase the power of the tests by focusing on a sample where the effect of violating debt covenants is likely to be more noticeable. While some of the evidence suggests that managers take income increasing actions delay the onset of default (Sweeney, 1994; Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994), other evidence does not (Beneish and Press,1993; DeAngelo,DeAngelo and Skinner,1994). Further, it is not clear such actions actually are sufficient to delay default. Thus, the evidence in these studies on whether managers make income increasing accounting choices to avoid default is mixed. However, examining a large sample of private debt agreements, and measuring firms’ closeness to current ratio and tangible net worth constraints, Dichev and Skinner (2000) find significantly greater proportions of firms slightly above the covenant’s violation threshold than below. They suggest that manag ers take actions consistent with avoiding covenant default.3.2 Compensation AgreementsStudies examining the bonus hypothesis (Healy, 1985；Gaveretal, 1995; and Holthausen, Larker and Sloan, 1995) provide evidence consistent with managers altering reported earnings toincrease their compensation. Except for Healy (1985)，these studies provide evidence consistent with managers decreasing reported earnings to increase future compensation. In addition, Holthausen et al. (1995) finds little evidence that managers increase income and suggest that the income-increasing evidence in Healy (1985) is induced by his experimental design.3.3 Equity OfferingsA grow ing body of research examines managers’ incentives to increase reported income in the context of security offerings. Information asymmetry between owners-managers and investors, particularly at the time of initial public offerings, is recognized in prior research.Models such as Leland and Pyle (1977) suggest that the amount of equity retained by insiders signals their private valuation, and models such as Hughes (1986), Titman and Trueman (1986), and Datar et al. (1991) examine the role of the reputation of the auditor on the offer price. In these models, the asymmetry is resolved by the choice of an outside certifier or by a commitment to a contract that penalizes the issuer for untruthful disclosure. Empirical studies assume that information asymmetry remains and use various models to estimate managers’ exercise of discretion over accruals at the time of security offerings.Four studies investigate earnings management as an explanation for the puzzling behavior of post-issuance stock prices. Teoh, Welch and Rao (1998) and Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998a) study earnings management in the context of initial public offerings (IPO), and Rangan (1998) and Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998b) do so in the context of seasoned equity offerings. These studies estimate the extent of earnings management usingJones like models around the time of the security issuance, and correlate their earnings management estimates with post-issue earnings and returns. The evidence presented suggests that estimates of at-issue earnings management are significantly negatively correlated with subsequent earnings and returns performance. The results in these studies suggest that market。