The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of Financial Politics A Review Essay

有关中国规则的英文作文Rules in China play a crucial role in shaping the social, economic, and political landscape of the country. As one of the world's oldest civilizations, China has a rich history of establishing and enforcing a comprehensive system of rules and regulations to maintain order, promote social stability, and foster economic development. These rules, often rooted in traditional Chinese values and philosophies, have evolved over time to address the changing needs and challenges faced by the nation.At the heart of China's rulebook lies the concept of "Fa," which translates to "law" or "rule." The Chinese legal system is a complex and multi-layered structure that encompasses a wide range of laws, regulations, and administrative policies. From the overarching Constitution to specific industry-specific guidelines, the Chinese government has meticulously crafted a framework to govern the behavior of its citizens, businesses, and institutions.One of the defining features of the Chinese rule system is its emphasis on social harmony and collective well-being. The Confucianprinciples of filial piety, respect for authority, and the primacy of the group over the individual have heavily influenced the development of Chinese rules. This is evident in the strong emphasis on maintaining social order, upholding family values, and ensuring the smooth functioning of the state.In the realm of personal conduct, Chinese rules often focus on promoting virtuous behavior and discouraging actions that may disrupt social harmony. For instance, the concept of "Li," which encompasses etiquette, propriety, and social norms, is deeply ingrained in Chinese culture. Individuals are expected to adhere to these unwritten rules of behavior, such as showing respect to elders, maintaining proper dress code in public, and avoiding public displays of affection.The Chinese government also wields significant control over the economic sphere, with a comprehensive set of rules and regulations governing various industries and sectors. From the management of state-owned enterprises to the regulation of foreign investment, the government's hand is ever-present in shaping the economic landscape. This level of control is often seen as a necessary measure to ensure the stability and continued growth of the Chinese economy, which has experienced remarkable transformation and expansion in recent decades.In the realm of politics, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has established a robust system of rules and regulations to maintain its grip on power and ensure the implementation of its policies. The CCP's rule is underpinned by a complex web of laws, party directives, and administrative measures that govern the behavior of government officials, political institutions, and the media. This tight control over the political sphere is often justified by the government as a means to preserve social stability and national unity.However, the Chinese rule system has also faced criticism from both domestic and international observers. Concerns have been raised about the lack of transparency, the suppression of dissent, and the perceived disregard for individual rights in the name of maintaining social order. Critics argue that the rigid and centralized nature of the Chinese rule system can stifle innovation, limit personal freedoms, and hinder the development of a more open and democratic society.Despite these criticisms, the Chinese government remains committed to its rule-based approach, constantly adapting and refining its policies to address emerging challenges and maintain its grip on power. The ongoing debate around the balance between order and individual liberty continues to be a central issue in the discourse surrounding China's political and social development.In conclusion, the rules in China play a pivotal role in shaping thecountry's social, economic, and political landscape. From the Confucian-inspired emphasis on social harmony to the government's tight control over various spheres of life, the Chinese rule system reflects the unique cultural, historical, and ideological foundations of the nation. As China continues to evolve and navigate the complexities of the modern world, the role and impact of these rules will undoubtedly remain a topic of intense scrutiny and discussion.。

发生巨大变化 to undergo yet more changes中国将更加遵循……原则 china will bring its own practices in linewith ……拉动世界经济 to provide/give/lend substantial impetus to the world economyrequire 这个词很重要比如“这都需要在国际合作的环境中才能实现”allof the above requires an environment of international cooperation给一个比较叼的说法“中国以敞开大门，张开双手”china has thrown its door wide open, and reached out with open arms 看起来比较还不多的哦，但是一个句子利用了两个open。

表示对下一步工作的继续进行，用continue 什么工作就好了。

有利于推动……的发展 be conductive to the development of sth做到……的统一 strike the balance of ……我们应该清楚地意识到 it is clear to us that保持经济的长盛不衰 perpetuate an economic boom……是有目共睹的 be there for all to see经济形势不是economic situation 而是economic climate国企改革问题、大量失业待业问题、生态环境破坏问题、金融风险问题、腐败问题等需要重点记住，这里不列英语了需要尽快找到解决方法 to require our immediate attention and effective solutions in the shortest time possible盲目发展 blind development调控 regulate这是一个把握分寸的问题 this is an issue of maintaining the right balance上市 seek listing on the stock market在金融全球化的潮流中急流勇进 to ride the wave of financial globalization表示数量很多的 a handful of省级银行 provincial level banks 重点看省级的即是怎么表示出来的法人在林超伦的翻译中是legal person，而经过我的查找，corporation和artificial person比较正确而且常见。

Unit 4Listen carefully and choose the best answer to the question after each dialog. Scripts & AnswersDialog 1M: Well, you’re back at last from the bank.W: Yes, just now. The manager of the Credit Department said that they willlearn about the economic performance of our business from the financialstatements submitted to them.M: Exactly. He can make a comparison between the financial statementsof one year with those of the next year. It is particularly helpful inunderstanding a company’s financial position.W: I understand that if we want to borrow money from a bank, we shouldprepare accounting reports and submit to the bank our financial statementson all the activities of operating, investing and financing of our company.M: Yes. The manager will read the statements and get the data implied by the accounting reports in order to make decision.Question: What need to be submitted to the bank according to the dialog? (B)译文男：啊，你总算从银行回来了。

财务规章制度英文回答：Financial regulations are essential for any business to ensure that financial transactions are conducted in a transparent and ethical manner. These regulations help to protect both the company and its stakeholders, including investors, creditors, customers, and employees.There are many different types of financial regulations, but some of the most common include:Accounting standards: These standards govern how companies must report their financial results. They ensure that financial statements are accurate and consistent, so that users can compare the financial performance ofdifferent companies.Auditing standards: These standards govern how audits are conducted. They ensure that audits are independent andobjective, so that investors and other stakeholders can rely on the results.Securities regulations: These regulations govern the issuance and sale of securities. They help to protect investors from fraud and abuse.Banking regulations: These regulations govern the operation of banks and other financial institutions. They help to ensure that these institutions are safe and sound, so that depositors and other customers can have confidence in them.Financial regulations are constantly evolving to keep up with the changing financial landscape. As new financial products and services are developed, new regulations are often created to address the risks associated with them.It is important for businesses to comply with all applicable financial regulations. Failure to comply can result in significant penalties, including fines, imprisonment, and/or the loss of business licenses.中文回答：财务规章制度对于任何企业来说都是至关重要的，它可以确保财务交易以透明且符合道德的方式进行。

美国是世界上公司法、证券法研究最为发达的国家之一，在美国法学期刊（Law Review & Journals）上每年发表400多篇以公司法和证券法为主题的论文。

自1994年开始，美国的公司法学者每年会投票从中遴选出10篇左右重要的论文，重印于Corporate Practice Commentator，至2008年，已经评选了15年，计177篇论文入选。

以下是每年入选的论文列表：2008年（以第一作者姓名音序为序）：1.Anabtawi, Iman and Lynn Stout. Fiduciary duties for activist shareholders. 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1255-1308 (2008).2.Brummer, Chris. Corporate law preemption in an age of global capital markets. 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1067-1114 (2008).3.Choi, Stephen and Marcel Kahan. The market penalty for mutual fund scandals. 87 B.U. L. Rev. 1021-1057 (2007).4.Choi, Stephen J. and Jill E. Fisch. On beyond CalPERS: Survey evidence on the developing role of public pension funds in corporate governance. 61 V and. L. Rev. 315-354 (2008).5.Cox, James D., Randall S. Thoma s and Lynn Bai. There are plaintiffs and…there are plaintiffs: An empirical analysis of securities class action settlements. 61 V and. L. Rev. 355-386 (2008).6.Henderson, M. Todd. Paying CEOs in bankruptcy: Executive compensation when agency costs are low. 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1543-1618 (2007).7.Hu, Henry T.C. and Bernard Black. Equity and debt decoupling and empty voting II: Importance and extensions. 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 625-739 (2008).8.Kahan, Marcel and Edward Rock. The hanging chads of corporate voting. 96 Geo. L.J. 1227-1281 (2008).9.Strine, Leo E., Jr. Toward common sense and common ground? Reflections on the shared interests of managers and labor in a more rational system of corporate governance. 33 J. Corp. L. 1-20 (2007).10.Subramanian, Guhan. Go-shops vs. no-shops in private equity deals: Evidence and implications.63 Bus. Law. 729-760 (2008).2007年：1.Baker, Tom and Sean J. Griffith. The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurer. 95 Geo. L.J. 1795-1842 (2007).2.Bebchuk, Lucian A. The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise. 93 V a. L. Rev. 675-732 (2007).3.Choi, Stephen J. and Robert B. Thompson. Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes During the First Decade After the PSLRA. 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1489-1533 (2006).4.Coffee, John C., Jr. Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation. 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1534-1586 (2006).5.Cox, James D. and Randall S. Thomas. Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions. 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1587-1640 (2006).6.Eisenberg, Theodore and Geoffrey Miller. Ex Ante Choice of Law and Forum: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements. 59 V and. L. Rev. 1975-2013 (2006).7.Gordon, Jeffrey N. The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder V alue and Stock Market Prices. 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1465-1568 (2007).8.Kahan, Marcel and Edward B. Rock. Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control. 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1021-1093 (2007).ngevoort, Donald C. The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley. 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1817-1855 (2007).10.Roe, Mark J. Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets. 120 Harv. L. Rev. 460-527 (2006).11.Subramanian, Guhan. Post-Siliconix Freeze-outs: Theory and Evidence. 36 J. Legal Stud. 1-26 (2007). (NOTE: This is an earlier working draft. The published article is not freely available, and at SLW we generally respect the intellectual property rights of others.)2006年：1.Bainbridge, Stephen M. Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment. 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1735-1758 (2006).2.Bebchuk, Lucian A. Letting Shareholders Set the Rules. 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1784-1813 (2006).3.Black, Bernard, Brian Cheffins and Michael Klausner. Outside Director Liability. 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1055-1159 (2006).4.Choi, Stephen J., Jill E. Fisch and A.C. Pritchard. Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. 835.Cox, James D. and Randall S. Thomas. Letting Billions Slip Through Y our Fingers: Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements. 58 Stan. L. Rev. 411-454 (2005).6.Gilson, Ronald J. Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy. 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1641-1679 (2006).7.Goshen , Zohar and Gideon Parchomovsky. The Essential Role of Securities Regulation. 55 Duke L.J. 711-782 (2006).8.Hansmann, Henry, Reinier Kraakman and Richard Squire. Law and the Rise of the Firm. 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1333-1403 (2006).9.Hu, Henry T. C. and Bernard Black. Empty V oting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications, and Reforms. 61 Bus. Law. 1011-1070 (2006).10.Kahan, Marcel. The Demand for Corporate Law: Statutory Flexibility, Judicial Quality, or Takeover Protection? 22 J. L. Econ. & Org. 340-365 (2006).11.Kahan, Marcel and Edward Rock. Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law.58 V and. L. Rev. 1573-1622 (2005).12.Smith, D. Gordon. The Exit Structure of V enture Capital. 53 UCLA L. Rev. 315-356 (2005).2005年：1.Bebchuk, Lucian Arye. The case for increasing shareholder power. 118 Harv. L. Rev. 833-914 (2005).2.Bratton, William W. The new dividend puzzle. 93 Geo. L.J. 845-895 (2005).3.Elhauge, Einer. Sacrificing corporate profits in the public interest. 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 733-869 (2005).4.Johnson, . Corporate officers and the business judgment rule. 60 Bus. Law. 439-469 (2005).haupt, Curtis J. In the shadow of Delaware? The rise of hostile takeovers in Japan. 105 Colum. L. Rev. 2171-2216 (2005).6.Ribstein, Larry E. Are partners fiduciaries? 2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 209-251.7.Roe, Mark J. Delaware?s politics. 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2491-2543 (2005).8.Romano, Roberta. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the making of quack corporate governance. 114 Y ale L.J. 1521-1611 (2005).9.Subramanian, Guhan. Fixing freezeouts. 115 Y ale L.J. 2-70 (2005).10.Thompson, Robert B. and Randall S. Thomas. The public and private faces of derivative lawsuits. 57 V and. L. Rev. 1747-1793 (2004).11.Weiss, Elliott J. and J. White. File early, then free ride: How Delaware law (mis)shapes shareholder class actions. 57 V and. L. Rev. 1797-1881 (2004).2004年：1Arlen, Jennifer and Eric Talley. Unregulable defenses and the perils of shareholder choice. 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 577-666 (2003).2.Bainbridge, Stephen M. The business judgment rule as abstention doctrine. 57 V and. L. Rev. 83-130 (2004).3.Bebchuk, Lucian Arye and Alma Cohen. Firms' decisions where to incorporate. 46 J.L. & Econ. 383-425 (2003).4.Blair, Margaret M. Locking in capital: what corporate law achieved for business organizers in the nineteenth century. 51 UCLA L. Rev. 387-455 (2003).5.Gilson, Ronald J. and Jeffrey N. Gordon. Controlling shareholders. 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 785-843 (2003).6.Roe, Mark J. Delaware 's competition. 117 Harv. L. Rev. 588-646 (2003).7.Sale, Hillary A. Delaware 's good faith. 89 Cornell L. Rev. 456-495 (2004).8.Stout, Lynn A. The mechanisms of market inefficiency: an introduction to the new finance. 28 J. Corp. L. 635-669 (2003).9.Subramanian, Guhan. Bargaining in the shadow of takeover defenses. 113 Y ale L.J. 621-686 (2003).10.Subramanian, Guhan. The disappearing Delaware effect. 20 J.L. Econ. & Org. 32-59 (2004)11.Thompson, Robert B. and Randall S. Thomas. The new look of shareholder litigation: acquisition-oriented class actions. 57 V and. L. Rev. 133-209 (2004).2003年：1.A yres, Ian and Stephen Choi. Internalizing outsider trading. 101 Mich. L. Rev. 313-408 (2002).2.Bainbridge, Stephen M. Director primacy: The means and ends of corporate governance. 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 547-606 (2003).3.Bebchuk, Lucian, Alma Cohen and Allen Ferrell. Does the evidence favor state competition in corporate law? 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1775-1821 (2002).4.Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, John C. Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian. The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further findings and a reply to symposium participants. 55 Stan. L. Rev. 885-917 (2002).5.Choi, Stephen J. and Jill E. Fisch. How to fix Wall Street: A voucher financing proposal for securities intermediaries. 113 Y ale L.J. 269-346 (2003).6.Daines, Robert. The incorporation choices of IPO firms. 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev.1559-1611 (2002).7.Gilson, Ronald J. and David M. Schizer. Understanding venture capital structure: A taxexplanation for convertible preferred stock. 116 Harv. L. Rev. 874-916 (2003).8.Kahan, Marcel and Ehud Kamar. The myth of state competition in corporate law. 55 Stan. L. Rev. 679-749 (2002).ngevoort, Donald C. Taming the animal spirits of the stock markets: A behavioral approach to securities regulation. 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 135-188 (2002).10.Pritchard, A.C. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the counterrevolution in the federal securities laws. 52 Duke L.J. 841-949 (2003).11.Thompson, Robert B. and Hillary A. Sale. Securities fraud as corporate governance: Reflections upon federalism. 56 V and. L. Rev. 859-910 (2003).2002年：1.Allen, William T., Jack B. Jacobs and Leo E. Strine, Jr. Function over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law. 26 Del. J. Corp. L. 859-895 (2001) and 56 Bus. Law. 1287 (2001).2.A yres, Ian and Joe Bankman. Substitutes for Insider Trading. 54 Stan. L. Rev. 235-254 (2001).3.Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, Jesse M. Fried and David I. Walker. Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation. 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 751-846 (2002).4.Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, John C. Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian. The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy. 54 Stan. L. Rev. 887-951 (2002).5.Black, Bernard and Reinier Kraakman. Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden V alue. 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 521-566 (2002).6.Bratton, William M. Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder V alue. 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1275-1361 (2002).7.Coates, John C. IV. Explaining V ariation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers. 89 Cal. L. Rev. 1301-1421 (2001).8.Kahan, Marcel and Edward B. Rock. How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law. 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 871-915 (2002).9.Kahan, Marcel. Rethinking Corporate Bonds: The Trade-off Between Individual and Collective Rights. 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1040-1089 (2002).10.Roe, Mark J. Corporate Law’s Limits. 31 J. Legal Stud. 233-271 (2002).11.Thompson, Robert B. and D. Gordon Smith. Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role: "Sacred Space" in Corporate Takeovers. 80 Tex. L. Rev. 261-326 (2001).2001年：1.Black, Bernard S. The legal and institutional preconditions for strong securities markets. 48 UCLA L. Rev. 781-855 (2001).2.Coates, John C. IV. Takeover defenses in the shadow of the pill: a critique of the scientific evidence. 79 Tex. L. Rev. 271-382 (2000).3.Coates, John C. IV and Guhan Subramanian. A buy-side model of M&A lockups: theory and evidence. 53 Stan. L. Rev. 307-396 (2000).4.Coffee, John C., Jr. The rise of dispersed ownership: the roles of law and the state in the separation of ownership and control. 111 Y ale L.J. 1-82 (2001).5.Choi, Stephen J. The unfounded fear of Regulation S: empirical evidence on offshore securities offerings. 50 Duke L.J. 663-751 (2000).6.Daines, Robert and Michael Klausner. Do IPO charters maximize firm value? Antitakeover protection in IPOs. 17 J.L. Econ. & Org. 83-120 (2001).7.Hansmann, Henry and Reinier Kraakman. The essential role of organizational law. 110 Y ale L.J. 387-440 (2000).ngevoort, Donald C. The human nature of corporate boards: law, norms, and the unintended consequences of independence and accountability. 89 Geo. L.J. 797-832 (2001).9.Mahoney, Paul G. The political economy of the Securities Act of 1933. 30 J. Legal Stud. 1-31 (2001).10.Roe, Mark J. Political preconditions to separating ownership from corporate control. 53 Stan. L. Rev. 539-606 (2000).11.Romano, Roberta. Less is more: making institutional investor activism a valuable mechanism of corporate governance. 18 Y ale J. on Reg. 174-251 (2001).2000年：1.Bratton, William W. and Joseph A. McCahery. Comparative Corporate Governance and the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference. 38 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 213-297 (1999).2.Coates, John C. IV. Empirical Evidence on Structural Takeover Defenses: Where Do We Stand?54 U. Miami L. Rev. 783-797 (2000).3.Coffee, John C., Jr. Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market Failure. 25 J. Corp. L. 1-39 (1999).4.Fisch, Jill E. The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters. 68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1061-1100 (2000).5.Fox, Merritt B. Retained Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment. 85 V a. L. Rev. 1335-1419 (1999).6.Fried, Jesse M. Insider Signaling and Insider Trading with Repurchase Tender Offers. 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 421-477 (2000).7.Gulati, G. Mitu, William A. Klein and Eric M. Zolt. Connected Contracts. 47 UCLA L. Rev. 887-948 (2000).8.Hu, Henry T.C. Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government Neutrality. 78 Tex. L. Rev. 777-884 (2000).9.Moll, Douglas K. Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations: The Unanswered Question of Perspective. 53 V and. L. Rev. 749-827 (2000).10.Schizer, David M. Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive Compatibility. 100 Colum. L. Rev. 440-504 (2000).11.Smith, Thomas A. The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty. 98 Mich. L. Rev. 214-268 (1999).12.Thomas, Randall S. and Kenneth J. Martin. The Determinants of Shareholder V oting on Stock Option Plans. 35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 31-81 (2000).13.Thompson, Robert B. Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting Shareholder Rights to V ote, Sell, and Sue. 62 Law & Contemp. Probs. 215-242 (1999).1999年（以第一作者姓名音序为序）：1.Bankman, Joseph and Ronald J. Gilson. Why Start-ups? 51 Stan. L. Rev. 289-308 (1999).2.Bhagat, Sanjai and Bernard Black. The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance. 54 Bus. Law. 921-963 (1999).3.Blair, Margaret M. and Lynn A. Stout. A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law. 85 V a. L. Rev. 247-328 (1999).4.Coates, John C., IV. “Fair V alue” As an A voidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in Conflict Transactions. 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1251-1359 (1999).5.Coffee, John C., Jr. The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications. 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 641-707 (1999).6.Eisenberg, Melvin A. Corporate Law and Social Norms. 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1253-1292 (1999).7.Hamermesh, Lawrence A. Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-laws: Taking Back the Street? 73 Tul. L. Rev. 409-495 (1998).8.Krawiec, Kimberly D. Derivatives, Corporate Hedging, and Shareholder Wealth: Modigliani-Miller Forty Y ears Later. 1998 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1039-1104.ngevoort, Donald C. Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading Regulation. 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1319-1343 (1999).ngevoort, Donald C. Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences By Investors and Others.52 Stan. L. Rev. 87-125 (1999).11.Talley, Eric. Turning Servile Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the Corporate Opportunities Doctrine. 108 Y ale L.J. 277-375 (1998).12.Williams, Cynthia A. The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency. 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1197-1311 (1999).1998年：1.Carney, William J., The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 715-780 (1998).2.Choi, Stephen, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 916-966 (1998).3.Coffee, John C., Jr., Brave New World?: The Impact(s) of the Internet on Modern Securities Regulation. 52 Bus. Law. 1195-1233 (1997).ngevoort, Donald C., Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms). 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 101-172 (1997).ngevoort, Donald C., The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases and Organizational Behavior. 63 Brook. L. Rev. 629-676 (1997).6.Mann, Ronald J. The Role of Secured Credit in Small-Business Lending. 86 Geo. L.J. 1-44 (1997).haupt, Curtis J., Property Rights in Firms. 84 V a. L. Rev. 1145-1194 (1998).8.Rock, Edward B., Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work? 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1009-1107 (1997).9.Romano, Roberta, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation. 107 Y ale L.J. 2359-2430 (1998).10.Schwab, Stewart J. and Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions. 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1018-1094 (1998).11.Skeel, David A., Jr., An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy. 51 V and. L. Rev. 1325-1398 (1998).12.Thomas, Randall S. and Martin, Kenneth J., Should Labor Be Allowed to Make Shareholder Proposals? 73 Wash. L. Rev. 41-80 (1998).1997年：1.Alexander, Janet Cooper, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1487-1537 (1996).2.Arlen, Jennifer and Kraakman, Reinier, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 687-779 (1997).3.Brudney, Victor, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. Rev. 595-665 (1997).4.Carney, William J., The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters, 26 J. Legal Stud. 303-329 (1997).5.Choi, Stephen J., Company Registration: Toward a Status-Based Antifraud Regime, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 567-651 (1997).6.Fox, Merritt B., Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom. 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2498-2632 (1997).7.Kahan, Marcel and Klausner, Michael, Lockups and the Market for Corporate Control, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1539-1571 (1996).8.Mahoney, Paul G., The Exchange as Regulator, 83 V a. L. Rev. 1453-1500 (1997).haupt, Curtis J., The Market for Innovation in the United States and Japan: V enture Capital and the Comparative Corporate Governance Debate, 91 Nw. U.L. Rev. 865-898 (1997).10.Skeel, David A., Jr., The Unanimity Norm in Delaware Corporate Law, 83 V a. L. Rev. 127-175 (1997).1996年：1.Black, Bernard and Reinier Kraakman A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1911 (1996)2.Gilson, Ronald J. Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter?, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 327 (1996)3. Hu, Henry T.C. Hedging Expectations: "Derivative Reality" and the Law and Finance of the Corporate Objective, 21 J. Corp. L. 3 (1995)4.Kahan, Marcel & Michael Klausner Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 347 (1996)5.Kitch, Edmund W. The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 Brooklyn L. Rev. 763 (1995)ngevoort, Donald C. Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law From Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 627 (1996)7.Lin, Laura The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 Nw. U.L. Rev. 898 (1996)lstein, Ira M. The Professional Board, 50 Bus. Law 1427 (1995)9.Thompson, Robert B. Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal's Role in Corporate Law, 84 Geo. L.J. 1 (1995)10.Triantis, George G. and Daniels, Ronald J. The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance. 83 Cal. L. Rev. 1073 (1995)1995年：公司法：1.Arlen, Jennifer and Deborah M. Weiss A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation,. 105 Y ale L.J. 325-391 (1995).2.Elson, Charles M. The Duty of Care, Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 649 (1995).3.Hu, Henry T.C. Heeding Expectations: "Derivative Reality" and the Law and Finance of the Corporate Objective, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 985-1040 (1995).4.Kahan, Marcel The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, 89 Nw. U.L. Rev. 565-622 (1995).5.Klausner, Michael Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 V a. L. Rev. 757-852 (1995).6.Mitchell, Lawrence E. Cooperation and Constraint in the Modern Corporation: An Inquiry Into the Causes of Corporate Immorality, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 477-537 (1995).7.Siegel, Mary Back to the Future: Appraisal Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 32 Harv. J. on Legis. 79-143 (1995).证券法：1.Grundfest, Joseph A. Why Disimply? 108 Harv. L. Rev. 727-747 (1995).2.Lev, Baruch and Meiring de V illiers Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 7-37 (1994).3.Mahoney, Paul G. Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1047-1112 (1995).4.Seligman, Joel The Merits Do Matter, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 438 (1994).5.Seligman, Joel The Obsolescence of Wall Street: A Contextual Approach to the Evolving Structure of Federal Securities Regulation, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 649-702 (1995).6.Stout, Lynn A. Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Mark Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 V a. L. Rev. 611 (1995).7.Weiss, Elliott J. and John S. Beckerman Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 Y ale L.J. 2053-2127 (1995).1994年：公司法：1.Fraidin, Stephen and Hanson, Jon D. Toward Unlocking Lockups, 103 Y ale L.J. 1739-1834 (1994)2.Gordon, Jeffrey N. Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative V oting, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 124-192 (1994)3.Karpoff, Jonathan M., and Lott, John R., Jr. The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear From Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & Econ. 757-802 (1993)4.Kraakman, Reiner, Park, Hyun, and Shavell, Steven When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 Geo. L.J. 1733-1775 (1994)5.Mitchell, Lawrence E. Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 Duke L.J. 425- 491 (1993)6.Oesterle, Dale A. and Palmiter, Alan R. Judicial Schizophrenia in Shareholder V oting Cases, 79 Iowa L. Rev. 485-583 (1994)7. Pound, John The Rise of the Political Model of Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1003-1071 (1993)8.Skeel, David A., Jr. Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 471-557 (1994)9.Thompson, Robert B. Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and V icarious Liability of Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 V and. L. Rev. 1-41 (1994)证券法：1.Alexander, Janet Cooper The V alue of Bad News in Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L.Rev. 1421-1469 (1994)2.Bainbridge, Stephen M. Insider Trading Under the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, 19 J. Corp. L. 1-40 (1993)3.Black, Bernard S. and Coffee, John C. Jr. Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1997-2087 (1994)4.Booth, Richard A. The Efficient Market, portfolio Theory, and the Downward Sloping Demand Hypothesis, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1187-1212 (1993)5.Coffee, John C., Jr. The SEC and the Institutional Investor: A Half-Time Report, 15 Cardozo L. Rev 837-907 (1994)6.Fox, Merritt B. Insider Trading Deterrence V ersus Managerial Incentives: A Unified Theory of Section 16(b), 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2088-2203 (1994)7.Grundfest, Joseph A. Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 961-1024 (1994)8.Macey, Jonathan R. Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 909-949 (1994)9.Rock, Edward B. Controlling the Dark Side of Relational Investing, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 987-1031 (1994)。

高二英语金融理财知识单选题40题1.If you want to save money for the future, you can put it in a _____.A.bank accountB.stock marketC.real estateD.gold mine答案：A。

解析：bank account 是银行账户，存钱到未来通常是放在银行账户里。

stock market 是股票市场，风险较大不适合单纯为未来存钱。

real estate 是房地产，需要较大资金且不便于随时存取。

gold mine 是金矿，不是常规存钱的地方。

2.When you invest in the stock market, you are buying _____.A.sharesB.bondsC.cashD.property答案：A。

解析：invest in the stock market 在股票市场投资是买shares 股票。

bonds 是债券。

cash 是现金。

property 是财产，通常不指股票市场的投资对象。

3.A person who manages money for others is called a _____.A.teacherB.doctorC.financial advisorwyer答案：C。

解析：financial advisor 是金融顾问，为别人管理钱财。

teacher 是老师。

doctor 是医生。

lawyer 是律师，都与管理钱财无关。

4.The interest rate is the percentage of the loan amount that you pay in addition to the principal. What does “principal” mean?A.The total amount borrowed.B.The interest paid.C.The bank fee.D.The repayment period.答案：A。

GRE（VERBAL）基础填空模拟试卷40(题后含答案及解析)题型有：1. PART ONEPART ONE （Time：30 minutes 38 Questions）SECTION 2Directions: In each of the following questions, a related pair of words or phrases is followed by five lettered pairs of words or phrases. Select the lettered pair that best expresses a relationship similar to that expressed in the original pair.1．Any account of experimental music in the United States that (i)________ the predominantly African American bebop and free jazz movements is (ii)________, since this body of music constitutes what is arguably the most influential African experimental music in the decades following the Second World War.Blank (i) Blank (ii)A. neglects D. underappreciatedB. exaggerates E. problematicC. reinterprets F. self-serving正确答案：A，E解析：- 方程等号：since因为，同义重复。

- 强词和对应：此题两空联动。

since前面说实验音乐空格(i)了美国黑人bebop和自由爵士运动的实验性音乐描述是空格(ii)的，其中没有取反词，所以空格(i)和空格(ii)应填入一组同向词。

NotesOnFinancialExpressions-A(1)金融专业术语注解_英语题库英文词汇中文释义详细注解a basket of currencies“一篮子”货币又称为“一篮子”货币或合成货币，由各国货币所组成的一个大的货币篮子。

每种货币在“货币篮子”里所占比例，是按照各国在世界贸易中所占比重来确定的。

这种合成货币一般不能直接用于国际贸易和非贸易支付。

如“欧洲货币单位”、“特别提款权”等都是合成货币。

ABA transit number美国银行家协会交换号码分配给一家金融机构例如一家银行的编号，该编号在美国支票右上角的支票分区号码上方注明。

Abandonment弃权 1.指资产所有权人自动放弃其权利。

例如：选择权的买方在选择权利期间结束时，不予以执行交易特定资产的权利，而任其权利作废。

股票持有人于除权除息日之前，将持股出售而无法享有发行公司所分配股息等。

2.To choose not to exercise or sell an option.Abandonment occurs when the option is out of the money on the expiration date.3.To voluntarily relinquish the rights of property ownership,usually real estate. abandonment option放弃选择权The option to close out an investment prior to the fulfillment of the original conditions for termination.abatement减少减免冲销 1.减免：指对一项税收的减免。

2.冲销：指一项临时性收益从成本中冲销。

3.A reduction in or reprieve from a tax,debt or any other payment obligation. An abatement is sometimes included in a contract,for example abatement of rent in the event that a building is destroyed by fire,flood or other accident.ABC agreement ABC协议 1.证券商以员工名义取得纽约证券交易会员席位，而与该员工之间约定公司权益的协议。

Dieter GrimmListe für China1. Constitutions, Constitutional Courts and Constitutional Interpretation at the Interface of Law and Politicsin: B. Iancu (ed.), The Law/Politics Distinction in Contemporary AdjudicationUtrecht 2009, S. 21 – 34(constitutional courts at the interface of law and politics 08-2008.doc)2. Constitutional Adjudication and Democracyin: M. Andenas (Hrsg.), Judical Review in International PerspectiveLiber Amicorum in Honour of Lord Slynn of Hadley Band IIDen Haag 2000, S. 103(constitutional adjudication lib.pdf)3. Political Parties(political parties engl fuer yale 07-2006)4. Levels of the Rule of Law(Levels of the rule of law final 15-12-09.doc)5. The Development towards a Rights-Oriented Legal Culture in Europe(rights-oriented legal culture china 03-2007.doc)6. Human Rights and Judicial Review in Germanyin: D. Beatty (Hrsg.), Human Rights and Judicial Review, Dordrecht 1994, S. 267(grimm human rights.pdf)7. Values in German Constitutional Law, Dennis Davis u.a. (Hrsg.) - noch nicht erschienen, (values in german const law Aenderungen 20-04-09.doc)8. Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudencein: University of Toronto Law Journal 57 (2007), S. 383 – 397(proportionality printversion 30-01-07.doc)9. The Protective Function of the Statein: G. Nolte (Hrsg.), European and US Constitutionalism, Cambridge (England) 2005,S. 137 – 155(protective function of the state 12-2004.doc)10. Civil Liberties in an Age of Terror(http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-0A000F0A-935A2172/bst/Transatlantic%20Thinkers_Part_5_final.pdf)Dieter GrimmConstitutions, Constitutional Courts and Constitutional Interpretation at the Interface of Lawand PoliticsI.1. Before the end of World War II constitutional courts or courts with constitutional jurisdiction werea rarity. Although constitutions had been in place long before, a worldwide demand for constitutionaladjudication arose only after the experiences with the many totalitarian systems of the 20th century. The post-totalitarian constitutional assemblies regarded judicial review as the logical consequence ofconstitutionalism. In a remarkable judgment the Israeli Supreme Court said in 1995: "Judicial reviewis the soul of the constitution itself. Strip the constitution of judicial review and you have removed its very life… It is therefore no wonder that judicial re view is now developing. The majority of enlightened democratic states have judicial review… The Twentieth Century is the century of judicial review." (United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Village, Civil Appeal No. 6821/93, decided 1995). Based on this universal trend the Israeli Court claimed the power of judicial review although it had not been explicitly endowed with it in the constitution.Yet, just as the transition from absolute rule to constitutionalism had modified the relationship between law and politics, this relationship was now modified by the establishment of constitutional courts. As long as law was regarded as being of divine origin politics were submitted to law. Political power derived its authority from the task to maintain and enforce divine law, but did not include the right to make law. When the Reformation undermined the divine basis of the legal order and led to the religious civil wars of the 16th and 17th century the inversion of the traditional relationship between law and politics was regarded as a precondition for the restoration of social peace. The political ruler acquired the power to make law regardless of the contested religious truth. Law became a product of politics. It derived its binding force no longer from God‘s will but from the ruler‘s will. It was henceforth positive law. Eternal or natural law, in spite of its name, was not law, but philosophy.Constitutionalism as it emerged in the last quarter of the 18th century was an attempt to re-establish the supremacy of the law, albeit under the condition that there was no return to divine or eternal law. The solution of the problem consisted in the reflexivity of positive law. Making and enforcing the law was itself subjected to legal regulation. To make this possible a hierarchy had to be established within the legal system. The law that regulated legislation and law-enforcement had to be superior to the law that emanates from the political process. Yet, since there was no return to divine law the higher law was itself the product of a political decision. But in order to fulfil its function of submitting politics to law it needed a source different from ordinary politics. In accordance with the theory that, in the absence of a divine basis of rulership the only possible legitimization of political power is the consent of the governed, this source was found in the people. The people replaced the ruler as sovereign, just as before the ruler had replaced God. But the role of the popular sovereign was limited to enacting the constitution while the exercise of political power was entrusted to representatives of the people who could act only on the basis and within the framework of the constitution.Hence, one can say that the very essence of constitutionalism is the submission of politics to law. This function distinguishes constitutional law from ordinary law in various respects. There is, first, a difference in object. The object of constitutional law is politics. Constitutional law regulates the formation and exercise of political power. The power holders are the addressees of constitutional law. Secondly, constitutional and ordinary law have different sources. Since constitutional law brings forth legitimate political power it cannot emanate from that same power. It is made by or attributed to the people. Consequently, the making of constitutional law differs, thirdly, from the making of ordinarylaw. It is usually a special body that formulates constitutional law and its adoption is subject to a special procedure in which either the people takes the decision or, if a representative body is called upon to decide, a supermajority is required.Fourthly, constitutional law differs from ordinary law in rank. It is higher law. In case of conflict between constitutional law and ordinary law or acts of ordinary law application constitutional law trumps. What has been regulated in the constitution is no longer open to political decision. Insofar, the majority rule does not apply. This does not mean a total juridification of politics. Such a total juridification would be the end of politics and turn it into mere administration. Constitutional law determines who is entitled to take political decisions and which procedural and substantive rules he has to observe in order to give these decisions binding force. But the constitution neither predetermines the input into the constitutionally regulated procedures nor their outcome. It regulates the decision-making process but leaves the decisions themselves to the political process. It is a framework, not a substitute for politics.Finally, constitutional law is characterized by a certain weakness compared to ordinary law. Ordinary law is made by government and applies to the people. If they do not obey government is entitled to use force. Constitutional law, on the contrary, is made by or at least attributed to the people as its ultimate source and applies to government. If the government does not comply with the requirements of constitutional law there is no superior power to enforce it. This weakness may differ in degree, depending on the function of the constitution. Regarding the constitutive function the structure of public power will usually conform to the constitutional arrangement. Regarding its function to regulate the exercise of political power this cannot be taken for granted. The historical and actual evidence is abundant.2. It was this weakness that gave rise to constitutional adjudication, in the United States soon after the invention of constitutionalism, in Europe and other parts of the world only after the collapse of the fascist and racist, socialist and military dictatorships beginning in the 1950s and culminating in the 1990s. Although many of these systems had constitutions their impact was minimal, and invoking constitutional rights could be dangerous to citizens. In the light of this experience constitutional courts were generally regarded as a necessary completion of constitutionalism. If the very essence of constitutionalism is the submission of politics to law, the very essence of constitutional adjudication is to enforce constitutional law vis-à-vis government. This implies judicial review of political acts including legislation. However, constitutional courts or courts with constitutional jurisdiction cannot fully compensate for the weakness of constitutional law. Since the power to use physical force remains in the hands of the political branches of government, courts are helpless when politicians refuse to comply with the constitution or disregard court orders.But apart from this situation, which is exceptional in a well-functioning liberal democracy with a deeply-rooted sense for the rule of law, it makes a difference whether a political system adopts constitutional adjudication or not. Even a government that is generally willing to comply with the constitution will be biased regarding the question what exactly the constitution forbids or requires in a certain situation. Politicians tend to interpret the constitution in the light of their political interests and intentions. In a system without constitutional adjudication usually the interpretation of the majority prevails. In the long run this will undermine the achievement of constitutionalism. By contrast, in a system with constitutional adjudication an institution exists that does not pursue political intentions, is not subject to election and specializes on constitutional interpretation in a professional manner. It is thus less biased and can uphold constitutional requirements vis-à-vis the elected majority. Even more important is the preventive effect of constitutional adjudication. The mere existence of a constitutional court causes the political majority to raise the question of the constitutionality of a political measure quite early in the political process and in a more neutral way. It observes its own political plans through the eyes of the constitutional court.Kelsen, whom the Israeli Supreme Court quotes approvingly in the Mizrahi opinion, may have exaggerated when he said that a constitution without constitutional adjudication is just like not having a constitution at all. There is a number of long-established democracies where the constitution mattersalthough no constitutional review exists. Here constitutional values have become part of the legal and political culture so that there is less need for institutionalized safeguards. But for the majority of states, in particular for those who turned toward constitutional democracy only recently, it is true that the constitution would not matter very much in day-to-day politics if it did not enjoy the support of a special agent that enforces the legal constraints to which the constitution submits politics. The small impact of fundamental rights before the establishment of judicial review proves this.However, the existence of a constitutional court alone is not sufficient to guarantee that politicians respect the constitution. Just as constitutionalism is an endangered achievement constitutional adjudication is in danger as well. Politicians, even if they originally agreed to establish judicial review, soon find out that its exercise by constitutional courts is often burdensome for them. Constitutions put politics under constraints and constitutional courts exist in order to enforce these constraints. Not everything that politicians find necessary – be it for themselves or their party, be it for what they deem good for the common interest – can be effectuated if the court sees it not in line with the constitution. Politicians therefore have a general interest in a constitutional court that, to put it mildly, is at least not adverse to their objectives and plans. But there is also a specific interest in the outcome of constitutional litigation on which the implementation of a certain policy depends.Yet, any political interference with the judicial process would undermine the whole system of constitutional democracy. This is why judges must be protected against political influence or pressure. The dividing line between the various organs of the state drawn by the principle of separation of powers is particularly strong where the judiciary is concerned. Independence of the judiciary is indispensable for the functioning of a constitutional system and is therefore itself in need of constitutional protection. If it is true that constitutional courts are helpless when political actors refuse to obey their orders, it is even more true that constitutional courts are useless when they cannot take their decisions independently from politics. The best protection of judicial independence is, of course, a deeply-rooted conviction on the side of politicians that any interference with court procedures is unacceptable, supported by a strong backing for the constitution within society. But this cannot be taken for granted. Rather, special safeguards are necessary. Judicial independence must be guaranteed, not only against any attempt to directly influence the outcome of litigation, but also against more subtle ways of putting pressure on the judiciary. This is why constitutions usually guarantee the irremovability of judges and often a sufficient salary, to mention only a few devices.A special problem in this context is the recruitment of judges of constitutional courts or courts with constitutional jurisdiction. Since these courts have a share in public power the judges need democratic legitimation. If they are not elected directly by the people, a circumstance which presents problems of its own regarding judicial independence, some involvement of the elected branches of government in the recruitment process seems inevitable. Yet, every involvement creates the temptation to elect or appoint deferential judges. Recruitment of judges is the open flank of judicial independence. A constitutional court that simply reflects political interests will hardly be able to keep the necessary distance from politics. Hence, safeguards against a politicization of the court are of vital importance.Most countries with constitutional adjudication have some special provisions for the election or appointment of constitutional judges. If they are elected by parliament often a supermajority, like the one required for amending the constitution, is prescribed. This means that majority and minority must agree on one candidate, which makes extreme partisan appointments unlikely. Other countries prefer a mixed system of election and appointment by dividing the right to select constitutional judges among different bodies of government. In others, non-political actors are involved in the process, for instance representatives of the legal profession. It may be difficult to determine which system is the best. But it is not difficult to see that some barriers against the threat of a politically docile constitutional court must be erected if constitutionalism is to live up to its aspirations.3. Judicial independence is the constitutional safeguard against the threat arising from politicians to the judges' proper exercise of their function. It is directed against attempts to induce judges not to apply the law but to bend to political expectations. This is an external threat. But it would be naïve toassume that this is the only threat the functioning of the constitutional system is exposed to. There is an internal threat as well that comes from the judges themselves. It comes in two forms. One is the inclination to voluntarily follow, for what reasons ever, political expectations or even party lines. The other is the temptation to adjudicate according to one‘s own political preferences or ideas of what is just and unjust instead of following constitutional standards. The constitutional guarantee of judicial independence protects judges against politics, but it does not protect the constitutional system and society against judges who, for other reasons than direct political pressure, are willing to disobey or distort the law.Therefore, external independence must be accompanied by internal independence. The constitutional guarantee of judicial independence is not a personal privilege to decide at will, but a functional requirement. It shall enable judges to fulfil their function, namely to apply the law irrespectively of the interests and expectations of the parties to the litigation or powerful political or societal forces. It frees judges from extra-legal bonds, not to give them leeway in their decisions, but to enable them to decide according to the law. The reason for the independence from extra-legal bonds is to give full effect to the legal bonds to which judges are submitted. Submission to law is the necessary counterpart of judicial independence. Like for external independence, precautions can be taken for internal independence as well.However, since internal independence is largely a matter of professional ethics and individual character, the possibilities of the law are limited. Gross misbehaviour such as corruption can of course be outlawed and made a crime. Experience shows, however, that it is difficult to fight corruption within the judiciary when corruption is habitual among politicians and in society as well. This seems to be quite a problem in a number of new democracies. It is likewise justified to criminalize perversion of justice. But it is not easy to clearly distinguish perversion of justice from false or questionable interpretation of the law. This is why convictions because of perversion of justice are rare. Yet, criminalizing corruption and perversion of justice and removing judges from office who committed these crimes is not a violation of the independence of the judiciary.A more subtle misconduct is the willingness or pre-disposition to interpret the law in a way that is favourable to certain political views or to a party or a candidate for political office, either in general or in an individual case. This usually comes in the disguise of a legal argumentation that seeks to hide that, as a matter of fact, it is result-driven. This will not always occur intentionally. Self-deception of judges as to the motives of their judicial behaviour is not impossible. The problem is that this type of misconduct does not only appear in a number of new democracies. It can be observed in solid constitutional states as well. The decision of the US Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore in the year 2000 may serve as an example. There will hardly be a legal sanction in these cases. But there may be harsh public criticism or even a loss of trust in the judiciary to which no court can remain indifferent.II.1. Law owes its existence to a political decision. Political motives are legitimate in the process of law-making. But in a constitutional democracy the role of politics ends when it comes to applying the law. Application of the law is a matter for the legal system in which political motives are illegitimate. For this reason the division between law and politics is of crucial importance. But what if law application and in particular constitutional adjudication is in itself a political operation so that all attempts to separate law from politics on the institutional level are thwarted on the level of law application? This is a serious question, and it is a question that should not be confused with the abuse of judicial power which lies in the intentional non-application or misapplication of the law.Of course, constitutional adjudication is inevitably political in the sense that the object and the effect of constitutional court decisions are political. This follows from the very function of constitutional law, which is to regulate the formation and exercise of political power, and the function of constitutional courts, which consists in enforcing this law vis-à-vis politics. Constitutional courts are a branch of government. Excluding political issues from judicial scrutiny would be the end ofconstitutional review. Hence, the question can only be whether operations that judges undertake in order to find the law and to apply it to political issues are of a political or a legal character.This question arises because all analyses of the process of law application to concrete issues show that the text of the law is unable to completely determine judicial decisions. One of the reasons is that the law in general and constitutional law in particular is neither void of gaps and contradictions nor always clear and unambiguous, and it can hardly be different, given the fact that a legal system is a product of different times, reacting to various challenges, inspired by different interests or concepts of justice and depending on the use of ordinary language. Filling the gaps, harmonizing the contradicting provisions, rendering them precise enough for the decision of an issue is the task of the law applicants, in the last resort of the courts, which, in turn, draw profit from the efforts of legal science.But even if provisions are formulated as clearly and as coherently as possible they can raise questions when it comes to solving a concrete case. This incapacity to guarantee a full determination of legal decisions, even in the case of seemingly clear provisions, is inherent in the law because a law is by definition a general rule applicable to an indefinite number of cases arising in the future. This is why it must be formulated in more or less abstract terms. Consequently, there will always remain a gap between the general and abstract norm on the one hand and the concrete and individual case on the other. The judge has to find out what the general norm means with regard to the case at hand. This is achieved by interpretation, which always precedes the application of the norm. The general norm must be concretized to a more specific rule before the individual case can be decided.Like the task of filling gaps, harmonizing contradicting provisions, clarifying vague norms, the concretization contains a creative element. Norm application therefore is always to a certain extent norm-construction. The fact as such is undisputable. The degree can vary. It depends on a number of variables. The most important one is the precision of a norm. A narrowly tailored norm leaves less room for the constructive element whereas a broad or even vague norm requires a lot of concretization before it is ready for application to a case. Usually a constitution will contain more vague norms than, say, the code of civil procedure. This is certainly true for the guiding principles and for fundamental rights, less so for organizational and procedural norms. Another variable is the age of a norm. The older a norm the larger the number of problems that were not or could not have been foreseen by the legislature and thus raise questions of meaning and applicability.The mere fact that the law does not fully determine the judgment in individual cases is not sufficient to turn law application from a legal into a political operation. It remains a legal operation if what the judge adds to the text of the law in the process of interpretation has its basis in the text and can be derived from it in a reasonable argumentative manner. If not it becomes a political one. The task therefore is to distinguish between legal and non-legal arguments, be they political, economic or religious. This decision can only be taken within the legal system. No other system is competent to determine what counts as a legal argument. Within the legal system the distinction between a legal and a non-legal argument is the concern of methodology. By doing so methodology attempts to eliminate subjective influences from the interpretation of the law as far as possible. This is why the distinction between legal and non-legal operations in the course of law application becomes largely a question of legal method.Yet, different from the text of the law that is the product of a political decision and thus not at the disposition of judges, methodology is itself a product of legal considerations. It emerges in the process of interpreting and applying the law or is developed in scholarly discourse, but it is nowhere decreed authoritatively. This means at the same time that various methodologies can coexist and so can different variations of a certain methodological creed. Method is a matter of choice within the legal system. All historical attempts by legislators to prohibit interpretation or to prescribe a certain method have been in vain. They were themselves subject to interpretation. But the lack of one authoritative method does not mean that methodology can justify any solution and thus loses its disciplining effect on judges. Just as certain legal systems have their time in history methodologies have their time, too. There is usually a core of accepted arguments or operations and a number of arguments or operationsthat are regarded as unacceptable. The degree to which a method can succeed in eliminating all subjective elements from interpretation is controversial. There were and are methods that claim this capacity.2. A historically influential method that promised to eliminate subjective influences was legal positivism, not in its capacity as a theory of the validity of law opposed to all natural law theories, but in its capacity as theory of legal interpretation. For a positivist in this sense the legal norm consists of its text and nothing else, and the only instrument to discover the meaning of the text is philology and logic, i.e. not the legislative history, not the motives or the intent of the legislature, not the values behind the norm, not the social reality that brought forth the problems the norm was meant to solve and in which it is to take effect, not the consequences the interpretation may entail. There can be but one correct understanding of a norm and this remains correct as long as the norm is in force, no matter how the context changes.The problem with positivism was on the one hand that it could not fulfil its promise to eliminate all subjective influences on interpretation. Rather these influences were infused into the interpretation in a clandestine way, mostly in connection with the definition of the notions used by the legislature. On the other hand, positivism prohibited an adaptation of the law to social change by way of interpretation. Since the social reality in which the norm was to take effect was regarded as irrelevant for the interpretation a positivist could not even perceive of social change. Of course, a positivist would not have denied that, because of social change, a legal norm may miss its purpose and produce dysfunctional results. But this was regarded as a matter for the law-maker, not for the law-applicant. It was this deficit that largely contributed to the decline of positivism after the far-reaching social change in the wake of the Industrial Revolution and World War I.There is yet another influential theory of interpretation that claims to preclude all subjective influences, namely originalism. Different from positivism, originalists believe that only a historical method is the right way to ascertain the meaning of a legal norm. The law-applicant must give a norm, in particular a norm of the constitution, no meaning other than the one that the framers had had in mind. Sometimes originalism appears in a crude way that excludes the application of a norm to any phenomenon the framers could not have known. If the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects the freedom of the press, this would not allow the law-applicant to extend the protection to radio and TV by way of interpretation. Sometimes originalism appears in a more enlightened form. The law-applicant is then permitted to ask whether the framers clearly would have included a new phenomenon had they known it at the time when the law was enacted. In this case it would be methodologically permissible to include radio and TV into the protection of the First Amendment by way of interpretation. But like a positivist an originalist is not prepared to acknowledge that there can be more than one sound interpretation of a norm and that the interpretation can legitimately change when the circumstances change in which it is applied.The problem with originalism is first a practical one. In most cases it is difficult or even impossible to know what the original understanding or the original intent was. It is the more difficult if many persons are involved in the process of constitution-making many of whom may not have expressed their understanding or intent. For this reason ascertaining the original intent or understanding is often a highly selective process, in which some utterances of actors are singled out and taken for the whole. The second problem is the same that positivism encountered. There is extremely limited or even no room at all for the adaptation of legal norms to social change. If social change affects the constitution adversely the only remedy is to amend the text, which can be extremely complicated in a country like the United States. The constitution tends to petrify, in opposition to the theory of a living constitution.Although one would have difficulties in finding positivists or originalists in Germany, these methodologies are by no means of historical interest only. Positivism, or more precisely a crude literal understanding, plays a considerable role in a number of post-communist countries and in parts of Latin America. Originalism has a stronghold in the United States in reaction to the activist Warren Court of the 1950s and '60s. In Germany, the idea that a legal method exists that can exclude any subjective。