Network Working Group S. Chokhani Request for Comments: 3647 Orion Security Solutions, Inc. Obsoletes: 2527 W. Ford Category: Informational VeriSign, Inc. R. Sabett Cooley Godward LLP C. Merrill McCarter & English, LLP S. Wu Infoliance, Inc. November 2003 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework
Status of this Memo
This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does
not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this
memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved. Abstract
This document presents a framework to assist the writers of
certificate policies or certification practice statements for
participants within public key infrastructures, such as certification authorities, policy authorities, and communities of interest that
wish to rely on certificates. In particular, the framework provides a comprehensive list of topics that potentially (at the writer’s
discretion) need to be covered in a certificate policy or a
certification practice statement. This document supersedes RFC 2527. Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.
2. Purpose. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3. Scope. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Definitions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.1. Certificate Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.2. Certificate Policy Examples. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.3. X.509 Certificate Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 1]
3.3.1. Certificate Policies Extension . . . . . . . . . 12 3.3.2. Policy Mappings Extension. . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3.3.3. Policy Constraints Extension . . . . . . . . . . 13 3.3.
4. Policy Qualifiers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3.4. Certification Practice Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3.
5. Relationship Between CP and CPS. . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.
6. Relationship Among CPs, CPSs, Agreements, and
Other Documents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.7. Set of Provisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4. Contents of a Set of Provisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 4.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4.1.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4.1.2. Document Name and Identification . . . . . . . . 22 4.1.3. PKI Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4.1.4. Certificate Usage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 4.1.
5. Policy Administration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 4.1.
6. Definitions and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 4.2. Publication and Repository Responsibilities. . . . . . . 25 4.3. Identification and Authentication (I&A). . . . . . . . . 25 4.3.1. Naming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 4.3.2. Initial Identity Validation. . . . . . . . . . . 26 4.3.3. I&A for Re-key Requests. . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 4.3.4. I&A for Revocation Requests. . . . . . . . . . . 27 4.4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements. . . . . 27 4.4.1. Certificate Application. . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 4.4.2. Certificate Application Processing . . . . . . . 28 4.4.3. Certificate Issuance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 4.4.4. Certificate Acceptance . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 4.4.5. Key Pair and Certificate Usage . . . . . . . . . 29 4.4.6. Certificate Renewal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 4.4.
7. Certificate Re-key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 4.4.
8. Certificate Modification . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4.4.
9. Certificate Revocation and Suspension. . . . . . 31 4.4.10. Certificate Status Services. . . . . . . . . . . 33 4.4.11. End of Subscription. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 4.4.12. Key Escrow and Recovery. . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 4.5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls . . . . . 33 4.5.1. Physical Security Controls . . . . . . . . . . . 34 4.5.2. Procedural Controls. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 4.5.3. Personnel Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 4.5.4. Audit Logging Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 4.5.5. Records Archival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 4.5.6. Key Changeover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 4.5.7. Compromise and Disaster Recovery . . . . . . . . 38 4.5.8. CA or RA Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 4.6. Technical Security Controls. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 4.6.1. Key Pair Generation and Installation . . . . . . 39 4.6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic
Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 2]
Module Engineering Controls. . . . . . . . . . . 40 4.6.3. Other Aspects of Key Pair Management . . . . . . 42 4.6.4. Activation Data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 4.6.5. Computer Security Controls . . . . . . . . . . . 42 4.6.6. Life Cycle Security Controls . . . . . . . . . . 43 4.6.7. Network Security Controls. . . . . . . . . . . . 43 4.6.8. Timestamping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 4.7. Certificate, CRL, and OCSP Profiles. . . . . . . . . . . 44 4.7.1. Certificate Profile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 4.7.2. CRL Profile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 4.7.3. OCSP Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 4.8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessment. . . . . . . . . . 45 4.9. Other Business and Legal Matters . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 4.9.1. Fees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 4.9.2. Financial Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 4.9.3. Confidentiality of Business Information. . . . . 47 4.9.4. Privacy of Personal Information. . . . . . . . . 48 4.9.5. Intellectual Property Rights . . . . . . . . . . 48 4.9.6. Representations and Warranties . . . . . . . . . 48 4.9.7. Disclaimers of Warranties. . . . . . . . . . . . 49 4.9.8. Limitations of Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 4.9.9. Indemnities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 4.9.10. Term and Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 4.9.11. Individual notices and communications
with participants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 4.9.12. Amendments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 4.9.13. Dispute Resolution Procedures. . . . . . . . . . 51 4.9.14. Governing Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 4.9.15. Compliance with Applicable Law . . . . . . . . . 51 4.9.16. Miscellaneous Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.9.17. Other Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5. Security Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
6. Outline of a Set of Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
7. Comparison to RFC 2527 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
10. Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
12. List of Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
13. Authors’ Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
14. Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 3]
1. Introduction
1.1. Background
In general, a public-key certificate (hereinafter "certificate")
binds a public key held by an entity (such as person, organization,
account, device, or site) to a set of information that identifies the entity associated with use of the corresponding private key. In most cases involving identity certificates, this entity is known as the
"subject" or "subscriber" of the certificate. Two exceptions,
however, include devices (in which the subscriber is usually the
individual or organization controlling the device) and anonymous
certificates (in which the identity of the individual or organization is not available from the certificate itself). Other types of
certificates bind public keys to attributes of an entity other than
the entity’s identity, such as a role, a title, or creditworthiness
information.
A certificate is used by a "certificate user" or "relying party" that needs to use, and rely upon the accuracy of, the binding between the subject public key distributed via that certificate and the identity and/or other attributes of the subject contained in that certificate.
A relying party is frequently an entity that verifies a digital
signature from the certificate’s subject where the digital signature is associated with an email, web form, electronic document, or other data. Other examples of relying parties can include a sender of
encrypted email to the subscriber, a user of a web browser relying on a server certificate during a secure sockets layer (SSL) session, and an entity operating a server that controls access to online
information using client certificates as an access control mechanism. In summary, a relying party is an entity that uses a public key in a certificate (for signature verification and/or encryption). The
degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied in a
certificate depends on several factors. These factors can include
the practices followed by the certification authority (CA) in
authenticating the subject; the CA’s operating policy, procedures,
and security controls; the scope of the subscriber’s responsibilities (for example, in protecting the private key); and the stated
responsibilities and liability terms and conditions of the CA (for
example, warranties, disclaimers of warranties, and limitations of
liability).
A Version 3 X.509 certificate may contain a field declaring that one or more specific certificate policies apply to that certificate
[ISO1]. According to X.509, a certificate policy (CP) is "a named
set of rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a
particular community and/or class of applications with common
security requirements." A CP may be used by a relying party to help Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 4]
in deciding whether a certificate, and the binding therein, are
sufficiently trustworthy and otherwise appropriate for a particular
application. The CP concept is an outgrowth of the policy statement concept developed for Internet Privacy Enhanced Mail [PEM1] and
expanded upon in [BAU1]. The legal and liability aspects presented
in Section 4.9 are outcomes of a collaborative effort between IETF
PKIX working group and the American Bar Association (ABA) members who have worked on legal acceptance of digital signature and role of PKI in that acceptance.
A more detailed description of the practices followed by a CA in
issuing and otherwise managing certificates may be contained in a
certification practice statement (CPS) published by or referenced by the CA. According to the American Bar Association Information
Security Committee’s Digital Signature Guidelines (hereinafter
"DSG")(1) and the Information Security Committee’s PKI Assessment
Guidelines (hereinafter "PAG")(2), "a CPS is a statement of the
practices which a certification authority employs in issuing
certificates." [ABA1, ABA2] In general, CPSs also describe practices relating to all certificate lifecycle services (e.g., issuance,
management, revocation, and renewal or re-keying), and CPSs provide
details concerning other business, legal, and technical matters. The terms contained in a CP or CPS may or may not be binding upon a PKI’s participants as a contract. A CP or CPS may itself purport to be a
contract. More commonly, however, an agreement may incorporate a CP or CPS by reference and therefore attempt to bind the parties of the agreement to some or all of its terms. For example, some PKIs may
utilize a CP or (more commonly) a CPS that is incorporated by
reference in the agreement between a subscriber and a CA or RA
(called a "subscriber agreement") or the agreement between a relying party and a CA (called a "relying party agreement" or "RPA"). In
other cases, however, a CP or CPS has no contractual significance at all. A PKI may intend these CPs and CPSs to be strictly
informational or disclosure documents.
1.2. Purpose
The purpose of this document is twofold. First, the document aims to explain the concepts of a CP and a CPS, describe the differences
between these two concepts, and describe their relationship to
subscriber and relying party agreements. Second, this document aims to present a framework to assist the writers and users of certificate policies or CPSs in drafting and understanding these documents. In
particular, the framework identifies the elements that may need to be considered in formulating a CP or a CPS. The purpose is not to
define particular certificate policies or CPSs, per se. Moreover,
this document does not aim to provide legal advice or recommendations Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 5]
as to particular requirements or practices that should be contained
within CPs or CPSs. (Such recommendations, however, appear in
[ABA2].)
1.3. Scope
The scope of this document is limited to discussion of the topics
that can be covered in a CP (as defined in X.509) or CPS (as defined in the DSG and PAG). In particular, this document describes the
types of information that should be considered for inclusion in a CP or a CPS. While the framework as presented generally assumes use of the X.509 version 3 certificate format for the purpose of providing
assurances of identity, it is not intended that the material be
restricted to use of that certificate format or identity
certificates. Rather, it is intended that this framework be
adaptable to other certificate formats and to certificates providing assurances other than identity that may come into use.
The scope does not extend to defining security policies generally
(such as organization security policy, system security policy, or
data labeling policy). Further, this document does not define a
specific CP or CPS. Moreover, in presenting a framework, this
document should be viewed and used as a flexible tool presenting
topics that should be considered of particular relevance to CPs or
CPSs, and not as a rigid formula for producing CPs or CPSs.
This document assumes that the reader is familiar with the general
concepts of digital signatures, certificates, and public-key
infrastructure (PKI), as used in X.509, the DSG, and the PAG.
2. Definitions
This document makes use of the following defined terms:
Activation data - Data values, other than keys, that are required to operate cryptographic modules and that need to be protected (e.g., a PIN, a passphrase, or a manually-held key share).
Authentication - The process of establishing that individuals,
organizations, or things are who or what they claim to be. In the
context of a PKI, authentication can be the process of establishing
that an individual or organization applying for or seeking access to something under a certain name is, in fact, the proper individual or organization. This corresponds to the second process involved with
identification, as shown in the definition of "identification" below. Authentication can also refer to a security service that provides
assurances that individuals, organizations, or things are who or what Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 6]
they claim to be or that a message or other data originated from a
specific individual, organization, or device. Thus, it is said that a digital signature of a message authenticates the message’s sender. CA-certificate - A certificate for one CA’s public key issued by
another CA.
Certificate policy (CP) - A named set of rules that indicates the
applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or class of application with common security requirements. For example, a
particular CP might indicate applicability of a type of certificate
to the authentication of parties engaging in business-to-business
transactions for the trading of goods or services within a given
price range.
Certification path - An ordered sequence of certificates that,
together with the public key of the initial object in the path, can
be processed to obtain that of the final object in the path.
Certification Practice Statement (CPS) - A statement of the practices that a certification authority employs in issuing, managing,
revoking, and renewing or re-keying certificates.
CPS Summary (or CPS Abstract) - A subset of the provisions of a
complete CPS that is made public by a CA.
Identification - The process of establishing the identity of an
individual or organization, i.e., to show that an individual or
organization is a specific individual or organization. In the
context of a PKI, identification refers to two processes:
(1) establishing that a given name of an individual or organization
corresponds to a real-world identity of an individual or
organization, and
(2) establishing that an individual or organization applying for or
seeking access to something under that name is, in fact, the
named individual or organization. A person seeking
identification may be a certificate applicant, an applicant for
employment in a trusted position within a PKI participant, or a
person seeking access to a network or software application, such as a CA administrator seeking access to CA systems.
Issuing certification authority (issuing CA) - In the context of a
particular certificate, the issuing CA is the CA that issued the
certificate (see also Subject certification authority).
Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 7]
Participant - An individual or organization that plays a role within a given PKI as a subscriber, relying party, CA, RA, certificate
manufacturing authority, repository service provider, or similar
entity.
PKI Disclosure Statement (PDS) - An instrument that supplements a CP or CPS by disclosing critical information about the policies and
practices of a CA/PKI. A PDS is a vehicle for disclosing and
emphasizing information normally covered in detail by associated CP
and/or CPS documents. Consequently, a PDS is not intended to replace a CP or CPS.
Policy qualifier - Policy-dependent information that may accompany a CP identifier in an X.509 certificate. Such information can include a pointer to the URL of the applicable CPS or relying party
agreement. It may also include text (or number causing the
appearance of text) that contains terms of the use of the certificate or other legal information.
Registration authority (RA) - An entity that is responsible for one
or more of the following functions: the identification and
authentication of certificate applicants, the approval or rejection
of certificate applications, initiating certificate revocations or
suspensions under certain circumstances, processing subscriber
requests to revoke or suspend their certificates, and approving or
rejecting requests by subscribers to renew or re-key their
certificates. RAs, however, do not sign or issue certificates (i.e., an RA is delegated certain tasks on behalf of a CA). [Note: The term Local Registration Authority (LRA) is sometimes used in other
documents for the same concept.]
Relying party - A recipient of a certificate who acts in reliance on that certificate and/or any digital signatures verified using that
certificate. In this document, the terms "certificate user" and
"relying party" are used interchangeably.
Relying party agreement (RPA) - An agreement between a certification authority and relying party that typically establishes the rights and responsibilities between those parties regarding the verification of digital signatures or other uses of certificates.
Set of provisions - A collection of practice and/or policy
statements, spanning a range of standard topics, for use in
expressing a CP or CPS employing the approach described in this
framework.
Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 8]
Subject certification authority (subject CA) - In the context of a
particular CA-certificate, the subject CA is the CA whose public key is certified in the certificate (see also Issuing certification
authority).
Subscriber - A subject of a certificate who is issued a certificate. Subscriber Agreement - An agreement between a CA and a subscriber
that establishes the right and responsibilities of the parties
regarding the issuance and management of certificates.
Validation - The process of identification of certificate applicants. "Validation" is a subset of "identification" and refers to
identification in the context of establishing the identity of
certificate applicants.
3. Concepts
This section explains the concepts of CP and CPS, and describes their relationship with other PKI documents, such as subscriber agreements and relying party agreements. Other related concepts are also
described. Some of the material covered in this section and in some other sections is specific to certificate policies extensions as
defined X.509 version 3. Except for those sections, this framework
is intended to be adaptable to other certificate formats that may
come into use.
3.1. Certificate Policy
When a certification authority issues a certificate, it is providing a statement to a certificate user (i.e., a relying party) that a
particular public key is bound to the identity and/or other
attributes of a particular entity (the certificate subject, which is usually also the subscriber). The extent to which the relying party should rely on that statement by the CA, however, needs to be
assessed by the relying party or entity controlling or coordinating
the way relying parties or relying party applications use
certificates. Different certificates are issued following different practices and procedures, and may be suitable for different
applications and/or purposes.
The X.509 standard defines a CP as "a named set of rules that
indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular
community and/or class of application with common security
requirements" [ISO1]. An X.509 Version 3 certificate may identify a specific applicable CP, which may be used by a relying party to Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 9]
decide whether or not to trust a certificate, associated public key, or any digital signatures verified using the public key for a
particular purpose.
CPs typically fall into two major categories. First, some CPs
"indicate the applicability of a certificate to a particular
community" [ISO1]. These CPs set forth requirements for certificate usage and requirements on members of a community. For instance, a CP may focus on the needs of a geographical community, such as the ETSI policy requirements for CAs issuing qualified certificates [ETS].
Also, a CP of this kind may focus on the needs of a specific
vertical-market community, such as financial services [IDT].
The second category of typical CPs "indicate the applicability of a
certificate to a . . . class of application with common security
requirements." These CPs identify a set of applications or uses for certificates and say that these applications or uses require a
certain level of security. They then set forth PKI requirements that are appropriate for these applications or uses. A CP within this
category often makes sets requirements appropriate for a certain
"level of assurance" provided by certificates, relative to
certificates issued pursuant to related CPs. These levels of
assurance may correspond to "classes" or "types" of certificates.
For instance, the Government of Canada PKI Policy Management
Authority (GOC PMA) has established eight certificate policies in a
single document [GOC], four policies for certificates used for
digital signatures and four policies for certificates used for
confidentiality encryption. For each of these applications, the
document establishes four levels of assurances: rudimentary, basic, medium, and high. The GOC PMA described certain types of digital
signature and confidentiality uses in the document, each with a
certain set of security requirements, and grouped them into eight
categories. The GOC PMA then established PKI requirements for each
of these categories, thereby creating eight types of certificates,
each providing rudimentary, basic, medium, or high levels of
assurance. The progression from rudimentary to high levels
corresponds to increasing security requirements and corresponding
increasing levels of assurance.
A CP is represented in a certificate by a unique number called an
"Object Identifier" (OID). That OID, or at least an "arc", can be
registered. An "arc" is the beginning of the numerical sequence of
an OID and is assigned to a particular organization. The
registration process follows the procedures specified in ISO/IEC and ITU standards. The party that registers the OID or arc also can
publish the text of the CP, for examination by relying parties. Any one certificate will typically declare a single CP or, possibly, be Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 10]
issued consistent with a small number of different policies. Such
declaration appears in the Certificate Policies extension of a X.509 Version 3 certificate. When a CA places multiple CPs within a
certificate’s Certificate Policies extension, the CA is asserting
that the certificate is appropriate for use in accordance with any of the listed CPs.
CPs also constitute a basis for an audit, accreditation, or another
assessment of a CA. Each CA can be assessed against one or more
certificate policies or CPSs that it is recognized as implementing.
When one CA issues a CA-certificate for another CA, the issuing CA
must assess the set of certificate policies for which it trusts the
subject CA (such assessment may be based upon an assessment with
respect to the certificate policies involved). The assessed set of
certificate policies is then indicated by the issuing CA in the CA-
certificate. The X.509 certification path processing logic employs
these CP indications in its well-defined trust model.
3.2. Certificate Policy Examples
For example purposes, suppose that the International Air Transport
Association (IATA) undertakes to define some certificate policies for use throughout the airline industry, in a PKI operated by IATA in
combination with PKIs operated by individual airlines. Two CPs might be defined - the IATA General-Purpose CP, and the IATA Commercial-
Grade CP.
The IATA General-Purpose CP could be used by industry personnel for
protecting routine information (e.g., casual electronic mail) and for authenticating connections from World Wide Web browsers to servers
for general information retrieval purposes. The key pairs may be
generated, stored, and managed using low-cost, software-based
systems, such as commercial browsers. Under this policy, a
certificate may be automatically issued to anybody listed as an
employee in the corporate directory of IATA or any member airline who submits a signed certificate request form to a network administrator in his or her organization.
The IATA Commercial-Grade CP could be used to protect financial
transactions or binding contractual exchanges between airlines.
Under this policy, IATA could require that certified key pairs be
generated and stored in approved cryptographic hardware tokens.
Certificates and tokens could be provided to airline employees with
disbursement authority. These authorized individuals might then be
required to present themselves to the corporate security office, show a valid identification badge, and sign a subscriber agreement
requiring them to protect the token and use it only for authorized
purposes, as a condition of being issued a token and a certificate. Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 11]
3.3. X.509 Certificate Fields
The following extension fields in an X.509 certificate are used to
support CPs:
* Certificate Policies extension;
* Policy Mappings extension; and
* Policy Constraints extension.
3.3.1. Certificate Policies Extension
A Certificate Policies field lists CPs that the certification
authority declares are applicable. Using the example of the IATA
General-Purpose and Commercial-Grade policies defined in Section 3.2, the certificates issued to regular airline employees would contain
the object identifier for General-Purpose policy. The certificates
issued to the employees with disbursement authority would contain the object identifiers for both the General-Purpose policy and the
Commercial-Grade policy. The inclusion of both object identifiers in the certificates means that they would be appropriate for either the General-Purpose or Commercial-Grade policies. The Certificate
Policies field may also optionally convey qualifier values for each
identified policy; the use of qualifiers is discussed in Section 3.4.
When processing a certification path, a CP that is acceptable to the relying party application must be present in every certificate in the path, i.e., in CA-certificates as well as end entity certificates.
If the Certificate Policies field is flagged critical, it serves the same purpose as described above but also has an additional role.
Specifically, it indicates that the use of the certificate is
restricted to one of the identified policies, i.e., the certification authority is declaring that the certificate must only be used in
accordance with the provisions of at least one of the listed CPs.
This field is intended to protect the certification authority against claims for damages asserted by a relying party who has used the
certificate for an inappropriate purpose or in an inappropriate
manner, as stipulated in the applicable CP.
For example, the Internal Revenue Service might issue certificates to taxpayers for the purpose of protecting tax filings. The Internal
Revenue Service understands and can accommodate the risks of
erroneously issuing a bad certificate, e.g., to an imposter.
Suppose, however, that someone used an Internal Revenue Service tax- filing certificate as the basis for encrypting multi-million-dollar- value proprietary trade secrets, which subsequently fell into the
wrong hands because of a cryptanalytic attack by an attacker who is
able to decrypt the message. The Internal Revenue Service may want Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 12]
to defend itself against claims for damages in such circumstances by pointing to the criticality of the Certificate Policies extension to show that the subscriber and relying party misused the certificate.
The critical-flagged Certificate Policies extension is intended to
mitigate the risk to the CA in such situations.
3.3.2. Policy Mappings Extension
The Policy Mappings extension may only be used in CA-certificates.
This field allows a certification authority to indicate that certain policies in its own domain can be considered equivalent to certain
other policies in the subject certification authority’s domain.
For example, suppose that for purposes of facilitating
interoperability, the ACE Corporation establishes an agreement with
the ABC Corporation to cross-certify the public keys of each others’ certification authorities for the purposes of mutually securing their respective business-to-business exchanges. Further, suppose that
both companies have pre-existing financial transaction protection
policies called ace-e-commerce and abc-e-commerce, respectively. One can see that simply generating cross-certificates between the two
domains will not provide the necessary interoperability, as the two
companies’ applications are configured with, and employee
certificates are populated with, their respective certificate
policies. One possible solution is to reconfigure all of the
financial applications to require either policy and to reissue all
the certificates with both policies appearing in their Certificate
Policies extensions. Another solution, which may be easier to
administer, uses the Policy Mapping field. If this field is included in a cross-certificate for the ABC Corporation certification
authority issued by the ACE Corporation certification authority, it
can provide a statement that the ABC’s financial transaction
protection policy (i.e., abc-e-commerce) can be considered equivalent to that of the ACE Corporation (i.e., ace-e-commerce). With such a
statement included in the cross-certificate issued to ABC, relying
party applications in the ACE domain requiring the presence of the
object identifier for the ace-e-commerce CP can also accept, process, and rely upon certificates issued within the ABC domain containing
the object identifier for the abc-e-commerce CP.
3.3.3. Policy Constraints Extension
The Policy Constraints extension supports two optional features. The first is the ability for a certification authority to require that
explicit CP indications be present in all subsequent certificates in a certification path. Certificates at the start of a certification
path may be considered by a relying party to be part of a trusted
domain, i.e., certification authorities are trusted for all purposes Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 13]
so no particular CP is needed in the Certificate Policies extension. Such certificates need not contain explicit indications of CP. When a certification authority in the trusted domain, however, certifies
outside the domain, it can activate the requirement that a specific
CP’s object identifier appear in subsequent certificates in the
certification path.
The other optional feature in the Policy Constraints field is the
ability for a certification authority to disable policy mapping by
subsequent certification authorities in a certification path. It may be prudent to disable policy mapping when certifying outside the
domain. This can assist in controlling risks due to transitive
trust, e.g., a domain A trusts domain B, domain B trusts domain C,
but domain A does not want to be forced to trust domain C.
3.3.
4. Policy Qualifiers
The Certificate Policies extension field has a provision for
conveying, along with each CP identifier, additional policy-dependent information in a qualifier field. The X.509 standard does not
mandate the purpose for which this field is to be used, nor does it
prescribe the syntax for this field. Policy qualifier types can be
registered by any organization.
The following policy qualifier types are defined in PKIX RFC 3280
[PKI1]:
(a) The CPS Pointer qualifier contains a pointer to a CPS, CPS
Summary, RPA, or PDS published by the CA. The pointer is in the form of a uniform resource identifier (URI).
(b) The User Notice qualifier contains a text string that is to be
displayed to subscribers and relying parties prior to the use of the certificate. The text string may be an IA5String or a
BMPString - a subset of the ISO 100646-1 multiple octet coded
character set. A CA may invoke a procedure that requires that
the relying party acknowledge that the applicable terms and
conditions have been disclosed and/or accepted.
Policy qualifiers can be used to support the definition of generic,
or parameterized, CPs. Provided the base CP so provides, policy
qualifier types can be defined to convey, on a per-certificate basis, additional specific policy details that fill in the generic
definition.
Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 14]
3.4. Certification Practice Statement
The term certification practice statement (CPS) is defined by the DSG and PAG as: "A statement of the practices which a certification
authority employs in issuing certificates." [ABA1, ABA2] As stated
above, a CPS establishes practices concerning lifecycle services in
addition to issuance, such as certificate management (including
publication and archiving), revocation, and renewal or re-keying. In the DSG, the ABA expands this definition with the following comments: "A certification practice statement may take the form of a
declaration by the certification authority of the details of its
trustworthy system and the practices it employs in its operations and in support of issuance of a certificate . . . ." This form of CPS is the most common type, and can vary in length and level of detail.
Some PKIs may not have the need to create a thorough and detailed
statement of practices. For example, the CA may itself be the
relying party and would already be aware of the nature and
trustworthiness of its services. In other cases, a PKI may provide
certificates providing only a very low level of assurances where the applications being secured may pose only marginal risks if
compromised. In these cases, an organization establishing a PKI may only want to write or have CAs use a subscriber agreement, relying
party agreement, or agreement combining subscriber and relying party terms, depending on the role of the different PKI participants. In
such a PKI, that agreement may serve as the only "statement of
practices" used by one or more CAs within that PKI. Consequently,
that agreement may also be considered a CPS and can be entitled or
subtitled as such.
Likewise, since a detailed CPS may contain sensitive details of its
system, a CA may elect not to publish its entire CPS. It may instead opt to publish a CPS Summary (or CPS Abstract). The CPS Summary
would contain only those provisions from the CPS that the CA
considers to be relevant to the participants in the PKI (such as the responsibilities of the parties or the stages of the certificate
lifecycle). A CPS Summary, however, would not contain those
sensitive provisions of the full CPS that might provide an attacker
with useful information about the CA’s operations. Throughout this
document, the use of "CPS" includes both a detailed CPS and a CPS
Summary (unless otherwise specified).
CPSs do not automatically constitute contracts and do not
automatically bind PKI participants as a contract would. Where a
document serves the dual purpose of being a subscriber or relying
party agreement and CPS, the document is intended to be a contract
and constitutes a binding contract to the extent that a subscriber or Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 15]
relying party agreement would ordinarily be considered as such. Most CPSs, however, do not serve such a dual purpose. Therefore, in most cases, a CPS’s terms have a binding effect as contract terms only if a separate document creates a contractual relationship between the
parties and that document incorporates part or all of the CPS by
reference. Further, if a particular PKI employs a CPS Summary (as
opposed to the entire CPS), the CPS Summary could be incorporated
into any applicable subscriber or relying party agreement.
In the future, a court or applicable statutory or regulatory law may declare that a certificate itself is a document that is capable of
creating a contractual relationship, to the extent its mechanisms
designed for incorporation by reference (such as the Certificate
Policies extension and its qualifiers) indicate that terms of its use appear in certain documents. In the meantime, however, some
subscriber agreements and relying party agreements may incorporate a CPS by reference and therefore make its terms binding on the parties to such agreements.
3.5. Relationship Between Certificate Policy and Certification
Practice Statement
The CP and CPS address the same set of topics that are of interest to the relying party in terms of the degree to and purpose for which a
public key certificate should be trusted. Their primary difference
is in the focus of their provisions. A CP sets forth the
requirements and standards imposed by the PKI with respect to the
various topics. In other words, the purpose of the CP is to
establish what participants must do. A CPS, by contrast, states how a CA and other participants in a given domain implement procedures
and controls to meet the requirements stated in the CP. In other
words, the purpose of the CPS is to disclose how the participants
perform their functions and implement controls.
An additional difference between a CP and CPS relates the scope of
coverage of the two kinds of documents. Since a CP is a statement of requirements, it best serves as the vehicle for communicating minimum operating guidelines that must be met by interoperating PKIs. Thus, a CP generally applies to multiple CAs, multiple organizations, or
multiple domains. By contrast, a CPS applies only to a single CA or single organization and is not generally a vehicle to facilitate
interoperation.
A CA with a single CPS may support multiple CPs (used for different
application purposes and/or by different relying party communities). Also, multiple CAs, with non-identical CPSs, may support the same CP. Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 16]
For example, the Federal Government might define a government-wide CP for handling confidential human resources information. The CP will
be a broad statement of the general requirements for participants
within the Government’s PKI, and an indication of the types of
applications for which it is suitable for use. Each department or
agency wishing to operate a certification authority in this PKI may
be required to write its own certification practice statement to
support this CP by explaining how it meets the requirements of the
CP. At the same time, a department’s or agency’s CPS may support
other certificate policies.
An additional difference between a CP and CPS concerns the level of
detail of the provisions in each. Although the level of detail may
vary among CPSs, a CPS will generally be more detailed than a CP. A CPS provides a detailed description of procedures and controls in
place to meet the CP requirements, while a CP is more general.
The main differences between CPs and CPSs can therefore be summarized as follows:
(a) A PKI uses a CP to establish requirements that state what
participants within it must do. A single CA or organization can use a CPS to disclose how it meets the requirements of a CP or
how it implements its practices and controls.
(b) A CP facilitates interoperation through cross-certification,
unilateral certification, or other means. Therefore, it is
intended to cover multiple CAs. By contrast, a CPS is a
statement of a single CA or organization. Its purpose is not to facilitate interoperation (since doing so is the function of a
CP).
(c) A CPS is generally more detailed than a CP and specifies how the CA meets the requirements specified in the one or more CPs under which it issues certificates.
In addition to populating the certificate policies extension with the applicable CP object identifier, a certification authority may
include, in certificates it issues, a reference to its certification practice statement. A standard way to do this, using a CP qualifier, is described in Section 3.4.
3.6. Relationship Among CPs, CPSs, Agreements, and Other Documents
CPs and CPSs play a central role in documenting the requirements and practices of a PKI. Nonetheless, they are not the only documents
relevant to a PKI. For instance, subscriber agreements and relying
party agreements play a critical role in allocating responsibilities Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 17]
to subscribers and relying parties relating to the use of
certificates and key pairs. They establish the terms and conditions under which certificates are issued, managed, and used. The term
subscriber agreement is defined by the PAG as: "An agreement between a CA and a subscriber that establishes the right and obligations of
the parties regarding the issuance and management of certificates."
[ABA2] The PAG defines a relying party agreement as: "An agreement
between a certification authority and relying party that typically
establishes the rights and obligations between those parties
regarding the verification of digital signatures or other uses of
certificates." [ABA2]
As mentioned in Section 3.5, a subscriber agreement, relying party
agreement, or an agreement that combines subscriber and relying party terms may also serve as a CPS. In other PKIs, however, a subscriber or relying party agreement may incorporate some or all of the terms
of a CP or CPS by reference. Yet other PKIs may distill from a CP
and/or CPS the terms that are applicable to a subscriber and place
such terms in a self-contained subscriber agreement, without
incorporating a CP or CPS by reference. They may use the same method to distill relying party terms from a CP and/or CPS and place such
terms in a self-contained relying party agreement. Creating such
self-contained agreements has the advantage of creating documents
that are easier for consumers to review. In some cases, subscribers or relying parties may be deemed to be "consumers" under applicable
law, who are subject to certain statutory or regulatory protections. Under the legal systems of civil law countries, incorporating a CP or CPS by reference may not be effective to bind consumers to the terms of an incorporated CP or CPS.
CPs and CPSs may be incorporated by reference in other documents,
including:
* Interoperability agreements (including agreements between CAs for cross-certification, unilateral certification, or other forms of
interoperation),
* Vendor agreements (under which a PKI vendor agrees to meet
standards set forth in a CP or CPS), or
* A PDS. See [ABA2]
A PDS serves a similar function to a CPS Summary. It is a relatively short document containing only a subset of critical details about a
PKI or CA. It may differ from a CPS Summary, however, in that its
purpose is to act as a summary of information about the overall
nature of the PKI, as opposed to simply a condensed form of the CPS. Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 18]
Moreover, its purpose is to distill information about the PKI, as
opposed to protecting security sensitive information contained in an unpublished CPS, although a PDS could also serve that function.
Just as writers may wish to refer to a CP or CPS or incorporate it by reference in an agreement or PDS, a CP or CPS may refer to other
documents when establishing requirements or making disclosures. For instance, a CP may set requirements for certificate content by
referring to an external document setting forth a standard
certificate profile. Referencing external documents permits a CP or CPS to impose detailed requirements or make detailed disclosures
without having to reprint lengthy provisions from other documents
within the CP or CPS. Moreover, referencing a document in a CP or
CPS is another useful way of dividing disclosures between public
information and security sensitive confidential information (in
addition to or as an alternative to publishing a CPS Summary). For
example, a PKI may want to publish a CP or CPS, but maintain site
construction parameters for CA high security zones as confidential
information. In that case, the CP or CPS could reference an external manual or document containing the detailed site construction
parameters.
Documents that a PKI may wish to refer to in a CP or CPS include:
* A security policy,
* Training, operational, installation, and user manuals (which may
contain operational requirements),
* Standards documents that apply to particular aspects of the PKI
(such as standards specifying the level of protection offered by
any hardware tokens used in the PKI or standards applicable to the site construction),
* Key management plans,
* Human resource guides and employment manuals (which may describe
some aspects of personnel security practices), and
* E-mail policies (which may discuss subscriber and relying party
responsibilities, as well as the implications of key management,
if applicable). See [ABA2]
Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 19]
3.7. Set of Provisions
A set of provisions is a collection of practice and/or policy
statements, spanning a range of standard topics for use in expressing a CP or CPS employing the approach described in this framework by
covering the topic appearing in Section 5 below. They are also
described in detail in Section 4 below.
A CP can be expressed as a single set of provisions.
A CPS can be expressed as a single set of provisions with each
component addressing the requirements of one or more certificate
policies, or, alternatively, as an organized collection of sets of
provisions. For example, a CPS could be expressed as a combination
of the following:
(a) a list of certificate policies supported by the CPS;
(b) for each CP in (a), a set of provisions that contains statements responding to that CP by filling in details not stipulated in
that policy or expressly left to the discretion of the CA (in its CPS) ; such statements serve to state how this particular CPS
implements the requirements of the particular CP; or
(c) a set of provisions that contains statements regarding the
certification practices on the CA, regardless of CP.
The statements provided in (b) and (c) may augment or refine the
stipulations of the applicable CP, but generally must not conflict
with any of the stipulations of such CP. In certain cases, however, a policy authority may permit exceptions to the requirements in a CP, because certain compensating controls of the CA are disclosed in its CPS that allow the CA to provide assurances that are equivalent to
the assurances provided by CAs that are in full compliance with the
CP.
This framework outlines the contents of a set of provisions, in terms of nine primary components, as follows:
1. Introduction
2. Publication and Repository
3. Identification and Authentication
4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements
5. Facilities, Management, and Operational Controls
6. Technical Security Controls
7. Certificate, CRL, and OCSP Profile
8. Compliance audit
9. Other Business and Legal Matters
Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 20]
论国家文化软实力的作用 文化软实力外延宽泛，如果我们把文化理解为“人类一切精神活动及其结果的总和”的话，那么文化软实力这个概念的外延既包括政治、外交、意识形态、价值体系，又包括哲学、法律、语言、宗教、艺术等等，所有这些东西所产生的综合影响力，就构成了一个国家的“文化软实力”。一个国家的综合国力，不仅包括经济实力、技术实力、国防实力，同时还包括民族凝聚力、道德感召力、舆论引导力等等。随着世界多极化、经济全球化的深入发展和科学技术的日新月异，文化与经济、政治相互交融的程度不断加深，与科学技术的结合更加紧密，国家文化软实力在经济、政治、外交、社会发展等方面的现实作用越来越显著。 一、国家文化软实力的经济作用 国家的兴衰、世界力量重心的转移，表面上看取决于资本、资源、军事实力等物质层面的东西，实际上，起根本作用的是精神层面的文化。13～14世纪，“文艺复兴”运动培育了意大利北部的威尼斯、米兰等城市的资本主义星星之火，16～17 世纪“尼德兰革命”后的荷兰以开放的文化环境，吸引了欧洲其他地区遭受宗教压制的工匠和学者，他们带来了技术、资金和思想，使荷兰取代意大利成为欧洲的经济重心。 17～18世纪，英国完备的专利保护和产权保护文化，对工业革命的产生和发展起到了引领作用。19世纪，以“新教伦理精神”为文化导向的殖民者在北美促成了美国的崛起。20世纪，日本和德国在战败后得以崛起，除了美国的保护与扶持以外，也得益于各
自的民族精神文化。而“亚洲四小龙”（香港、台湾、新加坡、韩国）的崛起，如果离开了市场经济与儒家文化的结合，也是难以实现的。 国家文化软实力作为上层建筑，对经济的作用主要表现为：（1）通过提高劳动力素质、调动劳动者积极性提高劳动效率； （2）通过影响企业文化促进企业发展； （3）直接转化为经济效益。 （1）通过提高劳动力素质、调动劳动者积极性提高劳动效率； 文化教育提高了劳动力的素质，是提高劳动生产率及产品的文化含量的主要因素。联合国教科文组织的一份研究报告也说，不同文化水平的人，其提高劳动生产的能力为:小学 43%，中学 108%，大学300%。 文化软实力在对与错、善于恶、真与假、是与非等一系列问题上，提供了正确的判断标准，指导人们形成与主流社会相适应的价值观念，使人们明确自己享有的权利和应尽的义务，从而推动经济秩序的建立和完善，改善经济环境，促进社会生产力的发展。 （2）通过影响企业文化促进企业发展； 文化软实力在企业的表现就是企业文化。文化是企业的灵魂，是企业发展的重要资源。企业经营管理中的文化要素越多，企业整体素质就越高，竞争力就越强。纵观世界，实力强大的国际企业，都很重视通过文化来塑造形象，提升无形资产的价值，获得张的资本，有的
科学技术是生产力中最活跃的因素和社会变革的主导推动力量，国家利益是国家对外行为的最基本动因和处理国际关系的最高准则，二者之间有着十分密切的联系。科学的发展历程也表明，科学与国家利益之间的关系日益密切是一个显而易见的事实。进入20世纪，人们越来越意识到在国家的竞争中，科学技术能力的竞争越来越成为关键。特别是两次世界大战，使人们清楚地看到了科学技术在国家安全中的突出重要性，人们开始越来越紧密地把科学与国家利益联系在一起。科学是重要的国家资源的观点开始更加深入地影响世界各国的政治家和科学家，科学研究带来的政治、经济、文化等方面的变化对国家利益产生越来越大重要性。在学习完在中国科学院第十七次院士大会、中国工程院第十二次院士大会上的讲话之后，明白了科学技术对于国家的发展具有很大作用，下面是我的学习心得。 回顾往昔，六十年来，站起来的中国人民，经过艰难的探索，其间，也走了弯路，吃了苦头，几经波澜。百年之交，千年之会的今天，终于迎来当今这个凭实力兴国强民的21世纪大发展时期，回首过去远至几百年近至几十年的悠悠历史，我们不难总结，20世纪乃至近代几个世纪从来都属于西方发达国家，这是因为西方发达国家在近代率先完成科技革命，把国家经济推向繁荣，“经济基础决定上层建筑”，繁荣的经济进而将国家的一切都在不同程度上推向更高层次。可以说，繁荣和成就来源于科技与创新，科技与创新反作用于经济，经济又直接对其他领域产生积极影响，进而使国家各个领域全面发展，增大了国家利益。对科学的研究是科技进步的源泉和根源，科学研究进行的程度和深度直接决定了科技革新的速度和程度，无疑这会影响国家大局利益。 不难理解，国家利益就是满足或能够满足国家以生存发展为基础的各方面需要并且对国家在整体上具有好处的事物。科学研究能够产生新领域的发现，新发现势必会对科学进步和技术革新产生助推作用，韬光养晦的民族和国家都将科学研究和科技创新置于重要地位。 当今，科学研究已成为国家的一种重要战略资源，综合国力的竞争已明显前移到了科学研究。对于我国来说，迅速提升科学研究的整体水平和原始创新能力，对于贯彻落实科学发展观，全面建设小康社会，在本世纪实现中华民族的伟大复兴至关重要。可以说，科学的发展代表着国家和人民的整体利益和长远利益。
记叙文阅读指导 ——独立段在文章的作用 一、教学要点： 独立段在文章的作用 提示文章脉络层次的句子，即在文首总领全文、在文中转承过渡、在文末总结全文的句子。 二、教学内容及过程： （一）复习引入： A、我与父亲不相见已二年余了，我最不能忘记的是他的背影。 ——《背影》 从全文看，这句话在结构和内容上起什么作用 结构上总领全文；内容上点明题意，表明背影在“我”心中留下极其深刻的印象 归纳方法： 答题方向： 结构上：根据独立段在文中所处的位置，能帮助我们快速确定句子在结构上所起的作用。 内容上：任何一篇文章都是作者为了表达自己的思想、抒发自己的情感而写，因此，我们一定要注意结合作者的思想感情与文章的中心思想来理解句子在文中所起的作用。 常见答题形式： 结构上（作用） 内容上（作用）（表意）写出了 （1）位于开头 结构上： 1、总领下文。 文章在开头即直接点明中心，对全文起总领作用。 2、设置悬念，吸引读者。 文章往往采用倒叙形式，以达到此目的。 3、为全文渲染某种气氛。 文章在开头引用诗句或描写环境、人物心情，为下文的叙事或抒情奠定感情基调。 4、埋下伏笔或作铺垫。 在文章的前边将下文要表现的内容预先作出暗示性的铺垫，然后在后文相宜之处作出呼应，使故事情节发展合理，使读者感到巧妙有趣。 内容上: 点题。 有些句子紧扣文题，起着点题的作用。 B、阿！这不是我二十年来时时记得的故乡？ ——《故乡》 这个句子在文中起什么作用？ 结构上承上启下。内容上表明作者的心绪由悲凉变得更加沉重。 注意：内容上的表达记住联系上下文的内容 常见答题形式： 结构上（作用） 内容上（表意）写出了
温家宝总理在十一届人大二次会议所作的工作报告中提出，要加快铁路、电力、盐业等行业改革。但改革从何处切入才能实现“牵一发而动全身”的效果，是一个仍待破解的问题。 电力调度机构独立的现实作用与深远意义 华中电监局 晓 宇 在纪念党的十一届三中全会召开30周年，全面回顾和总结改革开放伟大历程和宝贵经验之际，我们也需要认真总结几年来电力市场化改革实践成果，继续解放思想、开拓创新，充分利用和把握当前国际金融危机影响下电力供大于求的有利时机和条件，进一步深化电力体制改革，加快电力市场建设步伐，调整电力结构，转变电力发展方式，优化电力资源配置，变挑战为机遇，化压力为动力，树立人们的信心，激发大家的热情。 经过全面分析和认真思考，我们认为当前将电力调度机构从电网企业独立出来时机已经成熟，是掀起新一轮电力改革浪潮较好的切入点，具有重要的现实作用和深远意义。 电力调度职能具有公共属性 电力安全是基础。电力调度机构负责组织、指挥、指导和协调电力系统运行，在保障电力系统安全稳定运行和可靠供电方
面，具有不可替代的作用。 电力系统运行的客观物理规律要求供需保持瞬时平衡，但是由于机组物理特性约束、网络阻塞限制以及负荷波动、水情不确定性等因素的干扰，特别是电力系统故障等突发事件发生，电力供需平衡随时会被打破，并可能发展到危及电力系统安全稳定运行，因此调度必须被赋予充分的职能，一般情况下可以安排和调整电力系统运行方式，以保证电网运行有足够的安全稳定裕度，而在事故发生后可以独立指挥电网操作、隔离故障，将负荷损失控制在最小范围内并快速恢复供电。 厂网分开以后，发电投资主体多元化，厂网之间、厂厂之间、中央与地方企业之间、国有与民营企业之间，存在多种经济利益搏弈。发电利用小时数以及峰谷电量结构对于发电企业经营至关重要，关系到企业的生存和发展。另外发电量计划和市场交易结果如何分解到实时电力曲线，机组参与系统调峰力度、备用大小、启停次数等经济技术指标，都直接影响到发电企业成本，还有调度是否“按需调用”辅助服务，调用是否公平、合理等，都关系到发电企业的切身利益。 年度发电计划一般是由地方政府制定，但最终要靠调度分解和执行，即使开展了节能发电调度试点的省（市），虽然取消了年度计划，但在调度运行中也隐含有月度计划控制目标。另外国
地理位置对国家(或地区)发展的作用 “自然地理环境是人类社会生存和发展的永恒的必要的条件，是人们生活和生产的自然基础。”对于一个国家（或地区）来说，其地理位置不仅仅是一个自然属性而且往往影响它的民族性格、生产方式、军事部署、经济策略乃至政治格局，从而影响其整个历史进程。本文通过分析几个国家或地区的兴衰史及某些鲜明特点的形成来探讨地理位置在人类历史进程中不可磨灭的影响。 一．荷兰的崛起和衰落 荷兰，这个十七世纪的海上霸主，它的繁荣衰落与地理位置密不可分。背靠内地，面向欧洲两条古老的航线决定了它以运输业起家，为其海上事业的发展积累了大量的资金；靠海的位置也决定了它外向型经济的特点；四万平方公里的狭小面积让它不能像中国以一自给自足，于是它把目光投向了海外的世界。 这可以说这是它的幸运也是它的不幸：幸运之处在于它没有自我封闭的能力，因此得以十七世纪大力发展海上贸易造船业和殖民地，这些使大量的金银涌入了荷兰从而间接促进了国内工农业的发展形成了良性循环;不幸之处在于荷兰人缺乏它的对手英法所拥有的资源，荷兰没有法国和英国的人口土地带来的自然资源，它仅有一块狭小的国土和南非的一小块殖民地，因此荷兰缺少市场、劳动力、矿产、燃料、土地等国家发展所必需的资源，这使得它对西北欧市场依赖性很大，因此在英法对其实施歧视性发令后荷兰受到极大的打击，这也是它仅仅一个世纪就被迫让位的重要原因。 如今的荷兰是高度发达的资本主义国家，地形平坦低洼让它的自行车文化闻名世界，温带海洋性气候适宜花卉生长，荷兰也因此形成了以花卉出口为特色的外向型经济。 二．俄国的在亚洲扩张 俄国的发家史就是一部扩张史，因此研究俄国的扩张对于俄国历史的探索具有极其重大的意义。大约在1500年前，俄国人进行了横跨亚欧大陆的扩张，而俄国的地理环境在这部壮丽的扩张史画下了浓墨重彩的一笔。欧亚大陆在地形上有着惊人的一致，它极大部分是广袤的平原，这为早期扩张的勇敢的俄国人提供了交通上的便利以及修建大型军事驻地及基础生活设施的可能，他们不必耗费大量人力物力和财力在当时技术受限制的条件下去开凿冻土，开辟山路或者下海寻道。而看似阻碍脚步横跨南北的乌拉尔山脉也不过是2000英尺还截止到北纬51度，留下一块缺口作为俄国人天然的通道。 围绕欧亚平原的山脉圈阻挡了来自太平洋的湿风，使得在整个平原区探险者们感到一样的舒适，因此他们以令人惊恐的速度在西伯利亚平原扩张。中亚沙漠的干燥和狂虐的风沙阻碍了他们前进的步伐。 一方水土养一方人，西伯利亚平原的舒适养成了其人民温和宽顺的性格，也造就了一个软弱的部落；而沙漠的可怕荒芜迫使穆斯林汗国奋起抵抗自然的暴力，这也造就了他们民族性格中坚强不屈暴力剽悍不易被征服的一面。这与我国发家于内地并以农业为传统的宋朝的衰微敌不过起源于蛮荒的“马背上的王朝”元朝有着极其相似的地方。 这些两个方面造成了开发者占领平原很多年后才占领了沙漠地带。 地形的平坦使得俄国的河流平缓宽阔而且很长，这些宝贵的河流不仅为沿岸提供了灌溉和生活用水，还形成了天然的交通干线网，使得俄国在扩张、殖民、侵略等方面有着得天然的优势。 四种植被带中面积最大的森林带宽阔而绵长，也为开发者提供了天然的保护屏障和建筑房屋等必需的木材。森林草原的结合在俄国人的血脉中留下了粗犷、征服的因子，如今的我们想到俄国人脑海中浮现的还是身穿皮毛、胡须髯髯的大汉形象而不是文质彬彬的绅士形
独立主格结构是高中英语考试中考查频率很高的语法点，除了在单选中会遇到它，在其它各种题型中如完型、阅读中也会看到它。如果在作文中能用上一两个独立主格结构，文章瞬间提升一个档次。今天，小简老师就来和大家一起学习独立主格的概念、作用和形式。 一.独立主格结构的概念： 独立主格结构（Absolute Structure）是由名词或代词加上分词等构成的一种独立结构，用于修饰整个句子。独立主格结构中的名词或代词与其后的分词等构成逻辑上的主谓关系。这种结构与主句不发生句法上的联系，它的位置相当灵活，可置于主句前、主句末或主句中，常由逗号将其与主句分开。 需特别注意的是，独立主格结构与主句之间不能使用任何连接词。 二.独立主格结构的作用：独立主格结构在句子中一律做状语状语。 三.独立主格的形式： 1.名词（代词）+现在分词 The question being settled, we went home. 问题解决之后，我们就回家了。 We shall play the match tomorrow, weather permitting. 明天假设天气好，我们就进行比赛。 2. 名词（代词）+过去分词 The job finished, we went home. 工作结束后我们就回家了。 More time given, we should have done the job much better. 如果给我们更多的时间，我们会把工作做得更好。 3.名词（代词）+不定式 So many people to help him, he is sure to succeed. 有如此多的人来帮助他，他一定会成功的。 4. 名词（代词）+介词短语 The soldiers dashed in, rifle in hands. 士兵们端着枪冲了进来。 A girl came in, book in hand. 一个少女进来了，手里拿着书。
社会主义市场经济下国家的作用 摘要：国家与市场或政府与市场的关系是经济体制和经济理论研究的一个中心问题。对中国特殊国情与发展阶段来说，“发展型政府”与“服务型政府”并不能准确界定中国政府与市场的关系，而西方市场调节型市场经济模式也缺乏中国适用性。只有符合中国特殊国情与发展阶段的国家主导型市场经济模式，才是中国政府与市场关系的应有模式。 关键词：发展型政府；市场调节型；国家主导型；市场经济模式 中图分类号：F120文献标识码：A 文章编号：1007-7685(2009)06-0014-06 国家与市场或政府与市场的关系是经济体制和经济理论研究的一个中心问题。对如何处理国家与市场的关系，经济学家们众说纷纭，由此形成了经济自由主义和国家干预主义此消彼长的持久论争。尽管人们已认识到市场与政府的关系并不是一种简单的替代关系，但政府干预总是与市场缺陷有关。如果所有的经济问题都可以由市场很好地加以解决，政府干预也就失去了存在的价值。因此，政府与市场关系的讨论一般是从考察市场失灵或市场缺陷开始的。
一 目前，西方主流经济学关于市场失灵的理论是建立在对垄断、外部性、公用品和信息不对称等现象分析的基础之上的。但这种分析是一种短期的分析、静态的分析、微观的分析、纯粹的经济分析和以发达的资本主义市场经济为背景的分析。因此，并没有真正揭示市场机制的根本缺陷。实际上，市场经济最根本的缺陷不在微观方面，而在宏观方面，也就是马克思主义经典作家强调的由资本主义基本矛盾导致的 生产与消费的矛盾、收入和财富占有的两极分化及经济发展的无组织性，这也是凯恩斯宏观经济政策和国家干预主义的出发点。很多学者注意到中国政府在经济发展中所起到的核心作用，并主张以“发展型政府”概念概括中国政府的职能模式。“发展型政府”概念源于查默斯?约翰逊的《通产省与日本经济奇迹》一书。在该书中，约翰逊认为，日本模式介于苏、美模式之间，政府对经济起主导作用，但并非全面掌控；政府将市场作为发展经济的工具，而不是信奉原教旨的自由市场主义。韦德和阿姆斯登将约翰逊的原创性思想扩展到对我国台湾地区和韩国经济发展的经验性研究中，批判新古典经济学家对东亚奇迹的解释。一些学者鉴于“发展型政府”源于东北亚地区，与中国在文化背景、发展经验上有诸多相似之处，因而将中国政府的职能模式概括为“发展型政
论独立自主的科学意义 摘要：毛泽东是新中国的缔造者和领导者，也是新中国对外战略的主要奠基者和决策者。毛泽东的外交思想的精髓便是独立自主原则，同时独立自主又是毛泽东思想体系的根本指导路线。它具有指导和鼓舞我们科学地认识世界革命性地创造世界和指导新中国不断向前发展的伟大科学意义。 关键字：毛泽东、独立自主、科学意义。 一，独立自主的含义以及地位在很大程度上赋予了其的科学意义。 毛泽东在新中国成立之初不同时期提出的外交政策都紧紧围绕着独立自主原则来发展实施，可以衡量出独立自主原则的地位有多么的重要。毛泽东在1949年6月总结中国革命的历史经验和指引中国未来的发展前途时,明确强调:“中国必须独立,中国必须解放,中国的事情必须由中国人民自己作主张,自己来处,不容许任何帝国主义国家再有一丝一毫的干涉。中国的命运一经操在人民自己的手里,中国就将如太阳升起在东方那样,以自己的辉煌的光焰普照大地。”[1]这足于说明独立自主原则是毛泽东外交思想中根本原则的地位，是毛泽东思想体系的根本指导路线。 那么，独立自主的含义是什么呢？从字面上来说，独立是指人们自己拥有主权，自主是指人们自己掌控主权。毛泽东说过：“中国的事情必须由中国人民自己作主张,自己来处理,不容许任何帝国主义国家再有一丝一毫的干涉。[2]我们不怕美国的封锁,我们也不急于要同美国建交,不急于进联合国,我们奉行独立自主,自力更生的外交政策。”[3]此外周恩来也说过：“我们对外交问题有一个基本的立场,即中华民族独立的立场,独立自主、自力更生的立场,任何国家都不能干涉中国的内政。”[4]到后来邓小平也指出：“中国的事情要按照中国的情况来办,要依靠中国人民自己的力量来办,独立自主,自力更生,无论过去、现在和将来,都是我们的立足点。”[5]从三位伟大的领导人的观点中，我们不难可以概括出独立自主的含义：人们从实际情况出发,依靠自己的力量,拿定自己的主意,维护自己的主权,主宰自己的命运,选择自己的道路,谋求自己的生存,克服自己的困难,规范自己的活动,推进自己的发展,实现自己的目的。这是基于这含义，独立自主原则具有了指导中国广大人民为发展中国特色社会主义事业为创造更为发达的中国而不断努力奋斗的意义。 二，独立自主具有指导和鼓舞我们科学地认识世界革命性地创造世界
1.图示电路中，已知：U S=15V，当I S单独作用时，3Ω电阻中电流I1=2A，那么当I S、U S 共同作用时，2Ω电阻中电流I是( )。 (a)-1A (b)5A (c)6A 2.理想电流源的外接电阻越大，则它的端电压( )。 (a)越高(b)越低(c)不能确定 3.一个实际电源可以用电压源模型表示，也可以用电流源模型来表示。在这两种模型中，该实际电源的内阻应为( )。 (a)0 (b)∞(c)定值 4.在图示电路中，已知：U S1＝4V，U S2＝4V。当U S2单独作用时，电阻R中的电流是1mA。那么当U S1 单独作用时，电压U AB 是( )。 (a)1V (b)3V (c)-3V 5.实验测得某有源二端线性网络的开路电压为6V，短路电流为2A。当外接电阻为 3Ω时，其端电压U为( )。 (a)3V (b)2V (c)1V 6.图示电路中，用一个等效电源代替，应该是一个( )。 (a)2A的理想电流源(b)2V的理想电压源(c)不能代替，仍为原电路 7.某一有源二端线性网络如图1所示，它的戴维宁等效电压源如图2所示，其中U S 值为( )。 (a)6V (b)4V (c)2V
1.用电源等效变换法求图示电路中电阻R的值。 1.答案原图 图中： 5=(4//4+R)?1 R=3Ω
2.图示电路中，已知：U S=1V，I S=1A，R1=R2=R3=1Ω。试用叠加原理求支路电流I1，I2及电流源的端电压，并说明哪个元件是电源。 2.答案 I S单独作用时：I1'=I2'=0.5I S=0.5A U'=R3I S+R2I2'=1.5V U S单独作用时： U"=R2I2"=0.5V 叠加得：I1=－I1'+I1"=0I2=I2'+I2"=1A U=U'+U"=2V 电流源I S是电源 3.图示电路中，已知：U S=10V，I S1=5A，I S2=2A，R1=R2=R3=R4=2Ω。用戴维宁定理求电流I。 3.答案
我国的宏观调控与市场化过程相伴随,先后经历了总需求大于总供给背景下的抑制需求型和总需求小于总供给背景下的扩大需求型两个阶段。其中1997年以前,面对卖方市场的情形,宏观调控主要是通过行政手段、法律手段和经济手段来实现经济总量的平衡。1997年以后,市场机制的作用不断扩大,形成了买方市场的情形,政府实施了更具有市场经济意义的一系列财政和货币政策。具体说来，根据经济运行态势和体制环境不同，我国的宏观调控主要经历了六个阶段：① 1979-1981年；②1985-1986年；③1988-1990年；④1993年下半年-1996年； ⑤1998-2003年上半年；⑥2003年下半年-至今。本文着重从后四个阶段谈谈国家宏观调控对国民经济的影响。 一、1988-1990年治理整顿时期 （一）国家宏观调控的背景及措施 始于"六五"中后期全国出现的经济高速增长，在"七五"中期其所日趋积聚的诸多问题显露出来，信贷投资和消费失控，通货膨胀加剧，经济秩序混乱。为此, 从1988年10月开始，党中央、国务院提出了治理整顿的方针, 把稳定通货、物价作为宏观经济政策调控的首要目标，实行紧缩的财政政策和货币政策,大力压缩固定资产投资规模,努力增加有效供给,整顿商品流通秩序。在货币政策方面，提高利率，实行保值贴补，稳定存款；适当收缩信贷规模、控制货币发行、控制职工货币收入的增长。在财政政策方面，开征特别消费税、征收预算外调节资金、延期归还企事业单位的国库券本息等。在行政手段方面，对涨价过猛的商品（如农业生产资料）实行专营，对部分商品实行控购（如控制社会集团的商品购买）、清理公司、凭证供应；冻结部分生产资料和生活必需品的价格，并相应增加国家的物价补贴。通过治理整顿，使居高不下长达20个月的零售物价指数从1989年4月起开始回落,治理整顿初见成效。这个时期宏观调整和紧缩政策的手段主要是国家行政措施和增加物价补贴，以直接调控为主。 二、1993-1996年适度从紧时期 （一）国家宏观调控的背景及措施 经过三年治理整顿，1991年我国经济开始逐步走出低谷。1992年小平同志南巡讲话和党的十四大确立社会主义市场经济后，我国经济再次进入高速增长期，"八五"时期除1991年外，其它4年全国经济增长都在两位数以上，伴随经济的高增长，也出现了比较严重的通货膨胀，房地产业严重膨胀，开发区盲目扩张，信贷投资猛增。面对再次过热的国民经济，1993年党中央、国务院及时加强了宏观调控。以整顿金融秩序为重点、治理通货膨胀为首要任务，采取适度从紧的宏观经济政策，尤其是总量控制、结构调整和改进调控方式等经济政策，出台了宏观调控16条措施，加强和稳定农业基础，控制固定资产投资的过快增长。在调整优化产业结构政策方面，强化交通运输和通信等基础设施建设；加快能源和重要原材料工业的发展，重点是煤炭、电力、钢铁、建筑材料和石化工业的发展；大幅度地增加农业优质品种的产量；按照规模经济、合理布局和突出重点的原则，积极发展机械电子、石油化工、汽车制造和建筑业，使之成为国民经济的支柱产业，同时加快第三产业的发展。在财政政策方面，通过税制改革、清理预算外资
文化在提升国家地位中的作用 国家形象是一个国家在国际界政治、军事、文化、科技、教育等诸方面相互交往过程中获得的国际社会对其的解读、认知和评价，是国家力量和民族精神的表征，是综合国力的集中体现，也是一个国家重要的无形资产. 新中国成立50多年的来，特别在过去10多年中，中国发生了巨大的变化，文化建设全面推进，综合国力迅速提升，国家形象不断改善，国际影响力不断增强，中国越来越为国家社会所关注，可以说国际社会从来没有像今天这样关注和关心中国的发展变化。在北京举办2008年奥运会，既为中国全面充分展示和提升国家形象提供一个难得的机遇，也为国际社会全面了解中国文化，创造了一个不可多得的机会，奥运会是全球体育竞技大舞台，也是全人类四年一次大团聚，举世瞩目，无论在奥运会的筹办期间还是举办过程中，举办国和举办城市都会成为国际社会关注的聚焦点，只要牢牢把握机遇，一届成功的奥运会对举办国一定会有所回报。 1964年在东京举行18届奥运会成为日本战后重建的里程碑，奥运会成功举办重塑日本在国际社会的形象。1988年在当时汉城举办第24届奥运会为增进各国人民对韩国的理解和认识发挥了重要的作用。面对今天的机遇，中国日本在“同一个世界，同一个梦”的口号下，把2008年北京奥运会办成一届有特色、高水平的盛会，如何利用这个契机向全世界，全面展示中国悠久的文化，都需要我们认真思考，精心策划，不懈努力。 如何抓住举办奥运契机，全面展示和提升我国国际形象，我认为第一要把国家发展好，把各方面事办好，把处理的各类矛盾和问题处理好，依托自身的发展是良好国家形象的基础，没有经济、政治、文化、社会的快速、健康、稳定、持续发展，没有综合国力不断提升，就谈不上良好的国家形象，更谈不上全面提升国家形象。随着中国改革开放不断深化，中国与世界的融合和互动不断增强，中国的发展道路，发展模式、发展目标已成为越来越多国家所认识和了解，这显示出中国特色社会主义旺盛的生命力，当中国的经济建设和社会发展进入快速发展阶段的同时,同时也要广泛的宣传和展示独特和悠久的文化，这对于提升中国的国际地位和国际形象有着重要的作用。
文化在一个国家中的作用 文化对于一个国家存在和发展的作用；（248） 先进文化是符合人类社会发展方向、体现先进生产力发展要求、代表人民最广大根本利益的文化，它在推动国家发展和民族进步中的重大战略意义。人类文明进步史充分表明：没有先进的文化的积极引领，没有全民族创造精神的充分发挥，一个国家，一个民族不可能屹立于世界先进民族之林，当今时代，文化越来越成为民族凝聚力和创造力的重要源泉，越来越成为综合国力的竞争的重要因素，丰富多彩的文化生活越来越成为人民的热切愿望 文化作为一种精神力量，能够在人们认识世界、改造世界的过程中转化为物质力量，对社会发展产生深刻的影响； （2）这种影响不仅表现在个人的成长过程中，而且表现在民族和国家的历史中。只有物质和精神都富有的民族才能屹立于世界民族之林。 （3）文化具有自身的传承性和相对的独立性。 文化是包括人们的风俗习惯、行为规范以及各种意识形态在内的复合体，是人类的精神活动及其产品的总称。文化在社会生活中具有多方面的功能。文化是人与人之间联系和交往的精神纽带，是一个国家生命力、创造力和凝聚力的重要源泉：它具有维护和巩固特定社会制度，调控并保持其正常运转的功能。如果一个国家和民族失去其特有的文化，使意味着民族国家身份认同的特定符号已经消失，国将不国。文化是一定社会的政治和经济在观念形态上的反映。 文化具有的认知、教化、沟通、凝聚、传承、娱乐等方面功能，决定了它在推动国家发展和民族进步中的重大战略意义。新世纪世界各国都对提升文化竞争力予以高度重视。文化已经成为中国特色社会主义事业建设中体现国家综合国力的重要组成部分。文化功能的作用贯穿于人类历史始终，国家发展和民族进步与文化功能发挥具有正相关的关系。代表先进文化的前进方向，是中国共产党理论建设和实践创新的纲领性诉求，先进文化建设涉及各个方面，而它直接连接着两个明确的指向：一是实现中国现代化的战略目标，二是实现中华民族复兴的伟大使命。
科学研究对于国家的重 要性 WTD standardization office【WTD 5AB- WTDK 08- WTD 2C】
科学技术是生产力中最活跃的因素和社会变革的主导推动力量，国家利益是国家对外行为的最基本动因和处理国际关系的最高准则，二者之间有着十分密切的联系。科学的发展历程也表明，科学与国家利益之间的关系日益密切是一个显而易见的事实。进入20世纪，人们越来越意识到在国家的竞争中，科学技术能力的竞争越来越成为关键。特别是两次世界大战，使人们清楚地看到了科学技术在国家安全中的突出重要性，人们开始越来越紧密地把科学与国家利益联系在一起。科学是重要的国家资源的观点开始更加深入地影响世界各国的政治家和科学家，科学研究带来的政治、经济、文化等方面的变化对国家利益产生越来越大重要性。在学习完在中国科学院第十七次院士大会、中国工程院第十二次院士大会上的讲话之后，明白了科学技术对于国家的发展具有很大作用，下面是我的学习心得。 回顾往昔，六十年来，站起来的中国人民，经过艰难的探索，其间，也走了弯路，吃了苦头，几经波澜。百年之交，千年之会的今天，终于迎来当今这个凭实力兴国强民的21世纪大发展时期，回首过去远至几百年近至几十年的悠悠历史，我们不难总结，20世纪乃至近代几个世纪从来都属于西方发达国家，这是因为西方发达国家在近代率先完成科技革命，把国家经济推向繁荣，“经济基础决定上层建筑”，繁荣的经济进而将国家的一切都在不同程度上推向更高层次。可以说，繁荣和成就来源于科技与创新，科技与创新反作用于经济，经济又直接对其他领域产生积极影响，进而使国家各个领域全面发展，增大了国家利益。对科学的研究是科技进步的源泉和根源，科学研究进行的程度和深度直接决定了科技革新的速度和程度，无疑这会影响国家大局利益。? 不难理解，国家利益就是满足或能够满足国家以生存发展为基础的各方面需要并且对国家在整体上具有好处的事物。科学研究能够产生新领域的发现，新发现势必会对科学进步和技术革新产生助推作用，韬光养晦的民族和国家都将科学研究和科技创新置于重要地位。 当今，科学研究已成为国家的一种重要战略资源，综合国力的竞争已明显前移到了科学研究。对于我国来说，迅速提升科学研究的整体水平和原始创新能力，对于贯彻落实科学发展观，全面建设小康社会，在本世纪实现中华民族的伟大复兴至关重要。可以说，科学的发展代表着国家和人民的整体利益和长远利益。
国家政治统一的重要性 国家政治统一的重要性 也许很多人为十八大之前没有能够打日本而感到遗憾，其实这个就是世界的政治和军事博弈的结果。今天我把前面整个的博弈的过程简单讲一下（十八大后会写一篇文章分析一下前面5年全球局势演变的前因后果，体现全球各个政治人物、各方势力的智慧和谋略，一环扣一环，精彩纷呈）。 可以说在初期美国和中国双方的国家政治力量还是达成一定共识的，美国期望中国在经济层面支持来让奥巴马获得连任，中国通过美国在政治和军事层面的支持来获得一定程度的整合。然后双方有一个共同目标就是脱犹，正因为这个共同目标，双方可以达成一定的合作。 所有这些，奥巴马是站在美国的国家利益层面考虑问题的，胡总是站在中国的国家利益层面考虑问题的，在此也没必要去骂奥巴马，各为其主。 然后在整个进程中，美国的国家政治力量发觉一个问题，胡总的整个团队的能力和智慧超过了他们原先的预计，这个从9月份就开始体现出来了，到了11月1日前后达到顶峰（因为美国发觉中国军队高层的人事变动出来的全是忠于 胡总的），这个大大超出了美国的预计，这方面美国、犹太势力和俄罗斯都不期望看到中国出现一个汉武帝，这个也是
十八大之前本来要在钓鱼岛一战的戏没有上演的主要原因，今天美国的华盛顿号航母战斗群就在东海，目的已经很明显了。本来9月份是犹太势力联合了国内弱势的政治势力，现在是美国本土势力也联合了国内的弱势的政治势力，目的就是要形成一定的内部平衡来削弱胡总的政治影响力。美国自身虽然今天奥巴马连任了，但是美国的政治也并没有统一，因为美国是一个资本串联权力的模式的国家，政治永远无法统一，后面减赤的道路还是相当艰巨（今天的投票可以看出，民主党控制了参议院，共和党控制了众议院），后面这方面需要中国的配合，同时美国也有可能在减赤的过程中顺带收割中国，这方面就看中国手上有多少筹码，中国的抗打击能力有多强，这个时候后面拼的就是实力了，这个也是最近中国频繁展示我国军事实力的原因。 然后我们再来看国内，这次战役充分体现出来了胡总整个团队的战略和战术运用的手法和智慧，最关键的是完成了军事的统一，因为军事的统一是政治统一的基础，同时通过这阶段的整体运作，控制了金融系统和媒体的大部分，这个让全世界的政治人物刮目相看，也让国内的一些政治势力胆战心惊。 十八大将是政治统一的一个契机，十八大之前没有达到钓鱼岛一战的利益最大化模式，但是钓鱼岛确实起到很大的作用，不愧为“钓鱼岛”这个名字。相对来说在现在这个局面下，
国外国家实验室的作用和特点 国际上先进发达国家所建立的国家实验室主要指由国家(中央政府) 建立并资助的实验室、研究中心、研究所或其他科研机构。美国联邦政府拥有720 多个国家实验室,如著名的洛斯—阿拉莫斯实验室、阿贡实验室、劳伦斯—伯克利实验室等;英国也有不少在世界上非常著名、产生了许多举世瞩目的重大科技成果的实验室,如卡文迪什实验室、卢瑟福实验室、国家物理实验室等;法国的国家科研中心拥有 1 300 多个科研机构;德国的亥姆霍兹国家研究中心研究会有16 个大型研究中心,马普学会有71 个研究所;俄罗斯科学院有400 多个研究所等。尽管各国建设国家实验室的模式不尽相同,它们的地位、作用和功能也各具特色,但是它们都有共同的特点。 (1) 具有明确的国家目标,充分体现由国家利益导向的战略需求。如美国能源部所属的国家实验室基本上按照能源部研究开发的范畴从事基础研究和能源开发、民用能源技术和相关技术研究开发、国家安全研究等工作;而属于美国宇航局的喷气推进实验室则直接参与国家空间开发、地面观测、天体物理学及其相关技术研究开发等工作,并代表国家管理着美国全球性的深度空间网络系统。 (2) 实现先进设备、重大项目、高水平成果和杰出人才的协调统一。如美国能源部所属的国家实验室集聚了一批最先进的设备:世界上最新和最大的粒子加速器高能离子对撞机(RHIC) ,能量最大的软
X2射线先进光源(ALS) 、国家光源同步加速器(NSLS) 、强脉冲中子源等。并在此平台上完成对世界科技发展产生重要影响的成就:世界上第一颗原子弹,第一部雷达,第一个重水核反应堆,第一个民用核电站……;同时还造就了一批著名科学家,如先后有9 位在劳伦斯—伯克利工作过的科学家获得了诺贝尔奖。 (3) 基本上是综合性研究实验室,充分体现了国家实验室学科覆盖面广、学术影响大,在开展多学科交叉研究中的优势和特色;同时,这种多学科交叉综合的方式也非常有利于原始性创新成果的形成。如著名的洛斯—阿拉莫斯(Los Alamos) 国家实验室,所从事的研究领域涉及到核武器、能源、材料、生物、环境、高能物理、地球科学、非线性科学等多方面的研究与开发。 (4) 一般由政府建立,大多实行政府预算拨款制,绝大部分经费来源于中央政府,并强调给予国家实验室的研究以较大的优先申请权和经费使用自主权,在管理上具有较大的相对独立性,并具有独立的法人地位。 先进国家多年来的实践充分证明,国家实验室的建设和发展具有明确的国家目标,符合国家战略发展的重大需求,对国家科技发展能力和国际竞争力的迅速增强作出了极其重要的贡献。
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国家存在的意义 我们人类为什么要有国家？为什么要有政府呢？政府、国家存在的意义是什么呢？首先我们必须知道什么是国家，这样才能明白他存在的意义。国家不是与市民社会一起诞生的，它是人类社会生活发展到一定程度的产物，或用马克思主义的观点看，是社会矛盾不可调和的产物和表现。它应当是一个历史现象，即在人类社会发展的一定阶段诞生，又会在一定阶段消失。可见国家并非随人类产生而产生，而是历史发展的产物。由此可见它的存在是必然的。当然随着生产力的发展国家这一概念也可能湮没在历史的长河中。 总之，国家是一个成长于社会之中而又凌驾于社会之上的、以暴力或合法性为基础的、带有相当抽象性的权力机构。如果我们将一国之内的诸组成部分依范围大小列一个表，则国家的位置大概是：社会—政治—国家—政府。要想更好的明白什么是国家，必须将国家与祖国，国家与政府的区别，祖国与国家的区别：前者是一个地域、文化、历史、宗教、有时是民族及人种概念，而国家是一个政治权力机构。国家与政府的区别：在国家与政府的关系上，有时国家与祖国的概念不分。在分得十分清晰时，国家大于政府，尤其是国家是主权者的同义词，而政府只是国家的仆人、权力的执行者、被委托人。但在国际舞台上，国家的概念比在国内政治中宽泛很多。此时国家是国际法中的主体，是该国范围内的整个社会的代表，是这个国家全体人民的代表，与国内政治中的祖国十分相近。 有时国家并不仅仅意味着行使于市民社会内部的政
治权力，而是意味着在政治意义上的这个社会本身，如在国际关系中。正是在这个意义上，20世纪初的几位法国和德国学者如Jellinek, Laband, Carréde Malberg，创立了国家三要素的理论，强调了政治权力与领土、人民的统一。国家三要素理论可以如此概括：当在一个固定的领土范围内居住着一个人民（经常是同一民族或有共同的认同感），而在这个人民中又行使着一个合法的政治权力时，便存在着国家。所谓领土，在现在世界中是三维的：领土、领海、领空。 作为国家的基本要素，领土并不只是供人居住的一片土地，它同样构成了这个国家、这个民族的历史、文化、宗教记忆的一部分，是这个国家的象征，是联系人民、使他们自我认同及互相认同的纽带。有时这后一个作用甚至引起不同种族、人民之间的冲突，如科索沃、耶路撒冷。而国家存在的一个重要意义就是维护自己的领土，保护自己的人民。那么什么是人们呢？人民并不仅仅是国家的臣民。在现代国家中，它首先是政治生活中的一个重要角色，是一个国家政治权力合法性的唯一来源，是一国的主权者。按照自然法理论及现代民主理论，它在国家权力出现之前便已存在，或者说国家是他们的创造物。在国内政治的领域中，人民更多地是被定义为公民，即有权参加政治事务的人。它超越了人们在经济地位、文化、职业上的不同，使人们有了一个新的共同身份。 合法的政府，是一国政治生活中的一个重要角色，一个法人。国家意志因而与统治者的个人意志不同。在国内事务中，它合法地管理着人民，公正地处理人民之间的冲突，以及作为中央权力处理与其他国内法人的关系。它垄断着合法的强制权，单方面制订法律规范，是
国家的作用 建国的问题，为什么要强调国家暴力的作用。我们国家的许多问题，其实是国家的暴力不够。此外由于近来的事情，苏力意识到民族意识开始形成。这次课旨在批评自由主义法理学（我国目前的主流），他承认自己也是一种自由主义，但这是重叠认识的自由主义，试图包容其他，建立一个法律裁判、评价的基础。自由主义是一种强有力的理论，也确实有用，在实践中具有很大的弹性，能够回答西方国家的一些问题，包括妇女权利、种族问题以及国家独立。 但存在一个社群主义的问题，关于什么是美德自由主义是放弃回答的，既然价值多元，似乎所有偏好都是等值的。但我们在生活中很难不作判断，司法也是如此，我们必须支持或反对一些东西。我们每个人都希望过着善的生活，希望善，因此社群主义就进来了。但社群主义也是有问题的，过分强调对社群的尊重，有时也是很压迫人的。因此人也难免有逃离社群的希望。社群主义也有一些问题不能解决。秋菊这个状况，是我们自由主义法制不能解决得问题（但不一定要向社群主义妥协）。 但这不是我们最大的挑战，而在于上个世界独立出来的国家中，包括俄罗斯，这一系列新出现的威权主义国家。这都是与个人主义、自由主义相对的。胡志民提出自由和独立，即国家的自由与独立，是更高的价值。这个问题不是社群主义能回答的问题。从经验上看，一个社群是从家庭上发展起来。但没有哪一个国家，特别是中国，是从社群发展出来的。但维权主义国家不是从社群或者自由主义契约中发展出来的。美国的少数族裔社群也不是自发而生的，是受歧视而产生的，比如唐人街和犹太人，都是在一个歧视的环境中形成的，与自生自发的社群不同。那中国到底是一个什么样的国家？在当代中，形成尖锐冲突的其实是集权主义政治。我们现在的改革，特别是自由主义者，认为共和国的前30年是错的，或者蒋介石的前20年是错的。这实际上是在割裂历史，也影响到了如何评价毛泽东。1东欧的改革使人认为那段历史是错误的，而且大多数人从法治角度上看，那段历史只是教训，是错误的。苏力认为这种观念是轻率的，中国实际上还是社会主义制度，特别是在四川赈灾中，各省强令支援灾区，这体现了社会主义原则。中国的成功不能说是因为自由主义的成功。我们仍然是威权主义。 第二个问题，20世纪横贯各洲的威权主义实践，你不能说都是错误的，有没有其特定1中国最反动的人在党校和马列学院，通过耸人听闻来获取眼光。
龙源期刊网 https://www.doczj.com/doc/e43124047.html, 浅论软实力在国家发展中的作用 作者：贺虎 来源：《文存阅刊》2017年第15期 摘要：随着全球化的不断加深，软实力在应对和解决国家在发展竞争中所面对的种种状况以及维护国家安全方面都展现出了传统“硬实力”所不具备的作用力。我们有理由相信，软实力在国家安全中所发挥的作用将与日俱增。 关键词：软实力；国家安全；国家利益；国家战略 一、软实力是维护国家安全的重要手段方法 从作用方式上来说，软实力的作用方式较之传统硬实力有着本质的不同，表现在通过影响力与感召力使作用对象发自内心地产生共鸣与认同，“心甘情愿”地做出有利于软实力发出者的行为。信息时代下，国家安全的范畴也在不断“与时俱进”，随着全球传播潮流的不断跟进，一个国家，尤其是大国越来越重视自己国家的软实力安全，因为对每个国家而言，软实力俨然已经成为本国独一无二的战略资源，它的安全将对国家利益的实现产生深远的影响。因此，防止国家软实力受到外来因素的破坏，是国家安全领域十分重要的一环，而软实力也就自然成为国家安全中不可或缺的组成要素。 同样，随着信息的全球化与科技的不断进步，作为参与国际事务主体的国家也面临着诸多非传统安全领域带来的挑战，这些领域往往都是防不胜防的，而传统的以武力为主的“以暴制暴”的方式通常不能确保国家的绝对安全，相反还会增加一个国家再次受到安全威胁的几率而美国就是最好的证明。可见，软实力较之传统硬性方式的优点在于能从根源上最大程度地消除产生摩擦矛盾的几率并且大大降低国家用于维护国家安全的成本。 二、软实力可以有效地弥补硬实力的不足，更好的实现国家利益 软实力之父奈说过：“要在当今这样一个世界里获得成功，美国不仅必须维持其硬实力，同时还必须体察其软实力，明白如何将两种实力结合起来以维护国家和全球的利益。”[1]一个国家强大的硬实力固然可以通过武力威胁，经济制裁等强制性力量在一定程度上迫使他国做出某种行为，但他国并非出于自愿，也就是人们俗称的口服但不心服，因此也就为今后发展的埋下了不稳定的因素，可想，一旦有一天这样一种强制力削弱或不复存在，那么受作用的一方必然会产生相当程度的反弹。而如果是通过软实力的作用，一方面达到了相应的目的且使相应的国家心服口服，另一方面极大地节约了成本实现了利益的最大化。另外，软实力可以更好地实现国家利益，因为软实力的性质决定了它在国际竞争中所展现的特殊优势。在当今这样一个国家利益至上的大环境下，软实力所展现的强大的感召力，能使一国的价值观、对外政策得到更广泛的认同，使其他国家的民众产生好感，而民众对一国的普遍态度将直接影响到其政府的态