THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 0022‐1821
VolumeLVII December 2009 No. 4
Notes on the Journal of Industrial Economics Website
https://www.doczj.com/doc/f36082787.html,/jindec/
PROFIT RAISING ENTRY*
A RIJIT M UKHERJEE ?
L AIXUN Z HAO ?
Common wisdom suggests that entry reduces profits of incumbent firms. On the contrary, we demonstrate that if the incumbents differ in marginal costs and the entrants behave like Stackelberg followers, then entry may benefit the cost efficient incumbents while hurting the cost inefficient ones. And the total outputs of all incumbents may be higher under entry.
*We thank the Editor for extremely helpful comments and suggestions. Arijit Mukherjee gratefully acknowledges financial support from The Leverhulme Trust under Programme Grant F114/BF. The usual disclaimer applies.
?Authors’ affiliations: School of Economics, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham, NG7 2RD, UK.
e-mail:arijit.mukherjee@https://www.doczj.com/doc/f36082787.html,
?Research Institute for Economics & Business, Kobe University, Kobe 657-8501, Japan.
e-mail: zhao@rieb.kobe-u.ac.jp
I.INTRODUCTION
Since the works of Bain [1956] and Sylos-Labini [1962], the issue of entry has received a great deal of attention. In an influential paper, Seade [1980] shows that while entry may increase or reduce the incumbents’ outputs, it always reduces their profits. This result is based on two important assumptions. First, pre and post entry product-market competition is characterized by Cournot competition. Second, all firms are symmetric in terms of production costs. However, often there are situations when neither of these assumptions holds. For example, pre-commitment strategies by incumbent firms may help them to behave like Stackelberg leaders (Spence [1977], Dixit [1980], Spulber [1981], Fershtman and Judd [1987] and Basu and Singh [1990]). Further, cost asymmetry rather than symmetry is perhaps the empirical regularity.
In this paper, we relax the two above-mentioned assumptions and examine the effects of entry on outputs and profits, in a simple framework of two incumbents and one entrant. Specifically, we allow the incumbents to differ in marginal costs, and assume that they compete in the Cournot fashion between themselves while behaving as Stackelberg leaders against the entrant. We find that the entry of a cost inefficient firm increases both the output and profit of the cost efficient incumbent, while it reduces the profit but has an ambiguous effect on the output of the cost inefficient incumbent. These results are generalized to multiple incumbents and entrants in our working paper version (Mukherjee and Zhao [2008]). It thus follows that the cost efficient incumbents may actually encourage new entry into the industry.
Evidences show that there are several industries where Stackelberg competition is relevant. As documented in Cho et al. [1998], the semiconductor industry consists of incumbent U.S. firms (e.g., Intel and Motorola) and entrant Japanese and Korean firms (Fujitsu, NEC, Samsung and Toshiba). DeMiguel and Xu [2006] demonstrate that Stackelberg structure is also relevant in the telecommunications industry. In addition, since Stackelberg competition is the standard approach to take in the presence of dominant firms or market
leaders (see e.g., Martin [2001]), we can expect our results to also hold in industries with dominant incumbents.1
The profit raising effect of entry features also in Tyagi [1999] and Naylor [2002]. Using a vertical structure with a single input supplier, Tyagi [1999] shows that entry may increase the input price, which tends to reduce the output of the final good. Under certain demand conditions, entry increases the incumbents’ profits if the input-price effect dominates the added competition from entry. In a similar setup but with firm-specific bargaining over the input price, Naylor [2002] shows that entry decreases the input price, and if this effect dominates the competition effect, entry increases the profits of the incumbents. Our analysis differs from theirs in that we focus on the firms’ cost differences and the Stackelberg leader position the incumbents enjoy over the entrant. Stackelberg leadership affects the incumbents’ perception about market demand and marginal cost, leading to increases in the output and profit of the cost efficient incumbent.
II. THE MODEL AND THE RESULTS
II(i). The Case of No Entry
Consider two incumbent firms, 1 and 2, producing a homogenous product. The constant marginal costs of firm 1 and firm 2 are respectively 0 and 0c >. The firms compete in the Cournot fashion. We assume that the inverse market demand function for the product is
(1) P a q =?,
where the notations have usual meanings. The two firms maximize the following expressions respectively to determine their outputs:
(2) 11()q Max a q q ? and 22()q Max a q c q ??
where 12q q q =+. The equilibrium outputs can be found as 1 O pinion differs on the minimum size of a dominant firm. Scherer [1980] discusses about a leading firm’s market share of 40%, while Landes and Posner [1981] suggest 80% or more. The European Union suggests that market shares of 80% show clear evidence of dominance and a market share of 40-50% strongly implies the ability to exploit strategic advantage against rivals (George and Jacquemin [1992]). The U.S. Merger Guidelines contain a ‘leading firm proviso’ based on a market share of at least 35% (US department of justice [1988]).
(3) 1()/3q a c =+ and 2(2)/3q a c =?.
Positive outputs of all firms require that ?/2c a c <≡, which is assumed to hold. The equilibrium profits of firms 1 and 2 are respectively,
(4)
21()/9a c π=+ and 22(2)/9a c π=?.
II(ii). The Case of Entry
Now we introduce an entrant, firm 3, which can also produce the good and faces the constant marginal cost ()e c ≥. Such entry could arise due to exogenous knowledge spillover or patent expiry of old technologies of the incumbents. Considering the incumbents as dominant firms, or in view of the pre-commitment strategies adopted by the incumbents, we can treat the game between the incumbents and the entrants as a Stackelberg competition, where the incumbents behave like Stackelberg leaders and the entrants as followers. However, the incumbents play like Cournot oligopolists amongst them.
We consider the following game under entry. At stage 1, the incumbent firms choose their outputs simultaneously. At stage 2, the entrant determines its output and the profits are realized. We solve the game by backward induction.
Given the outputs of the incumbents, the entrant maximizes: (5) 33()q Max a q e q ??,
where 123q q q q =++, which gives its optimal output as 312()/2q a e q q =???. Firms 1 and 2 maximize respectively:
(6a)
1112121121 {()/2} ()/2q q Max a q q a e q q q Max a e q q q ??????=+?? (6b)
2212122122
{()/2} (2)/2q q Max a q q a e q q c q Max a e q q c q ???????=+???
The equilibrium outputs of firms 1 and 2 can be found as (7) 1(2)/3q a e c =++ and 2(4)/3q a e c =+?. Hence, the equilibrium output of firm 3 is 3(52)/3q a e c =?+. We assume that
(8) 30q >, i.e., (2)/5e a c e <+≡. Otherwise, entry has no meaning in our analysis. If (8) holds, the outputs of the incumbents are positive since 0e c ≥≥. Note that e c ≥ for /3c a ≤. Thus if /3c a >, we obtain 30q = for any e c ≥. To make entry meaningful for e c ≥, we restrict our attention to /3c a c <≡.
Next, the equilibrium profits of firms 1 and 2 can be derived as respectively (9) 21(2)/18a e c π=++ and 22(4)/18a e c π=+?. The equilibrium profit of firm 3 is 23(52)/36a e c π=?+.
Proposition 1: (i) The equilibrium output of firm 1 is higher under entry than under no entry. (ii) The equilibrium output of firm 2 is higher under entry than under no entry if (2,)e c e ∈ and [0,/8)c a ∈.
Proof: (i) It follows immediately from the outputs of firm 1 in (3) and (7).
(ii) By (3) and (7), the output of firm 2 is higher under entry than under no entry if 2c e <. Since [,)e c ∈, the condition 2c e < is feasible if 2e c > or /8c a <, where /8/3a c a <≡.
■
The intuition for the above results can be found from a comparison of (2) versus (6a) and (6b). If we ignore the constant 1/2 in (6a) and (6b), since it does not affect optimization, these profit functions suggest that Stackelberg competition induces both firms 1 and 2 to perceive a higher demand (i.e., (a + e) in (6a) and (6b) instead of a in (2)) and a higher marginal cost for firm 2 (i.e., 2c in (6b) instead of c in (2)) compared to the case of no entry. The perceived higher demand induces firm 1 to increase its output. However, there are opposing effects on firm 2. The perceived higher demand tends to increase firm 2’s output,
while the perceived higher marginal cost tends to reduce its output. On balance, entry increases firm 2’s output if the perceived demand effect outweighs the perceived marginal cost effect, which occurs if e is relatively high (i.e., the entrant being too inefficient) and c is relatively small (i.e., firm 2 being not too inefficient).
Proposition 2: (i) The profit of firm 1 is higher under entry than under no entry if
((),)c e e c e ∈, where ()1)(c e c a ≡? and (,)c c c c ∈ where
6)/(12c c a ≡??.
(ii) The profit of firm 2 is lower under entry than under no entry.
Proof: (i) From (4) and (9), entry increases firm 1’s profit if 1)(()c e a e c >??≡.
However, ()c e c is in the feasible range of [,)e c e ∈ if (2)/5()c e a c e c ≡+> or
6)/(12c c a c >?≡, where /3c c c a <≡.
(ii) Similarly, entry reduces firm 2’s profit if 1)()a e ?+>, which holds since
1)()a e ?+>.
■
The intuition for Proposition 2 is as follows. While entry tends to reduce the profits of the incumbents through increased competition (which is captured by the term 1/2 in (6a) and (6b)), the higher perceived demand curve under Stackelberg competition increases firm 1’s output, and this effect tends to rise with e . Further, from Proposition 1 it follows that the condition on c in Proposition 2(i) ensures that entry reduces firm 2’s output since /8c c a >. Because the outputs are “strategic substitutes”, firm 2’s lower output helps firm 1 to further expand its output. The positive output effect outweighs the negative competition effect on firm 1’s profit if both e and c are relatively high (or if neither of firms 2 and 3 are very efficient). However, though entry increases firm 2’s perceived demand curve, which has a positive effect on its profit, entry tends to reduce firm 2’s profit by increasing competition and firm 2’s
perceived marginal cost. These negative effects dominate the positive perceived demand effect and reduce firm 2’s profit.
III.CONCLUSION
We have shown that if the firms differ in marginal costs of production and the incumbents and entrants behave like Stackelberg leaders and followers respectively, entry increases output of the cost efficient incumbent but has an ambiguous effect on the cost inefficient incumbent. Further, entry increases the profit of the former firm if it is sufficiently cost efficient than the other firms. However, entry always reduces the profit of the cost inefficient incumbent.
It must be noted that the perceived demand and cost effects under Stackelberg competition do not depend on the demand structure. The effects occur since the incumbents internalize the strategic output choice of the entrant. A non-linear demand function will only affect the extent of these effects. Also note that Stackelberg competition under entry is important for our results. If the incumbents and the entrant behave like Cournot oligopolists ex-post entry, the above mentioned perceived demand and cost effects disappear, and entry reduces the profits of all incumbents.
To show the effects of entry in the simplest way, we have considered an exogenously given Stackelberg structure under entry. This structure can certainly arise endogenously following the strategies of the incumbents (see Spence [1979] and Dixit [1980]).
REFERENCES
Bain, J. S., 1956, Barriers to New Competition (Cambridge, Harvard University Press). Basu, K. and Singh, N., 1990, ‘Entry-Deterrence in Stackelberg Perfect Equilibrium’, International Economic Review, 31, pp. 61-71.
Cho, D.-S., Kim, D.-J. and Rhee, D. K., 1998,‘Latecomer Strategies: Evidence from the Semiconductor Industry in Japan and Korea’, Organization Science, 9, pp. 489-505. DeMiguel, V. and Xu, H., 2008, ‘A Stochastic Multiple Leader Stackelberg Model: Analysis, Computation and Application’, Operations Research, Forthcoming.
Dixit, A., 1980, ‘The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence’, The Economic Journal, 90, pp.
95-106.
Fershtman, C. and Judd, K. L., 1987, ‘Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly’, American Economic Review, 77, pp. 927-940.
George, K. and Jacquemin, A., 1992, ‘Dominant Firms and Mergers’, The Economic Journal, 102, pp. 148-157.
Landes, W. and Posner, R. A., 1981, ‘Market Power in Antitrust Cases’, Harvard Law Review, 94, pp. 937-983.
Martin, S., 2001, Industrial Organization: A European Perspective (Oxford University Press, New York, USA).
Mukherjee, A. and Zhao, L., 2008, ‘Profit Raising Entry’, Discussion Paper, No. 08/01, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
Naylor, R. A., 2002, ‘The Effects of Entry in Bilateral Oligopoly’, Mimeo, University of Warwick.
Scherer, F. M., 1980, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (Rand McNally, Chicago).
Seade , J., 1980, ‘On the Effects of Entry’, Econometrica, 48, pp. 479-490.
Spence, A. M., 1977, ‘Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing’, Bell Journal of Economics, 8, pp. 534-544.
Spulber, D. F., 1981, ‘Capacity, Output and Sequential Entry’, The American Economic Review, 71, pp. 503-514.
Sylos-Labini, P., 1962, Oligopoly and Technical Papers (Cambridge, Harvard University Press).
Tyagi, R. K., 1999, ‘On the Effects of Downstream Entry’, Management Science, 45, pp. 59-
73.
US Department of Justice, 1988, Merger Guidelines (Trade Regulation Reports, CCH, at 20561).
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最新英文论文的致谢词 论文英文答谢词1 First of all, I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Zhang Hong, for her instructive advice and useful suggestions on my thesis. I am deeply grateful of her help in the completion of this thesis. High tribute shall be paid to Ms. Geng Li, whose profound knowledge of English triggers my love for this beautiful language and whose earnest attitude tells me how to learn English. I am also deeply indebted to all the other tutors and teachers in Translation Studies for their direct and indirect help to me. Special thanks should go to my friends who have put considerable time and effort into their comments on the draft. Finally, I am indebted to my parents for their continuous support and encouragement. 论文英文答谢词2 I would like to express my gratitude to all those who helped me during the writing of this thesis.
1． S-C-P三者间的关系？答：在短期内，市场结构，市场行为，市场绩效之内的关系是，市场结构从根本上制约市场行为，市场行为又直接决定了市场绩效。从长期考察，市场结构也发生变化，而这种变化正是企业市场行为长期作用的结果，有时市场绩效的变化也会直接导致市场结构发生变化。所以，在一个较长的时期内，市场结构，市场行为，市场绩效之间是双向的因果关系。 2．可竞争市场理论的内容及政策主张？答：内容：市场内的企业从该市场退出时完全不用负担不可回收的沉没成本，从而企业进入和退出完全自由的市场。衡量可竞争市场的一个方法是看该市场的沉没成本：沉没成本越低，企业退出就越容易，从而企业进入决策不会太小心谨慎，在位企业面临的进入压力越大，市场就越接近于可竞争。政策主张：潜在的竞争完全可以替代政府的规制。政府的竞争政策与其说重视市场结构，不如说是重视是否存在充分的潜在竞争压力，而确保竞争压力的存在关键是要尽可能降低沉没成本3．试述市场结构的度量指标？答：市场的集中度；产品的差异化；进入和退出壁垒；市场需求的价格弹性；市场需求的增长率；短期成本结构。 4．试述主导产业的作用。？答：1）依靠科学技术进步，获得新的生产函数2）形成持续高速增长的增长率3）具有较强的扩散效应，对其他产业乃至所有产业的增长有决定性的影响。 5．试述古典企业模型？主要从技术角度出发，运用边际分析的方法，研究了在完全竞争的市场条件下一个产业最佳产出水平和市场均衡价格的决定问题，以及与此相应的企业最优生产规模和最佳生产范围的决定问题。 6．试述在完全竞争的市场条件下，短期与长期行业均衡及厂商最优规模分别是如何决定的。 答：所谓短期是指这样长的一段时期，在这个时期内的厂商的厂房设备的规模是固定不变的。他只有通过调整可变要素的使用量来调整其产销。从整个行业来看，在短期内，不仅该行业现有厂商的厂房规模是固定不变的，而且该行业的厂商的数量也是固定不变的。原因是由于时间较短，现有厂商来不及调整其厂房设备等资产，而其他厂商也无法建造出新的厂房设备从而进入到该行业中来。 长期：所谓的长期是指在这段时期内，厂商有足够的时间调整其厂房设备的规模，即厂商能够根据他的准备提供的产量选择一个所需的总成本为最低的厂房设备规模；而且整个行业的厂商的数量也有足够的时间发生变化，即只要现有厂商可获得超额利润，就会吸引新的厂商进入该行业，从而引起厂商数量的增加，反之，不能赚得正常利润而蒙受亏损的厂商势必退出该行业，从而引起该行业厂商数量的减少。 7．试分析企业的价格歧视策略？答：1厂商必须具有一定的市场力量。价格歧视通常发生在垄断市场或寡头垄断市场2价格歧视要求厂商能根据消费者的支付意愿划分顾客。厂商可以从地域、年龄、收入、消费习惯等多方面来划分顾客3厂商必须能够阻止消费者通过转售套利。
南京航空航天大学金城学院 毕业设计（论文）外文文献翻译 系部经济系 专业国际经济与贸易 学生姓名陈雅琼学号2011051115 指导教师邓晶职称副教授 2015年5月
Economic policy,tourism trade and productive diversification （Excerpt） Iza Lejárraga,Peter Walkenhorst The broad lesson that can be inferred from the analysis is that promoting tourism linkages with the productive capabilities of a host country is a multi-faceted approach influenced by a variety of country conditions.Among these,fixed or semi-fixed factors of production,such as land,labor,or capital,seem to have a relatively minor influence.Within the domain of natural endowments,only agricultural capital emerged as significant.This is a result that corresponds to expectations,given that foods and beverages are the primary source of demand in the tourism economy.Hence,investments in agricultural technology may foment linkages with the tourism market.It is also worth mentioning that for significant backward linkages to emerge with local agriculture,a larger scale of tourism may be important. According to the regression results,a strong tourism–agriculture nexus will not necessarily develop at a small scale of tourism demand. It appears that variables related to the entrepreneurial capital of the host economy are of notable explanatory significance.The human development index(HDI), which is used to measure a country's general level of development,is significantly and positively associated with tourism linkages.One plausible explanation for this is that international tourists,who often originate in high-income countries,may feel more comfortable and thus be inclined to consume more in a host country that has a life-style to which they can relate easily.Moreover,it is important to remember that the HDI also captures the relative achievements of countries in the level of health and education of the population.Therefore,a higher HDI reflects a healthier and more educated workforce,and thus,the quality of local entrepreneurship.Related to this point,it is important to underscore that the level of participation of women in the host economy also has a significantly positive effect on linkages.In sum, enhancing local entrepreneurial capital may expand the linkages between tourism and other sectors of the host country.
第一阶段课程主要完成了产业组织理论所涉及到的基本方法的介绍，应掌握以下主要内容： 1、规模经济与范围经济 2、不同市场结构及其福利分析 3、完全信息静态博弈分析方法 4、OLS 回归分析方法及结果分析 基本概念： 1、 马歇尔冲突：规模经济与垄断的冲突 2、 单一产品厂商的规模经济 （1） MC
（3）规模经济与学习曲线：规模经济表现为成本随着生产数量的增加而降低；学习曲线表现为在产量不变的情形下，成本曲线向下平移。 3、 多产品厂商的规模经济与范围经济 （1） 总成本：C(q 1,q 2)——厂商生产q 1单位的产品1和q 2单位的产品2时的成本，由 于可能存在规模经济与范围经济，C(q 1,q 2)不一定等于Cq 1+ Cq 2 （2） 边际成本：1 211) ,(q q q C MC ??= ，2 212) ,(q q q C MC ??= （3） 平均成本——基于定义多产品厂商总成本的同样原因，引入射线平均成本概念 （RAC ）表示多产品厂商的平均成本 用λ1和λ2表示产品1和产品2的生产比例，q 表示总产出，则q 1=λ1q ，q 2=λ2q ， 有：q q q C RAC q ),(21λλ= （4） 规模经济：用s 表示规模经济的衡量尺度（不同版本教材分子分母可能会颠倒，但 不影响分析） )(2 211q C q q C q Cq s ??+??= 有： s>1,RAC 随着q 的增加而下降，即存在规模经济；依次类推出规模不经济和规模报酬不变 （5） 特定产品规模经济 产品1产量不变，产品2从0增加到q 2所增加的成本记为IC 2，则：IC 2=C(q 1,q 2)- C(q 1,0);所增加的平均成本记为AIC 2，则：AIC 2=[C(q 1,q 2)- C(q 1,0)]/ q 2 特定产品的规模经济：当其他产出不变时，特定产品i 的规模经济衡量指标记为PS i ,则PS i =AIC i /MC i （6） 范围经济
感谢的英文翻译 I am hereon on behalf of all my colleagues of the company, to expremy gratitude for their efforts and outstanding performance in certification work,and to give them awards. 1. 我代表我的同事和我本人向你表示感谢。 On behalf of my colleagues and myself I thank you. 2. 我不知道该怎样来感谢你才好。 I don’t know how I can possibly thank you enough. 3. 我非常感谢您。 I’m extremely grateful to you. 4. 感谢你的邀请。 I appreciate your invitation. 5. 我们深深感谢你的支持。 We are deeply grateful for your support. 6. 感谢你做的一切。
Thank you for everything. 7. 我愿借此机会感谢每一位为这个项目辛勤工作的人。 I’d like to take this opportunity to thank everyone for their hard work on the project. 8. 非常感谢。 Thanks a million. thank you very much thanks a lot thank you so much many thanks 好运~~ 感谢生活，给了我苦难的同时也给了我巨大的财富。让我在自己的人生道路上，始终能含笑面对风雨，坦然应对挫折，荣辱不惊，得失随缘! 今天是感恩节，我为你准备了可口的火鸡，还有甜美的饮品，还有……还有我的心和戒指，感恩节，你愿意永远和我在一起吗? 今天是感恩节，向所有帮助过我和我爱的朋友们说声感谢，感谢你走进我的生命，让它完整而有意义。我愿以我有生的时光带给你无限快乐!
第一章产业经济学导论 （一）产业经济学的研究对象是什么? 产业经济学的研究对象顾名思义就是产业，即具有某种同类属性的具有相互作用的经济活动组成的集合或系统。具体来说，产业经济学研究的是产业内部各企业之间相互作用关系的规律、产业本身的发展规律、产业与产业之间互动联系的规律以及产业在空间区域中的分布规律等。 （二）如何理解产业经济学的学科体系? 产业经济学从产生到现在已经得到了巨大的发展，其学科体系已经比较完善。从国内外学者对产业经济的研究来看，与产业经济学研究的各个具体对象相对应，产业经济学的学科领域一般包括以下六个方面： （1）产业组织理论（2）产业结构理论 （3）产业关联理论（4）产业布局理论 （5）产业发展理论（6）产业政策研究 （三）学习产业经济学的意义是什么? （1）理论意义 1.产业经济学的研究有利于统一的经济学体系的建立； 2.产业经济学的研究有利于经济学和管理学的沟通； 3.产业经济学的研究有利于应用经济学的学科建设。 （2）实践意义 1.研究产业经济学，有利于建立有效的产业组织结构； 2.研究产业经济学，有利于产业结构的优化； 3.研究产业经济学，有利于产业的合理布局。 （3）现实意义 1.研究产业经济学，正确把握产业发展的现状、问题、成因及趋势，为产业政策的制定提供科学的理论依据，对我国经济的发展，特别是促使我国经济建设的两个转变具有特别的现实意义。 2.过去产业布局失误的重要原因之一就是对产业布局的客观规律认识不足，所以要杜绝这些弊病的重演，就必须加深对产业经济学的研究和理解。由此可见，研究产业经济学也是当今中国经济建设的现实需要。 （四）产业经济学有哪些研究方法? 1.实证分析与规范分析相结合的方法； 2.定性分析与定量分析相结合的方法； 3.静态分析与动态分析相结合的方法； 4.统计分析与比较分析相结合的方法； 5.博弈论的分析方法； 6.结构主义的分析方法； 7.案例研究方法； 8.系统动力学方法。 （五）产业的涵义有哪些？ 1.产业是社会分工的产物； 2.产业是社会生产力不断发展的必然结果； 3.产业是具有某种同类属性的企业经济活动的集合； 4.产业是介于宏观经济与微观经济之间的中观经济； 5.产业的含义具有多层次性； 6.产业随着社会生产力水平的不断提高，其内涵不断充实，其外延不断扩展。 （六）管理文化对产业经济的作用有哪些？ 1.管理文化在产业经济中的地位：管理文化与产业运行的同步性；管理文化对产业发展的先导性；管理文化在产业经济中的动力性；管理文化在产业发展中的创造性。 2.管理文化对产业经济作用的方式： 从广义上看，管理文化一般通过价值观念、技术形态、生活方式和精神的物化等几个方
英语毕业论文致谢信 dear ————, i am writing this letter to thank you for you warm hospitality accorded to me and my delegation during our recent visit to your beautiful country. i would also like to thank you for your interesting discussion with me which i have found very informative and useful. during the entire visit, my delegation and i were overwhelmed by the enthusiasm expressed by your business representatives on cooperation with china. i sincerely hope we could have more exchanges like this one when we would be able to continue our interesting discussion on possible ways to expand our bilateral ecomomic and trade relations and bring our business people together. i am lookingforward to your early visit to china when i will be able to pay back some of the hospitality i received during my memorable stay in yur beautiful country. with kind personal regards, faithfully yours, 相关的论文致谢样本·毕业论文致谢如何写·课程设计论文致谢词·博士生论文致谢例·硕士研究生毕业论文感谢信·本科毕业论文致谢·大专毕业论文致谢词 .WORD版本.
Inventory management Inventory Control On the so-called "inventory control", many people will interpret it as a "storage management", which is actually a big distortion. The traditional narrow view, mainly for warehouse inventory control of materials for inventory, data processing, storage, distribution, etc., through the implementation of anti-corrosion, temperature and humidity control means, to make the custody of the physical inventory to maintain optimum purposes. This is just a form of inventory control, or can be defined as the physical inventory control. How, then, from a broad perspective to understand inventory control? Inventory control should be related to the company's financial and operational objectives, in particular operating cash flow by optimizing the entire demand and supply chain management processes (DSCM), a reasonable set of ERP control strategy, and supported by appropriate information processing tools, tools to achieved in ensuring the timely delivery of the premise, as far as possible to reduce inventory levels, reducing inventory and obsolescence, the risk of devaluation. In this sense, the physical inventory control to achieve financial goals is just a means to control the entire inventory or just a necessary part; from the perspective of organizational functions, physical inventory control, warehouse management is mainly the responsibility of The broad inventory control is the demand and supply chain management, and the whole company's responsibility. Why until now many people's understanding of inventory control, limited physical inventory control? The following two reasons can not be ignored: First, our enterprises do not attach importance to inventory control. Especially those who benefit relatively good business, as long as there is money on the few people to consider the problem of inventory turnover. Inventory control is simply interpreted as warehouse management, unless the time to spend money, it may have been to see the inventory problem, and see the results are often very simple procurement to buy more, or did not do warehouse departments . Second, ERP misleading. Invoicing software is simple audacity to call it ERP, companies on their so-called ERP can reduce the number of inventory, inventory control, seems to rely on their small software can get. Even as SAP, BAAN ERP world, the field of
《产业经济学》推荐教科书 一、苏东水：产业经济学 此教科书是内容比较全面、系统，各大专院校采用较多的教材。是教育部“高等教育面向21世纪教学内容和课程体系改革计划”的研究成果，是经济学、管理学门类专业基础课程系列教材之一。本书根植于东方管理文化与现实产业发展的实践，围绕如何实现产业资源的有效开发、合理配置和合理利用这一中心，按照企业、市场和政府三条主线逐层展开，既同国际接轨又与实践结合。除论述产业组织、产业结构、产业政策、产业发展外，还适应中国特色和经济全球化对产业经济理论的要求，论述了东方管理“以人为本、以德为先、人为为人”的产业经济思想，吸收、体现世界产业经济领域的最新动态和精华。本书在第一版的基础上，在广大读者广泛实践的基础上，进行了较大的修改，补充形成了新的专著。 目录 第一篇总论 第一章产业经济学导论 第一节产业的含义与分类 一、产业的含义 二、产业的一般分类方法 三、产业的其他分类方法 第二节产业经济学的研究对象 一、什么是产业经济学 二、产业经济学的学科领域 三、产业经济学的学科体系 第三节研究产业经济学的意义 一、研究产业经济学的理论意义 二、研究产业经济学的实践意义 三、研究产业经济学的现实意义 第四节产业经济学的研究方法 一、产业经济学研究的方法论 二、产业经济学的具体研究方法 第五节产业经济学的理论基础 一、中国产业经济学的思想渊源 二、产业经济学的理论基础
三、管理文化对产业经济的作用 第二篇产业组织 第二章理论演变 第一节产业组织的定义与理论渊源 一、产业组织的定义 二、竞争机制与市场秩序 三、“马歇尔冲突”与不完全竞争 第二节产业组织理论的形成 一、产业组织理论体系的建立 二、哈佛学派的scP分析框架 第三节产业组织理论的发展 一、产业组织理论的芝加哥学派 二、可竞争市场理论 三、产业组织理论的新奥地利学派 四、博弈论在产业组织理论中的应用第三章企业 第一节西方观点：什么是企业 一、新古典企业理论 二、现代企业理论 第二节东方观点：什么是企业 一、东方人本主义企业理论 二、东方企业的特点 三、中国当代企业理论的形成与发展 第三节企业在产业经济中的地位和作用 一、企业的地位 二、企业的作用 第四章市场 第一节市场结构 一、市场结构的含义和基本类型 二、决定市场结构的主要因素 第二节市场行为 一、市场行为的定义 二、市场竞争行为 三、市场协调行为 第三节市场绩效
Acknowledgements I would like to express my gratitude to all those who helped me during the writing of this thesis. I gratefully acknowledge the help of my supervisor, Ms. Han Lin, who has offered me valuable suggestions in the academic studies and whose useful suggestions, incisive comments and constructive criticism have contributed greatly to the completion of this thesis. In the preparation of the thesis, her willingness to give me her time so generously has been much appreciated. Her tremendous assistance in developing the framework for analysis and in having gone through the draft versions of this thesis several times as well as her great care in life deserve more thanks than I can find words to express. Truly, without her painstaking efforts in revising and polishing my drafts, the completion of the present thesis would not have been possible. I do appreciate her patience, encouragement, and professional instructions during my thesis writing. She devotes a considerable portion of her time to reading my manuscripts and making suggestions for further revisions. I am also greatly indebted to all my teachers in Foreign Language School of Shaanxi University of Technology who have helped me directly and indirectly in my studies, from whose devoted teaching and enlightening lectures I have benefited a lot and academically prepared for the thesis. Any progress that I have made is the result of their profound concern and selfless devotion. Last but not the least, my gratitude also extends to my family who have been assisting, supporting and caring for me all of my life. Special thanks should go to my friends who have put considerable time and effort into their comments on the draft. I also owe my sincere gratitude to my fellow classmates who have given me the warm help and precious time to work out my problems during the tough course of the thesis.
第一章产业经济学导论 1.什么是产业，如何理解产业的含义？ 首先,产业是社会分工和生产力不断发展的产物。产业是社会分工的产物，它随社会分工的产生而产生，并随社会分工的发展而发展，社会生产力的不断提高促成了产业的产生和发展。 其次,产业随着社会生产力水平的不断提高其内涵不断充实，其外延不断扩展。 （由重农学派流行时期专指农业，扩展到资本主义工业高度发展时期主要指工业，在扩展到近代以后可以包括农业、工业、服务业三大产业及其细分产业。到了今天，凡是具有投入产出活动的产业和部门都可以列入产业的范畴。 第三，产业的含义具有多样性。产业是与社会生产力发展水平相适应的社会分工形式的表现,是一个多层次的经济系统。在社会生产力发展的不同阶段，社会分工的主导形式的转换和社会分工不断向深层次的发展形成了具有多层次的产业范畴。 第四,产业是具有某种同类属性的企业经济活动的集合，即同一产业的经济活动均具有这样或那样相同或相似的性质。（如:需求角度上是指具有同类或相互密切竞争关系和替代关系的产品或服务；供给角度上是指具有类似生产技术、生产过程、生产工艺等特征的物质生产活动或类似经济性质的服务活动。 第五，产业是结语宏观经济与微观经济之间的中观经济。（因为它研究的既不 是国民经济总量,也不是企业和家庭的经济行为，产业经济的研究对象是具有某些共同特征的企业经济活动组成的集合。 2.产业经济学的研究对象是什么？ 产业经济学是研究具有某些相同特征的经济组织集团的发展规律及其相互作用规律的学科。产业经济学研究的对象是产业，具体来说就是研究产业内部各企业之间相互作用关系的规律、产业本身的发展规律、产业与产业之间互动联系规律以 及产业在空间区域中的分布规律等,例如产业组织、产业结构、产业关联、产业布局、产业发展、产业政策等。产业经济学的研究正是从产业出发来揭示产业的发展和变化、产业内部企业之间的相互作用和产业与产业之间的相互联系等诸如此类产业本身所特有的经济规律。 3.如何理解产业经济学的学科体系？
Why Does Movie Popcorn Cost So Much? STANFORD GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS—Movie theaters are notorious for charging consumers top dollar for concession items such as popcorn, soda, and candy. Are moviegoers just being gouged? 为什么电影院里的爆米花卖的那么贵？ 斯坦福商学研究生院——电影院因在爆米花、饮料和糖果这样的特许项目上向消费者收取高价而被人诟病，那么影迷们到底是不是被“敲诈”了呢？ New research from Stanford and the University of California, Santa Cruz suggests that there is a method to theaters’ madness—and one that in fact benefits the viewing public. By charging high prices on concessions, exhibition houses are able to keep ticket prices lower, which allows more people to enjoy the silver-screen experience. 来自斯坦福大学的Santa Cruz做了一项新研究，研究表明电影院收取高价行为有一定的合理性——事实上，这对观众是有利的。通过在特许商品上收取高价，电影院能够维持一个低的票价，这样能使更多的人在影院享受电影。 The findings empirically answer the age-old question of whether it’s better to charge more for a primary product (in this case, the movie ticket) or a secondary product (the popcorn). Putting the premium on the ―frill‖ items, it turns out, indeed opens up the possibility for price-sensitive people to see films. That means more customers coming to theaters in general, and a nice profit from those who are willing to fork it over for the Gummy Bears. 实证的结果回答了这个古老的问题，那就是对主要产品（本例中的电影票）或次要产品（爆米花）收更高的价格哪一个更好。事实证明，将费用加在“花边”项目上，即使是价格敏感的人还是有可能去看电影。这意味着会有更多的顾客去电影院，由此带来高利润，主要来自于那些愿意为橡皮糖买单的人。 Indeed, movie exhibition houses rely on concession sales to keep their businesses viable. Although concessions account for only about 20 percent of gross revenues, they represent some 40 percent of theaters’ profits. That’s because while ticket revenues must be shared with movie distributors, 100 percent of concessions go straight into an exhibitor’s coffers. 事实上，电影院依靠特许产品销售来维持经营。尽管特许产品的收入只占总收入的20%，但是其利润却占总利润的40%。那是因为票价收入必须与电影发行商共享，而特许商品的收入则全部归电影院所有。
对感谢信的回复英文 【篇一：如何回复英文感谢信】 we greatly appreciate your letter describing the assistance you received in solving your air-conditioning problems. we are now in our fifty year of operation, and we receive many letters like your indicating a high level of customer satisfaction with our installation. we are pleased that our technical staff assisted you so capably. we would like you to know that it you need to contact us at any time in the future. our engineers will be equally responsive to your request for assistance. if we can be of service to you again, please let us know. thank you again for your very kind letter. 承蒙来信赞扬本公司提供的空调维修工程服务，欣喜不已。五年前开业至今，屡获客户来函嘉奖，本公司荣幸之至。欣悉贵公司识技术人员的服务，他日苛有任何需要，亦请与本公司联络，本公司定当提供优秀技师，竭诚效劳。在此谨再衷心感谢贵公司的赞赏，并请继续保持联络。 dear mr.green, we greatly appreciate your letter describing the assistance you received in solving your air-conditioning problems. we are now in our fifth year of operation,and we receive many letters like yours indicating a high level of customer satisfaction with our installations. we are pleased that our technical staff assisted you so capably.we would like you to know that if you need to contact us at any time in the future,our engineers will be equally responsive to your request for assistance. if we can be of service to you again,please let us know.thank you again for your very kind letter. yours sincerely, chief engineer 【篇二：回复英文感谢信】 篇一：如何回复英文感谢信 we greatly appreciate your letter describing the assistance you received in solving your air-conditioning problems. we are