Existence and Being
Source: Existence and Being from Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sartre edited by Walter Kaufman published in
full.
Descartes, writing to Picot, who translated the Principia Philosophiae into French, observed: "Thus the whole of philosophy is like a tree: the roots are metaphysics, the trunk is physics, and the branches that issue from the trunk are all the other sciences . . ."
Sticking to this image, we ask: In what soil do the roots of the tree of philosophy have their hold? Out of what ground do the roots-and through them the whole tree-receive their nourishing juices and strength? What element, concealed in the ground, enters and lives in the roots that support and nourish the tree? What is the basis and element of metaphysics? What is metaphysics, viewed from its ground? What is metaphysics itself, at bottom?
Metaphysics thinks about beings as beings. Wherever the question is asked what beings are, beings as such are in sight. Metaphysical representation owes this sight to tho light of Being. The light itself, i.e., that which such thinking experiences as light, does not come within the range of metaphysical thinking; for- metaphysics always represents beings only as beings. Within this perspective, metaphysical thinking does, of course, inquire about the being which is tho source and originator of this light. But the light itself is considered sufficiently
illuminated as soon as we recognise that we look through it whenever we look at beings.
In whatever manner beings are interpreted-whether as spirit, after tho fashion of spiritualism; or as matter and force, after the fashion of materialism; or as becoming and life, or idea, will, substance, subject, or energeia; or as the eternal recurrence of the same event - every time, beings as beings appear in the light of Being. Wherever metaphysics represents beings. Being has entered into the light. Being has arrived in a state of unconcealedness. But whether and how Being itself involves such unconcealedness, whether and how it manifests itself in, and as, metaphysics, remains obscure. Being in its revelatory essence, i. e. in its truth, is not recalled. Nevertheless, when metaphysics gives answers to its question concerning beings as such, metaphysics speaks out of the unnoticed revealedness of Being. The truth of Being may thus be called the ground in which metaphysics, as the root of the tree of philosophy, is kept and from which it is nourished.
Because metaphysics inquires about beings as beings, it remains concerned with beings and does not devote itself to Being as Being. As the root of the tree, it sends all nourishment and all strength into the trunk and its branches. The root branches out in the soil to enable the tree to grow out of the ground and thus to leave it. The tree of philosophy grows out of the soil in which metaphysics is rooted. The ground is the element in which the root of the tree lives, but the growth of the tree is never able to absorb this soil in such a way that it disappears in the tree as part of the tree. Instead, the roots, down to the subtlest tendrils, lose themselves in the soil. The ground is ground for the roots, and in the ground the roots forget themselves for the sake of the tree. The roots still belong to the tree even when they abandon
themselves, after a fashion, to the element of the soil. They squander themselves and their element on the tree. As roots, they do not devote themselves to the soil-at least not as if it were their life to grow only into this element and to spread out in it. Presumably, the element would not be the same element either if the roots did not live in it.
Metaphysics, insofar as it always represents only beings as beings, does not recall Being itself. Philosophy does not concentrate on its ground. It always leaves its ground-leaves it by means of metaphysics. And yet it never escapes its ground.
Insofar as a thinker sets out to experience the ground of metaphysics, insofar as he attempts to recall the truth of Being itself instead of merely representing beings as beings, his thinking has in a sense left metaphysics. From the point of view of metaphysics, such thinking goes back into tho ground of metaphysics. But what still appears as ground from this point of view is presumably something else, once it is experienced in its own terms - something as yet unsaid, according to which the essence of metaphysics, too, is something else and not metaphysics.
Such thinking, which recalls the truth of Being, is no longer satisfied with mere metaphysics, to be sure; but it does not oppose and think against metaphysics either. To return to our image, it does not tear up the root of philosophy. It tills the ground and ploughs the soil for this root. Metaphysics remains the basis of philosophy. The basis of thinking, however, it does not reach. When we think of the truth of Being, metaphysics is overcome. We can no longer accept the claim of metaphysics that it takes care of the fundamental involvement in "Being" and that it decisively determines all relations to beings as such. But this "overcoming of metaphysics" does not abolish metaphysics.
As long as man remains the animal rationale he is also the animal metaphysicum.As long as man understands himself as the rational animal, metaphysics belongs, as Kant said, to the nature of man. But if our thinking should succeed in its efforts to go back into the ground of metaphysics, it might well help to bring about a change in human nature, accompanied by a transformation of metaphysics.
If, as we unfold the question concerning the truth of Being, we speak of overcoming metaphysics, this means: recalling Being itself. Such recalling goes beyond the tradition of forgetting the ground of the root of philosophy. The thinking attempted in Being and Time (1927) sets out on the way to prepare an overcoming of metaphysics, so understood. That, however, which prompts such thinking can only be that which is to be recalled. That Being itself and how Being itself concerns our thinking does not depend upon our thinking alone. That Being itself, and the manner in which Being itself, strikes a man's thinking, that rouses his thinking and stirs it to rise from Being itself to respond and correspond to Being as such.
Why, however, should such an overcoming of metaphysics be necessary? Is the point merely to underpin that discipline of philosophy which was the root hitherto, or to supplant it with a yet more basic discipline? Is it a question of changing the philosophic system of instruction? No. (?r are we trying to go back into the ground of metaphysics in order to uncover a hitherto overlooked presupposition of philosophy, and thereby to show that philosophy does not yet stand on an unshakeable foundation and therefore cannot yet be the absolute science? No.
It is something else that is at stake with the arrival of tho truth of Being or its failure to arrive: it is neither the state of philosophy nor
philosophy itself alone, but rather the proximity or remoteness of that from which philosophy, insofar as it means the representation of beings as such, receives its nature and its necessity. What is to be decided u nothing less than this: can Being itself, out of its own unique truth, bring about its involvement in human nature; or shall metaphysics, which turns its back to its ground, prevent further that the involvement of Being in man may generate a radiance out of the very essence of this involvement itself radiance which might lead man to belong to Being?
In its answers to the question concerning beings as such, metaphysics operates with a prior conception of Being. It speaks of Being necessarily and hence continually. But metaphysics does not induce Being itself to speak, for metaphysics does not recall Being in its truth, nor does it recall truth as unconcealedness, nor does it recall the nature of unconcealedness. To metaphysics the nature of truth always appears only in the derivative form of the truth of knowledge and the truth of propositions which formulate our knowledge. Unconcealedness, however, might be prior to all truth in the sense of veritas. Alitheia might be the word that offers a hitherto unnoticed hint concerning the nature of esse which has not yet been recalled. If this should be so, then the representational thinking of metaphysics could certainly never reach this nature of truth, however zealously it might devote itself to historical studies of pre-Socratic philosophy; for what is at stake here is not some renaissance of pre-Socratic thinking: any such attempt would be vain and absurd. What is wanted is rather some regard for the arrival of the hitherto unexpressed nature of unconcealedness, for it is in this form that Being has announced itself. Meanwhile the truth of Being has remained concealed from metaphysics during its long history from Anaximander to Nietzsche.
Who does metaphysics not recall it? Is the failure to recall it merely a function of some kinds of metaphysical thinking? Or is it an essential feature of the fate of metaphysics that it own ground eludes it because in the rise of unconcealedness! its very core, namely concealedness, stays away in favour of the unconcealed which appears in the form of beings?
Metaphysics, however, speaks continually and in the most various ways of Being. Metaphysics gives, and seems to confirm, the appearance that it asks and answers the question concerning Being. In fact, metaphysics never answers the question concerning the truth of Being, for it never asks this question. Metaphysics does not ask this question because it thinks of Being only by representing beings as beings. It means all beings as a whole, although it speaks of Being. It refers to Being and means beings as beings. From its beginning to its completion, the propositions of metaphysics have been strangely involved in a persistent confusion of beings and Being. This confusion, to be sure, must be considered an event and not a mere mistake. It cannot by any means be charged to a mere negligence of thought or a carelessness of expression. Owing to this persistent confusion, the claim that metaphysics poses the question of Being lands us in utter error.
Due to the manner in which it thinks of beings, metaphysics almost seems to be, without knowing it, the barrier which keeps man from the original involvement of Being in human nature.
What if the absence of this involvement and the oblivion of this absence determined the entire modern age? What if the absence of Being abandoned man more and more exclusively to beings, leaving him forsaken and far from any involvement of Being in his nature,
while this forsakenness itself remained veiled? What if this were the case and had been the case for a long time now? What if there were signs that this oblivion will become still more decisive in the future?
Would there still be occasion for a thoughtful person to give himself arrogant airs in view of this fateful withdrawal with which Being presents us? Would there still be occasion, if this should be our situation, to deceive ourselves with pleasant phantasms and to indulge, of all things, in an artificially induced elation? If the oblivion of Being which has been described here should be real, would there not be occasion enough for a thinker who recalls Being to experience a genuine horror? What more can his thinking do than to t endure in dread this fateful withdrawal while first of all facing up to the oblivion of Being? But how could thought achieve this as long as its fatefully granted dread seems to it no more than a mood of depression? What does such dread, which is fated by Being, have to do with psychology or psychoanalysis?
Suppose that the overcoming of metaphysics involved the endeavour to commence with a regard for the oblivion of Being the attempt to learn to develop such a regard, in order to experience this oblivion and to absorb this experience into the involvement of Being in man, and to preserve it there: then, in the distress of the oblivion of Being, the question "What is metaphysics?" might well become the most necessary necessity for thought.
Thus everything depends on this: that our thinking should become more thoughtful in its season. This is achieved when our thinking, instead of implementing a higher degree of exertion, is directed toward a different point of origin. The thinking which is posited by beings as such, and therefore representational and illuminating in that way, must
be supplanted by a different kind of thinking which is brought to pass by Being itself and, therefore, responsive to Being.
All attempts are futile which seek to make representational thinking which remains metaphysical, and only metaphysical, effective and useful for immediate action in everyday public life. The more thoughtful our thinking becomes and the more adequate it is to the involvement of Being in it, the purer our thinking will stand eo ipso in the one action appropriate to it: recalling what is meant for it and thus, in a sense, what is already meant.
But who still recalls what is meant? One makes inventions. To lead our thinking on the way on which it may find the involvement of the truth of Being in human nature, to open up a path for our thinking on which it may recall Being itself in its truth-to do that the thinking attempted in Being and Time is "on its way." On this way-that is, in the service of the question concerning the truth of Being - it becomes necessary to stop and think about human nature; for the experience of the oblivion of Being, which is not specifically mentioned because it still had to be demonstrated, involves the crucial conjecture that in view of the unconcealedness of Being the involvement of Being in human nature is an essential feature of Being. But how could this conjecture, which is experienced here, become an explicit question before every attempt had been made to liberate the determination of human nature from the concept of subjectivity and from the concept of the animal rationale? To characterise with a single term both the involvement of Being in human nature and the essential relation of man to the openness ("there") of Being as such, the name of "being there [Dasein]" was chosen for that sphere of being in which man stands as man. This term was employed, even though in metaphysics it
is used interchangeably with existentia, actuality, reality, and objectivity, and although this metaphysical usage is further supported by the common [German] expression "menschliches Dasein." Any attempt, therefore, to re-think Being and Time is thwarted as long as one is satisfied with the observation that, in this study, the term "being there" is used in place of "consciousness." As if this were simply a matter of using different words! As if it were not the one and only thing at stake here: namely, to get men to think about the involvement of Being in human nature and thus, from our point of view, to present first of all an experience of human nature which may prove sufficient to direct our inquiry. The term "being there" neither takes the place of the term "consciousness" nor does the "object" designated as "being there" take the place of what we think of when we speak of "consciousness." "Being there" names that which should first of all be experienced, and subsequently thought of, as a place namely, the location of the truth of Being.
What the term "being there" means throughout the treatise on Being and Time is indicated immediately (page 42) by its introductory key sentence: "The 'essence' of being there lies in its existence." [Das "Wesen" des Daseins liegt in seiner Existenz.]
To be sure, in the language of metaphysics the word "existence" is a synonym of "being there": both refer to the reality of anything at all that is real, from God to a grain of sand. As long, therefore, as the quoted sentence is understood only superficially, the difficulty is merely transferred from one word to another, from "being there" to "existence." In B.&T. the term "existence" is used exclusively for the being of man. Once "existence" is understood rightly, the "essence" of being there can be recalled: in its openness, Being itself manifests and
conceals itself, yields itself and withdraws; at the same time, this truth of Being does not exhaust itself in being there, nor can it by any means simply be identified with it after the fashion of the metaphysical proposition: all objectivity is as such also subjectivity.
What does "existence" mean in B.&T.? The word designates a mode of Being; specifically, the Being of those beings who stand open for the openness of Being in which they stand, by standing it. This "standing it," this enduring, is experienced under the name of "care." The ecstatic essence of being there is approached by way of care, and, conversely, care is experienced adequately only in its ecstatic essence. "Standing it, experienced in this manner, is the essence of the ekstasis which must be grasped by thought. The ecstatic essence of existence is therefore still understood inadequately as long as one thinks of it as merely "standing out," while interpreting the "out" as meaning "away from" the inside of an immanence of consciousness and spirit. For in this manner, existence would still be understood in terms of "subjectivity" and "substance"; while, in fact, the "out" ought to be understood in terms of the openness of Being itself. The stasis of the ecstatic consists, strange as it may sound-in standing in the "out" and "there" of unconcealedness in which Being itself is present. What is meant by "existence" in the context of an inquiry that is prompted by, and directed toward, the truth of Being, can be most beautifully designated by the word "instancy [Instandigkeit]." We must think at the same time, however, of standing in the openness of Being, of enduring and outstanding this standing-in (care), and of out-braving the utmost (Being toward death); for it is only together that they constitute the full essence of existence.
The being that exists is man. Man alone exists. Rocks are, but they do not exist. Trees are, but they do not exist. Horses are, but they do not exist. Angels are, but they do not exist. God is, but he does not exist. The proposition "man alone exists" does not mean by any means that man alone is * real being while all other beings are unreal and mere appearances or human ideas. The proposition "man exists" means: man is that being whose Being is distinguished by the open-standing standing-in in the unconcealedness of Being, from Being, in Being. The existential nature of man is the reason why man can represent beings as such, and why ho can be conscious of them. All consciousness presupposes ecstatically understood existence as the essentia of man - essentia meaning that as which man is present insofar as he is j man. But consciousness does not itself create the openness of beings, nor is it consciousness that makes it possible for man to stand open for beings. Whither and whence and in what free dimension could the intentionality of consciousness move, if instancy were not the essence of man in the first instance? What else could be the meaning if anybody has ever seriously thought about this of the word sein in the [German] words Bewusstsein["consciousness"; literally: "being conscious"] and Selbstbewusstsein ["self-consciousness"] if it did not designate the existential nature of that which is in tho mode of existence? To be a self is admittedly one feature of the nature of that being which exists; but existence does not consist in being a self, nor can it be defined in such terms. We are faced with the fact that metaphysical thinking understands man's selfhood in terms of substance or - and at bottom this amounts to the same in terms of the subject. It is for this reason that the first way which leads away from metaphysics to the ecstatic existential nature of man must lead through the metaphysical conception of human selfhood (B.&T., §§63 and 64).
The question concerning existence, however, is always subservient to that question which is nothing less than tho only question of thought. This question, yet to be unfolded, concerns the truth of Being as the concealed ground of all metaphysics. For this reason the treatise which sought to point the way back into the ground of metaphysics did not bear the title "Existence and Time," nor "Consciousness and Time," but Being and Time. Nor can this title be understood as if it were parallel to the customary juxtapositions of Being and Becoming, Being and Seeming, Being and Thinking, or Being and Ought. For in all these cases Being is limited, as if Becoming, Seeming, Thinking, and Ought did not belong to Being, although it is obvious that they are not nothing and thus belong to Being. In Being and Time, Being is not something other than Time: "Time" is called the first name of the truth of Being, and this truth is the presence of Being and thus Being itself. But why "Time" and "Being"?
By recalling the beginnings of history when Being unveiled itself in the thinking of the Greeks, it can be shown that the Greeks from the very beginning experienced the Being d beings as the presence of the present. When we translate einai as "being" our translation is linguistically correct. Yet we merely substitute one set of sounds for another. As soon as we examine ourselves it becomes obvious that we neither think einai, as it were, in Greek nor have in mind a correspondingly clear and univocal concept when we speak of "being." What, then, are we saying when instead of einai we say "being," and instead of "being," einai and esse? We are saying nothing. The Greek, Latin, and German word all remain equally obtuse. As long as we adhere to the customary usage we merely betray ourselves as the pacemakers of the greatest thoughtlessness which has ever gained currency in human thought and which has remained dominant until
this moment. This einai, however, means: to be present [anwesen; this verb form, in place of the idiomatic "anwesend sein," is Heidegger's neology]. The true being of this being present [das Wesen dieses Anwesens] is deeply concealed in the earliest names of Being. But for us einai and ousia as par - and apousia means this first of all: in being present there moves, unrecognised and concealed, present time and duration-in one word, Time. Being as such is thus unconcealed owing to Time. Thus Time points to unconcealedness, i. e., the truth of Being. But the Time of which we should think here is not experienced through the changeful career of beings. Time is evidently of an altogether different nature which neither has been recalled by way of the time concept of metaphysics nor ever can be recalled in this way. Thus Time becomes the first name, which is yet to be heeded, of the truth of Being, which is yet to be experienced.
A concealed hint of Time speaks not only out of the earliest metaphysical names of Being but also out of its last name, which is "the eternal recurrence of the same events." Through the entire epoch of metaphysics, Time is decisively present in the history of Being, without being recognised or thought about. To this Time, space is neither co-ordinated nor merely subordinated.
Suppose one attempts to make a transition from the representation of beings as such to recalling the truth of Being:. such an attempt, which starts from this representation, must still represent, in a certain sense, the truth of Being, too; and any such representation must of necessity be heterogeneous and ultimately, insofar as it is a representation, inadequate for that which is to be thought. This relation, which comes out of metaphysics and tries to enter into the involvement of the truth of Being in human nature, is called
understanding. But here understanding is viewed, at the same time, from the point of view of the unconcealedness of Being. Understanding is a project thrust forth and ecstatic, which means that it stands in the sphere of the open. The sphere which opens up as we project, in order that something (Being in this case) may prove itself as something (in this case, Being as itself in its unconcealedness), is called the sense. (Cf. B.&T., p. 151) "The sense of Being" and "the truth of Being" mean the same.
Let us suppose that Time belongs to the truth of Being in a way that is still concealed: then every project that holds open the truth of Being, representing a way of understanding Being, must look out into Time as the horizon of any possible understanding of Being. (Cf. B.&T., §§31-34 and 68.)
The preface to Being and Time, on the first page of the treatise, ends with these sentences: "To furnish a concrete elaboration of the question concerning the sense of 'Being' is the intention of the following treatise. The interpretation of Time as the horizon of every possible attempt to understand Being is its provisional goal."
All philosophy has fallen into the oblivion of Being which has, at the same time, become and remained the fateful demand on thought in B.&T.; and philosophy could hardly have given a clearer demonstration of the power of this oblivion of Being than it has furnished us by the somnambulistic assurance with which it has passed by the real and only question of B.&T.What is at stake here is, therefore, not a series of misunderstandings of a book but our abandonment by Being.
Metaphysics states what beings are as beings. It offers a logos (statement) about the outa(beings). The later title "ontology" characterises its nature, provided, of course, that we understand it in accordance with its true significance and not through its narrow scholastic meaning. Metaphysics moves in the sphere of the on i on: it deals with beings as beings. In this manner, metaphysics always represents beings as such in their totality; it deals with the beingness of beings (the ousia of the on). But metaphysics represents the beingness of beings [die Seiendheit des Seienden] in a twofold manner: in the first place, the totality of beings as such with an eye to their most universal traits (ou katholou koinon;) but at the same time also the totality of beings as such in the sense of the highest and therefore divine being (on katholon, akrotaton, theiou). In the metaphysics of Aristotle, the unconcealedness of beings as such has specifically developed in this twofold manner.
Because metaphysics represents beings as beings, it is, two-in-one, the truth of beings in their universality and in the highest being. According to its nature, it is at the same time ontology in the narrower sense and theology. This ontotheological nature of philosophy proper (proti psilosopsia) is, no doubt, due to the way in which the on opens up in it, namely as 8v. Thus the theological character of ontology is not merely due to the fact that Greek metaphysics was later taken up and transformed by the ecclesiastic theology of Christianity. Rather it is due to the manner in which beings as beings have from the very beginning disconcealed themselves. It was this unconcealedness of beings that provided the possibility for Christian theology to take possession of Greek philosophy- whether for better or for worse may be decided by the theologians, on the basis of their experience of what is Christian; only they should keep in mind what is written in the First
Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Corinthians: "ouhi emoranen o theos tin sopsian tou kosmou; Has not God let the wisdom of this world become foolishness?" (I Cor. 1:20) The sposia tou kosmou [wisdom of this world], however, is that which, according to 1: 22, the Ellines zitousin, the Greeks seek. Aristotle even calls the proti psilosopsia (philosophy proper) quite specifically zitoumeni - what is sought. Will Christian theology make up its mind one day to take seriously the word of the apostle and thus also the conception of philosophy as foolishness?
As the truth of beings as such, metaphysics has a twofold character. The reason for this two-foldness, however, let alone its origin, remains unknown to metaphysics; and this is no accident, nor due to mere neglect. Metaphysics has this twofold character because it is what it is: the representation of beings as beings. Metaphysics has no choice. Being metaphysics, it is by its very nature excluded from the experience of Being; for it always represents beings (on) only with an eye to what of Being has already manifested itself as beings (i on). But metaphysics never pays attention to what has concealed itself in this very on insofar as it became unconcealed.
Thus the time came when it became necessary to make a fresh attempt to grasp by thought what precisely is said when we speak of on or use the word "being" [seiend]. Accordingly, the question concerning the on was reintroduced into human thinking. (Cf. B.&T., Preface.) But this reintroduction is no mere repetition of the Platonic-Aristotelian question; instead it asks about that which conceals itself in the on.
Metaphysics is founded upon that which conceals itself here as long as metaphysics studies the on i on. The attempt to inquire back into
what conceals itself here seeks, from the point of view of metaphysics, the fundament of ontology. Therefore this attempt is called, in Being and Time(page l3) "fundamental ontology" [Fundamentalontologie]. Yet this title, like any title, is soon seen to be inappropriate. From the point of view of metaphysics, to be sure, it says something that is correct; but precisely for that reason it is misleading, for what matters is success in the transition from metaphysics to recalling the truth of Being. As long as this thinking calls itself "fundamental ontology" it blocks and obscures its own way with this title. For what the title "fundamental ontology" suggests is, of course, that the attempt to recall the truth of Being-and not, like all ontology, the truth of beings-is itself (seeing that it is called "fundamental ontology") still a kind of ontology. In fact, the attempt to recall the truth of Being sets out on the way back into the ground of metaphysics, and with its first step it immediately leaves the realm of all ontology. On the other hand, every philosophy which revolves around an indirect or direct conception of "transcendence" remains of necessity essentially an ontology, whether it achieves a new foundation of ontology or whether it assures us that it repudiates ontology as a conceptual freezing of experience.
Coming from the ancient custom of representing beings as such, the very thinking that attempted to recall the truth of Being became entangled in these customary conceptions. Under these circumstances it would seem that both for a preliminary orientation and in order to prepare the transition from representational thinking to a new kind of thinking recalls [das andenkende Denken], that nothing could be more necessary than the question: What is metaphysics?
The unfolding of this question in the following Picture culminates in another question. This is called the basic question of metaphysics: Why is there any being at all and not rather Nothing? Meanwhile [since this lecture was first published in 1929], to be sure, people have talked back and forth a great deal about dread and the Nothing, both of which are spoken of in this lecture. But one has never yet deigned to ask oneself why a lecture which moves from thinking of the truth of Being to the Nothing, and then tries from there to think into the nature of metaphysics, should claim that this question is the basic question of metaphysics. How can an attentive reader help feeling on the tip of his tongue an objection which is far more weighty than all protests against dread and the Nothing? The final question provokes the objection that an inquiry which attempts to recall Being by way of the Nothing returns in the end to a question concerning beings. On top of that, the question even proceeds in the customary manner of metaphysics by beginning with a causal "Why?" To this extent, then, the attempt to recall Being is repudiated in favour of representational knowledge of beings on the basis of beings. And to make matters still worse, the final question is obviously the question which the metaphysician Leibniz posed in his Principes de la nature et de la grace: "Pourquoi il y a plutot quelque chose que rien?"
Does the lecture, then fall short of its intention? After all, this would be quite possible in view of the difficulty of effecting a transition from metaphysics to another kind of thinking. Does the lecture end up by asking Leibniz' metaphysical question about the supreme cause of all things that have being? Why, then, is Leibniz' name not mentioned, as decency would seem to require?
Or is the question asked in an altogether different sense? If it does not concern itself with beings and inquire about their first cause among all beings, then the question must begin from that which is not a being. And this is precisely what the question names, and it capitalises the word: the Nothing. This is the sole topic of the lecture. The demand seems obvious that the end of the lecture should be thought through, for once, in its own perspective which determines the whole lecture. What has been called the basic question of metaphysics would then have to be understood and asked in terms of fundamental ontology as the question that comes out of the ground of metaphysics and as the question about this ground.
But if we grant this lecture that in the end it thinks in tho direction of its own distinctive concern, how are we to under- n stand this question?
The question is: Why is there any being at all and not rather Nothing? Suppose that we do not remain within metaphysics to ask metaphysically in the customary manner; suppose we recall the truth of Being out of the nature and the truth of metaphysics; then this might be asked as well: How did it come about that beings take precedence everywhere and lay claim to every "is" while that which is not a being is understood as Nothing, though it is Being itself, and remains forgotten? How did it come about that with Being It really is nothing and that the Nothing really is not? Is it perhaps from this that the as yet unshaken presumption has entered into all metaphysics that "Being" may simply be taken for granted and that Nothing is therefore made more easily than beings? That is indeed the situation regarding Being and Nothing. If it were different, then Leibniz could wt have said in the same place by way of an explanation: "Car le rien est plus simple
et plus facile que quelque chose". For the nothing is simpler and easier than any thing]."
What is more enigmatic: that beings are, or that Being is? Or does even this reflection fail to bring us close to that enigma which has occurred with the Being of beings?
Whatever the answer may be, the time should have ripened meanwhile for thinking through the lecture "What is Metaphysics?" which has been subjected to so many attacks, from its end, for once-from its end and not from an imaginary end.
《“表现——存在论”语文学视界》读书心得 南塘桥小学陆静 记得薛特发这本书时说过：这本书是要啃的。事实上的确如此，《“表现——存在论”语文学视界》——这个题目我都是看了很久才弄懂它的意思的，这本书真的是啃过来的，而且啃了这么久，自认为还是一知半解。 这是福建师范大学著名教授潘新和撰写的一本书，阅读之后最大的感受是：艺高人胆大，潘教授博览群书书，有着丰厚的积累和深厚的文学功底，所以，他在大量阅读他人作品，透彻了解他人观点的基础上，就有了站在巨人肩膀上的感觉，因此，他就有胆量挑战权威，有能力提出自己独到的观点。 这本书让我耳目一新的地方是，我们平时视若真理的许多教育理论，在潘教授这里被一一颠覆，且讲得有理有据。比如： 1、语文即生活。这是我们耳熟能详，也许在论文中还应用频率较高的观点：语文即生活，语文的外延与生活的外延相等。潘教授却提出：语文到底是要贴近生活还是贴近心灵？他的中心观点是作文不是为了应付生活，应付生活指的是日常生活，物质生活，而不是人的精神生活，那么这就将人混同于动物了。应付生活观下，丢失了对人内在的生命、精神、思想之需的关注，丢失的是人文关怀、诗意情怀。他毫不客气地指出，应付生活的观点只是给我们批判的应试教育换了张脸而已，其实质是不变的。由此不禁联想到，每年都会有网上会有一些奇葩作文疯传，当然不乏一些专门人员制造的段子，但从中起码也体现了一点，就是孩子没有自己的想法，他们只是在应需，应生活之需，应考试只需。 所以，潘教授呼吁我们的观点要从“写作是为了生存”到“写作是为了存在”转变。从原来的“应试”到现在的“应生活之需”到“人的言语表现的需要”转变，强调了人的回归。他认为，应生活之需的写作是被动的，带有强制性的，语文教育应具体体现为对人的个体言语生命欲求的尊重与唤醒，对人的言语表现欲、主题精神创造力和存在性言语动机的珍视，引领学生走上言语上的自我实现，即从应付生活动力学（实用、行为主义）到言语生命动力学（人本、人文主义）的转变。 2、到实践中学语文。在我们大力提倡注重实践，要在实践中学语文
《存在与时间》中的时间观（1）- 〃海德格尔〃爱智论坛 第四章现象学运动第三节海德格尔?此在与时间?里面所画的表格（126页）：时间性此在的存在之存在状态 过去沉沦态 现在抛臵态 将来生存态 先行于……的存在――生存――将来Sorge：已经在……的存在――被抛――曾在寓于……中的存在――沉沦――当前春有百花秋有月，夏有凉风冬有雪；若无闲事挂心头，便是人间好时节。 很高兴不经意间找到了五维时空坐标系的发明者wdek先生.我对您挑战权威的勇气和持续钻研的耐性表示钦佩,不过我不得不指出的是您在建立整个体系之前的假设的逻辑性错误.您关于光速的相对性的探索的起点恰恰是先假定光速不变---也就是说您其实是在与爱因斯坦所采用的理论建立的基础相同的对于光速不变的假定上开始推论光速的相对性的.如果推导的结果指向与实际结果(实验的可重复验证的结果)一致,那就与您的初衷相悖,反过来证明相对论的基础是牢固的.如果情况相反才能说,相对论错了----但是(我只粗略的翻了一遍您的著作,但是并不妨碍我理通其中的逻辑性证明过程)这却是您极力避免出现的情况.您的推导过程也许在数学上可以成立(在某些情况下),但是因为您的前提与结论是完全相反的,这里就不可避免的有逻辑错误.我读到您的著作也纯是偶然,我首先读到了关于五维时空坐标系的论述.对于您在五维时空坐标系加入的那个t坐标,我当时的感觉是海德格尔的时间性的物理应用.这是令我震惊的.因为这样做无疑是把海德格尔的纯粹个人体验式样的时间与物理学根植于的对应于客观世界的理论体系中的时间臵入同一模型中(且不论这个模型的现实可能性)加以考察.这同样是一种逻辑混乱.因为海德格尔是不相信"流俗的"时间观念的,而这个流俗的时间观念却是自经典物理学到爱因斯坦相对论所一直沿用的,尽管我们根据相对论来看这个经典的时间观念必定要受到怀疑.我认为您的错误就在于将海德格尔的本己概念移植入科学.有时间的话,我将继续说明这种做法之所以不能成立的根源所在. 时间与变易、变化或运动有关，人们所持的是一种空间化的时间观念。 注：空间化的时间观念：外时间而已 ------------------------------------ 因此，借用现代宇宙论的说法，Dasein的时间是一种?有界无限?的时间。 注：?有界无限?：?无界限的有限?。首先是有限，在有限的基础下有一种无限。 ------------------------------------ Dasein的无限性指的是无论何时何地它都是可能之在，它存在着就保持其自身为可能之在。 注：即认识无限尔。 ------------------------------------ 一个在者总要?出离?自身变成他物――变易，但是在者不可能保持住?绽出?且总是在?绽出?。 ?出离?：?必然性的出离?！ 变易：?变易?！ ------------------------------------ 人的理想――即使不是唯一的也是最高的理想――就是超越时间，超越有限性。
船舶结构与设备 特点： 1、知识点多、杂。考点知识多为书本原文，计算、思考等题目较少； 2、与货运、避碰同考，所占比例较小。其中货运160道题目，结构占20-30道题； 3、后期新题更新不多； 4、难点不多，需记忆。如船舶种类及特点、轻型吊杆、舵设备等。
第一章船舶常识（结构货运） 第一节船舶的基本组成与主要标志 一、船舶基本组成 由主船体、上层建筑及其他各种配套设备等组成。 1、主船体 船底：分单层底、双层底。舭部 ★舷侧：首/尾部船首/尾 甲板：上甲板、平台甲板（注：强力甲板、遮蔽甲板、量吨甲板、舱壁甲板定义见“甲板结构”）、甲板命名 舱壁：按方向分横舱壁、纵舱壁（其他分类方式见“舱壁结构”）。★船底、舷侧、舭部构成船壳板 2、上层建筑 定义： 分类：长上层建筑、短上层建筑（定义） 组成：首楼、尾楼、桥楼（位置、作用）、甲板室（长甲板室、短甲板室） ★桅屋属于短甲板室 上层建筑各层甲板：艇甲板、罗经甲板 3、舱室名称 机舱、货舱、压载舱、深舱（定义）、其他舱室 ★隔离空舱（干隔舱）：仅有一个肋骨间距的空舱 二、船舶主要标志
1、球鼻首和首侧推器标志：位置（前、后） 2、吃水标志：公制/英制（10cm/6英尺），★读取 3、甲板线标志：尺寸（300mm×25mm）、★位置 ★4、载重线标志：位置、堪划要求、字母涵义、丈量最小干舷 5、其他标志： 船名船籍港标志：船名字高比船首字高小10%-20%；船籍港字高为船名字高60%-70% 烟囱标志：位置 分舱与顶推位置标志：位置、形状 引航员登离船标志：上白下红 船舶识别号：100总吨及以上客船/300总吨及以上货船，位置 公司名称标志： 第二节船舶尺度与船舶吨位 一、船舶尺度 分为：最大尺度、船型尺度、登记尺度
《存在与时间》中的?在世?概念之阐释 在海德格尔的基础本体论中，?在世?是一个最根本的概念，《存在与时间》第一篇就是围绕着在世来展开论述此在的各种规定性，或者说，此在正是通过对在世的种种情态的揭示而得以阐明的。此在的性质之一就是去存在，而存在只能是?在世界之中存在?；此在的各种规定，都是植根于?在世现象?之中。也正是从这一着眼点出发，海德格尔毫不留情地批评传统本体论全都是无根的本体论，因为传统本体论跳过了在世现象，不是以?在世存在?作为出发点，所以无法抓住存在，而只是抓到了存在者。这在海德格尔看来正是本末倒置，因为只要存在还被当作自明的现象而放在一边因而还停留在暗晦之中，对存在者的研究只能是劳而无功的，无法抓住存在的真正意义。正因为看到了这一点，海德格尔才作出了?存在者状态的?（Ontisch）性质与?存在论的?（Ontologisch）性质的区分，这一区分奠定了与传统本体论截然不同的基础本体论（Fundamental Ontology）的基础。 本文首先揭示出?在世?在海德格尔的《存在与时间》第一篇的总体结构上所处的位置。在世不仅是海德格尔思维方法上的着眼点，是其论述方法上的着手处，更重要的是其思想体系——尤其是其基础本体论中的最根本的基础。此在有两种根本性质，即存在（Existenz）与向来我属性（Jemeinigkeit）；此在的展开有三种情态：情绪、领会和言谈；此在的存在又有三种结构：被抛、筹划和沉沦。此在的这些性质、存在结构和展开方式，都植根于在世本身，海德格尔对它们的阐明，就揭示了此在在世本身的实际生存活动。第二方面论述了世界之为世界如何在?在世?的基础上开展出来。海德格尔批评传统本体论超越主体与超越对象世界之间的对立，指出不是先有世界然后才有主体及其对世界的概念；也不是先有一个无世界的孤立的主体，然后从主体之内投射出一个世界。这两种看法，或者假定了实在的优先地位，或者假定了主体和内部经验的优先地位，都把世界现象给遗忘了，都从在世的实际境遇之上跳了过去，从而迷失了方向，找不到存在的意义。与此相反，海德格尔认为，在世存在才是最重要的，只有通过此在的在世活动才能揭示出世界本身的存在，而海德格尔对此在的各种性质和展开方式的揭示，就是以对在世现象的揭示为基础的。第三方面论述了在世存在的总体结构及其存在论基础，即在世；也就是把在世的存在在存在论上把握为一个统一的整体结构——烦。 一、?在世?在第一篇中的地位 此在有两个性质：?存在?与?向来我属性?。此在的?存在?不同于现成存在者的存在，而是去存在。而?向来我属性?使得此在得以以自己的存在作为最本己的可能性来对它有所作为，就是说作为可能性而存在，它可以在其存在中选择自己本身，获得或失去自己本身，而这些就是其存在的可能性，因而是积极的。因此海德格尔认为，非本真状态也是存在的样式。由于此在的上述性质，海德格尔指出，必须用独特的、不同于对待现成存在的方式来对待此在，即不能把它的存在当成是自明的，而必须先在存在论上?给出?它的存在来！只有这样才能获得对它的领悟。此在分析亦不应在一种?确定?的生存活动的差别相?中来阐释，而是要在这一生存活动的无差别的平均状态中来阐释，因为这种平均状态乃是此在存在的积极的现象性质，一切如其所是的自下而上活动都从这一存在方式中来又回到其中去；此在在这种状态乃至于逃避它的存在和遗忘它的存在这类方式中现身。因为此在的这种独特的存在特性，海德格尔提出了此在的生存论性质与作为非此在式存在者的存在规定性这两个范畴的
《船舶结构与设备》第四章题库 第四章系泊设备 题库与答案 1)大型船舶的导缆钳多用________。 A．闭式和开式 B．单柱式 C．双滚轮或三滚轮式 D．单滚式 答案：C 2)下列属于植物纤维绳的有________。 ①白棕绳；②马尼拉绳；③油麻绳；④尼龙绳；⑤涤纶绳；⑥椰棕绳。 A．①～③⑥ B．①～⑥ C．①③⑤⑥ D．①②⑥ 答案：A 3)下列类型的钢丝绳中________是半硬钢丝绳。 A．7×7 B．7×19 C．6×24 D．6×19 答案：D 4)在英制中，各种缆绳的大小尺寸是以________来表示的。 A．半径 B．周径 C．直径 D．以上均可 答案：B 5)钢丝缆绳每百米重量W（kg）计算公式为＝0.35D2，其公式中D的单位是________。A．mm B．cm C．in D．dm 答案：A 6)钢丝缆绳每米的重量计算公式W（kg）＝0.35d2，其公式中d的单位是________。A．mm B．cm C．in D．dm 答案：B 7)各种不同规格钢丝绳的重量可用公式W＝0.35D2估算，其中"W"的含义是________。A．每200m钢丝绳重（kg）
B．每10m钢丝绳重量（kg） C．每50m钢丝绳重量（kg） D．每100m钢丝绳重量（kg） 答案：D 8)7×19的钢丝绳为________钢丝绳。 A．硬 B．软 C．半硬 D．A、C都对 答案：A 9)化纤缆的规格用直径表示时单位为________，用周径表示时单位为________。A．mm；in B．in；mm C．mm；mm D．in；in 答案：A 10)半硬钢丝绳常用于做________。 A．静索 B．拖缆或系船缆 C．绑扎 D．大桅支索 答案：B 11)钢丝缆中油麻心的作用是________。 ①使缆绳变软便于操作；②起软垫作用减少缆绳内部摩擦；③防锈和润滑缆绳内部；④减轻缆绳重量。 A．①②③ B．②③④ C．①③④ D．①②③④ 答案：A 12)各种不同规格钢丝缆的重量可用公式W＝0.0035d2估算，其中W的含义是________。A．每米钢丝缆的重量（kg） B．每10m钢丝缆的重量（kg） C．每50m钢丝缆的重量（kg） D．每100m钢丝缆的重量（kg） 答案：A 13)缆绳的长度一般以每捆220m计算，但也有每捆以________计算的。 A．100m B．200m C．300m D．500m 答案：D 14)缆绳的粗细一般以________来衡量的。 A．直径 B．周径 C．半径
休谟《人性论》读后感 在大概的看了下《西方哲学史》的情况下，我知道了休谟这位伟大的哲学家，他的《人性论》让我很好奇，看书名，就让我觉得比海德格尔的《存在与时间》，康德的《纯粹理性批判》要有趣，当然哲学类的书籍都是非常枯燥难懂的，但只要懂了，那么在思想境界上就得到改造和提升。 休谟这位伟大的哲学家，我在上课时听老师介绍后，甚是震惊。12岁的休谟已经是爱登堡大学的学生了。出于“一种对于学习哲学和知识以外所有事物的极度厌烦感”和在哲学研究上的突破，休谟决定“抛弃其他所有快乐和事业，完全奉献在这个领域（哲学）上。”，这时的他才18岁。我现在已经19岁了，还在拿“谁的青春不迷茫”这句话来作为自己迷迷糊糊的生活的托词，实在惭愧。 《人性论》这本著作是休谟在他26岁时初步完成的，并在之后不断地增加内容。这本伟大的著作在当时却得不到重视，给辛苦研究的休谟带来很重的挫折。 休谟认为一切科学都与人性有关，数学、自然科学和自然宗教，也都是在某种程度上依靠于人的哲学，科学是在人的认识范围之内，并且根据人的能力和官能而被判断的。因此休谟提出一个建立一个科学体系，即有关于人性的“人的科学”。在此之前，我认为科学是本身存在的，是不变的真理，它就在这个世界上，只能被同一地发现而不会有不同的认知。站在人的角度看，但是这世界在不同的人眼中是不一样的，否则就不会存在问题的辩论了，其中关于克隆的问题就是一
个例子。所以归根到底，“人的科学是其他科学的唯一牢固的基础”。 关于人性，休谟分成了三种：知性，情感和道德学。我仅对第一卷的《论知性》第一章《论观念的起源、组合、抽象、联系等》中的部分谈谈我的个人的体会，至于整个《人性论》的内容概括我还无法体会和概括。 《人性论》的第一卷，休谟认为人心灵的一切知觉可分为“印象”和“观念”这两种不同的类型。印象：初次进入人的灵魂中的最强烈的的知觉；观念：我们的感觉、情感和情绪在思维和推理中的微弱的意象。这两者是一般很容易区别，但是在少数的特殊例子上，两者可能很相近，以至于难以区分两者，所以需要一个东西作为区别，于是休谟就把印象和观念分为简单的和复合的这两类，这样就巧妙地消除了特殊例子对理论体系造成不严密性的漏洞威胁。 关于简单的印象和观念，书中所说“我们的全部简单观念最初出现时都是来自简单印象，这种简单印象和简单观念相应，而且为简单观念所精确地复现。”，这里边就存在着一个次序关系。次序的关系，休谟用的正面证明例子是儿童对于颜色和味道的观念，和官能出现事故类似天生就是盲人或聋子的人对于某些印象和观念的的缺失。但是休谟又提出来一个矛盾的例子，就是在渐变连续的色调中的中间一个空白点，人是可以凭想象来补充这一缺陷的。当看到这里时，我在想：这矛盾似乎彻底的摧毁了关于印象和观念的次序上的理论。但是休谟对这种例子作出了关于次生观念的说明，观念可以从新观念中产生自己的意象，通过这个说明休谟完整严密地证明出了一切简单观念或是
西方哲学简史读后感（一） 人类是一种很奇妙的智慧生物，在酒足饭饱后，面对世界的众多不可知的事物，人类往往充满了求知欲和好奇心。在其驱使之下，人类一方面通过经验的积累，另一方面通过理性的思考推理，来尝试着解答这些问题和解释一些现象。这样，一部分解答成为了确知的知识，即科学；另一部分由于时代的局限，不能给出确定的答案，但由于人类对未知事物有着敬畏和恐惧的一面，产生了看似能完美解答这些问题的东西，即神学。 罗素认为，哲学就是介于神学和科学之间的东西，是带着理性的思维去思考科学所不能解答，而神学看似给出了完美答案的问题。所以“哲学”的人生观与世界观，在罗素看来，乃是两种因素的产物：一种是传统的宗教和伦理观念，另一种是可以称之为“科学的”那种研究。唯有这两者同时存在，才能构成哲学的特征。 罗素说；哲学是诉之于理性而不是权威（这和文艺复兴时期的新教主观主义是不同的，区别在于罗素诉之于理性，而新教是唯心的。理性能让人清醒地看到他人的可取之处，而唯心让人傲慢）。这是我对罗素最欣赏的一句话，有了它，才能让我彻底放下顾忌而去研究哲学，虽然在某种程度上说，我的这种心灵安慰也是建立在对罗素的权威上的，但那不是哲学上的。 哲学是研究人类思辩的心灵所最感兴趣的一切问题，在这些问题中，我所最为重视的，是人为什么活着？我所需要的答案，不是原子论那些家伙所认为的机械式的解释，而是目的论的解释。即当这个问题具体到某个人时，就成了“你为什么活着？”。 首先给我答案的是物理学，世界是平衡的，有生就有灭，当这个理论扩大到整个宇宙时，即整个宇宙都有灭亡的那一天，如此渺小的人类，和更加如此渺小的我，又有什么好抱怨的呢？但这又引出了另一个问题，既然人都是要死的，人类也是要灭亡的，甚至整个宇宙都是会归于零的，那么我们现在所谓的奋斗除了养活自己，苟且偷生外，还有什么价值？当然这也是人类期望永恒的一种思想，如果连饭都吃不饱，当然就没有这个问题了。 天体物理给了我一个类似神秘主义的答案。 宇宙是如此的广袤，有着太多人类所称之为科学的东西，它是如此的寂寞，亿万年来是如此的安静（我用了好久时间才适应用“它”来形容宇宙）。它需要有什么来理解它，来认可它的存在，而人类作为一种智慧生物，承担起了这个责任。人类根本的责任，是发展科学，是尽可能的去了解这个宇宙的根本。 在这个基础上，我才展开其他的思考。 为了发展科技，在现今的情况来看，只有保持经济的稳定发展才行。这样，我的思想难免的流于世俗了。 西方哲学简史读后感（二）
向终结存在 ――《存在与时间》关于死亡的生存论分析 中国人民大学哲学系张志伟 【内容提要】 对死亡的生存论分析是《存在与时间》中最富魅力的章节之一。本文按照《存在与时间》的线索梳理海德格尔对于死亡的生存论分析，以?存在到头?与?向终结存在?来区别沉沦的死亡观与生存论的死亡观，通过?向终结存在?凸现时间性之?有终的将来?，探讨死亡的存在论意义以及与时间性之间的关系。顺便摆出一个问题：终有一死从而注定没有?明天（将来）?的存在者，如何能够确立一种以?明天（将来）?为核心的人生哲学。 【关键词】存在、此在、死亡、存在到头、向终结存在、时间性 《存在与时间》的主题是?存在问题?，不过它已完成的部分主要是对?此在?（Dasein）的生存论存在论分析，旨在为建立一种基础存在论做准备，因而?存在问题?是围绕?此在问题?来展开回答的。由于海德格尔以现象学方法对此在的日常生活进行了卓有成效的?生存论－存在论分析?，往往使人自觉不自觉地?陷入?人生哲学式的解读。毫无疑问，《存在与时间》对于一个人的人生观可能产生极其强烈的震撼作用，尤其是其中关于死亡的思考，但如果仅仅从这个角度理解海德格尔，从伦理学的角度理解存在论，显然难以通达其思想的本源境域。无论海德格尔的思想能否成就一种人生哲学，存在论都是其关注的核心。然而，如果反过来从存在论去理解伦理学，那又当别论。本文讨论《存在与时间》中的死亡概念有两个层面（尽管我们有时很难把它们分开），其一是存在论的，其一是伦理学的，意在通过海德格尔关于死亡的生存论分析，讨论它的伦理学意义。 《存在与时间》在哲学著作中向以晦涩难解而著称，甚至近40年之后才有了第一个英译本。然而从另一个角度看，实际上《存在与时间》的结构极其严谨，堪称丝丝入扣，环环相接，而其论述之充分，甚至有罗嗦累赘之嫌。究其难解之原因，主要在于
《存在与时间》读后感800字 《存在与时间》是德国马丁?海德格尔的着作，曾被教育局称为“不合格”的一本书，却被不少学者认定是20世纪最重要的哲学着作之一。 在书里蕴含了太丰富的内容，讨论的问题也庞杂且深刻，有些地方让人根本看不懂，但是某些话却让人印象深刻，若有所思。 人想要本真的存在，就必须本真的理解和面对死亡，海德格尔说：“死是存在的最本己的可能性，像这种可能性存在，就为此在开展除它的最本己的能在，而在这种能在中，一切都为的是此在的存在。” “为生存而生存就是本真的”乍看就觉得是废话，人肯定都是求生的，不会是求死的呀，所以自然是为生存而生存，这样的问题还有讨论的意义吗? 但是结合很多人各种生存论，就不难理解为什么这个哲学家要讲出这样的话来。有人觉得生存是为了赚钱，有人说是为了工作或者其他形形色色我们觉得对于生存很重要的事情，或者满带文艺范儿的“为了让生命有意义”。 但是生存就是生存本身，与其他一切都无关，我们是为了让自己活着而生存的，为了维持生命而呼吸、饮食，而只有生存在这个世界上才有了工作、金钱……所有的一切。
下次再给自己找理由的时候，请记得告诉自己，生存就是我们的目标，于是很多我们觉得乏味的东西可能也会有意思起来，很多困难也就不那么可怕了。 生死一向是哲学领域很容易提到的话题，于是，探讨了生存本质后，海德格尔又说“死亡不是人实际能经验的。”谁知道到底这样的话是不是正确的呢，至少现在的你我都不知道。 没有经历过的人自然没有发言权，经历过的人又有什么方法能告诉我们他们的经验?“死亡也不是能被他人代替的。”要是能，那不知道有多少冤魂会因为别人的推责而无辜走在黄泉路上。也许真的是死亡使人个体化，使自己的生存整体地呈现出来。 有时候想想还真的是死亡让人去注意某人，文学上更是如此，我们经常都爱说，只有死人才能出名，因为实在有太多的好的作品都在作者死后才受到大众的认可。 甚至觉得大家好像忽略了生存的意义，明明人死如灯灭什么都留不下，不管是盛名还是厚利，很怀疑这样的规律是依靠怎样的理据形成的，但是它就在那里。人所畏的情绪向自己展示了自身的生存作为一种有限的存在是终有一死的。谁也代替不了谁，也无可逃避。不管这辈子怕不怕死，在世上也不过几十年，谁也逃不了，当下的日子好好过便好了。 生死由天，我们总是在纠结自己的存在，总是计算着在
H3C新一代数据中心解决方案的4大优势 推荐 打印 收藏 标准化 新一代数据中心之标准化 传统数据中心的异构网络 数据中心经过多年的发展和变革，已经成为企业IT系统的心脏，然而，随着企业信息化发展的不断深入和信息量的爆炸式增长，数据中心正面临着前所未有的挑战。其中，传统数据中心在不断的建设和升级过程中积累下来的繁杂、异构的网络，阻碍了数据中心向高效、敏捷的方向发展。 从数据中心的网络结构看，存在相对独立的三张网：数据网（Data）、存储网（SAN）和高性能计算网（HPC），而目前的网络现状： 数据中心的前端访问接口通常采用以太网进行互联而成，构成了一张高速运转的数据网络数据中心后端的存储更多的是采用NAS、FC SAN等 服务器的并行计算则大多采用Infiniband和以太网 不同的服务器之间存在操作系统和上层软件异构、接口与数据格式不统一
以上问题导致数据中心运行时，协议转换开销大、速率不匹配、性能瓶颈明显、开发与部署周期长、无法满足业务快速灵活部署和实际应用的需求。 标准化之统一交换架构 为了便于未来的业务整合和服务提供、简化管理、降低建设成本和运营维护成本，为了解决传统数据中心异构网络带来的种种问题，数据中心的建设应尽量避免异构系统的存在，用一个统一的标准来规划完整的数据中心网络体系。 在业务网络，以太网随着技术的变革一直在向前不断的发展，以满足不断变化的行业和市场的需求。自1983年以太网开始大规模普及开始，到1995年的以太网网卡被大多数PC所采用，再到快速以太网(100 Mbps )，千兆以太网( 1000 Mbps )以及今天的万兆以太网，和即将推出的40 Gbps和100 Gbps以太网标准。其经历了从终端到局域网、从局域网到广域网、从广域网到城域网的变革，可以说以太网正凭借其强大的生命力得到了空前的发展和壮大。 在存储领域，自IP存储自诞生以来快速发展，万兆存储更将存储发展带入新纪元。 在超级计算和高性能计算领域，08年6月发布的世界TOP500超级计算机排名显示，285个站点采用以太网连接，占据57％的份额。 随着CEE（Convergence Enhanced Ethernet 融合增强型以太网）对现有以太网标准的改进，以太网解决了数据中心应用面临的所有技术问题。融合增强型以太网已经成为构建统一交换架构数据中心的最佳选择。
论海德格尔《存在与时间》中的空间观念(一) 摘要:海德格尔在《存在与时间》中,利用现象学和解释学的方法,对空间现象作了深入的探讨,消解了流俗的空间解释,首次提出了生存论存在论的空间观念,对于变革人们的思维方式,重新确立和把握哲学研究的主题、对象和方法做出了重大的理论贡献。通过集中考察海德格尔在《存在与时间》中对空间问题的探讨,凸显了其在空间问题研究上所取得的重要理论成果,深入地揭示和剖析了这一研究所存在的理论缺陷和难题,从一个侧面折射出了海德格尔生存论存在论的时间观念在解决存在的意义问题时所固有的局限性和不彻底性。 关键词:海德格尔;此在;空间;空间性;时间;时间性 “回到实事本身”这是现象学的基本方法和精神。当海德格尔把这种方法和精神自觉地运用和贯彻到自己的哲学思考之中时,真正的问题就转换成了“回到存在本身”,而具体到空间问题时,则又变成了“回到空间本身”。本文所要探讨的主要问题就是:海德格尔为什么要回到空间本身,以及他是如何回到空间本身的。 一、问题的提出 总体而言,人类的空间经验无外乎有这样几种:处所经验、虚空经验、广延经验。围绕这些空间经验,在人类近代认识史上逐步形成了以下几种空间观念:①实体论的空间观念以牛顿为代表;②关系论的空间观念以莱布尼茨为代表;③属性论的空间观念以笛卡儿为代表;④先?验论的空间观念以康德为代表〔1〕1－3。海德格尔把上述这些传统哲学的空间观念称之为是“流俗的空间解释”,认为这种解释一再地遗忘和遮蔽了作为现象实情的“源始而本真的空间”。空间的源始性问题仍旧被搁置在我们的思所茫然不知的地方。 海德格尔把对存在和存在者的区分这一其思想展开的指导性原则贯彻到了对空间问题的研究中。传统哲学在对空间进行思考时,有一个不明言的前提,那就是:空间总存在。但它们从来不问“空间如何存在”,而总是在问“空间是什么”。而在海德格尔看来,空间绝对不是“什么”。我们不能问“空间是什么”,而只能问“空间如何存在”。哲学家们要追问“空间是什么”,这就把空间当做了一个存在者,而试图在本质主义的思想路线上为空间下一个本质定义。对于空间问题,我们只能通过“形式显示”的现象学方法,寻找一种前理论的、非对象性的经验构成方式,不是对空间作出“什么”(Was)或“内容”(Gehalt)的对象性规定,而是要显示出实事(现象)的“如何”(Wie),也即是说要显示出对空间现象的“拥有方式”、“通达方式”,把握它的“如何存在”(Wiesein)〔2〕。 二、空间与此在 海德格尔在其基础存在论范围内对空间问题的探讨所要着力解决的一个问题就是要用现象学的还原方法和解释学方法消解流俗的空间解释,从物理学的、数学的空间观念中还原出源始而本真的空间观念。而要完成这项工作,在他看来则必须从此在的空间性问题入手。海德格尔认为,“在世界之中存在”(in-der-Welt-sein)是此在之有空间性的可能条件。因为,“此在本质上不是现成的存在,它的空间性不可能意味着摆在‘世界空间’(Weltraum)中的某一个地点上,也不意味着在一个位置上上手存在”〔3〕122,所以,无论空间性以何种方式属于此在,都只有根据此在存在的基本建构,即“在世界之中存在”才是可能的。“在世界之中存在”不仅是此在之空间性的可能条件,而且也是世内其他存在者之空间性的可能条件;只有把此在的空间性问题解说清楚了,非此在式的其他世内存在者的空间性问题才能得到合理的说明。 海德格尔在解释何谓“在世界之中存在”时,首先对“在……之中”这一结构作了一番分析。在常识看来,“在……之中”这个用语称谓着一种存在者的存在方式一个存在者在另一个存在者“之中”。比如说,水在杯子“之中”,衣服在柜子“之中”。但是,在海德格尔看来,在某个现成东西“之中”现成存在,是世内非此在式存在者的存在方式,这种所谓的“在之中”(in-Sein),严格地来讲,应该叫做“在之内”(innerhalb)。此在必须同“在之内”这种存在方式划清界限。此在只能是“在之中”。“‘在之中’不意味着现成的东西在空间上‘一个在一个之中’;就源始的意义而论,‘之中’
海德格尔的倾听 ———读《存在与时间》有感 于晓风X (山东大学文学院, 山东 济南 250100) 现代德国哲学家海德格尔是一位杰出的划时代人物。代表海德格尔整个哲学思想的奠基性著作是《存在与时间》。而对于世界的影响,撇开历史和个人的状况不谈,我们仍旧可以公正地说,在西方思想史上,《存在与时间》是一部绝无仅有的著作。 此书之所以享誉于世,是因为它在现代西方社会这个被称为“后工业社会”的特定的历史条件下提出了存在的问题。对存在的意义的追问是海德格尔的巨大贡献。 海德格尔所提出的存在的问题之所以在西方引起极大关注,这与西方社会数百年的历史和思想的发展有着密切的关系。在西方社会漫长的历史演变过程中尤其是近代科学哲学革命以来,理性一直是一面高扬的旗帜,社会生活的方方面面都必须接受理性的审判才能谋求自己的合法生存权。然而,理性的荒谬性如同其合理性一样是有迹可寻的,这其中蕴涵着非常微妙的机理。理性主义者倡导理性的最初本意是企图利用理性的力量去掉禁锢人的锁链从而获取自由。他们以为只要把理性无限地加以发展,人就可以相应地获得最大的自由。 精神的痛苦最早引发的哲学形态是叔本华的悲观主义,他把整个世界描述为痛苦意志的无望挣扎。尼采把叔本华的哲学发展成强权意志的哲学,生命就是对于强权的渴望。如果说叔本华、尼采深刻地感受到理性的统治而导致人生意义的失落,自己受制于这种精神痛苦的折磨而又无法挣脱内心深处的骚动从而带有强烈的反理性色彩的话,那么,海德格尔则可以说相对比较冷静。他不是用反理性主义来和理性主义对抗,他提出的存在的问题,对存在的意义的追问,对此在与世界的关系的哲思,表明他试图在存在的意义彰显的前提下含摄理性,因而他的哲学便显得更深厚扎实,更有意味。 海德格尔克服形而上学的全部卓越的工作,他对柏拉图、亚里斯多德、莱布尼兹、康德和黑格尔的批判性研究向我们指出,纵观柏拉图之后的整个西方形而上学的历史以及亚里斯多德、笛卡尔之后的科学技术史,甚至可以说整个西方文明历史所告诉我们的恰恰是存在如何被遗忘的历史。而20世纪认识论、逻辑学发展无非是这种遗忘的逻辑后承,并将这种遗忘发展到登峰造极的地步。只要看一看现代西方人———特别是那些生活在大城市中的西方人———的生活状态,便可知道他们是以怎样的心理方式或物质方式体现着、表现着这种对存在的遗忘。可以说,西方广泛存在的技术性问题、异化现象、反人道主义的深刻危机,都在向人们提示着存在的遗忘。 在海德格尔看来,在武断的、界说的和分类的西方形而上学用语中存在着一种内在的联系,它将导致理性……技术性对生活的虚无主义统治。笛卡尔的“自我”观念可以说提供了理性统治生活的全部方案。因此很显然,正是理性化了的形而上学的技巧,阻碍了我们对存在问题的思考,也妨碍了我们将思想放置在追问的富有活力的诗的境域之中。海德格尔试图在此在和世界的本真层次上以悬而未决的、循环往复的动态对话方式取代 ? 9 1 1 ? 第2卷第5期 V ol.2 N o.5 潍坊学院学报 Journal of Weifang University 2002年9月 Sept.2002 X收稿日期:2001—11—11 作者简介:于晓风(1978—),女,山东安丘人,山东大学文学院硕士研究生。
得益于老师给了我们这样一个静下心来读书的机会，在繁忙的功课之余，拜读了海德格尔的《存在与时间》，深有感触。在过去的两年大学岁月里，一直忙于参加形形色色的社团活动，结交各个圈子的朋友，去图书馆也只是为各种考试复习，竟没有静坐下来认认真真品一本书。在这些白驹过隙的时光中，我从来没有仔细思考过生活的意义是什么，我们是为了什么而活着？在看到德国哲学家海德格尔的《存在与时间》这本书之后，我对于这方面有了新的思考和认识。 代表海德格尔整个哲学思想的经典著作就是这本《存在与时间》，它奠定了整个现代西方哲学的基础和方向。它之所以享誉于世，是因为它在现代西方社会这个被称为“后工业社会”的特定的历史条件下提出了存在的问题。对存在的意义的追问是海德格尔的巨大贡献。海德格尔所提出的存在的问题之所以在西方引起极大关注，与西方社会数百年的历史和思想的发展有密切的关系。在西方社会漫长的历史演变过程中尤其是近代科学哲学革命以来，理性一直是一面高扬的旗帜，社会生活的方方面面都必须接受理性的审判才能谋求自己的合法生存权。 在读海德格尔之前自己所理解的“存在”，就是单纯的存在，例如：“存在即合理”即“一切存在的事物都有它存在的理由”。整部《存在与时间》只关心一个问题：存在的意义问题。但是海德格尔用“存在”这个词意指什么呢？如果有什么区别的话，存在意指什么呢？“存在即合理”在《小逻辑》43页原文译文是：“凡是合乎理性的东西都是现实的，凡是现实的东西都是合乎理性的。”“存在”是最普遍最抽象的共相，亦即事物的本质。而所谓“合理”是指合乎理性，合乎绝对精神。这种理性不仅仅是主观的理想性，而且是事物的本质，而事物是符合自己的本质的，所以合乎理性的东西一定会成为现实所接纳的东西；当只有合乎理性的东西才能“称”为现实的时候，一切现实的存在的东西就都是合理的，合乎理性成为现实的条件。而现实中存在的现在，因为已经存在，自然而然的获得了理性的支撑，它是合理的。跳出自己的思维，不是创造性思维，思维由于存在而存在，这让我想起了唯心主义最核心的命题“我思故我在”，笛卡尔的我思故我在，是他全部认识论哲学的起点，也是他“普遍怀疑”的终点。他从这一点出发确证了人类知识的合法性。从这个角度出发，存在的前提是思考，由于人的认识能力，所以世界因为认识而存在，缺乏了认识那么就构不成构成世界的要素，因为自己的想象世界因此存在，意即思考才是世界的本源，这样的思考和海德格尔的命题有很大的相似处。我思故我在，我的思考铸就了我这个人，推广开来就是思考创造了所有的像。这种思想虽然我们经常去批判，但是不无道理，在没有更合适的道理替代这个道理之前这就是最合理的解释。但是这样想下去，我因为不断地思考而存在，我不思考就是走向终极的毁
第一章船舶常识 (C)1、下列有关主船体描述正确的是：①、是船舶的主体部分；②、由船底、舷侧、内底及首尾等结构组成；③、由上甲板、内底板、舷侧、首尾及横舱壁等结构组成； ④、是指上甲板及以下由船底、舷侧、甲板、首尾及舱壁等结构所组成的水密空心结构 A.①、② B.①、③ C.①、④ D.①、③、④ (D)2、船底板与舷侧板之间的圆弧过渡部分称之为： A.舭肘板 B.舭龙骨 C.舭列板 D.舭部 (B)3、主船体两舷舷侧在过渡至船舶前后两端并最终会拢的会拢段部分分别称之为： A.首舷和尾舷 B.船首和船尾 C.首部和尾部 D.首端和尾端 (C)4、主船体两舷舷侧在前部的线型弯曲部分称之为: A.船首(船端) B.船头 C.首舷(首部) D.首端 (C)5、主船体两舷舷侧在后部的线型弯曲部分称之为： A.船尾(尾端) B.船头 C.尾舷(尾部) D.船端 (A)6、船首两侧船壳弯曲处称： A.首舷 B.首楼 C.舭部 D.胯部 (D)7、船舶外板(又称船壳板)是指主船体中的： A.船底板 B.舷侧外板 C.舭部 D.构成船底、舷侧及舭部外壳的板 (A)8、就普通货船而言，下列有关主船体中甲板描述正确的是：①、为主船体垂向上成 上下层并沿船长方向水平布置的大型纵向连续板架；②、上甲板为船体的最高一层全通甲板；③、平台甲板沿船长方向布置并计入船体总纵强度 A.①、② B.①、③ C.②、③ D.①、②、③ (B)9、上层连续甲板是指： A.船体的最高一层甲板 B.船体的最高一层全通甲板 C.水密横舱壁上伸到达的连续甲板 C.平台甲板 (A)10、平台甲板是指： A.沿船长方向布置并不计入船体总纵强度的不连续甲板 B.沿船长方向布置并计入船体总纵强度的连续甲板 C.沿船长方向布置并计入船体总纵强度的不连续甲板 D.沿船长方向布置并不计入船体总纵强度的连续甲板 (B)11、上甲板以下的第二层连续甲板常称为： A.二层甲板 B.三层甲板 C.主甲板 D.干舷甲板 (B)12、上甲板以下的第一层甲板常称为： A.一层甲板 B.二层甲板 C.舱内甲板 D.下甲板 (A)13、上甲板以上由一舷伸至另一舷的围蔽建筑称之为： A.上层建筑 B.甲板室
新一代数据中心建设的总体规划设计 中国IDC圈4月25日报道: 下面我们有请中国系统工程学会信息系统工程专业委员会副主任委员高复先先生发表演讲。她的演讲题目是新一代数据中心建设的总体规划设计。有请高教授! 各位下午好! 我讲的题目是"新一代数据中心建设的总体规划设计".和上面几位先生讲的不太一样, 在数据中心的物理平台支撑之下, 作为企业政府也好, 特别是电子政务, 省市一级的信息内容、信息资源怎么来组织。能够说在信息资源整合和开发方面, 利用已有的数据平台的东西。 关于数据中心建设的基本认识, 本世纪是信息资源整合的世纪。这是国际上IT界的公认的一个观点。20世纪是计算机表明、普及数据处理应用、数据海量堆积的时代的, 21世纪是整合无序数据, 深度开发利用信息资源的时代。中国油田企业从20世纪50年代, 开始二维地震数据处理到80年代的三维地震数据处理, 现在进行着企业资源计划软件推行, 还有数字油田建设等等, 还有信息化建设取得长足进步, 还有问题也出现了, 应用系统分散开发, 数据标准混乱, 矛盾、冗余的数据继续堆积, 信息孤岛丛生, 管理层和决策层应用开发滞后。这个现象在其它的行业和电子政务方面普遍存在的。要从数据层面, 管理层面要做数据中心, 是一体化解决问题的一个很重要的方法。
那么不论企业信息化, 还有电子政务数据中心建设的误区呢, 我们发现调查研究以后, 主要在数据中心建设定位, 投资方向有问题。基本上停留在物理建设层面, 只注重解决数据集中存储、备份与安全等问题, 不注重解决数据标准化建设和信息资源整合策略问题, 同时由于缺乏统筹规划和需求分析, 没有发挥业主方的主导作用, 将数据中心建设项目分保给系统集成商和软件商, 最终演变成了设备和软件产品的采购、安装、部分数据迁移和调查应用, 数据中心不能支持核心业务运作与辅助领导决策, 数据中心不能支持核心业务运作与辅助领导决策, 没有发挥数据中心建设的应用。 我们要总体的来看这个问题。第一是基础设施建设, 提供远程的委托式的数据中心服务。还有在这个之上, 要建立这个行业这个企业这个政府部门, 这个数据标准化, 而我们的研究对这个标准化不是单一的, 是五项的大致系。 还有网上是数据存储, 集中存储一些主机的数据仓库, 包括空间地理的数据。还有数字数据, 管理的源数据。这之上才是业务开发, 对企业来讲, 有一套。对于公共卫生、社会保障, 诚信等等等等, 要建设下去。还有能够搞领导决策, 数据决策。那么这是数据中心的高层应用。那么这个应用服务要落到实处。那么要协调的完成这些复杂艰巨的建设任务, 不但有物理设施, 技术资源, 要搞统一筹划, 要做好统一规划、设计。这是非常自然的现象。
《存在与时间》中的本真性哲学 作者:Ruediger Safranski 摘要: 海德格尔以重新开始为口号登上舞台。他在早期演讲中声称，要摧毁崇高的文化价值和传统的意义规定，揭发它们的一文不值的真相。他手握他的Faktizitaet(人生此在的现实性)怒不可遏地关注着“今天普遍的文化任务周围的那群小鬼”。开始十分吃力，但后来成功希望越来越大，渐渐地海德格尔从人生此在的昏暗中升了上来。现在他依据其结构把人的生存称之为：在存在中(In-Sein)，现身情态[Befindlichkeit]、领悟[Verstehe]、沉沦[Verfallen]、操心[Sorge]。把时间解释为领悟任何一种存在的可能性的境域，存在的意义是——时间。要点已经点明，但为了使人理解这一点，海德格尔不仅需要这整整一本书，而是还搭上了他整个余生。海德格尔公开拒绝为历史的长时期活动制定任何项目或规划。只是人们必须利用瞬间，抓机会。然而，为了达到何种目的（Wozu）？出于甚么动机（wofuer）？不是为了远在天边的历史目标。如果还有目的存在的话，这个目的就是瞬间本身。这里讲的是对人生此在的感觉的提升。本己本真性无非是一种努力奋斗[Eigentlichkeit ist Intensitaet, nichts anders]。 Ruediger Safranski 著靳希平译 节录自《来自德国的大师─海德格尔及其时代》(Ein Meister aus Deutschland. Heidegger und seine Zeit.)，第九章。本译着将由中国大陆商务印书馆出版。(编者按：在[ ]括号内的是编者所加的附注或相关词项的德语原文) 天国序曲 ...在终止了他的短期神学学习之后，马丁?海德格尔[Martin Heidegger] 是以天主教哲学家开始他的学术生涯的。他的思想活动在对上帝进行研究的领域：在这里，上帝是我们的世界性知识
大数据服务平台简介 1.1 建设目标 大数据服务平台以“整合资源、共享数据、提供服务”为指导思想，构建满足学校各部门信息化建设需求，进而更好为广大师生、各级管理人员、院领导等角色提供集中、统一的综合信息服务。因此， 要建设大数据服务平台 主要包括综合查询，教学、科研、人事、学生、图书、消费、资产、财务等数据统计分析和数据采集终端（含数据录入及数据导入）。通过此平台为学校的校情展示提供所需的基础数据，为学校的决策支持积累所需的分析数据，为广大师生、各级管理人员、校领导的综合信息服务提供所需的开发数据，为学校的应用系统建设提供所需的公共数据。 1.2建设效益 协助领导决策、提供智能分析手段通过建设大数据服务平台：为校领导提供独特、集中的综合查询数据，使校领导能够根据自身需要随时查询广大师生的个人情况，有助于校领导及时处理广大师生的各种诉求。 为校领导提供及时、准确的辅助决策支持信息，使校领导能够全面掌握多方面的信息，有助于校领导提高决策的科学性和高效性（以往各部门向校领导提供的信息往往只从部门角度考虑，而校领导无法及时获取多方面的信息，无法及时做出决策）。为校领导提供丰富、全面的校情展示数据，使校领导能够实时掌握教学、科研、人事、学生、图书、消费、资产、财务等情况，有助于校领导制定学校未来发展战略。 为校领导提供教育部《普通高等学校基本办学条件指标》检测报表，包括具有高级职务教师占专任教师的比例、生均占地面积、生均宿舍面积、百名学生配教学用计算机台数、百名学生配多媒体教室和语音实验室座位数、新增教学科研仪器设备所占比例、生均年进书量。对提高教学质量和高等学校信息化程度等具有积极的指导作用。1.3 建设内容基于中心数据库，将学校长期以来积累的大量管理数据以一种多维的形式进行重新组织，多层次、多维度的整合、挖掘和分析，从各个层面、各个角度充分展示学校的办学理念、教学质量、科研水平、师资队伍、学生风貌、后勤保障、办学条件等，为各级管理人员、校领导科学决策提供强有力的技术保障与数据支持。 1、信息查询 包括教职工信息查询和学生信息查询。