From consensus to atomic broadcast Time-free byzantine-resistant protocols without signatur
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FromConsensustoAtomicBroadcast:Time-FreeByzantine-ResistantProtocolswithoutSignatures
MiguelCorreia,NunoFerreiraNeves,PauloVer´ıssimo
DI–FCULTR–05–14
October2005
DepartamentodeInform´aticaFaculdadedeCiˆenciasdaUniversidadedeLisboaCampoGrande,1749–016LisboaPortugal
Technicalreportsareavailableathttp://www.di.fc.ul.pt/tech-reports.ThefilesarestoredinPDF,withthereportnumberasfilename.Alternatively,reportsareavailablebypostfromtheaboveaddress.FromConsensustoAtomicBroadcast:Time-Free
Byzantine-ResistantProtocolswithoutSignatures∗
MIGUELCORREIANUNOFERREIRANEVESPAULOVER´ISSIMO
FaculdadedeCiˆenciasdaUniversidadedeLisboa,CampoGrande,1749-016Lisboa-Portugal
{mpc,nuno,pjv}@di.fc.ul.pt
Keywords:consensus,atomicbroadcast,asynchronoussystems,Byzantinefaults,intrusiontolerance,randomization
Firstpublished:June2004
Revised:October2005
Abstract
ThispaperproposesastackofthreeByzantine-resistantprotocolsaimedtobeusedinpracticaldis-tributedsystems:multi-valuedconsensus,vectorconsensusandatomicbroadcast.Theseprotocolsaredesignedassuccessivetransformationsfromonetoanother.Thefirstprotocol,multi-valuedconsensus,isimplementedontopofarandomizedbinaryconsensusandareliablebroadcastprotocol.Theprotocolsshareasetofimportantstructuralproperties.Firstly,theydonotusedigitalsignaturesconstructedwithpublic-keycryptography,awell-knownperformancebottleneckinthiskindofprotocols.Secondly,theyaretime-free,i.e.,theymakenosynchronyassumptions,sincetheseassumptionsareoftenvulnerabletosubtlebuteffectiveattacks.Thirdly,theyarecompletelydecentralized,thusavoidingthecostofdetectingcorruptleaders.Fourthly,theyhaveoptimalresilience,i.e.,theytoleratef=n−13outofatotalofnprocesses.Intermsoftimecomplexity,themulti-valuedconsensusprotocolterminatesinaconstantexpectednumberofrounds,whilethevectorconsensusandatomicbroadcastprotocolshaveO(f)complexity.Thepaperalsoprovestheequivalencebetweenmulti-valuedconsensusandatomicbroadcastintheByzantinefailuremodelwithoutsignatures.Asimilarproofisgivenfortheequivalencebetweenmulti-valuedconsensusandvectorconsensus.Thesetworesultshavetheoreticalrelevancesincetheyshowoncemorethatconsensusisafundamentalproblemindistributedsystems.∗ThisworkwaspartiallysupportedbytheEUthroughprojectCRiticalUTilityInfrastructurALResilience(CRUTIAL),andtheFCTthroughprojectPOSI/EIA/60334/2004(RITAS)andtheLarge-ScaleInformaticSystemsLaboratory(LASIGE).AversionofthispaperwasacceptedforpublicationbyOxfordUniversityPressintheComputerJournal.1Introduction
DistributedprotocolscapableoftoleratingByzantinefaultshavebeenstudiedformorethantwodecades[1,
2,3,4].Recently,interestintheseprotocolshasgainedanewmomentumunderthedesignationofintrusion
tolerance[5].Thebasicideaisthatthesecurityconceptsofattack,intrusionandvulnerabilitycanbeconsidered
asfaults,morepreciselyasarbitraryfaults,alsocalledByzantinefaults.Aconsequenceofthisassertionisthat
Byzantine-resistantprotocolscanbeimportantbuildingblocksfortheconstructionofsecuresystems.
Byzantine-resistant(orintrusion-tolerant)protocolsusuallyhavehighertimeandmessagecomplexities
thancrash-tolerantprotocolsdo.TheyarealsomoreCPU-timedemandingsincetheymustusecryptography1,
andoftenpublic-keycryptography.ThisCPU-timeissueisfrequentlydismissedsincetheprocessingpowerof
computersisconstantlyincreasing.However,newclassesofcomputingenvironmentsareappearinginwhich
resourcesarescarce,e.g.,embeddedsystems.ThisisanimportantmotivationforthedesignoflessCPU-time
consumingintrusion-tolerantprotocols.Moreover,public-keycryptographyoperationscanbeanimportant
bottleneckfortheperformanceofintrusion-tolerantsystemseveninmorepowerfulhardware.Castroand
Liskovdesignedanintrusion-tolerantNFSsystemwhichperformsonaverageonly3%slowerthanstandard
NFS,inpartduetoavoidingtheuseofsignaturesbasedonpublic-keycryptography[6].
AnargumentofthispaperisthatthedesignofefficientByzantine-resistantprotocolsiscrucialforthe
implementationofpracticalintrusion-tolerantsystems,thereforetheseprotocolshavetoavoidasmuchaspos-
sibletheuseofpublic-keycryptography.Moreover,practicalintrusion-tolerantsystemsrequireprotocolswith
othercharacteristics,likestrictasynchrony,optimalresilience,andlowtimecomplexity.Thepaperprovidesa
modularandconsistentfamilyofprotocolswiththeseproperties.
PaperResults.Thepaperpresentsastackofthreemessage-passingByzantine-resistantprotocols:multi-
valuedconsensus,vectorconsensusandatomicbroadcast(seeFigure1).Consensusisadistributedsystems
problemwithboththeoreticalandpracticalinterest.Theproblemcanbestatedthisway:howdoesasetof
distributedprocessesachieveagreementonavaluedespiteanumberofprocessfailures?Thepaperimplements
twoflavorsofconsensus:multi-valuedconsensusthatmakesagreementonvalueswithanarbitrarysize;and
vectorconsensusthatmakesagreementonavectorwiththevaluesproposedbyseveraloftheprocesses.An
atomicbroadcastprotocolisacommunicationprotocolthatdeliversthesamemessagestoallprocessesin
thesameorder.Atomicbroadcastis,forinstance,themaincomponentoffault-tolerantsystemsbasedonthe
state-machineapproach,withbothcrash[7]andByzantinefaults[8,6].Theprotocolsinthepaperdonotsolve
consensusfromscratchbutarebuiltontopofarandomizedbinaryconsensusprotocol(e.g.,[9,10])anda
1Herewearetalkingaboutpracticalsystems.Theoreticallywecanassumeprivatechannelsconnectingtheprocesses,thereforecryptographyisnotanabsoluterequirement.
2