资本结构和企业价值之间的关系对公司治理的影响[外文翻译]

简析资本结构与公司治理及其相互关系摘要：本文讨论的是资本结构与公司治理的相互关系，并从资本结构着手，对公司治理中存在的问题给出一些解决的方案。

关键词：资本结构公司治理辩证统一资本结构和公司治理问题是两个具有重大理论价值和实践意义的研究课题，对这两个问题进行深刻的研究是公司能够稳定高效经营的保证。

而且，这两者之间本身也存在着相互影响、相互制约的辩证统一的关系。

一、资本结构及其对公司的重要意义资本结构是指企业各种资本的价值组成成分及其各成分之间的比例。

其定义有广义和狭义之分，广义的资本结构是指企业总资本价值的组成成分及其各成分之间的比例关系。

包括中长期和短期的资本价值。

狭义的资本结构仅指企业中长期资本价值的组成成分及各成分之间的比例关系，特别是指长期股权资本与债权资本的构成及其比例关系。

资本结构对公司具有重大的意义，具体表现为以下几个方面：首先，合理安排债务资本比例可降低企业的综合资本成本率。

一般情况下企业的负债性融资成本会比权益性融资的成本低，所以，企业可以在一定的风险要求下，通过提高资本负债率，达到降低平均资本成本的目的，进而提高企业的投资报酬率。

其次，有效安排资本结构中权益资本和负债资本的比例可以获得财务杠杆利益。

当企业经营状况好的情况下，即息税前利润增加时，税后利润也会相应增加，在这时提高资本结构中的负债比例可更大幅度的增加股东权益。

经营状况不佳时，通过降低负债资金的比例，可减少股东损失，降低财务风险。

第三，合理安排债务资本在总资本中的比例有利于增加公司的价值。

一般情况下，某公司的价值应该等于其债务资本的市场价值与权益资本的市场价值之和，用公式表示为：V=B+S。

式中：V——公司总价值，即公司总资本的市场价值；B——公司债务资本的市场价值；S——公司权益资本的市场价值。

上述公式清楚地表达了按资本的市场价值计量反映的资本属性结构与公司总价值的内在关系。

因此，合理安排资本结构有利于增加公司的市场价值。

资本结构与企业价值的关系资本结构是指企业通过债务和股权所形成的资金组成情况，而企业价值是衡量企业综合实力的指标。

资本结构的优化对企业的发展和价值创造至关重要。

本文将探讨资本结构与企业价值之间的关系，并分析如何优化资本结构以提升企业价值。

一、资本结构的定义与影响资本结构是企业通过内外部融资渠道筹集资金的方式和比例。

它由股权和债务构成，股权代表所有者权益，债务代表借款或发行债券所形成的负债。

不同的资本结构对企业的经营和发展产生重要影响。

一方面，债务融资可以降低资金成本，提高企业盈利能力。

通过借款或发行债券，企业可以利用外部资金实现扩张和投资，加速业务发展，从而提升企业价值。

另一方面，股权融资可以增加企业的所有者权益，提升企业信誉和可持续发展能力。

股权融资能够吸引更多投资者参与企业经营，提供更多资源和机会，助力企业拓展市场，增加利润，进而提高企业价值。

二、资本结构与企业价值的关系资本结构对企业价值具有直接影响。

恰当的资本结构能够提高企业的融资效率、盈利能力和市场竞争力，从而提升企业价值。

1. 资本结构与企业风险企业的资本结构与其风险承受能力密切相关。

过高的债务比例可能导致企业财务风险增加，资金缺口无法偿还债务，进而影响企业信誉和经营能力，导致企业价值下降。

同时，过高的债务也会使企业在经营活动中面临较高的利息支出压力，降低企业可分配现金流，进一步影响企业发展。

相反，较高的股权比例也可能对企业价值产生负面影响。

股权融资能够提供稳定的资金来源，但会导致股权稀释和利润分配的不平衡。

如果股权比例过高，可能造成现有股东利益受损，限制企业未来发展和创新能力，进而影响企业的长期价值。

因此，企业应该根据自身经营情况、行业特点和市场需求，合理配置债务和股权比例，降低财务风险，提升长期价值。

2. 资本结构与融资成本资本结构对企业融资成本产生直接影响。

债务融资通常比股权融资成本更低，因为债权人承担的风险较小。

通过适度的债务融资，企业可减少融资成本，提高企业盈利水平，从而增加企业价值。

外文翻译Capital Structure and Firm Performance Material Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve SystemAuthor: Allen N. BergerAgency costs represent important problems in corporate governance in both financial and nonfinancial industries. The separation of ownership and control in a professionally managed firm may result in managers exerting insufficient work effort, indulging in perquisites, choosing inputs or outputs that suit their own preferences, or otherwise failing to maximize firm value. In effect, the agency costs of outside ownership equal the lost value from professional managers maximizing their own utility, rather than the value of the firm.Theory suggests that the choice of capital structure may help mitigate these agency costs. Under the agency costs hypothesis, high leverage or a low equity/asset ratio reduces the agency costs of outside equity and increases firm value by constraining or encouraging managers to act more in the interests of shareholders. Since the seminal paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976), a vast literature on such agency-theoretic explanations of capital structure has developed (see Harris and Raviv 1991 and Myers 2001 for reviews). Greater financial leverage may affect managers and reduce agency costs through the threat of liquidation, which causes personal losses to managers of salaries, reputation, perquisites, etc. (e.g., Grossman and Hart 1982, Williams 1987), and through pressure to generate cash flow to pay interest expenses (e.g., Jensen 1986). Higher leverage can mitigate conflicts between shareholders and managers concerning the choice of investment (e.g., Myers 1977), the amount of risk to undertake (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976, Williams 1987), the conditions under which the firm is liquidated (e.g., Harris and Raviv 1990), and dividend policy (e.g., Stulz 1990).A testable prediction of this class of models is that increasing the leverage ratio should result in lower agency costs of outside equity and improved firm performance, all else held equal. However, when leverage becomes relatively high, further increases generate significant agency costs of outside debt – including higher expected costs of bankruptcy or financial distress – arising from conflicts between bondholders and shareholders.1 Because it is difficult to distinguish empiricallybetween the two sources of agency costs, we follow the literature and allow the relationship between total agency costs and leverage to be non-monotonic.Despite the importance of this theory, there is at best mixed empirical evidence in the extant literature (see Harris and Raviv 1991, Titman 2000, and Myers 2001 for reviews). Tests of the agency costs hypothesis typically regress measures of firm performance on the equity capital ratio or other indicator of leverage plus some control variables. At least three problems appear in the prior studies that we address in our application.First, the measures of firm performance are usually ratios fashioned from financial statements or stock market prices, such as industry-adjusted operating margins or stock market returns. These measures do not net out the effects of differences in exogenous market factors that affect firm value, but are beyond management’s control and therefore cannot reflect agency costs. Thus, the tests may be confounded by factors that are unrelated to agency costs. As well, these studies generally do not set a separate benchmark for each firm’s performance that would be realized if agency costs were minimized.We address the measurement problem by using profit efficiency as our indicator of firm performance. The link between productive efficiency and agency costs was first suggested by Stigler (1976), and profit efficiency represents a refinement of the efficiency concept developed since that time.2 Profit efficiency evaluates how close a firm is to earning the profit that a best-practice firm would earn facing the same exogenous conditions. This has the benefit of controlling for factors outside the control of management that are not part of agency costs. In contrast, comparisons of standard financial ratios, stock market returns, and similar measures typically do not control for these exogenous factors. Even when the measures used in the literature are industry adjusted, they may not account for important differences across firms within an industry –such as local market conditions – as we are able to do with profit efficiency. In addition, the performance of a best-practice firm under the same exogenous conditions is a reasonable benchmark for how the firm would be expected to perform if agency costs were minimized.Second, the prior research generally does not take into account the possibility of reverse causation from performance to capital structure. If firm performance affects the choice of capital structure, then failure to take this reverse causality into account may result in simultaneous-equations bias. That is, regressions of firmperformance on a measure of leverage may confound the effects of capital structure on performance with the effects of performance on capital structure.We address this problem by allowing for reverse causality from performance to capital structure. We discuss below two hypotheses for why firm performance may affect the choice of capital structure, the efficiency-risk hypothesis and the franchise-value hypothesis. We construct a two-equation structural model and estimate it using two-stage least squares (2SLS). An equation specifying profit efficiency as a function of the firm’s equity capital ratio and other variables is use d to test the agency costs hypothesis, and an equation specifying the equity capital ratio as a function of the firm’s profit efficiency and other variables is used to test the net effects of the efficiency-risk and franchise-value hypotheses. Both equations are econometrically identified through exclusion restrictions that are consistent with the theories.Third, some, but not all of the prior studies did not take ownership structure into account. Under virtually any theory of agency costs, ownership structure is important, since it is the separation of ownership and control that creates agency costs (e.g., Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet 1985). Greater insider shares may reduce agency costs, although the effect may be reversed at very high levels of insider holdings (e.g., Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988). As well, outside block ownership or institutional holdings tend to mitigate agency costs by creating a relatively efficient monitor of the managers (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1986). Exclusion of the ownership variables may bias the test results because the ownership variables may be correlated with the dependent variable in the agency cost equation (performance) and with the key exogenous variable (leverage) through the reverse causality hypotheses noted above.To address this third problem, we include ownership structure variables in the agency cost equation explaining profit efficiency. We include insider ownership, outside block holdings, and institutional holdings.Our application to data from the banking industry is advantageous because of the abundance of quality data available on firms in this industry. In particular, we have detailed financial data for a large number of firms producing comparable products with similar technologies, and information on market prices and other exogenous conditions in the local markets in which they operate. In addition, some studies in this literature find evidence of the link between the efficiency of firms and variables that are recognized to affect agency costs, including leverage andownership structure (see Berger and Mester 1997 for a review).Although banking is a regulated industry, banks are subject to the same type of agency costs and other influences on behavior as other industries. The banks in the sample are subject to essentially equal regulatory constraints, and we focus on differences across banks, not between banks and other firms. Most banks are well above the regulatory capital minimums, and our results are based primarily on differences at the margin, rather than the effects of regulation. Our test of the agency costs hypothesis using data from one industry may be built upon to test a number of corporate finance hypotheses using information on virtually any industry.We test the agency costs hypothesis of corporate finance, under which high leverage reduces the agency costs of outside equity and increases firm value by constraining or encouraging managers to act more in the interests of shareholders. Our use of profit efficiency as an indicator of firm performance to measure agency costs, our specification of a two-equation structural model that takes into account reverse causality from firm performance to capital structure, and our inclusion of measures of ownership structure address problems in the extant empirical literature that may help explain why prior empirical results have been mixed. Our application to the banking industry is advantageous because of the detailed data available on a large number of comparable firms and the exogenous conditions in their local markets. Although banks are regulated, we focus on differences across banks that are driven by corporate governance issues, rather than any differences in-regulation, given that all banks are subject to essentially the same regulatory framework and most banks are well above the regulatory capital minimums.Our findings are consistent with the agency costs hypothesis – higher leverage or a lower equity capital ratio is associated with higher profit efficiency, all else equal. The effect is economically significant as well as statistically significant. An increase in leverage as represented by a 1 percentage point decrease in the equity capital ratio yields a predicted increase in profit efficiency of about 6 percentage points, or a gain of about 10% in actual profits at the sample mean. This result is robust to a number of specification changes, including different measures of performance (standard profit efficiency, alternative profit efficiency, and return on equity), different econometric techniques (two-stage least squares and OLS), different efficiency measurement methods (distribution-free and fixed-effects), different samples (the “ownership sample” of banks with detailed ownership data and the “full sample” of banks), and the different sample periods (1990s and 1980s).However, the data are not consistent with the prediction that the relationship between performance and leverage may be reversed when leverage is very high due to the agency costs of outside debt.We also find that profit efficiency is responsive to the ownership structure of the firm, consistent with agency theory and our argument that profit efficiency embeds agency costs. The data suggest that large institutional holders have favorable monitoring effects that reduce agency costs, although large individual investors do not. As well, the data are consistent with a non-monotonic relationship between performance and insider ownership, similar to findings in the literature.With respect to the reverse causality from efficiency to capital structure, we offer two competing hypotheses with opposite predictions, and we interpret our tests as determining which hypothesis empirically dominates the other. Under the efficiency-risk hypothesis, the expected high earnings from greater profit efficiency substitute for equity capital in protecting the firm from the expected costs of bankruptcy or financial distress, whereas under the franchise-value hypothesis, firms try to protect the expected income stream from high profit efficiency by holding additional equity capital. Neither hypothesis dominates the other for the ownership sample, but the substitution effect of the efficiency-risk hypothesis dominates for the full sample, suggesting a difference in behavior for the small banks that comprise most of the full sample.The approach developed in this paper can be built upon to test the agency costs hypothesis or other corporate finance hypotheses using data from virtually any industry. Future research could extend the analysis to cover other dimensions of capital structure. Agency theory suggests complex relationships between agency costs and different types of securities. We have analyzed only one dimension of capital structure, the equity capital ratio. Future research could consider other dimensions, such as the use of subordinated notes and debentures, or other individual debt or equity instruments.译文资本结构与企业绩效资料来源: 联邦储备系统理事会作者：Allen N. Berger 在财务和非财务行业，代理成本在公司治理中都是重要的问题。

资本结构与公司价值的关系引言资本结构是指公司在运作过程中所选择的不同融资方式的组合，包括债务和股权。

而公司价值则取决于其盈利能力、成长潜力以及风险承受能力。

本文将探讨资本结构与公司价值之间的关系，并分析不同资本结构对公司价值的影响。

1. 资本结构的影响因素资本结构的选择对公司经营状况有着重要影响。

以下是几个主要的影响因素：A. 成本和风险：债务融资相比于股权融资具有较低的成本，但却带来了更高的风险，因为公司必须偿还债务利息和本金。

在选择资本结构时，公司需要考虑到这两方面的因素。

B. 经济周期：在经济繁荣时期，公司的盈利能力通常较强，因此更容易获得债务融资。

然而，在经济衰退时期，公司的盈利能力可能下降，使得融资变得更加困难。

C. 税收政策：不同国家的税收政策对资本结构选择产生了影响。

一些国家对股权融资给予税收优惠，而其他国家则提供优惠措施以鼓励债务融资。

2. 资本结构与公司价值资本结构对公司价值有着直接和间接的影响。

直接影响表现在：A. 税收优势：根据税收政策的不同，公司通过债务融资可以享受到税收优惠，从而减少企业所得税的负担。

这种税收优势可以提高公司的净利润，进而增加公司的价值。

B. 财务杠杆效应：当公司利用债务资金进行投资时，债务的杠杆效应可以放大公司盈利和投资回报的比例关系。

这种杠杆效应可以增加公司的利润和价值。

间接影响表现在：A. 信号效应：公司的资本结构可以向市场发出关于公司财务状况和前景的信号。

高比例的债务融资可能会使市场对公司的风险感到担忧，从而降低公司的估值。

相反，适度的债务融资可以表明公司有信心并具备良好的经营能力，有助于提高公司的估值。

B. 风险管理：通过适当的资本结构选择，公司可以平衡不同类型的风险。

债务融资可以帮助公司降低财务风险，而股权融资则可以分散经营风险。

通过管理风险，公司能够在竞争激烈的市场环境中更好地发展并提高公司价值。

3. 不同资本结构的案例分析为了更好地理解资本结构与公司价值之间的关系，我们可以通过分析不同资本结构下的公司进行案例研究。

资本结构与企业价值的关系资本结构是指企业通过融资手段筹集的各种资本资源的构成和比重。

而企业价值是指企业在市场上所能创造的经济效益。

资本结构与企业价值之间存在着密切的关系，合理的资本结构能够有效地提升企业的价值。

本文将从企业的资本结构对企业价值的影响等方面来探讨资本结构与企业价值的关系。

一、资本结构的基本概念及类型资本结构是企业融资所形成的资本构成，主要由内部融资和外部融资两部分构成。

内部融资主要包括自有资本的利润留存和资产减值计提，外部融资主要包括债务融资和股权融资。

根据债务融资与股权融资的比重不同，资本结构可以分为债务型、股权型和混合型资本结构。

二、资本结构对企业价值的影响1. 资本结构对企业融资成本的影响不同的融资方式有不同的成本，债务融资相对于股权融资来说，具有较低的融资成本。

当企业的资本结构偏向债务融资时，可以降低融资成本，从而提升企业的盈利能力，进而提高企业的价值。

2. 资本结构对企业风险承受能力的影响债务融资相对于股权融资来说，存在较大的偿还压力和利息负担。

当企业的资本结构偏向债务融资时，如果遇到经营不善或者市场变化等风险因素，企业将可能面临偿债困难甚至破产的风险。

相比之下，股权融资能够分担企业的风险承受能力，降低企业的经营风险。

3. 资本结构对企业治理结构的影响资本结构的不同会对企业的治理结构产生直接的影响。

当企业的股权结构比较分散时，股东的权力较弱，企业治理结构较为松散，管理层的自由度相对较高，容易产生代理问题。

而当企业的股权结构较为集中时，股东的权力较强，能够更好地监督和约束管理层，提高企业的治理效率。

三、如何优化资本结构提升企业价值1. 合理配置资本企业应根据自身的经营状况和市场环境，合理配置内部和外部融资的比例。

可以通过增加自有资本的留存比例、引入风险投资等方式来改善资本结构，减少对债务融资的依赖。

2. 提高盈利能力企业应通过提高经营效益、扩大市场规模等方式，提高盈利能力，减少对外部融资的需求。

资本结构与企业价值资本结构是指企业的各种资金来源以及这些资金在企业内部的比例关系。

它直接关系到企业的财务状况和经营效益，进而对企业的价值产生重要影响。

本文将探讨资本结构与企业价值之间的关系，并分析如何优化资本结构以提升企业价值。

一、资本结构的构成资本结构由长期资本和短期资本组成。

长期资本包括股东权益和长期借款，它们对企业的长期发展起到重要作用。

股东权益包括股本和留存收益，是企业的净资产部分。

长期借款则是企业从金融机构等长期融资所得到的资金。

短期资本则是企业短期借款和其它应付款项，主要用于企业日常经营活动。

二、资本结构与企业价值之间的关系资本结构与企业价值之间存在着密切关系。

一个合理的资本结构能够最大化地提升企业的价值。

首先，资本结构直接影响企业的融资成本。

如果企业过度依赖债务融资，那么企业的债务成本会增加，从而降低企业的价值。

相反，如果企业能够吸引到更多的股东资金，降低债务比例，那么企业的融资成本将减少，从而提升企业的价值。

其次，资本结构还影响着企业的经营风险和财务稳定性。

偏向于债务融资的企业，总体上承担着更大的偿债压力，一旦遭遇经营困难，可能会面临更大的危机。

而倾向于股权融资的企业，由于承担的债务较少，经营风险相对较低，财务稳定性更好。

最后，资本结构还对企业的财务灵活性产生影响。

一个灵活的资本结构可以让企业更好地适应经营环境的变化。

如果企业过度依赖债务融资，财务灵活性会相应降低，企业在面对市场波动和经营调整时可能会受到更大的制约。

而适度依赖股权融资的企业，能够更好地应对市场变化，提高财务灵活性。

三、优化资本结构提升企业价值的方法1. 多元化融资渠道：企业应该积极探索多元化的融资方式，包括股权融资、债权融资、内部积累等，以降低融资成本，提高融资效率，优化资本结构。

2. 控制财务风险：企业应该合理控制债务比例，避免过度依赖债务融资。

通过提高盈利能力和现金流量，增强企业的财务稳定性，减少经营风险。

3. 提高财务灵活性：企业应建立起多样化的融资渠道，灵活运用各种财务工具，提高资金的可支配性，以应对市场波动和经营调整。

资本结构与企业价值的关系研究随着市场经济的发展，企业在发展壮大的同时也面临着各种挑战。

资本结构是企业经营过程中至关重要的一环，它可以决定企业的债务水平、融资成本、股权结构等关键问题。

在如今的商业环境下，企业经营的成功与否往往取决于它的资本结构。

因此，深入研究资本结构与企业价值之间的关系，对于企业的发展具有重要的意义。

1. 资本结构对企业价值的影响资本结构是指企业在融资过程中所采用的各种融资方式和融资组合，包括债券、股票、贷款等。

它关系到企业的债务负担、税务成本和股权结构等方面，对企业经营的多个层面都有着重要的影响。

首先，合理的资本结构能够提高企业的财务风险。

当企业的融资主要依靠股票时，它的债务风险就会相对较低。

相比之下，过分倚重债券融资可能会增加企业的债务风险，进而影响企业的信用评级和投资者的信心，从而限制企业的融资渠道。

其次，资本结构还决定了企业的成本水平。

债券融资相对于股票融资来说，融资成本更低，但它也会带来更高的税务成本。

而股权融资的税务成本较低，但由于股票价格的波动性，股权融资的成本可能更加不稳定。

因此，企业应该结合自身情况，选择合适的融资方式，以降低成本、降低风险。

最后，资本结构还会影响企业的股权结构。

一些投资者喜欢债券融资，因为这样可以避免股权融资的重要性问题。

但过多的债务融资可能会导致企业的股权过于分散，从而影响企业的治理和发展。

2. 如何确定合理的资本结构确定合理的资本结构需要考虑多个方面的因素。

首先，企业管理者需要对企业的特性进行全面分析。

通过分析企业的经营状况、行业特点以及竞争环境，确定适合企业的资本结构。

其次，企业需要结合自身的财务状况，以及未来的发展方向，进行资本结构的规划。

在确定资本结构时，企业还应该充分考虑投资者的意愿。

比如，如果董事会决定采用股票融资，但对股票市场不熟悉的投资者可能会选择其他投资机会。

因此，企业需要对投资者的心理状态和行为特点进行分析，以确定合适的资本结构。

外文翻译Capital Structure and Firm Performance Material Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve SystemAuthor: Allen N. BergerAgency costs represent important problems in corporate governance in both financial and nonfinancial industries. The separation of ownership and control in a professionally managed firm may result in managers exerting insufficient work effort, indulging in perquisites, choosing inputs or outputs that suit their own preferences, or otherwise failing to maximize firm value. In effect, the agency costs of outside ownership equal the lost value from professional managers maximizing their own utility, rather than the value of the firm.Theory suggests that the choice of capital structure may help mitigate these agency costs. Under the agency costs hypothesis, high leverage or a low equity/asset ratio reduces the agency costs of outside equity and increases firm value by constraining or encouraging managers to act more in the interests of shareholders. Since the seminal paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976), a vast literature on such agency-theoretic explanations of capital structure has developed (see Harris and Raviv 1991 and Myers 2001 for reviews). Greater financial leverage may affect managers and reduce agency costs through the threat of liquidation, which causes personal losses to managers of salaries, reputation, perquisites, etc. (e.g., Grossman and Hart 1982, Williams 1987), and through pressure to generate cash flow to pay interest expenses (e.g., Jensen 1986). Higher leverage can mitigate conflicts between shareholders and managers concerning the choice of investment (e.g., Myers 1977), the amount of risk to undertake (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976, Williams 1987), the conditions under which the firm is liquidated (e.g., Harris and Raviv 1990), and dividend policy (e.g., Stulz 1990).A testable prediction of this class of models is that increasing the leverage ratio should result in lower agency costs of outside equity and improved firm performance, all else held equal. However, when leverage becomes relatively high, further increases generate significant agency costs of outside debt – including higher expected costs of bankruptcy or financial distress – arising from conflicts between bondholders and shareholders.1 Because it is difficult to distinguish empiricallybetween the two sources of agency costs, we follow the literature and allow the relationship between total agency costs and leverage to be non-monotonic.Despite the importance of this theory, there is at best mixed empirical evidence in the extant literature (see Harris and Raviv 1991, Titman 2000, and Myers 2001 for reviews). Tests of the agency costs hypothesis typically regress measures of firm performance on the equity capital ratio or other indicator of leverage plus some control variables. At least three problems appear in the prior studies that we address in our application.First, the measures of firm performance are usually ratios fashioned from financial statements or stock market prices, such as industry-adjusted operating margins or stock market returns. These measures do not net out the effects of differences in exogenous market factors that affect firm value, but are beyond management’s control and therefore cannot reflect agency costs. Thus, the tests may be confounded by factors that are unrelated to agency costs. As well, these studies generally do not set a separate benchmark for each firm’s performance that would be realized if agency costs were minimized.We address the measurement problem by using profit efficiency as our indicator of firm performance. The link between productive efficiency and agency costs was first suggested by Stigler (1976), and profit efficiency represents a refinement of the efficiency concept developed since that time.2 Profit efficiency evaluates how close a firm is to earning the profit that a best-practice firm would earn facing the same exogenous conditions. This has the benefit of controlling for factors outside the control of management that are not part of agency costs. In contrast, comparisons of standard financial ratios, stock market returns, and similar measures typically do not control for these exogenous factors. Even when the measures used in the literature are industry adjusted, they may not account for important differences across firms within an industry –such as local market conditions – as we are able to do with profit efficiency. In addition, the performance of a best-practice firm under the same exogenous conditions is a reasonable benchmark for how the firm would be expected to perform if agency costs were minimized.Second, the prior research generally does not take into account the possibility of reverse causation from performance to capital structure. If firm performance affects the choice of capital structure, then failure to take this reverse causality into account may result in simultaneous-equations bias. That is, regressions of firmperformance on a measure of leverage may confound the effects of capital structure on performance with the effects of performance on capital structure.We address this problem by allowing for reverse causality from performance to capital structure. We discuss below two hypotheses for why firm performance may affect the choice of capital structure, the efficiency-risk hypothesis and the franchise-value hypothesis. We construct a two-equation structural model and estimate it using two-stage least squares (2SLS). An equation specifying profit efficiency as a function of the firm’s equity capital ratio and other variables is use d to test the agency costs hypothesis, and an equation specifying the equity capital ratio as a function of the firm’s profit efficiency and other variables is used to test the net effects of the efficiency-risk and franchise-value hypotheses. Both equations are econometrically identified through exclusion restrictions that are consistent with the theories.Third, some, but not all of the prior studies did not take ownership structure into account. Under virtually any theory of agency costs, ownership structure is important, since it is the separation of ownership and control that creates agency costs (e.g., Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet 1985). Greater insider shares may reduce agency costs, although the effect may be reversed at very high levels of insider holdings (e.g., Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988). As well, outside block ownership or institutional holdings tend to mitigate agency costs by creating a relatively efficient monitor of the managers (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1986). Exclusion of the ownership variables may bias the test results because the ownership variables may be correlated with the dependent variable in the agency cost equation (performance) and with the key exogenous variable (leverage) through the reverse causality hypotheses noted above.To address this third problem, we include ownership structure variables in the agency cost equation explaining profit efficiency. We include insider ownership, outside block holdings, and institutional holdings.Our application to data from the banking industry is advantageous because of the abundance of quality data available on firms in this industry. In particular, we have detailed financial data for a large number of firms producing comparable products with similar technologies, and information on market prices and other exogenous conditions in the local markets in which they operate. In addition, some studies in this literature find evidence of the link between the efficiency of firms and variables that are recognized to affect agency costs, including leverage andownership structure (see Berger and Mester 1997 for a review).Although banking is a regulated industry, banks are subject to the same type of agency costs and other influences on behavior as other industries. The banks in the sample are subject to essentially equal regulatory constraints, and we focus on differences across banks, not between banks and other firms. Most banks are well above the regulatory capital minimums, and our results are based primarily on differences at the margin, rather than the effects of regulation. Our test of the agency costs hypothesis using data from one industry may be built upon to test a number of corporate finance hypotheses using information on virtually any industry.We test the agency costs hypothesis of corporate finance, under which high leverage reduces the agency costs of outside equity and increases firm value by constraining or encouraging managers to act more in the interests of shareholders. Our use of profit efficiency as an indicator of firm performance to measure agency costs, our specification of a two-equation structural model that takes into account reverse causality from firm performance to capital structure, and our inclusion of measures of ownership structure address problems in the extant empirical literature that may help explain why prior empirical results have been mixed. Our application to the banking industry is advantageous because of the detailed data available on a large number of comparable firms and the exogenous conditions in their local markets. Although banks are regulated, we focus on differences across banks that are driven by corporate governance issues, rather than any differences in-regulation, given that all banks are subject to essentially the same regulatory framework and most banks are well above the regulatory capital minimums.Our findings are consistent with the agency costs hypothesis – higher leverage or a lower equity capital ratio is associated with higher profit efficiency, all else equal. The effect is economically significant as well as statistically significant. An increase in leverage as represented by a 1 percentage point decrease in the equity capital ratio yields a predicted increase in profit efficiency of about 6 percentage points, or a gain of about 10% in actual profits at the sample mean. This result is robust to a number of specification changes, including different measures of performance (standard profit efficiency, alternative profit efficiency, and return on equity), different econometric techniques (two-stage least squares and OLS), different efficiency measurement methods (distribution-free and fixed-effects), different samples (the “ownership sample” of banks with detailed ownership data and the “full sample” of banks), and the different sample periods (1990s and 1980s).However, the data are not consistent with the prediction that the relationship between performance and leverage may be reversed when leverage is very high due to the agency costs of outside debt.We also find that profit efficiency is responsive to the ownership structure of the firm, consistent with agency theory and our argument that profit efficiency embeds agency costs. The data suggest that large institutional holders have favorable monitoring effects that reduce agency costs, although large individual investors do not. As well, the data are consistent with a non-monotonic relationship between performance and insider ownership, similar to findings in the literature.With respect to the reverse causality from efficiency to capital structure, we offer two competing hypotheses with opposite predictions, and we interpret our tests as determining which hypothesis empirically dominates the other. Under the efficiency-risk hypothesis, the expected high earnings from greater profit efficiency substitute for equity capital in protecting the firm from the expected costs of bankruptcy or financial distress, whereas under the franchise-value hypothesis, firms try to protect the expected income stream from high profit efficiency by holding additional equity capital. Neither hypothesis dominates the other for the ownership sample, but the substitution effect of the efficiency-risk hypothesis dominates for the full sample, suggesting a difference in behavior for the small banks that comprise most of the full sample.The approach developed in this paper can be built upon to test the agency costs hypothesis or other corporate finance hypotheses using data from virtually any industry. Future research could extend the analysis to cover other dimensions of capital structure. Agency theory suggests complex relationships between agency costs and different types of securities. We have analyzed only one dimension of capital structure, the equity capital ratio. Future research could consider other dimensions, such as the use of subordinated notes and debentures, or other individual debt or equity instruments.译文资本结构与企业绩效资料来源: 联邦储备系统理事会作者：Allen N. Berger 在财务和非财务行业，代理成本在公司治理中都是重要的问题。

Optimal Capital Structure: Reflections on economic and other valuesBy Marc Schauten & Jaap Spronk11. IntroductionDespite a vast literature on the capital structure of the firm (see Harris and Raviv, 1991, Graham and Harvey, 2001, Brav et al., 2005, for overviews) there still is a big gap between theory and practice (see e.g. Cools, 1993, Tempelaar, 1991, Boot & Cools, 1997). Starting with the seminal work by Modigliani & Miller (1958, 1963), much attention has been paid to the optimality of capital structure from the shareholders’ point of view.Over the last few decades studies have been produced on the effect of other stakeholders’interests on capital structure. Well-known examples are the interests of customers who receive product or service guarantees from the company (see e.g. Grinblatt & Titman, 2002). Another area that has received considerable attention is the relation between managerial incentives and capital structure (Ibid.). Furthermore, the issue of corporate control2 (see Jensen & Ruback, 1983) and, related, the issue of corporate governance3 (see Shleifer & Vishney, 1997), receive a lion’s part of the more recent academic attention for capital structure decisions.From all these studies, one thing is clear: The capital structure decision (or rather, the management of the capital structure over time) involves more issues than the maximization of the firm’s market value alone. In this paper, we give an overview of the different objectives and considerations that have been proposed in the literature. We make a distinction between two broadly defined situations. The first is the traditional case of the firm that strives for the maximization of the value of the shares for the current shareholders. Whenever other considerations than value maximization enter capital structure decisions, these considerations have to be instrumental to the goal of value maximization. The second case concerns the firm that explicitly chooses for more objectives than value maximization alone. This may be because the shareholders adopt a multiple stakeholders approach or because of a different ownership structure than the usual corporate structure dominating finance literature. An example of the latter is the co-operation, a legal entity which can be found in a.o. many European countries. For a discussion on why firms are facing multiple goals, we refer to Hallerbach and Spronk (2002a, 2002b).In Section 2 we will describe objectives and considerations that, directly or indirectly, clearly help to create and maintain a capital structure which is 'optimal' for the value maximizing firm. The third section describes other objectives and considerations. Some of these may have a clear negative effect on economic value, others may be neutral and in some cases the effect on economic value is not always completely clear. Section 4 shows how, for both cases, capital structure decisions can be framed as multiple criteria decision problems which can then benefit from multiple criteria decision support tools that are now widely available.2. Maximizing shareholder valueAccording to the neoclassical view on the role of the firm, the firm has one single objective: maximization of shareholder value. Shareholders possess the property rights of the firm and are thus entitled to decide what the firm should aim for. Since shareholders only have oneobjective in mind - wealth maximization - the goal of the firm is maximization of the firm's contribution to the financial wealth of its shareholders. The firm can accomplish this by investing in projects with positive net present value4. Part of shareholder value is determined by the corporate financing decision5. Two theories about the capital structure of the firm - the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory - assume shareholder wealth maximization as the one and only corporate objective. We will discuss both theories including several market value related extensions. Based on this discussion we formulate a list of criteria that is relevant for the corporate financing decision in this essentially neoclassical view.The original proposition I of Miller and Modigliani (1958) states that in a perfect capital market the equilibrium market value of a firm is independent of its capital structure, i.e. the debt-equity ratio6. If proposition I does not hold then arbitrage will take place. Investors will buy shares of the undervalued firm and sell shares of the overvalued shares in such a way that identical income streams are obtained. As investors exploit these arbitrage opportunities, the price of the overvalued shares will fall and that of the undervalued shares will rise, until both prices are equal.When corporate taxes are introduced, proposition I changes dramatically. Miller and Modigliani (1958, 1963) show that in a world with corporate tax the value of firms is a.o. a function of leverage. When interest payments become tax deductible and payments to shareholders are not, the capital structure that maximizes firm value involves a hundred percent debt financing. By increasing leverage, the payments to the government are reduced with a higher cash flow for the providers of capital as a result. The difference between the present value of the taxes paid by an unlevered firm (G u ) and an identical levered firm (G l ) is the present value of tax shields (PVTS). Figure 1 depicts the total value of an unlevered and a levered firm7. The higher leverage, the lower G l , the higher G u - G l(=PVTS). In the traditional trade-off models of optimal capital structure it is assumed that firms balance the marginal present value of interest tax shields8 against marginal direct costs of financial distress or direct bankruptcy costs.9 Additional factors can be included in this trade-off framework. Other costs than direct costs of financial distress are agency costs of debt (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Often cited examples of agency costs of debt are the underinvestment problem (Myers, 1977)10, the asset substitution problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976 and Galai & Masulis, 1976), the 'play for time' game by managers, the 'unexpected increase of leverage (combined with an equivalent pay out to stockholders to make to increase the impact)', the 'refusal to contribute equity capital' and the 'cash in and run' game (Brealey, Myers & Allan, 2006). These problems are caused by the difference of interest between equity and debt holders and could be seen as part of the indirect costs of financial distress. Another benefit of debt is the reduction of agency costs between managers and external equity (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Jensen, 1986, 1989). Jensen en Meckling (1976) argue that debt, by allowing larger managerial residual claims because the need for external equity is reduced by the use of debt, increases managerial effort to work. In addition, Jensen (1986) argues that high leverage reduces free cash with less resources to waste on unprofitable investments as a result.11 The agency costs between management and external equity are often left out the trade-off theory since it assumes managers not acting on behalf of the shareholders (only)which is an assumption of the traditional trade-off theory.In Myers' (1984) and Myers and Majluf's (1984) pecking order model12 there is no optimal capital structure. Instead, because of asymmetric information and signalling problems associated with external financing13, firm's financing policies follow a hierarchy, with a preference for internal over external finance, and for debt over equity. A strict interpretation of this model suggests that firms do not aim at a target debt ratio. Instead, the debt ratio is just the cumulative result of hierarchical financing over time. (See Shyum-Sunder & Myers, 1999.) Original examples of signalling models are the models of Ross (1977) and Leland and Pyle (1977). Ross (1977) suggests that higher financial leverage can be used by managers to signal an optimistic future for the firm and that these signals cannot be mimicked by unsuccessful firms14. Leland and Pyle (1977) focus on owners instead of managers. They assume that entrepreneurs have better information on the expected cash flows than outsiders have. The inside information held by an entrepreneur can be transferred to suppliers of capital because it is in the owner's interest to invest a greater fraction of his wealth in successful projects. Thus the owner's willingness to invest in his own projects can serve as a signal of project quality. The value of the firm increases with the percentage of equity held by the entrepreneur relative to the percentage he would have held in case of a lower quality project. (Copeland, Weston & Shastri, 2005.)The stakeholder theory formulated by Grinblatt & Titman (2002)15 suggests that the way in which a firm and its non-financial stakeholders interact is an important determinant of the firm's optimal capital structure. Non-financial stakeholders are those parties other than the debt and equity holders. Non-financial stakeholders include firm's customers, employees, suppliers and the overall community in which the firm operates. These stakeholders can be hurt by a firm's financial difficulties. For example customers may receive inferior products that are difficult to service, suppliers may lose business, employees may lose jobs and the economy can be disrupted. Because of the costs they potentially bear in the event of a firm's financial distress, non-financial stakeholders will be less interested ceteris paribus in doing business with a firm having a high(er) potential for financial difficulties. This understandable reluctance to do business with a distressed firm creates a cost that can deter a firm from undertaking excessive debt financing even when lenders are willing to provide it on favorable terms (Ibid., p. 598). These considerations by non-financial stakeholders are the cause of their importance as determinant for the capital structure. This stakeholder theory could be seen as part of the trade-off theory (see Brealey, Myers and Allen, 2006, p.481, although the term 'stakeholder theory' is not mentioned) since these stakeholders influence the indirect costs of financial distress.16As the trade-off theory (excluding agency costs between managers and shareholders) and the pecking order theory, the stakeholder theory of Grinblatt and Titman (2002) assumes shareholder wealth maximization as the single corporate objective.17Based on these theories, a huge number of empirical studies have been produced. See e.g. Harris & Raviv (1991) for a systematic overview of this literature18. More recent studies are e.g. Shyum-Sunder & Myers (1999), testing the trade-off theory against the pecking order theory, Kemsley & Nissim (2002) estimating the present value of tax shield, Andrade & Kaplan (1998) estimating the costs of financial distress and Rajan & Zingales (1995) investigating the determinants of capital structure in the G-7 countries. Rajan & Zingales(1995)19 explain differences in leverage of individual firms with firm characteristics. In their study leverage is a function of tangibility of assets, market to book ratio, firm size and profitability. Barclay & Smith (1995) provide an empirical examination of the determinants of corporate debt maturity. Graham & Harvey (2001) survey 392 CFOs about a.o. capital structure. We come back to this Graham & Harvey study in Section 3.20Cross sectional studies as by Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan & Zingales (1995) and Barclay & Smith (1995) and Wald (1999) model capital structure mainly in terms of leverage and then leverage as a function of different firm (and market) characteristics as suggested by capital structure theory21. We do the opposite. We do not analyze the effect of several firm characteristics on capital structure (c.q. leverage), but we analyze the effect of capital structure on variables that co-determine shareholder value. In several decisions, including capital structure decisions, these variables may get the role of decision criteria. Criteria which are related to the trade-off and pecking order theory are listed in Table 1. We will discuss these criteria in more detail in section 4. Figure 2 illustrates the basic idea of our approach.3. Other objectives and considerationsA lot of evidence suggests that managers act not only in the interest of the shareholders (see Myers, 2001). Neither the static trade-off theory nor the pecking order theory can fully explain differences in capital structure. Myers (2001, p.82) states that 'Yet even 40 years after the Modigliani and Miller research, our understanding of these firms22 financing choices is limited.' Results of several surveys (see Cools 1993, Graham & Harvey, 2001, Brounen et al., 2004) reveal that CFOs do not pay a lot of attention to variables relevant in these shareholder wealth maximizing theories. Given the results of empirical research, this does not come as a surprise.The survey by Graham and Harvey finds only moderate evidence for the trade-off theory. Around 70% have a flexible target or a somewhat tight target or range. Only 10% have a strict target ratio. Around 20% of the firms declare not to have an optimal or target debt-equity ratio at all.In general, the corporate tax advantage seems only moderately important in capital structure decisions. The tax advantage of debt is most important for large regulated and dividend paying firms. Further, favorable foreign tax treatment relative to the US is fairly important in issuing foreign debt decisions23. Little evidence is found that personal taxes influence the capital structure24. In general potential costs of financial distress seem not very important although credit ratings are. According to Graham and Harvey this last finding could be viewed as (an indirect) indication of concern with distress. Earnings volatility also seems to be a determinant of leverage, which is consistent with the prediction that firms reduce leverage when the probability of bankruptcy is high. Firms do not declare directly that (the present value of the expected) costs of financial distress are an important determinant of capital structure, although indirect evidence seems to exist. Graham and Harvey find little evidence that firms discipline managers by increasing leverage. Graham and Harvey explicitly note that ‘1) managers might be unwilling to admit to using debt in this manner, or 2) perhaps a low rating on this question reflects an unwillingness of firms to adopt Jensen’s solution more than a weakness in Jensen’s argument'.The most important issue affecting corporate debt decisions is management’s desire for financial flexibility (excess cash or preservation of debt capacity). Furthermore, managers arereluctant to issue common stock when they perceive the market is undervalued (most CFOs think their shares are undervalued). Because asymmetric information variables have no power to predict the issue of new debt or equity, Harvey and Graham conclude that the pecking order model is not the true model of the security choice25.The fact that neoclassical models do not (fully) explain financial behavior could be explained in several ways. First, it could be that managers do strive for creating shareholder value but at the same time also pay attention to variables other than the variables listed in Table 1. Variables of which managers think that they are (justifiably or not) relevant for creating shareholder value. Second, it could be that managers do not (only) serve the interest of the shareholders but of other stakeholders as well26. As a result, managers integrate variables that are relevant for them and or other stakeholders in the process of managing the firm's capital structure. The impact of these variables on the financing decision is not per definition negative for shareholder value. For example if ‘value of financial rewards for managers’ is one the goals that is maximized by managers – which may not be excluded – and if the rewards of managers consists of a large fraction of call options, managers could decide to increase leverage (and pay out an excess amount of cash, if any) to lever the volatility of the shares with an increase in the value of the options as a result. The increase of leverage could have a positive effect on shareholder wealth (e.g. the agency costs between equity and management could be lower) but the criterion 'value of financial rewards' could (but does not have to) be leading. Third, shareholders themselves do possibly have other goals than shareholder wealth creation alone. Fourth, managers rely on certain (different) rules of thumb or heuristics that do not harm shareholder value but can not be explained by neoclassical models either27. Fifth, the neoclassical models are not complete or not tested correctly (see e.g. Shyum-Sunder & Myers, 1999).Either way, we do expect variables other than those founded in the neoclassical property rights view are or should be included explicitly in the financing decision framework. To determine which variables should be included we probably need other views or theories of the firm than the neoclassical alone. Zingales (2000) argues that ‘…corporate finance theory, empirical research, practical implications, and policy recommendations are deeply rooted in an underlying theory of the firm.’ (Ibid., p. 1623.) Examples of attempts of new theories are 'the stakeholder theory of the firm' (see e.g. Donaldson and Preston, 1995), 'the enlightened stakeholder theory' as a response (see Jensen, 2001), 'the organizational theory' (see Myers, 1993, 2000, 2001) and the stakeholder equity model (see Soppe, 2006).We introduce an organizational balance sheet which is based on the organizational theory of Myers (1993). The intention is to offer a framework to enhance a discussion about criteria that could be relevant for the different stakeholders of the firm. In Myers' organizational theory employees (including managers) are included as stakeholders; we integrate other stakeholders as suppliers, customers and the community as well. Figure 3 presents the adjusted organizational balance sheet.Pre-tax value is the maximum value of the firm including the maximum value of the present value of all stakeholders' surplus. The present value of the stakeholders' surplus (ES plus OTS) is the present value of future costs of perks, overstaffing, above market prices for inputs (including above market wages), above market services provided to customers and the community etc.28 Depending on the theory of the firm, the pre-tax value can be distributedamong the different stakeholders following certain 'rules'. Note that what we call 'surplus' in this framework is still based on the 'property rights' principle of the firm. Second, only distributions in market values are reflected in this balance sheet. Neutral mutations are not29. Based on the results of Graham and Harvey (2001) and common sense we formulate a list of criteria or heuristics that could be integrated into the financing decision framework. Some criteria lead to neutral mutations others do not. We call these criteria 'quasi non-economic criteria'. Non-economic, because the criteria are not based on the neoclassical view. Quasi, because the relations with economic value are not always clear cut. We include criteria that lead to neutral mutations as well, because managers might have good reasons that we overlook or are relevant for other reasons than financial wealth.The broadest decision framework we propose in this paper is the one that includes both the economic and quasi non-economic variables. Figure 4 illustrates the idea. The additional quasi non-economic variables are listed in Table 2. This list is far from complete.flexibility could be relevant for at least employees and the suppliers of resources needed for these projects. As long as managers only would invest in zero net present value projects this variable would have no value effect in the organizational balance sheet. But if it influences the value of the sum of the projects undertaken this will be reflected in this balance sheet. Of course, financial flexibility is also valued for economic reasons, see Section 2 and 4.The probability of bankruptcy influences job security for employees and the duration of a 'profitable' relationship with the firm for suppliers, customers and possibly the community. For managers (and other stakeholders without diversified portfolios) the probability of default could be important. The cost of bankruptcy is for them possibly much higher than for shareholders with diversified portfolios. As with financial flexibility, the probability of default influences shareholder value as well. In Section 2 and 4 we discuss this variable in relation to shareholder value. Here the variable is relevant, because it has an effect on the wealth or other 'valued' variables of stakeholders other than equity (and debt) holders. We assume owner-managers dislike sharing control of their firms with others. For that reason, debt financing could possibly have non-economic advantages for these managers. After all, common stock carries voting rights while debt does not. Owner-managers might prefer debt over new equity to keep control over the firm. Control is relevant in the economic framework as well, see Section 2 and 4.In practice, earnings dilution is an important variable effecting the financing decision. Whether it is a neutral mutations variable or not30, the effect of the financing decision on the earnings per share is often of some importance. If a reduction in the earnings per share (EPS) is considered to be a bad signal, managers try to prevent such a reduction. Thus the effect on EPS becomes an economic variable. As long as it is a neutral mutation variable, or if it is relevant for other reasons we treat EPS as a quasi non-economic variable.The reward package could be relevant for employees. If the financing decision influences the value of this package this variable will be one of the relevant criteria for the manager. If it is possible to increase the value of this package, the influence on shareholder value is ceteris paribus negative. If the reward package motivates the manager to create extra shareholder value compared with the situation without the package, this would possibly more than offset this negative financing effect.优化资本结构：思考经济和其他价值By Marc Schauten & Jaap Spronk11。

资本结构与企业价值的关系研究企业的资本结构是指企业通过债务和股本融资的比例。

债务融资是通过负债来筹集资金，而股本融资是通过股票发行来筹集资金。

企业的资本结构对其价值和经营绩效有着重要的影响。

本文将探讨资本结构对企业价值的影响，并对资本结构的优化提出一些建议。

首先，资本结构与企业的价值之间存在着密切的关系。

研究表明，资本结构对企业的价值有着直接的影响。

过高的负债率会增加企业的财务风险，降低投资者对企业价值的评估，从而抑制股价的上涨，减少企业的市值。

而过低的负债率则会限制企业的扩张和投资，影响企业的成长和利润率。

其次，资本结构对企业的经营绩效也有着重要的影响。

合理的资本结构有助于提高企业的盈利能力和经营效率。

通过债务融资，企业可以利用负债做杠杆，扩大投资规模，增加营收和利润。

但是，过度依赖债务融资也会增加企业的金融风险，降低企业的经营绩效。

因此，企业需要在债务融资和股本融资之间寻找一个平衡点，以实现最佳的资本结构。

然而，资本结构的优化并非易事。

不同行业的企业以及企业的规模和特点不同，其所需的资本结构也会存在差异。

然而，一般来说，企业应考虑以下几个因素来优化其资本结构。

首先是税收因素。

由于利息支出可以列为企业的税收抵扣项目，债务融资在一定程度上可以降低企业的税负。

因此，企业可以通过适度债务融资来降低税收成本，提高利润。

其次是财务灵活性。

债务融资可以提供企业更大的财务灵活性。

企业可以根据需要来增加或减少债务，从而灵活应对市场变化和经营需求。

而股本融资则相对较为困难和耗时，限制了企业在资金运作上的灵活度。

再次是风险分散。

适度的债务融资可以帮助企业实现风险分散。

当企业面临财务困境时，股东不需要承担额外的责任，而是由债权人承担。

这样可以减轻股东的风险压力，保护企业的价值。

最后是市场反应。

企业的资本结构会对投资者和市场产生信号。

过高的负债率可能会引起市场的担忧，降低企业的股价和市值。

因此，企业应该根据市场的需求和投资者的偏好来选择适当的资本结构。

资本结构外文文献资本结构是一个公司的股权和负债的组合，可以通过权益比率和负债比率来描述。

资本结构的选择与公司的风险、财务灵活性、成本效益等有联系，因此，对于公司来说，资本结构的选择至关重要。

在本文中，我们将介绍两篇外国文献，以了解资本结构的现状和选择对公司的影响。

第一篇文献第一篇文献名为“Capital Structure and Corporate Performance in China: Evidence from Foreign Listed Firms”，作者为Sung C. Bae、Chang-Soo Kim和Akihiko Takahashi。

这篇文章研究了中国外资上市公司的资本结构与业绩之间的关系，并通过样本回归分析得出。

文章首先介绍了中国外资上市公司的资本结构情况，指出了其负债比率高、权益比率低的特点，这些特点也反映在其经营绩效上。

然后，文章对不同的资本结构与公司绩效之间的关系进行了实证研究。

分析发现，在外籍公司中，负债比率与公司绩效呈倒U型关系，而权益比率与公司绩效呈现正向关系。

同时，还发现公司规模和成长率对资本结构选择具有重要影响。

文章得出：在中国外资上市公司中，权益比率对公司绩效具有显著的正向作用；负债比率和公司绩效之间存在倒U型关系；公司规模和成长率都对资本结构选择有重要影响。

第二篇文献第二篇文献名为“Capital Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from Malaysia”，作者为Chee-Wooi Hooy、Chin-Fei Goh和Yew-Ming Chia。

这篇文章研究了马来西亚公司的资本结构选择与公司绩效之间的关系。

文章首先介绍了马来西亚公司的资本结构特点，包括股权比例高、负债比例低的现象。

然后，文章通过样本回归分析研究了资本结构选择与公司绩效之间的关系。

分析发现，在马来西亚公司中，权益比率和公司绩效呈现正相关关系，负债比率与公司绩效之间没有显著关系。

资本结构与企业价值的关系随着市场竞争的日益激烈和经济发展的不断进步，企业在运营中需要不断地提高自身的核心竞争力，而资本结构的优化则成为了一项重要的手段之一。

那么，资本结构与企业价值之间存在何种关系呢？下面，本文将就此问题进行探讨。

一、什么是资本结构？资本结构是企业融资方式和资产规模的组合，包括股权融资和债务融资两种方式。

企业可以通过发行股票或发行债券等不同方式来融资，构建不同的资本结构。

二、为什么要优化企业资本结构？合理优化企业资本结构能够带来多方面的好处。

首先，通过集中资源、优化资金利用效率等方式，优化资本结构可以有效提高企业的运营效率和盈利能力。

其次，优化资本结构可以减少企业财务风险，保护企业的股东和债权人的权益。

最后，优化资本结构可以提高企业的市场声望，增强企业的市场影响力，从而带来更多的商业机会。

三、资本结构与企业价值的关系资本结构对企业价值的影响主要从三个方面展开：成本、风险和效率。

举个例子，假设A企业和B企业拥有相同的收入和投资项目，但A企业的资本结构更倾向于股权融资，B企业更倾向于债务融资，那么两家企业的成本、风险和效率就会存在巨大的差异。

如果投资回报率高于企业的融资成本率，那么对股东而言，股权融资的利润更高。

另一方面，若还贷款利率高于投资回报率，那么债务融资的利润更高。

所以，资本结构对于企业的成本和效率，同时也对企业的风险进行了平衡。

总之，在实际的企业运营过程中，合理优化企业资本结构是提高企业综合竞争力、增强企业发展后劲的关键。

企业应该综合考虑自身的资产负债状况、发展规划、市场变化等因素，选择最合适的资本结构方案，以此提升企业的投资价值。

资本结构与企业价值的关系一、引言随着市场经济的发展，企业的资本结构逐渐成为影响企业经营和发展的重要因素之一。

一个合理和稳定的资本结构能够对企业的价值产生积极的影响。

本文将探讨资本结构与企业价值之间的关系，并分析资本结构对企业价值的影响因素。

二、资本结构的定义与特点1.资本结构的定义资本结构是企业长期资本与短期资本的比例关系，其中长期资本包括股权资本和债务资本，短期资本包括流动资金等。

2.资本结构的特点(1)长期资本与短期资本的比例不同，可形成不同的资本结构。

(2)资本结构可通过资产负债表进行分析和评估。

(3)资本结构的优化可提高企业的财务稳定性和经营效率。

三、资本结构对企业价值的影响1.负债资本对企业价值的影响(1)债务资本可以降低企业的实际税负，提高资本的杠杆作用。

(2)适度的债务资本可以降低企业的成本，增加利润空间。

(3)但高比例的债务资本也会增加企业的财务风险，使企业在面临困难时更加脆弱。

2.股权资本对企业价值的影响(1)股权资本为企业提供了稳定和长期的资金来源。

(2)股权资本能够提高企业的声誉和信誉度，进而增加企业的市值。

(3)然而，股权资本的筹资成本相对较高，可能对企业的资金利用效率带来一定的压力。

3.资本结构的调整对企业价值的影响(1)合理的资本结构调整能够减少财务风险，提高企业的价值。

(2)资本结构调整要考虑市场环境、行业特点和企业自身发展阶段等因素。

(3)资本结构的调整需在平衡风险与效益的前提下进行。

四、影响资本结构的因素1.税收政策税收政策对企业的财务结构有重要影响。

税收优惠政策有助于提高债务资本的利用率。

2.市场环境与行业特点市场环境和行业特点会影响企业融资成本和融资渠道选择，从而对资本结构产生影响。

3.企业规模和发展阶段企业规模的变化和不同发展阶段所需的资金量不同，会导致企业资本结构的调整。

4.财务风险和经营效率企业财务风险的程度和经营效率的水平也会对资本结构产生影响。

五、优化资本结构的策略1.平衡债务和股权资本的比例，合理控制财务风险。

资本结构与企业价值企业的资本结构，也即债务和股本比例，直接影响了企业的价值。

一个企业的资本结构越合理，其价值也会越高；而对于不合理的资本结构，其企业价值则会遭受惨重的打击。

因此，企业应该高度注重资本结构的构建，合理分配债务和股本的比例，并不断优化和调整资本结构，以提升企业价值。

下面，我们来深入探讨资本结构与企业价值之间的关系及其影响因素。

一、资本结构对企业价值的影响资本结构通常包括股本和负债两个部分。

企业通过股票发行和借贷融资来获得资金，股本和负债的比例就形成了企业的资本结构。

资本结构的结构性合理与否，直接影响到企业的稳定性和获利能力，从而影响企业价值的高低。

具体来说，资本结构对企业价值的影响主要表现在以下几个方面：1. 决定企业的融资成本企业的融资成本主要由借贷利率和股东要求的股权回报率两部分组成。

当企业的债务比例较高，或者贷款的利率较高时，企业的融资成本将达到一个高峰。

而当企业的股本比例较高时，股东的股权回报率也会比较高，从而提高企业的融资成本。

由此可见，资本结构会间接影响企业的融资成本，而融资成本则会影响企业的盈利能力，进而影响企业的价值。

2. 决定企业的债务风险高比例的负债意味着企业需要支付更多的利息和贷款本金，如果企业无法及时偿还，就会产生债务风险。

而资本结构的不合理也会导致企业财务状况的恶化，从而引发更大的债务风险。

3. 决定股权比例企业的股权比例完全由股票的流通发行量所决定。

当股票的发行量越大，企业的股权比例也就越高，股东获得分红的权益也就越大。

股东的权力和股利又会直接影响到企业的管理层和股权结构，从而进而导致企业高低不同的价值。

4. 决定企业的税收政府对于企业的税收政策通常是根据企业的税前利润来确定的——一般来说，债务比例较高的企业的税前利润比股权比例较高的企业来得更低。

因此，不同的企业资本结构也很可能会导致不同的税负水平。

以上是资本结构对企业价值的一些直接和间接影响因素，同时，资本结构的合理性又与企业自身特点和外部环境因素有关，下面我们一一来探讨。

The influence of corporate governance on the relationbetween capital structure and valueCapital structure: relation with corporate value and main research streamsWhen looking at the most important theoretical contributions on the relation between capital structure and value, as illustrated in Figure 1, it becomes immediately evident that there is a substantial difference between the early theories and the more recent ones.Modigliani and Miller (1958), who had originally asserted that there was no relationship between capital structure and value ; in 1963, instead, reached the paradoxical and provocative conclusion that a maximum level of debt would mean a maximum level of firm value, due to the fact that interest is tax deductible . Many later contributions pointed out that this effect is compensated when considering personal taxes (Miller, 1977),an eventual lack of tax capacity, due to the presence of economic loss, the effect of other types of tax shields (De Angelo and Masulis, 1980), as well as the introduction of the costs(direct and indirect) of financial distress; all these situations end up creating a trade-off between debt costs and benefits. Point L’ in Figure 1c indicates an optimal level of debt,beyond which any rise in leverage would cause an increase in the benefits of debt that would be less than proportional with respect to the costs of financial distress. Furthermore, this non monotonic relation would be modified even more when considering agency costs as well as the costs of financial distress . Finally, one last stream of research (Myers, 1984,Myers 1984) points out managerial preferences when choosing financing resources . In this case no optimal level of debt becomes ‘‘objectively’’ evident, but this is due to the various situations the manager had to deal with over time. The function of managerial preference has particular relevance due to information asymmetries, therefore the level of firm indebtedness will be determined by the tangent between the firm value function and the curve of manager indifference.Furthermore, it can be observed that debt increases in correspondence with the better the firm’s reputation is on the market (Chevalier, 1995). Research has shown similarities between firms that belong to the same sector (Titman and Wessels, 1988);in other words, capital structure tends to be industry-specific.The empirical comparison between the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory seems to be controversial. On one hand, empirical evidence shows moderate coherence with the trade-off theory, when revenue and agency problems are taken into consideration contextually; on the other hand, the negative relation between leverage and firm profit does not seem to support the trade-off theory, as it confirms a hierarchical order in financial decision making.It is, thus, clear that the topic of capital structure is anything but defined and that there are still many open problems regarding it.As many authors have noted (Rajan and Zingales, 1995) capital structure is a ‘‘hot’’ topic in finance. By analyzing international literature the main research priorities and new analytical approaches are related to:the important comparison between ‘‘rational’’ and ‘‘behavioural’’ finance (Barberis and Thaler, 2002);a lively comparison made between the pecking order theory and the trade-off theory(Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999);the attempt to apply these theories to small firms (Berger and Udell, 1998, Fluck, 2001);the role of corporate governance on the relation between capital structure and value(Heinrich, 2000, Bhagat and Jefferis, 2002, Brailsford et al., 2004, Mahrt-Smith, 2005).The behavioural approach, that considers the pecking order of financial resources in terms of ‘‘irrational’’ preferences, caused an immediate reaction from Stewart Myers in 2000 and 2001 and jointly with Shyam-Sunder in 1999 (Myers, 2000; 2001; Shyam-Sunder and Myers,1999). Stewart Myers is the founder of the pecking order theory[7]. Problems of information asymmetry, together with transaction costs, would be able to offer a rational explanation to managerial behaviour when financial choices are made following a hierarchical order (Fama and French, 2002). In other words, according to Myers and Fama, there should be a‘‘rational’’ explanation to the phenomenon observed by Stein, Baker, Wrugler, Barberis and Thaler.Moreover, studies on capital structure have also been done looking at small and medium size firms (Berger and Udell, 1998, Michaelas et al., 1999, Romano et al., 2000, Fluck, 2001),due to the relevant economic role of these firms (in Europe they are 95 percent of the total firms operating). Zingales (2000) as well has emphasizedthe fact that today ‘‘ . . . the attention shown towards large firms tends to partially obscure firms that do not have access to the financial markets . . . ’’. In one of the most interesting studies done on this topic, Berger and Udell (1998) asserted that firm financial behaviour depends on what phase of their life cycle they are in. In fact, there should be an optimal pro-tempore capital structure, related to the phase of the life cycle that the firm is in.Finally, the observations of Michael Jensen (1986), made throughout his many contributions on corporate governance, as well as those of Williamson (1988), have encouraged a line of research that, revitalized in the second part of the nineties, seems to be quite promising as a means to analyze how corporate governance directly or indirectly influences the relation between capital structure and value (Fluck, 1998, Zhang, 1998, Myers, 2000, De Jong, 2002,Berger and Patti, 2003, Brailsford et al., 2004, Mahrt-Smith, 2005). In synthesis, it is possible to affirm, as it follows, that a joined analysis of capital structure and corporate governance is necessary when describing and interpreting the firm’s ability to create value (Zingales, 2000, Heinrich, 2000, Bhagat and Jefferis, 2002). This type of consideration could help overcome the controversy found when studying the relation between capital structure and value, on both a theoretical and empirical level.Influence of corporate governance on the relation between capital structure and value.Capital structure can be analyzed by looking at the rights and attributes that characterize the firm’s assets and that influence, with different levels of intensity, governance activities. Equity and debt, therefore, must be considered as both financial instruments and corporate governance instruments (Williamson, 1988): debt subordinates governance activities to stricter management, while equity allows for greater flexibility and decision making power. It can thus be inferred that when capital structure becomes an instrument of corporate governance, not only the mix between debt and equity and their well known consequences as far as taxes go must be taken into consideration. The way in which cash flow is allocated (cash flow right) and, even more importantly, how the right to make decisions and manage the firm (voting rights) is dealt with must also be examined. For example, venture capitalists areparticularly sensitive to how capital structure and financing contracts are laid out, so that an optimal corporate governance can be guaranteed while incentives and checks for management behavior are well established (Zingales, 2000)[10].Coase (1991), in a sort of critique on his own work done in 1937, points out that it is important to pay more attention to the role of capital structure as an instrument that can mediate and moderate economical transactions within the firm and, consequently, between entrepreneurs and other stakeholders (corporate governance relations).As explicitly pointed out by Bhagat and Jefferis (2002), when they pay particular attention to the relations between cause and effect and to their interactions recently described on a theoretical level (Fluck, 1998, Zhang, 1998, Heinrich, 2000, Brailsford et al., 2004,Mahrt-Smith, 2005), a ‘‘research proposal’’ that future empirical studies should evaluate should be, how corporate governance can potentially have a relevant influence on the relation between capital structure and value, with an effect of mediation and/or moderation.The five relations identified in Figure 2 describe:the relation between capital structure and firm value (relation A) through a role of corporate governance ‘‘mediation’’ ; the relation between capital structure and firm value (relation A) through the role of capital governance ‘‘moderation’’ (relation D);the role of corporate governance as a determining factor in choices regarding capital structure (relation E).All five relations shown in Figure 2 are particularly interesting and show two threads of research that focus on the relations between:corporate governance and capital structure, where the dimensions of the corporate governance determine firmfinancing choices, causing a possible relation of co-causation Whether management voluntarily chooses to use debt as a source of financing to reduce problems of information asymmetry and transaction, maximizing the efficiency of its firm governance decisions, or the increase in the debt level is forced by the stockholders as an instrument to discipline behavior and assure good corporate governance, capital structure is influenced by corporate governance (relation E) and vice versa (relation B).On one hand, a change in how debt and equity are dealt with influences firmgovernance activities by modifying the structure of incentives and managerial control. If, through the mix debt and equity, different categories of investors all converge within the firm, where they have different types of influence on governance decisions, then managers will tend to have preferences when determining how one of these categories will prevail when defining the firm’s capital structure. Even more importantly, through a specific design of debt contracts and equity it is possible to considerably increase firm governance efficiency.On the other hand, even corporate governance influences choices regarding capital structure (relation E). Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) show how firmfinancing choices are made by management following an order of preference; in this case, if the manager chooses the financing resources it can be presumed that she is avoiding a reduction of her decision making power by accepting the discipline represented by debt.Internal resource financing allows management to prevent other subjects from intervening in their decision making processes. De Jong (2002) reveals how in the Netherlands managers try to avoid using debt so that their decision making power remains unchecked. Zwiebel(1996) has observed that managers don’t voluntarily accept the ‘‘discipline’’ of debt; other governance mechanisms impose that debt is issued. Jensen (1986) noted that decisions to increase firm debt are voluntarily made by management when it intends to ‘‘reassure’’stakeholders that its governance decisions are ‘‘proper’’.In this light, firm financing decisions can be strictly deliberated by managers-entrepreneurs or else can be induced by specific situations that go beyond the will of the management.ConclusionThis paper define a theoretical approach that can contribute in clearing up the relation between capital structure, corporate governance and value, while they also promote a more precise design for empirical research. Capital structure represents one of many instruments that can preserve corporate governance efficiency and protect its ability to create value.Therefore, this thread of research affirms that if investment policies allow for value creation,financing policies, together with other governance instruments, can assure that investment policies are carried out efficiently while firmvalue is protected from opportunistic behavior.In other words, various authors (Borsch-Supan and Koke, 2000, Bhagat and Jefferis, 2002 and Berger and Patti, 2003) point out the necessity to analyze the relation between capital structure and value by always taking into consideration the interaction between corporate governance variables such as ownership concentration, management participation in the equity capital, the composition of the Board of Directors, etc.Furthermore, there is a problem in the way to operationalize these constructs, due to multidimensional nature of these. It is quite difficult to identify indicators that perfectly correspond to theoretical constructs; it means that proxy variables, or empirical measures of latent constructs, must be used (Corbetta, 1992).Moreover, it must be considered possible that there may be distortions in the signs and entities of the connections between variables due to endogeneity problems, or rather the presence of co-variation even when there is no cause, and reciprocal cause, where the distinction between the cause variable and the effect variable are lacking, and the two reciprocally influence each other.From an econometric point of view, therefore, it would seem to be important to further investigate the research proposal outlined above, by empirically examining the model proposed in Figure 2 using appropriate econometric techniques that can handle the complexity of the relations between the elements studied. Some proposals for study can be found in literature; the use of lagged variables is criticized by Borsch-Supan and Koke(2000) that affirm that it would be better to determine instrumental variables that influence only one of the two elements of study; Berger and Patti (2003), Borsch-Supan and Koke(2000) and Chen and Steiner (1999) promote the application of structural model equations to solve these problems, that is a method appropriate for examining the causal relations between latent, one-dimensional or multi-dimensional variables, measured with multiple indicators (Corbetta, 1992).In conclusion, this paper defines a theoretical model that contributes to clarifying the relations between capital structure, corporate governance and firm value, while promoting,as an aim for future research, a verification of the validity of this modelthrough application of the analysis to a wide sample of firms and to single firms. To study the interaction between capital structure, corporate governance and value when analyzing a wide sample of firms,the researcher has to take into account the relations showed in Figure 2, look at problems of endogeneity and reciprocal causality, and make sure there is complementarity between all the three factors. Such an analysis deserves the application of refined econometric techniques. Moreover, these relations should be investigated in a cross-country analysis, to catch the role of country-specific factors.Source: Maurizio La Rocca,2007 “The influence of corporate governance on the relation between capital structure and value”. corporate gorernance,vol.7,no.3april,pp.312-325.公司治理对本钱结构和企业价值关系的影响本钱结构: 关系到公司价值及其主要研究趋向当查看关于描述本钱结构与企业价值两者之间总体关系的最重要的理论文献时，会明显感触感染到早期的理论与新近的理论有本色性的分歧。

本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文：The Determinants of Capital Structure ChoiceI. Determinants of Capital StructureIn this section, we present a brief discussion of the attributes that different theories of capital structure suggest may affect the firm's debt-equity choice. These attributes are denoted asset structure, non-debt tax shields, growth, uniqueness, industry classification, size, earnings volatility, and profitability. The attributes, their relation to the optimal capital structure choice, and their observable indicators are discussed below.A. Collateral Value of AssetsMost capital structure theories argue that the type of assets owned by a firm in some way affects its capital structure choice. Scott suggests that, by selling secured debt, firms increase the value of their equity by expropriating wealth from their existing unsecured creditors.Arguments put forth by Myers and Majluf also suggest that firms may find it advantageous to sell secured debt. Their model demonstrates that there may be costs associated with issuing securities about which the firm's managers have better information than outside shareholders. Issuing debt secured by property with known values avoids these costs. For this reason, firms with assets that can be used as collateral may be expected to issue more debt to take advantage of this opportunity.Work by Galai and Masulis , Jensen and Meckling , and Myers suggests that stockholders of leveraged firms have an incentive to invest yet to expropriate wealth from the firm's bondholders. This incentive may also induce a positive relation between debt ratios and the capacity of firms to collateralize their debt. If the debt can be collateralized, the borrower is restricted to use the funds for a specified project. Since no such guarantee can be used for projects that cannot be collateralized, creditors may require more favorable terms, which in turn may lead such firms to use equity rather than debt financing.The tendency of managers to consume more than the optimal level of perquisites mayproduce the opposite relation between collateralized capital and debt levels. Grossman and Hart suggest that higher debt levels diminish this tendency because of the increased threat of bankruptcy. Managers of highly levered firms will also be less able to consume excessive perquisites since bondholders (or bankers) are inclined to closely monitor such firms. The costs associated with this agency relation may be higher for firms with assets that are less collateralized since monitoring the capital outlays of such firms is probably more difficult. For this reason, firms with less collateralized assets may choose higher debt levels to limit their managers' consumption of perquisites.The estimated model incorporates two indicators for the collateral value attribute. They include the ratio of intangible assets to total assets (INT/TA) and the ratio of inventory plus gross plant and equipment to total assets (IGP/TA). The first indicator is negatively related to the collateral value attribute, while the second is positively related to collateral value.B. Non-Debt Tax ShieldsDeAngelo and Masulis present a model of optimal capital structure that incorporates the impact of corporate taxes, personal taxes, and non-debt-related corporate tax shields. They argue that tax deductions for depreciation and investment tax credits are substitutes for the tax benefits of debt financing. As a result, firms with large non-debt tax shields relative to their expected cash flow include less debt in their capital structures.Indicators of non-debt tax shields include the ratios of investment tax credits over total assets (ITC/TA), depreciation over total assets (DITA), and a direct estimate of non-debt tax shields over total assets (NDT/TA). The latter measure is calculated from observed federal income tax payments (T), operating income (OI), interest payments (i), and the corporate tax rate during our sample period (48%), using the following equation:NDT = OI-i-T/0.48which follows from the equalityT= 0.48(0I- i-NDT)These indicators measure the current tax deductions associated with capital equipment and, hence, only partially capture the non-debt tax shield variable suggested by DeAngelo and Masulis. First, this attribute excludes tax deductions that are not associated with capital equipment, such as research and development and selling expenses. (These variables, used as indicators of anotherattribute, are discussed later.) More important, our non-debt tax shield attribute represents tax deductions rather than tax deductions net of true economic depreciation and expenses, which is the economic attribute suggested by theory. Unfortunately, this preferable attribute would be very difficult to measure.C. GrowthAs we mentioned previously, equity-controlled firms have a tendency to invest suboptimally to expropriate wealth from the firm's bondholders. The cost associated with this agency relationship is likely to be higher for firms in growing industries, which have more flexibility in their choice of future investments. Expected future growth should thus be negatively related to long-term debt levels. Myers, however, noted that this agency problem is mitigated if the firm issues short-term rather than long-term debt. This suggests that short-term debt ratios might actually be positively related to growth rates if growing firms substitute short-term financing for long-term financing. Jensen and Meckling, Smith and Warner, and Green argued that the agency costs will be reduced if firms issue convertible debt. This suggests that convertible debt ratios may be positively related to growth opportunities.It should also be noted that growth opportunities are capital assets that add value to a firm but cannot be collateralized and do not generate current taxable income. For this reason, the arguments put forth in the previous subsections also suggest a negative relation between debt and growth opportunities.Indicators of growth include capital expenditures over total assets (CE/TA) and the growth of total assets measured by the percentage change in total assets (GTA). Since firms generally engage in research and development to generate future investments, research and development over sales (RD/S) also serves as an indicator of the growth attribute.D. UniquenessTitman presents a model in which a firm's liquidation decision is causally linked to its bankruptcy status. As a result, the costs that firms can potentially impose on their customers, suppliers, and workers by liquidating are relevant to their capital structure decisions. Customers, workers, and suppliers of firms that produce unique or specialized products probably suffer relatively high costs in the event that they liquidate. Their workers and suppliers probably have job specific skills and capital, and their customers may find itdifficult to find alternative servicing for their relatively unique products. For these reasons, uniqueness is expected to be negatively related to debt ratios.Indictors of uniqueness include expenditures on research and development over sales (RD/S), selling expenses over sales (SEIS), and quit rates (QR), the percentage of the industry's total work force that voluntarily left their jobs in the sample years. It is postulated that RD/S measures uniqueness because firms that sell products with close substitutes ar'e likely to do less research and development since their innovations can be more easily duplicated. In addition, successful research and development projects lead to new products that differ from those existing in the market. Firms with relatively unique products are expected to advertise more and, in general, spend more in promoting and selling their products. Hence, SE/S is expected to be positively related to uniqueness. However, it is expected that firms in industries with high quit rates are probably relatively less unique since firms that produce relatively unique products tend to employ workers with high levels of job-specific human capital who will thus find it costly to leave their jobs.It is apparent from two of the indicators of uniqueness, RD/S and SEIS, that this attribute may also be related to non-debt tax shields and collateral value. Research and development and some selling expenses (such as advertising) can be considered capital goods that are immediately expensed and cannot be used as collateral. Given that our estimation technique can only imperfectly control for these other attributes, the uniqueness attribute may be negatively related to the observed debt ratio because of its positive correlation with non-debt tax shields and its negative correlation with collateral value.E. Industry ClassificationTitman suggests that firms that make products requiring the availability of specialized servicing and spare parts will find liquidation especially costly. This indicates that firms manufacturing machines and equipment should be financed with relatively less debt. To measure this, we include a dummy variable equal to one for firms with SIC codes between 3400 and 4000 (firms producing machines and equipment) and zero otherwise as a separate attribute affecting the debt ratios.F. SizeA number of authors have suggested that leverage ratios may be related to firm size.Warner and Ang, Chua, and McConnell provide evidence that suggests that direct bankruptcy costs appear to constitute a larger proportion of a firm's value as that value decreases. It is also the case that relatively large firms tend to be more diversified and less prone to bankruptcy. These arguments suggest that large firms should be more highly leveraged.The cost of issuing debt and equity securities is also related to firm size. In particular, small firms pay much more than large firms to issue new equity (see Smith) and also somewhat more to issue long-term debt. This suggests that small firms may be more leveraged than large firms and may prefer to borrow short term (through bank loans) rather than issue long-term debt because of the lower fixed costs associated with this alternative.We use the natural logarithm of sales (LnS) and quit rates (QR) as indicators of size. The logarithmic transformation of sales reflects our view that a size effect, if it exists, affects mainly the very small firms. The inclusion of quit rates, as an indicator of size, reflects the phenomenon that large firms, which often offer wider career opportunities to their employees, have lower quit rates.G. V olatilityMany authors have also suggested that a firm's optimal debt level is a decreasing function of the volatility of earnings. We were only able to include one indicator of volatility that cannot be directly affected by the firm's debt level. It is the standard deviation of the percentage change in operating income (SIGOI). Since it is the only indicator of volatility, we must assume that it measures this attribute without error.H. ProfitabilityMyers cites evidence from Donaldson and Brealey and Myers that suggests that firms prefer raising capital, first from retained earnings, second from debt, and third from issuing new equity. He suggests that this behavior may be due to the costs of issuing new equity. These can be the costs discussed in Myers and Majluf that arise because of asymmetric information, or they can be transaction costs. In either case, the past profitability of a firm, and hence the amount of earnings available to be retained, should be an important determinant of its current capital structure. We use the ratios of operating income over sales (OI/S) and operating income over total assets (OI/TA) as indicators of profitability.II. Measures of Capital StructureSix measures of financial leverage are used in this study. They are long-term, short-term, and convertible debt divided by market and by book values of equity.8 Although these variables could have been combined to extract a common "debt ratio" attribute, which could in turn be regressed against the independent attributes, there is good reason for not doing this. Some of the theories of capital structure have different implications for the different types of debt, and, for the reasons discussed below, the predicted coefficients in the structural model may differ according to whether debt ratios are measured in terms of book or market values. Moreover, measurement errors in the dependent variables are subsumed in the disturbance term and do not bias the regression coefficients.Data limitations force us to measure debt in terms of book values rather than market values. It would, perhaps, have been better if market value data were available for debt. However, Bowman demonstrated that the cross-sectional correlation between the book value and market value of debt is very large, so the misspecification due to using book value measures is probably fairly small. Furthermore, we have no reason to suspect that the cross-sectional differences between market values and book values of debt should be correlated with any of the determinants of capital structure suggested by theory, so no obvious bias will result because of this misspecification.Source: Sheridan Titman; Roberto Wessels,1988.“The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice”. The Journal of Finance. Vol.43, No.1, march.pp.1-19.译文：资本结构的影响因素I、资本结构的决定因素在本节中，我们提出了一个简短讨论资本结构的不同理论认为可能会影响公司的债务权益选择的属性。

资本结构与企业价值的关系资本结构是一个企业内部资金的来源和使用方式的组合。

企业主要通过股权和债务融资来获取资金。

为了保证企业的长期竞争力和稳定发展，企业的资本结构需要保持合理的比例。

资本结构直接影响到企业的资本成本、风险水平和企业价值。

因此，企业管理者需要合理地制定公司的资本结构，以增加股东利益，保护股东投资，提升企业的价值。

一、资本结构的构成企业的融资方式主要分为两种，股权融资和债权融资。

股权融资：以发行股票为主要形式，通过向外部投资人出售股票来获得资金。

投资人成为公司的股东。

他们有权决定公司的事务并分配利润，也承担公司利润的风险。

一般而言，股票融资的成本高但风险小。

债权融资：以借款为主要形式，通过向外部投资人出租债券来获得资金。

投资人成为公司的债权人。

公司需要向债权人支付一定利息，同时承担偿还本金的压力。

一般而言，债券融资的成本相对较低，但风险也较高。

二、资本结构的意义资本结构不仅能影响企业的融资成本和风险，还直接贡献到企业价值的产生和增长。

正常运作的企业借助资本结构优化企业的融资方式和运营效率，最终提高企业的价值。

资本结构合理的企业通常会有如下几个优点：（1）资本成本降低：企业的资本成本由股权和债权融资而来。

合理的资本结构可以降低这种成本。

因为通过选择债权融资，企业可以获得低成本的融资，同时避免承担股权融资带来高风险和高成本的问题。

（2）财务风险降低：合理的资本结构可以平衡债务和股权。

通过股权的引入，企业可以拓宽融资来源渠道，降低财务风险。

此外，其中一种融资形式出现问题时，可以通过另一种融资形式进行补救，从而减少企业破产的可能性。

（3）企业价值增长：合理的资本结构可以提高企业的生产效率，降低成本，提高收益。

同时，资本结构的优化可以为企业提供强大的融资基础，支持企业业务的拓展和发展，最终提高企业的价值。

三、资本结构的优化（1）债务比例控制在合理水平：企业应该合理控制其债务比例，这是保持良好的资本结构的基础。

资本结构与企业价值的关系本页仅作为文档页封面，使用时可以删除This document is for reference only-rar21year.March财务管理课后论文[ 资本结构与企业价值的关系]姓名：陶浩杰班级：会计102学号：4资本结构与企业价值的关系摘要: 资本结构理论是西方当代财务理论的主要研究成果之一。

企业的资本结构是由于企业采取不同的筹资方式形成的,表现为企业长期资本的构成及其比例关系即企业资产负债表右方的长期债务资本、权益资本的结构。

各种筹资方式及其不同组合类型决定着企业的资本结构及其变化。

而资本结构的变动会对企业价值产生一定的影响。

当企业资本结构处于什么状态下能使企业的价值最大,他们二者处于怎样的关系,这些问题已经成为现代理财学有关资本结构争论的焦点。

本文以当代已被公认的一些资本结构理论作为依据,对资本结构与企业价值的关系以及如何使企业价值达到最大化展开综合的论述。

关键词: 资本结构企业价值企业价值概念已经成为现代理财学的核心概念之一,对它的理解与运用从很大程度上讲将决定一个企业财务管理水平的高低。

自20世纪80年代以来,越来越多的理财学界人士以及实务界人士已经接受了以企业价值最大化作为企业的理财目标。

而如何实现这一目标,资本结构为其最关键的决定性因素。

有关资本结构的理论就是讨论各种来源的资金各占多大比重,才能使总资本成本最低,而此时可实现企业价值的最大化。

一、早期资本结构理论早期资金结构理论的研究始于20世纪50年代,以美国财务学家戴维杜兰德为代表的西方研究者提出了净收益理论、净营业收益理论和传统理论三种观点。

(1)净收益理论(Net Income Approach, NIA),该理论认为,利用债务资本筹资,可以降低企业的综合资本成本,从而提高企业的价值。

这是因为债务利息和股权资本成本均不受财务杠杆的影响,无论负债程度多高因此,企业的债务资本成本和股权资本成本都不会发生变化。