Economic regulation of quality in electricity
distribution networks
Virendra Ajodhia *,Rudi Hakvoort
Delft University of Technology,P.O.Box 5015,2600GA,Delft,The Netherlands
Received 15November 2003;accepted 14July 2004
Abstract
This paper provides an overview of the objectives,methods,and di?culties of regulating quality in electricity distribution networks.Stricter price regulation is associated with a risk of quality degradation and thus a need for quality regulation.But information problems hinder the development of e?ective quality regulation schemes.This suggests that at some point the bene?ts of stricter price regulation will not outweigh the additional regulatory costs of setting in place adequate quality regulation.ó2004Elsevier Ltd.All rights reserved.
Keywords:Regulation;Quality;Electricity
1.Introduction
Price and quality go hand in hand.It makes little sense to buy a cheap product without knowledge of its quality.The same applies for electricity –cheap electricity does not really mean anything if there are constant interrup-tions in the supply.But paying huge sums of money for no interruptions at all does not make sense either.The question,therefore,is:what is the optimal quality level and at what price should this be o?ered to consumers?When competition is feasible,the answer to this question is to leave it to the market.A market more or less automatically converges toward an optimal out-come:prices re?ect e?cient costs and products are adapted to the consumers’preferences and expectations.Under competition,both price and quality directly a?ect the vending ?rm’s pro?tability.On the supply side,costs and quality are inextricably bound since higher quality
involves higher costs.On the demand side,consumers choose from a range of products those that best match their price and quality preferences.In the electricity network business,however,competition is not feasible because of the natural monopoly character of the service.Consumers are connected to the nearby network and usually do not have an alternative.Here,regulation (not competition)has to induce optimal price and quality outcomes.
Under traditional regulation systems,prices are set such that the utility’s costs are fully recouped,and a reasonable return can be made.Setting prices on the basis of observed costs create no stimulus to operate in a cost-e?cient manner.This has been generally recog-nized and several alternative regulation mechanisms have been designed in the last few years,each associated with particular problems.1An additional weakness of
*Corresponding author.Tel.:C 31152782727;fax:C 31152783422.
E-mail addresses:v.ajodhia@tbm.tudelft.nl (V.Ajodhia),r.a.hakvoort@tbm.tudelft.nl (R.Hakvoort).
1
For a critical review of rate-of-return regulation,see,for example,Averch and Johnson,1962,and Baumol and Klevorick (1970).Alternative price regulation mechanisms can be found in Loeb and Magat (1979),Vogelsang and Finsinger (1979),and Sappington and Sibley (1988)and are discussed in Train (1991).
0957-1787/$-see front matter ó2004Elsevier Ltd.All rights reserved.doi:10.1016/j.jup.2004.07.008
Utilities Policy 13(2005)
211–221
rate-of-return regulation is that it creates a bias in the choice of inputs.In particular,if the regulated rate-of-return is higher than the?rm’s cost of capital,there will be an over usage of capital(Averch and Johnson,1962). Overcapitalizing is associated with an oversupply of quality since quality is typically a capital-using attribute (Spence,1975).It can therefore be expected that both prices and quality levels will be too high.Empirical studies show that under rate-of-return regulation, existing reliability levels in the electricity industry are generally higher than optimal from a social point of view.2This‘‘gold-plating’’e?ect suggests that consum-ers may be paying too high a price for too high a level of quality.
In recent years,there is a noticeable trend toward stricter forms of price regulation,in particular for electricity distribution networks(Jamasb and Pollit, 2002;Sappington et al.,2001).New schemes such as price and revenue caps are characterized by the unlinking of prices from observed costs.This creates a strong incentive to operate e?ciently as cost savings are eventually transformed into higher pro?ts.Economic theory,however,suggests that,for capital-intensive industries like the electricity network business,a change toward stricter forms of price regulation is likely to lead to degradation in quality?rms?nd it pro?table to achieve some cost savings at the expense of quality.As long as quality is external to the?rm,its private decision regarding quality is not likely to be the socially optimal one.The solution then is to internalize these e?ects into the?rm’s decision-making process.This,however,is more easily said than done.
Consumers should not pay high prices for associated high quality costs if they do not prefer this option. Neither should they receive too low a quality when they are willing to pay for higher quality.Somewhere in between there is a balance between costs and quality levels.Finding this balance is di?cult because the regulator does not have su?cient information about either the(e?cient)costs to deliver quality or the value that consumers attach to it.Quality costs are a function of many factors that,in turn,depend on the location and topology of the network.Furthermore,the relation between quality and costs becomes more complex when time dynamics are included because the e?ect of cost decisions on quality may be visible only after a time lag. Such problems will need to be taken into account when designing a regulation system for quality.
The di?culty of e?ective quality regulation becomes evident if one moves from traditional regulatory forms (such as rate-of-return)toward stricter price-cap regu-lation.As we will show,under rate-of-return regulation there is no explicit need for quality regulation as quality is more or less safeguarded.This is no longer so under price-cap regulation.The point is that in order to fully harvest the advantages of price-cap regulation,quality problems need to be dealt with properly.The objective of this paper is to provide an overview of the di?culties and possible solutions to the quality regulation problem.
The paper is structured as follows.The next section reviews the economic arguments for regulating quality and quality dimensions in the context of electricity distribution networks.Section3provides an overview of methods currently used to regulate quality and reviews some international experiences.Section4focuses on optimal quality regulation.We consider how a regula-tion scheme can be designed to achieve optimal quality outcomes under certain assumptions.Section5deals with the informational problems that prevent such an optimal quality regulation scheme.Section6concludes by arguing that stricter price controls may lead to a higher economic e?ciency but that the quality regulation problem becomes much more complicated. Therefore,regulators need to?nd a proper balance between price and quality regulation.
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2.1.Impact of price regulation on quality
Spence(1975)and Sheshinski(1976)have shown that there will always be an undersupply of quality under price-cap regulation.From the monopoly network ?rm’s point of view,quality is optimal if pro?ts are maximized.From the social point of view,quality is optimal when the costs to produce quality and the bene?ts that consumers derive from this are equal at the margin.The?rm’s private optimum and the social optimum are not likely to coincide.If the regulated rate-of-return is higher than the?rm’s capital costs,rate-of-return regulation leads to overcapitalization.Since quality is capital-intensive,quality levels will tend to be higher than the optimum.3When shifting toward stricter forms of price control,the reverse is likely to be true.For the?rm,quality reductions are pro?table if the associated cost savings exceed the foregone revenue resulting from the demand decrease,likely in electricity networks where quality is capital-intensive and demand is inelastic.
2See,for example,Shipley et al.(1972),Telson(1975)and Bental and Ravid(1982).
3The regulated return is not always higher than the?rm’s capital cost.For example,in former communist countries,prices were often below the?rm’s costs.In this case,an undersupply of quality is more likely to occur.This hypothesis is supported by the general observation of historically lower investment and quality levels in electricity infrastructures in transitional countries as compared to Western Europe or the U.S.
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Fraser(1994)shows that price-cap regulation induces the regulated?rm to react to cost increases by lowering quality.Kidokoro(2002)?nds that a regulatory shift from rate-of-return toward price-cap regulation lowers quality-related investments.Weisman(2002)shows that the regulated?rm’s incentive to invest in service quality increases under price regulation with the level of the price cap.He analyzes the e?ect of di?erent regulatory measures on quality.Under revenue-sharing,the reve-nue is reduced by a revenue-share parameter.The?rm bears all costs associated with investment in quality while retaining only a fraction of the corresponding revenues(Sappington and Weisman,1996).Such schemes may actually provide the regulated?rm with incentives to reduce investment in service quality.Under pro?t-sharing penalties,the regulated?rm has clear incentives to increase investment in service quality.
Empirical studies of the e?ect of incentive regulation on quality are unfortunately scarce in the case of electricity.Vickers and Yarrow(1988)note that British Telecom’s quality of service has not deteriorated since privatization,but it has not improved much either. Weisman(2002)provides the examples of Idaho and Oregon,where a revenue-sharing system for the tele-communications industry was abandoned because of problems with service quality.In a review of the impact of incentive regulation on levels of quality delivered to retail telephone customers,Sappington(2003)evaluates empirical studies by Ai and Sappington(1998),Roycroft and Garcia-Murillo(2000),Banerjee(2003)and Clem-ents(in press).He reports that the empirical results do not provide unequivocal conclusions.For electricity, Ter-Martirosyan(2003)notes that the Oregon Public Utility Commission terminated performance-based reg-ulation plans for Paci?c Power in1995because of the low quality of service,then reintroduced it in1998after incorporating strict quality standards for reliability.She also performs an empirical analysis of the e?ects of the shift from rate-of-return regulation to incentive-based regulation for electricity utilities.Her analysis of a sample of78utilities in23states of the US during the period1993–1999shows that incentive regulation is associated with an increase in the average duration of electricity outages but that implementation of explicit quality benchmarks reduces the average duration of outages per customer.Also,incentive regulation reduces the?rm’s operational and maintenance expenses at the distribution level,which engenders an increase in the duration of outages.
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Before discussing the options and di?culties of regulating network quality,it is useful to have a de?ni-tion of quality in the context of electricity distribution. In general,a distinction can be made between three quality aspects:voltage quality,commercial quality,and network reliability(CEER,2001).Voltage quality, sometimes called power quality,is mainly determined by the quality of the voltage waveform.There can be a variety of disturbances in a power system.The relevant technical phenomena are:variations in frequency,?uctuations in voltage magnitude,short-duration volt-age variations(dips,swells and short interruptions), long-duration voltage variations(over-or under-vol-tages),transients(temporarily transient over-voltages) and waveform distortion(Dugan et al.,1996).Com-mercial quality is related to individual agreements between the network company and their customers. Examples of such agreements are the conditions for (re)connection of new customers,installation of mea-suring equipment,regular transactions such as billing and meter readings and occasional transactions such as responding to problems and complaints.
In many countries voltage and commercial qualities are regulated by means of performance standards (CEER,2001).In this paper,we will be primarily concerned with the third quality aspect,network reliability.This is generally considered the most important aspect of network quality as it lies at the heart of the network https://www.doczj.com/doc/e515006419.html,work reliability is a measure for the ability of the network to continuously meet the demand from customers.This aspect can be divided into two elements:the?rst relates to guaran-teeing su?cient capacity in the long-term(adequacy)so that the network service can be delivered.The second relates to whether the service can actually be delivered in the short run without interruptions in the supply of electricity.In practice,such outages may be caused by network failures or by system balance de?cits.In this article we consider only network causes.
Network reliability is measured by the number and duration of interruptions experienced by customers. Several indicators are used to evaluate reliability in distribution networks.The most common measures at the system level are the so-called SAIFI,SAIDI and CAIDI indicators,which measure reliability over a pre-de?ned period,usually one year(IEEE,1999):
SAIFI stands for System Average Interruption Frequency Index and measures the probability that
a customer will experience an outage.It is calculated
by dividing the number of customer interruptions by the total number of customers served.The number of customer interruptions is the total number of interrupted customers for each outage.
SAIDI stands for System Average Interruption Duration Index and provides a measure for the average time that customers are interrupted.It is calculated by dividing the total customer interrup-tion duration by the total number of customers.The customer interruption duration is de?ned as the
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aggregated time that all customers were interrupted.
SAIDI is a high-level indicator representing the overall performance of the network.
CAIDI stands for Customer Average Interruption Duration Index and is a measure for the average time required to restore service to the average customer per outage.It is calculated by dividing the total interruption duration by the total number of out-ages.
At the customer level,typical indicators include the number of outages experienced per year or the average duration of the outage.Although the calculation of the reliability measures is a straightforward process,com-parison of reliability levels between companies or countries should always be treated with caution.For example,experiences in the UK and the Netherlands show that data can be a serious problem when evaluating or comparing reliability statistics.4Di?er-ences in de?nitions and measurement procedures can lead to ambiguous comparisons.For example,some include an interruption in the statistics if it lasts longer than3min,while others include all interruptions longer than a single minute.Moreover,the starting point of an outage may not always be de?ned in the same way since some outages are detected automatically while others are recorded when customers report the outage.
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Regulatory attention to network reliability has in-creased during the last few years.Di?erent types of regulatory instruments for quality are presented in Rovizzi and Thompson(1995),Arblaster(1999), IPART(2001),Williamson(2001),and Ajodhia (2002).These instruments,discussed and reviewed below in terms of recent international experience,can generally be classi?ed as indirect instruments,standards and incentive schemes.
3.1.Indirect instruments
Indirect instruments promote good quality service by strengthening the information and negotiation position of customers.There are di?erent methods to achieve this.The regulator may require the?rm to publish information about its performance or it may publish comparative overviews itself.Exposure to public criti-cism can motivate a network?rm to consider consum-ers’preferences for quality.Most regulators use some form of performance publication as it is relatively simple and does not require intensive regulatory involvement.Nevertheless,one could wonder whether exposing the ?rm to public criticism really matters to a monopolist since consumers are not able to choose another provider anyhow.Another problem is that a network?rm may exploit low performance to its own advantage,for example,by blaming a too harsh regulatory price control.
Other indirect instruments include customer repre-sentation on advisory boards or and customer commit-tees.Public ownership itself may indirectly regulate quality.Customer empowerment can be increased through the establishment of dedicated bodies to handle con?icts between customers and regulated companies or a legal framework to hold companies liable for sub-standard service that causes loss or damage.However, interactions between a?rm and its customers,either directly or via an ombudsman or court,can bear high transaction costs.
3.2.Standards
Standards dictate a minimum performance level for a network?rm.Violation of the standard leads to a?ne or tari?rebate.In general,two types of standards exist, overall and individual.Overall standards relate to network quality at the system level.Examples are customer minutes lost,percentage of customers with an outage,or an aggregate quality index.Individual standards prescribe a minimum level of performance to be delivered to individual customers.These usually come in the form of a limit on the number or duration of outages for any customer.
Standards are a useful quality regulation instrument. They de?ne clearly the boundaries for quality levels. Fines for sublevel performance can provide companies with strong incentives to deliver adequate quality levels. Still,standards do have some limitations,as they impose a discrete rather than a continuous relationship between quality and price.The?rm either pays a?ne or not when it violates the standard;there is nothing in between. Because companies are expected to maximize pro?ts, they seldom supply higher quality levels than strictly required.E?ectively,standards implicitly prescribe the desired level of performance.Thus,the standard and associated penalties need to be low enough to be defensible but high enough to be e?ective.If set too high,the standard may severely punish the?rm for not meeting unrealistic targets.If set too low,it loses credibility and quality degradation may occur.
3.3.Incentive schemes
Quality incentive schemes can be considered as an extension of a standard.Here,price and quality are closely related:the?rm’s performance is compared to some quality target,and deviations result in a price
4See Ofgem(2001)and DTe(2002).
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adjustment that can be either a penalty or a reward. There are many variations of quality incentive schemes. Price and quality can be mapped continuously,in a discrete fashion,or in some combination of these; the level of the penalty or reward can be capped;dead bands may be applied,etc.Fig.1shows some examples.
Under the?rst scheme in Fig.1,a?xed penalty is imposed after reaching a certain quality level.This is essentially an ordinary standard scheme.In the second scheme,there is a continuous relation between price and quality.At each level of quality,a corresponding penalty or reward is attached.This penalty or reward can be accounted for in di?erent ways,for example,through an adjustment of the allowed price or revenue level or through direct compensations to consumers.The third scheme is also a continuous scheme but now with a cap on the level of penalty and reward.The usual argument for this capping is that this reduces the?nancial risks to the?rm and customers.However,capping also has some drawbacks:if quality decreases,the?rm would have to pay penalties only up to a certain level.After that, further quality degradation does not carry any?nancial penalty.The cap should be high enough to prevent this, but then why impose a cap after all?In addition,capping the reward level does not help customers since it is not likely that the?rm further improves quality once the maximum reward has been reached.
The fourth scheme has a dead band;quality variations within this band do not lead to price adjustments.Quality can be thought of as consisting of the natural quality level and a superimposed stochas-tic element.In the short-term,these stochastic e?ects can lead to signi?cant quality?uctuations and un-intended penalty and reward?uctuations.Dead bands are used to dampen these e?ects.However,dead bands can leave genuine quality changes undetected.An alternative is for a dead band to use multi-year averages.This has the same dampening e?ect but does recognize genuine changes in quality.
3.4.International experiences
In practice,regulators do not restrict themselves to a single instrument but usually adopt a combination of them.Table1presents the results from our survey of the types of quality instruments used in di?erent countries.
As can be observed,all regulators included in the survey use performance publication.This consists of aggregated numbers for outage frequency and duration. Overall standards are used by some regulators,although some are only indicative and without any?nancial consequence.Individual standards are more popular. However,both the level of the standard and its associated penalty tend to di?er substantially from country to country and sometimes even within coun-tries.A possible explanation for this may be the di?erences in historical reliability levels and perception: customers who have experienced historically high re-liability levels may have got accustomed to this and consequently be more a?ected by outages than custom-ers who are used to frequent and long outages.
The structure of incentive schemes also tends to vary widely between countries.For example,in England and Wales the level of penalty/reward is capped at1.75%of the allowed revenue,with the quality target set on the basis of companies’historical performance(Ofgem, 2001).In Italy,the regulator has set national standards for each type of density zone(urban,sub-urban and rural).Here,the quality target is de?ned as an annual improvement to reach national targets.The marginal penalty/reward is based on an analysis of the costs to improve quality.The total penalty/reward is not capped but depends only on the measured di?erence between the actual and forecasted quality improvement within a dead band(Lo Schiavo and Malaman,2003).In the Norwegian system–the so-called CENS arrangement–each distribution company has an assigned quality target,expressed in terms of kWh of energy not supplied (Langset et al.,2001).This target is based on average Table1
Use of quality regulation instruments in di?erent countries(2002)
Performance
publication
Overall
standard
Individual
standard
Incentive
scheme Australia(Victoria)Yes No Yes Yes England and Wales Yes Yes Yes Yes
Italy Yes Indicative No Yes
The Netherlands Yes Indicative Yes Announced Norway Yes No No Yes Portugal Yes Indicative Yes No
Spain Yes Indicative Yes No Sources:ACCC(2003),Ofgem(2001),Lo Schiavo and Malaman (2003),DTe(2002),Langset et al.(2001)and CEER(2003).
Fig.1.Examples of quality incentive schemes.The horizontal axis represents the measured quality level of a?rm,the vertical axis the adjustment in price.215
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historical performance and is adjusted for various structural di?erences such as climatic and topographical factors.Deviations from the target lead to price adjust-ments proportional to the interruption costs per kWh of energy not supplied.The idea of the CENS scheme is to provide incentives to operate at optimal quality levels. That is,the scheme rewards companies for making better tradeo?s between costs and bene?ts in the form of higher allowed prices.
The Dutch regulator has announced a further step, having recently proposed a quality regulation system similar to Norway’s,one based on the yardstick competition concept(DTe,2002).Price adjustments are made according to deviations from a pre-de?ned quality target and are proportional to the level of interruption costs.The di?erence here is that the quality target is adjusted dynamically to re?ect developments in the
average quality level of all distribution?rms.Through this mechanism,the bene?ts from better cost and quality tradeo?s are eventually transferred to consumers.
4.Optimal quality incentive schemes
4.1.Optimal quality levels
The survey of international experiences reveals a large variation in the application of quality incentive schemes. Now we will discuss the elements of optimal quality incentive schemes.From a theoretical point of view,an optimal quality level implies that the costs and consumer willingness to pay(WTP in Figs.2and3)for quality are in balance.This concept is demonstrated in Fig.2.For simpli?cation the marginal costs and marginal consumer willingness to pay are shown as a function of quality only.Furthermore,we assume quality to be a one-dimensional attribute supplied uniformly to consumers. The point where the marginal costs and marginal consumers’willingness to pay for quality intersect is the optimal quality level.If quality is higher than the optimum,this results in a welfare loss since consumers are receiving and paying for a level of quality higher than they require.Conversely,supplying quality below the optimal level also results in a welfare loss as consumers are not receiving the level of quality for which they would be willing to pay.
Clearly,the regulator’s objective is to arrive at the optimal quality level for the highest social welfare. Analogous to the optimal pricing scheme proposed by Loeb and Magat(1979)this could be achieved by allowing the?rm to retain all social surplus,i.e.,the sum of both consumer and producer surplus.E?ectively,this internalizes the e?ects of the quality choice on consum-ers into the?rm’s decision-making process.Rationally then,the?rm will seek to operate at the quality level where the total social surplus is maximized,which coincides with the optimal quality level.
Although seemingly simple and attractive,there are some problems attached to the practical applicability of such an approach.These problems are similar to that experienced in the application of the Loeb–Magat scheme to price regulation(Armstrong et al.,1994,28–30).First,it assumes an ability to exactly measure the consumer utility from quality,i.e.,the?rm has perfect information about the consumers’willingness to pay for quality.As we will discuss in next sections,this is not a realistic assumption.A second drawback is that although the scheme theoretically leads to an optimal quality outcome,the distributional properties of this outcome are debatable:the?rm retains all surplus but consumers are left with none.The latter problem could, at least in theory,be solved by imposing a quality target such that the?rm retains only the amount of surplus associated with the di?erence between the actual quality level and the target level.Essentially,this quality target would act as a means to transfer some of the surplus from the?rm to its consumers.The?rm still has an
Fig.2.Concept of optimal quality.
Fig.3.Dynamics of optimal quality regulations.
216V.Ajodhia,R.Hakvoort/Utilities Policy13(2005)211–221
incentive to choose a quality level where additional surplus equals marginal quality cost,but would retain only a(small)part of the total surplus.In the benchmark case,the quality target will be equal to the optimal quality level while all surpluses will be allocated to consumers.But in order to set the optimal quality target,one needs to be able to measure the surplus, which,as noted,is not likely to be performed perfectly.
4.2.Setting the quality target
Even if surplus cannot be measured properly,the regulator may use some practical guidelines in setting the quality target.Alexander(1996)has presented three options.Firstly,it could be based on historical quality levels.The idea is that a?rm should be able to attain a performance level similar to that attained previously. Secondly,quality levels observed in other regions or countries can be used as a benchmark.The argument here is that if other?rms can achieve better results,an under-performing?rm should demonstrate why similar results cannot be achieved.Thirdly,performance goals can be litigated or negotiated to achieve gradual progress during the term of the regulation plan.
Alexander(1996)does not discuss how to assure that improvements in costs and quality are eventually trans-ferred over time to the consumers.If?rms increase their e?ciency,they will enjoy higher pro?ts at the given price.This is indeed the basic idea of applying a price cap:inducing higher e?ciency by allowing the?rm to retain the gains that come from it.Eventually,however, regulators would like consumers to also bene?t from improvements.This requires adjustments to the price cap to re?ect the developments in e?ciency levels.The same principle can be applied to quality.As?rms become more e?cient,they require less cost to deliver the same level of quality,or,alternatively,they can produce higher quality at the same level of costs.
As can be observed in Fig.3,an e?ciency increase re-sults in lower marginal quality costs and,consequently, in an upward shift of the optimal quality level.As in a competitive market place,these e?ciency improve-ments should eventually have to be transferred to consumers.This can be achieved by making the quality target dynamic by adjusting it according to observed quality outcomes.Such an approach is similar to that of a price-cap system where the price level is adjusted periodically on the basis of observed savings in costs during the previous regulatory period.Under price regulation,the incentive to continuously improve pro-ductivity arises from the ability to retain pro?ts resulting from better than expected performance(re?ected in the X-factor).Similarly,the regulator could make an estimation of quality improvements over time and re?ect this in an adjustment of the quality target over time(e.g.,by setting an additional so-called Q-factor).
As has been widely discussed in the literature,the optimal design of the price regulation scheme is severely hindered by the asymmetry of information between the ?rm and its regulator.5The same applies to quality regulation.In general,the regulator lacks su?cient information about the(e?cient)costs of quality and consumer willingness to pay.In the next section we review these problems in more detail.
https://www.doczj.com/doc/e515006419.html,rmation problems
5.1.The costs of quality
The main problem facing the regulator is the issue of de?ning and measuring(marginal)costs in electricity distribution.There may be many factors that in?uence the actual level of https://www.doczj.com/doc/e515006419.html,work density and structure, the climate,etc.,are conspicuous,but such company-speci?c facts as the speci?c cables and IT-systems historically used by a company are much more di?cult to take into account.Furthermore,the level of costs as a function of quality may vary by location in the network.For example,it is more costly to deliver quality to consumers located in rural or sparsely populated areas.Because the cost of quality di?ers geographically, the optimal quality level will also vary accordingly,as may the level of consumer willingness to pay for quality. Thus,even if quality is optimal on average,this may not be true at the level of the individual consumer.
An incentive scheme based only on an average notion of quality may create perverse incentives.The regulated ?rm may?nd it pro?table to rebalance quality levels.In high cost areas,quality may be decreased and in low cost areas,it may be increased.Since lower than average quality levels are usual in high cost areas and higher than average levels are usual in low cost areas,this may increase the di?erences between areas.Even if such a quality rebalancing is e?cient from an economic point of view,it may not be acceptable from a policy point of view.Thus,it makes sense to augment incentive schemes with individual standards to make sure strategic quality rebalancing does not result in unfair outcomes.This in turn gives rise to the problem discussed earlier of setting an appropriate standard and associated?ne.
5.2.Yardstick competition
When multiple companies are being regulated, yardstick competition may be an attractive solution to (at least partly)solve the informational problems
5Information asymmetry between the regulator and?rm is the central theme of the so-called new regulatory economics.Baron and Myerson(1982)?rst discussed this problem.An exhaustive treatment of the incentive theory is contained in La?ont and Tirole(1993).
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experienced under regulation.Under yardstick compe-tition,the?nancial income of each?rm depends on its performance relative to others–usually the average performance of the industry.Individual companies have a strong incentive to perform better than average as this increases income and thus pro?t.In turn,this leads to a better average performance of the industry as a whole. Yardstick regulation is an attractive option because it simulates a competitive environment.Theoretical frame-works for yardstick competition for quality have been developed by Mikkers and Shestalova(2001),and Tangera s(2002),for example,but there is no known instance of actual application as yet,and there are still a number of practical issues to be sorted out(Weyman-Jones,1995).At the strategic level,there are the dangers of collusion and regulatory commitment.
The problem of collusion becomes more critical with a small number of?rms since yardstick competition requires a su?cient pool of companies to be e?ective. Moreover,regulatory commitment(i.e.,a stable and predictable regulatory approach)is necessary for the system to work properly.Unexpected changes of rules by the regulator may interfere with company’s quality improvement programs or destroy incentives.For example,it may be that some companies enjoy very high pro?ts under yardstick competition while others go bankrupt.The regulator can be tempted to interfere by barring windfall pro?ts or transferring subsidies,in-advertently destroying the incentives of the yardstick scheme along the way.Indeed,in his seminal paper on yardstick competition,Shleifer(1985)argued that,for yardstick competition to be e?ective,possible bankruptcy of one or more regulated companies should be a viable option.
At the operational level,yardstick schemes have the problem of de?ning a proper yardstick.Calculating average performance becomes a problem when compar-ing?rms operating under di?erent circumstances and demand conditions.When quality is included in the yardstick scheme,this becomes even more complicated.
A proper yardstick should be able to accommodate the di?erent conditions and evaluate them in a neutral way with respect to economic e?ciency and the level of quality.Benchmarking techniques such as Data Envel-opment Analysis(DEA)might help to achieve this goal. However,these techniques should be used with discre-tion and recognition of their limitations,especially when applied under a yardstick competition framework (Ajodhia et al.,2003a).
5.3.Time lag problem
The electricity network industry is capital-intensive and has long-lived assets.This long-term character is also re?ected in the time lag between cost decisions and the quality outcome.Periods of under-investment in the quality of the network can result in a gradual de-terioration of the network quality,which may remain unnoticed for several years.However,once the number of supply interruptions has been noticed,it may again take a long time to get the system back to a higher level of quality.
When the period between cost investments and quality outcome is long,the three quality regulation instruments discussed earlier may not be su?cient.If the ?rm’s management is focused on short-term pro?t maximization,they may not pick up the signals from the regulatory system.This becomes a substantial problem when management is appointed for a shorter term than the quality feedback timeframe.The time between reviews would need to be made long enough–say10–15years–for the feedback mechanism to function properly.However,such long regulation periods are impractical,and it makes more sense to install additional regulation explicitly focused on the assurance of appropriate quality levels in the longer term.
Ajodhia et al.(2003b)have discussed three possible methods to deal with the time lag problem.Firstly,the regulator could assure that network managers spend enough on quality.The regulator may review past and proposed future expenditure levels and critically exam-ine di?erences between past projections and expendi-tures.It is also possible to monitor a more detailed level of expenditure,for example,by equipment type or function,although this requires the regulator to have signi?cant knowledge of the relation between invest-ments and resulting network quality.A second method is to prescribe(or even certify)the company’s asset management processes and audit whether the companies are acting in line with them.Thirdly,the regulator could monitor the health of the network by requiring the company to report in detail the performance of in-dividual network components and actions envisaged to maintain or improve this performance over time.
Needless to say,these approaches go much further than the perceived idea of output steering or‘‘arms-length regulation’’.Price-cap regulation is an example of an arms-length approach.The regulator provides the company only with high-level incentives that promote some regulatory objective without getting into the details of running the company.But concern for quality requires additional regulation,which can be intrusive and contrary to the idea of arms-length regulation.The obvious way out of this dilemma is to slightly weaken price regulation,although this comes at the loss of e?ciency.Nevertheless,it is worthwhile to explore measures that help obtain a better balance between price and quality regulation,when these lead to better outcomes at relatively low costs.For example,it has been argued theoretically that spill-over e?ects can act as a means to assure adequate quality levels.
218V.Ajodhia,R.Hakvoort/Utilities Policy13(2005)211–221
The reputation of a?rm in a monopoly market can ‘‘spill over’’to competitive markets it is also active in (Weisman,2002).Providing good quality in the network monopoly improves the?rm’s overall image,which in turn creates a competitive advantage in the non-monopoly areas.But spill-over e?ects work best when ?rms are not required to structurally separate the network business from the other competitive functions. Recent empirical evidence shows that such spill-over e?ects have actually contributed to the success of quality regulation in Italy(Ajodhia et al.,submitted for publication).These?ndings suggest that the degree of unbundling in?uences the need to apply quality regula-tion;further,it may be worth considering some degree of re-bundling if concerns for quality are high.
5.4.Outage cost estimation
Another important informational problem speci?cally associated with quality regulation is that of measuring consumers’preferences for quality as quanti?ed in their willingness to pay for it.As discussed earlier,to reach optimal outcomes,the level of penalty or reward should be equal to the marginal willingness to pay.However, quantifying this is a di?cult issue and,regarding reliability,is usually approximated by its inverse:the costs incurred as a result of outages(Sanghvi,1982).
Generally,outage costs can be short-term or long-term costs.Short-term costs are those that can be unambig-uously associated with an outage.Examples are lost production,process restart costs,spoilage,and also inconvenience,loss of leisure time,personal injury,and looting.Long-term outage costs are those associated with long-term adaptive responses to expected outages. Consumers who anticipate a certain level of reliability adopt mitigating actions to reduce potential outage costs. Examples are emergency equipment like candles or ?ashlights,protective switchgear,and backup generators.
Measuring outage costs–either short-term or long-term–is a complex issue.A general distinction can be made between indirect and direct(or survey)methods. Survey methods acquire outage cost information di-rectly from customers while indirect methods use other information sources for this purpose.Examples of indirect methods are proxies such as the ratio of the Gross National Product(GNP)to electricity consumed, which yields roughly the upper bound for outage costs, or the ratio of the electricity bill and energy consump-tion,which acts as the lower bound for the outage costs (Telson,1975).Speci?c proxies for certain customer groups have also been developed.For residential customers,the wage rate has been used as a measure of the foregone leisure in case of an outage(Muna-singhe,1980).For industrial customers,the cost of backup power installed has been proposed(Bental and Ravid,1982).In contrast,consumer surplus methods derive outage costs by using information on electricity demand(Sanghvi,1982).
Survey(or direct)methods collect information on outage costs directly from the customer.These methods have been re?ned over time and have now reached a substantial level of acceptance.Direct-cost surveys request outage costs directly from customers by asking them to identify the di?erent cost categories related to an outage and attach an economic value to these.If such a study is done directly after an outage,it is usually referred to as a‘‘blackout study’’.
More sophisticated survey methods are contingency ranking and conjoint analysis methods(Caves et al., 1990).In a hypothetical market,customers are asked to indicate either their willingness to pay for higher re-liability or their willingness to accept lower reliability levels.Additionally,customers can be asked to rank measures to avoid or reduce the costs of an outage,e.g., buying candles or installing a backup generator(Fig.4).
Experience shows that the results from outage cost studies should be interpreted with great caution(Caves et al.,1990).Outage costs tend to vary as a function of factors like timing and duration of the outage,whether advance notice is given,etc.,as well as customer-related
Fig.4.Overview of outage cost measurement techniques.219
V.Ajodhia,R.Hakvoort/Utilities Policy13(2005)211–221
factors like intensity of electricity usage,customer age and income,etc.This makes it less straightforward to determine or compare outage costs unambiguously. Some regulators have recently made outage costs the basis for de?ning penalty and reward levels.In Norway, the results of an outage cost study feed directly into the regulation system.A similar approach has been an-nounced in Italy and the Netherlands.
6.Conclusions
This paper has provided an overview of the objectives and di?culties of including network quality in economic regulation schemes.As with price regulation,the regulator is hampered by lack of information.A move from rate-of-return toward price-cap regulation would be justi?ed only if the overall bene?ts to consumers are higher than the costs.Quality regulation leads to additional regulatory cost but can also cause consumers to be worse o?if regulators do not manage to deal with quality issues properly.Under traditional regulation schemes,quality regulation was less conspicuous and problematic.Indeed,as Spence(1975)has shown,rate-of-return regulation may imply some attractive,second-best properties with regard to quality.Essentially,the bias towards overcapitalization can then be regarded as a premium for high quality.
The current focus on incentives and e?ciency in price regulation creates an explicit need for quality regulation. At the same time,however,e?ective quality regulation is complex to design,implement and administer.These complexities become more manifested under stricter price regulation schemes.This suggests that at some point the advantages of stricter price regulation–coming from an enhancement of e?ciency levels–will not outweigh the additional regulatory costs of setting in place adequate quality regulation.
This implied trade-o?between price and quality regulation leads to another interesting observation.The trend toward arms-length regulation provides?rms with incentives to operate more e?ciently while remaining independent of the regulator.Such an approach is in line with the spirit of price-cap regulation as promoted back in the1980s.However,this regulatory approach can lead to undesired quality e?ects,which in turn require regulators to develop and apply additional and some-times complex measures in con?ict with the original idea of an arms-length regulator.
Further work is needed regarding the relatively unexplored world of quality regulation.In this paper, we have provided an overview of the problems related to regulating electricity distribution networks.Similar problems may also apply to other network infra-structures.Further research will certainly contribute to a better understanding of the complexities surrounding quality regulation and help regulators to successfully deal with these to the bene?t for consumers on whose behalf they regulate.
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比较级与最高级 1.as...as 与(not) as(so)...as as...as...句型中，as的词性 第一个as是副词，用在形容词和副词的原级前，常译为“同样地”。第二个as是连词，连接与前面句子结构相同的一个句子(相同部分常省略)，可译为“同..... He is as tall as his brother is (tall) . (后面的as 为连词) 只有在否定句中，第一个as才可换为so 改错: He is so tall as his brother.（X） 2.在比较状语从句中，主句和从句的句式结构一般是相同的 与as...as 句式中第二个as一样，than 也是连词。as和than这两个连词后面的从句的结构与前面的句子大部分情况下结构是相同的，相同部分可以省略。 He picked more apples than she did. 完整的表达为: He picked more apples than she picked apples. 后而的picked apples和前面相同，用did 替代。 He walked as slowly as she did.完整表达为: He walked as slowly as she walked slowly. she后面walked slowly与前面相同，用did替代。
3.谓语的替代 在as和than 引导的比较状语从句中，由于句式同前面 主句相同，为避免重复，常把主句中出现而从句中又出现的动词用do的适当形式来代替。 John speaks German as fluently as Mary does. 4.前后的比较对象应一致 不管后面连词是than 还是as,前后的比较对象应一致。The weather of Beijing is colder than Guangzhou. x than前面比较对象是“天气”，than 后面比较对象是“广州”，不能相比较。应改为: The weather of Bejing is colder than that of Guangzhou. 再如: His handwriting is as good as me. 应改为: His handwriting is as good as mine. 5.可以修饰比较级的词 常用来修饰比较级的词或短语有: Much,even,far,a little,a lot,a bit,by far,rather,any,still,a great deal等。 by far的用法: 用于强调，意为“...得多”“最最...”“显然”等，可修饰形容词或副词的比较级和最高级，通常置于其后，但是若比较级或最高级前有冠词，则可置于其前或其后。
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The way 的用法 Ⅰ常见用法： 1)the way+ that 2)the way + in which（最为正式的用法） 3)the way + 省略（最为自然的用法） 举例：I like the way in which he talks. I like the way that he talks. I like the way he talks. Ⅱ习惯用法： 在当代美国英语中，the way用作为副词的对格，“the way+ 从句”实际上相当于一个状语从句来修饰整个句子。 1)The way =as I am talking to you just the way I’d talk to my own child. He did not do it the way his friends did. Most fruits are naturally sweet and we can eat them just the way they are—all we have to do is to clean and peel them. 2）The way= according to the way/ judging from the way The way you answer the question, you are an excellent student. The way most people look at you, you’d think trash man is a monster. 3）The way =how/ how much No one can imagine the way he missed her. 4）The way =because
人教版（新目标）初中英语形容词与副词的比较级与最高级 （一）规则变化： 1．绝大多数的单音节和少数双音节词，加词尾-er ，-est tall—taller—tallest 2．以不发音的e结尾的单音节词和少数以-le结尾的双音节词只加-r，-st nice—nicer—nicest , able—abler—ablest 3．以一个辅音字母结尾的重读闭音节词或少数双音节词，双写结尾的辅音字母，再加-er，-est big—bigger—biggest 4．以辅音字母加y结尾的双音节词，改y为i再加-er，-est easy—easier—easiest 5．少数以-er，-ow结尾的双音节词末尾加-er，-est clever—cleverer—cleverest, narrow—narrower—narrowest 6．其他双音节词和多音节词，在前面加more，most来构成比较级和最高级 easily—more easily—most easily （二）不规则变化 常见的有： good / well—better—best ; bad (ly)/ ill—worse—worst ; old—older/elder—oldest/eldest many / much—more—most ; little—less—least ; far—farther/further—farthest/furthest
用法： 1．原级比较：as + adj./adv. +as（否定为not so/as + adj./adv. +as）当as… as中间有名字时，采用as + adj. + a + n.或as + many / much + n. This is as good an example as the other is . I can carry as much paper as you can. 表示倍数的词或其他程度副词做修饰语时放在as的前面 This room is twice as big as that one. 倍数+as+adj.+as = 倍数+the +n.+of Your room is twice as larger as mine. = Your room is twice the size of mine. 2．比较级+ than 比较级前可加程度状语much, still, even, far, a lot, a little, three years. five times,20%等 He is three years older than I (am). 表示“（两个中）较……的那个”时，比较级前常加the（后面有名字时前面才能加冠词） He is the taller of the two brothers. / He is taller than his two brothers. Which is larger, Canada or Australia? / Which is the larger country, Canada or Australia? 可用比较级形式表示最高级概念，关键是要用或或否定词等把一事物（或人）与其他同类事物（或人）相分离 He is taller than any other boy / anybody else.
大多数形容词有三种形式,原级,比较级和最高级, 以表示形容词说明的性质在程度上的不同。 形容词的原级: 形容词的原级形式就是词典中出现的形容词的原形。例如: poor tall great glad bad 形容词的比较级和最高级: 形容词的比较级和最高级形式是在形容词的原级形式的基础上变化的。分为规则变化和不规则变化。 规则变化如下: 1) 单音节形容词的比较级和最高级形式是在词尾加 -er 和 -est 构成。 great (原级) (比较级) (最高级) 2) 以 -e 结尾的单音节形容词的比较级和最高级是在词尾加 -r 和 -st 构成。wide (原级) (比较级) (最高级) 3)少数以-y, -er, -ow, -ble结尾的双音节形容词的比较级和最高级是在词尾加 -er 和 -est 构成。 clever(原级) (比较级) (最高级) 4) 以 -y 结尾,但 -y 前是辅音字母的形容词的比较级和最高级是把 -y 去掉,加上 -ier 和-est 构成. happy (原形) (比较级) (最高级) 5) 以一个辅音字母结尾其前面的元音字母发短元音的形容词的比较级和最高级是双写该辅音字母然后再加 -er和-est。 big (原级) (比较级) (最高级) 6) 双音节和多音节形容词的比较级和最高级需用more 和 most 加在形容词前面来构成。 beautiful (原级) (比较级) (比较级) difficult (原级) (最高级) (最高级) 常用的不规则变化的形容词的比较级和最高级: 原级------比较级------最高级 good------better------best many------more------most much------more------most bad------worse------worst far------farther, further------farthest, furthest 形容词前如加 less 和 least 则表示"较不"和"最不 形容词比较级的用法: 形容词的比较级用于两个人或事物的比较,其结构形式如下: 主语+谓语(系动词)+ 形容词比较级+than+ 对比成分。也就是, 含有形容词比较级的主句+than+从句。注意从句常常省去意义上和主句相同的部分, 而只剩下对比的成分。
The way的用法及其含义（二） 二、the way在句中的语法作用 the way在句中可以作主语、宾语或表语： 1.作主语 The way you are doing it is completely crazy.你这个干法简直发疯。 The way she puts on that accent really irritates me. 她故意操那种口音的样子实在令我恼火。The way she behaved towards him was utterly ruthless. 她对待他真是无情至极。 Words are important, but the way a person stands, folds his or her arms or moves his or her hands can also give us information about his or her feelings. 言语固然重要,但人的站姿,抱臂的方式和手势也回告诉我们他(她)的情感。 2.作宾语 I hate the way she stared at me.我讨厌她盯我看的样子。 We like the way that her hair hangs down.我们喜欢她的头发笔直地垂下来。 You could tell she was foreign by the way she was dressed. 从她的穿著就可以看出她是外国人。 She could not hide her amusement at the way he was dancing. 她见他跳舞的姿势，忍俊不禁。 3.作表语 This is the way the accident happened.这就是事故如何发生的。 Believe it or not, that's the way it is. 信不信由你, 反正事情就是这样。 That's the way I look at it, too. 我也是这么想。 That was the way minority nationalities were treated in old China. 那就是少数民族在旧中
英语比较级和最高级的用法归纳 在学习英语过程中，会遇到很多的语法问题，比如比较级和最高级的用法，对于 这些语法你能够掌握吗？下面是小编整理的英语比较级和最高级的用法，欢迎阅读！ 英语比较级和最高级的用法 一、形容词、副词的比较级和最高级的构成规则 1.一般单音节词和少数以-er，-ow结尾的双音节词，比较级在后面加-er，最高级 在后面加-est; (1)单音节词 如：small→smaller→smallest short→shorter→shortest tall→taller→tallest great→greater→greatest (2)双音节词 如：clever→cleverer→cleverest narrow→narrower→narrowest 2.以不发音e结尾的单音节词，比较在原级后加-r，最高级在原级后加-st; 如：large→larger→largest nice→nicer→nicest able→abler→ablest 3.在重读闭音节(即：辅音+元音+辅音)中，先双写末尾的辅音字母，比较级加-er，最高级加-est; 如：big→bigger→biggest hot→hotter→hottest fat→fatter→fattest 4.以“辅音字母+y”结尾的双音节词，把y改为i，比较级加-er，最高级加-est; 如：easy→easier→easiest heavy→heavier→heaviest busy→busier→busiest happy→happier→happiest 5.其他双音节词和多音节词，比较级在前面加more，最高级在前面加most; 如：bea utiful→more beautiful→most beautiful different→more different→most different easily→more easily→most easily 注意：(1)形容词最高级前通常必须用定冠词 the，副词最高级前可不用。 例句： The Sahara is the biggest desert in the world. (2) 形容词most前面没有the，不表示最高级的含义，只表示"非常"。 It is a most important problem. =It is a very important problem.
定冠词the的用法： 定冠词the与指示代词this ,that同源,有“那(这)个”的意思,但较弱,可以和一个名词连用,来表示某个或某些特定的人或东西. (1)特指双方都明白的人或物 Take the medicine.把药吃了. (2)上文提到过的人或事 He bought a house.他买了幢房子. I've been to the house.我去过那幢房子. (3)指世界上独一无二的事物 the sun ,the sky ,the moon, the earth (4)单数名词连用表示一类事物 the dollar 美元 the fox 狐狸 或与形容词或分词连用,表示一类人 the rich 富人 the living 生者 (5)用在序数词和形容词最高级,及形容词等前面 Where do you live?你住在哪? I live on the second floor.我住在二楼. That's the very thing I've been looking for.那正是我要找的东西. (6)与复数名词连用,指整个群体 They are the teachers of this school.(指全体教师) They are teachers of this school.(指部分教师) (7)表示所有,相当于物主代词,用在表示身体部位的名词前 She caught me by the arm.她抓住了我的手臂. (8)用在某些有普通名词构成的国家名称,机关团体,阶级等专有名词前 the People's Republic of China 中华人民共和国 the United States 美国 (9)用在表示乐器的名词前 She plays the piano.她会弹钢琴. (10)用在姓氏的复数名词之前,表示一家人 the Greens 格林一家人(或格林夫妇) (11)用在惯用语中 in the day, in the morning... the day before yesterday, the next morning... in the sky... in the dark... in the end... on the whole, by the way...
More than的用法 A. “More than+名词”表示“不仅仅是” 1)Modern science is more than a large amount of information. 2)Jason is more than a lecturer; he is a writer, too. 3) We need more than material wealth to build our country.建设我们国家，不仅仅需要物质财富. B. “More than+数词”含“以上”或“不止”之意，如： 4)I have known David for more than 20 years. 5)Let's carry out the test with more than the sample copy. 6) More than one person has made this suggestion. 不止一人提过这个建议. C. “More than+形容词”等于“很”或“非常”的意思，如： 7)In doing scientific experiments, one must be more than careful with the instruments. 8)I assure you I am more than glad to help you. D. more than + (that)从句，其基本意义是“超过（=over）”，但可译成“简直不”“远非”.难以，完全不能（其后通常连用情态动词can） 9) That is more than I can understand . 那非我所能懂的. 10) That is more than I can tell. 那事我实在不明白。 11) The heat there was more than he could stand. 那儿的炎热程度是他所不能忍受的 此外，“more than”也在一些惯用语中出现，如： more...than 的用法 1. 比……多，比……更 He has more books than me. 他的书比我多。 He is more careful than the others. 他比其他人更仔细。 2. 与其……不如 He is more lucky than clever. 与其说他聪明，不如说他幸运。 He is more （a）scholar than （a）teacher. 与其说他是位教师，不如说他是位学者。 注：该句型主要用于同一个人或物在两个不同性质或特征等方面的比较，其中的比较级必须用加more 的形式，不能用加词尾-er 的形式。 No more than/not more than 1. no more than 的意思是“仅仅”“只有”“最多不超过”，强调少。如： --This test takes no more than thirty minutes. 这个测验只要30分钟。 --The pub was no more than half full. 该酒吧的上座率最多不超过五成。-For thirty years，he had done no more than he （had）needed to. 30年来，他只干了他需要干的工作。 2. not more than 为more than （多于）的否定式，其意为“不多于”“不超过”。如：Not more than 10 guests came to her birthday party. 来参加她的生日宴会的客人不超过十人。 比较： She has no more than three hats. 她只有3顶帽子。（太少了） She has not more than three hats. 她至多有3顶帽子。（也许不到3顶帽子） I have no more than five yuan in my pocket. 我口袋里的钱最多不过5元。（言其少） I have not more than five yuan in my pocket. 我口袋里的钱不多于5元。（也许不到5元） more than, less than 的用法 1. （指数量）不到，不足 It’s less than half an hour’s drive from here. 开车到那里不到半个钟头。 In less than an hour he finished the work. 没要上一个小时，他就完成了工作。 2. 比……（小）少 She eats less than she should. 她吃得比她应该吃的少。 Half the group felt they spent less than average. 半数人觉得他们的花费低于平均水平。 more…than,/no more than/not more than (1)Mr．Li is ________ a professor; he is also a famous scientist． (2)As I had ________ five dollars with me, I couldn’t afford the new jacket then． (3)He had to work at the age of ________ twelve． (4)There were ________ ten chairs in the room．However, the number of the children is twelve． (5)If you tel l your father what you’ve done, he’ll be ________ angry． (6)－What did you think of this novel? －I was disappointed to find it ________ interesting ________ that one． 倍数表达法 1. “倍数+形容词（或副词）的比较级+than+从句”表示“A比B大（长、高、宽等）多少倍” This rope is twice longer than that one.这根绳是那根绳的三倍（比那根绳长两倍）。The car runs twice faster than that truck.这辆小车的速度比那辆卡车快两倍（是那辆卡车的三倍）。 2. “倍数+as+形容词或副词的原级+as+从句”表示“A正好是B的多少倍”。
第五章老年社会工作 第一节老年社会工作概述 第二节老年社会工作的主要内容 第三节老年社会工作的主要方法 第一节老年社会工作概述 一、老年人与老年期 （一）年龄界定 生理年龄：生理指标与功能确定 心理年龄：心理活动程度确定 社会年龄：与他人交往的角色确定 （二）老年期的划分 低龄老年人：60-69岁 中龄老年人：70-79 高龄老年人：80岁以上 （三）划分的意义 1.三种年龄：不能仅凭日历年龄判断服务需求，而要关注不同个体在生理、心理与社会方面的差异。 2.三个时期：关注老年同期群的共性需要。 二、老年期的特点 （一）生理变化 1.生理变化的特点：九大生理系统老化 2.对开展老年社会工作的影响 （1）要特别关注老年人的身体健康状况； （2）处理好隐私的健康问题，如大小便； （3）帮助机构和家庭策划环境的调整。 （二）心理变化 1.智力、人格、记忆力的变化 智力：结晶智力强，但处理问题速度下降 人格：总结自己生命的意义 记忆力：记忆速度下降，动机决定是否学习 2.对开展老年社工的影响 （1）提供机会但尊重选择 （2）所有事放慢节奏 （3）关注身体健康对心理功能的重要性 （三）社会生活方面的变化 1.对老年社会生活变化的理论解释 （1）角色理论：丧失象征中年的社会角色 （2）活动理论：生活满足感与活动有积极联系 （3）撤离理论：接受减少与社会的交往 （4）延续理论：不能割裂看待老年阶段 （5）社会建构理论：老年是一个独特的个人过程 （6）现代化理论：现代化使老年人地位下降
2.理论在社会工作中的应用 （1）注意角色转变的重大生活事件 （2）注意老年个体的差异性，尊重其对生活意义的不同理解 （3）注意社会隔离可能对老年人造成的伤害 （4）改变总有可能 （5）关注社会变迁对老年人的影响，推动社会政策的调整 三、老年人的需要及问题 （一）老年人的需要 1.健康维护 2.经济保障 3.就业休闲 4.社会参与 5.婚姻家庭 6.居家安全 7.后事安排 8.一条龙照顾 （二）老年人的问题 1.慢性病问题与医疗问题 2.家庭照顾问题 3.宜居环境问题 4.代际隔阂问题 5.社会隔离问题 四、老年社会工作 （一）老年社会工作的对象 1.老年人自身：空巢、残疾、高龄老人，也包括健康老人 2.老年人周围的人：家庭成员、亲属、朋友、邻居等 3.宏观系统：单位与服务组织 （二）老年社会工作的目的 根本目标：老有所养、老有所医、老有所教、老有所学、老有所为、老有所乐 （三）老年社会工作的作用 1.个体层面：维持日常生活、获得社会支持 2.宏观层面：参与制定有关老年人的服务方案与政策 五、老年社会工作的特点 （一）老年歧视等社会价值观会影响社会工作者的态度与行为 （二）反移情是社会工作者的重要课题 （三）社会工作者要善于运用督导机制 （四）需要多学科合作 第二节老年社会工作的主要内容 一、身体健康方面的服务 二、认知与情绪问题的处理 三、精神问题的解决 四、社会支持网络的建立 五、老年人特殊问题的处理 一、身体健康方面的服务
“tｈｅwａｙ+从句”结构的意义及用法 首先让我们来看下面这个句子: Ｒead the foｌloｗｉnｇpassagｅａnd talkａbout ｉt wi ｔh your classmaｔes．Try tｏｔeｌl whaｔyｏu thiｎk ｏf Tom aｎd ｏｆｔhe ｗay the chiｌｄrenｔrｅated ｈim. 在这个句子中，ｔhe waｙ是先行词,后面是省略了关系副词that或in whｉch的定语从句。 下面我们将叙述“the ｗaｙ+从句”结构的用法。 1.tｈe wａy之后，引导定语从句的关系词是tｈat而不是hoｗ,因此，<<现代英语惯用法词典＞＞中所给出的下面两个句子是错误的：Ｔhｉs is ｔｈeｗayｈowｉtｈａppened. This is the way how he ａlwａｙs treats me. 2．在正式语体中,thaｔ可被in which所代替;在非正式语体中，ｔhat则往往省略。由此我们得到theｗay后接定语从句时的三种模式：1) tｈe ｗaｙ＋ｔhａt-从句２）the way +ｉn whiｃh－从句3) the ｗay +从句 例如：Ｔｈe way(in whiｃh ，thａt) ｔhｅｓｅｃomｒade ｓloｏｋａｔｐrobｌems is wrong．这些同志看问题的方法
不对。 Ｔｈｅｗａy(that ,ｉn ｗhiｃh)yoｕ’ｒe doinｇit is comple ｔeｌy crａzy.你这么个干法,简直发疯。 Wｅａdmiｒｅd him for thｅｗay ｉｎｗhｉch he fａｃeｓdiｆficultieｓ． Waｌlａｃe ａｎd Ｄarwiｎｇreed ｏn the way ｉｎwhi ｃh ｄｉfｆｅrｅnt forms ｏf life had ｂegｕn.华莱士和达尔文对不同类型的生物是如何起源的持相同的观点。 Thｉs is ｔｈe ｗaｙ（tｈａｔ) hｅdｉd it. I lｉkeｄｔhe waｙ(ｔhat) ｓｈeｏｒganized ｔhe ｍeetｉng． 3.theｗay(tｈat)有时可以与hｏw(作“如何”解）通用。例如： That’s tｈe ｗaｙ(tｈaｔ) shｅspoke. = Tｈat’s how shｅspoke.
初中英语比较级和最高级讲解与练习 形容词比较级和最高级 一．绝大多数形容词有三种形式,原级,比较级和最高级, 以表示形容词说明的性质在程度上的不同。 1. 形容词的原级: 形容词的原级形式就是词典中出现的形容词的原形。例如: poor tall great glad bad 2. 形容词的比较级和最高级: 形容词的比较级和最高级形式是在形容词的原级形式的基 础上变化的。分为规则变化和不规则变化。 二．形容词比较级和最高级规则变化如下: 1) 单音节形容词的比较级和最高级形式是在词尾加-er 和-est 构成。 great (原级) greater(比较级) greatest(最高级) 2) 以-e 结尾的单音节形容词的比较级和最高级是在词尾加-r 和-st 构成。 wide (原级) wider (比较级) widest (最高级) 3) 少数以-y, -er, -ow, -ble结尾的双音节形容词的比较级和最高级是在词尾加 -er 和-est构成。 clever(原级) cleverer(比较级) cleverest(最高级)， slow(原级) slower(比较级) slowest (最高级) 4) 以-y 结尾,但-y 前是辅音字母的形容词的比较级和最高级是把-y 去掉,加上-ier 和-est 构成. happy (原形) happier (比较级) happiest (最高级) 5) 以一个辅音字母结尾其前面的元音字母发短元音的形容词的比较级和最高级是双写该 辅音字母然后再加-er和-est。 原形比较级最高级原形比较级最高级 big bigger biggest hot hotter hottest red redder reddest thin thinner thinnest 6) 双音节和多音节形容词的比较级和最高级需用more 和most 加在形容词前面来构 成。 原形比较级最高级 careful careful more careful most careful difficult more difficult most difficult delicious more delicious most delicious 7)常用的不规则变化的形容词的比较级和最高级: 原级比较级最高级 good better best 好的 well better best 身体好的 bad worse worst 坏的 ill worse worst 病的 many more most 许多 much more most 许多 few less least 少数几个 little less least 少数一点儿 （little littler littlest 小的） far further furthest 远（指更进一步，深度。亦可指更远） far farther farthest 远（指更远，路程）
表示“方式”、“方法”，注意以下用法： 1.表示用某种方法或按某种方式，通常用介词in(此介词有时可省略)。如： Do it (in) your own way. 按你自己的方法做吧。 Please do not talk (in) that way. 请不要那样说。 2.表示做某事的方式或方法，其后可接不定式或of doing sth。 如： It’s the best way of studying [to study] English. 这是学习英语的最好方法。 There are different ways to do [of doing] it. 做这事有不同的办法。 3.其后通常可直接跟一个定语从句(不用任何引导词)，也可跟由that 或in which 引导的定语从句，但是其后的从句不能由how 来引导。如： 我不喜欢他说话的态度。 正：I don’t like the way he spoke. 正：I don’t like the way that he spoke. 正：I don’t like the way in which he spoke. 误：I don’t like the way how he spoke. 4.注意以下各句the way 的用法： That’s the way (=how) he spoke. 那就是他说话的方式。 Nobody else loves you the way(=as) I do. 没有人像我这样爱你。 The way (=According as) you are studying now, you won’tmake much progress. 根据你现在学习情况来看，你不会有多大的进步。 2007年陕西省高考英语中有这样一道单项填空题： ——I think he is taking an active part insocial work. ——I agree with you_____. A、in a way B、on the way C、by the way D、in the way 此题答案选A。要想弄清为什么选A，而不选其他几项，则要弄清选项中含way的四个短语的不同意义和用法，下面我们就对此作一归纳和小结。 一、in a way的用法 表示：在一定程度上，从某方面说。如： In a way he was right.在某种程度上他是对的。注：in a way也可说成in one way。 二、on the way的用法 1、表示：即将来(去)，就要来(去)。如： Spring is on the way.春天快到了。 I'd better be on my way soon.我最好还是快点儿走。 Radio forecasts said a sixth-grade wind was on the way.无线电预报说将有六级大风。 2、表示：在路上，在行进中。如： He stopped for breakfast on the way.他中途停下吃早点。 We had some good laughs on the way.我们在路上好好笑了一阵子。 3、表示：(婴儿)尚未出生。如： She has two children with another one on the way.她有两个孩子，现在还怀着一个。 She's got five children，and another one is on the way.她已经有5个孩子了，另一个又快生了。 三、by the way的用法
形容词比较级和最高级的形式 一、形容词比较级和最高级的构成 形容词的比较级和最高级变化形式规则如下 构成法原级比较级最高级 ①一般单音节词末尾加 er 和 est strong stronger strongest ②单音节词如果以 e结尾，只加 r 和 st strange stranger strangest ③闭音节单音节词如末尾只有一个辅音字母， 须先双写这个辅音字母，再加 er和 est sad big hot sadder bigger hotter saddest biggest hottest ④少数以 y, er(或 ure), ow, ble结尾的双音节词， 末尾加 er和 est(以 y结尾的词，如 y前是辅音字母， 把y变成i，再加 er和 est，以 e结尾的词仍 只加 r和 st) angry Clever Narrow Noble angrier Cleverer narrower nobler angriest cleverest narrowest noblest ⑤其他双音节和多音节词都在前面加单词more和most different more different most different 1) The most high 〔A〕mountain in 〔B〕the world is Mount Everest，which is situated 〔C〕in Nepal and is twenty nine thousand one hundred and fourty one feet high 〔D〕 . 2) This house is spaciouser 〔A〕than that 〔B〕white 〔C〕one I bought in Rapid City，South Dakota 〔D〕last year. 3) Research in the social 〔A〕sciences often proves difficulter 〔B〕than similar 〔C〕work in the physical 〔D〕sciences. 二、形容词比较级或最高级的特殊形式：
比较级和最高级 1.在形容词词尾加上―er‖ ―est‖ 构成比较级、最高级： bright（明亮的）—brighter—brightest broad（广阔的）—broader—broadest cheap（便宜的）—cheaper—cheapest clean（干净的）—cleaner—cleanest clever（聪明的）—cleverer—cleverest cold（寒冷的）—colder—coldest cool（凉的）—cooler—coolest dark（黑暗的）—darker—darkest dear（贵的）—dearer—dearest deep（深的）—deeper—deepest fast（迅速的）—faster—fastest few（少的）—fewer—fewest great（伟大的）—greater—greatest hard（困难的,硬的）—harder—hardest high（高的）—higher—highest kind（善良的）—kinder—kindest light（轻的）—lighter—lightest long（长的）—longer—longest loud（响亮的）—louder—loudest low（低的）—lower—lowest near（近的）—nearer—nearest new（新的）—newer—newest poor（穷的）—poorer—poorest quick（快的）—quicker—quickest quiet（安静的）—quieter—quietest rich（富裕的）—richer—richest short（短的）—shorter—shortest slow（慢的）—slower—slowest small（小的）—smaller—smallest smart（聪明的）—smarter—smartest soft（柔软的）—softer—softest strong（强壮的）—stronger—strongest sweet（甜的）—sweeter—sweetest tall（高的）-taller-tallest thick（厚的）—thicker—thickest warm（温暖的）—warmer—warmest weak（弱的）—weaker—weakest young（年轻的）—younger—youngest 2.双写最后一个字母,再加上―er‖ ―est‖构成比较级、最高级： big（大的）—bigger—biggest fat（胖的）—fatter—fattest hot（热的）—hotter—hottest red（红的）—redder—reddest sad（伤心的）—sadder—saddest thin（瘦的）—thinner—thinnest wet（湿的）—wetter—wettest mad（疯的）—madder—maddest 3.以不发音的字母e结尾的形容词,加上―r‖ ―st‖ 构成比较级、最高级：able（能干的）—abler—ablest brave（勇敢的）—braver—bravest close（接近的）—closer—closest fine（好的,完美的）—finer—finest large（巨大的）—larger—largest late（迟的）—later—latest nice（好的）—nicer—nicest ripe（成熟的）—riper—ripest