关联交易及利润操纵的英文文献就(带中文译文)

本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文：The relationship between working capital management andprofitability of listed companies in the Athens Stock Exchange AbstractIn this paper we investigate the relationship of corporate profitability and working capital management. We used a sample of 131 companies listed in the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) for the period of 2001-2004. The purpose of this paper is to establish a relationship that is statistical significant between profitability, the cash conversion cycle and its components for listed firms in the ASE. The results of our research showed that there is statistical significance between profitability, measured through gross operating profit, and the cash conversion cycle. Moreover managers can create profits for their companies by handling correctly the cash conversion cycle and keeping each different component (accounts receivables, accounts payables, inventory) to an optimum level.IntroductionCapital structure and working capital management are two areas widely revisited by academia in order to postulate firms’ profitability. Working capital management has been approached in numerous ways. Other researchers studied the impact of optimum inventory management while other authors studied the management of accounts receivables in an optimum way that leads to profit maximization. According to Deloof (2003) the way that working capital is managed has a significant impact on profitability of firms. This result indicates that there is a certain level of working capital requirements which potentially maximizes returns.Other work on the field of working capital management focuses on the routines employed by firms. This research showed that firms which focus on cash management were larger, with fewer cash sales, more seasonality and possibly more cash flowproblems. While smaller firms focused more on stock management and less profitable firms were focused on credit management routines. It is suggested that high growth firms follow a more reluctant credit policy towards their customers, while they tie up more capital in the form of inventory. Meanwhile accounts payables will increase due to better relations of suppliers with financial institutions which divert this advantage of financial cost to their clients.According to Wilner (2000) most firms extensively use trade credit despite its apparent greater cost, and trade credit interest rates commonly exceed 18 percent. In addition to that he states that in 1993 American firms extended their credit towards customers by 1.5 trillion dollars. Similarly Deloof (2003) found out through statistics from the National Bank of Belgium that in 1997 accounts payable were 13% of their total assets while accounts receivables and inventory accounted for 17% and 10% respectively. Summers and Wilson (2000) report that in the UK corporate sector more than 80% of daily business transactions are on credit terms.There seems to be a strong relation between the cash conversion cycle of a firm and its profitability. The three different components of cash conversion cycle (accounts payables, accounts receivables and inventory) can be managed in different ways in order to maximize profitability or to enhance the growth of a company. Sometimes trade credit is a vehicle to attract new customers. Many firms are prepared to change their standard credit terms in order to win new customers and to gain large orders. In addition to that credit can stimulate sales because it allows customers to assess product quality before paying. Therefore it is up to the individual company whether a ‘marketing’ approach should be followed when managing the working capital through credit extension. However the financial department of such a company will face cash flow and liquidity problems since capital will be invested in customers and inventory respectively. In order to have maximum value, equilibrium should be maintained in receivables-payables and inventory. According to Pike & Cheng (2001) credit management seeks to create, safeguard and realize a portfolio of high quality accounts receivable. Given the significant investment in accounts receivable by most large firms, credit management policy choices and practices could have importantimplications for corporate value. Successful management of resources will lead to corporate profitability, but how can we measure management success since a period of ‘credit granting’ might lead to increased sales and market share whilst accompanied by decreased profitability or the opposite? Since working capital management is best described by the cash conversion cycle we will try to establish a link between profitability and management of the cash conversion cycle. This simple equation encompasses all three very important aspects of working capital management. It is an indication of how long a firm can carry on if it was to stop its operation or it indicates the time gap between purchase of goods and collection of sales. The optimum level of inventories will have a direct effect on profitability since it will release working capital resources which in turn will be invested in the business cycle, or will increase inventory levels in order to respond to higher product demand. Similarly both credit policy from suppliers and credit period granted to customers will have an impact on profitability. In order to understand the way working capital is managed cash conversion cycle and its components will be statistically analyzed. In this paper we investigate the relationship between working capital management and firms’ profitability for 131 listed companies in the Athens Stock Exchange for the period 2001-2004. The purpose of this paper is to establish a relationship that is statistical significant between profitability, the cash conversion cycle and its components for listed firms in the ASE (Athens Stock Exchange). The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we present the variables used as well as the chosen sample of firms. Results of the descriptive statistics accompanied with regression modeling relating profitability (the dependent variable) against other independent variables including components of the cash conversion cycle, in order to test statistical significance. Finally the last section discusses the findings of this paper and comes up with conclusions related with working capital management policies and profitability.Data Collection and Variables(i) Data CollectionThe data collected were from listed firms in the Athens Stock Exchange Market. The reason we chose this market is primarily due to the reliability of the financialstatements. Companies listed in the stock market have an incentive to present profits if those exist in order to make their shares more attractive. Contrary to listed firms, non listed firms in Greece have less of an incentive to present true operational results and usually their financial statements do not reflect real operational and financial activity. Hiding profits in order to avoid corporate tax is a common tactic for non listed firms in Greece which makes them less of a suitable sample for analysis where one can draw inference, based on financial data, for working capital practices.For the purpose of this research certain industries have been omitted due to their type of activity. We followed the classification of NACE(Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community) industries from which electricity and water, banking and financial institutions, insurance, rental and other services firms have been omitted. The original sample consisted of about 300 firms which narrowed down to 131 companies. The most recent period for which we had complete data was 2001-2004. Some of the firms were not included in the data due to lack of information for the certain period. Finally the financial statements were obtained from the ICAP SA(International Capital SA) database. Our analysis uses stacked data for the period 2001-2004 which results to 524 total observations.(ii) VariablesAs mentioned earlier in the introduction the cash conversion cycle is used as a measure in order to gauge profitability. This measure is described by the following equation:Cash Conversion Cycle = No of Days A/R(Accounts Receivables)+ No of Days Inventory – No of Days A/P(Accounts Payables) (1) In turn the components of cash conversion cycle are given below:No of Days A/R = Accounts Receivables/Sales*365 (2) No of Days Inventory = Inventory/Cost of Goods Sold*365 (3) No of Days A/P = Accounts Payables/Cost of Goods Sold*365 (4) Another variable chosen for the model specification is that of company size measured through the natural logarithm of sales. Shares and participation to other firm are considered as fixed financial assets. The variable I we use which is related tofinancial assets is the following:Fixed Financial Assets Ratio = Fixed Financial Assets/Total Assets (5) This variable is used since for many listed companies financial assets comprise a significant part of their total assets. This variable will be used later on in order to obtain an indication how the relationship and participation of one firm to others affects its profitability. Another variable used in order to perform regression analysis later on, includes financial debt measured through the following equation: Financial Debt Ratio = (Short Term Loans + Long Term Loans)/Total Assets (6) This is used in order to establish relation between the external financing of the firm and its total assets.Finally the dependent variable used is that of gross operating profit. In order to obtain this variable we subtract cost of goods sold from total sales and divide the result with total assets minus financial assets.Gross Operating Profit = (Sales – COGS)/(Total Assets – Financial Assets (7) The reason for using this variable instead of earnings before interest tax depreciation amortization (EBITDA) or profits before or after taxes is because we want to associate operating ‘success’ or ‘failure’ with an operating ratio and relate this variable with other operating variables (i.e cash conversion cycle). Moreover we want to exclude the participation of any financial activity from operational activity that might affect overall profitability, thus financial assets are subtracted from total assets. Regression AnalysisSo far we established a framework of literature and data analysis in order to investigate the impact of working capital management on profitability. In order to shed more light on the relationship of working capital management on firms’ profitability we use regression analysis. In the following proposed models we examine the endogenous variable which is profitability (measured through operational profitability as mentioned in section 2 (ii) by equation (7)) against six exogenous variables and industry dummy variables. The independent variables are fixed financial assets (measured by equation (5)), the natural logarithm of sales, financial debt ratio (measured through equation (6)) and cash conversion cycle. We included in thepreceding models industry dummy variables according to NACE coding. However, in order to have the minimum degrees of freedom necessary we used general sectors of NACE categories instead of having a more detailed 4 digit codes (the 4 digit coding gave 77 different categories). Hence the total number of NACE sectors was nine, which resulted to eight industry dummy variables (in order not to fall to what is called the dummy variable trap, which is the situation of perfect collinearity or multicollinearity).ConclusionThis paper adds to existing literature such as Shin and Soenen (1998) who found a strong negative relationship between the cash conversion cycle and corporate profitability for listed American firms for the 1975- 1994 period and Deloof (2003) who found negative relationship between profitability and number of days accounts receivable, inventories and accounts payable of Belgian firms for the period 1992-1996.So far we observed a negative relationship between profitability (measured through gross operating profit) and the cash conversion cycle which was used as a measure of working capital management efficacy. Therefore it seems that operational profitability dictates how managers or owners will act in terms of managing the working capital of the firm. We observed that lower gross operating profit is associated with an increase in the number days of accounts payables. The above could lead to the conclusion that less profitable firms wait longer to pay their bills taking advantage of credit period granted by their suppliers. The negative relationship between accounts receivables and firms’ profitability suggests that less profitable firms will pursue a decrease of their accounts receivables in an attempt to reduce their cash gap in the cash conversion cycle. Likewise the negative relationship between number of days in inventory and corporate profitability suggests that in the case of a sudden drop in sales accompanied with a mismanagement of inventory will lead to tying up excess capital at the expense of profitable operations. Therefore managers can create profits for their companies by handling correctly the cash conversion cycle and keeping each different component (accounts receivables, accounts payables,inventory) to an optimum level.So urce: Ioannis Lazaridis and Dimitrios Tryfonidis ,2006 “The relationship between working capital management and profitability of listed companies in the Athens Stock Exchange”. Journal of Financial Management and Analysis, vol.19, no.1, January-June. pp. 150-159.译文：雅典证交所营运资金管理和上市公司盈利能力之间的关系摘要在本文中我们调查营运资金管理与公司盈利能力的关系。

会计财务管理类外文文献翻译、外文翻译、中英文翻译外文翻译译文1并购的收益来源资本市场领域研究的另一个课题是收入的一般来源当收入只是别人非盈利成果时资本市场领域的研究人员还不能确认资产已被重新分配使之创造财富的盈利回升虽然金融经济学家不能合理解释为什么并购是别人的非盈利目标的成果但是研究人员推断这些合乎逻辑的假设值的目标收益不仅是重新通过并购得到的也是分配产生的结果一些研究者认为股东的利益是从债券持有人处得来的丹尼斯和麦康奈尔1986不支持这个意见另外一个观点是利润是从目标公司的资源税操作衍生而来的从学术上讲这个证据是存在的但不明确奥尔巴赫和雷苏斯1987推测在可能情况下税款这个因素占好处的20说明是足够重要的它将影响并购的决策吉尔森1988等人却发现众多有关税收优惠的定义问题交易成本和信息费复杂化的说法以及税前利润方面肯定是并购活动产生的原因或者说并购是公司实现税收优惠的最合适方法在一个几项研究中贾雷尔1988等人发现大部分的并购活动也不能归因于税收方面的原因施莱弗和萨默斯1988声称利润从并购产生因为新的董事会违反嵌入施莱弗和萨默斯1988声称利润从并购产生原因是新的董事会违反了公司与利益相关者群体的嵌入式就业条件链接并购目标公司管理不佳的表现研究是由施莱佛和维什尼1988审查的他们的研究表明公司还没有建立完善的管理机制来制止执行者开展的活动这个活动是不会为股东创造价值的此外莫克1988等分析这种敌意收购时声称收购发生的过快或者下属企业和管理当局不能尽快地减少相关程序或其他相匹配模型结果验证了这一事实有代理成本新股东们认为这一成本将能够被减少收购公司的负面影响提出为什么并购活动能够开始进行的问题鲁巴特肯1983提供了对这种有明显难度问题的一个可能解释他认为与并购有关的行政上的困难会消除潜在的利润他还断言在使用该方法可能不足以发现利润这与詹森1986并购投标人利润公司量化复杂性的观点一致其结论解释了在投标人利润匮乏的情况下并购活动仍然活跃的原因鲁巴特肯1983认为只有特定类型的并购战略才可能对购买公司的股东有好处除了这些论点罗尔1986在同意有效率的市场假说的同时声称在经验性地评估工作的目标和招标公司的集体价值后并购是不能令人信服他们没有办法估计投标人的假设因此他制定了傲慢自大假说的规定即并购的总利润是确定的罗尔1986换句话说管理层继续对目标公司超值估价这些结果显示金融界的研究人员是如何结合自由现金流假设代理理论以及效率市场的事件研究方法来解释并购活动的合理化的然而金融研究人员驳斥了金融经济学家中央假说以及一个市场公司控制权假设是约束经理的一个重要手段这一事件的研究是创造价值的量化的有效方法而股票市场则能够恰当地估价公司学者们使用现有的数据事件研究方法之外的其他方法提出有关并购的利润的特定减免索罗弗斯克莱福特和谢勒1987年二例如他们声称长期的结果通常显示相比国内市场标准并购目标执行一般高于行业平均水平的8％左右此外它们的财政收入表现既不增加也不减少与并购后相当这些研究人员不相信股市场总是有效-一个基本假设-提出对并购相比于金融学者提供的不同表现的解释谢勒1988推测由于股市并不总是能够正确估计股票价值一些企业将在任何特定时间被高估了这使他们能够购买其他公司但有些公司将被低估这是他们感兴趣的目标被高估的公司会研究可能的的目标公司了解他们是否有被低估导致其股价上升这个发现被低估的公司将被购买他们的新股票价格只是表达了一种市场调整企业在审查后没有低估的将不会被购买在被并购的目标中它们的股票价格可能回归到以前的水平作者托马斯施特劳布国籍德国出处并购频繁失败的原因原文1The Origins of earnings through MAsAnother of the capital market schools field of study is the origins of earnings in general When earnings are just the outcome of somebody elses disprofit the capital market schools researchers cannot confirm that assets have been redistributed so as to create wealth by picking up profitability However although financial economists cannot reasonably explain the gains in MA targets as somebody elses disprofitsresearchers deduce that it is logical to suppose that value is not just re-allocated through MAs but is producedSome researchers believe that shareholder profits come from bondholders lossesDennis and McConnel 1986 do not uphold this opinion An additional perspective is that profits are derived from tax manipulations of the target firms resources In the literature the evidence for this is however ambiguous Auerbach and Reishus 1987surmised that in possibly 20 of cases tax benefits are sufficiently important to affect the MA decision Gilson et al 1988 nevertheless found that a multitude of problems concerning definitions of tax benefits transaction costs and information costs complicate the claim that tax profits are definitely the reason for MA activitiesor that MAs are the most suitable method for companies to realize tax benefits In an evaluation of several studies Jarrell et al 1988 found that much of the MA activity could not be attributed to tax reasonsShleifer and Summers 1988 claim that profits are derived from MAs because a new board breaches the embedded employment conditions between the company and the stakeholder groups Studies that link MAs to poor target company management performance were examined by Shleifer and Vishny 1988c Their study shows that firms have not succeeded in establishing controls to prevent managers from carrying out activities that do not increase the stockholder valueMoreover Morck et als 1988 analysis of hostile takeovers claims that such takeovers take place in swiftly changing or declining businesses and in firms wherethe management is not able to minimize procedures fast enough or model other adaptations The results verify the fact that there are agency costs that the new hareholders think they will be able to decreaseThe negative consequences of MAs for the buying companies raise the question why MA activities are undertaken at all A number of potentialexplanations for this apparent puzzle are offered by Lubatkin 1983 who suggests that the administrative difficulties associated with MAs could erase potential profits His further assertion that the methods in use have possibly not been sufficient to uncover profits is consistent with Jensens 1986 argument of the complexity of quantifying profits for MA bidder companies As a concluding explanation for MAs permanence despite the lack of profits for the bidders Lubatkin 1983 suggests that just specific types of MA strategies might profit the buying companys shareholders Besides these arguments Roll 1986 while agreeing with the efficient market hypothesis claims that the empiric work that evaluates the target and bidding companies collective value after an MA is unconvincing no way related to the bidders supposition that their estimations are He consequently formulated the hubris hypothesis which states that MAs aggregate profits are in correct Roll1986 In other words managements continue to over valuate target firmsThese results demonstrate how the financial schools researchers combine the ypotheses of free cash flow a market for corporate control the agency theory and efficient markets with the event studies method to improve the rationalization in respect of MA activity However a number of financial researchers refute the financial economists central hypothesis as well as the hypothesis that a market for corporate control is a key instrument for disciplining managers that event studies are a valid method ofquantifying value creation and that the share market is capable of precisely valuing firmsScholars who use other methods than event studies of existing data make specific deductions with regard to MA profits Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987 b for example claim that long-term-based results usually reveal that MA targets perform above the industry average - at around 8 - compared to their home market standards Furthermore their financial income performances neither increased nor declined considerably after the MAThose researchers who do not believe that the share market is always efficient –a basic assumption - suggest different explanations for MA performance than the ones offered by financial scholars Scherer 1988 hypothesizes that because the stock market does not always properly value stock some firms will be overvalued at any given point in time enabling them to purchase other firms but some firms will be undervalued which renders them interesting targets Companies that are overvalued will examine possible target companies to find out if they have been underestimatedcausing their share price to increaseFirms that are discovered to be underestimated are purchased and their new share price simply expresses a market correction Firms that are not purchased after being examined were not underestimated and their share prices return to the level prior to their being possible MA targets AuthorProf Dr oec Thomas StraubNationalityGermanyOriginate from Reasons for Frequent failure in Mergers and Acquisitions译文2评价成功的客观标准客观的措施是建立在公开信息之上的容易获得信息是因为利用了外部信息的优点由于外部信息不受到答辩人的偏见基于外部数据就可以比较不同的研究成果同时外部信息也苦于缺乏差异如外部经济波动的影响工业企业的具体因素以及其他收购等具体因素或各种因素对结果影响很大从而限制了外部信息的解释力运用客观成功措施研究人员研究了使并购成功的两个方面战略上的成功和财务上的成功并购财务上的成功已经在不同的研究中被标准化最后创造价值是公司的核心目标因此在财务上价值创造的成功是并购成功的一个标准有两种在财务上成功的数据源已被用于确定兼并和收购成功股票的市场数据和公司的会计数据股市会响应公司合并和收购的公告这意味着股东估计将收购公司的创造价值或评估已收购公司的销毁价值如果他们希望收购能够增加收购公司的的价值创造股票价格将上涨如果他们希望收购能够摧毁收购公司的价值股票价格将下跌当然这只有与股票价格的发展无关的行业或特定的股票市场的发展可以考虑这些不相关的影响即所谓不正常的股市反应不同时期使用了前后公告例如阿格拉瓦尔1992等调查股市的影响公布在前其结果直到5年后才宣布其他的如哈布利安芬克尔斯坦1999测量5天的异常收益率在合并后的前5天然而这种假设是建立在能够正常地反应公布及预计并购的所有可能产生的影响之上的虽然长期收购具有捕捉长期发展的优势但是它们会受到合并后发生事件的影响阿格拉瓦尔1992等在765项收购研究中发现与去年同期研究相比收购的累积异常收益率在510％之间芬克尔斯坦1999则发现没有任何影响同样鲁巴特肯1987在439项有关公司收购的研究中发现没有重大的股票在不同的市场有时间效应18-64个月后的兼并与收购鲁巴特肯斯里尼瓦桑曼切尔特1997年也发现并购后的第2天第16天以及第56天无异常收益布赫纳1990调查的90个公司的股票的市场表现也认为是无相关联系的其结果表明收购没有使抽样公司的市场价值增加1990a 自己的译本在另一项研究中布赫纳1990发现封闭后12个月的平均异常收益率恢复到-10布赫纳 1990c300在对波士顿咨询集团2004的研究中作者发现在收购平均创造价值表现上大多数并购是失败的因为高风险活动所以这是异常现象但是如果一家公司从事很多兼并和收购就平均而言实际上是可能创造价值的根据有关财务执行情况的调查结果鲁巴特肯奥尼尔1987发现并购交易显着增加公司的非系统风险而减少系统性风险该系统风险下降是因为兼并和收购遵循一种产品或市场推广的目标这降低了系统行业在大多数情况下的市场风险但是非系统性风险取决于公司大力增加的特性一些公司在并购后表现得非常好但另外一些现象是并购后变得松散然后这大大增加了非系统性风险对股市信息使用相应的金融理论假设市场能够正确地估计公司的价值与战略根据这个假设收购将正确地评估股市从而代表其有潜在的价值衡量并购成功的与否在建立在合并前的会计数据和合并后的会计数据的基础之上的常用的尺度是资产回报股本息税前利润销售或收购公司的利润回报库斯维特1985在3500项大规模收购的研究中发现一年后公司获得了533的平均增长居留权库斯维特1985还认为一年后收购企业将增加340的市场回报同样布赫纳1990探讨了110项德国并购事件发现在并购交易3年后才能得到资本回报以及股本回报他发现平均而言收购公司会恶化财务性能作者弗洛里弗伦施国籍美国出处从社会角度看并购原文2Objective success measuresObjective measures are based on publicly available information The advantage of using external information is that the information is readily available As external information does not suffer from respondents biases it is possible to compare results from different studies based on external data At the same external information suffers from a lack of differentiation External effects such as economic fluctuations industry specific factors as well as firm specific factors such as other acquisitions or divestures strongly affect the result and thus limit the explanatory power of external informationUsing objective success measures researchers have studied the success of mergers and acquisitions in two different dimensions strategic success and financial success Financial success of mergers and acquisitions has been measured in many different studiesUltimately value creation is the core objective of firms Hence value creation respectively financial success is a usefulsuccess measure for mergers and acquisitions There are two different sources of data for financial success that have been used to identify success of mergers and acquisitions Stock market data and accounting data of firmsStock markets react to the announcement of mergers and acquisitions That means that stockholders evaluate the expected value creation or value destruction of acquisitions for acquiring firms and acquired firms If they expect that an acquisition creates value for the acquiring firm stock prices go up If they expect that an acquisition destroys value for the acquiring firm stock prices go down Of course only stock price developments that are unrelated to industry specific developments or stock market developments can be consideredThese unrelated effects are called abnormal stock market reactions Different time periods have been used before and after the announcement For example Agrawal et al 1992 investigate the stock market effect before the announcement until five years after the announcement Others such as Haleblian Finkelstein 1999 measure abnormal returns from 5 days prior to the merger until 5 days after the merger This however assumes that stock markets react correctly to an announcement and anticipate all possible effects of an MA While long periods have the advantage of capturing long-term developments of an acquisition they suffer from events happening after the mergerWhile Agrawal et al 1992 find in a study on 765 acquisitions that cumulative abnormal returns ofacquisitions are -10 over a 5-year period Haleblian Finkelstein 1999 find no effect Similarly Lubatkin 1987 finds in a study on 439 acquiring firms that there is no significant stock market effect at different points in time 18 – 64 months after the MAtransactionLubatkin Srinivasan Merchant 1997 also find overperiods of 2 16 56 days after an MA-announcement no abnormal returnsBühner 1990a investigates the stock market performance of 90 firms and finds that ummarized the results indicate that acquisitions do not yield increase of market value of the firms in the sample 1990a 45 own translation In another study Bühner 1990c finds an average abnormal rate of return of -10 twelve months after the closing Bühner 1990c300 In a study of The Boston Consulting Group 2004 the authors find that while the majority of mergers fail acquirers on the average create value This is curious insofar as the risk is seemingly high But if a firm engages in many mergers and acquisitions on the average it might actually create moneyConsistent with the findings about financial performance Lubatkin ONeill 1987 find that MA-transactions significantly increase the unsystematic risk of firms while the systematic risks decrease The systematic risk decreases because mergers and acquisitions that follow a product or market extension objective reduce the systematic industry respectively market risk in most cases However the unsystematic risk which depends on firm characteristics strongly increases becausesome firms perform very well after mergers and acquisitions and somesignificantly loose after mergers and acquisitions This howeverincreasesthe unsystematic risk stronglyThe use of stock market informationcorresponds to financial theories that assume that markets correctlyprice the value of a firm and its strategy According to this assumptionacquisitions will be evaluated correctly by stock marketsthereby representing the value potentialSuccess measures based on accounting data use premerger and postmerger accounting dataCommon measures are return on assets return onequity EBIT sales or profit of an acquiring firm Kusewitt 1985 findsin a large scale study on 3500 acquisitions that one year after anacquisition the average ROA of acquiring firms increased by 533 Kusewitt1985 also finds that the market return of acquiring firm increases by340 one year after the acquisition Similarly Bühner 1990a investigatesin a study on 110 German mergers and acquisitions the return on capitalas well as the return on equity 3 years after an MA transactionHe findsthat on the average acquiring companies have deteriorating financialperformanceAuthor Florian FrenschNationalityAmericaOriginate from The social Side of Mergers and Acquisitions。

文献出处: Comell B., Financial risk control of Mergers and Acquisitions [J]. International Review of Business Research Papers, 2014, 7(2): 57-69.原文Financial risk control of Mergers and AcquisitionsComellAbstractM&A plays a significant part in capital operation activities. M&A is not only important way for capital expansion, but also effective method for resource allocation optimization. In the world around, many firms gained high growth and great achievement through M&A transactions. The cases include: the merger between German company Daimler-Benz and U.S. company Chrysler, Wal-Mart’s acquisition for British company ADSA, Exxon’s merger with Mobil and so on.Keywords: Enterprise mergers and acquisitions; Risk identification; Risk control1 Risk in enterprise mergers and acquisitionsMay encounter in the process of merger and acquisition risk: financial risk, asset risk, labor risk, market risk, cultural risk, macro policy risk and risk of laws and regulations, etc.1. 1 Financial riskRefers to the authenticity of corporate financial statements by M&A and M&A enterprises in financing and operating performance after the possible risks. Financial statements is to evaluate and determine the trading price in acquisition of important basis, its authenticity is very important to the whole deal. False statements beautify the financial and operating conditions of the target enterprise, and even the failing companies packing perfectly. Whether the financial statements of the listed companies or unlisted companies generally exists a certain degree of moisture, financial reporting risk reality In addition, the enterprise because of mergers and acquisitions may face risks, such as shortage of funds, a decline in margins has adverse effects on the development of enterprises.1. 2 Asset riskRefers to the assets of the enterprise M&A below its actual value or the assets after the merger failed to play a role of original and the formation of the risk. Enterprise merger and a variety of strategies, some of them are in order to obtain resources. In fact, enterprise asset accounts consistent with actual situation whether how much has the can be converted into cash, inventory, assets assessment is accurate and reliable, the ownership of the intangible assets is controversial, the assets disposal before delivery will be significantly less than the assets of the buyer to get the value of the contract. Because of the uncertainty of the merger and acquisition of asset quality at the same time, also may affect its role in buying businesses.1. 3 Labor riskRefers to the human resources of the enterprise merger and acquisition conditions affect purchase enterprise. Surplus staff and workers of the target enterprise burden is overweight, on-the-job worker technical proficiency, ability to accept new technology and the key positions of the worker will leave after the merger, etc., are the important factors influencing the expected cost of production.1. 4 Market riskRefers to the enterprise merger is completed, the change of the market risk to the enterprise. One of the purposes of mergers and acquisitions may be to take advantage of the original supply and marketing channels of the target enterprise save new investment enterprise develop the market. Under the condition of market economy, the enterprise reliance on market is more and more big, the original target enterprise the possibility of the scope of supply and marketing channels and to retain, will affect the expected profit of the target enterprise. From another point of view, the lack of a harmonious customer relationship, at least to a certain extent, increase the target enterprise mergers and acquisitions after the start-up capital.1. 5 Culture riskRefers to whether the two enterprise culture fusion to the risks of mergers and acquisitions, two broad and deep resources, structure integration between enterprises, inevitably touches the concept of corporate culture collision, due to incompleteinformation or different regions, and may not be able to organizational culture of the target enterprise become the consensus of the right. If the culture between two enterprises cannot unite, members will make the enterprise loss of cultural uncertainty, which generates the fuzziness and reduce dependence on enterprise, ultimately affect the realization of the expected values of M&A enterprises.2 Financial risk of M&AHowever, there are even more unsuccessful M&A transactions behind these exciting and successful ones. A study shows that 1200 Standard & Poor companies have been conducting frequent M&A transactions in recent years, but almost 70%cases ended up as failures.There are various factors that lead to the failures of M&A transactions, such as strategy, culture and finance, among which the financial factor is the key one. The success or failure of the M&A transactions largely depends upon the effectiveness of financial control activities during the process. Among the books talking about M&A, however, most focus on successful experience but few on lessons drawn from unsuccessful ones; most concentrate on financial evaluation methods but few on financial risk control. Therefore, the innovations of this thesis lie in: the author does not just talk about financial control in general terms, but rather specify the unique financial risks during each step of M&A transaction; the author digs into the factors inducing each type of risks, and then proposes feasible measures for risk prevention and control, based on the financial accounting practices, and the combination of international experience and national conditions.The thesis develops into 3 chapters. Chapter 1 defines “M&A” and several related words, and then looks back on the five M&A waves in western history. Chapter 2 talks about 3 types of financial risks during M&A process and digs into factors inducing each type of risks. Chapter 3 proposes feasible measures for risk prevention and control. At the beginning of chapter 1, the author defines M&A as follows: an advanced form of property right transaction, such as one company (firm) acquires one or more companies (firms), or two or more companies (firms) merge as one company (firm). The aim of M&A transaction is to control the property andbusiness of the other company, by purchasing all or part of its property (asset). In the following paragraph, the thesis compares and contrasts several related words with “M&A”, which are merger, acquisition, consolidation and takeover.In the chapter 1, the author also introduces the five M&A waves in western history. Such waves dramatically changed the outlook of world economy, by making many small and middle-sized companies to become multinational corporations. Therefore, a close look at this period of time would have constructive influence on our view with the emergence and development of M&A transactions. After a comprehensive survey of M&A history, we find that, with the capitalism development, M&A transactions presented diverse features and applied quite different means of financing and payment, ranging from cash, stock to leveraged buyout. Chapter 2 primarily discusses the different types of financial risks during M&A, as well as factors inducing such risks.According to the definition given by the thesis, financial risks during M&A are the possibilities of financial distress or financial loss as a result of decision-making activities, including pricing, financing and payment.Based on the M&A transaction process, financial risks can be grouped into 3 categories: decision-making risks before M&A (Strategic risk), implementation risks during M&A (Evaluation risk, financing risk and payment risk) and integration risks after M&A. Main tasks and characteristics in each step of M&A transaction are different, as well as the risk-driven factors, which interrelate and act upon each other. Considering limited space, the author mainly discusses target evaluation risk, financing and payment risk, and integration risk. In chapter 2, the thesis quotes several unsuccessful M&A cases to illustrate 3 different types of financial risks and risk-driven factors. Target evaluation risk is defined as possible financial loss incurred by acquirer as a result of target evaluation deviation. Target evaluation risk may be caused by: the acquirer’s expectation deviation for the future value and time of target’s revenue, pitfalls of financial statements, distortion of target’s stock price, the deviation of evaluation methods, as well as backward intermediaries. Financing and payment risks mainly reflect in: liquidity risk, credit risk caused by deterioratedcapital structure, financial gearing-induced solvency risk, dilution of EPS and control rights, etc.Integration risks most often present as: financial institution risk, capital management risk and financial entity risk. Chapter 3 concludes characters of financial risks that mentioned above, and then proposes detailed measures for preventing and controlling financial risks. Financial risks during M&A are comprehensive, interrelated, preventable, and dynamic. Therefore, the company should have a whole picture of these risks, and take proactive measures to control them.As for target evaluation risk control, the thesis suggests that (1) Improve information quality, more specifically, conduct financial due diligence so as to have comprehensive knowledge about the target; properly use financial statements; pay close attention to off-balance sheet resource. (2) Choose appropriate evaluation methods according to different situations, by combining other methods to improve the evaluation accuracy. Meanwhile, the author points out that, in practice the evaluation method is only a reference for price negotiation. The target price is determined by the bargaining power of both sides, and influenced by a wealth of factors such as expectation, strategic plan, and exchange rate.In view of financing and payment risk control, the author conducts thorough analysis for pros and cons of different means of financing and payment. Then the author proposes feasible measures such as issuing convertible bonds and commercial paper, considering specific conditions. To control integration risk, the author suggests start with the integration of financial strategy, the integration of financial institution, the integration of accounting system, the integration of asset and liability, and the integration of performance evaluation system. Specific measures include: the acquirer appoints person to be responsible for target’s finance; the acquirer conducts stringent property control over target’s operation; the acquirer conducts comprehensive budgeting, dynamic prevision and internal auditing.3 ConclusionsAt the end of the thesis, the author points out that many aspects still worth further investigation. For instance, this thesis mainly concentrates on qualitativeanalysis, so it would be better if quantitative analysis were introduced. Besides, the thesis can be more complete by introducing financial risk forecast model.译文企业并购中的财务风险控制作者：康奈尔摘要企业并购是资本营运活动的重要组成部分，是企业资本扩张的重要手段，也是实现资源优化配置的有效方式。

现代企业财务控制外文文献翻译(含：英文原文及中文译文)文献出处：Ryan Davidson, Jenny Stewart, Pamela Kent. Discussion on the Modern Enterprise Financial Control [J]Business Inform, 2014(2):83-88.英文原文Discussion on the Modern Enterprise Financial ControlRyan Davidson, Jenny Stewart, Pamela KentThis paper discusses the modern enterprise is becoming China's economic development in the process of an important new force. However, with the modern enterprise investment on the scale of the expansion and extension of the growing investment levels, the modern enterprise financial control is becoming increasingly urgent. This is common in state-owned enterprise groups and private enterprise groups, a common predicament. At present, the modern enterprise is becoming China's enterprises to compete in the international market, the leading force. In a market economy under the conditions of modern business success or failure depends largely on the Group's financial management and financial control is a modern enterprise financial management of the link. Many of the modern enterprise by strengthening the financial control so that the Group significant increase efficiency, and even some loss-making by strengthening the financial control of the modernenterprise to enable companies to achieve profitability. In this paper, expounding China's modern enterprises the main problems of financial control, based on the choice of financial control method was summarized and analyzed the content of the modern enterprise financial controls, the final resolution of the financial control mode selected key factors for the modern enterprise the improvement of financial control to provide a degree of meaningful views.1 IntroductionWith China's accession to WTO, China's enterprise groups must be on the world stage to compete with TNCs from developed countries. At present the development of enterprise groups in China is not satisfactory, although there are national policies and institutional reasons, but more important is its financial management in particular, caused by inadequate financial controls. For a long time, China's enterprise group cohesion is not strong, their respective subsidiaries within the Group for the array, can not play the whole advantage; redundant construction and haphazard introduction of frequent, small investments, decentralized prominent problem: financial management is chaotic, resulting in frequent loss of control, a waste of money the phenomenon of serious; ineffective financial control, financial management loopholes. In recent years, enterprise group's financial control has been our country's financial circles. In short, the problem of exploration in our country has obviouspractical significance.Clearly, China's modern enterprise financial controls are the main problem is to solve the problem of financial control method based on the choice of financial control method is the key financial control of the modern enterprise content is content, while the financial control method of choice is the ultimate ownership of the main factors that point, This train of thought here on the modern enterprise's financial control method were analyzed.2. An overview of the modern enterprise financial controlInternal control over financial control is an important part, is a subsidiary of parent company control of an important part of its financial management system is the core of. The concept of modern enterprise financial controls in accordance with the traditional definition, financial control refers to the "Financial Officers (sector) through the financial regulations, financial systems, financial scale, financial planning goals of capital movement (or the daily financial activities, and cash flow) for guidance, organization, supervision and discipline, to ensure that the financial plan (goals) to achieve the management activities. Financial control is an important part of financial management or basic functions, and financial projections, financial decision-making, financial analysis and evaluation together with a financial management system or all the functions.The modern enterprise's financial control is in the investor's ownership and corporate property rights based on the generated surrounding the Group's overall objective, using a variety of financial means, the members of the enterprise's economic activities, regulation, guidance, control and supervision, so that it Management Group's development activities are consistent with the overall goal of maintaining the group as a whole. Financial control is a power to control one side of the side control, inevitably based on one or several powers. Financial control is essentially related to the interests of enterprises in the organization, the conduct of control, namely, by controlling the financial activities of the assets, personnel actions, to coordinate the objectives of the parties to ensure that business goals. The modern enterprise financial control includes two aspects: the owner funded financial control and corporate manager’s financial control. From the donor’s point of view, the essence of the modern enterprise is characterized by investor and corporate property rights of ownership and separation. Investors will invest its capital to the enterprise after their capital combined with debt capital, constitute the enterprise's capital, the formation of corporate business assets is funded by corporate property, then lost direct control over the funders in order to achieve its Capital maintenance and appreciation of the goal, only through control of its capital manipulation of corporate assets in order to achieve the maximum capital value donors.The control of capital controls is an important property is the prerequisite and foundation for financial control. From the perspective of internal management of enterprises and its financial control target is the legal property of its operations.3 China's modern enterprises the main problems of financial controlAt present, the modern enterprise is becoming China's enterprises to compete in the international market, the leading force. In a market economy under the conditions of modern business success or failure depends largely on the Group's financial management and financial control is a modern enterprise financial management of the link. China's modern enterprise financial controls are still in the stage to be further improved, to varying degrees, there are some urgent need to address the problem:Financial control set decentralized model of polarization, low efficiencyIn the financial control of the set of decentralized model, China's modern enterprise polarization. The current group of financial control either over-centralization of power, the members of the business has no legal status as a subsidiary factory or workshop, the group is seen as a big business management, leadership financial rights absolute; or excessive decentralization, a large number of decentralized financial control to a subsidiary, any of its free development.In addition, the modern enterprise financial control system suited the needs of a market economy, financial control and flexibility of principle there is no organic unity. If the subordinate enterprises, with few financial decision-making power, then the temporary financial problems occur at every level always reported to the Group's headquarters, and then from the headquarters down the implementation of the decision-making at every level, so it is easy to miss market opportunities. On the contrary, when the subsidiary of financial decision-making power is too large, they easily lead to financial decision-making blind and mistakes, not only for the Group's staff to participate in market competition, failed to exercise any decision-making role, but will also become a competitor to the market to provide a tool for competitive information, hinder the the further development of enterprises.One of the lack of financial controlFinancial control in accordance with the owner of intention, in accordance with relevant laws and regulations, systems and standards, through certain financial activities and financial relations, and financial activities to promote all aspects of the financial requirements in accordance with a code of conduct to conduct his activities. From China's current situation, the financial control of a modern enterprise mainly focused on ex post facto control, is often the lack of critical pre-budget and to control things. Many modern enterprises, after a decision is inadvance, for further financial control tended to focus on the annual profit plan, to meet on the development of a full-year sales revenue, cost, target profit, and several other overarching objectives, without further specific decision-making technology to compile for control and management, according to the month, quarterly, annual financial budget. Therefore, the interim budget and thus difficult to compare operating performance is a matter to control the empty words. As for the ex post facto control, although based on the year-end assessment of the needs and to get some attention, they can still profit in the annual plan, based on the relevant accounting information barely supported by whom, but the effects are pretty effective. Since the ex ante control may not be effective, so subordinate enterprises throughout the implementation process of decision-making are largely outside the core business of financial control, divorced from the core business of financial control.Modern enterprises themselves do not establish a parent-subsidiary link up the financial control mechanisms, financial control their own ways, the parent company of the modern enterprise can not come to the unified arrangement of a strategic investment and financing activities, the group blindly expand the scale of investment, poor investment structure, external borrowing out of control, financial structure is extremely weak, once the economic downturn or product sales are sluggish, there barriers to capital flows, the Group into trouble when they become addicted. Aninternal financial assessment indicators are too single, not fully examine the performance of subsidiaries. A considerable number of modern enterprise's internal assessment targets only the amount of the contract amount and profit .Regardless of the financial and accounting functions, institutional settings are not standardizedAt present, China's financial and accounting sector enterprises are usually joined together, such a body set up under the traditional planned economic system, still capable to meet the management needs, but the requirements of modern enterprise system, its shortcomings exposed. Manifested in: (1) financial services targeted at business owners, it is the specific operation and manipulation of objects is the enterprise's internal affairs, while the accounting of clients within the enterprise and external stakeholders, would provide open accounting information must reflect the "true and fair" principle. Will be different levels of clients and flexibility in a merger of two tasks, will inevitably lead to interference with the financial flexibility of the fairness of accounting. (2) The financial sector is committed to the financial planning, financial management, the arduous task, but flexible in its mandate, procedures and time requirements more flexible, but assume that the accounting information collection, processing, reporting and other accounting work, and flexibility in work assignments weak, procedures and time requirements more stringent andnorms. If the enterprises, especially in modern enterprises to financial management and accounting work are mixed together, is likely to cause more "rigid" in accounting work runs more "flexible" financial management is difficult to get rid of long-standing emphasis on accounting, financial management light situation.Irregularities in the operation of a modern enterprise fundsAt present, the modern enterprise fund operation of the following problems: First, a serious fragmentation of the modern enterprise funds. Some of the modern enterprise have not yet exceeded a certain link between the contractual relationship to conduct capital, operating, and its essence is still the executive order virtual enterprise jointly form of intra-group members are still strict division of spheres of influence, difficult to achieve centralized management of funds, unification deployment of large groups is difficult to play the role of big money. Second, the stock of capital make an inventory of modern enterprise poor results. Result of the planned economy under the "re-output, light efficiency, re-extension, light content, re-enter, light output" of inertia, making the enterprise carrying amount of funds available to make an inventory of large, but the actual make an inventory of room for small, thus affecting the to the effect of the stock of capital. Third, the modern enterprise funds accumulated a lot of precipitation.Internal audit exists in name onlyAt present, enterprises in the financial monitoring of internal audit work to become a mere formality process. The first formal audit management. Hyundai organized every year in different forms of audit, has become a fixed procedure, but because the internal audit staff and the audited entity at the same level, thus in the company's financial problems can not get to the bottom, just a form of and going through the motions. This audit not only failed to exercise any oversight role, to some extent encouraged the small number of staff violations of law. Second, nothing of audit responsibilities. Internal audit is a modern enterprise group commissioned by the audit staff members of Corporate Finance to conduct inspection and supervision process, and therefore the auditors have had an important mandate and responsibilities. But in reality, become a form of audit work, audit officers, whether seriously or not, are not required to bear the responsibility, thus making the audit is inadequate supervision. Third, the audit results and falsified. Audit results should be true and can be *, but in reality the different audit bodies of the same company during the same period of the audit, results are often different, and a far cry from, these are false true performance of the audit findings.中文译文论现代企业财务控制瑞安戴维森，珍妮斯图尔特，帕米拉肯特本文论述了现代企业正在成为中国经济发展过程中的重要生力军。

文献综述会计学上市公司利用关联交易操纵利润问题研究随着中国经济市场化和国际化进程的加快，为了能够在经济市场中取得较大的竞争优势，追求资本的扩张和规模效应，对关联交易操控利润的研究很早便引起了理论界的关注和重视。

在我国，虽然上市公司关联交易的出现只有二十余年的历史，但是由于关联方利用关联交易进行转移利润、粉饰财务报表等行为的大量出现，导致上市公司及其股东的利益不断受到侵害，资本市场的健康发展受到严重损害。

关联交易作为一种普遍现象在上市公司中广泛存在，其目的是为了充分利用集团内部资源，降低交易成本，提高经营效率，实现公司资本良好营运与利润最大化。

但其毕竟与市场竞争、公开竞争的方式不同，其价格可由关联双方协商确定，尤其在我国尚不十分成熟的资本市场中，由于证券市场体制上的缺陷，上市公司治理结构上的不足以及对关联交易的监管还未形成完整体系等原因，关联交易往往演变成上市公司及其大股东操纵利润、损害中小投资者利益的非公平关联交易。

因此本文将对有关关联交易利润操纵的理论问题进行总结与评述。

1、关联交易的定义及其范围关于关联交易的概念，根据2006年2月15日新颁布的《企业会计准则第36号——关联方披露》，关联交易是指关联方之间转移资源、劳务或义务的行为，而不论是否收取价款。

上市公司的关联交易是指上市公司及其控股子公司与关联人之间发生的转移资源或义务的事项。

我国会计准则中，列举了关联交易的主要形式:①购买或销售商品②购买或销售除商品以外的其他资产③提供或接受劳务④代理⑤租赁⑥提供资金⑦担保和抵押⑧管理方面的合同⑨研究与开发项目的转移⑩关键管理人员报酬。

由此可得，关联交易是在已经存在关联关系的情况下各关联方之间发生的交易；在资源、劳务转移的同时，风险与报酬也随之转移；关联方之间转移资源、劳务的价格是整个交易的关键。

2、国外对关联交易操控利润的研究现状国际上对关联方关系及其交易问题的研究较为深入，许多国家和组织都制定了相应的会计准则加以限制和规范。

会计内部控制中英文对照外文翻译文献会计内部控制中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)内部控制系统披露—一种可替代的管理机制根据代理理论，各种治理机制减少了投资者和管理者之间的代理问题（Jensen and Meckling，1976； Gillan，2006）。

传统上，治理机制已经被认定为内部或外部的。

内部机制包括董事会及其作用、结构和组成（Fama，1980；Fama and Jensen，1983），管理股权(Jensen and Meckling，1976)和激励措施，起监督作用的大股东(Demsetz and Lehn，1985)，内部控制系统(Bushman and Smith，2001)，规章制度和章程条款(反收购措施)和使用的债务融资（杰森，1993）。

外部控制是由公司控制权市场(Grossman and Hart,1980)、劳动力管理市场（Fama,1980）和产品市场（哈特,1983）施加的控制。

各种各样的金融丑闻，动摇了世界各地的投资者，公司治理最佳实践方式特别强调了内部控制系统在公司治理中起到的重要作用。

内部控制有助于通过提供保证可靠性的财务报告，和临时议会对可能会损害公司经营目标的事项进行评估和风险管理来保护投资者的利益。

这些功能已被的广泛普及内部控制系统架构设计的广泛认可，并指出了内部控制是用以促进效率，减少资产损失风险，帮助保证财务报告的可靠性和对法律法规的遵从（COSO,1992）。

尽管有其相关性，但投资者不能直接观察，因此也无法得到内部控制系统设计和发挥功能的信息，因为它们都是组织内的内在机制、活动和过程（Deumes and Knechel,2008）。

由于投资者考虑到成本维持监控管理其声称的（Jensen and Meckling，1976）,内部控制系统在管理激励信息沟通上的特性，以告知投资者内部控制系统的有效性,是当其他监控机制（该公司的股权结构和董事会）比较薄弱，从而为其提供便捷的监控（Leftwich et等,1981）。

企业并购财务风险控制外文文献翻译2014年译文3100字Enterprise mergers and ns involve us financial risks。

such as liquidity risk。

credit risk。

market risk。

and nal risk。

These risks can lead to a decline in the value of assets。

a decrease in profitability。

XXX。

it XXX.1.2 Risk XXXXXX and control financial risks in M&A ns。

enterprises should conduct a comprehensive analysis of the target company's financial status。

including its financial statements。

cash flow。

debt structure。

and financial management。

nally。

enterprises should establish a risk management system that includes risk assessment。

risk monitoring。

and risk control measures.2.Risk XXX2.1 Due diligenceXXX of the target company's financial。

legal。

and XXX diligence。

enterprises XXX about whether to proceed with the n.2.2 Contract designThe contract design should include clear and specific clauses related to risk n。

外文文献翻译原文及译文（节选重点翻译）银行间市场关系外文翻译中英文文献出处：Review of Economic Dynamics，Volume 35, January 2020, Pages 170-191译文字数：3800 多字英文Relationships in the interbank marketJonathan Chiu，Jens Eisenschmidt，Cyril Monnet AbstractThe market for central bank reserves is mainly over-the-counter and exhibits a core-periphery network structure. This paper develops a model of relationship lending in the unsecured interbank market. Banks choose to build relationships in order to insure against liquidity shocks and to economize on the cost to trade in the interbank market. Relationships can explain some anomalies in the level of interest rates – e.g., the fact that banks sometimes trade below the central bank's deposit rate, as we find using data from the ECB. The model also helps understand how monetary policy affects the network structure of the interbank market and its functioning.Keywords：Relationships，Interbank market，Core- periphery，Networks，Corridor systemMajor central banks implement monetary policy by targeting the overnight rate in the unsecured segment of the interbank market for reserves –the very short term rate of the yield curve. The textbook principles of monetary policy implementation are intuitive: Each bank holds a reserve account at the central bank. Over the course of a normal business day, this account is subject to shocks depending on the banks'payment outflows (negative shock) and inflows (positive shock) driven by business activities. Banks seek to manage their account balance to satisfy some reserve requirements. By changing the supply of reserves, a central bank influences the interest rate at which banks borrow or lend reserves in the interbank market, and as a consequence the marginal cost of making loans to businesses and individuals. In recent years, many major central banks have refined this system by offering two facilities: In addition to auctioning reserves, the central bank stands ready to lend reserves at a penalty rate –the lending rate –if banks end up short of reserves. Symmetrically, banks can earn an interest at the deposit rate if they end up holding reserves in excess of the requirement. As a consequence the interbank rate should stay within the bands of the corridor defined by the lending and the deposit rates. This is known as the “corridor system” for monetary policy implementation.The reality is more complex than this basic narrative. Bowman et al. (2010) and others report that in many jurisdictions with large excess reserves, banks have been trading below the deposit rate (supposedly the floor of the corridor). It is also well known that banks sometimes trade above the lending rate (supposedly the ceiling of the corridor). This is a challenge to the basic intuition that simple arbitrage would maintain the rates within the bands of the corridor. At a time when central banks are thinking of exiting quantitative easing policies, we may wonder whetherthese apparent details are symptomatic of a dysfunctional interbank market that will hamper exit, or if they are “natural” phenomena with little relevance for the conduct of monetary policy during the exit stage.Contrary to folk belief, the interbank market is very far from being the epitome of the Walrasian market. For example, every year the ECB money market survey (e.g. ECB, 2013) shows that the majority of the transactions in the European (unsecured) interbank market is made over- the-counter (OTC). Many banks maintain long term relationships with their partners. Smaller banks tend to trade with just a few other banks, if not only one, or they directly access the central bank facilities without even trading with another bank. We review the evidence below, but these facts are now well accepted.In this paper we analyze the effects of long-term trading relationships and monetary policy on interbank trading volume and rates, the network structure of the interbank market and its functioning. We show that modeling relationships matters for both individual and aggregate demand for liquidity, and can explain why banks trade below the deposit rate or above the lending rate. Our analysis also sheds light on the effect of monetary policy on the network structure of the interbank market. In particular we show that the accommodative monetary policy stance can lower the value of building and maintaining relationships, so that in steady state, no or few relationships exist. Some central bankershave been pointing out this phenomenon and it arises endogenously from our model.Within this framework, we can explain why we observe arbitrage opportunities in the data. Small banks value long-term relationships which provide liquidity insurance and save their costs of accessing the OTC market. As a result, they are willing to temporarily lower their surplus from trading a loan as long as the long-term gains from keeping a relationship outweigh the short-term loss. Specifically, if the conditions are right, we show that small banks with surplus reserves agree to lend at a rate below id. Symmetrically, small banks that need reserves may end up paying a rate above iℓ. Therefore, in equilibrium some banks trade below the floor or above the ceiling of the corridor. On the surface there seems to be unexploited arbitrage opportunities. There is none really: small banks are willing to trade at a rate outside the corridor only for small loans with their long-term partners, but not for large loans or with other counterparties. Our stylized model shows that the corridor is “soft”, i.e. equilibrium interbank rates can be below id or above iℓ, when trading frictions are present, even though small banks can access the deposit/lending facilities at no cost. Furthermore our model implies that the occurrence of this outcome depends on aggregate liquidity conditions: A soft corridor is more likely when there is a large aggregate liquidity surplus or deficit.To get a sense for the performance of the model, we use data from the Money Market Survey Report of the ECB. This survey started in July 2016 and contains the universe of money market trades for the largest 52 banks in the Euro area. The data shows that the money market has a core- periphery structure, very much like that in other jurisdictions. In addition, we find that a significant fraction of loans (38%) from small banks to large banks are conducted at a rate below the deposit facility rate. We parameterize our model by matching several moments in the data, in particular the frequency of trades below the floor. We then conduct several experiments. For example, we study the effects of changing the width and position of the interest rate corridor and the supply and distribution of reserve balances on rates and the trading activities in the core and periphery markets.A lesson for policy makers is that trades outside the corridor are consistent with a well-functioning core-periphery interbank market. Thus, central banks have no need to worry about eliminating deviations due to long-term relationships. However, one should be careful in interpreting the interbank market rate as a reference for overnight cost of liquidity, because it may also incorporate a relationship premium, which at times can significantly distort the observed overnight rate.Our work is also one of the first attempts at explaining the endogenous response of the network structure of the interbank market to achange in monetary policy. The network structure that emerges endogenously resembles the core-periphery structure we observe in the data, where most of the trading activities is due to a number of banks that appear to intermediate the trades of others. We show how the interest rate corridor and the distribution of liquidity can affect banks' incentives to build relationships and accordingly the terms and patterns of trades.LiteratureThe interbank market typically has a core-periphery network structure (or tiered structure) where some banks in the periphery only trade with one bank, the latter possibly trading with many others. Bech and Atalay (2010) point out that, in the US interbank market, “[t]here are two methods for buying and selling federal funds. Depository institutions can either trade directly with each other or use the services of a broker. … In the direct trading segment, transactions commonly consist of sales by small-to-medium sized banks to larger banks and often take place on a recurring basis. The rate is set in reference to the prevailing rate in the brokered market. In the brokered segment, participation is mostly confined to larger banks acting on their own or a customers behalf. Stigum and Crescenzi (2007, Ch. 12) also reports anecdotal evidence of the tiered structure of the fed funds market. In particular, they report that “[i]n the fed funds market now, regional banks buy up funds fromeven tiny banks, use what they need, and resell the remainder in round lots in the New York market. Thus, the fed funds market resembles a river with tributaries: money is collected in many places and then flows through various channels into the New York market. In essence, the nation's smaller banks are the suppliers of fed funds, and the larger bankers are the buyers.”Also“[t]o cultivate correspondents that will sell funds to them, large banks stand ready to buy whatever sums these banks offer, whether they need all these funds or not. If they get more funds than they need, they sell off the surplus in the brokers market. Also, they will sell to their correspondents if the correspondents need funds, but that occurs infrequently. As a funding officer of a large bank noted, ‘We do feel the need to sell to our correspondents, but we would not have cultivated them unless we felt that they would be selling to us 99% of the time. On the occasional Wednesday when they need $ 100,000 or $ 10 million, OK. Then we w ould fill their need before we would fill our own.’”Elsewhere, using Bundesbank data on bilateral interbank exposures among 1800 banks, Craig and Von Peter (2014) and Brauning and Fecht (2012) find strong evidence of tiering in the German banking system. Using UK data Wetherilt et al. (2010) also report the existence of a core of highly connected banks alongside a periphery. Of course, this hasimportant consequences on rates. As Stigum and Crescenzi (2007) note, Our paper is related to the literature on the interbank market and monetary policy implementation, to the growing literature on financial networks, and to the literature on OTC markets. The first literature on the interbank market includes, Poole (1968), Hamilton (1996), Berentsen and Monnet (2008), Berentsen et al. (2011), Bech and Klee (2011), Afonso and Lagos (2012), and Afonso et al. (2012), among others. See also Bech and Keister (2012) for an interesting application of the Poole (1968) model to reserve management with a liquidity coverage ratio requirement. While Afonso et al. (2012) show some evidence of long term relationship in the interbank market, none of the papers above accounts for it. Rather they all treat banks as anonymous agents conducting random, “spot” trades. So our paper is the first to study the effect of long term relationship on rates. Based on private information, Ennis and Weinberg (2013) explain why some banks borrow at a rate above the central bank's lending rate. Armenter and Lester (2017) explain why banks trade below the deposit rate when some do not qualify for receiving the interest on excess reserves in the US federal funds market. The early literature on financial networks is mostly motivated by understanding financial fragility and has been covered in Allen and Babus (2009), see also Jackson (2010). It includes Allen and Gale (2000) who study whether some banks networks are more prone tocontagion than others. Also, Leitner (2005) studies the optimality of linkages, motivated by the desirability of mutual insurance, when banks can fail; while Gofman (2011) and Babus (2013) analyze the emergence and efficiency of intermediaries in OTC markets. In a recent calibration exercise, Gofman (2014) finds that it is suboptimal to limit banks' interdependencies in the interbank market. Elliott et al. (2014) apply network theory to financial contagion through net worth shocks. Finally, the literature on OTC market includes Duffie et al. (2005), and Lagos and Rocheteau (2009), among many others. Within this literature, Chang and Zhang (2015) study network formation in asset markets based on heterogeneous liquidity preferences.“A few big banks, however, still see a potential arbitrage, ‘trading profits,’ in selling off funds purchased from smaller banks and attempt to profit from it to reduce their effective cost of funds. Also a few tend to bid low to their correspondents. Said a trader typical of the latter attitude, ‘We have a good name in the market, so I often underbid the market by 1/16.”There is a large empirical literature on the interbank market and we already mentioned a few papers. Furfine (1999) proposes a methodology to extract fed funds transactions from payments data and Armantier and Copeland (2012) test the methodology. Afonso et al. (2012) study the fed funds market in time of stress. The two papers most related to ours areperhaps the empirical study of Brauning and Fecht (2012) and the theoretical paper of Blasques et al. (2015). Brauning and Fecht suggest a theory of relationship lending based on private information, as proposed by Rajan (1992). In good times, banks extract an informational rent, thus explaining why the relationship lending rates are usually higher than the average rate in normal times. In bad times, a lending bank knows whether the borrower is close to failure, and it is willing to offer a discount in order to keep the bank afloat. This argument fails to recognize that in bad times, some borrowers may not be close to failure and the rent that can be extracted from a relationship lender can be even higher then. Moreover, the size of discount involved in these loans is usually not an amount significant enough to matter for the survival of a borrowing bank.7 Although we do not want to minimize the role of private information, we argue that the simple threat of terminating the relationship can also yield to interbank rate discounts. Blasques, Brauning, and van Lelyveld study a dynamic network model of the unsecured interbank market based on peer monitoring. However, they do not study the impact of the supply of reserves on the structure of the network, or explain why interest rates can fall outside of the corridor.译文银行间市场关系乔纳森·邱，詹斯·艾森施密特，西里尔·莫妮特摘要中央银行外汇储备市场主要是场外交易，并具有核心-外围网络结构。

浅谈关联方交易信息披露标准【外文翻译】外文翻译原文：Discussion of related party transaction information disclosure normsAt present, the related party transactions of listed companies is widespread, many listed company has become an important part of business activities. In theory, related party transactions are neutral areas of the economy, market behavior is neither simple, nor "black box" trading. Its main role is to make full use of internal resources, lower transaction costs, improve operational efficiency and achieve the company goal of capital operation. However, because the purpose of related party transactions and forms the main body by the micro-economic control, so in practice, many listed companies, related party transactions not in the free competition under market conditions, but controlled by large shareholders. Particularly in the laws and regulations are not perfect, assessment and auditing role of intermediaries has not been fully played, accounting practitioners are not high quality case, related party transactions even easier to become part of the adjustment of profits of listed companies, the means to evade tax . This resulted in varying degrees of distortion of accounting information and misleading investors investment decisions.First, the existence of related party transactions in questionWhile certain related party transactions are conducted in public, but in many cases, related party transactions is not based on a fair and impartial, but to gloss over the party's financial position and operating results, to achieve set a good corporate image, to appease the creditors, incentives of investors. Obviously unfair related party transactions, mainly the following aspects:1. Adjustment of profits. ① The favorable transfer pricing and false sales to the inflated profits. If listed companies well below the market price of raw materials purchased from related parties or stock merchandise on, he is far above the market price of the sale to related parties, the low prices, then the operating results of listed companies to gradually"brilliant "get up. ② profits through asset replacement regulation. Assets between related parties, the performance in the form of unequal exchange: one related party to purchase quality assets at low prices to listed companies and listed companies or non-performing assets of unequal exchange; two non-performing assets of listed companies and related debt equal to the related party stripped to reduce the financial costs, enhance profitability; three listed companies the market price much higher than the sale of bad assets to related parties in order to obtain significant disposal gains.2. Shift the burden of debt and costs. Between related parties bear the debt and costs, mainly in the following several forms: ① the other party to repay the debt; ② the other party to pay the purchase price; ③ pay the other party; ④ otherwise the othe r party to incur obligations and costs.3. Transfer of funds. By listed companies are often higher or lower than the market price, selling goods to related parties or to provide services to achieve the purpose of transfer of funds. In addition, listed companies and financial exchanges between related parties and lending are quite common, although business lending to each other between the acts not permitted by the regulations, but the related party transactions and the lending of funds between the two is difficult to strictly distinguish between , and the method was not responsible for the public.4. Reduce the tax burden. Reduce the tax burden through related party transactions, the main two things: First, the profits of profit-making enterprises will be transferred to the loss-making enterprises, to minimize the tax burden on the whole group; second is the use of different enterprises in different regions and tax incentives tax provisions of the difference , the profits to low tax or even more preferential tax policies related party.Second, the limitations of the relevant laws and regulations binding1. Difficult to control the related party relationship between the behavior of non-associated. In order to truly reflect the economic substance of related party transactions, promulgated the "sale of assets between related parties, such as the Provisional Regulations on Accounting Treatment." The central element is: listed companies and transactions between related parties, if there is no conclusive evidence that thetransaction price is fair, on the obviously unfair trading price of parts, shall be allowed to be recognized as current period profit as a capital surplus shall be dealt with and This part of the difference may not be used to increase the capital, or make up the losses. As the Interim Provisions on non-related party transactions is not to regulate, resulting in a number of listed companies by various means, the association of non-related party relationship, so that the original revenue from related parties into from non-affiliated parties, to achieve the manipulation of profit purposes. In addition, listed companies will be non-association of related party relationships since then replacement of non-monetary assets, monetary transactions: the first non-correlation of related party relationship, then a non-monetary asset exchange transactions, as the two document monetary transaction processing, asset replacement soon had a business into a sale of assets and acquired assets of the two document-monetary transactions to evade the "Accounting Standards for Enterprises - Non-monetary transactions" constraints, to increase the company's profits with .2. Relationship between related parties narrow the scope of the provisions. "Enterprise Accounting Standards - related party relationships and transactions disclosed in", the not give a clear definition of related parties, gave only a standard to judge the relationship between related parties, namely: direct or indirect control, joint control or direct significant impact; two or more parties with the subject's control. But indirect common control, significant indirect effects, with the under common control between two or more parties, not as a related party accounting standards; on the form is not in fact belong to therelationship between related parties, accounting standards only in principle requirements, but no specific requirements. Define the scope of related party relationships too narrow for the listed companies manipulated profits through related party transaction has left more space.3. Pricing policies on related party transaction disclosure requirementsis too simple. "Accounting Standards for Enterprises - related party relationships and transactions disclosure" requires listed companies in the notes to financial statements, the related party transactions pricing policy as one element of their transactions to be disclosed. However, the scope of the pricing policy, to which pricing policies can be used, different pricing policies apply to which types of transactions, etc., notto make provision. Currently, listed companies to disclose the related party transaction pricing policies varied, such as the ex-factory price, price agreements, plans price, contract price, the wholesale price so the choice of pricing policies are also highly irregular, and did not explain the pricing basis, with non-associated party transactions are consistent pricing policies and the amount of Wen Ti the difference, the resulting public right, "Accounting Standards - Related Party Relationships and Transactions disclosure" disclosure requirement widely questioned.4. Disclosure of information on irregular lack of effective monitoring. Currently, listed companies to disclose the actual related party relationships and transactions there are more problems: first, incomplete disclosure of related party relationships. Not many listed companies have a major impact on their companies or controlling shareholders to be disclosed as related party. Major individual investors, key management personnel and their close family members and other related parties, disclosed little. Second is the type of related party transactions do not grasp the accurate disclosure is not sufficient. Between related parties such as the guarantee and mortgage as a contingent liability on the license agreement, and key management personnel compensation, transfer and other receivables, the basic non-disclosure. ?Disclosure of related party transactions statement is too general, the current focus on disclosure of related party transactions form a large extent the disclosure, and its economic substance, the rationale behind, the production and operation of the parties to the transaction and the extent of current performance of the substance did not make disclosure. Third, the disclosure of related party transactions ambiguous content, such as the type of transaction, the transaction elements of the disclosure, or understatement, or incomplete, so that users of financial statements can not be clear, accurate accounting information. 4 is a fraud, in order to misconduct. All this, yet the lack of relevant rules and regulations to regulate and control.Third, disclosure of related party transactions on the normative Suggestions1. Stock Exchange's regulatory role to play. Stock Exchange listed company to disclose the contents of the related party transactions should have the power to examine, from the relevant laws and regulations to standardize the system. Establish government regulation, industry self-discipline and social supervision Trinity regulatory framework.Information disclosure in the securities market regulation, in the sametime improve the ability of government regulation. Government regulation should be established, industry self-discipline and social supervision Trinity regulatory framework.2. Establish and improve laws and regulations safeguarding the interestsof small investors in the system. For related party transactions due tothe unfair result of shareholder interests are infringed upon, relevantlaws and regulations should be appropriate provisions to protect victims, punish the aggressor. Should gradually establish a complete range of civil, criminal and administrative liability, including multi-level information disclosure regulatory regime, and gradually change the current excessive reliance on administrative control to regulate the securities market information disclosure practices. From the legislative point of view, to give small investors, certain special powers, such as in particular, small and medium investors to ask the court to reject the shareholder meeting, Board of Directors the powers of resolution.3. Expand the scope of related party relationships. Whether an association party relations, In addition to the accounting standards of the provisions, indirect?common control, under common control with both sides in or to be considered as associated with. "International Accounting Standards No. 24- the reveal of the related parties", the indirect joint control or significant influence indirectly, and with under common control betweentwo or more parties, are considered related parties. According to our current situation, this could be reference.4. Increase disclosure of the contents of the related party transactions. Operating performance of listed companies have a significant impactrelated party transactions, in addition to existing disclosurerequirements should be content, but also to disclose the extent of its influence; involving the transfer of assets, mutual funds, such as guarantees and collateral information, regardless of their the amount of size, should be fully disclosed; on the relationship between relatedparties has been discharged from the original related parties, such astrade or financial dealings with its occurrence, it should be full disclosure.5. Standard pricing policies related party transactions. Resources or obligations between related parties of the transfer price is the key tounderstand the related party transactions. However, as "Enterprise Accounting Standards - related party relationships and transactions disclosed in" Related party transactions not provided pricing policy,which led to the pricing policies of listed companies to disclose highly irregular. In my opinion, can learn from the practice of international accounting standards, to make provision for this, such as the widely used internationally comparable uncontrolled price, resale price, cost plusprofit price.6. Study abroad and learn from the disclosure requirements of relatedparty transactions. If some countries require listed companies to disclose related party transactions outstanding amount of the settlement period and manner of senior staff or joint venture receivable and notes receivable, with joint ventures, directors and other related-party receivables, payables , director and CEO compensation and related party in the balance sheet of the commitments. Some countries also require listed companies on the amount of related party transactions in large amounts in the balance sheet disclosure of transactions with related parties are disclosed in the income statement. These practices, we should learn from.7. Increase disclosure of related party transactions violation penalties. For listed companies to manipulation related party transactions,accounting statements or to gloss over certain related party transactionsit hidden, refused to disclose important information or distort thebehavior of the appropriate punishment should be to develop rules and increase penalties. In addition, irregularities of listed companies,listed companies must not only punish, but also on the board of directors and related companies be held responsible in civil and criminal liability.Source: K.C. John Wei. Tunneling or propping: Evidence from connected transactions in China [J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2021(5):26-34.译文：浅谈关联方交易信息披露标准目前，上市公司的关联交易十分普遍，很多上市公司关联交易已成为企业活动的重要组成局部。

外文翻译原文Propping through related party transactionsMaterial.Source:Review.of.Accounting.Studies Author: Ming.Jian ,T.J.WongBased on a sample of Chinese listed firms from 1998 through 2002, this paper documents that listed firms prop up earnings by using abnormal related sales to their controlling owners. Such related sales propping is more prevalent among state-owned firms and in regions with weaker economic institutions. We also find that these abnormal related sales are not entirely accrual-based but can be cash-based as well, and they serve as a substitute rather than complement to accruals management for meeting earnings targets. Since these abnormal related sales can be cash-based, there is significant cash transfer via related lending from listed firms back to controlling owners after the propping. However, no cash transfer via related lending is found to be associated with accruals earnings management.Using a sample of listed firms in China, we study how institutions and firm organizational structures in a transitional economy shape the ways firms use related party transactions to manage earnings. This paper is motivated by recent research on economic institutions and accounting properties. In contrast to prior studies that attempt to draw broad inferences from data across many countries, this paper utilizes the intricate institutional structures of a particular country and the variation of the institutions across provinces within the country. In addition, by analyzing related party transactions as a form of earnings management, this paper complements prior research such as Leuz et al.，who focus primarily on the relationship between accruals and earnings management.China offers a natural setting for a study of the questions for three reasons. First, as in many other emerging markets, the capital, product, and labor markets in China are underdeveloped. As a result, firms in these markets organize into groups to form internal markets to lower transaction costs (Khanna and Palepu 2000). Further, therestructuring process before the initial public offering of listed state-owned enterprises (hereafter SOEs) creates corporate groups with frequent related party transactions between the listed subsidiaries and the parent companies, which serve as the controlling owners.Second, the bright-line rules for share issuance and delisting in China allow us to identify clear evidence of earnings management incentives. Chinese securities regulators have set two earnings targets that regulate firm listings. In particular, a firm must report at least 10% return on equity (ROE) to maintain its listing status and 10% (6% after 2001) ROE to issue new shares. These targets create incentives for controlling owners to assist listed firms in managing ROEs. We expect that more income-inflating transactions are associated with reported ROEs that are only slightly above the earnings targets.Third, the weak legal and market institutions in China implies a higher frequency of propping (Cheung et al. 2006) and increases the power of our tests. The significant variation in the degree of market development and government intervention in business activities across China’s thirty provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities (excluding Hong Kong and Macau SAR) allows us to examine the cross-sectional effects of legal and market institutions on propping.We hypothesize that controlling owners inflate Chinese listed firms’ revenues and earnings through related sales to qualify for rights issues or to avoid delisting.4 Chinese firms have ample opportunities to use related sales for earnings management because related party transactions are very common. One reason for their prevalence is that SOEs rely heavily on internal markets for materials, products, lab or, and capital. Before China’s economic reforms, these markets were non-existent as the central government directed all aspects of SOEs’ operations. Another reason is that close to 80% of the listed firms in China were previously production units that had been carved out from their parent SOEs, which serve as the controlling owners after the listing (Aharony et al. 2000). After the carve-out and IPO, the listed subsidiaries continue to engage in frequent related party transactions with their parent SOEs.Following Khanna and Yafeh (2005), we use related sales to proxy for propping because they are one of the most frequent types of related party transactions in our sample. The high frequency of these transactions allows sellers to inflate earnings simply by shifting next period’s related sales to the current period. Compared with real activities manipulation such as aggressive price discounts toincrease sales or deferral of R&D projects discussed in Roychowdhury (2006), accelerating related sales are likely to be less costly to the manipulating firm. We hypothesize that the level of related sales is abnormally high when firms try to meet earnings targets.We note that firms could use other types of related party transactions such as asset injections as an alternative way to achieve propping, but such transactions are much more infrequent and thus more easily detected. According to the CSRCs 1999 regulations for rights offerings, infrequent items such as gains and losses from investments and sales of fixed assets are no longer allowed to be included in the calculation of ROE, which suggests that government regulators regard nonrecurring items as potential earnings management tools. In the diagnostic checks reported in Sect. 4, we examine other operating items, such as related purchases, and non-operating items, such as asset or cash injections. The results do not support the notion that firms use these items for propping around the time of share issuances and delistings.Chinese listed companies have been required to disclose related party transactions since 1997. This disclosure was incomplete and irregular in the first year (Yuan 1998), but more systematic thereafter. Most companies report in a special footnote to their financial statements the identity of their related parties, the relation with these related parties (for example, percentage of shares held), and the types and amounts of related party transactions. Due to the complexity of some Chinese corporate groups, footnote disclosures of these connected dealings can be very complicated. For instance, Shanghai Dragon Corporation reported more than 140 transactions with more than 100 related parties in 2002 alone.Based on the financial statement footnotes on related party transactions, we manually collect and classify each transaction by the nature of the transaction and the related party involved. Generally, the major related parties are the shareholders (or companies in the shareholder’s group), the subsidiaries and the associated companies of the listed companies. Some other related parties include the subsidiary’s minority shareholders and the listed companies’ ex-shareholders. We classify related party transactions into 17 different types of transactions. The firm-year frequency and the average value for each transaction are as follows: sales (47.29%, RMB 303 million), purchases of goods and products (44.50%, RMB 5.5 billion), accounts receivable and payable (37.07%, RMB 1 billion), loans to and from related parties and other receivables and payables (51.32%, RMB 1.8 billion),service revenues (12.53%, RMB 78 million) and expenses (22.08%, RMB 66 million), interest income (14.57%, RMB 11 million) and expenses (3.6%, RMB 18 million), asset purchases (10.44%, RMB 136 million) and sales (5.69%, RMB 75 million), stock purchases (7.95%, RMB 6.8 billion) and sales (5.56%, RMB 51 million), rent revenues (11.90%, RMB 10 million) and expenses (28.63%, RMB 35 million), joint investments (2.73%, RMB 83 million), and loan guarantees to related parties (24.87%, RMB 1.4 billion) and from related parties (23.49%, RMB 3.6 billion). The average total assets of these firms are RMB 1.96 billion.Panel A of Table 2 reports summary statistics on related sales with various types of related parties in the three general categories of firm ownership. Specifically, 57 and 48% of the central and local government firms, respectively, have related sales, while only 37% of the nonstate firms report such dealings. The majority of these intra-group trades involve the largest shareholder, with 48% of central government firms and 40% of local government firms. Related sales with the second-largest shareholder are much less frequent, ranging from 2% for local government firms to 5% for central government firms.This study uses a sample of firms listed in China from 1998 through 2002 to provide evidence of propping through related party transactions. China offers a natural setting for studying the shifting of resources between controlling owners and listed firms due to its underdeveloped capital, product, and labor markets; bright-line rules for share issuance and delisting; and weak legal and market institutions.Our evidence shows that controlling owners of Chinese listed firms engage in propping through related sales. The increase in related sales is associated with higher operating profits, and related sales are used to damp negative industry earnings shocks when listed firms have incentives to manage earnings. By using such inter-company trades to meet securities regulators’ earnings targets, the controlling owners help the listed firms maintain their listing status or qualify for rights issues.Propping through related sales can be effected through cash-based, rather than entirely accrual-based, transactions. Related sales and discretionary accruals are found to be substitutes for earnings management. When firms generally have sales transactions with their related parties or they have positive abnormal related sales, they have a weaker tendency to use discretionary accruals to meet earnings targets. However, we find that firms have a stronger tendency to use discretionary accruals to inflate earnings when they do not have related sales or when they have notengaged in related sales management. Also, cash-based propping through related sales is associated with the transfer of cash back to the controlling owner through related lending. Since discretionary accruals management does not involve cash transfers, such earnings management activity is not linked with subsequent cash transfers.译文利用关联方交易支撑资料来源: 会计研究述评作者：Ming.Jian ,T.J.Wong 以1998至2002的中国上市公司为研究样板，本文研究了上市公司利用关联交易操纵利润问题。