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经济学人2016年4月2日Haves and have-nots

经济学人2016年4月2日Haves and have-nots
经济学人2016年4月2日Haves and have-nots

New York theatre

Haves and have-nots

Putting America’s financial inequality on the stage

Apr 2nd 2016 | NEW YORK | From the print edition

Looking up fortune cookies THERE is something familiar about the Blakes, the American family at the centre of “The Humans”, a new play by Stephen Karam that is now on Broadway. Anyone who has navigated the emotional minefield of a family meal will recognise the affectionate way they bicker, their barbs softened with tenderness. But something else about this family will also resonate with a growing group of Americans: each member is struggling financially.

Over the course of the fraught feast, it becomes clear that the youngest daughter (Sarah Steele), an aspiring composer, is working nights as a bartender to pay off her student loans. Her sister (Cassie Beck) is about to lose her job as a lawyer after calling in sick too often. Their parents are in their 60s, but neither can afford to retire, particularly now that they are stuck paying the grandmother’s mounting medical bills. The mother (Jayne Houdyshell), a veteran office manager, complains that the 20-something “kids” she works for earn five times her salary “just ’cause they have a special degree.” But no one sounds more bitter or frustrated than the father (the excellent Reed Birney), who recently lost his job of 28 years at a school. “I thought I’d be settled by my age, you know, but man, it never ends,” he gripes. “Don’tcha think it should cost less to be alive?”

This conversation resembles countless others across the country, as Americans try to make sense of an economy in which working hard is no longer enough to afford a comfortable life. Parents who assumed that their children would surpass their own accomplishments are now startled to find so many of them sweating

over rent and saddled with college debt. What does it take to get ahead? Why does the system create so few haves and so many have- nots? These questions are pushing voters towards presidential candidates who promise to blow up the status quo. They are also inspiring a generation of playwrights.

“Hungry”, at the Public Theatre until April 3rd, is the first in a trilogy from Richard Nelson to look at a single American family over the course of this odd election year (pictured). Like the Blakes, the Gabriels sit at the kitchen table talking about a country they increasingly have trouble recognising, and an economy that is leaving them behind. In “Hold on to Me Darling”, a funny new play by Kenneth Lonergan (at the Atlantic Theatre Company until April 17th), Timothy Olyphant is hilarious as Strings McCrane, a swanning, impulsive, narcissistic celebrity who has more money than he knows what to do with. Without moralising, this play nicely illustrates some of the bizarre consequences of an economy in which the spoils of wealth are in the hands of a lucky few. Many of these dramas show ordinary Americans grappling with spiralling expenses. In Mona Mansour’s “The Way West”, produced by the Labyrinth Theatre Company at the Bank Street Theatre, Deirdre O’Connell is magical as an ageing mother who spins yarns about plucky pioneers to distract herself from the problems of her own life. Having lost her job at a tyre shop, she cannot quite remember the last time she paid her bills, nor can she afford to see a doctor about her mysteriously immobile arm. The housing market has just collapsed, and most of her neighbours in dusty Stockton, California, have already abandoned their homes. Her grown-up daughters are helping her file for bankruptcy, but they have financial woes of their own. Their mix of bad luck and poor choices sends them into a situation that seems comically dire. But instead of succumbing to despair, the mother takes a near-delusional comfort in yet more tales of early American fortitude, plainly unwilling to let go of the promise of the American dream.

Other plays ponder what it takes to make it to the top. “Dry Powder”, a darkly amusing new work from Sarah Burgess, directed for the Public Theatre by Thomas Kail (who also directed “Hamilton”, a popular musica l), considers the cunning machinations of the 1%. Hank Azaria plays a private-equity boss who is being “eviscerated” in the press for throwing himself a ritzy party on the very day his firm announced extensive lay-offs. “Of course they’re protesting, that’s what unemployed people do,” quips Jenny (Claire Danes), a particularly ruthless founding partner.

To help improve the firm’s “optics”, Seth (John Krasinski), another founding partner, has a plan that would create jobs and increase revenues at an American luggage company. Yet the firm also ponders making more money by gutting the company and moving manufacturing to Bangladesh. Ms Burgess has little regard

for the way such wheeling and dealing prioritises profits over people. This slick, fast-paced play will not win any awards for nuance, but it is entertaining.

For a more subtle look at the ethical challenges posed by a winner-takes-all economy, Lucas Hnath’s taut and profoundly good “Red Speedo”, directed by Lileana Blain-Cruz at the New York Theatre Workshop, is on until April 3rd. Alex Breaux cuts a convincing figure as Ray, a lithe, monosyllabic competitive swimmer on the eve of the Olympics trials. For Ray, who lacks an education and lives in his car much of the time, qualifying for the Olympics is his only meal ticket. If he makes the cut he will be sponsored by Speedo in a deal that is worth “a lot of money”, assures his brother (Lucas Caleb Rooney), who works as his manager. When the stakes are so high, can Ray be blamed for taking drugs to help him compete? When so many others appear to be bending the rules, what is the value of heeding them? “Don’t I deserve a chance?” Ray pleads to his brother in the dark hours before the tryout. “Isn’t that the American thing?”

考研英语经济学人文章阅读训练五十

Convalescent plasma and artificial antibodies:Survivors as saviours 恢复期血浆和人工抗体:康复者成为了人们的救星 During the flu pandemic of1918-19doctors at an American naval hospital developed a treatment which,according to the American Journal of Public Health,had“a decided influence in shortening the course of the disease and in lowering the mortality”. 据《美国公共卫生杂志》报道称,在1918年至1919年的流感大流行期间,美国一家海军医院的医生研发了一种能够“有效缩短疾病病程并降低患者死亡率”的治疗方法。It involved clotting and then centrifuging blood from people who had got over the disease so as to separate out the antibodies it contained,then giving those antibodies to patients in dire need. 该方法是对处于恢复期的病人的血液进行采集和离心,进而分离出含有抗体的血浆,然后将其用于那些亟待治疗的患者。 Since then antibody-rich“convalescent plasma”(CP)has been used as a treatment for various diseases,including SARS and the pandemic strains of H1N1and H5N1influenza.Now covid-19has joined the list. 从那时起,富含抗体的“恢复期血浆”被广泛用于治疗包括SARS以及H1N1和H5N1流感大流行在内的各种疾病。如今,新冠肺炎也也位列其中。 A recent study in Wuhan found that severely ill covid-19patients treated with CP did significantly better than patients matched with them by age, gender and severity of infection had done earlier in the epidemic. 最近在武汉进行的一项研究发现,相比疫情早期那些年龄、性别和病情相当的新冠肺炎患者,接受恢复期血浆治疗的重症患者的治疗效果明显要好一些。

经济学人经济类文章精选3

What went wrong IN RECENT months many economists and policymakers, including such unlikely bedfellows as Paul Krugman, an economist and New York Times columnist, and Hank Paulson, a former American treasury secretary, have put “global imbalances”—the huge current-account surpluses run by countries like China, alongside America’s huge deficit—at the root of the financial crisis. But the IMF disagrees. It argues, in new papers released on Friday March 6th, that the “main culprit” was deficient regulation of t he financial system, together with a failure of market discipline. Olivier Blanchard, the IMF's chief economist, said this week that global imbalances contributed only “indirectly” to the crisis. This may sound like buck-passing by the world’s main interna tional macroeconomic organisation. But the distinction has important consequences for whether macroeconomic policy or more regulation of financial markets will provide the solutions to the mess. In broad strokes, the global imbalances view of the crisis argues that a glut of money from countries with high savings rates, such as China and the oil-producing states, came flooding into America. This kept interest rates low and fuelled the credit boom and the related boom in the prices of assets, such as houses and equity, whose collapse precipitated the financial crisis. A workable long-term fix for the problems of the world economy would, therefore, involve figuring out what to do about these imbalances. But the IMF argues that imbalances could not have caused the crisis without the creative ability of financial institutions to develop new structures and instruments to cater to investors’ demand for higher yields. These instruments turned out to be more risky than they appeared. Investors, overly optimistic about continued rises in asset prices, did not look closely into the nature of the assets that they bought, preferring to rely on the analysis of credit-rating agencies which were, in some cases, also selling advice on how to game the ratings system. This “failure of market discipline”, the fund argues, played a big role in the crisis. As big a problem, according to the IMF, was that financial regulation was flawed, ineffective and too limited in scope. What it calls the “shadow banking system”—the loosely regulated but highly interconnected network of investment banks, hedge funds, mortgage originators, and the like—was not subject to the sorts of prudential regulation (capital-adequacy norms, for example) that applied to banks. In part, the fund argues, this was because they were not thought to be systemically important, in the sense that banks were understood to be. But their being unregulated made it more attractive for banks (whose affiliates the non-banks often were) to evade capital requirements by pushing risk into these entities. In time, this network of institutions grew so large that they were indeed systemically important: in the now-familiar phrase, they were “too big” or “too interconnected” to fail. By late 2007, some estimates of the assets of the bank-like institutions in America outside the scope of existing prudential regulation, was around $10 trillion, as large as the assets of the regulated American banking system itself. Given this interpretation, it is not surprising that the IMF has thrown its weight strongly behind an enormous increase in the scale and scope of financial regulation in a series of papers leading up to the G20 meetings. Among many other proposals, it wants the shadow banking system to be subjected to the same sorts of prudential requirements that banks must follow. Sensibly, it is calling for regulation to concentrate on what an institution does, not what it is called (that is, the basis of regulation should be activities, not entities). It also wants regulators to focus more broadly on

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1、The Americas Argentina's debt Let's not make a deal Argentina may spurn a chance to settle with its creditors 美洲阿根廷债务别签协议啦阿根廷或将还债机会弃如敝履 WHEN Argentina defaulted on its debt for the second time in 13 years last July, the government blamed a pesky clause in its contracts with bondholders. 去年七月,阿根廷发生了十三年来的第二次债务违约,而政府却将这次违约归咎于与债权人签订的合同中的某项麻烦条款。 The so-called Rights Upon Future Offers (RUFO) clause was set to expire on December 31st,in theory opening the way to a settlement with bondholders who had refused Argentina's earlier offers of partial payment. 由于之前债权人拒绝阿根廷部分偿还,这项本应于12月31日到期的未来发行权利(RUFO)条款理论上可以解决与债权人之间的债务问题。 A deal would make it easier to borrow dollars, which the country badly needs to pay for imports. 这项协议可以为阿根廷借入美元提供更多便利,有了美元,阿根廷就可以解决进口商品所使用货币的燃眉之急。 But the president, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, may spurn the opportunity. 不过,克里斯蒂娜?费尔南德斯?基什内尔总统却有可能将这一机会弃如敝履。 After its previous default (in 2001) Argentina offered RUFO as a way to entice bond holders to swap the old debt for new bonds worth much less than the original ones. 上次(2001年)债务违约后,阿根廷通过RUFO 怂恿债券持有人进行债务掉期,也就是说用原先价格较低的旧债券交换价格较高的新债券。 The clause says that any future deal offered to some bondholders would be extended to all of them. 这一条款规定,合同签署后,政府和部分债券持有人达成的协议将适用于全体债券持有人。 In 2012 a court in New York ruled that Argentina would have to pay in full the small minority of bondholders who refused the debt swap. 2012年,纽约一家法院判定阿根廷政府应向拒绝债务掉期的少数债券持有人一次付清所有债务。 These are mostly American hedge funds, which bought the bonds at a fraction of their face value. 后者主要是美国对冲基金,它们当初就是以远远低于面值的价格买入了阿根廷债券。 Argentina argued that complying with the court order would trigger billions in payments to all holders of bonds issued under New York law, and so chose to default. 阿根廷称,根据纽约法律,按法庭裁决行事将导致对债券持有人支付高达数十亿的费用,于是便选择了违约。 Since the court's ruling, its foreign-exchange reserves have dwindled to 30 billion, less than needed to pay for six months' imports. 法院作出判决后,阿根廷外汇储备已缩减至300亿美元,甚至不足以支付六个月的商品进口。 Low commodity prices mean that few dollars are flowing in. 较低物价意味着美元流入会更少。 The government has responded by further restricting imports, which has led to shortages of supplies to factories and of some consumer goods. 由于限制进口导致工厂供货和部分日用品出现了短缺,政府已对进一步限制进口做出了回应。 That is one reason why the economy is expected to shrink by around 1% in 2015. 这便是阿根廷经济增速预计将在2015年下跌1个百分点的原因之一。 Debt payments during the year will siphon off some 40% of international reserves. 全年的债务将造成外汇储备流失40%。In December Argentina tried to reduce that drain by offering holders of bonds due for repayment new securities that mature in 2024. 十二月时,阿根廷曾试图给债券持有人提供2024年到期的新债券,以避免本国外汇储备消耗过快。 The gambit failed miserably:just 4% of creditors volunteered to exchange their 2015 bonds. 这项策略后以惨败告终:只有4%的债权人自愿用2015年债券进行兑换。 Things are so desperate that the government will soon make an attractive offer to holdout bondholders, some observers believe. 一些观察家认为,当前情况万分危急,政府不久就会制定出富有吸引力的政策来维系人心。 The expiration of the RUFO clause makes the cost bearable; the government would not have to make the same offer to the other bondholders. 这次RUFO条款期满后,违约成本尚可担负;但政府今后不会再和其他债券持有人签署同样的协议了。But that is a minority view. 不过,这只是小部分人的看法。 The real obstacles to paying off the holdouts have always been political rather than contractual, many think. 许多人认为,一直以来,政府无力清偿债务的真正原因都不是合同问题,而是各种政治方面的因素。 Ms Fernandez and her advisers demonised them as vultures and blamed them for many of Argentina's woes. 在费尔南德斯总

15年每周经济学人报刊中英文对照讲课讲稿

15年每周经济学人报刊中英文对照

空气污染英国需要采取更多措施来净化污浊的空气 Air pollution空气污染The big smoke雾都 Britain needs to do more to clean up its dirty air 英国需要采取更多措施来净化污浊的空气VISITING Oxford Street, a road teeming with tatty shops and overcrowded with people, is plainly a trial. Less plainly, levels of nitrogen dioxide (NO2), a noxious gas, have been found to be around three times higher there than the legal limit. In 2013 the annual mean concentration of NO2 on the street was one of the highest levels found anywhere in Europe. 来到牛津街,你会看到街道两边布满了各式杂乱的商店,而道路上人满为患。行走在这条街上,很明显是个磨练。不为人觉察的是,这里有毒气体二氧化氮(NO2)测出含量超出法定水平的约三倍以上。2013年,这条街的NO2年均浓度是欧洲最高之一。 British air is far cleaner than it was a few decades ago. Fewer people use coal-burning stoves; old industrial plants have been decommissioned. But since 2009 levels of nitrogen oxides and particulate matter, coarse or fine particles that are linked to lung cancer and asthma, have fallen more slowly. The exact number of deaths caused by dirty air is unknown. But in 2010 a government advisory group estimated that removing man-made fine particulate matter from the atmosphere would increase life expectancy for those born in 2008 by an average of six months. 英国的空气比几十年前干净多了。使用燃煤炉灶的人越来越少;老工业厂已经停产。但自2009年起,氧 化氮、微粒物质、以及与肺癌和哮喘相关的粗、细颗粒含量的下降速度减慢了。因污浊空气所引发的死亡人数是未知的。但2010年,一个政府顾问组估算如果将大气中人为造成的微粒物质除去的话,2008年的出生人口人均寿命将增加六个月。 Much of the slowdown is the result of fumes from diesel cars, which were championed by successive governments because they use less fuel and thus produce less carbon dioxide than petrol cars. In 2001 only 14% of all cars ran on diesel; by 2013 the proportion had increased to 35%. (Greener “hybrid” and electric cars have increased ninefold since 2006, but account for just 0.5% of the entire fleet.) Second-hand cars are particularly noxious, but even newer ones have not been as clean as hoped. Many cars that belched out few pollutants in tests produced more when on the roads. 下降速度放缓的大部分原因在于柴油汽车排放的尾气—这为历任政府所支持,因为柴油汽车耗用更少的能源,比汽油汽车排放更少的二氧化碳。2001年,仅14%的汽车使用柴油。2013年,这个比例上涨到了35%。(更绿色的“混合动力”和电瓶车自2006年以来增加了九倍,但仅占汽车总量的0.5%。)二手汽 车尤其有害,但新车也没所期望的那样清洁。很多车在污染物排放测试中排放量低,车在上路时却排放了更多。 Climate change and geoengineering气候变化与地质工程学Fears of a bright planet 地球发光,令人担心Experiments designed to learn more about ways of geoengineering the climate should be allowed to proceed为更好地利用工程学手段研究气候问题所设计的实验应该获准进行下去。SHINY things absorb less heat when left in the sun. This means that if the Earth could be made a little shinier it would be less susceptible to global warming. Ways to brighten it, such as adding nanoscale specks of salt to low clouds, making them whiter, or putting a thin haze of particles into the stratosphere, are the province of “geoengineering”. The small band of scientists which have been studying this subject over the past decade or so have mostly been using computer models. Some of them are now proposing outdoor experiments—using seawater-fed sprayers to churn out particles of the exact size needed to brighten clouds, or spewing sulphur particles from underneath a large balloon 20km up in the sky.发光的物体放在太阳下面会吸收较少的热量。这就意味着如果让地球发一点光的话,受到全球变暖的影响就会小一些。让地球发光的方式,比方说在低空云层上添加纳米级的盐微粒,让云变得更白,或者是将一层薄的雾状物洒向平流层,这些都属于地质工程学的范畴。过去十年左右研究这一领域的一小批科学家主要使用计算机模型,其中一些人现在提出要做室外实验――就是用装有

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Dominant and dangerous As America's economic supremacy fades, the primacy of the dollar looks unsustainable IF HEGEMONS are good for anything, it is for conferring stability on the systems they dominate. For 70 years the dollar has been the superpower of the financial and monetary system. Despite talk of the yuan's rise, the primacy of the greenback is unchallenged. As a means of payment, a store of value and a reserve asset, nothing can touch it. Yet the dollar's rule has brittle foundations, and the system it underpins is unstable. Worse, the alternative reserve currencies are flawed. A transition to a more secure order will be devilishly hard. When the buck stops For decades, America's economic might legitimised the dollar's claims to reign supreme. But, as our special report this week explains, a faultline has opened between America's economic clout and its financial muscle. The United States accounts for 23% of global GDP and 12% of merchandise trade. Yet about 60% of the world's output, and a similar share of the planet's people, lie within a de facto dollar zone, in which currencies are pegged to the dollar or move in some sympathy with it. American firms' share of the stock of international corporate investment has fallen from 39% in 1999 to 24% today. But Wall Street sets the rhythm of markets globally more than it ever did. American fund managers run 55% of the world's assets under management, up from 44% a decade ago. The widening gap between America's economic and financial power creates problems for other countries, in the dollar zone and beyond. That is because the costs of dollar dominance are starting to outweigh the benefits. First, economies must endure wild gyrations. In recent months the prospect of even a tiny rate rise in America has sucked capital from emerging markets, battering currencies and share prices. Decisions of the Federal Reserve affect offshore dollar debts and deposits worth about $9 trillion. Because some countries link their currencies to the dollar, their central banks must react to the Fed. Foreigners own 20-50% of local-currency government bonds in places like Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey: they are more likely to abandon emerging markets when American rates rise. At one time the pain from capital outflows would have been mitigated by the stronger demand—including for imports—that prompted the Fed to raise rates in the first place. However, in the past decade America's share of global merchandise imports has dropped from 16% to 13%. America is the biggest export market for only 32

经济学人杂志一些图表文章

Our interactive overview of global house prices and rents 全球房价和租价互动概貌 SCARCELY has one bubble deflated when another threatens to pop. While America's housing bust—the crash that began the global financial crisis—is near an end, adjustments elsewhere are incomplete. In a few countries, like China and France, values look dangerously frothy. There is always trouble somewhere. And because buying a house usually involves taking on lots of debt, the bursting of this kind of bubble hits banks disproportionately hard. Research into financial crises in developed and emerging markets shows a consistent link between house-price cycles and banking busts. 一个泡沫很少在另一个泡沫行将破灭时自行减退。当美国房地产泡沫破裂(房地产暴跌导致全球金融危机)接近尾声之时,其他地方的一些调整措施尚在进行中。在一些国家——如中国和法国——房地产价格看上去依然是危险的泡沫。总会有地方有麻烦。并且,买房通常涉及承担大量贷款,这种类型的泡沫破裂之后,对银行造成的冲击会相当的大。对发达和新兴市场的金融危机的研究表明,房价周期与银行萧条有一致的联系。 The Economist has been publishing data on global house prices since 2002. The interactive tool above enables you to compare nominal and real house prices across 20 markets over time. And to get a sense of whether buying a property is becoming more or less affordable, you can also look at the changing relationships between house prices and rents, and between house prices and incomes. 《经济学人》自2002年以来就开始发布全球房地产价格数据。您可以使用上面的互动式工具来比较不同时间段20个市场的房地产名义价格和实际价格。并且,对于购买物业是变得容易了还是难了,您可以看看房价和租价、房价与收入之间变化的关系,来作出自己的判断。

考研英语经济学人文章阅读训练五十一

Many economists defend disaster profiteers.They are wrong 许多经济学家为发灾害财的人们辩解,但他们错了 With price gouging,morality trumps economics 就哄抬物价而言,道德胜过经济学 Much about the pandemic sweeping across the world is unprecedented, but one aspect is all too familiar:price gouging in the wake of a disaster. In New York police arrested a man who had stockpiled medical gear, allegedly selling it for a700%mark-up. 当一场流行病席卷全球之际,世界发生了许多前所未见的事情,但有一件事我们再熟悉不过了:灾难发生后,人们会哄抬物价。纽约警方逮捕了一名男子,该男子囤积医疗物资,并溢价700%进行销售。 Indonesian authorities seized600,000masks from hoarders.In Italy the government launched a probe into sky-high online prices for basic protective equipment.Such crackdowns are popular.Who could possibly endorse disaster profiteering?Many economists,as it turns out. 印尼当局从囤积者手中没收了60万个口罩。意大利政府针对线上天价基本防护物资展开了调查。此类打击行动受到了人们的欢迎。那么谁会支持发灾难财的行为呢?答案是,许多经济学家。 To be clear,it is not that they want the public to miss out on life-saving products.Quite the contrary.They believe that soaring prices stimulate greater output,and that policies to cap costs might limit supplies and so do more harm than good. 有一点需要说明的是,并不是说他们希望人们错失这些救命物资。恰恰相反。他们认为,价格的飞涨能够刺激产量的增长,而价格管制政策可能会导致供应紧缩,反而弊大于利。

经济学人中英对照文章 Northern lights

Northern lights 北极光 The Nordic countries are reinventing their model of capitalism, says Adrian Wooldridge 艾德里-伍尔德里奇(Adrian Wooldridge)指出北欧国家正在重塑它们的资本主义模式 THIRTY YEARS AGO Margaret Thatcher turned Britain into the world’s leading centre of “thinking the unthinkable”. Today that distinction has pas sed to Sweden. The streets of Stockholm are awash with the blood of sacred cows. The think-tanks are brimful of new ideas. The erstwhile champion of the “third way” is now pursuing a far more interesting brand of politics. 三十年前马格丽特-撒切尔(Margaret Thatcher)将英国转变成了一个在全世界首屈一指“敢于想不可想象之事”的中心。今天这项荣耀则移到了瑞典头上。斯德哥尔摩的大街上充满着打破禁忌局限所产生的新气象。智囊机构的好点子层出不穷。之前身为“第三条道路”[1]的拥护者,如今瑞典所追求的政治模式要比过去有趣得多。 Sweden has reduced public spending as a proportion of GDP from 67% in 1993 to 49% today. It could soon have a smaller state than Britain. It has also cut the top marginal tax rate by 27 percentage points since 1983, to 57%, and scrapped a mare’s nest of taxes on property, gifts, wealth and inheritance. This year it is cutting the corporate-tax rate from 26.3% to 22%. 瑞典政府开支占国民生产总值(GDP)的比例已从1993年的67%降到了今天的49%。很快其政府规模将会比英国更小。同时,瑞典的最高边际税率已降到了57%,比1983年整整低了27个百分点,而且瑞典政府也已取消了大量混乱不堪的财产税,馈赠税以及继承税。今年瑞典将会把企业所得税从26.3%下调到22%。 Sweden has also donned the golden straitjacket of fiscal orthodoxy with its pledge to produce a fiscal surplus over the economic cycle. Its public debt fell from 70% of GDP in 1993 to 37% in 2010, and its budget moved from an 11% deficit to a surplus of 0.3% over the same period. This allowed a country with a small, open economy to recover quickly from the financial storm of 2007-08. Sweden has also put its pension system on a sound foundation, replacing a defined-benefit system with a defined-contribution one and making automatic adjustments for longer life expectancy. 瑞典也披上了“黄金紧身衣”[2]——承诺会在这个经济周期内达到财政预算盈余。其政府债务占GDP的比例已从已从1993年的70%减少到了2010年的37%。同期瑞典政府预算也从11%的赤字转变至0.3%的盈余。所有这些行动使这个开放的小经济体迅速地从2007-08的金融风暴中恢复过来。瑞典同时也打稳了其退休金制度的基础,将约定提存制度改成了约定给付制度[3],并让退休金根据平均寿命的增长自动进行调整。

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