外文翻译原文Credit guarantee schemes as an instrument to promote access to finance for small and medium enterprises: an analysis of Khula EnterpriseFinance Ltd’s individual credit guaranteeMaterial Source: Development Southern Africa Vol. 19, No. 5, December 2002Author: Morne´ Nigrini & Andrie Schoombee1Abstract：Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) face many constraints, such as lack of credit, which hinder them from reaching their job-creating potential. This article focuses on the constraints that increase banks’ risk in lending to SMEs, and how credit guarantee schemes are used to overcome some of them. In South Africa, Chula Enterprise Finance Limited, a government operates three such guarantee schemes. This article explains the functioning of one of the schemes, namely Khula’s Individual Credit Guarantee Scheme. Its performance is evaluated with reference to international best practices. Although it is generally found to operate efficiently, there are various aspects concerning the functioning of the scheme that influence negatively the willingness of banks to participate. These problems need to be addressed, as the authors are convinced that a credit guarantee scheme, with all its problems, still remains a viable way for the government to lower the normally high risk involved for banks in dealing with SMEs, and in this way to entice them to serve SMEs.Although SMEs can contribute significantly to economic growth and development in developing economies, they face serious constraints. In surveys of SMEs worldwide (DTI, 1995; Levitsky, n.d.), access to finance emerged as one of the most urgently felt needs. This is why programmers of financial assistance are one of the principal ways in which governments, international development agencies and donors support this sector. Other constraints faced by SMEs include the legal framework and regulatory environment confronting them; the lack of access to appropriate and relevant information and advice; the acquisition of skills and managerial advice; problems relating to market access; low levels of literacy; andlack of entrepreneurial skills.The financial sector consists of two subsectors: the formal financial sector, which encompasses institutions that are registered, licensed and recorded, i.e. central banks and commercial banks serving the formal sector within the economy; and the informal financial sector, which serves those segments of the market that do not have access to formal financial services, and includes institutions that are unregulated and unlicensed. Within the financial sector, banks are reluctant to deal with SMEs for three main reasons:· It is perceived as too risky.· The costs involved are seen as too high.· The returns from SME loans are seen as too low.In credit markets, in contrast to other markets, the exchange process between providing money to borrowers and receiving payments does not occur simultaneously, thus causing risk. The longer the time period involved, the higher the risk. This risk is particularly high for formal financial institutions lending to the SME sector, because of the uncertainties faced by emerging businesses, their high mortality rates, their susceptibility to market changes and to economic fluctuations, and the scarcity of information on the performance of the SME sector.To offset these risks, banks perform three tasks:· They screen potential borrowers to establish the risk of default.· They create incentives for borrowers to fulfill their promise.·They develop various enforcement actions to make sure that those who are able to repay, do so.These tasks are difficult and costly to undertake, especially when serving the SME sector. SMEs are not always able to present full accounting records and other documentation called for by banks, making the appraisal of applicants difficult. The scarcity of information results in important information asymmetries between SMEs and banks, namely that borrower will always know more about their ability and willingness to repay than do lenders. Such information asymmetries increase ba nks’ reluctance to lend to SMEs because of the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard in the credit transaction (see Hoff & Stieglitz, 1990, for a discussion). To circumvent these asymmetries, banks create repayment incentives and enforce repayment by attaching collateral requirements to loans. Unfortunately, SMEs seldom have adequate collateral. High interest rates then have to be levied to compensate for the high risk involved.In addition to information problems, high operating costs relative to the size of SME accounts deter banks from serving them. Costs are incurred in screening potential borrowers to establish the risk of default, and in monitoring borrowers to prevent default. In addition to their highly skilled personnel, banks employ standardized procedures for deposits, withdrawals or lending, irrespective of the size of the account. These factors can combine to make the unit cost of small accounts very high (Oehering, 1990; Allhar & Brown, 1995; Schoombee & Smith, 1995; Schoombee, 1997, 1998).In conclusion, SMEs have difficulty in obtaining finance from the formal financial sector, due mainly to the lack of adequate information. Hoff & Stieglitz (1990) consider that in such circumstances the government needs to intervene in an attempt to correct the perceived market failure. The formal financial sector has to be coaxed to change its credit policies in ways that serve the SME sector. A possibility is for the government to set up a credit guarantee scheme to cover some of the risk involved. According to Levitsky & Prasad (1987: 1), the purpose of such schemes ‘is to encourage financial institutions, and in particular commercial banks, to lend to, SMEs with viable projects and good prospects of success, but which are unable to provide adequate collateral or which do not have a suitable record of financial transactions to prove that they are creditworthy’.In South Africa, several discussion papers, reports and workshops have focused on the promotion of SMEs, to encourage critical comments on and practical proposals for the adjustment of existing systems. These proposals are summarized in the Small Business White Paper (DTI, 1995), thus paving the way for the development of the SME sector through eliminating the many obstacles they face.In an attempt to encourage financial institutions to make loans to SMEs, the South African government, like most governments, intervened by setting up a credit guarantee scheme. In the previous dispensation, the Small Business Development Corporation (now known as Business Partners) operated such a scheme. Unfortunately, not many guaranteed loans were written by participating banks and the scheme had to be restructured.The purpose of credit guarantee schemes is to assist banks in lending to SMEs by overcoming coll ateral problems, thus lowering banks’ risk and costs, which finally contributes to higher returns for the banks. International best practices were identified by considering guarantee schemes operating in Central and South America,Asia, Africa and Europe. The functioning of Khula's scheme was then measured against the identified best practices.There are various aspects regarding the functioning of the Individual Guarantee Scheme that negatively influence the banks’ participation in the scheme. Banks incur increased administration costs by having to undertake the full investigation and appraisal of loan applications –there is not, apparently, consensus internationally on whom should take responsibility for this function. The 3 per cent guarantee fee that Khula charges appears high in relation to international experience, and the way in which the fee is calculated is also of the utmost concern to the banks, who feel that it results in an excessive fee. Whether or not Khula needs this high fee to cover its administration costs (which, according to them, it does), could not be determined, as this information was not available to the researchers.The banks’ 20 per cent share of the default risk is below the international benchmark minimum of 30 per cent and should, in principle, sway banks to participate. This, however, is not the case. The way in which Khula calculates the risk it accepts when the borrower provides collateral, may increase the banks’ risk. Furthermore, when a client does default, Khula is allowed – if it is of the opinion that the bank has misreported any information on the client –to throw out the bank’s claim or to charge a penalty. Some banks feel that there is not enough transparency in this process and that it could lead to them suffering unnecessary losses.Although the guarantee agreement between Khula and a bank spells out who is responsible for what, implementation thereof in practice, as summarized above, has been shown to have many deficiencies. This problem needs to be addressed urgently. As far as the claim ratio is concerned, the scheme’s 1 per cent is low in international terms, given the age of the scheme. This indicates that the selection process has worked reasonably well, especially as the launch of the Thuso Mentorship Programmer.In the final instance, what matters is if additionally is created by a credit guarantee scheme. Khula and the banks differ in this regard, the former arguing in the positive and the latter disagreeing. Our conclusion is that the truth lies somewhere between the two views.Whether sufficient additionally has been created to warrant the governments investment in the scheme would always be a subjective view. We are convinced, however, that a credit guarantee scheme, with all its problems, still remains a viable way for the government to lower the normally high risk involved for banks indealing with SMEs and, in this way, to entice them to serve SMEs. Nevertheless, the problems the banks experience with Khul's Individual Guarantee Scheme should be addressed. Khula needs the cooperation of the banks to overcome some of the constraints SMEs face when trying to secure bank loans.译文以信用担保计划为工具，促进中小型企业融资：一个Khula企业财务有限公司的个人信用担保分析资料来源:南非发展作者：莫妮.尼格利妮和安吉尔.斯谷比尔摘要：中小企业融资面临许多约束的条件,缺少信誉就是其中之一,这个条件阻碍了他们提供就业机会和达到创造潜能的目的。
