资本结构外文文献翻译

资本价格与经济结构外文文献翻译中英文2020英文The relative price of capital and economic structureRoberto SamaniegoAbstractAre trends in the price of capital technological in nature? First, we find that trends in the relative price of capital vary significantly across countries. We then show that a multi-industry growth model, calibrated to match differences in economic structure around the world and productivity growth rates across industries, accounts for this variation –mainly due to variation in the composition of capital. The finding indicates that the rate of change in the relative price of capital can be interpreted as investment-specific technical change – the extent to which productivity growth is relatively more rapid in the capital-producing sector. The model also accounts for the empirical dispersion of investment rates, but not of rates of economic growth.Keywords: Investment-specific technical change, Multi-sector growth models, Structural transformation, Capital goods prices IntroductionDeclines in the relative price of capital are viewed as an important factor of economic growth in the United States (US). See for example work by Hulten (1992), Greenwood et al. (1997), Cummins and Violante(2002) and Oulton (2007). These studies typically identify the decline in the price of capital as being technological in nature, reflecting faster productivity growth in the production of new capital than in the production of consumption and services – a phenomenon known as investment-specific technical change (ISTC). However, the extent to which the relative price of capital declines in other countries is not known. In addition, it is not known whether trends in the price of capital around the world can be given a technological interpretation, such as ISTC. An alternative hypothesis is that these differences are due to the presence of barriers to capital accumulation, as proposed by Restuccia and Urrutia (2001) to account for differences in levels of the price of capital.We begin by documenting that the rate at which the relative price of capital changes over time varies significantly across countries. We find that the median growth rate of the price of capital is zero. In addition, the price of capital increasesin as many places as it decreases. This indicates that, if there is a technological explanation for this phenomenon, technical progress in capital relative to other sectors must vary widely around the world.If the explanation is indeed technological, however, one would expect such glaring differences in productivity to be evidence of draconian barriers to international technology transfer (or trade). The alternative possibility is that capital and consumption are themselveshighly disaggregated, and that there are substantial differences in the composition of capital and consumption around the world that account for the aggregate differences in the trends in the relative price of capital.We ask whether this variation can be accounted for by differences in industry composition. The reason we do this is as follows. It is well known that rates of technical progress in the US differ significantly not just between capital and non-capital, but also across types of consumption, services and capital. Thus, even if productivity growth rates are constant across countries for each industry, the rate of change in the relative price of capital may be different if the composition of capital –or the composition of consumption and services – is different. Indeed, we find that the composition of capital is skewed towards high-TFP growth capital types in countries where the price of capital declines rapidly. We therefore ask: to what extent can differences around the world in industry composition account for variation in the rate at which the relative price of capital changes?To this end, we employ a canonical multi-industry growth model. In the model, the composition of the economy evolves as a result of changes in prices of different goods or services that agents consume, as well as changes in the prices of different capital goods. In turn, these are determined by differences in productivity growth rates across industries.We calibrate the model using detailed productivity growth data from the US, as well as data on the initial composition of economies around the world in the year 1991. We use constant productivity growth rates for a given industry in all countries partly because of data limitations; however, as mentioned, significant barriers to technological transfer would have to exist to significantly deviate from this assumption. Composition is a key part of the “no barriers” hypothesis.Strikingly, we find that the model delivers a close match to the rate of change in the relative price of capital, as measured using the Penn World Tables (PWT) version 7.1. In a statistical sense, the model can account for the entirety of the magnitude of variation of the growth rate in the relative price of capital over the period from 1983 to 2011, simply based on industry TFP growth rate differences and on differences in industry composition across countries. Not only does the model match the extent of variation, but also the correlations between model-generated capital price growth rates and those in the data are highly significant. We conclude that differences in the relative price of capital around the world can be interpreted as a technological phenomenon –ISTC –and that a key factor behind these differences is industry composition.The link between composition and the decline in the relative price of capital could be for two reasons: differences in the composition of capital, or in the composition of non-capital. We refer to these possibilities asthe capital hypothesisand the consumption hypothesis, respectively. We study the importance of each hypothesis by removing productivity growth differences in the capital producing industries, and then separately removing them in the non-capital producing industries. We find that the capital hypothesis is mainly responsible for cross-country variation in ISTC: removing productivity growth in non-capital makes very little difference to the results, whereas removing productivity growth in capital-producing industries results in model-generated statistics that bear little relationship with the data.Finally, we ask to what extent a growth model driven solely by these factors can account for differences in aggregate behavior across countries over the sample period. Specifically, we look at investment rates and rates of economic growth. This is a non-trivial task, as it requires solving for investment patterns in a model where conditions for a balanced growth path do not hold in general. We find that the model generates investment rates that are strongly correlated with investment rates in the PWT 7.1 data and the PWT 9.1 data, although they underpredict the extent of empirical variation in investment rates. Thus, the model is able to capture cross-country variation in both ISTC and (to a lesser extent) investment rates, solely based on differences in industry composition. However, the model does not generate a good match to variation in rates of economic growth in the PWT 7.1 data, nor in the PWT 9.1 data. We conclude thatthere is widespread divergence in the rate of ISTC around the world, and that this accounts for variation in investment, but that economic growth rates are due to other factors. Interestingly, when we give each country an aggregate productivity trend that exactly matches its economic growth rate in the data, investment rates are no longer correlated with those in the data, suggesting that whatever factors do underlie rates of economic growth are not simply captured by a trend in productivity.The results contribute to a long-standing debate regarding whether or not changes in the efficiency of investment are an important factor of growth. This debate goes back to Solow (1962), Abramovitz (1962) and Denison (1964). Greenwood et al. (1997) find that, in the US, more than half of economic growth can be accounted for by ISTC in a general equilibrium growth accounting framework. We provide a clear answer to the question about whether differences in the relative price of capital can be attributed to barriers or to technological factors, indicating that changes in the efficiency of investment are an important factor affecting growth rates. This is not to say that there is no scope for barriers to be important for the relative price of capital; however, their impact might not be direct, but rather indirect, through their influence on economic composition. More broadly, this suggests that future work on the manner in which factors of economic growth might be affected by policy through the channel of economic composition could be fruitful.DiscussionComments on institutionsWe find that the model without barriers accounts well for the empirical magnitude and variation in log⁡gq, solely on the basis of economic composition. On the other hand, our findings do leave the door open for institutional factors or other barriers to influence log⁡gq indirectly, through any impact they might have on economic composition.What might these determinants be? There is a precedent in the literature for the idea that policy or institutional factors may affect composition. For example, Samaniego (2006) shows in an open-economy context that labor market regulationcan affect comparative advantage in industries depending on their rate of ISTC, skewing industrial composition towards industries that use capital types with low values of gi (an effect termed high-tech aversion). Also, Ilyina and Samaniego (2012) show that when technology adoption requires external financing, financial underdevelopment also skews industrial composition towards low-tech industries. This begs the question as to whether any policy or institutional indicators might be statistically related to our findings. Of course, there is a question of reverse causality: political economy considerations imply that countries that depend on technological transfer rather than de novo innovation for growth mightadopt particular kinds of institutions, see for example Boldrin and Levine (2004). Given this, we briefly explore whether there is suggestive evidence of a link between log⁡gq in the data and institutions, without taking a stand on the direction of causality.Following Samaniego (2006) we look at firing costs (drawn from the World Bank, firing costs paid by workers with at least one year's tenure, FC). We also look at other forms of regulation that have been found to be important for aggregate outcomes – namely product market regulation, measured using entry costs paid as a share of GDP, EC, as reported by the World Bank. See Moscoso-Boedo and Mukoyama (2012). Another possibility suggested by Ilyina and Samaniego (2012)is financial development, which we measure using FD, the credit-to-GDP ratio, as in King and Levine (1993). Data on FC, EC and FD are from the World Bank 1960–2010.In addition, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) and others argue that financial development is ultimately derived from the state of contracting institutions and property rights institutions. We measure the strength of contracting institutions using the negative of the index of legal system formality from Djankov et al. (2003), which we call CONT. We measure property rights enforcement using the index developed by the Property Rights Alliance (2008), PROP, averaged over the available period 2007–2013. Finally, we also look at intellectual property rights, whichhave been related to the generation and diffusion of technology, see Samaniego (2013) for a survey. We measure intellectual property rights IPR, using the patent enforcement method developed in Ginarte and Park (1997), as reported by the World Bank, averaging over the available sample. Ilyina and Samaniego (2011) find that copyright enforcement specifically is a form of IPR enforcement that bears the strongest relationship to financial development –see also Samaniego (2013). The BSA (Software Alliance) publishes the rate at which unlicensed software is used in different countries. Following the Property Rights Alliance (2008), we take this measure (times −1) as an indicator of copyright enforcement. Finally, we also look at human capital, HC, using the standard Barro and Lee (2013) schooling-based measure averaged over the period. While this is not an institutional measure as such it is an important country characteristic which could be related to the need or ability to produce or import high-tech capital goods.Comments on tradeThe model abstracts from international trade. Eaton and Kortum (2001) find that machinery is often imported by developing countries, which might suggest that the price of capital could be significantly affected by trade rather than by domestic output, and that domestic output shares might not be indicative of the composition of capital. However their data is for 1985, so it is not clear that their findings are relevant forthe relative price of capital in more recent data. Indeed, using data for 1995, Caselli and Wilson (2004) find that the composition of imported machinery is very highly correlated with the composition of domestically-produced capital, both in developed and developing countries. Nonetheless, it would certainly be interesting to explore the extent to which trends in the price of capital might be affected either by trade flows or by changes in trade costs. In particular, Mutreja et al. (2018) argue that reductions in trade costs may lower the relative price of capital by allowing countries to more easily access capital from countries that might produce them more efficiently. This suggests that one factor that might contribute to the dispersion in investment rates could be trade costs.Concluding remarksWe document extensive differences in the rate of change in the relative price of capital around the world. We then show that these differences can be accounted for on the basis of differences around the world in economic composition, without recourse to any barriers or frictions. We also find that a general equilibrium model economy accounts for a significant portion of the variation in the rate of change in the relative price of capital and for differences in investment rates around the world, although not for differences in rates of economic growth. We conclude that these differences can be given a technological interpretation,based on differences in composition among industries with different rates of technical progress. As a result, the term “investment-specific technical progress,” which the literature widely identifies with declines in the relative price of capital, is appropriate. Given the key role played by industry composition in this phenomenon it seems important to understand what are the deep determinants of industry composition. Is it due to comparative advantage or other trade-theoretic mechanisms? Is due to policy distortions, as suggested by Samaniego (2006) or Ilyina and Samaniego (2012)? Or does it result form hysteresis, for example, based on the date at which the process of development began in earnest and the speed of transition, as in Ngai (2004)? These are likely useful questions for further research.中文资本相对价格与经济结构罗伯托·萨曼涅戈摘要资本价格的趋势本质上是技术性的吗？首先，我们发现各国的资本相对价格趋势差异很大。

Evaluating A Company's Capital StructureFor stock investors that favor companies with good fundamentals, a "strong" balance sheet is an important consideration for investing in a company's stock. The strength of a company' balance sheet can be evaluated by three broad categories of investment-quality measurements: working capital adequacy, asset performance and capital structure. In this article, we'll look at evaluating balance sheet strength based on the composition of a company's capital structure..A company's capitalization (not to be confused with market capitalization) describes the composition of a company's permanent or long-term capital, which consists of a combination of debt and equity. A healthy proportion of equity capital, as opposed to debt capital, in a company's capital structure is an indication of financial fitness.Clarifying Capital Structure Related TerminologyThe equity part of the debt-equity relationship is the easiest to define. In a company's capital structure, equity consists of a company's common and preferred stock plus retained earnings, which are summed up in the shareholders' equity account on a balance sheet. This invested capital and debt, generally of the long-term variety, comprises a company's capitalization, i.e. a permanent type of funding to support a company's growth and related assets.A discussion of debt is less straightforward. Investment literature often equates a company's debt with its liabilities. Investors should understand that there is a difference between operational and debt liabilities - it is the latter that forms the debt component of a company's capitalization - but that's not the end of the debt story.Among financial analysts and investment research services, there is no universal agreement as to what constitutes a debt liability. For many analysts, the debt component in a company's capitalization is simply a balance sheet's long-term debt. This definition is too simplistic. Investors should stick to a stricter interpretation of debt where the debt component of a company's capitalization should consist of the following: short-term borrowings (notes payable), the current portion of long-termdebt, long-term debt, two-thirds (rule of thumb) of the principal amount of operating leases and redeemable preferred stock. Using a comprehensive total debt figure is a prudent analytical tool for stock investors.It's worth noting here that both international and U.S. financial accounting standards boards are proposing rule changes that would treat operating leases and pension "projected-benefits" as balance sheet liabilities. The new proposed rules certainly alert investors to the true nature of these off-balance sheet obligations that have all the earmarks of debt. (To read more on liabilities, see Off-Balance-Sheet Entities: The Good, The Bad And The Ugly and Uncovering Hidden Debt.) Is there an optimal debt-equity relationship?In financial terms, debt is a good example of the proverbial two-edged sword. Astute use of leverage (debt) increases the amount of financial resources available to a company for growth and expansion. The assumption is that management can earn more on borrowed funds than it pays in interest expense and fees on these funds. However, as successful as this formula may seem, it does require that a company maintain a solid record of complying with its various borrowing commitments. (For more stories on company debt loads, see When Companies Borrow Money, Spotting Disaster and Don't Get Burned by the Burn Rate.)A company considered too highly leveraged (too much debt versus equity) may find its freedom of action restricted by its creditors and/or may have its profitability hurt as a result of paying high interest costs. Of course, the worst-case scenario would be having trouble meeting operating and debt liabilities during periods of adverse economic conditions. Lastly, a company in a highly competitive business, if hobbled by high debt, may find its competitors taking advantage of its problems to grab more market share.Unfortunately, there is no magic proportion of debt that a company can take on. The debt-equity relationship varies according to industries involved, a company's line of business and its stage of development. However, because investors are better off putting their money into companies with strong balance sheets, common sense tells us that these companies should have, generally speaking, lower debt and higher equitylevels.Capital Ratios and IndicatorsIn general, analysts use three different ratios to assess the financial strength of a company's capitalization structure. The first two, the so-called debt and debt/equity ratios, are popular measurements; however, it's the capitalization ratio that delivers the key insights to evaluating a company's capital position.The debt ratio compares total liabilities to total assets. Obviously, more of the former means less equity and, therefore, indicates a more leveraged position. The problem with this measurement is that it is too broad in scope, which, as a consequence, gives equal weight to operational and debt liabilities. The same criticism can be applied to the debt/equity ratio, which compares total liabilities to total shareholders' equity. Current and non-current operational liabilities, particularly the latter, represent obligations that will be with the company forever. Also, unlike debt, there are no fixed payments of principal or interest attached to operational liabilities.The capitalization ratio (total debt/total capitalization) compares the debt component of a company's capital structure (the sum of obligations categorized as debt + total shareholders' equity) to the equity component. Expressed as a percentage, a low number is indicative of a healthy equity cushion, which is always more desirable than a high percentage of debt. (To continue reading about ratios, see Debt Reckoning.)Additional Evaluative Debt-Equity ConsiderationsCompanies in an aggressive acquisition mode can rack up a large amount of purchased goodwill in their balance sheets. Investors need to be alert to the impact of intangibles on the equity component of a company's capitalization. A material amount of intangible assets need to be considered carefully for its potential negative effect as a deduction (or impairment) of equity, which, as a consequence, will adversely affect the capitalization ratio. (For more insight, read Can You Count On Goodwill? and The Hidden Value Of Intangibles.)Funded debt is the technical term applied to the portion of a company's long-termdebt that is made up of bonds and other similar long-term, fixed-maturity types of borrowings. No matter how problematic a company's financial condition may be, the holders of these obligations cannot demand payment as long the company pays the interest on its funded debt. In contrast, bank debt is usually subject to acceleration clauses and/or covenants that allow the lender to call its loan. From the investor's perspective, the greater the percentage of funded debt to total debt disclosed in the debt note in the notes to financial statements, the better. Funded debt gives a company more wiggle room. (To read more on financial statement footnotes, see Footnotes: Start Reading The Fine Print.)Lastly, credit ratings are formal risk evaluations by credit-rating agencies - Moody's, Standard & Poor's, Duff & Phelps and Fitch –of a company's ability to repay principal and interest on debt obligations, principally bonds and commercial paper. Here again, this information should appear in the footnotes. Obviously, investors should be glad to see high-quality rankings on the debt of companies they are considering as investment opportunities and be wary of the reverse.ConclusionA company's reasonable, proportional use of debt and equity to support its assets is a key indicator of balance sheet strength. A healthy capital structure that reflects a low level of debt and a corresponding high level of equity is a very positive sign of investment quality.To continue learning about financial statements, read What You Need To Know About Financial Statements and Advanced Financial Statement Analysis.。

农业企业资本结构论文中英文对照资料外文翻译文献摘要本文比较了不同国家的农业企业的资本结构，以及其对企业绩效的影响。

研究发现，农业企业的资本结构受到多种因素的影响，包括国家的法律环境、财务市场发展程度和农业行业的特点。

同时，资本结构也对企业的经营绩效产生了显著影响。

研究结果对农业企业的融资决策和资本结构优化提供了有益的参考。

Abstract摘要本研究探讨了农业公司资本结构的决定因素。

研究结果表明，农业公司的资本结构受到多个因素的影响，包括公司规模、盈利能力、资产结构、行业竞争程度等。

此外，研究还发现农业公司资本结构与公司价值和经营绩效之间存在一定的关系。

研究结果对农业公司进行资本结构管理和融资决策具有一定的启示意义。

Abstract文献3: The Role of Debt in Agricultural Firm Capital Structure摘要本文研究了债务在农业企业资本结构中的作用。

研究发现，债务在农业企业的融资中起到了重要的作用，并且对企业的经营绩效有着显著影响。

此外，研究还发现不同种类的债务（长期债务和短期债务）对农业企业的资本结构和经营绩效产生了不同的影响。

研究结果为农业企业的融资决策提供了重要的参考。

AbstractThis article investigates the role of debt in the capital structure of agricultural firms. The study finds that debt plays a crucial role in the financing of agricultural firms and has a significant impact on firm's operational performance. Additionally, the study also reveals that different types of debt (long-term debt and short-term debt) have varying effects on the capital structure and operational performance of agricultural firms. The findings provide important insights for financing decisions in agricultural firms.摘要本研究比较了农业行业和非农业行业的资本结构。

文献信息：文献标题：Capital Structure Theory: An Overview（资本结构理论综述）国外作者：DK Yapa Abeywardhana文献出处：《Accounting and Finance Research》,2017,6(1):133-138 字数统计：英文2840单词，15223字符；中文5026汉字外文文献：Capital Structure Theory: An Overview Abstract Capital structure is still a puzzle among finance scholars. Purpose of this study is to review various capital structure theories that have been proposed in the finance literature to provide clarification for the firms’ capital structure decision. Starting from the capital structure irrelevance theory of Modigliani and Miller (1958) this review examine the several theories that have been put forward to explain the capital structure.Three major theories emerged over the years following the assumption of the perfect capital market of capital structure irrelevance model. Trade off theory assumes that firms have one optimal debt ratio and firm trade off the benefit and cost of debt and equity financing. Pecking order theory (Myers, 1984, Myers and Majluf, 1984) assumes that firms follow a financing hierarchy whereby minimize the problem of information asymmetry. But neither of these two theories provide a complete description why some firms prefer debt and others prefer equity finance under different circumstances.Another theory of capital structure has introduced recently by, Baker and Wurgler (2002), market timing theory, which explains the current capital structure as the cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity market. Market timing issuing behaviour has been well established empirically by others already, but Baker and Wurgler (2002) show that the influence of market timing on capital structure is regular and continuous. So the predictions of these theories sometimes acted in acontradictory manner and Myers (1984) 32 ye ars old question “How do firms choose their capital structure?” still remains.Keywords: Capital structure, Pecking order theory, Trade off theory, Market Timing Theory1.IntroductionThe second financing choice faced by the firm, Capital Structure is still a puzzle in finance. Capital structure or financial leverage decision should be examined concerning how debt and equity mix in the firm’s capital structure influence its market value. Debt to equity mix of the firm can have important implications for the value of the firm and cost of capital. In maximizing shareholders wealth firm use more debt capital in the capital structure as the interest paid is a tax deductible and lowers the debt’s effective cost. Further equity holders do not have to share their profit with debt holders as the debt holders get a fixed return. However, the higher the debt capital, riskier the firm, hence the higher its cost of capital. Therefore it is important to identify the important elements of capital structure, precise measure of these elements and the best capital structure for a particular firm at a particular time.Researchers and practitioners explain conflicting theories on capital structure. Durand (1952) states using the Net Income (NI) approach that firm can decrease its cost capital and consequently increase the value of the firm through debt financing. In contrast, Modigliani and Miller (1958) claims in their seminal paper capital structure irrelevance that firm’s value is independent of its debt to equity ratio whic h is known as Net Operating Income (NOI) approach. They argue that perfect capital market without taxes and transaction cost the firm value remain constant to the changes in the capital structure. According to Pandey (2007) the traditional approach has emerged a compromise to the extreme position taken by the NI approach. Traditional approach does not assume constant cost of equity change in debt to equity ratio and continuously declining Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC). Further this approach assume the concept of optimal capital structure and thereby very clearly implies that WACC decreases only for a certain level of financial leverage andreaching the minimum level. Further increase in financial leverage would increase the WACC.During the past five decades various theories have been developed and to explain the capital structure and value of the firm and main factors determining capital structure. Simultaneously enormous number of empirical studies have also tried to explain these theories and their effectiveness.2.Capital Structure Theories2.1.Capital Structure Irrelevance Theory of Modigliani and MillerCapital structure irrelevance theory of Modigliani and Miller (1958) is considered as the starting point of modern theory of capital structure. Based on assumptions related to the behavior of investors and capital market MM illustrates that firm value is unaffected by the capital structure of the firm. Securities are traded in perfect capital market, all relevant information are available for insiders and outsiders to take the decision (no asymmetry of information), that is transaction cost, bankruptcy cost and taxation do not exist. Borrowing and lending is possiblefor firms andindividual investors at the same interest rate which permits for homemade leverage, firms operatingin a similar risk classes and have similar operating leverage, interest payable on debt do not save any taxes and firms follow 100% dividend payout. Under these assumptions MM theory proved that there is no optimal debt to equity ratio and capital structure is irrelevant for the shareholders wealth. This preposition presented by MM (1958) in their seminal paper and argue that value of levered firm is same as the value of unlevered firm. Therefore they propose that managers should not concern the capital structure and they can freely select the composition of debt to equity. Important contributions to the MM approach include Hirshleifer (1966) and Stiglitz (1969). Further in their preposition II they claim that increase in leverage increase the risk of the firm and as a result the cost of equity increases. But WACC of the firm remain constant as cost of debt compensate with higher cost of equity.Capital structure irrelevance theory was theoretically very sound but was based on unrealistic set of assumptions. Therefore this theory led to a plenty of research oncapital structure. Even though their theory was valid theoretically, world without taxes were not valid in reality. In order to make it more accurate Modigliani and Miller (1963) incorporated the effect of tax on cost of capital and firm value. In the presence of corporate taxes, the firm value increase with the leverage due to the tax shield. Interest on debt capital is an acceptable deduction from the firm’s income and thu s decreases the net tax payment of the firm. This would result in an added benefit of using debtcapital through lowering the capital cost of the firm. Drawbacks in MM theory stimulated series of research devoted on proving irrelevance as theoretical and empirical matter.So may other theories that contribute to capital structure theorem have developed based on the MM theorem and it is much hard to validate any of them. Even though there are weaknesses in MM theorem it cannot be completely ignored or excluded.2.2.Trade off TheoryOne of the basic theory that have dominated the capital structure theory which recommends that optimal level of the debt is where the marginal benefit of debt finance is equal to its marginal cost. Firm can achieve an optimal capital structure through adjusting the debt and equity level thereby balancing the tax shield and financial distress cost. There is no consensus among researchers on what consist the benefit and costs. Eliminating the constraints of the capital structure irrelevance proposition of MM Myers (1984) use the trade of theory as a theoretical foundation to explain the “Capital Structure Puzzle”. Myers (1977) suggest that the use of debt up to a certain level offset the cost of financial distress and interest tax shield. According to Fama and French (2002) the optimal capital structure can be identified through the benefits of debt tax deductibility of interest and cost of bankruptcy and agency cost.Arnold (2008) explains how is the increase in debt capital in the capital structure effect the value of the firm in the Figure 1. As debt capital increase WACC of the firm declines until the firm reaches the optimal gearing level and cost of financial distress increases along with the debt level. This is confirmed by Miller (1988) that the optimal debt to equity ratio shows the highest possible tax shield that the company can enjoy. Further consistent with Modigliani and Miller (1963), Miller (1988)confirmed the fact that firms increase the risk of bankruptcy due to the debt capital in their capital structure. In the trade off theory cost of debt are linked with direct as well as indirect cost of bankruptcy. Bradley et. al., (1984) explained that cost of bankruptcy include legal and administrative cost, other indirect cost resulting from loosing of customers and trust between staff and suppliers due to the uncertainties.Figure 1Apart from the bankruptcy cost, agency cost of Jenson and Meckling (1976) is also considered in the trade off model. Jenson and Meckling (1976) explains that separation of ownership and control is the reason to rise the agency cost. According to Arnold (2008) agency costs are direct and indirect costs result from principals and agents act in their best interest and, failure to make agents to act this way.Jenson (1986) states that debt can reduce the agency cost and argue that higher the debt capital grater the commitment to pay out more cash. Though, Frank and Goyal (2008) contend that it is not been totally explained the impact of agency conflicts on capital structure. Harris and Raviv (1990) suggest that debt capital in the capital structure produce valuable information in monitoring the agency behavior andfor self-interest reasons managers are reluctant to liquidate the firm or provide such information which could lead to bankruptcy. Debt holders also concerned only on their benefit and would prefer firms to undertake safe investments nut do not bother about the profitability of those investments. This further explains Fama and French (2002) that due to the cost of debt agency conflicts arise between shareholders and bondholders.Brounen et. al., (2005) states that the presence of optimal capital structure or target capital structure increase the shareholder wealth. Further this study explains that even the value maximizing firm use debt capital to full capacity they face low probability of going bankrupt. Hovakimian et. al. (2004) claims that high profitability of gearing proposes that the firms’ tax shield higher and lower the possibility of bankruptcy. This is consistent with the key prediction of the trade-off model that there is a positive correlation between profitability and gearing. But none ofthese theoretical and empirical studies fully substitute the traditional version and therefore researchers still test the trade-off theory based on the original assumptions. In the literature contradictory evidence can be found in favor and against the trade-off model and optimal capital structure. Titman and Wessels (1988) found that non-debt tax shield and use of debt capital in the capital structure is positively correlated. Contradictory to this results. Consistent with Modigliani and Miller (1963) Mackie-Mason (1990) found that firms which incur a tax loss are rarely issue debt capital. Gearing level of the firms are steady even the tax rates vary to great extent (Wright, 2004). Contrary to this Graham and Harvey (2001) revealed that capital structure choice depend on tax rates.Optimal capital structure choice of the firm would be to issue debt capital and/or equity capital. Trade off theory postulate that all firms have an optimal debt ratio at which the tax shield equal the financial distress cost. This theory eliminate the impact of information asymmetry and incorporating the different information on conflicts between insiders and outsiders Pecking Order Theory proposed.2.3.Pecking Order TheoryAssuming perfect capital market as proposed by MM (1958), Myers and Majluf(1984) propose pecking order theory following the findings of Donaldson (1961) which found that management prefer internally generated funds rather using external funds. Pecking order theory suggest that firm prefer internal financing over debt capital and explains that firms utilize internal funds first then issue debt and finally as the last resort issue equity capital. Al-Tally (2014) confirmed the same that firms prefer to finance new investments with internally generated funds first and then with debt capital and as the last resort they would go for equity issue. Pecking order theory further explains that firms borrow more when internally generated funds are not sufficient to fulfill the investment needs ((Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). This is confirmed by Myers (2001) and found that debt ratio of the firm reflect the cumulative figure for external financing and firms with higher profit and growth opportunities would use less debt capital. If the firm has no investment opportunities profits are retained to avoid the future external financing. Further firms’ debt ratio represent the accumulated external financing as the firm do not have optimal debt ratio.Based on the pecking order theory Harris and Raviv (1991) claim that capital structure decisions are intended to eliminate the inefficiencies caused by information asymmetry. Information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders and separation of ownership explain why firms avoid capital markets (Myers, 2001). Frydenberg (2004) explains that debt issue of a firm give a signal of confidence to the market that firm is an outstanding firm that their management if not afraid of debt financing. Further Frank and Goyal (2007) show that due to the agency conflict between managers and owners and outside investors pecking order can occur.Studies on pecking order theory have not been able to show the significance of this theory on determining firms’ capital structure. Fama and French (1998) compared the trade off theory and pecking order theory and shows that certain features of financial data are better described by the pecking order theory. This is confirmed by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) Raj Aggarwal et al (2006) and Karadeniz et al (2009). Shortcomings in this theory pressed the further development of the theories of capital structure to solve the capital structure puzzle.2.4.Market Timing TheoryMarket timing theory of capital structure explains that firms issue new equity when their share price is overrated and they buy back shares when the price of shares are underrated (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). This fluctuation in the price of shares affect the corporate financing decisions and finally the capital structure of the firm. Further Baker and Wurgler (2002) explains that consistent with the pecking order theory of capital structure market timing theory does not move to target leverage as equity transactions are completely time to stock market conditions. This implies that capital structure changes persuaded by market timing are long lasting (Bessler et al, 2008).This preposition explains that gearing ratios are negatively related to the past stock returns (Bessler 2004) and Welch (2004) found that the most important determinant of capital structure is the stock returns. However Hovakimian (2006) stated that market timing does not have a significant effects on the firms’ capital structure in the long run. Confirming the same Alti (2006) shows that impact of market timing on gearing will entirely fades within two years.2.5.Credit Rating – Capital Structure (CR-CS) HypothesisKisgen (2006) proposed CR-CS hypothesis as an extension of the existing trade off theory of capital structure. Capital structure decision would change based on the cost and benefit associated with the different rating levels. Further Kisgen (2006) explains that credit rating changes directly affects capital structure decision of the firm and when the firms closer to a rating change issues less debt capital than firms not closer a rating change. CR-CS hypothesis complements traditional capital structure theories in deciding the capital structure.3.ConclusionUnderstanding the capital structure decision of firms is the focus of the all the theories discussed above. Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem of capital structure irrelevance which was developed based on the fundamental nature of debt and equity of the firm and unrealistic assumptions pave the way to the other theories of capitalstructure. The pecking order theory explains how company raises funds following a hierarchy whereas trade off theory advocates tax shield advantage and value maximizing through the optimal debt to equity mix. Ladder of preference use in the pecking order theory and the tax shield advantage of the trade off theory leads to the same conclusion. The tax shield advantage provides rational for the preference for external debt and which signify trade off theory as complementary to the pecking order theory. Differences in capital structure theories occurs in their explanations of significance of taxes and changes in information and agency costs. These theories that have been developed based onModigliani and Miller (1958) would work healthy under some assumptions only but they do not clarify actual gearing level adopted by firms. Further market timing theory do not explain an optimal capital structure and according to this theory capital structure is an outcome of various different decisions the firm has taken over time. This theory suggests that firms issue new shares when they notice they are overrated and that firms repurchase own shares when they consider these to be underrated. It is important to have more comprehensive view on capital structure of firms as these theories are not being able to explain everything. This proposes that there is no single theory on capital structure which incorporates all important factors and predictions of this theories suggest that capital structure puzzle still remains.中文译文：资本结构理论综述摘要资本结构仍然是金融学界的一个难题。

本科毕业设计（论文）中英文对照翻译(此文档为word格式,下载后您可任意修改编辑!)文献出处:Ashkanasy N M. The study on capital structure theory and the optimization of enterprise capital [J]. Journal of Management, 2016, 5(3): 235-254.原文The study on capital structure theory and the optimization ofenterprise capital structureAshkanasy N MAbstractIn this paper, corporate finance is an important content of modern enterprise management decision. Around the existence of optimal capitalstructure has been a lot of controversy. Given investment decisions, whether an enterprise to change its value by changing the capital structure and the cost of capital, namely whether there is a market make the enterprise value maximization, or make the enterprise capital structure of minimizing the cost of capital? To this problem has different answers in different stages of development, has formed many theory of capital structure.Key words: Capital structure; financial structure; Optimization; Financial leverage1 IntroductionIn financial theory, capital structure due to the different understanding of "capital" in the broad sense and narrow sense two explanations: one explanation is that the "capital" as all funding sources, the structure of the generalized capital structure refers to the entire capital, the relationship between the contrast of their own capital and debt capital, as the American scholar Alan c. Shapiro points out that "the company's capital structure - all the debt and equity financing; an alternative explanation is that if the" capital "is defined as a long-term funding sources, capital structure refers to the narrow sense of their own capital and long-term debt capital, and the tension and the short-term debt capital as the business capital management. Whether it is a broad concept ornarrow understanding of the capital structure is to discuss the proportion of equity capital and debt capital relations. 2 The capital structure theory Capital structure theory has experienced a process of gradually forming, developing and perfecting. First proposed the theory of American economist David Durand (David Durand) thinks that enterprise's capital structure is in accordance with the method of net income, net operating income method and traditional method, in 1958 di Gayle Anne (Franco Modigliani and Miller (Mertor Miller) and put forward the famous MM theory, created the modern capital structure theory, on this basis, the later generations and further put forward many new theory: 2.1 Net Income Theory (Net Income going) Net income theory on the premise of two assumptions --, investors with a fixed proportion of investment valuation or enterprise's net income. Enterprises to raise debt funds needed for a fixed rate. Therefore, the theory is that: the enterprise use of debt financing is always beneficial, can reduce the comprehensive cost of capital of enterprise. This is because the debt financing in the whole capital of enterprise, the bigger the share, the comprehensive cost of capital is more c lose to the cost of debt, and because the cost of debt is generally low, so, the higher the debt level, comprehensive capital cost is lower, the greater the enterprise value. When the debt ratio reached 100%, the firm will achieve maximum value.2.2 Theory of Net Operating Income (Net Operating Income going) Netoperating income theory is that, regardless of financial leverage, debt interest rates are fixed. If enterprises increase the lower cost of debt capital, but even if the cost of debt remains unchanged, but due to the increased the enterprise risk, can also lead to the rising cost of equity capital, it a liter of a fall, just offset, the enterprise cost of capital remain unchanged. Is derived as a result, the theory "" does not exist an optimal capital structure of the conclusion.2.3 Traditional Theory (Traditional going) Traditional theory is that the net income and net operating income method of compromise. It thinks, the enterprise use of financial leverage although will lead to rising cost of equity, but within limits does not completely offset the benefits of using the low cost of debt, so can make comprehensive capital cost reduction, increase enterprise value. But once exceed this limit, rights and interests of the rising cost of no longer can be offset by the low cost of debt, the comprehensive cost of capital will rise again. Since then, the cost of debt will rise, leading to a comprehensive capital costs rise more rapidly. Comprehensive cost of capital from falling into a turning point, is the lowest, at this point, to achieve the optimal capital structure. The above three kinds of capital structure theory is referred to as "early capital structure theory", their common features are: three theories are in corporate and personal income tax rate is zero under the condition of the proposed. Three theories and considering the capital structure of the dual effects of the cost of capital and enterprise value.Three theories are prior to 1958. Many scholars believe that the theory is not based on thorough analysis.3 Related theories3.1 Balance TheoryIt centered on the MM theory of modern capital structure theory development to peak after tradeoff theory. Trade-off theory is based on corporate MM model and miller, revised to reflect the financial pinch cost (also known as the financial crisis cost) and a model of agent cost.(1) the cost of financial constraints. Many enterprises always experience of financial constraints, some of them will be forced to go bankrupt. When the financial constraints but also not bankruptcy occurs, may appear the following situation: disputes between owners and creditors often leads to inventory and fixed assets on the material damaged or obsolete. Attorney fees, court fees and administrative costs to devour enterprise wealth, material loss and plus the legal and administrative expenses referred to as the "direct costs" of bankruptcy. Financial pinch will only occur in business with debt, no liability companies won't get into the mud. So with more debt, the fixed interest rate, and the greater the profitability of the probability of large leading to financial constraints and the cost of the higher the probability of occurrence. Financial pinch probability high will reduce the present value of the enterprise, to improve the cost ofcapital.(2) the agency cost. Because shareholders exists the possibility of using a variety of ways from the bondholders who benefit, bonds must have a number of protective constraint clauses. These terms and conditions in a certain extent constrained the legal management of the enterprise. Also must supervise the enterprise to ensure compliance with these terms and conditions, the cost of supervision and also upon the shareholders with higher debt costs. Supervise cost that agency cost is will raise the cost of debt to reduce debt interest. When the tax benefits and liabilities of financial constraints and agency costs when balance each other, namely the costs and benefits offset each other, determine the optimal capital structure. Equilibrium theory emphasizes the liabilities increase will cause the risk of bankruptcy and rising costs, so as to restrict the enterprise infinite pursuit of the behavior of tax preferential policies. In this sense, the enterprise the best capital structure is the balance of tax revenue and financial constraints caused by all kinds of costs as a result, when the marginal debt tax shield benefit is equal to the marginal cost of financial constraints, the enterprise value maximum, to achieve the optimal capital structure.3.2 Asymmetric Information TheoryAsymmetric Information and found)Due to the trade-off theory has long been limited to bankruptcy cost and tax benefit both conceptual framework, to the late 1970 s, the theory is centered on asymmetricinformation theory of new capital structure theory. So-called asymmetric information is in the information management and investors are not equal, managers than investors have more and more accurate information, and managers try to existing shareholders rather than new seeks the best interests of shareholders, so if business prospect is good, the manager will not issue new shares, but if the prospects, will make the cost of issuing new shares to raise too much, this factor must be considered in the capital structure decision. The significance of these findings to the enterprise's financial policy lies in: first it prompted enterprise reserve a certain debt capacity so as to internal lack of funding for new investment projects in the future debt financing. In addition, in order to avoid falling stock prices, managers often don't have to equity financing, and prefer to use external funding. The central idea is: internal financing preference, if you need external finance, preferences of creditor's rights financing. Can in order to save the ability to issue new debt at any time, the number of managers to borrow is usually less than the number of enterprises can take, in order to keep some reserves. Ross (s. Ross) first systematically introduce the theory of asymmetric information from general economics enterprise capital structure analysis, then, tal (e. Talmon), haeckel (Heikel) development from various aspects, such as the theory. After the 1980 s, thanks to the new institutional economics, and gradually formed a financial contract theory, corporate governance structure theory of capitalstructure theory, both of which emphasize enterprise contractual and incomplete contract, financial contract theory focuses on the design of optimal financial contract, and the arrangement of enterprise governance structure theory focuses on the right, focuses on the analysis of the relationship between capital structure and corporate governance.4 the capital structure theory of adaptability analysis On the one hand, capital structure theory especially the theory of modern capital structure is the important contribution is not only put forward "the existence of the optimal capital structure" this financial proposition, and that the optimal combination of the capital structure, objectively and make us on capital structure and its influence on the enterprise value have a clear understanding. The essence of these theories has direct influence and infiltrate into our country financial theory, and gives us enlightenment in many aspects: Because of various financing way, channel in financing costs, risks, benefits, constraints, as well as differences, seeking suitable capital structure is the enterprise financial management, especially the important content of financing management, must cause our country attaches great importance to the financial theory and financial practice. Capital structure decision despite the enterprise internal and external relationships and factor of restriction and influence, but its decision-making is the enterprise, the enterprise to the factors related to capital structure and the relationship between the quantitativeand qualitative analysis, discusses some principles and methods of enterprise capital structure optimization decision. Any enterprise capital structure in the design, all should leave room, maintain appropriate maneuver ability of financing, the financing environment in order to cope with the volatility and deal with unexpected events occur at any time. In general, businesses leverage ratio is high, has an adverse effect on the whole social and economic development, easily led to the decrease of the enterprise itself the economic benefits and losses and bankruptcies, deepen the entire social and economic development is not stable, increase the financial burden, cause inflation, not conducive to the transformation of industrial structure, and lower investment efficiency. Therefore, the enterprise capital structure should be in accordance with the business owners, creditors, and the public can bear the risk of the society in different aspects.译文资本结构理论与企业资本结构优化Ashkanasy N M摘要企业融资是现代企业经营决策的一项重要内容。

中英文对照外文翻译(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)The effect of capital structure on profitability : an empirical analysis of listed firms in Ghana IntroductionThe capital structure decision is crucial for any business organization. The decision is important because of the need to maximize returns to various organizational constituencies, and also because of the impact such a decision has on a firm’s ability to deal with its competitive environment. The capital structure of a firm is actually a mix of different securities. In general, a firm can choose among many alternative capital structures. It can issue a large amount of debt or very little debt. It can arrange lease financing, use warrants, issue convertible bonds, sign forward contracts or trade bond swaps. It can issue dozens of distinct securities in countless combinations; however, it attempts to find the particular combination that maximizes its overall market value.A number of theories have been advanced in explaining the capital structure of firms. Despite the theoretical appeal of capital structure, researchers in financial management have not found the optimal capital structure. The best that academics and practitioners have been able to achieve are prescriptions that satisfy short-term goals. For example, the lack of a consensus about what would qualify as optimal capital structure has necessitated the need for this research. A better understanding of the issues at hand requires a look at the concept of capital structure and its effect on firm profitability. This paper examines the relationship between capital structure and profitability of companies listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange during the period 1998-2002. The effect of capital structure on the profitability of listed firms in Ghana is a scientific area that has not yet been explored in Ghanaian finance literature.The paper is organized as follows. The following section gives a review of the extant literature on the subject. The next section describes the data and justifies the choice of the variables used in the analysis. The model used in the analysis is then estimated. The subsequent section presents and discusses the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, the last section summarizes the findings of the research and also concludes the discussion.Literature on capital structureThe relationship between capital structure and firm value has been the subject of considerable debate. Throughout the literature, debate has centered on whether there is an optimal capital structure for an individual firm or whether the proportion of debt usage is irrelevant to the individual firm’s value. The capital structure of a firm concerns the mix of debt and equity the firm uses in its operation. Brealey and Myers (2003) contend that the choice of capital structure is fundamentally a marketing problem. They state that the firm can issue dozens of distinct securities in countless combinations, but it attempts to find the particular combination that maximizes market value. According to Weston and Brigham (1992), the optimal capital structure is the one that maximizes the market value of the firm’s outstanding shares.Fama and French (1998), analyzing the relationship among taxes, financing decisions, and the firm’s value, concluded that the debt does not concede tax b enefits. Besides, the high leverage degree generates agency problems among shareholders and creditors that predict negative relationships between leverage and profitability. Therefore, negative information relating debt and profitability obscures the tax benefit of the debt. Booth et al. (2001) developed a study attempting to relate the capital structure of several companies in countries with extremely different financial markets. They concluded thatthe variables that affect the choice of the capital structure of the companies are similar, in spite of the great differences presented by the financial markets. Besides, they concluded that profitability has an inverse relationship with debt level and size of the firm. Graham (2000) concluded in his work that big and profitable companies present a low debt rate. Mesquita and Lara (2003) found in their study that the relationship between rates of return and debt indicates a negative relationship for long-term financing. However, they found a positive relationship for short-term financing and equity.Hadlock and James (2002) concluded that companies prefer loan (debt) financing because they anticipate a higher return. Taub (1975) also found significant positive coefficients for four measures of profitability in a regression of these measures against debt ratio. Petersen and Rajan (1994) identified the same association, but for industries. Baker (1973), who worked with a simultaneous equations model, and Nerlove (1968) also found the same type of association for industries. Roden and Lewellen (1995) found a significant positive association between profitability and total debt as a percentage of the total buyout-financing package in their study on leveraged buyouts. Champion (1999) suggested that the use of leverage was one way to improve the performance of an organization.In summary, there is no universal theory of the debt-equity choice. Different views have been put forward regarding the financing choice. The present study investigates the effect of capital structure on profitability of listed firms on the GSE.MethodologyThis study sampled all firms that have been listed on the GSE over a five-year period (1998-2002). Twenty-two firms qualified to be included in the study sample. Variables used for the analysis include profitability and leverage ratios. Profitability is operationalized using a commonly used accounting-based measure: the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to equity. The leverage ratios used include:. short-term debt to the total capital;. long-term debt to total capital;. total debt to total capital.Firm size and sales growth are also included as control variables.The panel character of the data allows for the use of panel data methodology. Panel data involves the pooling of observations on a cross-section of units over several time periods and provides results that are simply not detectable in pure cross-sections or pure time-series studies. A general model for panel data that allows the researcher to estimate panel data with great flexibility and formulate the differences in the behavior of thecross-section elements is adopted. The relationship between debt and profitability is thus estimated in the following regression models:ROE i,t =β0 +β1SDA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (1) ROE i,t=β0 +β1LDA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (2) ROE i,t=β0 +β1DA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (3)where:. ROE i,t is EBIT divided by equity for firm i in time t;. SDA i,t is short-term debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. LDA i,t is long-term debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. DA i,t is total debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. SIZE i,t is the log of sales for firm i in time t;. SG i,t is sales growth for firm i in time t; and. ëi,t is the error term.Empirical resultsTable I provides a summary of the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables for the sample of firms. This shows the average indicators of variables computed from the financial statements. The return rate measured by return on equity (ROE) reveals an average of 36.94 percent with median 28.4 percent. This picture suggests a good performance during the period under study. The ROE measures the contribution of net income per cedi (local currency) invested by the firms’ stockholders; a measure of the efficiency of the owners’ invested capital. The variable SDA measures the ratio of short-term debt to total capital. The average value of this variable is 0.4876 with median 0.4547. The value 0.4547 indicates that approximately 45 percent of total assets are represented by short-term debts, attesting to the fact that Ghanaian firms largely depend on short-term debt for financing their operations due to the difficulty in accessing long-term credit from financial institutions. Another reason is due to the under-developed nature of the Ghanaian long-term debt market. The ratio of total long-term debt to total assets (LDA) also stands on average at 0.0985. Total debt to total capital ratio(DA) presents a mean of 0.5861. This suggests that about 58 percent of total assets are financed by debt capital. The above position reveals that the companies are financially leveraged with a large percentage of total debt being short-term.Table I.Descriptive statisticsMean SD Minimum Median Maximum━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ROE 0.3694 0.5186 -1.0433 0.2836 3.8300SDA 0.4876 0.2296 0.0934 0.4547 1.1018LDA 0.0985 0.1803 0.0000 0.0186 0.7665DA 0.5861 0.2032 0.2054 0.5571 1.1018SIZE 18.2124 1.6495 14.1875 18.2361 22.0995SG 0.3288 0.3457 20.7500 0.2561 1.3597━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Regression analysis is used to investigate the relationship between capital structure and profitability measured by ROE. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results are presented in Table II. The results from the regression models (1), (2), and (3) denote that the independent variables explain the debt ratio determinations of the firms at 68.3, 39.7, and 86.4 percent, respectively. The F-statistics prove the validity of the estimated models. Also, the coefficients are statistically significant in level of confidence of 99 percent.The results in regression (1) reveal a significantly positive relationship between SDA and profitability. This suggests that short-term debt tends to be less expensive, and therefore increasing short-term debt with a relatively low interest rate will lead to an increase in profit levels. The results also show that profitability increases with the control variables (size and sales growth). Regression (2) shows a significantly negative association between LDA and profitability. This implies that an increase in the long-term debt position is associated with a decrease in profitability. This is explained by the fact that long-term debts are relatively more expensive, and therefore employing high proportions of them could lead to low profitability. The results support earlier findings by Miller (1977), Fama and French (1998), Graham (2000) and Booth et al. (2001). Firm size and sales growth are again positively related to profitability.The results from regression (3) indicate a significantly positive association between DA and profitability. The significantly positive regression coefficient for total debt implies that an increase in the debt position is associated with an increase in profitability: thus, the higher the debt, the higher the profitability. Again, this suggests that profitable firms depend more on debt as their main financing option. This supports the findings of Hadlock and James (2002), Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Roden and Lewellen (1995) that profitable firms use more debt. In the Ghanaian case, a high proportion (85 percent)of debt is represented by short-term debt. The results also show positive relationships between the control variables (firm size and sale growth) and profitability.Table II.Regression model results━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Profitability (EBIT/equity)Ordinary least squares━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Variable 1 2 3SIZE 0.0038 (0.0000) 0.0500 (0.0000) 0.0411 (0.0000)SG 0.1314 (0.0000) 0.1316 (0.0000) 0.1413 (0.0000)SDA 0.8025 (0.0000)LDA -0.3722(0.0000)DA -0.7609(0.0000)R²0.6825 0.3968 0.8639SE 0.4365 0.4961 0.4735Prob. (F) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ConclusionsThe capital structure decision is crucial for any business organization. The decision is important because of the need to maximize returns to various organizational constituencies, and also because of the impact such a decision has on an organization’s ability to deal with its competitive environment. This present study evaluated the relationship between capital structure and profitability of listed firms on the GSE during a five-year period (1998-2002). The results revealed significantly positive relation between SDA and ROE, suggesting that profitable firms use more short-term debt to finance their operation. Short-term debt is an important component or source of financing for Ghanaian firms, representing 85 percent of total debt financing. However, the results showed a negative relationship between LDA and ROE. With regard to the relationship between total debt and profitability, the regression results showed a significantly positive association between DA and ROE. This suggests that profitable firms depend more on debt as their main financing option. In the Ghanaian case, a high proportion (85 percent) of the debt is represented in short-term debt.译文加纳上市公司资本结构对盈利能力的实证研究论文简介资本结构决策对于任何商业组织都是至关重要的。

How Important is Financial Risk?IntroductionThe financial crisis of 2008 has brought significant attention to the effects of financial leverage. There is no doubt that the high levels of debt financing by financial institutions and households significantly contributed to the crisis. Indeed, evidence indicates that excessive leverage orchestrated by major global banks (e.g., through the mortgage lending and collateralized debt obligations) and the so-called “shadow banking system” may be the underlying cau se of the recent economic and financial dislocation. Less obvious is the role of financial leverage among nonfinancial firms. To date, problems in the U.S. non-financial sector have been minor compared to the distress in the financial sector despite the seizing of capital markets during the crisis. For example, non-financial bankruptcies have been limited given that the economic decline is the largest since the great depression of the 1930s. In fact, bankruptcy filings of non-financial firms have occurred mostly in U.S. industries (e.g., automotive manufacturing, newspapers, and real estate) that faced fundamental economic pressures prior to the financial crisis. This surprising fact begs the question, “How important is financial risk for non-financial firms?” At the heart of this issue is the uncertainty about the determinants of total firm risk as well as components of firm risk.StudyRecent academic research in both asset pricing and corporate finance has rekindled an interest in analyzing equity price risk. A current strand of the asset pricing literature examines the finding of Campbell et al. (2001) that firm-specific (idiosyncratic) risk has tended to increase over the last 40 years. Other work suggests that idiosyncratic risk may be a priced risk factor (see Goyal and Santa-Clara, 2003, among others). Also related to these studies is work by Pástor and Veronesi (2003) showing how investor uncertainty about firm profitability is an important determinant of idiosyncratic risk and firm value. Other research has examined the role of equity volatility in bond pricing (e.g., Dichev, 1998, Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi, 2008).However, much of the empirical work examining equity price risk takes the risk of assets as given or tries to explain the trend in idiosyncratic risk. In contrast, thispaper takes a different tack in the investigation of equity price risk. First, we seek to understand the determinants of equity price risk at the firm level by considering total risk as the product of risks inherent in the firms operations (i.e., economic or business risks) and risks associated with financing the firms operations (i.e., financial risks). Second, we attempt to assess the relative importance of economic and financial risks and the implications for financial policy.Early research by Modigliani and Miller (1958) suggests that financial policy may be largely irrelevant for firm value because investors can replicate many financial decisions by the firm at a low cost (i.e., via homemade leverage) and well-functioning capital markets should be able to distinguish between financial and economic distress. Nonetheless, financial policies, such as adding debt to the capital structure, can magnify the risk of equity. In contrast, recent research on corporate risk management suggests that firms may also be able to reduce risks and increase value with financial policies such as hedging with financial derivatives. However, this research is often motivated by substantial deadweight costs associated with financial distress or other market imperfections associated with financial leverage. Empirical research provides conflicting accounts of how costly financial distress can be for a typical publicly traded firm.We attempt to directly address the roles of economic and financial risk by examining determinants of total firm risk. In our analysis we utilize a large sample of non-financial firms in the United States. Our goal of identifying the most important determinants of equity price risk (volatility) relies on viewing financial policy as transforming asset volatility into equity volatility via financial leverage. Thus, throughout the paper, we consider financial leverage as the wedge between asset volatility and equity volatility. For example, in a static setting, debt provides financial leverage that magnifies operating cash flow volatility. Because financial policy is determined by owners (and managers), we are careful to examine the effects of firms’ asset and operating characteristics on financial policy. Specifically, we examine a variety of characteristics suggested by previous research and, as clearly as possible, distinguish between those associated with the operations of the company (i.e. factors determining economic risk) and those associated with financing the firm (i.e. factors determining financial risk). We then allow economic risk to be a determinant of financial policy in the structural framework of Leland and Toft (1996), or alternatively,in a reduced form model of financial leverage. An advantage of the structural model approach is that we are able to account for both the possibility of financial and operating implications of some factors (e.g., dividends), as well as the endogenous nature of the bankruptcy decision and financial policy in general.Our proxy for firm risk is the volatility of common stock returns derived from calculating the standard deviation of daily equity returns. Our proxies for economic risk are designed to capture the essential characteristics of the firms’ operations and assets that determine the cash flow generating process for the firm. For example, firm size and age provide measures of line of- business maturity; tangible assets (plant, property, and equipment) serve as a proxy for the ‘hardness’ of a firm’s assets; capital expenditures measure capital intensity as well as growth potential. Operating profitability and operating profit volatility serve as measures of the timeliness and riskiness of cash flows. To understand how financial factors affect firm risk, we examine total debt, debt maturity, dividend payouts, and holdings of cash and short-term investments.The primary result of our analysis is surprising: factors determining economic risk for a typical company explain the vast majority of the variation in equity volatility. Correspondingly, measures of implied financial leverage are much lower than observed debt ratios. Specifically, in our sample covering 1964-2008 average actual net financial (market) leverage is about 1.50 compared to our estimates of between 1.03 and 1.11 (depending on model specification and estimation technique). This suggests that firms may undertake other financial policies to manage financial risk and thus lower effective leverage to nearly negligible levels. These policies might include dynamically adjusting financial variables such as debt levels, debt maturity, or cash holdings (see, for example, Acharya, Almeida, and Campello, 2007). In addition, many firms also utilize explicit financial risk management techniques such as the use of financial derivatives, contractual arrangements with investors (e.g. lines of credit, call provisions in debt contracts, or contingencies in supplier contracts), special purpose vehicles (SPVs), or other alternative risk transfer techniques.The effects of our economic risk factors on equity volatility are generally highly statistically significant, with predicted signs. In addition, the magnitudes of the effects are substantial. We find that volatility of equity decreases with the size and age of the firm. This is intuitive since large and mature firms typically have more stable lines ofbusiness, which should be reflected in the volatility of equity returns. Equity volatility tends to decrease with capital expenditures though the effect is weak. Consistent with the predictions of Pástor and Veronesi (2003), we find that firms with higher profitability and lower profit volatility have lower equity volatility. This suggests that companies with higher and more stable operating cash flows are less likely to go bankrupt, and therefore are potentially less risky. Among economic risk variables, the effects of firm size, profit volatility, and dividend policy on equity volatility stand out. Unlike some previous studies, our careful treatment of the endogeneity of financial policy confirms that leverage increases total firm risk. Otherwise, financial risk factors are not reliably related to total risk.Given the large literature on financial policy, it is no surprise that financial variables are,at least in part, determined by the economic risks firms take. However, some of the specific findings are unexpected. For example, in a simple model of capital structure, dividend payouts should increase financial leverage since they represent an outflow of cash from the firm (i.e., increase net debt). We find that dividends are associated with lower risk. This suggests that paying dividends is not as much a product of financial policy as a characteristic of a firm’s operations(e.g., a mature company with limited growth opportunities). We also estimate how sensitivities to different risk factors have changed over time. Our results indicate that most relations are fairly stable. One exception is firm age which prior to 1983 tends to be positively related to risk and has since been consistently negatively related to risk. This is related to findings by Brown and Kapadia (2007) that recent trends in idiosyncratic risk are related to stock listings by younger and riskier firms.Perhaps the most interesting result from our analysis is that our measures of implied financial leverage have declined over the last 30 years at the same time that measures of equity price risk (such as idiosyncratic risk) appear to have been increasing. In fact, measures of implied financial leverage from our structural model settle near 1.0 (i.e., no leverage) by the end of our sample. There are several possible reasons for this. First, total debt ratios for non-financial firms have declined steadily over the last 30 years, so our measure of implied leverage should also decline. Second, firms have significantly increased cash holdings, so measures of net debt (debt minus cash and short-term investments) have also declined. Third, the composition of publicly traded firms has changed with more risky (especially technology-oriented)firms becoming publicly listed. These firms tend to have less debt in their capital structure. Fourth, as mentioned above, firms can undertake a variety of financial risk management activities. To the extent that these activities have increased over the last few decades, firms will have become less exposed to financial risk factors.We conduct some additional tests to provide a reality check of our results. First, we repeat our analysis with a reduced form model that imposes minimum structural rigidity on our estimation and find very similar results. This indicates that our results are unlikely to be driven by model misspecification. We also compare our results with trends in aggregate debt levels for all U.S. non-financial firms and find evidence consistent with our conclusions. Finally, we look at characteristics of publicly traded non-financial firms that file for bankruptcy around the last three recessions and find evidence suggesting that these firms are increasingly being affected by economic distress as opposed to financial distress.ConclusionIn short, our results suggest that, as a practical matter, residual financial risk is now relatively unimportant for the typical U.S. firm. This raises questions about the level of expected financial distress costs since the probability of financial distress is likely to be lower than commonly thought for most companies. For example, our results suggest that estimates of the level of systematic risk in bond pricing may be biased if they do not take into account the trend in implied financial leverage (e.g., Dichev, 1998). Our results also bring into question the appropriateness of financial models used to estimate default probabilities, since financial policies that may be difficult to observe appear to significantly reduce risk. Lastly, our results imply that the fundamental risks born by shareholders are primarily related to underlying economic risks which should lead to a relatively efficient allocation of capital.Some readers may be tempted to interpret our results as indicating that financial risk does not matter. This is not the proper interpretation. Instead, our results suggest that firms are able to manage financial risk so that the resulting exposure to shareholders is low compared to economic risks. Of course, financial risk is important to firms that choose to take on such risks either through high debt levels or a lack of risk management. In contrast, our study suggests that the typical non-financial firm chooses not to take these risks. In short, gross financial risk may be important, but firms can manage it. This contrasts with fundamental economic and business risks thatare more difficult (or undesirable) to hedge because they represent the mechanism by which the firm earns economic profits.References[1]Shyam,Sunder.Theory Accounting and Control[J].An Innternational Theory on PublishingComPany.2005[2]Ogryezak,W,Ruszeznski,A. Rom Stomchastic Dominance to Mean-Risk Models:Semide-Viations as Risk Measures[J].European Journal of Operational Research.[3] Borowski, D.M., and P.J. Elmer. An Expert System Approach to Financial Analysis: the Case of S&L Bankruptcy [J].Financial Management, Autumn.2004;[4] Casey, C.and N. Bartczak. Using Operating Cash Flow Data to Predict Financial Distress: Some Extensions[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,Spring.2005;[5] John M.Mulvey,HafizeGErkan.Applying CVaR for decentralized risk management of financialcompanies[J].Journal of Banking&Finanee.2006;[6] Altman. Credit Rating:Methodologies,Rationale and Default Risk[M]．Risk Books,London.译文：财务风险的重要性引言2008年的金融危机对金融杠杆的作用产生重大影响。

资本结构英文参考文献Evaluating A Company's Capital StructureFor stock investors that favor companies with good fundamentals, a "strong" balance sheet is an important consideration for investing in a company's stock. The strength of a company' balance sheet can be evaluated by three broad categories of investment-quality measurements: working capital adequacy, asset performance and capital structure. In this article, we'll look at evaluating balance sheet strength based on the composition of a company's capital structure..A company's capitalization (not to be confused with market capitalization) describes the composition of a company's permanent or long-term capital, which consists of a combination of debt and equity. A healthy proportion of equity capital, as opposed to debt capital, in a company's capital structure is an indication of financial fitness.Clarifying Capital Structure Related TerminologyThe equity part of the debt-equity relationship is the easiest to define. In a company's capital structure, equity consists of a company's common and preferred stock plus retained earnings, which are summed upin the shareholders' equity account on a balance sheet. This invested capital and debt, generally of the long-term variety, comprises a company's capitalization, i.e. a permanent type of funding to support a company's growth and related assets.A discussion of debt is less straightforward. Investment literature often equates a company's debt with its liabilities. Investors should understand that there is a difference between operational and debt liabilities - it is the latter that forms the debt component of a company's capitalization - but that's not the end of the debt story.Among financial analysts and investment research services, there is no universal agreement as to what constitutes a debt liability. For many analysts, the debt component in a company's capitalization is simply a balance sheet's long-term debt. This definition is too simplistic. Investors should stick to a stricter interpretation of debt where the debt component of a company's capitalization should consist of the following: short-term borrowings (notes payable), the current portion of long-termdebt, long-term debt, two-thirds (rule of thumb) of the principal amount of operating leases and redeemable preferred stock. Using a comprehensive total debt figure is a prudent analytical tool for stock investors.It's worth noting here that both international and U.S. financial accounting standards boards are proposing rule changes that would treat operating leases and pension "projected-benefits" as balance sheet liabilities. The new proposed rules certainly alert investors to the true nature of these off-balance sheet obligations that have all the earmarks of debt. (To read more on liabilities, see Off-Balance-Sheet Entities: The Good, The Bad And The Ugly and Uncovering Hidden Debt.)Is there an optimal debt-equity relationship?In financial terms, debt is a good example of the proverbial two-edged sword. Astute use of leverage (debt) increases the amount of financial resources available to a company for growth and expansion. The assumption is that management can earn more on borrowed funds than it pays in interest expense and fees on these funds. However, as successful as this formula may seem, it does require that a company maintain asolid record of complying with its various borrowing commitments. (For more stories on company debt loads, see When Companies Borrow Money, Spotting Disaster and Don't Get Burned by the Burn Rate.)A company considered too highly leveraged (too much debt versus equity) may find its freedom of action restricted by its creditorsand/or may have its profitability hurt as a result of paying high interest costs. Of course, the worst-case scenario would be having trouble meeting operating and debt liabilities during periods of adverse economic conditions. Lastly, a company in a highly competitive business, if hobbled by high debt, may find its competitors taking advantage ofits problems to grab more market share.Unfortunately, there is no magic proportion of debt that a company can take on. The debt-equity relationship varies according to industries involved, a company's line of business and its stage of development. However, because investors are better off putting their money into companies with strong balance sheets, common sense tells us that these companies should have, generally speaking, lower debt and higher equitylevels.Capital Ratios and IndicatorsIn general, analysts use three different ratios to assess thefinancial strength of a company's capitalization structure. The first two, the so-called debt and debt/equity ratios, are popular measurements; however, it's the capitalization ratio that delivers the key insights to evaluating a company's capital position.The debt ratio compares total liabilities to total assets. Obviously, more of the former means less equity and, therefore, indicates a more leveraged position. The problem with this measurement is that it is too broad in scope, which, as a consequence, gives equal weight to operational and debt liabilities. The same criticism can be applied to the debt/equity ratio, which compares total liabilities to total shareholders' equity. Current and non-current operational liabilities, particularly the latter, represent obligations that will be with the company forever. Also, unlike debt, there are no fixed payments of principal or interest attached to operational liabilities.The capitalization ratio (total debt/total capitalization) compares the debt component of a company's capital structure (the sum of obligations categorized as debt + total shareholders' equity) to the equity component. Expressed as a percentage, a low number is indicative of a healthy equity cushion, which is always more desirable than a high percentage of debt. (To continue reading about ratios, see Debt Reckoning.)Additional Evaluative Debt-Equity ConsiderationsCompanies in an aggressive acquisition mode can rack up a large amount of purchased goodwill in their balance sheets. Investors need to be alert to the impact of intangibles on the equity component of a company's capitalization. A material amount of intangible assets need to be considered carefully for its potential negative effect as a deduction (or impairment) of equity, which, as a consequence, will adverselyaffect the capitalization ratio. (For more insight, read Can You Count On Goodwill? and The Hidden Value Of Intangibles.)Funded debt is the technical term applied to the portion of a company's long-termdebt that is made up of bonds and other similar long-term, fixed-maturity types of borrowings. No matter how problematic a company's financial condition may be, the holders of these obligations cannot demand payment as long the company pays the interest on its funded debt. In contrast, bank debt is usually subject to acceleration clauses and/or covenants that allow the lender to call its loan. From the investor's perspective, the greater the percentage of funded debt to total debt disclosed in the debt note in the notes to financial statements, the better. Funded debt gives a company more wiggle room. (To read more on financial statement footnotes, see Footnotes: Start Reading The Fine Print.)Lastly, credit ratings are formal risk evaluations by credit-rating agencies - Moody's, Standard & Poor's, Duff & Phelps and Fitch – of a company's ability torepay principal and interest on debt obligations, principally bonds and commercial paper. Here again, this information should appear in the footnotes. Obviously, investors should be glad to see high-quality rankings on the debt of companies they are considering as investment opportunities and be wary of the reverse.ConclusionA company's reasonable, proportional use of debt and equity to support its assets is a key indicator of balance sheet strength. A healthy capital structure that reflects a low level of debt and a corresponding high level of equity is a very positive sign of investment quality.To continue learning about financial statements, read What You Need To Know About Financial Statements and Advanced Financial Statement Analysis.。

外文文献翻译译文原文：Capital Structure around the World: The Roles of FirmandCountry-Specific DeterminantsWe analyze the importance of firm-specific and country-specific factors in the leverage choice of firms from 42 countries around the world. Our analysis yields two new results. First, we find that firm-specific determinants of leverage differ across countries, while prior studies implicitly assume equal impact of firm-specific factors. Second, although we concur with the conventional direct impact of country-specific factors on the capital structure of firms, we show that there is an indirect impact because country-specific factors also influence the roles of firm-specific determinants of leverage.Prior research (e.g. Demirgüç-Kuntand Maksimovic, 1999; Booth, Demirgüç-Kunt andMaksimovic, 2001; Claessens, Djankov and Nenova, 2001; Bancel and Mittoo, 2004) finds thata firm’s capital structure is not only influenced by firm-specific factors but also by country specificfactors. In this study, we demonstrate that country-specific factors can affect corporateleverage in two ways. On the one hand, these factors can influence leverage directly. Forexample, a more developed bond market facilitating issue and trading of public bonds may leadto the use of higher leverage in a country, while a developed stock market has theoppositeeffect. On the other hand, we show that country-specific factors can also influence corporateleverage indirectly through their impact on firm-specific factors’ roles. For example, althoughthe dev eloped bond market of a country stimulates the use of debt, the role of asset tangibility ascollateral in borrowing will be rather limited for firms in the same country. In other words,country-characteristics may explain why in one country a firm’s tangibi lity affects leverage, butnot in another country. Previous studies have not systematically investigated these indirecteffects.International studies comparing differences in the capital structure between countriesstarted to appear only during the last decade. An early investigation of seven advancedindustrialized countries is performed by Rajan and Zingales (1995). They argue that althoughcommon firm-specific factors significantly influence the capital structure of firms acrosscountries, several country-specific factors also play an important role. Demirgüç-Kunt andMaksimovic (1999) compare capital structure of firms from 19 developed countries and 11developing countries. They find that institutional differences between developed and developingcountries explain a large portion of the variation in the use of long-term debt. They also observethat some institutional factors in developing countries influence the leverage of large and smallfirms differently. Several recent studies on the field have indicated that even amongdevelopedeconomies like the U.S. and European countries, the financing policies and managers’ behaviorare influenced by the institutional environment and international operations (see, for example, Graham and Harvey, 2001; Bancel and Mittoo, 2004; and Brounen, De Jong and Koedijk,2006).The literature specifically discusses only the direct impact of country characteristics onleverage. In an analysis of ten developing countries, Booth et al. (2001) find that capitalstructure decisions of firms in these countries are affected by the same firm-specific factors as indeveloped countries. However, they find that there are differences in the way leverage isaffected by country-specific factors such as GDP growth and capital market development. Theyconclude that more research needs to be done to understand the impact of institutional factors onfirms’ capital structure choices. The importance of country-specific factors in determining crosscountrycapital structure choice of firms is also acknowledged by Fan et al. (2006) who analyzea larger sample of 39 countries. They find a significant impact of a few additional country-specificfactors such as the degree of development in the banking sector, and equity and bondmarkets. In another study of 30 OECD countries, Song and Philippatos (2004) report that mostcross-sectional variation in international capital structure is caused by the heterogeneity of firm-,industry-, and country-specific determinants. However, they do notfind evidence to support theimportance of cross-country legal institutional differences in affecting corporate leverage.Giannetti (2003) argues that the failure to find a significant impact of country-specific variablesmay be due to the bias induced in many studies by including only large listed companies. Sheanalyzes a large sample of unlisted firms from eight European countries and finds a significantinfluence on the leverage of individual firms of a few institutional variables such as creditorprotection, stock market development and legal enforcement. Similarly, Hall et al. (2004) analyze a large sample of unlisted firms from eight European countries. They observe crosscountryvariation in the determinants of capital structure and suggest that this variation could bedue to different country-specific variables.A remarkable feature of existing studies on international capital structure is the implicitassumption that the impact of firm-specific factors on leverage is equal across countries (see forexample Booth et al., 2001; Giannetti, 2003; Song and Philippatos, 2004; and Fan et al., 2006). By reporting the estimated coefficients for firm-specificdeterminants of leverage per country, these papers, on the one hand, acknowledge that theimpact of firm-level determinants does differ in terms of signs, magnitudes and significancelevels. On the other hand, in the analysis of country-specific determinants of corporateleverage,these papers also make use of country dummies in pooled firm-year regressions, thus forcing thefirm-specific coefficients to have the same value. With an extremely large number of firm-yearobservations, it is more likely for this procedure to produce statistically significant results formany country-specific variables. But, utilizing an alternative regression framework where asingle average capital structure for each country is used as an observation, one hardly findsstrong evidence on this issue. As an additional contribution of our paper, we show the invalidity of this implicit assumption. Our analysis without imposing such restriction thus provides a more reliable analysis on theimportance of country-specific variables.The study encompasses a large number of countries (42 in total) from every continent forthe period 1997-2001. We construct a database of nearly 12,000 firms (about 60,000 firm-yearobservations). All types of firms –large and small – are included as long as a reasonable amountof data is available. We analyze the standard firm-specific determinants of leverage like firmsize, asset tangibility, profitability, firm risk and growth opportunities. Besides, we incorporate alarge number of country-specific variables in our analysis, including legal enforcement,shareholder/creditor right protection, market/bank-based financial system, stock/bond marketdevelopment and growth rate in a country’s gross domestic product (GDP).Firm-specific and country-specific determinants are the two major types of variables thatwe take into account when analyzing the impacts on firms’ leverage choice.The firms in our sample cover 42 countries that are equally divided between developedand developing countries. Data for leverage and firm-specific variables are collected fromCOMPUSTAT Global database. We exclude financial firms and utilities. Data on country-specificvariables are collected from a variety of sources, mainly World Development Indicatorsfiles and Financial Structure Database of the World Bank. Few country-specific variables aretaken from previous studies including La Porta et al. (1998), Claessens and Klapper (2002) andBerkowitz et al. (2003).Our sample period covers the years 1997-2001. The selection of a time-period involves atrade-off between the number of countries that can be included in the study and the availabilityof enough firm-specific data. Whenever needed, we resort to some other sources to collect anymissing data. It is still impossible to obtain data for each and every variable from all 42countries during this time period. The final sample consists of 59,225 observations on 11,845firms. Even though we aim to keep the number of countries high enough and also maintain a reasonable number of firms, our dataset has unavoidably a limited number of firms in a fewcountries.Analyzing the direct impact of country-specific factors on leverage, the evidencesuggests that creditor right protection, bond market development,and GDP growth rate have asignificant influence on corporate capital structure. In measuring the impact indirectly, we findevidence for the importance of legal enforcement, creditor/shareholder right protection, andmacro-economic measures such as capital formation and GDP growth rate. It implies that incountries with a better legal environment and more stable and healthier economic conditions, firms are not only likely to take more debt, but also the effects of firm-level determinants of leverageare also reinforced. Overall, the evidence provided here highlights the importance of country-specificfactors in corporate capital structure decisions. Our conclusion is that country-specificfactors do matter in determining and affecting the leverage choice around the world, and it isuseful to take into account these factors in the analysis of a country’s capital structure. If thelimitations of data, especially the number of countries, can be overcome, one might find evenmore significant results with respect to the impact of country-specificfactors.We first make a detailed comparative analysis of the impact of various firm-specificfactors. We find across a large number of countries that the impact of some factors liketangibility, firm size, risk, and profitability and growth opportunities is strong and consistent withstandard capital structure theories. Our study shows that, in terms of firm-specific determinantsof leverage, capital structure theories doexplain the corporate leverage choice in a large numberof countries. Using a model with several firm-specific explanatory variables, we find a relativelylarge explanatory power of leverage regressions in most countries. However, a few determinantsremain insignificant, and in some countries one or two coefficients are significant with anunexpected sign. Performing a simple statistical test, we reject the hypothesis that firm-specificcoefficients across countries are equal. It indicates that the often-made implicit assumption ofequal firm-level determinants of leverage across countries does not hold.In the analysis of the direct impact of country-specific factors, we observe that certainfactors like GDP growth rate, bond market development and creditor rightprotectionsignificantly explain the variation in capital structure across countries. Moreover, we findconsiderable explanatory power of country-specific variables beyond firm-specific factors. Wethen proceed to measure the indirect impact of country-specific variables. The resultsconsistently show the importance of country factors as we document significant effects of thesevia firm-specific determinants. For example, we observe that in countries with a better lawenforcement system and a more healthy economy, firms are not only likely to take more debt,but the effects of some firm-level determinants of leverage such as growth opportunities,profitability and liquidity are also reinforced. Our findings indicate that theconventionaltheories on capitalstructure developed using listed firms in the United States as a role model,work well in similar economies with developed legal environment and high level of economicdevelopment. The indirect impact analysis also indicates that firm-specific variables aresignificantly influenced by several country-specific variables but in different ways.Capital structure theories have been mostly developed and tested in the single-countrycontext. Researchers have identified several firm-specific determinants of a firm’s leverage,based on the three most accepted theoretical models of capital structure, i.e. the static trade-offtheory, the agency theory and the pecking-order theory. A large number of studies have beenconducted to date investigating to what extent these factors influence capital structures of firmsoperating within a specific country. In this paper, we examine the role of firm-specificdeterminants of corporate leverage choice around the world. We analyze a large sample of 42countries, divided equally between developed and developing countries. Our main objective isto verify the role of various country-specific factors in determining corporate capital structure.We distinguish two types of effects: the direct effect on leverage and the indirect effect throughthe influence on firm-specific determinants of corporate leverage.We find that the impact of several firm-specific factors liketangibility, firm size, risk,growth and profitability on cross-country capital structure is significant and consistent with theprediction of conventional capital structure theories. On the other hand, we also observe that ineach country one or more firm-specific factors are not significantly related to leverage. Forsome countries, we find results that are inconsistent with theoretical predictions.Several studies analyzing international capital structure assume cross-country equality offirm-level determinants. We show that this assumption is unfounded. Rather, it is necessary toconduct an analysis of country-specific factors by including countries as observations and avoida specification using a pooled regression method. We conduct regressions using country-specificfactors to explain coefficients of country dummies as well as firm-specificdeterminants.Source:Abede Jong, RezaulK abir, 2007.9 “Capital Structure around the World: The Roles of FirmandCountry-Specific Determinants”. ERIM Report Series Reach in Management.September.pp.58-63.译文：世界各地的资本结构：公司和国家因素在其中的影响我们从世界42个国家中分析了公司在选择财务杠杆所需要考虑的公司特有因素和国家因素的重要性。

┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊装┊┊┊┊┊订┊┊┊┊┊线┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊Evaluating A Company's Capital StructureFor stock investors that favor companies with good fundamentals, a "strong" balance sheet is an important consideration for investing in a company's stock. The strength of a company' balance sheet can be evaluated by three broad categories of investment-quality measurements: working capital adequacy, asset performance and capital structure. In this article, we'll look at evaluating balance sheet strength based on the composition of a company's capital structure.A company's capitalization (not to be confused with market capitalization) describes the composition of a company's permanent or long-term capital, which consists of a combination of debt and equity. A healthy proportion of equity capital, as opposed to debt capital, in a company's capital structure is an indication of financial fitness.Clarifying Capital Structure Related TerminologyThe equity part of the debt-equity relationship is the easiest to define. In a company's capital structure, equity consists of a company's common and preferred stock plus retained earnings, which are summed up in the shareholders' equity account on a balance sheet. This invested capital and debt, generally of the long-term variety, comprises a company's capitalization, i.e. a permanent type of funding to support a company's growth and related assets.A discussion of debt is less straightforward. Investment literature often equates a company's debt with its liabilities. Investors should understand that there is a difference between operational and debt liabilities - it is the latter that forms the debt component of a company's capitalization - but that's not the end of the debt story.Among financial analysts and investment research services, there is no universal agreement as to what constitutes a debt liability. For many analysts, the debt component in a company's capitalization is simply a balance sheet's long-term debt. This definition is too simplistic. Investors should stick to a stricter interpretation of debt where the debt component of a company's capitalization should consist of the following: short-term borrowings (notes payable), the current portion of long-term debt, long-term debt, two-thirds (rule of thumb) of the principal amount of operating leases and redeemable preferred stock. Using a comprehensive total debt figure is a prudent analytical tool for stock investors.It's worth noting here that both international and U.S. financial accounting standards boards are proposing rule changes that would treat operating leases and pension "projected-benefits" as balance sheet liabilities. The new proposed rules certainly alert investors to the true nature of these off-balance sheet obligations that have all the earmarks of debt. (To read more on liabilities, see Off-Balance-Sheet Entities: The Good, The Bad And The Ugly and Uncovering Hidden Debt.)┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊装┊┊┊┊┊订┊┊┊┊┊线┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊Is there an optimal debt-equity relationship?In financial terms, debt is a good example of the proverbial two-edged sword. Astute use of leverage (debt) increases the amount of financial resources available to a company for growth and expansion. The assumption is that management can earn more on borrowed funds than it pays in interest expense and fees on these funds. However, as successful as this formula may seem, it does require that a company maintain a solid record of complying with its various borrowing commitments. (For more stories on company debt loads, see When Companies Borrow Money, Spotting Disaster and Don't Get Burned by the Burn Rate.)A company considered too highly leveraged (too much debt versus equity) may find its freedom of action restricted by its creditors and/or may have its profitability hurt as a result of paying high interest costs. Of course, the worst-case scenario would be having trouble meeting operating and debt liabilities during periods of adverse economic conditions. Lastly, a company in a highly competitive business, if hobbled by high debt, may find its competitors taking advantage of its problems to grab more market share.Unfortunately, there is no magic proportion of debt that a company can take on. The debt-equity relationship varies according to industries involved, a company's line of business and its stage of development. However, because investors are better off putting their money into companies with strong balance sheets, common sense tells us that these companies should have, generally speaking, lower debt and higher equity levels.Capital Ratios and IndicatorsIn general, analysts use three different ratios to assess the financial strength of a company's capitalization structure. The first two, the so-called debt and debt/equity ratios, are popular measurements; however, it's the capitalization ratio that delivers the key insights to evaluating a company's capital position.The debt ratio compares total liabilities to total assets. Obviously, more of the former means less equity and, therefore, indicates a more leveraged position. The problem with this measurement is that it is too broad in scope, which, as a consequence, gives equal weight to operational and debt liabilities. The same criticism can be applied to the debt/equity ratio, which compares total liabilities to total shareholders' equity. Current and non-current operational liabilities, particularly the latter, represent obligations that will be with the company forever. Also, unlike debt, there are no fixed payments of principal or interest attached to operational liabilities.The capitalization ratio (total debt/total capitalization) compares the debt component of a company's capital structure (the sum of obligations categorized as debt + total shareholders' equity) to the equity component. Expressed as a percentage, a low number is indicative of a healthy equity cushion, which is always more desirable than a high┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊装┊┊┊┊┊订┊┊┊┊┊线┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊percentage of debt. (To continue reading about ratios, see Debt Reckoning.) Additional Evaluative Debt-Equity ConsiderationsCompanies in an aggressive acquisition mode can rack up a large amount of purchased goodwill in their balance sheets. Investors need to be alert to the impact of intangibles on the equity component of a company's capitalization. A material amount of intangible assets need to be considered carefully for its potential negative effect as a deduction (or impairment) of equity, which, as a consequence, will adversely affect the capitalization ratio. (For more insight, read Can You Count On Goodwill? and The Hidden Value Of Intangibles.)Funded debt is the technical term applied to the portion of a company's long-term debt that is made up of bonds and other similar long-term, fixed-maturity types of borrowings. No matter how problematic a company's financial condition may be, the holders of these obligations cannot demand payment as long the company pays the interest on its funded debt. In contrast, bank debt is usually subject to acceleration clauses and/or covenants that allow the lender to call its loan. From the investor's perspective, the greater the percentage of funded debt to total debt disclosed in the debt note in the notes to financial statements, the better. Funded debt gives a company more wiggle room. (To read more on financial statement footnotes, see Footnotes: Start Reading The Fine Print.)Lastly, credit ratings are formal risk evaluations by credit-rating agencies - Moody's, Standard & Poor's, Duff & Phelps and Fitch – of a company's ability to repay principal and interest on debt obligations, principally bonds and commercial paper. Here again, this information should appear in the footnotes. Obviously, investors should be glad to see high-quality rankings on the debt of companies they are considering as investment opportunities and be wary of the reverse.ConclusionA company's reasonable, proportional use of debt and equity to support its assets is a key indicator of balance sheet strength. A healthy capital structure that reflects a low level of debt and a corresponding high level of equity is a very positive sign of investment quality.To continue learning about financial statements, read What You Need To Know About Financial Statements and Advanced Financial Statement Analysis.一个公司的资本结构评价┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊装┊┊┊┊┊订┊┊┊┊┊线┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊┊对于股票投资者来说，具有良好的基本面支持的公司，一个好的资产负债表是对投资一家公司的股票的一个重要的考虑因素。

资本结构代理成本外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)原文：The Impact of Capital Structure on Agency Costs[Abstract] This paper aims to provide empirical evidence on the agency costs hypothesis which suggests that increase of leverage may reduce agency costs. Both multivariate tests and univariate tests are employed in this study. The multivariate tests reveal that general relationship between leverage and agency costs is significantly negative. Univariate tests are further used to assess whether agency costs are significantly different when a firm has a relatively higher debt to asset ratio from when it is less leveraged. Similar supporting evidence is found for the agency costs hypothesis. Moreover, results from the univariate tests also indicate that this general negativerelationship no longer holds when an extremely high level of leverage is present.[Keywords] Agency costs, Leverage, Agency costs hypothesis, and Opposite effect1. IntroductionIn their seminal work, Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that agency costs occur due to incomplete alignment of the agent’s and the owner’s interests. The separation of ownership and control may generate agency costs. Two types of agency costs are identified in the paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976): agency costs derived from conflicts between outside equity holders and owner-managers, and conflicts between equity holders and debt holders. From then on, a great amount of research has been devoted to demonstrate the interaction between agency costs and financial decisions, governance decisions, dividend policy, and capital structure decisions.Much empirical evidence collected by researchers, for example, Ang et al. (2000), and Fleming et al. (2005), shows that agency costs generated from the conflicts between outside equity holders and owner-manager could be reduced by increasing the owner-managers’ proportion in equity, i.e., agency costs vary inversely with the manager’s ownership. However, the conflicts between equity holders and debt holders would be more complicated. Theoretically, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that there should be an optimal capital structure, under which the lowest agency costs of a firm can be deduced from an independent variable --- “the ratio of outside equity to the whole outside financing”. The locus of agency costs, which is equal to agency costs of outside equity and the ones of debt, would be a convex curve. This implies that agency costs should not be monotonic any more.Some researchers such as Grossman and Hart (1982); Williams (1987), argue that high leverage reduces agency costs and increases firm value byencouraging managers to act more in the interests of equity holders. This argument is known as the agency costs hypothesis. Higher leverage may reduce agency costs through the monitoring activities by debt holders (Ang et al., 2000), the threat of liquidation which may cause managers to lose reputation, salaries, etc. (William, 1987), pressure to generate cash flow for the payment of interest expenses (Jensen 1986), and curtailment of overinvestment (Harvey et al., 2004).However, as the proportion of debt in the capital structure increases beyond a certain point, the opposite effect of leverage on agency costs may occur (Altman, 1984 and Titman, 1984). When leverage becomes relatively high, further increases may generate significant agency costs. Three reasons are identified in the literature which can cause this opposite effect: first reason is the increase of bankruptcy costs (Titman 1984). Second reason is that managers may reduce their effort to control risk which result in higher expected costs of financial distress, bankruptcy, or liquidation (Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2005). Finally, inefficient use of excessive cash used by managers for empire building would also increase agency costs (Jensen, 1986).2. Literature ReviewJensen and Meckling (1976) identify agency costs derived from conflicts between equity holders and owner-managers as “residual loss” which means agent consumes various pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits from the firm to maximize his own utility. Related to this issue, Harris & Raviv (1990), Childs et al. (2005) and Lee et al. (2004) argue that managers always want to continue firm’s current operations even if liquidation of the firm is preferred by investors. Also, Stulz (1990), Alvarez et al. (2006) and Kent et al. (2004) suggest the manager always want to invest all available funds even if paying out cash is better for outside shareholders, and conflictbetween the manager and equity holders cannot be resolved through contracts based on cash flows and investment expenditures.Agency theory becomes more complicated when debt holders’ interest is considered. As a financing strategy, debt is widely discussed in capital structure literatures. Modigliani and Miller (1963) demonstrate that in order to raise the value of a firm, the amount of debt financing should be as big as possible for tax subsidyii. However, their theory ignores the agency costs of debt. Theoretically, Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that the optimal utilization of debt is when the debt is utilized to the point where marginal wealth benefits of the tax subsidy are just equal to the marginal wealth effects of agency costs.A number of researchers focus on the issue of improvement of firm efficiency by reducing agency costs. Some of them focus on the methods to control managers’ behaviors. For instance, Fama (1980) conducts a discussion of how the pressure from managerial labor markets helps to discipline managers. He points out that the key condition to acquire absolute control of managerial behavior through wage adjustments is that the weight of the wage revision process is sufficient enough to resolve any potential managerial incentives problems. Another example is Chance’s (1997) argument on a derivate substitution of executive compensation. He suggests giving the manager stocks without right to vote, which could be beneficial in preventing an executive from wielding too much control. Other researchers are interested in the optimal capital structure under which value of firms could be maximized while agency costs could be minimized. Based on these observations, the agency costs hypothesis stating that the leverage affects agency costs is put forward.Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that monitoring activities by debt holders will tend to increase the optimal level of monitoring and thereforewill increase the marginal benefits. What’s more, banks which are one of the major sources of external funds especially for small firms also play a crucial role in monitoring the activities of managers.However, as suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976), the effect of leverage on total agency costs could not be monotoniciii. When the proportion of debt in total capital increases beyond a certain point, the loss would increase due to negative net present value projects, and the firm will not be able to meet current payments on a debt obligation, thus bankruptcy will occur (Terje et al. 2006). Although Haugen and Senbet (1978) argue that bankruptcy cos ts are an insignificant determinant of a firm’s capital structure, Altman (1984) finds that indirect costs associated with bankruptcy are not insignificant when these costs are accounted for the first time. Titman (1984) gives a possible theoretical link between liquidation and capital structure. It links the potentially substantial costs associated with liquidation with the event of bankruptcy. Furthermore, Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2005) suggest that in highly leveraged firms, managers may shift risk or reduce effort to control risk which would also result in expected costs of financial stress, bankruptcy, or liquidation. Additionally, inefficient use of excessive cash which is derived from higher than normal leverage level for empire building would also increase agency costs (Jensen, 1986).Therefore, at low level of leverage, increases of leverage will produce positive incentives for managers and reduce total agency costs by reducing the counterpart of external equity. However, after reaching a certain point, where bankruptcy and distress become more likely and the agency costs of outside debt overwhelm the agency costs of outside equity, any further increases in leverage will then result in higher total agency costs.The subject of the measurements of the agency costs magnitude and firm performance has been widely discussed in the literature. Thesemeasurements are usually taken by using ratios fashioned from financial statements or stock market data. Ang et al. (2000) made one of the first attempts to measure the magnitude of agency costs by two ratios from financial statements. First ratio is a proxy for the so-called direct agency costs. In order to facilitate comparisons, it is standardized as operating expenses to sales ratio. Second ratio is a proxy for the loss in revenues attributable to inefficient asset utilization. This type of agency costs is derived from management’s shirking or from poor investment decisions. This ratio is calculated by annual sales to total assets. Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) take a different approach and employ profit efficiency as the performance measure. They use profit efficiency, rather than cost efficiency to evaluate the performance of managers, since profit efficiency explains how well managers raise revenues while reduce costs and it processes tighter relationship with the concept of value maximization. Additionally, Saunders et al. (1990); Cole and Mehran (1998) use stock market returns and their volatility to measure agency costs and firm performance.3. Data and MethodologyData used in this study are drawn from Datastream. 323 UK companies are selected from FTSE ALL SHARE index. We choose UK public companies in this study because of three reasons: First, The UK is a country with mature money and capital markets where debt financing is relatively easy to conduct by companies. Second, maximization of shareholders’ wealth is the dominant goal of management in the Anglo-American world which is consistent with the theory this study is based on. Third, data of public companies could reflect the effect of leverage on agency costs more accurately and sensitively especially in the efficient markets like the UK.There are five variables used in this study. Table 1 provides a summary of these variables along with definitions. Following Ang et al. (2000)’s study,we focus on measuring the direct agency costs which is the ratio of operating expenses to sales. This ratio indicates how effectively the firm’s management controls operating expenses and it tends to capture the impact of agency costs such as excessive perquisite consumption. Operating expenses variable here excludes corporate wages, salaries and other labor-related items, interest expense, rent, leasing and hiring expenses, purchases, depreciation and bad assets written off. A series of checks and filters on the data have been conducted to reduce the sample from a maximum of approximately 400iv firms to a final sample of 323 firms for Year 2004 to Year 2005. The top and bottom 5%v are also removed to avoid the possible outlier effect.The measurements of leverage and agency costs are critical. Debt to asset ratio is employed which is total debts divided by total assets. However, we do not differentiate between long-term or short-term debt. Three other variables are considered to control other confounding effects: performance (proxied by return on asset), firm size (proxied by log of sales), and industry classification (13 industry dummies). Note that we include 13 industry dummy variables in this study because the ratio of operating expenses to sales varies across industries due to the varying importance of inventory and fixed assets.译文：关于资本结构中代理成本理论的影响[导言] 本文旨在提供经验证据对代理成本假说这表明增加的杠杆可以减少代理成本。

How Important is Financial Risk?IntroductionThe financial crisis of2008has brought significant attention to the effects of financial leverage.There is no doubt that the high levels of debt financing by financial institutions and households significantly contributed to the crisis.Indeed,evidence indicates that excessive leverage orchestrated by major global banks(e.g.,through the mortgage lending and collateralized debt obligations)and the so-called“shadow banking system”may be the underlying cause of the recent economic and financial dislocation.Less obvious is the role of financial leverage among nonfinancial firms.To date,problems in the U.S.non-financial sector have been minor compared to the distress in the financial sector despite the seizing of capital markets during the crisis. For example,non-financial bankruptcies have been limited given that the economic decline is the largest since the great depression of the1930s.In fact,bankruptcy filings of non-financial firms have occurred mostly in U.S.industries(e.g.,automotive manufacturing,newspapers,and real estate)that faced fundamental economic pressures prior to the financial crisis.This surprising fact begs the question,“How important is financial risk for non-financial firms?”At the heart of this issue is the uncertainty about the determinants of total firm risk as well as components of firm risk.StudyRecent academic research in both asset pricing and corporate finance has rekindled an interest in analyzing equity price risk.A current strand of the asset pricing literature examines the finding of Campbell et al.(2001)that firm-specific(idiosyncratic)risk has tended to increase over the last40years.Other work suggests that idiosyncratic risk may be a priced risk factor(see Goyal and Santa-Clara,2003,among others).Also related to these studies is work by Pástor and Veronesi(2003)showing how investor uncertainty about firm profitability is an important determinant of idiosyncratic risk and firm value.Other research has examined the role of equity volatility in bond pricing (e.g.,Dichev,1998,Campbell,Hilscher,and Szilagyi,2008).However,much of the empirical work examining equity price risk takes the risk of assets as given or tries to explain the trend in idiosyncratic risk.In contrast,this paper takes a different tack in the investigation of equity price risk.First,we seek tounderstand the determinants of equity price risk at the firm level by considering total risk as the product of risks inherent in the firms operations(i.e.,economic or business risks)and risks associated with financing the firms operations(i.e.,financial risks). Second,we attempt to assess the relative importance of economic and financial risks and the implications for financial policy.Early research by Modigliani and Miller(1958)suggests that financial policy may be largely irrelevant for firm value because investors can replicate many financial decisions by the firm at a low cost(i.e.,via homemade leverage)and well-functioning capital markets should be able to distinguish between financial and economic distress. Nonetheless,financial policies,such as adding debt to the capital structure,can magnify the risk of equity.In contrast,recent research on corporate risk management suggests that firms may also be able to reduce risks and increase value with financial policies such as hedging with financial derivatives.However,this research is often motivated by substantial deadweight costs associated with financial distress or other market imperfections associated with financial leverage.Empirical research provides conflicting accounts of how costly financial distress can be for a typical publicly traded firm.We attempt to directly address the roles of economic and financial risk by examining determinants of total firm risk.In our analysis we utilize a large sample of non-financial firms in the United States.Our goal of identifying the most important determinants of equity price risk(volatility)relies on viewing financial policy as transforming asset volatility into equity volatility via financial leverage.Thus, throughout the paper,we consider financial leverage as the wedge between asset volatility and equity volatility.For example,in a static setting,debt provides financial leverage that magnifies operating cash flow volatility.Because financial policy is determined by owners(and managers),we are careful to examine the effects of firms’asset and operating characteristics on financial policy.Specifically,we examine a variety of characteristics suggested by previous research and,as clearly as possible, distinguish between those associated with the operations of the company(i.e.factors determining economic risk)and those associated with financing the firm(i.e.factors determining financial risk).We then allow economic risk to be a determinant of financial policy in the structural framework of Leland and Toft(1996),or alternatively, in a reduced form model of financial leverage.An advantage of the structural modelapproach is that we are able to account for both the possibility of financial and operating implications of some factors(e.g.,dividends),as well as the endogenous nature of the bankruptcy decision and financial policy in general.Our proxy for firm risk is the volatility of common stock returns derived from calculating the standard deviation of daily equity returns.Our proxies for economic risk are designed to capture the essential characteristics of the firms’operations and assets that determine the cash flow generating process for the firm.For example,firm size and age provide measures of line of-business maturity;tangible assets(plant,property,and equipment)serve as a proxy for the‘hardness’of a firm’s assets;capital expenditures measure capital intensity as well as growth potential.Operating profitability and operating profit volatility serve as measures of the timeliness and riskiness of cash flows. To understand how financial factors affect firm risk,we examine total debt,debt maturity,dividend payouts,and holdings of cash and short-term investments.The primary result of our analysis is surprising:factors determining economic risk for a typical company explain the vast majority of the variation in equity volatility. Correspondingly,measures of implied financial leverage are much lower than observed debt ratios.Specifically,in our sample covering1964-2008average actual net financial (market)leverage is about1.50compared to our estimates of between1.03and1.11 (depending on model specification and estimation technique).This suggests that firms may undertake other financial policies to manage financial risk and thus lower effective leverage to nearly negligible levels.These policies might include dynamically adjusting financial variables such as debt levels,debt maturity,or cash holdings(see,for example, Acharya,Almeida,and Campello,2007).In addition,many firms also utilize explicit financial risk management techniques such as the use of financial derivatives, contractual arrangements with investors(e.g.lines of credit,call provisions in debt contracts,or contingencies in supplier contracts),special purpose vehicles(SPVs),or other alternative risk transfer techniques.The effects of our economic risk factors on equity volatility are generally highly statistically significant,with predicted signs.In addition,the magnitudes of the effects are substantial.We find that volatility of equity decreases with the size and age of the firm.This is intuitive since large and mature firms typically have more stable lines of business,which should be reflected in the volatility of equity returns.Equity volatility tends to decrease with capital expenditures though the effect is weak.Consistent withthe predictions of Pástor and Veronesi(2003),we find that firms with higher profitability and lower profit volatility have lower equity volatility.This suggests that companies with higher and more stable operating cash flows are less likely to go bankrupt,and therefore are potentially less risky.Among economic risk variables,the effects of firm size,profit volatility,and dividend policy on equity volatility stand out. Unlike some previous studies,our careful treatment of the endogeneity of financial policy confirms that leverage increases total firm risk.Otherwise,financial risk factors are not reliably related to total risk.Given the large literature on financial policy,it is no surprise that financial variables are,at least in part,determined by the economic risks firms take.However, some of the specific findings are unexpected.For example,in a simple model of capital structure,dividend payouts should increase financial leverage since they represent an outflow of cash from the firm(i.e.,increase net debt).We find that dividends are associated with lower risk.This suggests that paying dividends is not as much a product of financial policy as a characteristic of a firm’s operations(e.g.,a mature company with limited growth opportunities).We also estimate how sensitivities to different risk factors have changed over time.Our results indicate that most relations are fairly stable. One exception is firm age which prior to1983tends to be positively related to risk and has since been consistently negatively related to risk.This is related to findings by Brown and Kapadia(2007)that recent trends in idiosyncratic risk are related to stock listings by younger and riskier firms.Perhaps the most interesting result from our analysis is that our measures of implied financial leverage have declined over the last30years at the same time that measures of equity price risk(such as idiosyncratic risk)appear to have been increasing. In fact,measures of implied financial leverage from our structural model settle near1.0 (i.e.,no leverage)by the end of our sample.There are several possible reasons for this. First,total debt ratios for non-financial firms have declined steadily over the last30 years,so our measure of implied leverage should also decline.Second,firms have significantly increased cash holdings,so measures of net debt(debt minus cash and short-term investments)have also declined.Third,the composition of publicly traded firms has changed with more risky(especially technology-oriented)firms becoming publicly listed.These firms tend to have less debt in their capital structure.Fourth,as mentioned above,firms can undertake a variety of financial risk management activities.To the extent that these activities have increased over the last few decades,firms will have become less exposed to financial risk factors.We conduct some additional tests to provide a reality check of our results.First,we repeat our analysis with a reduced form model that imposes minimum structural rigidity on our estimation and find very similar results.This indicates that our results are unlikely to be driven by model misspecification.We also compare our results with trends in aggregate debt levels for all U.S.non-financial firms and find evidence consistent with our conclusions.Finally,we look at characteristics of publicly traded non-financial firms that file for bankruptcy around the last three recessions and find evidence suggesting that these firms are increasingly being affected by economic distress as opposed to financial distress.ConclusionIn short,our results suggest that,as a practical matter,residual financial risk is now relatively unimportant for the typical U.S.firm.This raises questions about the level of expected financial distress costs since the probability of financial distress is likely to be lower than commonly thought for most companies.For example,our results suggest that estimates of the level of systematic risk in bond pricing may be biased if they do not take into account the trend in implied financial leverage(e.g.,Dichev,1998).Our results also bring into question the appropriateness of financial models used to estimate default probabilities,since financial policies that may be difficult to observe appear to significantly reduce stly,our results imply that the fundamental risks born by shareholders are primarily related to underlying economic risks which should lead to a relatively efficient allocation of capital.Some readers may be tempted to interpret our results as indicating that financial risk does not matter.This is not the proper interpretation.Instead,our results suggest that firms are able to manage financial risk so that the resulting exposure to shareholders is low compared to economic risks.Of course,financial risk is important to firms that choose to take on such risks either through high debt levels or a lack of risk management.In contrast,our study suggests that the typical non-financial firm chooses not to take these risks.In short,gross financial risk may be important,but firms can manage it.This contrasts with fundamental economic and business risks that are more difficult(or undesirable)to hedge because they represent the mechanism by which the firm earns economic profits.References[1]Shyam,Sunder.Theory Accounting and Control[J].An Innternational Theory on PublishingComPany.2005[2]Ogryezak,W,Ruszeznski,A.Rom Stomchastic Dominance to Mean-Risk Models:Semide-Viations as Risk Measures[J].European Journal of Operational Research.[3]Borowski,D.M.,and P.J.Elmer.An Expert System Approach to Financial Analysis:the Case of S&L Bankruptcy[J].Financial Management,Autumn.2004;[4]Casey, C.and ing Operating Cash Flow Data to Predict Financial Distress:Some Extensions[J].Journal of Accounting Research,Spring.2005;[5]John M.Mulvey,HafizeGErkan.Applying CVaR for decentralized risk management of financialcompanies[J].Journal of Banking&Finanee.2006;[6]Altman.Credit Rating:Methodologies,Rationale and Default Risk[M]．Risk Books,London.译文：财务风险的重要性引言2008年的金融危机对金融杠杆的作用产生重大影响。

资本结构外文文献资本结构是一个公司的股权和负债的组合，可以通过权益比率和负债比率来描述。

资本结构的选择与公司的风险、财务灵活性、成本效益等有联系，因此，对于公司来说，资本结构的选择至关重要。

在本文中，我们将介绍两篇外国文献，以了解资本结构的现状和选择对公司的影响。

第一篇文献第一篇文献名为“Capital Structure and Corporate Performance in China: Evidence from Foreign Listed Firms”，作者为Sung C. Bae、Chang-Soo Kim和Akihiko Takahashi。

这篇文章研究了中国外资上市公司的资本结构与业绩之间的关系，并通过样本回归分析得出。

文章首先介绍了中国外资上市公司的资本结构情况，指出了其负债比率高、权益比率低的特点，这些特点也反映在其经营绩效上。

然后，文章对不同的资本结构与公司绩效之间的关系进行了实证研究。

分析发现，在外籍公司中，负债比率与公司绩效呈倒U型关系，而权益比率与公司绩效呈现正向关系。

同时，还发现公司规模和成长率对资本结构选择具有重要影响。

文章得出：在中国外资上市公司中，权益比率对公司绩效具有显著的正向作用；负债比率和公司绩效之间存在倒U型关系；公司规模和成长率都对资本结构选择有重要影响。

第二篇文献第二篇文献名为“Capital Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from Malaysia”，作者为Chee-Wooi Hooy、Chin-Fei Goh和Yew-Ming Chia。

这篇文章研究了马来西亚公司的资本结构选择与公司绩效之间的关系。

文章首先介绍了马来西亚公司的资本结构特点，包括股权比例高、负债比例低的现象。

然后，文章通过样本回归分析研究了资本结构选择与公司绩效之间的关系。

分析发现，在马来西亚公司中，权益比率和公司绩效呈现正相关关系，负债比率与公司绩效之间没有显著关系。

资本结构外文文献Optimal Capital Structure: Reflections on economic and other values By Marc Schauten & Jaap Spronk11. IntroductionDespite a vast literature on the capital structure of the firm (see Harris and Raviv, 1991, Graham and Harvey, 2001, Brav et al., 2005, for overviews) there still is a big gap between theory and practice (see e.g. Cools, 1993, Tempelaar, 1991, Boot & Cools, 1997). Starting with the seminal work by Modigliani & Miller (1958, 1963), much attention has been paid to the optimality of c apital structure from the shareholders’ point of view.Over the last few decades studies have been produced on the effectof other stakeholders’ interests on capital structure. Well-known examples are the interests of customers who receive product or service guarantees from the company (see e.g. Grinblatt & Titman, 2002). Another area that has received considerable attention is the relation between managerial incentives and capital structure (Ibid.). Furthermore, the issue of corporate control2 (see Jensen & Ruback, 1983) and, related,the issue of corporate governance3 (see Shleifer & Vishney, 1997), receive a lion’s part of the more recent academic attention for capital structure decisions.From all these studies, one thing is clear: The capital structure decision (or rather, the management of the capital structure over time)involves more issues than the maximization of the firm’s market value alone. In this paper, we give an overview of the different objectivesand considerations that have been proposed in the literature. We make a distinction between two broadly defined situations. The first is the traditional case of the firm that strives for the maximization of the value of the shares for the current shareholders. Whenever other considerations than value maximization enter capital structure decisions, these considerations have to be instrumental to the goal of value maximization. The second case concerns the firm that explicitly chooses for more objectives than value maximization alone. This may be because the shareholders adopt a multiple stakeholders approach or because of a different ownership structure than the usual corporate structure dominating finance literature. An example of the latter is the co-operation, a legal entity which can be found in a.o. many European countries. For a discussion on why firms are facing multiple goals, we refer to Hallerbach and Spronk (2002a, 2002b).In Section 2 we will describe objectives and considerations that, directly or indirectly, clearly help to create and maintain a capital structure which is 'optimal' for the value maximizing firm. The third section describes other objectives and considerations. Some of these may have a clear negative effect on economic value, others may be neutraland in some cases the effect on economic value is not always completely clear. Section 4 shows how, for both cases, capital structure decisions can be framed as multiple criteria decision problems which can thenbenefit from multiple criteria decision support tools that are now widely available.2. Maximizing shareholder valueAccording to the neoclassical view on the role of the firm, the firm has one single objective: maximization of shareholder value. Shareholders possess the property rights of the firm and are thus entitled to decide what the firm should aim for. Since shareholders only have oneobjective in mind - wealth maximization - the goal of the firm is maximization of the firm's contribution to the financial wealth of its shareholders. The firm can accomplish this by investing in projects with positive net present value4. Part of shareholder value is determined by the corporate financing decision5. Two theories about the capital structure of the firm - the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory - assume shareholder wealth maximization as the one and only corporate objective. We will discuss both theories including several market value related extensions. Based on this discussion we formulate a list of criteria that is relevant for the corporate financing decision in this essentially neoclassical view.The original proposition I of Miller and Modigliani (1958) states that in a perfect capital market the equilibrium market value of a firm is independent of its capital structure, i.e. the debt-equity ratio6. If proposition I does not hold then arbitrage will take place. Investors willbuy shares of the undervalued firm and sell shares of the overvalued shares in such a way that identical income streams are obtained. As investors exploit these arbitrage opportunities, the price of the overvalued shares will fall and that of the undervalued shares will rise, until both prices are equal.When corporate taxes are introduced, proposition I changes dramatically. Miller and Modigliani (1958, 1963) show that in a world with corporate tax the value of firms is a.o. a function of leverage. When interest payments become tax deductible and payments toshareholders are not, the capital structure that maximizes firm value involves a hundred percent debt financing. By increasing leverage, the payments to the government are reduced with a higher cash flow for the providers of capital as a result. The difference between the present value of the taxes paid by an unlevered firm (G) and an identicallevered firm (G) is ulthe present value of tax shields (PVTS). Figure 1 depicts the total value of an unlevered and a levered firm7. The higher leverage, thelower G, the higher G- G(=PVTS). lu lIn the traditional trade-off models of optimal capital structure itis assumed that firms balance the marginal present value of interest tax shields8 against marginal direct costs of financial distress or direct bankruptcy costs.9 Additional factors can be included in this trade-off framework. Other costs than direct costs of financial distress are agency costs of debt(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Often cited examples of agency costs of debt are the underinvestment problem (Myers, 1977)10, the asset substitution problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976 and Galai & Masulis, 1976), the 'play for time' game by managers, the 'unexpected increase of leverage (combined with an equivalent pay out to stockholders to make to increase the impact)', the 'refusal to contribute equity capital' andthe 'cash in and run' game (Brealey, Myers & Allan, 2006). These problems are caused by the difference of interest between equity anddebt holders and could be seen as part of the indirect costs offinancial distress. Anotherbenefit of debt is the reduction of agency costs between managersand external equity (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Jensen, 1986, 1989). Jensen en Meckling (1976) argue that debt, by allowing larger managerial residual claims because the need for external equity is reduced by the use of debt, increases managerial effort to work. In addition, Jensen (1986) argues that high leverage reduces free cash with less resourcesto waste on unprofitable investments as a result.11 The agency costs between management and external equity are often left out the trade-off theory since it assumes managers not acting on behalf of theshareholders (only)which is an assumption of the traditional trade-off theory.In Myers' (1984) and Myers and Majluf's (1984) pecking order model12 there is no optimal capital structure. Instead, because of asymmetric information and signalling problems associated with external financing13,firm's financing policies follow a hierarchy, with a preference for internal over external finance, and for debt over equity. A strict interpretation of this model suggests that firms do not aim at a target debt ratio. Instead, the debt ratio is just the cumulative result of hierarchical financing over time. (See Shyum-Sunder & Myers, 1999.) Original examples of signalling models are the models of Ross (1977) and Leland and Pyle (1977). Ross (1977) suggests that higher financial leverage can be used by managers to signal an optimistic future for the firm and that these signals cannot be mimicked by unsuccessful firms14. Leland and Pyle (1977) focus on owners instead of managers. They assume that entrepreneurs have better information on the expected cash flows than outsiders have. The inside information held by an entrepreneur can be transferred to suppliers of capital because it is in the owner's interest to invest a greater fraction of his wealth in successful projects. Thus the owner's willingness to invest in his own projects can serve as a signal of project quality. The value of the firm increases with the percentage of equity held by the entrepreneur relative to the percentage he would have held in case of a lower quality project. (Copeland, Weston & Shastri, 2005.)The stakeholder theory formulated by Grinblatt & Titman (2002)15 suggests that the way in which a firm and its non-financial stakeholders interact is an important determinant of thefirm's optimal capital structure. Non-financial stakeholders are those parties other than the debt and equity holders. Non-financialstakeholders include firm's customers, employees, suppliers and the overall community in which the firm operates. These stakeholders can be hurt by a firm's financial difficulties. For example customers may receive inferior products that are difficult to service, suppliers may lose business, employees may lose jobs and the economy can be disrupted. Because of the costs they potentially bear in the event of a firm's financial distress, non-financial stakeholders will be less interested ceteris paribus in doing business with a firm having a high(er)potential for financial difficulties. This understandable reluctance to do business with a distressed firm creates a cost that can deter a firm from undertaking excessive debt financing even when lenders are willing to provide it on favorable terms (Ibid., p. 598). These considerationsby non-financial stakeholders are the cause of their importance as determinant for the capital structure. This stakeholder theory could be seen as part of the trade-off theory (see Brealey, Myers and Allen, 2006, p.481, although the term 'stakeholder theory' is not mentioned) since these stakeholders influence the indirect costs of financial distress.16 As the trade-off theory (excluding agency costs between managers and shareholders) and the pecking order theory, the stakeholder theory of Grinblatt and Titman (2002) assumes shareholder wealth maximization as the single corporate objective.17Based on these theories, a huge number of empirical studies havebeen produced. See e.g. Harris & Raviv (1991) for a systematic overview of this literature18. More recent studies are e.g. Shyum-Sunder & Myers(1999), testing the trade-off theory against the pecking order theory, Kemsley & Nissim (2002) estimating the present value of tax shield, Andrade & Kaplan (1998) estimating the costs of financial distress and Rajan & Zingales (1995) investigating the determinants of capitalstructure in the G-7 countries. Rajan & Zingales(1995)19 explain differences in leverage of individual firms withfirm characteristics. In their study leverage is a function oftangibility of assets, market to book ratio, firm size and profitability. Barclay & Smith (1995) provide an empirical examination of the determinants of corporate debt maturity. Graham & Harvey (2001) survey392 CFOs about a.o. capital structure. We come back to this Graham & Harvey study in Section 3.20Cross sectional studies as by Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan & Zingales (1995) and Barclay & Smith (1995) and Wald (1999) model capital structure mainly in terms of leverage and then leverage as a function of different firm (and market) characteristics as suggested by capital structure theory21. We do the opposite. We do not analyze the effect of several firm characteristics on capital structure (c.q. leverage), butwe analyze the effect of capital structure on variables that co-determine shareholder value. In several decisions, including capital structure decisions, these variables may get the role of decisioncriteria. Criteria which are related to the trade-off and pecking order theory are listed in Table 1. We will discuss these criteria in moredetail in section 4. Figure 2 illustrates the basic idea of our approach.3. Other objectives and considerationsA lot of evidence suggests that managers act not only in theinterest of the shareholders (see Myers, 2001). Neither the statictrade-off theory nor the pecking order theory can fully explain differences in capital structure. Myers (2001, p.82) states that 'Yet even 40 years after the Modigliani and Miller research, our understanding of these firms22 financing choices is limited.' Results of several surveys (see Cools 1993, Graham & Harvey, 2001, Brounen et al., 2004) reveal that CFOs do not pay a lot of attention to variables relevant in these shareholder wealth maximizing theories. Given the results of empirical research, this does not come as a surprise.The survey by Graham and Harvey finds only moderate evidence for the trade-off theory. Around 70% have a flexible target or a somewhat tight target or range. Only 10% have a strict target ratio. Around 20% of the firms declare not to have an optimal or target debt-equity ratio at all.In general, the corporate tax advantage seems only moderately important in capital structure decisions. The tax advantage of debt is most important for large regulated and dividend paying firms. Further, favorable foreign tax treatment relative to the US is fairly importantin issuing foreign debt decisions23. Little evidence is found that personal taxes influence the capital structure24. In general potential costs of financial distress seem not very important although credit ratings are. According to Graham and Harvey this last finding could be viewed as (an indirect) indication of concern with distress.Earnings volatility also seems to be a determinant of leverage, which is consistent with the prediction that firms reduce leverage when the probability of bankruptcy is high. Firms do not declare directly that (the present value of the expected) costs of financial distress are an important determinant of capital structure, although indirect evidence seems to exist. Graham and Harvey find little evidence that firms discipline managers by increasing leverage. Graham and Harvey explicitly note that ‘1) managers mightbe unwilling to admit to using debt in this manner, or 2) perhaps a low rating on this question reflects an unwillingness of firms to adopt Jensen’s solution more than a weakness in Jensen’sargument'.The most important issue affecting corporate debt decisions is management’s desire forfinancial flexibility (excess cash or preservation of debt capacity). Furthermore, managers arereluctant to issue common stock when they perceive the market is undervalued (most CFOs think their shares are undervalued). Because asymmetric information variables have no power to predict the issue of new debt or equity, Harvey and Graham conclude that the pecking order model is not the true model of the security choice25.The fact that neoclassical models do not (fully) explain financial behavior could be explained in several ways. First, it could be that managers do strive for creating shareholder value but at the same timealso pay attention to variables other than the variables listed in Table 1. Variables of which managers think that they are (justifiably or not) relevant for creating shareholder value. Second, it could be that managers do not (only) serve the interest of the shareholders but of other stakeholders as well26. As a result, managers integrate variables that are relevant for them and or other stakeholders in the process of managing the firm's capital structure. The impact of these variables on the financing decision is not per definition negative for shareholder value. For example if ‘value of financial rewards for managers’ is one the goalsthat is maximized by managers – which may not be excluded – and if the rewards of managersconsists of a large fraction of call options, managers could decide to increase leverage (and pay out an excess amount of cash, if any) to lever the volatility of the shares with an increase in the value of the options as a result. The increase of leverage could have a positive effect on shareholder wealth (e.g. the agency costs between equity and management could be lower) but the criterion 'value of financial rewards' could (but does not have to) be leading. Third, shareholders themselves do possibly have other goals than shareholder wealth creation alone. Fourth, managers rely on certain (different) rules of thumb or heuristics that do not harm shareholder value but can not be explained by neoclassical models either27. Fifth, the neoclassical models are not complete or not tested correctly (see e.g. Shyum-Sunder & Myers, 1999).Either way, we do expect variables other than those founded in the neoclassical property rights view are or should be included explicitlyin the financing decision framework. To determine which variables should be included we probably need other views or theories ofthe firm than the neoclassical alone. Zingales (2000) argues that ‘…corporate finance theory,empirical research, practical implications, and policy recommendations are deeply rooted in an underlying theory of the firm.’ (Ibid., p. 1623.) Examples of attempts of new theories are 'the stakeholder theory of the firm' (see e.g. Donaldson and Preston, 1995), 'the enlightened stakeholder theory' as a response (see Jensen, 2001), 'the organizational theory' (see Myers, 1993, 2000, 2001) and the stakeholder equity model (see Soppe, 2006).We introduce an organizational balance sheet which is based on the organizational theory of Myers (1993). The intention is to offer a framework to enhance a discussion about criteria that could be relevant for the different stakeholders of the firm. In Myers' organizational theory employees (including managers) are included as stakeholders; we integrate other stakeholders as suppliers, customers and the community as well. Figure 3 presents the adjusted organizational balance sheet.Pre-tax value is the maximum value of the firm including the maximum value of the present value of all stakeholders' surplus. The present value of the stakeholders' surplus (ES plus OTS) is the present value of future costs of perks, overstaffing, above market prices for inputs(including above market wages), above market services provided to customers and the community etc.28 Depending on the theory of the firm, the pre-tax value can be distributedamong the different stakeholders following certain 'rules'. Notethat what we call 'surplus' in this framework is still based on the'property rights' principle of the firm. Second, only distributions in market values are reflected in this balance sheet. Neutral mutations are not29. Based on the results of Graham and Harvey (2001) and common sense we formulate a list of criteria or heuristics that could be integrated into the financing decision framework. Some criteria lead to neutral mutations others do not. We call these criteria 'quasi non-economic criteria'. Non-economic, because the criteria are not based on the neoclassical view. Quasi, because the relations with economic value are not always clear cut. We include criteria that lead to neutral mutations as well, because managers might have good reasons that we overlook or are relevant for other reasons than financial wealth.The broadest decision framework we propose in this paper is the one that includes both the economic and quasi non-economic variables. Figure 4 illustrates the idea. The additional quasi non-economic variables are listed in Table 2. This list is far from complete.flexibility could be relevant for at least employees and the suppliers of resources needed for these projects. As long as managers only would invest in zero net present value projects this variable would have no value effect in the organizational balance sheet. But if itinfluences the value of the sum of the projects undertaken this will be reflected in this balance sheet. Of course, financial flexibility is also valued for economic reasons, see Section 2 and 4. The probability of bankruptcy influences job security for employees and the duration of a 'profitable' relationship with the firm for suppliers, customers and possibly the community. For managers (and other stakeholders without diversified portfolios) the probability of default could be important. The cost of bankruptcy is for them possibly much higher than for shareholders with diversified portfolios. As with financial flexibility, the probability of default influences shareholder value as well. In Section 2 and 4 we discuss this variable in relation to shareholder value. Here the variable is relevant, because it has an effect on the wealth or other 'valued' variables of stakeholders other than equity (and debt) holders. We assume owner-managers dislike sharing control of their firms with others. For that reason, debt financing could possibly have non-economic advantages for these managers. After all, common stock carries voting rights while debt does not. Owner-managers might prefer debt over new equity to keep control over the firm. Control is relevant in the economic framework as well, see Section 2 and 4.In practice, earnings dilution is an important variable effectingthe financing decision. Whether it is a neutral mutations variable or not30, the effect of the financing decision on the earnings per share is often of some importance. If a reduction in the earnings per share (EPS) is considered to be a bad signal, managers try to prevent such areduction. Thus the effect on EPS becomes an economic variable. As long as it is a neutral mutation variable, or if it is relevant for other reasons we treat EPS as a quasi non-economic variable.The reward package could be relevant for employees. If the financing decision influences the value of this package this variable will be one of the relevant criteria for the manager. If it is possible to increase the value of this package, the influence on shareholder value is ceteris paribus negative. If the reward package motivates the manager to create extra shareholder value compared with the situation without the package, this would possibly more than offset this negative financing effect.优化资本结构:思考经济和其他价值By Marc Schauten & Jaap Spronk11。

优化资本结构：思考经济和其他价值---资本结构外文文献翻译西安工业大学北方信息工程学院毕业设计论文外文翻译资料系别管理信息系专业财务管理班级 B080510 姓名郭静学号 B08051019导师王化中Optimal Capital Structure: Reflections oneconomic and other valuesBy Marc Schauten & Jaap Spronk11. IntroductionDespite a vast literature on the capital structure of the firm see Harris and Raviv, 1991, Graham and Harvey, 2001, Brav et al., 2005, for overviews there still is a big gap between theory and practice see e.g. Cools, 1993, Tempelaar, 1991, Boot & Cools, 1997. Starting with the seminal work by Modigliani & Miller 1958, 1963, much attention has been paid to the optimality of capital structure from the shareholders’ point of view Over the last few decades studies have been produced on the effect of other stakeholders’ inte rests on capital structure. Well-knownexamples are the interests of customers who receive product or service guarantees from the company see e.g. Grinblatt & Titman, 2002. Another area that has received considerable attention is the relationbetween managerial incentives and capital structure Ibid.. Furthermore, the issueof corporate control2 see Jensen & Ruback, 1983 and, related, the issue of corporate governance3 see Shleifer & Vishney, 1997, receive a lion’s part of the more recent academic attentio n for capital structure decisions From all these studies, one thing is clear: The capital structure decision or rather, the management of the capital structure over time involves more issues than the imization of the firm’s market value alone. In this paper,we give an overview of the different objectives and considerations that have been proposed in the literature. We make a distinction between two broadly defined situations. The first is the traditional case of the firm that strives for the imization of the value of the shares for the current shareholders. Whenever other considerations than value imization enter capital structure decisions, these considerations have to be instrumental to the goal of value imization. The second case concerns the firm that explicitly chooses for more objectives than valueimization alone. This may be because the shareholders adopt a multiple stakeholders approach or because of a different ownership structure than the usual corporate structure dominating finance literature. An example of the latter is the co-operation, a legal entity which can be found in a.o. many European countries. For a discussion on why firms are facing multiple goals, we refer to Hallerbach and Spronk 2002a, 2002b In Section 2 we will describe objectives and considerations that, directlyor indirectly, clearly help to create and maintain a capital structure which is 'optimal'for the value imizing firm. The third section describes other objectives and considerations. Some of these may have a clear negative effect on economic value, others may be neutral and in some cases the effect on economic value is not always completely clear. Section 4 shows how, for both cases, capital structure decisions can be framed as multiple criteria decision problems which can then benefit from multiple criteria decision support tools that are now widely available2. imizing shareholder valueAccording to the neoclassical view on the role of the firm, the firm has one single objective: imization of shareholder value. Shareholders possess the property rights of the firm and are thus entitled to decide what the firm should aim for. Since shareholders only have one objective in mind - wealth imization - the goal of the firm is imization of the firm's contribution to the financial wealth of its shareholders. Thefirm can accomplish this by investing in projects with positive net present value4. Part of shareholder value is determined by the corporate financing decision5. Two theories about the capital structure of thefirm - the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory - assume shareholder wealth imization as the one and only corporate objective. We will discuss both theories including several market value related extensions. Based on this discussion we formulate a list of criteriathat is relevant for the corporate financing decision in thisessentially neoclassical viewThe original proposition I of Miller and Modigliani 1958 states that in aperfect capital market the equilibrium market value of a firm is independent of its capital structure, i.e. the debt-equity ratio6. If proposition I does not hold then arbitrage will take place. Investors will buy shares of the undervalued firm and sell shares of the overvalued shares in such a way that identical income streams are obtained. As investors exploit these arbitrage opportunities, the price of the overvalued shares will fall and that of the undervalued shares will rise, until both prices are equalWhen corporate taxes are introduced, proposition I changes dramatically. Miller and Modigliani 1958, 1963 show that in a world with corporate tax the value of firms is a.o. a function of leverage. When interest payments become tax deductible and payments to shareholders are not, the capital structure that imizes firm value involves a hundred percent debt financing. By increasing leverage, the payments to the government are reduced with a higher cash flow for the providers of capital as a result. Thedifference between the present value of the taxes paid by an unlevered firm Gu and an identical levered firm Gl is the present value of tax shields PVTS. Figure 1 depicts the total value of an unlevered and a levered firm7. The higher leverage, the lower Gl, the higher Gu - Gl PVTSIn the traditional trade-off models of optimal capital structure it is assumed that firms balance the marginal present value of interest taxshields8 against marginal direct costs of financial distress or direct bankruptcy costs.9 Additional factors can be included in this trade-off framework. Other costs than direct costs of financial distress are agency costs of debt Jensen & Meckling, 1976. Often cited examples of agency costs of debt are the underinvestment problem Myers, 197710, the asset substitution problem Jensen & Meckling, 1976 and Galai & Masulis, 1976, the 'play for time' game by managers, the 'unexpected increase of leverage combined with an equivalent pay out to stockholders to make to increase the impact', the 'refusal to contribute equity capital' and the 'cash in and run' game Brealey, Myers & Allan, 2006. These problems are caused by the difference of interest between equity and debt holders and could be seen as part of the indirect costs of financial distress. Another benefit of debt is the reduction of agency costs between managers and external equity Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Jensen, 1986, 1989. Jensen en Meckling 1976 argue that debt, by allowing larger managerial residual claims because the need for external equity is reduced by the use of debt, increases managerial effort to work. In addition, Jensen 1986 argues that high leverage reduces free cash with less resources to waste on unprofitable investments as a result.11 The agency costs between management and external equity are often left out the trade-off theory since it assumes managers not acting on behalf of the shareholders only which is an assumption of the traditional trade-off theoryIn Myers' 1984 and Myers and Majluf's 1984 pecking ordermodel12 there is no optimal capital structure. Instead, because of asymmetric information andsignalling problems associated with external financing13, firm's financing policies follow a hierarchy, with a preference for internal over external finance, and for debt over equity. A strict interpretation of this model suggests that firms do not aim at a target debt ratio. Instead, the debt ratio is just the cumulative result of hierarchical financing over time. See Shyum-Sunder & Myers, 1999. Original examples of signalling models are the models of Ross 1977 and Leland and Pyle 1977. Ross 1977 suggests that higher financial leverage can be used by managers to signal an optimistic future for the firm and that these signals cannot be mimicked by unsuccessful firms14. Leland and Pyle 1977 focus on owners instead of managers. They assume that entrepreneurs have better information on the expected cash flows than outsiders have. The inside information held by an entrepreneur can be transferred to suppliers of capital because it is in the owner's interest to invest a greater fraction of his wealth in successful projects. Thus the owner's willingness to invest in his own projects can serve as a signal of project quality. The value of the firm increases with the percentage of equity held by the entrepreneur relative to the percentage he would have held in case of a lower quality project. Copeland, Weston & Shastri, 2005.The stakeholder theory formulated by Grinblatt & Titman 200215 suggests that the way in which a firm and its non-financial stakeholders interact is an important determinant of the firm's optimal capital structure. Non-financial stakeholders are those parties other than the debt and equity holders. Non-financial stakeholders include firm's customers, employees, suppliers and the overall community in which the firm operates. These stakeholders can be hurt by a firm's financial difficulties. For example customers may receive inferior products that are difficult to service, suppliers may lose business, employees may lose jobs and the economy can be disrupted. Because of the costs they potentially bear in the event of a firm's financial distress, non-financial stakeholders will be less interested ceteris paribus in doing business with a firm having a higher potential for financialdifficulties. This understandable reluctance to do business with a distressed firm creates a cost that can deter a firm from undertaking excessive debt financing even when lenders are willing to provide it on favorable terms Ibid., p. 598. These considerations by non-financial stakeholders are the cause of their importance as determinant for the capital structure. This stakeholder theory could be seen as part of the trade-off theory see Brealey, Myers and Allen, 2006, p.481, although the term 'stakeholder theory' is not mentioned since these stakeholders influence the indirect costs of financial distress.16 As the trade-off theory excluding agency costs between managers and shareholders and the pecking order theory, the stakeholder theory of Grinblatt and Titman2002 assumes shareholder wealth imization as the single corporate objective.17Based on these theories, a huge number of empirical studies have been produced. See e.g. Harris & Raviv 1991 for a systematic overview of this literature18. More recent studies are e.g. Shyum-Sunder & Myers 1999, testing the trade-off theory against the pecking order theory, Kemsley & Nissim 2002 estimating the present value of tax shield, Andrade & Kaplan 1998 estimating the costs of financial distress and Rajan & Zingales 1995 investigating the determinants of capitalstructure in the G-7 countries. Rajan & Zingales 199519 explain differences in leverage of individual firms with firm characteristics. In their study leverage is a function of tangibility of assets, market to book ratio, firm size and profitability. Barclay & Smith 1995 provide an empirical examination of the determinants of corporate debt maturity. Graham & Harvey 2001 survey 392 CFOs about a.o. capital structure. We come back to this Graham & Harvey study in Section 3.20Cross sectional studies as by Titman and Wessels 1988, Rajan & Zingales 1995 and Barclay & Smith 1995 and Wald 1999 model capital structure mainly in terms of leverage and then leverage as a function of different firm and market characteristics as suggested by capital structure theory21. We do the opposite. We do not analyze the effect of several firm characteristics on capital structure c.q. leverage, but we analyze the effect of capital structure on variables that co-determine shareholder value. In several decisions, including capital structuredecisions, these variables may get the role of decision criteria. Criteria which are related to the trade-off and pecking order theory are listed in Table 1. We will discuss these criteria in more detail in section 4. Figure 2 illustrates the basic idea of our approach 3. Other objectives and considerationsA lot of evidence suggests that managers act not only in theinterest of the shareholders see Myers, 2001. Neither the static trade-off theory nor the pecking order theory can fully explain differences in capital structure. Myers 2001, p.82 states that 'Yet even 40 years after the Modigliani and Miller research, our understanding of these firms22 financing choices is limited.' Results of several surveys see Cools 1993, Graham & Harvey, 2001, Brounen et al., 2004 reveal that CFOs do not pay a lot of attention to variables relevant in these shareholder wealth imizing theories. Given the results of empirical research, this does not come as a surpriseThe survey by Graham and Harvey finds only moderate evidence for the trade-off theory. Around 70% have a flexible target or a somewhat tight target or range. Only 10% have a strict target ratio.Around 20% of the firms declare not to have an optimal or targetdebt-equity ratio at allIn general, the corporate tax advantage seems only moderately important in capital structure decisions. The tax advantage of debt is most important for large regulated and dividend paying firms. Further, favorable foreign tax treatment relative to the US is fairlyimportant in issuing foreign debt decisions23. Little evidence is found that personal taxes influence the capital structure24. In general potential costs of financial distress seem not very important although credit ratings are. According to Graham and Harvey this last finding could be viewed as an indirect indication of concern with distress. Earnings volatility also seems to be a determinant of leverage, which is consistent with the prediction that firms reduce leverage when the probability of bankruptcy is high. Firms do not declare directly that the present value of the expected costs of financial distress are an important determinant of capital structure, although indirect evidence seems to exist. Graham and Harvey find little evidence that firms discipline managers by increasing leverage. Graham and Harvey explicitly note that ‘1 managers might be unwilling to admit to using debt in this manner, or 2 perhaps a low rating on this question reflects an unwillingness of firms to adopt Jensen’s solution more than a weakness in Jensen’s argument'The most i mportant issue affecting corporate debt decisions is management’s desire for financial flexibility excess cash or preservation of debt capacity. Furthermore, managers are reluctant to issue common stock when they perceive the market is undervalued most CFOs think their shares are undervalued. Because asymmetric information variables have no power to predict the issue of new debt or equity, Harvey and Graham conclude that the pecking order model is not the true model of the security choice25Thefact that neoclassical models do not fully explain financialbehavior could be explained in several ways. First, it could be that managers do strive for creating shareholder value but at the same time also pay attention to variables other than the variables listed in Table 1. Variables of which managers think that they are justifiably or not relevant for creating shareholder value. Second, it could be that managersdo not only serve the interest of the shareholders but of other stakeholders as well26. As a result, managers integrate variables that are relevant for them and or other stakeholders in the process of managing the firm's capital structure. The impact of these variables on the financing decision is not per definition negative for shareholder value. For exampl e if ‘value of financial rewards for managers’ is one the goals that is imized by managers ? which may not be excluded ? andif the rewards of managers consists of a large fraction of call options, managers could decide to increase leverage and pay out an excess amount of cash, if any to lever the volatility of the shares with an increasein the value of the options as a result. The increase of leverage could have a positive effect on shareholder wealth e.g. the agency costs between equity and management could be lower but the criterion 'value of financial rewards' could but does not have to be leading. Third, shareholders themselves do possibly have other goals than shareholder wealth creation alone. Fourth, managers rely on certain different rules of thumb or heuristics that donot harm shareholder value but can not be explained by neoclassical models either27. Fifth, the neoclassical models are not complete or not tested correctly see e.g. Shyum-Sunder & Myers, 1999 Either way, we do expect variables other than those founded in the neoclassical property rights view are or should be included explicitly in the financing decision framework. To determine which variables should be included we probably need other views or theories of the firm than the neoclassical alone. Zingales 2000 argues that ‘…corporate finance theory, empirical research, practical implications, and policy recommendations are deeply rooted in an underlying theory of the firm.’ Ibid., p. 1623. Examples of attempts of new theories are 'the stakeholder theory of the firm' see e.g. Donaldson and Preston, 1995, 'the enlightened stakeholder theory' as a response see Jensen, 2001, 'the organizational theory' see Myers, 1993, 2000, 2001 and the stakeholder equity model see Soppe, 2006Weintroduce an organizational balance sheet which is based on the organizational theory of Myers 1993. The intention is to offer a framework to enhance a discussion about criteria that could be relevant for the different stakeholders of the firm. In Myers' organizational theoryemployees。

资本价格与经济结构外文文献翻译中英文2020英文The relative price of capital and economic structureRoberto SamaniegoAbstractAre trends in the price of capital technological in nature? First, we find that trends in the relative price of capital vary significantly across countries. We then show that a multi-industry growth model, calibrated to match differences in economic structure around the world and productivity growth rates across industries, accounts for this variation –mainly due to variation in the composition of capital. The finding indicates that the rate of change in the relative price of capital can be interpreted as investment-specific technical change – the extent to which productivity growth is relatively more rapid in the capital-producing sector. The model also accounts for the empirical dispersion of investment rates, but not of rates of economic growth.Keywords: Investment-specific technical change, Multi-sector growth models, Structural transformation, Capital goods prices IntroductionDeclines in the relative price of capital are viewed as an important factor of economic growth in the United States (US). See for example work by Hulten (1992), Greenwood et al. (1997), Cummins and Violante(2002) and Oulton (2007). These studies typically identify the decline in the price of capital as being technological in nature, reflecting faster productivity growth in the production of new capital than in the production of consumption and services – a phenomenon known as investment-specific technical change (ISTC). However, the extent to which the relative price of capital declines in other countries is not known. In addition, it is not known whether trends in the price of capital around the world can be given a technological interpretation, such as ISTC. An alternative hypothesis is that these differences are due to the presence of barriers to capital accumulation, as proposed by Restuccia and Urrutia (2001) to account for differences in levels of the price of capital.We begin by documenting that the rate at which the relative price of capital changes over time varies significantly across countries. We find that the median growth rate of the price of capital is zero. In addition, the price of capital increasesin as many places as it decreases. This indicates that, if there is a technological explanation for this phenomenon, technical progress in capital relative to other sectors must vary widely around the world.If the explanation is indeed technological, however, one would expect such glaring differences in productivity to be evidence of draconian barriers to international technology transfer (or trade). The alternative possibility is that capital and consumption are themselveshighly disaggregated, and that there are substantial differences in the composition of capital and consumption around the world that account for the aggregate differences in the trends in the relative price of capital.We ask whether this variation can be accounted for by differences in industry composition. The reason we do this is as follows. It is well known that rates of technical progress in the US differ significantly not just between capital and non-capital, but also across types of consumption, services and capital. Thus, even if productivity growth rates are constant across countries for each industry, the rate of change in the relative price of capital may be different if the composition of capital –or the composition of consumption and services – is different. Indeed, we find that the composition of capital is skewed towards high-TFP growth capital types in countries where the price of capital declines rapidly. We therefore ask: to what extent can differences around the world in industry composition account for variation in the rate at which the relative price of capital changes?To this end, we employ a canonical multi-industry growth model. In the model, the composition of the economy evolves as a result of changes in prices of different goods or services that agents consume, as well as changes in the prices of different capital goods. In turn, these are determined by differences in productivity growth rates across industries.We calibrate the model using detailed productivity growth data from the US, as well as data on the initial composition of economies around the world in the year 1991. We use constant productivity growth rates for a given industry in all countries partly because of data limitations; however, as mentioned, significant barriers to technological transfer would have to exist to significantly deviate from this assumption. Composition is a key part of the “no barriers” hypothesis.Strikingly, we find that the model delivers a close match to the rate of change in the relative price of capital, as measured using the Penn World Tables (PWT) version 7.1. In a statistical sense, the model can account for the entirety of the magnitude of variation of the growth rate in the relative price of capital over the period from 1983 to 2011, simply based on industry TFP growth rate differences and on differences in industry composition across countries. Not only does the model match the extent of variation, but also the correlations between model-generated capital price growth rates and those in the data are highly significant. We conclude that differences in the relative price of capital around the world can be interpreted as a technological phenomenon –ISTC –and that a key factor behind these differences is industry composition.The link between composition and the decline in the relative price of capital could be for two reasons: differences in the composition of capital, or in the composition of non-capital. We refer to these possibilities asthe capital hypothesisand the consumption hypothesis, respectively. We study the importance of each hypothesis by removing productivity growth differences in the capital producing industries, and then separately removing them in the non-capital producing industries. We find that the capital hypothesis is mainly responsible for cross-country variation in ISTC: removing productivity growth in non-capital makes very little difference to the results, whereas removing productivity growth in capital-producing industries results in model-generated statistics that bear little relationship with the data.Finally, we ask to what extent a growth model driven solely by these factors can account for differences in aggregate behavior across countries over the sample period. Specifically, we look at investment rates and rates of economic growth. This is a non-trivial task, as it requires solving for investment patterns in a model where conditions for a balanced growth path do not hold in general. We find that the model generates investment rates that are strongly correlated with investment rates in the PWT 7.1 data and the PWT 9.1 data, although they underpredict the extent of empirical variation in investment rates. Thus, the model is able to capture cross-country variation in both ISTC and (to a lesser extent) investment rates, solely based on differences in industry composition. However, the model does not generate a good match to variation in rates of economic growth in the PWT 7.1 data, nor in the PWT 9.1 data. We conclude thatthere is widespread divergence in the rate of ISTC around the world, and that this accounts for variation in investment, but that economic growth rates are due to other factors. Interestingly, when we give each country an aggregate productivity trend that exactly matches its economic growth rate in the data, investment rates are no longer correlated with those in the data, suggesting that whatever factors do underlie rates of economic growth are not simply captured by a trend in productivity.The results contribute to a long-standing debate regarding whether or not changes in the efficiency of investment are an important factor of growth. This debate goes back to Solow (1962), Abramovitz (1962) and Denison (1964). Greenwood et al. (1997) find that, in the US, more than half of economic growth can be accounted for by ISTC in a general equilibrium growth accounting framework. We provide a clear answer to the question about whether differences in the relative price of capital can be attributed to barriers or to technological factors, indicating that changes in the efficiency of investment are an important factor affecting growth rates. This is not to say that there is no scope for barriers to be important for the relative price of capital; however, their impact might not be direct, but rather indirect, through their influence on economic composition. More broadly, this suggests that future work on the manner in which factors of economic growth might be affected by policy through the channel of economic composition could be fruitful.DiscussionComments on institutionsWe find that the model without barriers accounts well for the empirical magnitude and variation in log⁡gq, solely on the basis of economic composition. On the other hand, our findings do leave the door open for institutional factors or other barriers to influence log⁡gq indirectly, through any impact they might have on economic composition.What might these determinants be? There is a precedent in the literature for the idea that policy or institutional factors may affect composition. For example, Samaniego (2006) shows in an open-economy context that labor market regulationcan affect comparative advantage in industries depending on their rate of ISTC, skewing industrial composition towards industries that use capital types with low values of gi (an effect termed high-tech aversion). Also, Ilyina and Samaniego (2012) show that when technology adoption requires external financing, financial underdevelopment also skews industrial composition towards low-tech industries. This begs the question as to whether any policy or institutional indicators might be statistically related to our findings. Of course, there is a question of reverse causality: political economy considerations imply that countries that depend on technological transfer rather than de novo innovation for growth mightadopt particular kinds of institutions, see for example Boldrin and Levine (2004). Given this, we briefly explore whether there is suggestive evidence of a link between log⁡gq in the data and institutions, without taking a stand on the direction of causality.Following Samaniego (2006) we look at firing costs (drawn from the World Bank, firing costs paid by workers with at least one year's tenure, FC). We also look at other forms of regulation that have been found to be important for aggregate outcomes – namely product market regulation, measured using entry costs paid as a share of GDP, EC, as reported by the World Bank. See Moscoso-Boedo and Mukoyama (2012). Another possibility suggested by Ilyina and Samaniego (2012)is financial development, which we measure using FD, the credit-to-GDP ratio, as in King and Levine (1993). Data on FC, EC and FD are from the World Bank 1960–2010.In addition, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) and others argue that financial development is ultimately derived from the state of contracting institutions and property rights institutions. We measure the strength of contracting institutions using the negative of the index of legal system formality from Djankov et al. (2003), which we call CONT. We measure property rights enforcement using the index developed by the Property Rights Alliance (2008), PROP, averaged over the available period 2007–2013. Finally, we also look at intellectual property rights, whichhave been related to the generation and diffusion of technology, see Samaniego (2013) for a survey. We measure intellectual property rights IPR, using the patent enforcement method developed in Ginarte and Park (1997), as reported by the World Bank, averaging over the available sample. Ilyina and Samaniego (2011) find that copyright enforcement specifically is a form of IPR enforcement that bears the strongest relationship to financial development –see also Samaniego (2013). The BSA (Software Alliance) publishes the rate at which unlicensed software is used in different countries. Following the Property Rights Alliance (2008), we take this measure (times −1) as an indicator of copyright enforcement. Finally, we also look at human capital, HC, using the standard Barro and Lee (2013) schooling-based measure averaged over the period. While this is not an institutional measure as such it is an important country characteristic which could be related to the need or ability to produce or import high-tech capital goods.Comments on tradeThe model abstracts from international trade. Eaton and Kortum (2001) find that machinery is often imported by developing countries, which might suggest that the price of capital could be significantly affected by trade rather than by domestic output, and that domestic output shares might not be indicative of the composition of capital. However their data is for 1985, so it is not clear that their findings are relevant forthe relative price of capital in more recent data. Indeed, using data for 1995, Caselli and Wilson (2004) find that the composition of imported machinery is very highly correlated with the composition of domestically-produced capital, both in developed and developing countries. Nonetheless, it would certainly be interesting to explore the extent to which trends in the price of capital might be affected either by trade flows or by changes in trade costs. In particular, Mutreja et al. (2018) argue that reductions in trade costs may lower the relative price of capital by allowing countries to more easily access capital from countries that might produce them more efficiently. This suggests that one factor that might contribute to the dispersion in investment rates could be trade costs.Concluding remarksWe document extensive differences in the rate of change in the relative price of capital around the world. We then show that these differences can be accounted for on the basis of differences around the world in economic composition, without recourse to any barriers or frictions. We also find that a general equilibrium model economy accounts for a significant portion of the variation in the rate of change in the relative price of capital and for differences in investment rates around the world, although not for differences in rates of economic growth. We conclude that these differences can be given a technological interpretation,based on differences in composition among industries with different rates of technical progress. As a result, the term “investment-specific technical progress,” which the literature widely identifies with declines in the relative price of capital, is appropriate. Given the key role played by industry composition in this phenomenon it seems important to understand what are the deep determinants of industry composition. Is it due to comparative advantage or other trade-theoretic mechanisms? Is due to policy distortions, as suggested by Samaniego (2006) or Ilyina and Samaniego (2012)? Or does it result form hysteresis, for example, based on the date at which the process of development began in earnest and the speed of transition, as in Ngai (2004)? These are likely useful questions for further research.中文资本相对价格与经济结构罗伯托·萨曼涅戈摘要资本价格的趋势本质上是技术性的吗？首先，我们发现各国的资本相对价格趋势差异很大。

本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文：The Determinants of Capital Structure ChoiceI. Determinants of Capital StructureIn this section, we present a brief discussion of the attributes that different theories of capital structure suggest may affect the firm's debt-equity choice. These attributes are denoted asset structure, non-debt tax shields, growth, uniqueness, industry classification, size, earnings volatility, and profitability. The attributes, their relation to the optimal capital structure choice, and their observable indicators are discussed below.A. Collateral Value of AssetsMost capital structure theories argue that the type of assets owned by a firm in some way affects its capital structure choice. Scott suggests that, by selling secured debt, firms increase the value of their equity by expropriating wealth from their existing unsecured creditors.Arguments put forth by Myers and Majluf also suggest that firms may find it advantageous to sell secured debt. Their model demonstrates that there may be costs associated with issuing securities about which the firm's managers have better information than outside shareholders. Issuing debt secured by property with known values avoids these costs. For this reason, firms with assets that can be used as collateral may be expected to issue more debt to take advantage of this opportunity.Work by Galai and Masulis , Jensen and Meckling , and Myers suggests that stockholders of leveraged firms have an incentive to invest yet to expropriate wealth from the firm's bondholders. This incentive may also induce a positive relation between debt ratios and the capacity of firms to collateralize their debt. If the debt can be collateralized, the borrower is restricted to use the funds for a specified project. Since no such guarantee can be used for projects that cannot be collateralized, creditors may require more favorable terms, which in turn may lead such firms to use equity rather than debt financing.The tendency of managers to consume more than the optimal level of perquisites mayproduce the opposite relation between collateralized capital and debt levels. Grossman and Hart suggest that higher debt levels diminish this tendency because of the increased threat of bankruptcy. Managers of highly levered firms will also be less able to consume excessive perquisites since bondholders (or bankers) are inclined to closely monitor such firms. The costs associated with this agency relation may be higher for firms with assets that are less collateralized since monitoring the capital outlays of such firms is probably more difficult. For this reason, firms with less collateralized assets may choose higher debt levels to limit their managers' consumption of perquisites.The estimated model incorporates two indicators for the collateral value attribute. They include the ratio of intangible assets to total assets (INT/TA) and the ratio of inventory plus gross plant and equipment to total assets (IGP/TA). The first indicator is negatively related to the collateral value attribute, while the second is positively related to collateral value.B. Non-Debt Tax ShieldsDeAngelo and Masulis present a model of optimal capital structure that incorporates the impact of corporate taxes, personal taxes, and non-debt-related corporate tax shields. They argue that tax deductions for depreciation and investment tax credits are substitutes for the tax benefits of debt financing. As a result, firms with large non-debt tax shields relative to their expected cash flow include less debt in their capital structures.Indicators of non-debt tax shields include the ratios of investment tax credits over total assets (ITC/TA), depreciation over total assets (DITA), and a direct estimate of non-debt tax shields over total assets (NDT/TA). The latter measure is calculated from observed federal income tax payments (T), operating income (OI), interest payments (i), and the corporate tax rate during our sample period (48%), using the following equation:NDT = OI-i-T/0.48which follows from the equalityT= 0.48(0I- i-NDT)These indicators measure the current tax deductions associated with capital equipment and, hence, only partially capture the non-debt tax shield variable suggested by DeAngelo and Masulis. First, this attribute excludes tax deductions that are not associated with capital equipment, such as research and development and selling expenses. (These variables, used as indicators of anotherattribute, are discussed later.) More important, our non-debt tax shield attribute represents tax deductions rather than tax deductions net of true economic depreciation and expenses, which is the economic attribute suggested by theory. Unfortunately, this preferable attribute would be very difficult to measure.C. GrowthAs we mentioned previously, equity-controlled firms have a tendency to invest suboptimally to expropriate wealth from the firm's bondholders. The cost associated with this agency relationship is likely to be higher for firms in growing industries, which have more flexibility in their choice of future investments. Expected future growth should thus be negatively related to long-term debt levels. Myers, however, noted that this agency problem is mitigated if the firm issues short-term rather than long-term debt. This suggests that short-term debt ratios might actually be positively related to growth rates if growing firms substitute short-term financing for long-term financing. Jensen and Meckling, Smith and Warner, and Green argued that the agency costs will be reduced if firms issue convertible debt. This suggests that convertible debt ratios may be positively related to growth opportunities.It should also be noted that growth opportunities are capital assets that add value to a firm but cannot be collateralized and do not generate current taxable income. For this reason, the arguments put forth in the previous subsections also suggest a negative relation between debt and growth opportunities.Indicators of growth include capital expenditures over total assets (CE/TA) and the growth of total assets measured by the percentage change in total assets (GTA). Since firms generally engage in research and development to generate future investments, research and development over sales (RD/S) also serves as an indicator of the growth attribute.D. UniquenessTitman presents a model in which a firm's liquidation decision is causally linked to its bankruptcy status. As a result, the costs that firms can potentially impose on their customers, suppliers, and workers by liquidating are relevant to their capital structure decisions. Customers, workers, and suppliers of firms that produce unique or specialized products probably suffer relatively high costs in the event that they liquidate. Their workers and suppliers probably have job specific skills and capital, and their customers may find itdifficult to find alternative servicing for their relatively unique products. For these reasons, uniqueness is expected to be negatively related to debt ratios.Indictors of uniqueness include expenditures on research and development over sales (RD/S), selling expenses over sales (SEIS), and quit rates (QR), the percentage of the industry's total work force that voluntarily left their jobs in the sample years. It is postulated that RD/S measures uniqueness because firms that sell products with close substitutes ar'e likely to do less research and development since their innovations can be more easily duplicated. In addition, successful research and development projects lead to new products that differ from those existing in the market. Firms with relatively unique products are expected to advertise more and, in general, spend more in promoting and selling their products. Hence, SE/S is expected to be positively related to uniqueness. However, it is expected that firms in industries with high quit rates are probably relatively less unique since firms that produce relatively unique products tend to employ workers with high levels of job-specific human capital who will thus find it costly to leave their jobs.It is apparent from two of the indicators of uniqueness, RD/S and SEIS, that this attribute may also be related to non-debt tax shields and collateral value. Research and development and some selling expenses (such as advertising) can be considered capital goods that are immediately expensed and cannot be used as collateral. Given that our estimation technique can only imperfectly control for these other attributes, the uniqueness attribute may be negatively related to the observed debt ratio because of its positive correlation with non-debt tax shields and its negative correlation with collateral value.E. Industry ClassificationTitman suggests that firms that make products requiring the availability of specialized servicing and spare parts will find liquidation especially costly. This indicates that firms manufacturing machines and equipment should be financed with relatively less debt. To measure this, we include a dummy variable equal to one for firms with SIC codes between 3400 and 4000 (firms producing machines and equipment) and zero otherwise as a separate attribute affecting the debt ratios.F. SizeA number of authors have suggested that leverage ratios may be related to firm size.Warner and Ang, Chua, and McConnell provide evidence that suggests that direct bankruptcy costs appear to constitute a larger proportion of a firm's value as that value decreases. It is also the case that relatively large firms tend to be more diversified and less prone to bankruptcy. These arguments suggest that large firms should be more highly leveraged.The cost of issuing debt and equity securities is also related to firm size. In particular, small firms pay much more than large firms to issue new equity (see Smith) and also somewhat more to issue long-term debt. This suggests that small firms may be more leveraged than large firms and may prefer to borrow short term (through bank loans) rather than issue long-term debt because of the lower fixed costs associated with this alternative.We use the natural logarithm of sales (LnS) and quit rates (QR) as indicators of size. The logarithmic transformation of sales reflects our view that a size effect, if it exists, affects mainly the very small firms. The inclusion of quit rates, as an indicator of size, reflects the phenomenon that large firms, which often offer wider career opportunities to their employees, have lower quit rates.G. V olatilityMany authors have also suggested that a firm's optimal debt level is a decreasing function of the volatility of earnings. We were only able to include one indicator of volatility that cannot be directly affected by the firm's debt level. It is the standard deviation of the percentage change in operating income (SIGOI). Since it is the only indicator of volatility, we must assume that it measures this attribute without error.H. ProfitabilityMyers cites evidence from Donaldson and Brealey and Myers that suggests that firms prefer raising capital, first from retained earnings, second from debt, and third from issuing new equity. He suggests that this behavior may be due to the costs of issuing new equity. These can be the costs discussed in Myers and Majluf that arise because of asymmetric information, or they can be transaction costs. In either case, the past profitability of a firm, and hence the amount of earnings available to be retained, should be an important determinant of its current capital structure. We use the ratios of operating income over sales (OI/S) and operating income over total assets (OI/TA) as indicators of profitability.II. Measures of Capital StructureSix measures of financial leverage are used in this study. They are long-term, short-term, and convertible debt divided by market and by book values of equity.8 Although these variables could have been combined to extract a common "debt ratio" attribute, which could in turn be regressed against the independent attributes, there is good reason for not doing this. Some of the theories of capital structure have different implications for the different types of debt, and, for the reasons discussed below, the predicted coefficients in the structural model may differ according to whether debt ratios are measured in terms of book or market values. Moreover, measurement errors in the dependent variables are subsumed in the disturbance term and do not bias the regression coefficients.Data limitations force us to measure debt in terms of book values rather than market values. It would, perhaps, have been better if market value data were available for debt. However, Bowman demonstrated that the cross-sectional correlation between the book value and market value of debt is very large, so the misspecification due to using book value measures is probably fairly small. Furthermore, we have no reason to suspect that the cross-sectional differences between market values and book values of debt should be correlated with any of the determinants of capital structure suggested by theory, so no obvious bias will result because of this misspecification.Source: Sheridan Titman; Roberto Wessels,1988.“The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice”. The Journal of Finance. Vol.43, No.1, march.pp.1-19.译文：资本结构的影响因素I、资本结构的决定因素在本节中，我们提出了一个简短讨论资本结构的不同理论认为可能会影响公司的债务权益选择的属性。