China' pathway towards low-carbon economy

低碳经济视角下的校园建设研究作者：武亮来源：《科教导刊》2014年第04期摘要低碳经济是人类社会在面临日益加剧的全球气候变暖压力下提出的一种新的发展理念，而低碳校园作为其中的一个子系统，正确认识其内涵和意义将为低碳校园的建设提供坚实的基础。

通过大力宣传校园低碳化建设、开展绿色实践活动、组织环保社团、垃圾分类收集、学生低碳生活方式的养成等措施，为低碳校园的建设提供了可以借鉴的发展路径。

关键词低碳经济低碳校园涵义途径中图分类号：G640 文献标识码：AConstruction of the Campus in Carbon Economy PerspectiveWU Liang（Xinhua College of Sun Yat-sen University， Guangzhou， Guangdong 510320）Abstract Low-carbon economy is a new development concept of human society in the face of growing pressure on global warming raised， and low-carbon campus as one of the subsystems， a correct understanding of its meaning and significance for the construction of low-carbon campus provide a solid foundation. By vigorously promote the construction of low-carbon campus，developing green practices， organizational environmental organizations， waste collection， and other measures to develop a low-carbon lifestyle of students， provides a development path for the construction of low-carbon campus construction.Key words low-carbon economy； low-carbon campus； connotation； pathway1 低碳经济的提出与内涵在1998年就有一些学者指出为了遏制气候持续变暖，应该大力发展低碳经济，并进一步提出国际碳排放机制的三个过程：首先短期内，制定鼓励低成本碳减排做法的政策，其次在近期和中期，建立更有力的机制实现碳减排常规化，最后形成一种追求低碳经济的生活方式。

“双碳”战略下中国港口与清洁能源融合发展路径探析*蒋一鹏1袁成清2▲袁裕鹏2董明望2江涛1钟晓晖1童亮2（1.宁波舟山港集团有限公司浙江宁波315042；2.武汉理工大学交通与物流工程学院武汉430063）摘要：采用清洁能源是港口行业绿色低碳发展的有效途径，但目前对于港区可用的清洁能源形式以及相关自然资源禀赋缺乏统筹规划和合理开发，这在一定程度上制约了中国港口行业的可持续发展。

为促进中国港口实现“双碳”目标，解决港口能耗大、碳排放量高的用能结构性问题，对国内外港口与清洁能源融合的发展现状与不足进行了梳理，总结提出目前中国港口与清洁能源融合发展过程中存在的清洁能源应用模式单一、清洁能源渗透率低、多能源并网技术存在瓶颈、绿氢制储注供一体化应用欠缺等关键问题。

针对这些问题，结合港口自然资源禀赋，分析港口用能形态和用能模式特征，提出在“源-网-荷”这3个方面形成多能源融合局面的港口综合能源系统发展模式，形成碳减排的港口能源融合体系，增强了港口能源自主保障能力和自洽率。

在此基础上，进一步细化了发电与耗能制氢相结合的港口与清洁能源融合场景，明确了以发电/储能系统-电网-港口装备/在港船舶用能为主体的港口综合能源系统拓扑结构，提出了包括政策扶持、技术创新、示范试点在内的多项发展路径。

以宁波舟山港为对象，规划建设了以能源层、控制层、电网层和负荷层为核心的水运港-船多能源融合集成应用系统架构。

依托于港区的自然禀赋，实现了以风能为主体，多种清洁能源互补的供能模式，预计的清洁能源发电量将超过14MW，碳减排效果将超过20000t。

关键词：港口；清洁能源；综合能源系统；多能源融合；绿氢制备中图分类号：U6-9文献标识码：A doi:10.3963/j.jssn.1674-4861.2023.02.015 Pathway for Integrated Development of Port and Clean Energy Under Strategy of Carbon Peaking and Carbon Neutralization in ChinaJIANG Yipeng1YUAN Chengqing2▲YUAN Yupeng2DONG Mingwang2JIANG Tao1ZHONG Xiaohui1TONG Liang2（1.Ningbo Zhoushan Port Group Company Limited，Ningbo315042，Zhejiang，China;2.School of Transportation and Logistics Engineering，Wuhan University of Technology，Wuhan430063，China）Abstract:Clean energy provides a viable approach towards environmentally friendly,low-carbon development with-in the port industry.However,the lack of comprehensive planning and efficient utilization of accessible clean energy sources hinders a sustainable growth of China's port industry.To achieve the“Carbon Peaking and Carbon Neutrali-ty”goals for ports and address challenges of high energy consumption and carbon emissions,the limitations within the integration process between the Port and Clean energy are investigated both domestically and abroad.Key issues are identified,such as limited types of clean energy,low penetration rates of clean energy,challenges in multi-energy grid technology,and the absence of integrated green hydrogen applications.This paper studies the endowment of nat-ural resources in ports and analyzes their energy consumption forms.In addition,a comprehensive energy system for ports is proposed,which involves multi-energy integration across three aspects of“source-grid-load”,forming an ar-chitecture that focuses on reducing carbon emissions and enhancing self-sufficiency in energy.Furthermore,the 收稿日期：2022-09-05*国家重点研发计划项目（2021YFB2601605）资助第一作者简介：蒋一鹏（1968—），工程师.研究方向：水运交通与能源融合等.E-mail：*******************.cn ▲通信作者：袁成清（1976—），博士，教授.研究方向：船港新能源及能效提升等.E-mail：************.cnstructure of energy integration system,which includes power generation and hydrogen consumption,is further re-fined.This system identifies a topology structure for the port's comprehensive energy system,centered primarily on power systems,electrical grid,and energy consumption of the terminal.Developmental paths are also outlined,includ-ing the policy support,technological innovation,and demonstration trials.Moreover,taking Chuanshan port region of Ningbo Zhoushan Port as an example,this paper devises a waterborne port-vessel multi-energy integration applica-tion system architecture,with core components spanning energy,control,grid,and load layers.By utilizing the natural resources of the port region,a sustainable energy provision architecture has been devised,which is anchored by wind power and supported by supplementary clean energy options.The power generation replaced by clean energy is antic-ipated to surpass14MW,with an associated carbon emissions reduction exceeding20000t.This paper exemplifies the integration of ports with clean energy,substantiating its practicability and efficacy,as well as providing a scientif-ic reference for the future ecologically conscious and low-carbon development of port industry in China. Keywords:port;clean energy;integrated energy system;multi-energy integration;green hydrogen production0引言在全球经济一体化背景下，水运行业蓬勃发展，同时化石能源消耗量和CO2排放量与日俱增。

本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文：Low carbon economyThis paper examines different carbon pathways for achieving deep CO2 reduction targets for the UK using a macro-econometric hybrid model E3MG, which stands for Energy–Economy–Environment Model at the Global level. The E3MG, with combines a top-down approach for modeling the global economy and for estimating the aggregate and disaggregate energy demand and a bottom-up approach (Energy Technology sub Model, ETM) for simulating the power sector, which then provides feedback to the energy demand equations and the whole economy. The ETM sub model uses a probabilistic approach and historical data for estimating the penetration levels of the different technologies, considering their economic, technical and environmental characteristics. Three pathway scenarios (CFH, CLC and CAM) simulate the CO2 reduction by 40%, 60% and 80% by 2050 compared to 1990 levels respectively and are compared with a reference scenario, with no reduction target. The targets are modeled as the UK contribution to an international mitigation effort, such as achieving the G8 reduction targets, which is a more realistic political frame work for the UK to move towards deep reductions rather than moving alone. This paper aims to provide modeling evidence that deep reduction targets can be met through different carbon pathways while also assessing the macroeconomic effects of the pathways on GDP and investment.Climate change, as a result of rising greenhouse gas emissions, threatens the stability of the w orld’s climate, economy and population. The causes and consequences of climate change are global, and while national governments can and should take action, the ultimate solution must be a collective global effort. The latest scientific consensus (IPCC, 2007) has further strengthened the evidence base that it is very likely that anthropogenic GHG emissions at or above current rates would causefurther warming and induce many changes in the global climate system during the 21st century. A major recent report on the economics of global climate change (Stern, 2006) supports the position that the benefits of stringent climate mitigation action outweighed the costs and risks of delayed action. Although there is a global consideration of the climate change effects, individual countries have undertaken different steps in climate change mitigation, which is obvious given the extended negotiations towards the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. The EU and individual Member States have undertaken several commitments and directed several policies towards the reduction of their emissions. UK has been selected for this analysis as there is political will within the country, as described below from the commitments to tackle climate change. But this commitment can be examined in the context of negotiations at international level, such as the recent commitment of G8 to reduce their emissions by 80% by 2050.Climate change mitigation and energy security are the UK’s core energy policy goals (BERR, 2007). In addition, the decline in domestic reserves and production of UK oil and natural gas, combined with increasing geopolitical instabilities in key gas and oil production and transmission countries have highlighted the need for a secure and resilient UK energy system. Other UK energy policy goals are reductions in vulnerable consumers’ exposure to high energy prices and a continued emphasis on open and competitive energy markets.The UK set itself a groundbreaking climate change mitigation policy with the publication of a long-term national CO2 reduction target of 60% by 2050(DTI, 2003). This target was established in response to the climate challenge set out by the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP, 2000). Climate change mitigation targets were reaffirmed in light of competing energy security issues via the 2007 Energy White paper (BERR, 2007). The 60% UK CO2 reductions target is being established in the UK legislative process through the Climate Change Bill as the minimum CO2 reduction target required by 2050 (DEFRA, 2008). This longer term target has been further analyzed by the new regulatory Committee on Climate Change (CCC, 2008), in light of new evidence concerning global stabilization targets (IPCC,2007). This has led to the proposal for an 80% reduction target for greenhouse gases by 2050 compared to 1990 levels. This target has been adopted by the Brown Administration and the Energy and Climate Change Secretary of State Ed Miliband, becoming a law through the Climate Change Act (DECC, 2008). Additionally, the UK has been a leading proponent of global long-term CO2 target setting within the G8, as the causes and consequences of climate change are global, and while national governments can and should take action, the ultimate solution must be a collective global effort. The G8 dialogue resulted in agreement at the 2009 G8 Italian summit for a robust response to climate change including the adoption of the goal to achieve at least 80% reduction of their emissions by 2050, and aiming to reach an agreement of a 50% reduction in global emissions with other countries.The implementation of three deep CO2 reduction targets (40%, 60% and 80%) for the G8 is examined using the macro-econometric E3MG model. Results are reported for the UK, which is selected as there is a political will to implement such reductions. These targets, examined within the UK Energy Research Center’s 2050 project (UKERC, 2050), are met through the implementation of a portfolio of policies in contrast to the neoclassical approach, where the targets are imposed and the marginal abatement cost for meeting those targets is estimated. The paper contributes by adopting a novel hybrid approach integrating simulation models of the economic system and energy technologies and therefore providing an alternative approach to the traditional economic equilibrium modeling. Moreover the paper aims to provide evidence that there exist pathways for meeting deep reduction targets and also helping the economy to grow. The need for such evidence has been noted by the IPCC in its assessment of the literature on stringent mitigation targets. Such evidence can inform the international negotiations for a post-Kyoto global agreement.Long-term forecast of the economy and of the energy system expansion is subject to uncertainties on fossil fuel resources, prices, economic and technical characteristics of new technologies, behavioral change, political framework and regulatory environment. But the modeling approach implemented to simulate the energy system and the interaction with the global economy is crucial for the results.There are many modeling approaches used for examining energy and climate policies at global or at national level either through macro or energy system models. In the extensive literature on energy-economic modeling of energy and climate policies, there are two wide spread modeling approaches: bottom-up vs. top- down models. The two model classes differ mainly with respect to the emphasis placed on technological details of the energy system and the comprehensiveness of endogenous market adjustments (Bohringer and Rutherford, 2007). However, recent evaluations of the literature (IPCC, 2007) have shown the increasing convergence of these model categories as each group of modelers adopts the strengths of the alternate approach. There is a long track record of energy models underpinning major energy policy initiatives, producing a large and vibrant research community and a broad range of energy modeling approaches (Jebara and Iniyan, 2006). Particularly in recent years, energy models have been directly applied by policy makers for long-term decarburization scenarios (IEA, 2008; Das et al., 2007; European Commission, 2006), with further academic modeling collaborations directly feeding into the global policy debate on climate change mitigation (Weyant, 2004; Strachan Neil et al., 2009).Before deriving any particular conclusion from the scenarios presented in this paper, it is important to consider the modeling approach and the way the scenarios have been implemented with E3MG. E3MG being a macro-econometric model of the global economy has the advantage of examining policies at global and at national level, which is more important in cases of international efforts. The 40%, 60% and 80% reduction targets are not realistic options if implemented only by UK because they would not lead to a significant reduction in climate change and because no single country would easily take a decision moving towards such policies on its own. For these reasons we assume that the emissions reduction targets for the UK are implemented as part of international reduction targets. Based on the facts that the Obama USA Administration is committed to finding solution to climate change issue and the major developing countries are reluctant to adopt such policies in the medium term, a G8 reduction target of 40%, 60% and 80% by 2050 compared to 1990 levels seems to be a more realistic framework.The E3MG model adopts a hybrid approach. The aggregate and disaggregate energy demand is estimated using econometric techniques, allowing for fuel switching for the 12 different fuel types and for the 19 fuel users, while the power sector is simulated using a probabilistic approach which considers the economic, technical, environmental characteristics of the power units but considers also the history. The electric system expansion is modeled by using parameters for the different technologies based on historical data on learning rates, which allows new technologies to gain a share in the market even when their cost is higher than conventional technologies. Moreover the dispatch of the different technologies to meet the electric demand, although using the cost optimization approach comparing the penetration of the different technologies, takes historical data as its starting point. Both the energy demand system and the energy technology options are implemented so as to model market imperfections which exist in all markets and are not usually considered in the classical cost optimization techniques. These market imperfections, resulting either from socio-political factors or from the presence of oligopolies that speculate on the electricity price, cause differentiation in the electricity mix across countries, and lead in many cases to significantly different profiles from those projected from models assuming perfect market conditions.The scenarios are implemented in this framework, allowing the cumulative investment at global level for alternative technologies so their faster penetration provides solutions with a more diverse electric mix. It is also important to mention that the emission reduction scenarios are modeled not by imposing a reduction target and estimating the marginal abatement cost for meeting this target, but by applying different policies at different strengths and different timing, which is consistent with the theoretical background of the space–time economics adopted in the E3MG model. The strength and timing of a policy can trigger (or not) the penetration of a new technology. For example, large investments in electric cars in the medium term can lead to their fast penetration, while large investments in hydrogen cars take longer to have effect and so cannot have similar results. The different scenarios have been implemented by applying in different strengths and timing the policies of carbonpricing, direct investment and revenue recycling in the form of investments in the power sector, investments in the transport and other consumption sectors. The aim was all of them to have a positive effect, by reducing emissions whilst maintaining economic growth. This proves to be the most important conclusion of this paper, that there exist several portfolios of policies that can have large emissions reductions and also help the economy to grow. This finding is in contrast with those from many models predicting that energy investments will have an important negative effect on the economic growth, deriving from the assumptions in the neoclassical approach of full employment (so that there are no extra resources available to produce extra output) and of optimization of the baseline economy by a central planner (so that any shift away from the optimal solution will reduce GDP). But it is consistent with recent political decisions at EU, USA and Japan to invest on green technologies and infrastructure so as to boost their economies out of the global recession.The set of Carbon Ambition scenarios (40%, 60%and80% CO2 reductions from 1990 levels by 2050) offer insights on decarburization pathways and energy–economy–environment trade offs. Decarbonising the global energy system is a timing and well as a political problem with the different portfolios of policies becoming preferable depending on the final and intermediate targets. Achieving the stringent 80% target for the UK by 2050 appears feasible, while maintaining economic growth, but implies adoption of a portfolio of policies including strong regulation and high carbon prices.Source: A.S.Dagoumas,T.S.Barker,2010. “Pathways to a low-carbon economy for the UK with the macro-econometric E3MG model”. Energy Policy,April,pp.3067-3077.译文：低碳经济本文通过审查不同的碳途径来实现二氧化碳深度减排的目标，为实现这一目标，英国使用了在全球水平上代表能源——经济——环境的宏观经济混合模型E3MG。

本科毕业设计（论文）外文文献(此文档为word格式,下载后您可任意修改编辑!)标题: The Challenge of Changing to a Low-Carbon Economy: A Brief Overview作者: Carrasco, Jorge F出版物名称: Low Carbon Economy卷: 5;期: 1;页: 1-5;页数: 5;出版年份: 2014;出版商: Scientific Research Publishing出版物国家/地区: United StatesISSN: 21587000The Challenge of Changing to a Low-Carbon Economy: A BriefOverviewCarrasco, Jorge FAbstractClimate change alters all sustainable development dimensions for a given nation or region, therefore, decreasing emission of GHG is not only an environmental issue, but it has also implication on the economic, social and political matters. In 2009, the Copenhagen Accord adopted the 2°C global warming increase limit as an international policy, being this threshold the maximum allowable warming to avoid dangerous and irreversible anthropogenic interference in the climate system. The observed monthly average CO^sub 2^ concentrations in the atmosphere crossed the 400 parts per million thresholds, for the first time in April and May 2013. The energy sector is the single largest source of climate changing GHG emissions, and therefore moving from fossil fuel to clean energy production should be a priority challenge for all countries. For that, it is necessary to develop a low carbon economy for confronting the climate change.Keywords：Climate Change; Carbon Dioxide; Low-Carbon Economy; 2°C Target1. OverviewSince the release of the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) [1], when the main conclusion was that the climate change is unequivocal; the vast majority of the world reached the consensus that this environmental change is real and it is due to the atmosphere warming as a con- sequence of the increased concentration of greenhouse gases (GHG) of anthropogenic origin. This has recently been confirmed by the Fifth IPCC Report [2]. One of the main conclusions indicates that "human influence has been detected in warming of the atmosphere and the ocean, as well as, changes in the global water cycle, in re- ductions in snow and ice, in global mean sea level rise, and in changes in some climate extremes". Also, the re- port reveals that "it is extremely likely (i.e., 95% - 100% probability) that human influence has been the domi- nant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century" [2]. Climate model simulations project further warming and changes in all components of the climate system as emissions of CO2 continue, or even if emis- sions of CO2 are stopped now [2]. Therefore, it is necessary to face and to be prepared for a warmer world than the present one, with an appropriate worldwide plan and/or with integrated and synergetic national programs that globally mitigate the emission of GHG. This mainly implies to end with our dependence on fossil fuels, which is the major source of carbon dioxide(CO2) released into the atmosphere, and to assume that this action is a challenge that should be the main worldwide environmental problem of our time. The CO2 is the most impor- tant anthropogenic GHG contributing ~64% to the radiative forcing of the long-lived GHG, and it is responsible for ~84% of the increment in radiative forcing since 2002 [3]. Climate change alters all sustainable development dimensions for a given nation or region, therefore, de- creasing emission of GHG is not only an environmental issue, but it has also implications on the economic, so- cial and political matters. Since this issue was recognized by the global community, several actions and agree- ments have been taking place in the Conference of the Parties (COP) of the United Nations Framework Conven- tion on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Among others, in 2009 the Copenhagen Accord endorsed the continuation of the Kyoto Protocol; it recognized that climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time and em- phasized the needed for a "strong political will to urgently combat climate change in accordance with the prin- ciple of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities". Also, it was recognized that deep cuts in global emissions are required according to science results [1] [2] and that countries should agree in cooperative way in stopping from rising global and national GHG emissions "as soon as possible". To achieve this, it is necessary to develop a low CO2 emission strategy in order to secure a sustainabledevelopment. Later in the COP at Durban 2011, the governments recognized the need of a new universal, legal agreement to deal with climate change beyond 2020, where all parties will play their part to the best of their ability. Meanwhile, an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol was adopted in the COP at Doha 2012 where the parties agreed on an 8-year second commitment period, this in order to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that will prevent dangerous human interference with the climate system.Also, the Copenhagen Accord adopted the 2°C global warming increase limit [4] as an international policy, being this threshold the maximum allowable warming to avoid dangerous and irreversible anthropogenic inter- ference in the climate, beyond this threshold the risks of significant damage to ecosystems and of non-linear responses are expected to increase rapidly. These actions are now even more urgent after knowing the results of the last Fifth IPCC Report [2]. The International Energy Agency (IEA) [4] also recognized that the energy sector is the single largest source of climate changing GHG emissions, and therefore changing from fossil fuel to clean energy production should be a priority challenge. This means to develop an economic based on a low-emission pathway, in other words, to establish a low carbon economy (LCE) for confronting the climate change. This im- plies a low-fossil-fuel economy, or a decarbonized economy that has a minimal output of GHGemissions into the atmosphere, specifically CO2 as a result of human activity. The IEA [5] recently indicated that even though Governments have decided collectively that the world needs to limit the average global temperature increase to no more than 2°C (as sooner as possible), any resulting global agreement related with this challenge will emerge after 2015 and new legal obligations will most probably begin after 2020. Meanwhile, despite the agreement taken by governments and that many countries are taking new ac- tions, the GHG emission continue increasing and the world target for accomplishing the 2°C is drifting further from the track that it needed to follow [5]. In fact, the observed monthly average CO2 concentrations in the at- mosphere crossed the 400 parts per million thresholds, for the first time in April and May 2013, in several ob- serving stations (Barrow/Alaska-USA, Alert/Canada, Ny-?lesund/Norway, Iza?a/Canary Islands-Spain, and Mauna Loa/Hawaii-USA) [6]. Recently, the PwC (PricewaterhouseCooper LLP) [7] revealed that the annual rate reduction of CO2 emission for the 2012-2050 period, needed to accomplish the 2°C warming target, has ris- en from 3.7% to 5.1% (Figure 1) [6]. Also, the IEA indicated in its World Energy Outlook Special Report [5] that we are more likely to increase the air temperature between 3.6°C and 5.3°C during the 21th century, com- pared with pre-industrial values (see also Peter et al. [8]). Figure 1 also shows that the business as usual projec- tion will not accomplish the 2°C targetreduction. Neither it will be if the annual reduction rate is 3.7% as origin- ally was estimated. If we continue the business as usual pathway, every year the annual reduction rate needed will be larger and therefore more challenge to achieve. Peter et al. [8] comparing the observed annual global CO2 emission with those projected by different IPCC scenarios, since the first report until those used in the fifth one, concluded that the current trend follows or even is above the worse scenario. They concluded that if the CO2 emission track continues the global warming will be above the 2°C target, and that to return to the 2°C pathway requires a sustainable global mitigation, including capture and storage CO2, but also high level of technological, social and political innovations [8].Despite of this, the 2°C target is still a feasible challenge but it is now more difficult to achieve and actions are urgently needed before 2020. It is well recognized that energy accounts for around two-third of GHG emis- sions, as more than 80% of global energy consumption is based on fossil fuels. Therefore, achieving a LCE is a worldwide challenge in order that the climate change impacts can be mitigated any time soon. Such an endeavor must be undertaken, not only by developed countries (Annex 1 of the Kioto Protocol), but it should also be a compromise by developing countries (non Annex 1 of the Kioto Protocol). However, any action should be in accordance with the principle ofcommon but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Natural energy resources are vital for securing economic growth and development for all countries, not just today but for future generations. The relationship between economic growth and the environment is complex. Changes in technology due to LCE can have the potential of reducing the environmental impacts, but also of af- fecting the economic growth. Traditional economy is based mainly on energy generated by using fossil fuel. For this reason many economical indexes include results of consumption of fossil fuel, like the economic growth, nation and people prosperity, and other overall cost and benefits. The LCE implies the development of a new way of generating energy, which it should be based on "clean-renewable" sources. For the vast majority of the countries this shift is highly cost and it will affect their economy, mainly to those less-developed communities. As indicated earlier, the international community recognizes that the climate change (and its impacts) is one of the largest problems facing humanity. This is well assumed in economic terms, but the challenge goes beyond this, arising ethical questions that many time are often overlooked, questions that have to be with ourselves and with our interaction with the environment including the ecosystems and the biodiversity. What should be the objectives of climate change, and who should bear the burdens of climate change? Who should be included in decision-making about mitigationand adaptation strategies? Is it only governmental decision? What role plays the private sector? Beinhocker and Oppenheim [9] ind icated that moving to a LCE involves a technology shift might cause job losses in some sectors, but on the other hand is likely to create more jobs than it will destroy. Also, greater social equity could be an additional benefit of such a low-carbon revolution. For example, in de- veloping countries innovations in power generation technology could make electricity both more affordable and more accessible to less-developed communities. Increased electrification has a wide variety of development benefits ranging from improved healthcare and access to clean water, to greater economic growth. Even, the de- velopment of a truly sustainable biofuels industry could offer vast economic opportunities for the rural poor communities.Clearly climate change will impact our way of life, moving to a LCE for accomplishing the goal of 2°C target will cause changes in the current social status, on the people's capacity to enjoy fundamental rights to life, food, water and health [9]. This means that the 2°C target is likely to be too high to safeguard these rights. Then, how we as worldwide society are able to confront the challenge imposed by climate change, in moving to a LCE and adopting polices for mitigation and adaptation, without compromising people's rights for a better life and the environment as a whole. No doubt that LCE requires an ethical and political frameworkthat differs from current ones.Climate change is the result of human activity involving many actors from the individual level (summing bil- lions of people), to industry and governmental levels, and from national (private and public) to international in- stitutions. To move to a LCE requires a collective action of all countries and across the entire society, from pri- vate to public sectors, from the individual to a community levels. It requires actions that go beyond legal decla- rations, (完整文献请到百度文库) from national legislatures and international agreement and involving national and international organi- zations, like the World Trade Organization and World Bank, two bodies funding research into new technologies. It also requires that these institutions coordinate and cooperate with each other to ensure that social and eco- nomic policies are not pursued in ways that destroy the environment. In many countries, the balance between private and public investment in a LCE should be driven by the market but with governmental policies and regu- lations that ensure the least impact on the most vulnerable communities. It is most probable that the private sec- tor will not act on those areas where the return investment is of long-term or highly uncertain. In these cases, ac- tion from the public sector will be needed by taking responsibility on the investment or by subsidizing private ones or to the vulnerable communities. The climate change is a global problem with a global solution, even though the responsibilitiesare differentiated, all countries should take actions, and all industries should be in- volved in moving to a LCE. Today, in a global market and economy, most industrial production is also of an in- ternational scale and, therefore, they should be involved in LCE actions.The LCE also implies the concept of low carbon technology (LCT) for energy generation and the develop- ment of new technology with zero carbon emission. This development has relationships with electricity, trans- portation and construction sectors; chemistry industry and many other new technologies. Globally, technology development has dramatically accelerated over recent decades in developed countries, however, this develop- ment remains slow in low- and middle-income countries. Technology transfer from developed to developing countries needs further implementation. Also, LCT involves research for improving efficiency of existing tech- nology and for developing new technology from renewable energy that comes from natural resources. Advances in technology and policy will allow renewable energy and energy efficiency to play major roles in replacing fos- sil fuels, meeting global energy demand, but at the same time reducing CO2 emissions. In summary, the world is facing a warmer environment due to human activity that have being increasing the GHG concentration. To overcome the impacts of the climate changes we need to adapt to the new scenarios, but also to reduce the GHG emission by moving to a LCE, which requires the compromiseof all countries and indi- viduals. LCE will impact the society in different way, for example on the economic growth which can be com- promised; it will need a balance between private and public investment, governmental policies and regulations, research and development of new technologies. It will require an international agreement where all nations should act with generosity for the well-being of humanity. AcknowledgementsThis study was carried out when the author was still affiliated with the Dirección Meteorológica de Chile. This article is a contribution to FONDAP (CR2) N° 1511009. ReferencesReferences[1] Solomon, S., Qin, D., Manning, M., Chen, Z., Marquis, M., Averyt, K.B., Tignor, M. and Miller, H.L. (2007) Contri- bution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. IPCC 2007, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New Y ork. [2] Stocker, T.F., Qin, D., Plattner, G.-K., Alexander, L.V., Allen, S.K., Bindoff, N.L., Bréon, F.-M., Church, J.A., Cu- basch, U., Emori, S., Forster, P., Friedlingstein, P., Gillett, N., Gregory, J.M., Hartmann, D.L., Jansen, E., Kirtman, B., Knutti, R., Krishna Kumar, K., Lemke, P., Marotzke, J., Masson-Delmotte, V., Meehl, G.A., Mokhov, I., Piao, S., Ra- maswamy,V., Randall, D., Rhein, M., Rojas, M., Sabine, C., Shindell, D., Talley, L.D., V aughan, D.G. and Xie, S.-P. (2013) Technical Summary. In: Stocker, T.F., Qin, D., Plattner, G.-K., Tignor, M., Allen, S.K., Boschung, J., Nauels, A., Xia, Y., Bex, V. and Midgley, P.M., Eds., Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge Uni- versity Press, Cambridge and New Y ork, in Press. [3] WMO (2013) The State of the Greenhouse Gases in the Atmosphere Based on Global Observations through 2012. Greenhouse Gas Bulletin, 9, 4 p. [4] Jaeger, C.C. and Jaeger, J. (2010) Three Views of Two Degrees. European Climate Forum (ECF) Working Paper 2, Potsdam.[5] International Energy Agency (2013) Redrawing the Energy-Climate Map. [6] Bala, G. (2013) Digesting 400 ppm for Global Mean CO2 Concentration. Current Science, 104, 47-48. [7] PwC (Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP) (2012) Too Late for Two Degrees Low Carbon Economy Index. /gx/en/sustainability/publications/low-carbon-econo my-index/index.jhtml [8] Glen, P.P., Andrew, R.M., Boden, T., Canadell, J.G., Ciais, P., Le Quere, C., Marland, G., Raupach, M.R. and Wilson, C. (2013) The Challange to Keep Global Warming below 2°C. Nature Climate Change, 3, 4-6. [9] Beinhocker, E. and Oppenheim, J. (2009)Economic Opportunities in a Low-Carbon World. UNFCCC E-Newsletter. https://unfccc.int/press/news_room/newsletter/guest_column/items/4608.php AuthorAffiliationJorge F. Carrasco1,21Dirección Meteorológica de Chile, Santiago, Chile 2Universidad de Magallanes, Punta Arenas, Chile Email:****************** Received 8 December 2013; revised 8 January 2014; accepted 16 January 2014 Copyright ?2014 by author and Scientific Research Publishing Inc. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY)./licenses/by/4.0/。

After a decade of false starts, the goal of radically reducing emissions of greenhouse gases, and particularly carbon dioxide, is rising up the political agenda. The renewed urgency of the ‘carbon control’ agenda reflects a tipping point in political, public and media acceptance of the reality of global warming, its human causes, and the future economic and social costs of inaction. Political commitment to carbon control is also being driven by various other pressures, including the rising cost and instability of oil supplies, and the threats posed by rapid industrialisation in India and China.At the international level, the desperate search is on for a robust programme for reducing carbon emissions to levels that avoid irreversible and damaging global climate change (currently linked to a 2o C rise in global temperature). Like the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the new international programme will be based on the setting of national targets. However, unlike the Kyoto Protocol, these targets will be framed within an agreed set of ‘environmental’ limits for future greenhouse gas emissions underpinned by broad international support. Clearly there is still much to be negoti-ated in terms of the distribution of the global emissions quota, but it is a matter of ‘when’ rather than ‘if ’ the post-Kyoto target will be set. The geopolitics of carbon control means that the targets will be rigorously monitored and enforced at national and international levels.Towards a new regulatory era of carbon controlMost Western nations have begun to anticipate the new era of carbon control, with Norway planning to become carbon-neutral by cutting its net greenhouse gas emissions to zero by 2050 (Vidal, 2007). In the UK, the Stern Review of the economics of climate change (HM Treasury , 2006) has been followed by a succession of policy commitments: a requirement for zero-carbon new housing by 2016; more stringent national targets for reducing carbon dioxide emissions by 60 per cent on 1990 levels by 2050; a draft planning policy statement on climate change (DCLG, 2006); minis-terial enthusiasm for a personal carbon-trading scheme; and a raft of related policy initiatives across government departments. Political responses have been mirrored by widespread media interest in climate change and a minor publishing boom in carbon calculators and guides to low-carbon lifestyles. It is becoming increasingly Aidan While is Senior Lecturer at the Department of Town and Regional Planning, University of Sheffield, Western Bank, Sheffield, S10 2TN; email: a.h.while@TPR, 79 (1) 2008Aidan WhileViewpoint Climate change and planning:carbon control and spatial regulationAidan While viiiapparent that the years 2006–2007 represent a major turning point in attitudes to socio-environmental regulation as a new era of carbon control takes hold. From now on, carbon considerations will exert increasing influence over the choices we make in all aspects of our lives. Moreover, the pace of change will increase rapidly.There has been a lot of debate about the implications of carbon control for spatial regulation. So far, much of the discussion has focused on the actions required to reduce our carbon footprint: shifting the balance of energy supply away from carbon-based fuels; investing in renewable energy technologies; increased energy efficiency;reducing dependence on car travel; and investing in sustainable transport solutions (Bulkeley, 2006). The new politics of carbon control will bring a new urgency to these policy commitments, most of which have been priorities for well over a decade.However, relatively little has been said in spatial planning circles about what is likely to be the most distinctive aspect of new climate change regimes: the use of carbon quotas and market-based carbon emissions-trading schemes to guide the transition to low-carbon living. This element of carbon-control mitigation has largely gone unexplored because carbon quotas and emissions trading have not yet been rolled out explicitly to places and people.1 Nevertheless, the subnational regulation of carbon emissions through quotas and trading – ‘carbon budgeting’, to use the UK govern-ment’s preferred phrase – is clearly on the horizon as one of a set of government responses to the challenge of reducing the global carbon footprint.Targets, trading and low-carbon capitalismA low-carbon polity is structured around a somewhat instrumental goal, especially incomparison with the integrated perspective of sustainable development. The objec-tive to be secured is the reduction of the major greenhouse-gas emissions to a stable level, as quickly and efficiently as possible. The definition of a stable level of emissions is set by climate science at a global scale, currently sanctioned by the Intergovern-mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Although the question of who should bear the costs of carbon inputs can get complicated, it is fairly easy to monitor the carbon we use, and also to hypothecate the embodied carbon of goods and services (Henson, 2006). However, as carbon control is ultimately concerned with reducing emissionsrather than the use of CO2per se, it is possible that the political goal of carboncontrol could be achieved through technological fixes that seek to manage rather than reduce the emissions, such as carbon capture and storage.While the broad goal of reducing carbon emissions has always been part of approaches to sustainable development, making genuine progress on a low carbon economy poses a range of regulatory and legitimation challenges for governments.1 There have been limited experiments with emissions trading across some of the US states (Rabe, 2004).Viewpoint ix So far, much of the approach has relied on a mix of fairly weak direct regulation, voluntary measures and market-based incentives, as energy generators pass carbon costs on to consumers. This has had only a limited effect in achieving the degreeof behaviour change required, particularly at the household level, where emissions continue to rise (Seyfang, 2007). The new regulatory phase of carbon control will leadto an increase in direct environmental taxes, and in the UK this is already reflectedin more stringent low carbon standards for housing and transport sectors, targetsfor non-renewable energy generation, government experiments with low-carbon communities, and monitoring the climate-change impacts of regional spatial strate-gies. The problem for governments is that pushing further via direct taxation is politi-cally sensitive, potentially socially regressive and risks failing to engage citizens in the carbon-control agenda. Moreover, direct taxation does not necessarily guarantee afixed level of emissions reduction.The spatial logic of carbon control is that once the global emissions-reduction requirement is agreed, it is then translated into a series of territorially-based targets organised at the scale of the nation-state. However, because the carrying capacity isset globally, international carbon-control regimes offer the possibility of the exchangeor trading of carbon credits between participants. One form of carbon exchange isa bilateral agreement, whereby one country offsets its carbon emissions by ‘buying’ credits from another country. An example is the Clean Development Mechanism, whereby Western nations can fund projects intended to reduce emissions in devel-oping countries. Another form of exchange is the market-based trading of carbon units, in which a financial price is attached to carbon emissions, which can then be traded as commodities. The logic of these ‘cap and trade’ schemes is that those whosave carbon emissions are rewarded by being able to sell the excess carbon credits,while those who overshoot have to pay for their pollution by buying additional carbon credits. The overall quota is reduced over time, thus pushing up the value of each carbon unit while ensuring that carbon emissions remain within natural limits. In 2005, the EU emissions trading scheme was established for large European compa-nies. The UK government has also discussed the possibility of establishing personal carbon trading, in which carbon points would be used alongside cash when purchasing goods and services such as energy, petrol, flights, and so on (in theory each product could have an embodied carbon value).For governments, there are a range of advantages to cap-and-trade carbon control. First, there is certainty about the emissions quota, but flexibility in the choice of howthat target should be met. Second, carbon trading leaves participants to determinethe cheapest and easiest way to meet their target, allowing for choices and trade-offsto be made between different sources of carbon emissions. In theory this should meanthat carbon trading exerts an influence on upstream producers and service providers,as well as consumers. In addition, proponents of carbon trading argue that it is poten-Aidan While xtially more equitable and more empowering than direct taxation, though that can depend on the ways in which carbon quotas are distributed (Seyfang, 2007).The UK government has signalled its commitment to using new economic instru-ments as a central element in its approach to national carbon management: ‘the best way to encourage a change in investment patterns towards a low-carbon economy, and the most cost-effective way of reducing global emissions, is to establish a price for carbon’ (DTI, 2007, 38). The draft Climate Change Bill of March 2007 (Defra, 2007) set out proposals for enabling powers to introduce new domestic emissions-trading schemes and carbon budgeting as major parts of the government’s plan for ‘a clear and credible pathway’ to a 60 per cent reduction in carbon dioxide emissions by 2050. The bill places a legal duty on the Secretary of State to stay within the carbon budget, which would be allocated for five-year cycles. The bill allows for the banking and borrowing of emissions across each five-year cycle, as well as emissions trading with other countries. It also supports the extension of existing international trading mechanisms, such as the EU emissions trading scheme.The rolling out of carbon control: the regional and localdimensionThe draft Climate Change Bill and related UK government carbon-control state-ments have largely sidestepped the question of how the national carbon budget will be distributed among people, places and organisations. This is perhaps not surprising given that the priority has been to set the national framework. However, given the importance of spatial planning in meeting climate change outcomes it is likely that carbon budgeting will have strong local and regional dimensions. To some extent the devolution of responsibility for (though not necessarily powers over) carbon control is already happening through targets for renewable energy generation and a require-ment for regional planning authorities to monitor, report on and ultimately reduce the climate-change impact of regional spatial strategies (DCLG, 2006). The Energy White Paper 2007 also announced plans to implement a mandatory cap-and-trade scheme for all large UK organisations, which will cover many of the large local authorities. But that is just the beginning. Explicit carbon quotas will open up a new phase of socio-spatial regulation, and far-sighted regional and local decision-makers are busy preparing for the new era by developing carbon-reduction strategies and modelling the complex carbon impacts of different spatial planning and management trajectories. Some authorities, such as the Greater London Authority, are seeking to secure their competitive post-carbon future by experimenting with alternative energy supply, investing in low-carbon infrastructure and ensuring that present planning decisions will not be a burden in the future (Hodson and Marvin, 2007). The Transi-tion Towns movement in the UK has seen carbon constraint as an opportunity toViewpoint xi experiment with (re)localisation and alternative economic development strategies (Transition Towns, 2006).The question I want to pose is: how might carbon budgeting begin to change the metrics and calculations – and thus the politics – of decision-making at the subna-tional scale? One set of issues relates to the ways in which carbon quotas will cascade down to the regional and local scale.•What will be the balance between quotas for organisations, places and house-holds, and how will these overlap with one another? How will production-relatedand consumption-related emissions be covered in different quota and tradingschemes?•How will quotas be set for different localities? Will they be weighted to account for the current unevenness in carbon dependence by taking into account factors suchas the amount of heavy industry, power generation, the number of households,geographical area, and so on? Will there be some form of contraction and conver-gence factored into carbon quotas and public spending?•Will quotas for local areas be set at national or regional levels?•How will carbon budgets be related to other strategic planning policy objectives such as new housing development, regeneration and economic development?Another set of issues relates to the ways in which carbon quotas might alterthe strategic and operational context for decision-making at the subnational level. Rigorous carbon budgets for places would mean that carbon impacts have to be takeninto account in all spatial planning decisions. Hard choices would then have to be made about development and investment decisions on the basis of carbon impacts within the overall carbon budget. In other words, regional and local authorities willneed to secure their own carbon-control fixes within the target they have been set, weighing up the costs and savings of actions in social, economic and environmental spheres. We might imagine the necessity for a much more integrated and interven-tionist approach to local and regional development, in which the management of energy, waste and mobility is explicitly linked to economic and social development. A whole range of questions and possibilities begin to open up:•How will carbon budgets change the metrics of local growth and economic devel-opment strategies?•Will carbon budgets lead to new forms of spatial interdependencies and/or spatial coalitions at the regional, intra-regional, subregional or city scales?•Will the diktats of carbon control alter the relationship between citizens and local authorities?•What will be the penalties for failure to comply? What will be the balance between disciplining or punishing and rewarding local authorities?Aidan While xii•Will local authorities need new powers if carbon trading is to work effectively?•Will regions and localities be allowed to trade carbon credits? Will regions and localities be allowed to bank or borrow credits?Lurking behind these questions are wider issues of uneven development and spatial justice in an era of carbon control. Some commentators, for example, see the poten-tial for a progressive new localism as regional and local authorities seek to balance economic and social development with carbon control. This might lead to a different view of what gets valued, as well as new sets of relationships between citizens and the state. The possibility might even exist for local authorities to think about local devel-opment differently, particularly if strong sustainability approaches lead to financial rewards; some areas might find a future as carbon-savers, selling their excess credits to high-carbon centres of production and consumption. It is in this context that the new era of carbon control opens up the potential for a renewed progressive environmental politics following the somewhat cosy and co-opted approach to sustainable develop-ment years. But that is one scenario. One might equally warn of the dangers of a new protectionism and increased socio-spatial polarisation as some places and some communities find it easier to adjust to a post-carbon future than others.ConclusionsCarbon control is rapidly becoming the ‘overriding concern at the heart of sustain-able development’ (Bulkeley, 2006, 206), and it is well on its way to being an overriding concern at the heart of public policy. Backed by a powerful political mandate, carbon control entails a significant reworking of state–society and economy–environment relations as governments seek to deliver on commitments to a low carbon future. To achieve the required reductions in carbon (ab)use, governments will need to find new ways of steering patterns of consumption and behaviour, through a mix of encour-agement and compulsion. This is reflected in the current experiment with new forms of socio-spatial regulation, and especially the commitment to carbon accounting.The new regulatory phase of carbon control will gather pace when national targets are set in a post-Kyoto international treaty, and particularly when it becomes clear that much more stringent measures are required (the UK government’s target of a 60 per cent cut in emissions is unlikely to limit the temperature increase to 2o C).Carbon control will be rolled out differently in different national regulatory contexts.However, in all countries, the imperative of achieving a low-carbon transition will bring challenges and opportunities for spatial regulation in two main ways:•hard decisions about the distribution of emissions quotas between different places, and different interests within those places; andViewpoint xiii•new requirements for regional and local authorities to manage their territories within their carbon quotas.Whilst the outcomes of carbon control are uncertain, it is guaranteed that carbon rationing will have a significant impact on the ways in which we think about the sustainable management of cities and regions.Referencesbulkeley, h. (2006), ‘A changing climate for spatial planning’, Planning Theory and Practice, 7, 203–214.dclg (department for communities and local government) (2006), Consultation – Planning Policy Statement: Planning and Climate Change (Supplement to Planning Policy Statement 1), Wetherby,Communities and Local Government Publication.defra (department for environment, food and rural affairs) (2007), Draft Climate Change Bill (Cm7040),available at /document/cm70/7040/7040.asp (accessed 08/04/2007).dti (department of trade and industry) (2007), Meeting the Energy Challenge: A White Paper on Energy, available at /files/file39387.pdf (accessed 10/06/07).henson, r. (2006), The Rough Guide to Climate Change, London, Rough Guides.hm treasury (2006), Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, available at http://www./index.asp?id=1143908 (accessed 24/04/07).hodson, m. and marvin, s. (2007), ‘Understanding the role of the national exemplar in constructing “strategic glurbanization”’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research,31, 303–25.rabe, b. g. (2004), Statehouse and Greenhouse: The Emerging Politics of American Climate Change Policy, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press.seyfang, g. (2007), Personal Carbon Trading: Lessons From Complemetary Currencies(CSERGE Working Paper ECM 07-01), available at /geography/seminars/ecm_2007_01.pdf (accessed 01/06/07).transition towns (2006), Transition T owns, available at (accessed 08/04/2007).vidal, j. (2007), ‘Norway aims for zero-carbon status with all emissions offset by 2050’, The Guardian, 21 April, available at /climatechange/story/0,,2062357,00.html (accessed 01/06/2007).Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.Further reproduction prohibited without permission.。

26full implementation of the Paris Agreement “pledges and targets,”without the new China announcement, the CAT estimates global temperature increase will be 2.7 degrees Celsius by 2100. Realization of the Chinese goal would lower warming to around 2.4-2.5 degrees, closer to the 1.5-degree warming limit of the Paris Agreement.Michal Meidan, director of the China Energy Programme at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, called China’s carbon neutralitypledge “nothing short of momentous” and said that in the context of anongoing expansion of coal-fired power generation capacity within China, it gives cause for cautious optimism. Reaching this goal would require a fundamental change in how China develops its economy and consumes energy, which in turn would require a shake-up of existing industrialcomplexes and political power groups.Challenges and OpportunitiesCarbon neutrality refers to achieving net zero carbon dioxide emissions by planting trees for carbon offsetting or simply eliminating carbon dioxide emissions altogether.To prevent climate change from threatening global life, many developed countries have made clear timetables for achieving carbon neutrality in recent years. Finland announced it would neutralize its carbon emissions before 2035, while Sweden, Austria, and Iceland set a 2045 deadline. The European Union, the United Kingdom, Norway, Canada and Japan, as well as developing countries such as Chile, pledged to become carbon neutral by 2050. “In 2018, China’s greenhouse gas emissions accounted for about 30 percent of the world’s total, and its per capita emissions exceeded that of the European Union,” said Pan Jiahua, director of the Institute for Urban andLowering carbon emissions is a significant component of China’s endeavors to safeguard the blue sky. An issue attracting domestic and global attention, controlling carbon emissions has been included in China’s 14th Five-Year Plan. The Proposals of the CPC Central Committee for Formulating the 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and the Long-Range Objectives Through the Year 2035, adopted at the fifth plenary session of the 19th CPC Central Committee, proposed that “eco-friendly ways of working and living will be advanced to cover all areas of society,” and “carbon emissions will steadily decline after reaching a peak, bringing fundamental improvement to the environmenttowards the goal of building a Beautiful China.” The document also stresses that the government will support local efforts to peak carbon emissions in advance and formulate corresponding plans.In a speech delivered at the General Debate of the 75th Session of the United Nations General Assembly on September 22, President Xi Jinping revealed the date set for China to achieve carbon neutrality. He noted that the Paris Agreement on Climate Change charted a course for the world to transition to green and low-carbon development. “It outlines the minimum steps to be taken to protect the Earth, our shared homeland, and all countries must take decisive steps to honor this Agreement,” he said. “China will scale up its Intended Nationally Determined Contributions by adopting more vigorous policies and measures. We aim to see CO2 emissions peak before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060.”China’s pledge to lower carbon emissions was celebrated by the global community. On September 23, the Climate Action Tracker (CAT), an international organization tracking how well countries are meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement, published an article calling the announcement from President Xi Jinping at the UN General Assembly “a true milestone in international climate policy.” According to the author, assumingF eaturesCHINA’S CARBON NEUTRALITY PLEDGEChina is aiming to peak carbon dioxide emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060Copyright©博看网 . All Rights Reserved.Farmers catch crayfish in a pond under rows of solarpanels in Yangzhou, Jiangsu Province, on August 14,2019. The photovoltaic field is a project of China’sfishery-solar hybrid system. (MENG DELONG)27。

China 's low-carbon transition for addressing climate changeDU Xiang-WanChinese Academy of Engineering,Beijing 100088,ChinaReceived 29February 2016;revised 17June 2016;accepted 17June 2016Available online 23June 2016AbstractThis study discusses high-carbon characteristics,the unsustainability of China 's development,and the fact that China needs to transform its development mode.China 's low-carbon transition must include industry structure adjustment,energy saving and efficiency increases,energy structure improvement,carbon sink development,adaptation capability,and low-carbon pilot schemes.Low-carbon urbanization is a key measure in China 's low-carbon transition.China 's urbanization faces high-carbon risks.Thus,this study presents a roadmap for transforming urbanization into a low-carbon one.The transition to low-carbon urbanization is a common trend in the developing world.There is a lot of room for international cooperation.Keywords:Low-carbon transition;Urbanization;Risk;Roadmap1.High-carbon characteristics and low-carbon transition of China 's developmentAfter years of rapid economic development,China has increasingly realized the unsustainability of growth based on an excessive consumption of resources and environmental degra-dation.China 's energy consumption per unit GDP is nearly double the world average.In 2013,China made up 12.3%of the world 's total GDP ,yet consumed 21.5%of global energy.Annual CO 2emissions in China have already reached 7t per capita and continue to increase,approaching EU 's and Japan 's levels (Fig.1).Some of China 's more developed eastern regions have annual per capita emissions greater than10t,more than the historic peak levels of the EU and Japan (see Fig.2).In China,the use of coal and oil accounts for >60%of PM 2.5,and the use of fossil fuel accounts for ~80%of GHG emissions of the country.Data show that eastern regions 'coal consumption spatial density is 12times the world average and the CO 2emission spatial density is six times the world average (Fig.3).The most fundamental means to realize sustainable devel-opment,improve air quality,and address climate change is by avoiding resource-intensive high-carbon developments and embarking on a journey toward ecological civilization through green and low-carbon development.Therefore,China has established national strategic goals for low-carbon develop-ment in the INDC,submitted to the UN in June 2015.It is necessary for China to transform its current develop-ment mode.China 's low-carbon transition may include the following details:(1)Industry structure adjustment.Six industries accountedfor 64.5%of the total energy consumption during 2012.E-mail address:duxw@.Peer review under responsibility of National Climate Center (China MeteorologicalAdministration).Available online at ScienceDirectAdvances in Climate Change Research 7(2016)105e108/en/journals/accr//10.1016/j.accre.2016.06.0041674-9278/Copyright ©2016,National Climate Center (China Meteorological Administration).Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V.on behalf of KeAi.This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).(2)Energy saving and efficiency increase.China hascontributed 50%to the world 's energy saving over the past 20years.(3)Energy structure improvement.Fossil fuels will not beexhausted anytime soon;thus,the efficient and clean use of fossil energy is of significant practical value.Efforts should be made to increase the proportion of natural gas (including unconventional gas)used in primary energy.Non-fossil fuels such as renewable and nuclear energy are the main-stay of future energy.According to the CAE report (RGCAE,2011),in China,non-fossil energy will account for 15%of the primary energy structure in 2020,and reach >20%in 2030,and 40%e 45%in 2050(Fig.4).The pro-portion of non-fossil energy will eventually exceed that of fossil energy,and this will be a historical landmark for anenergy revolution in China.The electricity utilization pattern should be based on “network þenergy,”which includes distributed energy,smart grids,and high-capacity storage (physical and chemical).(4)To develop carbon sink,adaptation capability,and low-carbon pilots.2.Low-carbon urbanization is a key measure for China 's low-carbon transition2.1.High-carbon risks of urbanizationFrom the present year to 2030,China 's urbanization rate can increase by 15%e 20%,eventually reaching 65%e70%.Fig.1.Energy-economic analysis (Notice the red circle)(WB,2015).Fig.2.Global satellite-derived PM2.5concentration averaged over 2001e 2006(unit:m g m -3,van Donkelaar et al.,2010).106DU X.-W./Advances in Climate Change Research 7(2016)105e 108Whether urbanization can maintain a low-carbon development course remains a severe challenge entailing high-carbon risks,specifically for the following:(1)A substantial increase in building areas during urbani-zation and reconstruction of existing urban in-frastructures will lead to considerable energy consumption from building (including energy con-sumption from construction material manufacturing and construction activities).This accounted for 41%of the gross energy consumption in China in 2012,with the construction industry consuming 915Mt of steel,3.73Gt of cement,64Mt of aluminum,and 4.48weight boxes of glass.With the urbanization rate increasing by 1%,new building areas will annually increase by 800million m 2and hence reach 16billion m 2by 2030,becoming a critical source of carbon emissions.(2)During urbanization,energy consumption by residentswill significantly increase;moreover,because of agri-cultural modernization,energy consumption by hun-dreds of millions of peasants residing in rural areas will increase.According to the World Energy Council,China 's household electricity consumption averaged at 1349kW h in 2010,with the global average reaching 3471kW h;this level was exceeded by all developed countries.However,if China 's energy structure un-dergoes no significant improvement,the domination of coal power will certainly lead to an increase in coal consumption and carbon emissions as the living stan-dards of residentsimprove.Fig.3.Average CO 2concentration in October e November 2014(NASA,2014).Fig.4.China 's primary energy structure (RGCAE,2011).107DU X.-W./Advances in Climate Change Research 7(2016)105e 108(3)If cities continue to expand in a rough manner,the co-efficient of urban land-use growth elasticity(ratio ofurban land-use growth rate to urban population growthrate)will continue to rapidly increase(reaching2.28inChina,with1.12being the internationally recognizedreasonable limit).Unscientific urban planning willaggravate the separation of work from residence,thusleading to an increase in vehicle traffic and recurrent “tidal traffic.”Such passive transport needs give rise to long travel times and distances,which in turn lead to theemergence of hundreds of millions of new vehicles andthe consequent substantial increase in fuel consumptionand carbon emissions.(4)If the development model cannot be effectively trans-formed,combined with the adverse effects of roughdevelopment,the abovementioned risks will be aggra-vated.Regarding the lifestyle guidance policy,if allprovinces vie with each other for urbanization speed andrate instead of truly considering green and low-carbonapproaches as hard indicators for new urbanization,i.e.,if all provinces fail to advocate a low-carbon life-style but vie with each other for luxury,high-carbonemissions would occur,and the social morality,spirit,and culture would be jeopardized.2.2.Roadmap of low-carbon urbanizationIt's possible to avoid the high-carbon risks of China's ur-banization and embark on a road to low-carbon development.To this end,we must make a massive effort and take thefollowing measures:(1)Identify the philosophy and guiding ideology for newurbanization and announce low-carbon as a key featureand a major criterion for evaluating urbanization.(2)Scientific urbanization planning.We must develop spe-cific planning and design for low-carbon urbanization toreflect the intensive and compact urbanization model,provide necessary functions,allow convenient publictransport,avoid“separation of work from residence,”and reduce the energy consumption from transport.Weshould also avoid mass-demolition,mass-construction,the construction of poor quality short-life buildings,anddefine and monitor the standards for low-carbonbuildings.(3)Readjust the industrial structure.We must reduce thenumber of high energy consumption industries,boost theservice and other emerging industries,control the totalenergy consumption,and achieve low-speed growth ofthe total energy consumption.(4)Optimize the energy structure.We must significantlyreduce direct coal burning(to be replaced by gas,elec-tricity or industrial exhaust heat),curb the growth inmotor gasoline fuel,develop mini-type electric motorvehicles,and reinforce the development of three low-carbon energy sources:natural gas(including non-conventional gas),renewable energy(water,wind, solar,biomass,terrestrial heat,and ocean energy),and nuclear power,thus increasing the proportion of low-carbon electricity in the power supply structure to50% or more.(5)Elaborate the design and implementation of the distrib-uted low-carbon energy network.We shall allow“on-site and cyclic”provision of the energy needed during the course of urbanization.The decision regarding which energy source is to be used needs consideration of local realities,such as the availability of natural gas,solar energy,biomass energy,and terrestrial heat,and we shall also allow for the recycling of agricultural,forestry,and domestic wastes.Correspondingly,efforts shall be made to develop micro-grids and energy storage technologies.(6)Develop the biological carbon sink in urban forests andprotect grasslands and wetlands.Urbanization shall be accompanied by the construction of beautiful rural areas.(7)Advocate a low-carbon lifestyle.We must construct low-carbon communities and villages,develop low-carbon product certification,logos and services,gradually improve the carbon trade and carbon market,and enable the broad participation of urban and rural areas.(8)Vie with each other for low-carbon rates and urbaniza-tion quality instead of urbanization speed and urbani-zation rate.(9)Draw on the experience of other countries regardinglow-carbon urbanization.3.ConclusionsLow-carbon transition and development is not merely for climate change mitigation,but more for sustainable develop-ment of the country and humankind.China's international re-sponsibilities for addressing climate change and meeting the domestic demand for sustainable development are strikingly similar.Addressing climate change internationally and domestically can be promoted and supported to mutual advantage.Urbanization's low-carbon transition is a common trend in the developing world.Many countries face similar problems with scientific,technical,and industrial development and embrace extensive opportunities for international cooperation. ReferencesNASA(National Aeronautics and Space Administration,U.S.),2014.NASA's Space Borne Carbon Counter Maps New Details./jpl/ oco2/nasas-spaceborne-carbon-counter-maps-new-details.RGCAE(Research Group of Chinese Academy of Engineering),2011.Research on the Energy Development Strategy of China in Mid and Long-term(2030,2050).Science Press,Beijing(in Chinese).van Donkelaar,A.,Martin,R.V.,Brauer,M.,et al.,2010.Global estimates of ambientfine particulate matter concentrations from satellite-based aerosol optical depth:development and application.Environ.Health Perspect.118(6),847e855.WB(World Bank),2015.World Development Indicators.http://data./indicator/all.108DU X.-W./Advances in Climate Change Research7(2016)105e108。

中国2050年低碳能源经济转型路径分析
霍健;翁玉艳;张希良
【期刊名称】《环境保护》
【年(卷),期】2016(0)16
【摘要】2015年中国在巴黎气候大会前夕发布国家自主决定贡献,承诺二氧化碳排放2030年左右达到峰值并争取尽早达峰;单位国内生产总值二氧化碳排放比2005年下降60%~65%,非化石能源占一次能源消费比重达到20%。

要履行这一应对气候变化国际承诺,中国的能源经济系统需要深刻的低碳转型。

本文借助于中国—全球能源模型（China in Global Energy Model,C-GEM）,利用情景分析的方法,对中国未来低碳能源经济转型的路径和政策进行了量化分析,并评估了转型对中国社会福利的直接影响。

【总页数】5页(P38-42)
【关键词】二氧化碳排放;气候变化;低碳能源经济;经济转型;模型
【作者】霍健;翁玉艳;张希良
【作者单位】中海油能源发展股份有限公司;清华大学能源环境经济研究所
【正文语种】中文
【中图分类】F121
【相关文献】
1.低碳经济的全球化与中国的低碳转型——访厦门大学中国能源经济研究中心主任林伯强 [J], 吴长勇
2.向低碳型能源经济化社会转型 [J], 张帅
3.低碳经济在资源型城市转型中的实现路径分析——基于朔州市资源型城市低碳转型的思考 [J], 龚葳; 樊森; 张圆
4.低碳经济在资源型城市转型中的实现路径分析——基于朔州市资源型城市低碳转型的思考 [J], 龚葳; 樊森; 张圆
5.碳中和目标下电力部门低碳转型路径分析 [J], 郝鑫;孔英
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·58·引言2020年9月22日，国家主席习近平在第七十五届联合国大会一般性辩论上发表重要讲话。

习主席提出：“中国将提高国家自主贡献力度，采取更加有力的政策和措施，二氧化碳排放力争于2030年前达到峰值，努力争取2060年前实现碳中和。

”在新冠肺炎疫情后复杂的国际政治经济格局中，中国的碳中和承诺彰显了我国构建人类命运共同体的大国责任与担当，体现了我国在应对气候变化问题上的决心和雄心，为疫后实现全球绿色复苏注入新的活力，对全球气候行动起到重要推动作用[1,2]。

政府间气候变化专门委员会（IPCC ）发布的《全球温控1.5℃特别报告》[3]指出，实现1.5℃温控目标有望避免气候变化给人类社会和自然生态系统造成不可逆转的负面影响，而这需要各国共同努力在2030年实现全球净人为CO 2排放量比2010年减少约45%，在2050年左右达到净零。

已有研究指出，中国2060年碳中和目标的达成将有效缓解全球温升趋势，使得全球温度比预期降低0.2～0.3℃左右[4]。

目前已有大量国家做出碳中和承诺。

截至2020年10月，碳中和承诺国达到127个，这些国家的温室气体排放总量已占到全球排放的50%，经济总量在全球的占比超过40%①，并且全球十大煤电国家中的5个已做出相应承诺（表1），这些国家的煤电发电量在全球的占比超过60%。

作为碳排放大国和煤电大国，中国的碳中和承诺无疑为提升碳中和行动影响力，提振全球气候行动信心做出了重要贡献。

从碳中和目标和战略文件来看，各国尚未就碳中和目标表述达成共识，已有表述主要包括“气候中性”“碳中和”“净零排放”，以及“净零碳排放”。

目前，除个别国家②使用“气候中和”，以及少数国 家③明确将实现“非二氧化碳温室气体中和”外，多数国家以“碳中和”为目标，或并未明确将实现“非二氧化碳温室气体的净零排放”[7]。

根据IPCC 《全球1.5℃温升特别报告》[3]，以上表述的内涵存在较大差异。