In this paper, we bring structural holes theory to different cultural contexts by studying the effect of structural holes in four high-tech companies in China and assessing whether they confer the benefits to individuals occupying the brokering position in a career network that have been found in Western contexts. On the level of national cul-ture, we propose that the typical collectivistic culture of China will dampen the effects of structural holes. On the organizational level, we propose that in organizations that foster a high-commitment culture—a culture that empha-sizes mutual investment between people—the control benefits of structural holes are dissonant with the domi-nant spirit of cooperation, and the information benefits of structural holes cannot materialize due to the communal-sharing values in such organizations. Empirical results of network surveys confirm our hypotheses, and interview data add depth to our explanations. Brokers do not fit with the collectivistic values of China. Further, the more an organization possesses a clan-like, high-commitment culture, the more detrimental are structural holes for employees’ career achievements such as salary or bonus,even after controlling for a host of other factors that may influence these career outcomes. In high commitment organizations, the “integrators” who bring people togeth-er to fill structural holes enjoy greater career benefits.?An important insight of the social network perspective is that actions and outcomes can be predicted by the positions indi-viduals occupy in a network of relationships. Social capital, as a metaphor, is the advantages individuals gain from being in certain types of social networks (Bourdieu, 1980; Coleman,1988; Burt, 1992). One variant of the social network approach, structural holes theory (Burt, 1992, 1997, 2000),makes a strong case that an individual who connects two or more otherwise disconnected individuals (who have a struc-tural hole between them) has more social capital than an indi-vidual who does not hold such a “brokering” position. Social capital as benefits that accrue to the brokers comes in two forms, information benefits and control benefits. Information benefits derive from the fact that the individual who bridges a structural hole has access to more nonredundant informa-tion and hence to more opportunities. Control benefits derive from the fact that the individual who bridges a structural hole decides whose interests to serve with those rewarding opportunities.It is not clear, however, that such benefits can be realized under all conditions. Recently, scholars have issued some caveats and provided some empirical evidence on the bound-aries of structural holes theory. For instance, evidence sug-gests that whether structural holes constitute social capital depends on the content of the network (Podolny and Baron,1997). Structural holes create social capital in resource net-works but not in identity networks, the conduits through which behavioral norms and role expectations flow (Ibarra and Smith-Lovin, 1997). Other contingent factors that moder-ate the effect of structural holes include the number of peers (Burt, 1997), organizational changes (Gargiulo and Benassi,2000), the context and objectives of the network (Ahuja,2000), and the time dimension of the network (Soda, Usai,
? 2007 by Johnson Graduate School,
Cornell University.
0001-8392/07/5201-0001/$3.00.
?
We would like to thank Martin Gargiulo,
Quy Huy, Fabrizio Castellucci, Jonghoon
Bae, Charles Galunic, Bruce Kogut, Her-
minia Ibarra, Steven White, seminar par-
ticipants at the 2004 Academy of Man-
agement Meeting, 2005 IACMR Research
Methods Workshop at Xi’an Jiaotong Uni-
versity, University of Texas at Dallas, Uni-
versity of Kansas, Georgia State Universi-
ty, and Cornell University for their helpful
comments on an earlier version of this
paper. The first author is particularly grate-
ful to Martin Gargiulo for his guidance and
support of his dissertation research. We
also thank Linda Johanson, Dan Brass,
and the anonymous ASQ reviewers for
their careful and constructive feedback
and suggestions.When Brokers May
Not Work: The Cultural
Contingency of Social
Capital in Chinese
High-tech Firms
Zhixing Xiao
China Europe International
Business School
Anne S. Tsui
Arizona State University,
Peking University, and
Xi’an Jiaotong University
1/Administrative Science Quarterly, 52 (2007): 1–31
and Zaheer, 2004). But thus far, empirical studies of social capital have largely been limited to the Western context of open markets, free competition, and individualistic orienta-tion, a context that is the backbone of structural holes theory (Burt, Hogarth, and Michaud, 2000). How the mechanisms of social capital operate in other contexts with different cultural norms and market mechanisms remains largely unexplored. Scholars have studied the effect of culture on a few closely related phenomena, such as social loafing (Earley, 1989), cooperation (Chen, Chen, and Meindl, 1998), or opportunism (Chen, Peng, and Saparito, 2002). Findings suggest the potential constraining effects of culture on structural holes. Culture operates not only on the national level but also on the organizational level (Schein, 1985; Martin, 1992; O’Reilly and Chatman, 1996). Research on social capital at the individual level often focuses on employees in a single organization (e.g., Burt, 1992; Podolny and Baron, 1997; Mehra, Kilduff, and Brass, 2001) or on a societal sample such as the alumni of a university (Siebert, Kraimer, and Liden, 2001). In both cases, the role of organizational culture as a boundary condi-tion has been ignored in assessing the benefits of structural holes. Different kinds of organizational culture can affect whether brokers benefit or do not benefit from structural holes, particularly the culture of high-commitment organiza-tions, which values cooperation rather than competition among employees. The concept of high-commitment organi-zations (Walton, 1985) has proved useful to scholars in the fields of industry and labor relations (Osterman, 1988; Mac-Duffie, 1995), human resources management (Huselid, 1995; Becker and Huselid, 1998; Baron and Kreps, 1999) and, more generally, organizational theory (Pfeffer, 1997). A common view across these fields is that the high-commitment organi-zation uses a system of human resource management prac-tices (such as employee participation, internal promotion, team rewards, profit sharing, extensive training and benefits, job security, and so on) that signal commitment to the employees, with the expectation that employees will commit to the organization in return. The benefits to individuals of structural holes are likely to be fewer in an organizational cul-ture that values cooperation and rewards group performance. Taking into account both national and organizational culture, the benefits of structural holes would be less likely realized in collectivistic national cultures and in organizations with a high level of commitment, which is the manifestation of collec-tivism at the organizational level (Earley, 1993; Chatman and Barsade, 1995; Chatman et al., 1998). A viable career advancement strategy in a collectivistic society, and particu-larly in a high-commitment organizational culture, should take into account the context’s overwhelmingly cooperative nature. While brokers might thrive in the market and in orga-nizations with market-like cultures, a collectivistic environ-ment should reward those whose behaviors are consonant with the context’s core values. We test these ideas using data from high-technology firms in China, a country with a heritage of strong collectivism (Earley, 1989, 1994; Chen, 1995) and a fertile ground for organization and management research (Peng et al., 2001; Leung and White, 2003; Tsui et 2/ASQ, March 2007
Social Capital in Chinese Firms
al., 2004; March, 2005; Tsui, 2006). It provides an ideal con-text for examining the cultural boundaries of structural holes. EFFECTS OF CULTURE ON SOCIAL CAPITAL
Collectivist National Culture
Students of culture have relied on the concept of individual-ism vs. collectivism to describe an important distinction between cultures (Hui and Triandis, 1986; Triandis, 1989, 1995; Triandis and Gelfand, 1998). Triandis (1995) summa-rized the four defining attributes of individual-collectivism: (1) independent self vs. interdependent self, (2) individual goals or collective goals as priority, (3) relative importance of social norms vs. individual values and interests, and (4) emphasis on relationships vs. task accomplishment. The cultural conse-quences of collectivism in China have been documented in a wide range of phenomena, including decreasing social loafing in work groups (Earley, 1989), increasing the effects of self-efficacy training (Earley, 1994), affecting preferences in reward allocation (Chen, 1995), determining mechanisms of cooperation (Chen, Chen, and Meindl, 1998), decreasing propensity toward opportunism in intragroup transactions (Chen, Peng, and Saparito, 2002), avoiding adversarial arrangements in conflicts (Leung, 1987), deemphasizing eco-nomic gains in distributive negotiations (Liu, Friedman, and Chi, 2005), attributing successes to groups (Morris and Peng, 1994; Choi, Nisbett, and Norenzayan, 1999), and influencing the dynamics of decision making (Weber and Hsee, 2000; Weber, Ames, and Blais, 2005).
As Burt, Hogarth, and Michaud (2000: 124) noted, “The image of network entrepreneurs negotiating for advantages has a market flavor associated with the American economy.”Based on the definition of individualism-collectivism (Triandis, 1995), it is not difficult to see that brokering around structural holes is individualistic to the extent that (1) it starts from the premise of an independent self, (2) it puts priority on individ-ual goals rather than the collective’s goals, (3) it focuses on fulfilling self-interest rather than accommodating social norms and obligations, and (4) it prioritizes task achievement above harmonious relationships. Accordingly, an individualistic cul-ture is not only tolerant of this kind of brokering behavior, it actually encourages people to act in this fashion, as brokering behaviors are consonant with the liberal-individualistic values of independence and self-reliance.
Adler and Kwon (2002) made the same observation in their conceptualization of social capital. In structural holes theory (what they called the “bridging” view of social capital), social capital is seen as a resource that inheres in a focal actor’s external network to give the actor advantages in his or her competitive rivalries. By contrast, network closure, or what Adler and Kwon called the “bonding” view of social capital (Coleman, 1988, 1990), focuses on the linkages among indi-viduals or groups within a collectivity that “give the collectivi-ty cohesiveness and thereby facilitate the pursuit of collec-tive goals” (Adler and Kwon, 2002: 21). The focus on the welfare of the collectivity is paralleled by Putnam’s (1993) and Fukuyama’s (1995) conception of social capital as trust
3/ASQ, March 2007
and cooperative norms in communities and the society at large.
The individualistic undertone of structural holes theory is par-ticularly clear with respect to the control function of structural holes. As Burt (1992: 34) described it, the person who occu-pies a structural hole position, the tertius(the third person, or the broker between two persons), “plays conflicting demands and preferences against one another and builds value from their disunion” and “ broker[s] communication while displaying different beliefs and identities to each con-tact” (Burt, 2000: 354). This image of “self-seeking and ego-centric agents with little sense of obligation to others”stands in stark contrast to the self-restrained actor in a closed network, in which norms of reciprocity transform actors into “members of a community with shared interests, a common identity, and a commitment to the common good”(Alder and Kwon, 2002: 25).
Social Capital in Chinese Culture
The concept most closely related to social capital in Chinese culture is guanxi,which points to the importance of trust, obligations, and reciprocity in Chinese people’s social interac-tions: “Guanxi refers to instrumental-personal ties that range from strong personal loyalty to ceremonial bribery” (Walder, 1986: 19). It comprises particularistic ties in which instrumen-tal and expressive-moral elements intertwine (Tsui and Farh, 1997). On the art of social relationships in China, Yang (1994) made a convincing case for the importance of guanxi in con-temporary Chinese society. She defined guanxi as a condition that “involves the exchange of gifts, favors and banquets; the cultivation of personal relationships and networks of mutual dependence; and the manufacturing of obligation and indebtedness” (p. 6). Wank (1996) advanced similar argu-ments in observing that Chinese entrepreneurs typically rely on their guanxi to reach their patrons in the government to get market information, scarce resources, and protection when needed. Recently, Guthrie (1998) posited that, with the emergence of a rational-legal system to govern and guide business transactions, guanxi practices (using guanxi to get things done) should have declined, but according to the man-agers he surveyed for his study, the importance of guanxi relations has remained. In essence, in spite of recent efforts to build its legal infrastructure, China still has a society that relies largely on the informal relationships embedded in guanxi.Managers still consider guanxi or relationships in gen-eral to be an important part of the Chinese social fabric that effective managers cannot afford to ignore (Tsui, 1997; Y. Luo, 2000; J.-D. Luo, 2005).
Another related concept that sheds light on the nature of social exchanges in Chinese society is that of the in-group (Leung and Bond, 1984; Redding and Wong, 1986). People in a collectivistic culture form in-groups on the basis of charac-teristics such as kinship, hometown, common schooling, or work experiences. As the basic social fabric of collectivistic societies, in-groups are usually the permanent groups, in con-trast to the temporary and flexible groups based on the com-mon beliefs or shared interests of individualistic societies
4/ASQ, March 2007
Social Capital in Chinese Firms
(Triandis, 1995). Large amounts of resources flow through these inner networks in the form of favors and return of favors (Walder, 1986; Yang, 1994). People who are on the margins of or are excluded from these networks of insiders are seriously disadvantaged.
In Chinese culture, to establish the right guanxi and be included in the in-group is crucial for career and business suc-cess or survival. People who stay at the boundary of two in-groups tend to be distrusted by both groups—both in-groups are likely to regard them as out-group members who do not deserve in-group treatment. Spanning structural holes, as a Chinese saying has it, is like standing on two boats, which is one of the most socially disparaged behaviors and subject to heavy social sanctions. Simple and dense networks that rep-resent clear group membership, rather than networks full of structural holes, constitute resources for social actors. These arguments suggest that in a collectivistic culture such as China’s, it is network closure (Coleman, 1988, 1990), rather than structural holes, that creates social capital. In the organi-zational setting, this suggests that employees with many structural holes in their networks might not be able to achieve good career performance as evidenced by salary level or bonus awards. Thus, controlling for other factors influencing career performance, we hypothesize that: Hypothesis 1 (H1):Structural holes will be negatively related to an employee’s career performance in organizations located in a collec-tivistic culture (China).
The facilitative effect of structural holes has been found at the individual level in some organizations (Burt, 1992, 1997) but not in others (Podolny and Baron, 1997). As Podolny and Baron pointed out, one reason for this finding lies in organiza-tional differences. For instance, though structural holes may be “most beneficial in traditional bureaucratic firms,” they might be less so in “strong culture organizations where a sense of belonging and a clear organizational identity may be crucial” (Podolny and Baron, 1997: 690). One type of “strong culture” organization in which social capital may play out dif-ferently is the high-commitment organization.
High-Commitment Organizational Culture
In recent years, research on strong-culture organizations has converged on the concept of so-called high-commitment organizations, i.e., organizations that implement a system of work practices that aims at eliciting employees’ commitment to the organization (Walton, 1985; Pfeffer, 1997; Baron and Kreps, 1999). Scholars have consistently documented the positive relationship between such a high-commitment cul-ture and organizational performance (e.g., Arthur, 1994; Huselid, 1995; Youndt et al., 1996; Appelbaum et al., 2000; Guthrie, 2001). The high-commitment concept also underlies employment relationships. Tsui and colleagues (1995, 1997) noted two basic employment approaches: the quasi spot-con-tract (or job-focused) approach and the mutual-investment (or organization-focused) approach. The quasi spot-contract approach is based on a purely economic-exchange model. By empowering employers to hire and fire employees with rela-5/ASQ, March 2007
tive freedom, this approach is an attempt to create a market-like flexibility. The mutual-investment approach is based on a model that combines economic and social exchanges. While the terms of economic exchanges are specified and closed, social exchanges create obligations that are unspecified and open-ended among the exchange parties and are imbued with a strong sense of trust and reciprocity. By encouraging employees to take extra-role responsibilities in return for employment security, the mutual-investment approach is an attempt to create a clan-like flexibility (Ouchi, 1981). In the human resources management literature, Delery and Doty (1996) distinguished an internal-type employment system from a market-type employment system. The internal type emphasizes long-term relationships with employees and hence is akin to the mutual-investment approach. In contrast, the market type operates on the basis of quasi spot con-tracts. The fundamental difference between these two kinds of organizations is consistent with the distinctions in earlier theoretical work, such as Blau’s (1964) distinction between economic exchanges and social exchanges and Etzioni’s (1961) distinction between utilitarian involvement and norma-tive involvement.
Organizations differ in the degree of commitment offered to and expected from employees. At the two ends of the spec-trum are clan-like, high-commitment organizations and mar-ket-like, low-commitment organizations, with different orga-nizing principles. Whereas low-commitment organizations are based on formal contracts not unlike those found between organizations in the market, in high-commitment organiza-tions, there is a great amount of trust between the employer and the employee. While low-commitment organizations resemble the market in their transaction approach to handling the organization-employee relationship, high-commitment organizations operate more like a clan, with strong norms of cooperation. This fundamental difference might have impor-tant implications for the effect of structural holes theory in the organization. If structural holes constitute social capital for organizational members, they should have a different utili-ty in the market-like, low-commitment organizations than they do in the clan-like, high-commitment organizations. Structural holes in high-commitment organizations. The level of commitment has a direct impact on how organization members act and interact. In high-commitment organizations, there is usually wide information sharing, participation in deci-sion making, and egalitarianism in both words and deeds (Baron and Kreps, 1999). Various socialization mechanisms such as social gatherings, employee clubs, and ceremonies promote identification with the organization (Watson and Petre, 1990; Packard, 1995). There is an atmosphere of trust between management and employees, but there are also strong norms and peer pressure to invest high levels of effort and achieve high performance (Kreps, 1990; Miller, 1992). The behavior of employees is controlled through culture and role expectations rather than through detailed items in their job descriptions (Schein, 1985; Van Maanen and Kunda, 1989). Performance is often measured at the team, depart-ment, or even the firm level. Employees are expected to help 6/ASQ, March 2007
Social Capital in Chinese Firms
each other in problem solving, to meet the requirements of a variety of unforeseen contingencies, and are subject to strong norms and effective social sanctions inside the organi-zation.
The image of a high-commitment organization as a cohesive group is consistent with Coleman’s (1988, 1990) thesis on social capital, in which obligations, trust, and the effective sanction of uncooperative behaviors are the central mecha-nisms. Brokers are less likely to play a central role in these high-commitment organizations. First, the effects of a typical high-commitment work environment, characterized by employment security, hiring from within, and heavy socializa-tion outside work, are all means to provide network closure. Second, as a result of the employees’ strong identification with the organization and with each other (March and Simon, 1958; Ashforth and Mael, 1989), people in different parts of the organization can develop spontaneous collaborative rela-tionships because of their common identity. Further, employ-ees themselves are expected to fill structural holes in high-commitment organizations. If there are disconnections between groups, cliques, and departments, the cooperative norms prescribe that these disconnected parties be directly brought together immediately, rather than have a broker stand between the parties to control the opportunities for them to interact. In other words, structural holes are quickly filled once they appear. Employees find solutions and solve problems communally in the interest of the organization, in line with its high-commitment values.
Further analysis of the information benefits and control bene-fits of structural holes sheds more light on the limitations of brokerage in high-commitment organizations. Brass, Butter-field, and Skaggs (1998), in their research on unethical behav-iors, pointed out that, other things being equal, structural holes will bring more opportunities for malpractice. This is also evident in Burt’s (2000: 354) argument that the purpose of controlling behaviors is to ensure that the broker has a “disproportionate say in whose interests are served.” To that end, “accurate, ambiguous, or distorted information is strate-gically moved between contacts by the tertius” (Burt, 2000: 355). Through these controlling behaviors, the interests of the tertius rather than those of the collectivity are enhanced, sometimes at the expense of the organization as a whole. Though this kind of manipulation might be tolerated or com-mon in market-like organizations, it is often viewed as a source of political infighting and a symptom of mismanage-ment in high-commitment organizations. Its self-seeking nature runs counter to the value of selflessness and enthusi-astic pursuit of the common interests of the organization. Furthermore, because the network is dense, people who profit from controlling opportunities in high-commitment organizations are more likely to be discovered and sanctioned by their colleagues for doing so. Therefore, the control bene-fits of structural holes will be attenuated in high-commitment organizations.
Although the control benefits of structural holes will be restricted for the reasons we discussed above, the informa-tion benefits of structural holes might not disappear entirely. 7/ASQ, March 2007
In large organizations, especially in multinational and multi-business firms, lack of coordination across internal bound-aries is a perennial problem (e.g., Kogut and Zander, 1992; Ghoshal, Korine, and Szulanski, 1994). Hence, achieving con-summate communication between subunits can be problem-atic, which is documented by a stream of research on the optimal network configuration for knowledge transfer inside firms (e.g., Tsai, 2001, 2002; Reagans and McEvily, 2003; Oh, Chung, and Labianca, 2004). In this sense, no firm can entire-ly avoid cliques inside the organization. It still needs some employees to undertake the valuable tasks of bridging infor-mation and resource flows between otherwise unconnected silos inside the organization. Employees who span those boundaries are valuable to the organization and should be rewarded by the organization for doing so. But generating value is not equivalent to appropriating that value (Blyler and Coff, 2003; Ahuja, Coff, and Lee, 2005). Being a broker is one thing, but getting rewarded for being a broker is another. Say-ing that the information benefits for the organization of struc-tural holes do not disappear is not equivalent to saying that employees who act as brokers will actually be able to reap advantages from their positions and perform better than their peers. Given the communal-type values of the high-commit-ment organization, the benefits of structural holes tend to be shared by all the people around the holes, and brokers might not be able to enjoy the information benefits of their bridging behaviors to the extent that they could in market-like organi-zations.
Further, because high-commitment organizations are one kind of collectivism, the tendency to share information bene-fits in high-commitment organizations is reinforced by a cog-nitive mechanism. Collectivists are more likely to attribute successes to the group than to individuals (Morris and Peng, 1994; Menon et al., 1999), and thus colleagues do not neces-sarily perceive the contributions of the broker as belonging to the individual. Whereas individualists tend to attribute the agent role to individuals and hence perceive a large share of the pie as the broker’s contribution, collectivists are apt to perceive a smaller share as the contribution of the broker. Because of the collectivistic culture of high-commitment organizations, affecting both values and cognitions, brokers will not be able to fully realize the information benefits of structural holes in their career performance in these organiza-tions.
Structural holes as a source of social capital for employees are thus limited in high-commitment organizations in two ways. First, the control benefits of structural holes are limited because of the effective sanction mechanisms in high-com-mitment organizations. Second, even when the bridging func-tion of structural holes adds value to the individual, the com-munal-sharing values and attributions for behaviors in such organizations prevent the broker from appropriating this value. While the sanction mechanism limits the broker’s capacity to extract personal value beyond his or her “fair share,” the attribution mechanism limits the broker’s ability
to realize the value he or she creates. These two aspects in combination minimize the comparative advantage of structur-8/ASQ, March 2007
Social Capital in Chinese Firms
al holes in high-commitment organizations as opposed to those in more market-like organizations. Further, to the extent that the sanction mechanism will effectively punish controlling behaviors, structural holes potentially even bring disadvantages to brokers, which will have implications for an employee’s career performance in high-commitment organi-zations:
Hypothesis 2 (H2):Organizational culture will moderate the relation-ship between structural holes and an employee’s career perfor-mance such that structural holes will be more negatively related to career performance in high-commitment organizations than in low-commitment organizations.
METHODS
Empirical Setting
We conducted the study in China’s information technology (IT) industry, one of the major forces in the country’s econo-my. It is among the largest export industries of China, pro-ducing 28 percent of the total exports of the country (Min-istry of the Information Industry, 2003). Foreign direct investment is the driving engine of the industry, as foreign investment companies account for 68 percent of the revenue and 64 percent of the profits, though local Chinese compa-nies also have very strong holdings in the industry due to their intimate knowledge of the local market. In recent years, by pouring resources into research and development (R&D) and recruiting a large number of graduates from engineering schools, local companies have begun to catch up with their multinational competitors in technological competence. It is a highly competitive industry, full of innovation, uncertainty, and rapid change. The hyper-competition creates a high level of interdependence inside organizations and brings the “soft stuff,” such as a high-commitment culture, up front as an important competitive advantage for companies (Burt et al., 1994; Burt, 1999). Studying high-tech companies also facili-tates comparisons of our results with those of prior major research conducted in this industry (e.g., Burt, 1992; Podolny and Baron, 1997; Mehra, Kilduff, and Brass, 2001). Procedure
We first went to six industry experts for suggestions of com-panies to study. Three were senior editors from a leading IT magazine in China that covers current issues in the country’s IT industry and has extensive connections to its major com-panies. The other three were executive-search consultants from a leading global executive-search company that special-izes in serving the rapidly growing IT industry in China. Because executive search is based on information and con-nections, those consultants were well informed about the industry and were able to provide information about major IT companies from the perspective of industry insiders.
Our sampling frame included companies in computer hard-ware, software, telecommunications, and Internet equipment providers that employed more than 1,000 salaried or profes-sional employees. We included both multinational and local Chinese companies. We provided the industry experts with a list of major IT companies to help them recall the names of
9/ASQ, March 2007
the companies. We also gave them a list of high-commit-ment work practices that they could use as guides to name companies that vary on this dimension. We asked them to nominate a set of high-commitment and another set of low-commitment companies to ensure that we had variance on this variable.
The next step was to persuade the nominated companies to participate in the studies. In the next six months, we approached sixteen companies through various channels and gained access to four companies. They are a leading Chinese software producer (hereafter referred to as Software), a lead-ing Chinese hardware producer (hereafter referred to as Hardware), a multinational telecommunications equipment producer (hereafter referred to as Telecom), and a multina-tional wireless and mobile equipment producer (hereafter referred to as Mobile). Table 1offers a brief description of the four organizations. The descriptions suggest that we achieved some variance on potential differences in commit-ment among these four companies: Hardware is clearly a high-commitment and Software clearly a low-commitment company; Mobile and Telecom are somewhere in between. We collected data from Software and Hardware in October and November 2002. We asked the two companies for a ran-dom sampling of 200 to 300 salaried employees and invited these employees to participate in our network survey. We first created random numbers between one and the size of the population and then picked out those employees corre-sponding to the random numbers. At Software, 200 of about 1,000 employees (20 percent) at the headquarters were sam-pled. At Hardware, 300 of about 4,000 employees (7.5 per-cent) at the headquarters were sampled. The human resources (HR) director sent a letter to all these employees, inviting them to participate in a study on their career net-works. The questionnaire was not anonymous, but the social desirability problem (Arnold and Feldman, 1981) was alleviat-ed by using the following measures: (1) respondents did not need to use the real names of their contacts, and (2) we promised that we would keep all individual responses com-pletely confidential and that we would conduct our analyses only at the aggregate level. We asked the company to send two rounds of e-mail reminders to the employees approxi-mately two and four weeks after the first invitation. From Software we received 88 completed questionnaires, a response rate of 44 percent. From Hardware we received 117 questionnaires, a response rate of 39 percent. In both cases, if the questionnaire had missing data points, we e-mailed, called, or met with the respondents to fill in the miss-ing information.
We interviewed the HR executives on key HR policies and HR indicators of the companies. We also conducted in-depth interviews with fourteen managers, seven from each compa-ny. The theme was “how social networks influence career development.” The interviews typically lasted for about nine-ty minutes but ranged from one to over two hours. We took handwritten notes but also tape-recorded and transcribed most of the interviews verbatim.
10/ASQ, March 2007
We collected data on career performance six months later.
Software’s annual performance review occurred in January
and February 2003, and we collected the performance data
from the HR department in March. For Hardware, whose
financial year 2002 ended in March 2003, the performance
data came out in April 2003, and we collected them in May.
We replicated the data-collection procedure at Telecom and
Mobile in March and April 2003. At Mobile, 300 of about
1,500 employees (20 percent) who worked at the headquar-
ters were sampled. At Telecom, the study was conducted
within the R&D division, which had 407 engineers and man-
agers. In this case, it was not a random sample—invitations
were sent to all employees in the division. At Mobile, we col-
lected 102 questionnaires, a response rate of 34 percent. At
Telecom, we collected 128 questionnaires, a response rate of
31 percent.
We interviewed the HR executive (one for each company)
and nine managers (two at Telecom and seven at Mobile)
during the same period. We collected the career-performance
data of all participants in the study for the year March 2002
11/ASQ, March 2007Social Capital in Chinese Firms Table 1Descriptions of the Four Organizations
Description Size Leadership style Human resources Surroundings and
atmosphere Hardware Founded by a group of scientists from a national research institute in 1984; the largest PC maker in China and one of the most respected local companies.Revenue: USD 4 bil-lion; 16,000 employ-ees.The current CEO, 36years old, took over leadership from the founder 2 years ear-lier and is a strong advocate of egalitari-anism.Promotion from with-in; careful selection procedures; exten-sive training and socialization; exten-sive shared owner-ship.In a huge glass-and-steel headquarters full of sunlight, the atmosphere is open,genial, and pleasant,if not cheerful.Software The leading producer of accounting and enterprise resource planning (ERP) soft-ware in China.Revenue:USD 121million (second only to Microsoft in the national ranking of software sales);4,000 employees.The founder is an icon-ic entrepreneur in China, famous for his low-key, prag-matic style.The founder owns 55
percent of the com-
pany and recently
hired an American
Chinese as CEO
with an astonishing
salary of RMB 5
million.Senior managers have large private offices.Rank-and-file employees sit in small cubicles,enclosed by high dividers and a low ceiling.Mobile A cumulative invest-ment of USD 5 bil-lion; known as the largest foreign investment in China.Revenue: USD 5.7 bil-lion in China; 12,000employees.Strong commitment to the Chinese market.A preferred employer in China; good com-pensation, quality work environment,extensive training,but the market pres-sure from strong local competitors is also accumulating.The workplace is spa-cious, quiet, clean,and full of green plants. But there is also a sense of enti-tlement, referred as the “Iron Rice Bowl of Capitalism.”
Telecom
First multinational company in this industry in China;the powerhouse of telecommunications technology world-wide for several decades.Revenue: USD 1.2 bil-lion in China; 3,000employees.An integrated part of the global network.
Good development plan for engineers,although the expenses for train-ing and overseas trips (mostly to the U.S.) have been cut recently.Technology and sci-ence focused,
down-to-earth
approach, proud to
be in the center of
telecommunication
innovation.
to March 2003. Hence, for these two companies, there was no time lag in the career-performance data, though, as explained below, we took measures to ensure that the net-work data preceded the career-performance data in these two companies.
We collected a total of 435 questionnaires from the four companies. Excluding 18 incomplete surveys, 417 question-naires were used in the final analyses. Of the 417 respon-dents, 26 percent were managers with responsibility for peo-ple or projects, and the rest were individual contributors who did not have any employees reporting directly to them. In terms of functional background, 74 percent were in engineer-ing jobs; 12 percent in sales, marketing, and public relations jobs; 8 percent in administrative jobs; and 6 percent in other jobs. Of all the respondents, 63 percent were male. A large proportion, 92 percent of the respondents, had a bachelor’s or higher degree. Their average age was 29, and their aver-age tenure with the organization was three years. The demo-graphic profiles of the participants in the four companies were generally similar. The average age ranged from 28 to 32 years, company tenure ranged from two to four years, the majority were males (57–76 percent), 80–99 percent had a bachelor’s degree or higher, most held an engineering degree (59–97 percent), and the majority of them were in non-man-agement positions (55–92 percent). We controlled for the demographic differences in the hypothesis-testing analyses. Finally, from the HR department we collected the basic demographic information on all the invited employees for a response-bias analysis using Probit (the dependent variable is a dummy: 1 = response; 0 = no response). Results showed that the probability of an employee’s responding did not relate to his or her gender, age, education, experience, seniority, or organizational rank in any of the four organiza-tions. We were also able to collect information on the employee’s job function from two of the four companies and found no significant differences in the distribution of func-tions in the respondent sample and the employee population of the companies.
Controlling for Reverse Causality
Research has shown that people are remarkably accurate in recalling typical interactions and long-term relationships (Free-man, Romney, and Freeman, 1987). Still, because any ego-centered network is based on retrospective recall, the causal direction of any event is a key issue, so we needed to take steps to assure that career performance was not affecting the network data. Burt (1992) did not control for this problem in his research design. Brass (1984) collected performance data (promotion) three years after collecting his network data. In Burt’s study (1997) of the investment banker’s bonus, there was also a six-month time difference between collect-ing the network and performance data. Podolny and Baron (1997) excluded the direct ties that existed in the time win-dow in which they collected performance data (shifts in job grades). We used two measures to alleviate this problem. For Software and Hardware, we conducted the network sur-vey in October 2002 and waited for about half a year to col-12/ASQ, March 2007
lect the performance data, after the annual performance review. In other words, we used network information at t 1and tested its influence on performance at t 2.Although six months is not long enough to observe the more long-term career changes such as promotion and turnover, it is perti-nent for the performance variables we used in the current study (salary, bonus, and satisfaction). For Telecom and Mobile, for which there was no time lag, we asked the respondents not only when they got to know their contacts (whether they had known their contacts for more than one year) but also when their contacts got to know each other (whether they had known each other for more than one year). After obtaining this information, we included in the study only those network linkages that existed before the time window for which we collected the career-performance data. We excluded not only ego-alter linkages that did not exist before the dependent variables we measured but also alter-alter linkages that did not exist beforehand.1Measures Structural holes.We collected data on ego-centered net-works from the employees by first asking the respondent (ego) to list the names of the individuals within that person’s career networks (alters) and then asking the respondent for information on the strength of all ego-alter ties and alter-alter ties in the network. It is important to note that ego-centered network data are the perceived network rather than the actu-al network (Krackhardt, 1987) and that ego-centered network data can be subject to possible biases such as perceived bal-ance (Krackhardt and Kilduff, 1999), i.e., the bias toward strong ties (hence the tendency to underreport weak ties).Because these biases, if they existed, would operate the same way across all respondents, however, they should not have affected our outcome for interpersonal comparisons.Further, it was important that we use the same method as Burt (1992) and Podolny and Baron (1997), which renders cross-study comparison possible.To maximize comparability across studies, we adopted the name-generator procedures of Burt (1992) and Podolny and Baron (1997). The first name generator was a question about career development. Respondents could give a maximum of five names. In addition, we asked about mentors (2nd), task advice (3rd), strategic information (4th), uncooperative people (5th), buy-ins (6th), political aid (7th), and social support (8th).For each question, the respondent could provide up to three names. The last two items were formal relationships, which are an important part of employees’ career networks: the superior (9th) and the superior of the superior (10th). For these two networks, we asked the respondent to give one name for each, if appropriate. About 72 percent of the respondents included the superior of the superior as a mem-ber of their networks.We combined the names generated by the 10 name genera-tors to assemble the career network of the respondent. The strength of relationship was measured by 0–3 (0 = Distant: a person you don’t know or don’t like, would avoid seeing; 1 =Less close: the person is OK to get along with, but no person-
1
We also tested the models without drop-
ping the ties of less than one year. The
results were essentially the same.13/ASQ, March 2007
Social Capital in Chinese Firms
al bond; 2 = Close: a person you get along with well, but no
strong personal bond; 3 = Very close: strong personal bond).
We used Burt’s (1992) constraint (c) to measure structural
holes.In an ego-centered network, the extent to which an
alter, j, constrains the ego, i, is a multiplication of (a) i’s invest-
ment in j, and (b) the lack of structural holes around j, i.e.,
c ij = (p ij + Σq p iq p qj )2, for q ≠i, j,
where p ij is the proportion of i’s relations invested in contact j
and Σq p iq p qj is the portion of i’s relations invested in contact q
who are in turn invested in contact j.
Summed over all the alters, Σj c ij is the network constraint
measure. It is a function of the network’s size, density, and
hierarchy (networks in which all contacts are exclusively tied
to a dominant contact) and is designed to measure the
extent to which the focal actor’s network lacks structural
holes. The higher the actor’s constraint score, the fewer
structural holes exist in his or her network. Because con-
straint has a range between 0 and 1, to facilitate interpreta-
tion, we used 1 – constraint to directly measure the number
of structural holes. We used UCINET 6 (Borgatti, Everett, and
Freeman, 2002) to compute this measure.
Career performance.Career performance includes the cur-
rent monthly salary and bonus.Salary is a widely used mea-
sure of career success in the literature (e.g., Burt, Hogarth,
and Michaud, 2000; Siebert, Kraimer, and Liden, 2001). To
the extent that employees’ network patterns are developed
throughout their entire career history and are relatively con-
sistent over time (Burt, Jannotta, and Mahoney, 1998), salary
captures the long-term accumulation of social capital effects
and hence is a pertinent measure of an employee’s career
performance. The bonus during the one-year window is a
direct measure of the employee’s career performance in the
period (Burt, 1997). We standardized these two variables
within each company to represent an employee’s career per-
formance relative to his or her colleagues (Burt, 1992, 1997).
In addition, using items on the employee questionnaire, we
measured job satisfaction,the subjective aspect of career
success (“To what extent are you satisfied with this job?”)
on a Likert scale with a 1–7 response. Because the survey
was long and we wanted to avoid tiring respondents, we
chose to use a single-item measure of job satisfaction, given
that organization researchers have found that single-item
measures of job satisfaction are as robust as multiple-item
measures (Scarpello and Campbell, 1983; Gerhart, 1987;
Trevor, 2001).
High commitment. Based on the literature, we identified fif-
teen items to measure high-commitment organization (Delery
and Doty, 1996; Youndt et al., 1996; Pfeffer, 1997; Baron and
Kreps, 1999). We performed principal component factor
analysis and used Kaiser’s criterion (eigenvalue of greater
than 1) to define the number of factors to retain. Table 2
shows the results. Based on Kaiser’s criteria, five factors
emerged to account for 61 percent of the total variance.
14/ASQ, March 2007
Social Capital in Chinese Firms
Table 2
Results of Factor Analysis of Organization’s Commitment to Employee Items
Item12345
1. Promotion from within rather than from outside.56
2. Careful selection procedures in recruiting.66
3. Extensive training and socialization.62
4. Hesitation to fire employees.77
5. Expanded jobs and job rotation.57
6. Appraisal of team performance rather than individual performance.49
7. Behavior-oriented appraisal rather than result-oriented appraisal.77
8. Feedback for development purposes rather than for evaluation .55
9. Good remuneration (including compensation and fringe benefits)–.50
10. Extensive ownership of shares, options, or profit sharing.50
11. Promotion of egalitarianism in income, status, and culture.58
12. Participation in the form of suggestion, grievance systems, and morale survey.72
13. Open communication and wide information sharing.71
14. Emphasis on strong, overarching goals–.67
15. Work in teams; successes of teams rather than individuals are hailed.55
Eigenvalue 4.15 1.70 1.17 1.13 1.01 Percentage of variance explained.28.11.08.08.07 Alpha coefficient.81
Ten of the fifteen items loaded on factor 1 (accounting for 28
percent of the variance), and this was the only interpretable
factor. Therefore, we used these ten items to form a scale
that measured the organization’s commitment to the employ-
ees as perceived by the employees. The Cronbach’s alpha for
this scale was .81. We estimated the within-group agree-
ment on this measure among the respondents in each com-
pany. The rwg value (James, Demaree, and Wolf, 1983) is
.85 for Software, .83 for Hardware, .83 for Telecom, and .84
for Mobile. The ICC(1) (James, 1982) and ICC(2) (Klein and
Kozlowski, 2000) are .14 and .95, respectively, both indicating
a good within-group (within-company) interrater reliability. Of
the two Chinese companies, Hardware had a higher commit-
ment level than Software (F= 59.8, p < .001). Of the two
multinational companies, Telecom had a higher commitment
level than Mobile (F= 5.33, p < .05).
Control variables.We controlled for a number of factors that
might be associated with the career performance of employ-
ees, including the demographic variables of age(in years),
gender (dummy variable, 1 for male), and education(1 for
high school, 2 for some years of college, 3 for a bachelor’s
degree, 4 for a master’s degree, 5 for a doctoral degree). We
controlled for the work experience of the employees by the
number of companies worked for before the employee joined
the current company. We also controlled for company-specific
experience, including company tenure,the number of years
the employee had worked for the company, and job tenure,
the length of time the employee had been in the current
position. We used dummy variables to control for organiza-
tional rank and the job function of the employee: manager 1
(junior manager), manager 2(middle manager), manager 3
(senior manager), sales (sales, marketing, and public relations
jobs), technical (various engineering jobs), and administrative
(HR, finance, and general management jobs). Non-managerial
employees and employees holding other kinds of jobs were
the reference groups in the two dummy-coded measures of
rank and job function. Last, to ensure that the employee’s rat-
15/ASQ, March 2007
ing of the organization’s commitment to the employees was
not an attribution bias of the employee’s commitment to the
organization, we controlled for the employee’s affective com-
mitment to the organization. We used the five-item scale
reported in Tsui et al. (1997). A confirmatory factor analysis of
the scale showed good psychometric properties, with a CFI
of .97, an RMSR of .05, and a coefficient alpha of .81.
RESULTS
The average number of names from each of the networks
was 3.9 for career discussion (1st), 1.6 for mentors (2nd), 2.1
for task advice (3rd), 1.8 for strategic information (4th), .48
for uncooperative people (5th), 2.2 for buy-ins (6th), 1.6 for
political aid (7th), 2.1 for social support (8th), 1.0 for the supe-
rior (9th), and .93 for the superior of the superior (10th).
These ten name generators produced a career network for
the respondent comprising, on average, 9.4 contacts that
ranged from 3 to 19.
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix*
Variable Mean S.D.1234567891011
1. Age29 4.3
2. Gender.6
3.48–.01
3. Education 3.
4.73.1
5.07
4. No. of companies worked for 1.5 1.4.36–.01–.29
5. Company tenure 3.0 2.3.60–.12–.08.04
6. Job tenure 1.8 1.4.32–.13.04–.01.48
7. Technical.74.44–.12.17.25–.19–.18–.00
8. Sales.12.33.12–.11–.17.16.17.00–.62
9. Administrative.08.27.03–.10–.13.07.03–.06–.50–.11
10. Other functions.06.24.01–.04–.10.05.06.07–.42–.09–.08
11. Manager 1.09.28.16–.03–.03.07.28–.02–.16.20.00.03
12. Manager 2.04.19.18.04–.00.05.13–.01–.06–.03.08.06–.06
13. Manager 3.02.14.15.11.07.00.16–.03–.04.00.02.04–.04
14. Non-managerial.85.35–.28–.04–.00–.08–.36.04.18–.14–.06–.07–.76
15. Hardware?.27.44–.20.01–.30–.08–.07–.26–.20.00.23.10.06
16. Software?.21.41–.14.13–.23.21–.18–.08.04.04–.11–.00–.03
17. Mobile?.24.45.36–.07–.04.20.29.14–.19.20–.00.07.15
18. Telecom?.29.43–.02–.06.54–.30–.04.20.34–.24–.13–.16–.18
19. High commitment 4.1.87–.07.06–.05–.11.02–.10–.04.04.04–.02.03
20. Structural holes.66.11–.02.03.02–.01–.09–.03.01.03–.05–.01–.02
21. Salary?01.43.12.26.07.38.08–.04–.00.01.06.21
22. Bonus?01.22.05.10.02.27.12–.03–.03.03.05.07
23. Satisfaction 4.6 1.1.01.10–.07.04–.01–.14–.07.05.07–.01.11
24. Affective commitment 5.5.91.09.09–.12.06.05–.18–.09.07.13–.08.13 Variable12131415161718192021222324
13. Manager 3–.03
14. Non-managerial–.46–.34
15. Hardware?.12.11–.16
16. Software?.03–.03.02–.31
17. Mobile?–.08.00–.08–.34–.29
18. Telecom?–.07–.09.21–.38–.32–.35
19. High commitment.04.09–.08.30–.27–.11.06
20. Structual holes–.05–.01.05–.15.01.05.09.01
21. Salary?.49.45–.61.01.00.00–.01.06–.16
22. Bonus?.40.34–.40.01.00.00–.01.04–.21.70
23. Satisfaction.13.08–.19.10.08–.01–.16.43–.05.10.08
24. Affective commitment.11.12–.21.19.01.00–.20.50.02.08.08.66
*For all correlations > .17, p < .001; > .13, p < .01; > .10, p < .05; > .08,p <.10.
?Organization dummies are included to show cross-organization differences.
?Standardized within the companies.
16/ASQ, March 2007
Social Capital in Chinese Firms
Table 3presents the descriptive statistics. We found no rela-
tionship between structural holes and the employee’s age,
gender, education, length of work experience, number of
companies worked for, tenure in the current position, organi-
zational rank, and job function. They were only marginally
associated with seniority or company tenure (–.09, p < .10),
which means that the longer the employee had worked in
the company, the more constrained his or her network tend-
ed to be. This is intuitive, as longer-tenured employees would
have more opportunities to socialize with colleagues and to
have denser networks.
H1 predicted a negative relationship between structural holes
and career performance for the entire sample. The results in
table 4show that constraint is a good predictor of salary; in
model 1, the coefficient for structural holes is negative and
highly significant. The more structural holes in employees’
networks, the lower are their salaries compared with those
of their colleagues. Structural holes also predict bonus; the
coefficient for structural holes in the bonus model, model 2,
is also negative and highly significant. The more structural
holes in employees’ networks, the lower are their bonuses in
this period compared with those of their colleagues. The Table 4
Effects of Structural Holes on Career Performance (N = 417)*
Salary Bonus Job satisfaction Predictor Model 1 Model 2Model 3 Constant–1.559???.326 4.987???
(.306)(.422)(.574) Age.019–.005.006
(.010)(.014)(.019) Gender.133?.053.189
(.061)(.085)(.115) Education.348???.121–.100
(.046)(.064)(.086)
No. of companies worked for.056?.019–.005
(.025)(.034)(.047) Company tenure.071???.043–.024
(.019)(.027) (.037)
Job tenure–.006.069?–.081
(.025)(.034)(.047) Technical?–.095–.026.074
(.123)(.170)(.231) Sales–.166–.114.225
(.144)(.199)(.270) Administrative–.161–.040.288
(.154)(.213)(.289) Manager 1?.702???.302?.491?
(.111)(.153)(.208) Manager 2 2.457??? 2.081???.830??
(.159)(.220)(.299) Manager 3 2.932??? 2.399???.682
(.218)(.300)(.408) Structural holes–1.017???–1.531???–.423
(.254)(.351)(.477)
F60.22???17.29??? 2.47??
R2.660.358.074 Adjusted R2.649.337.044
?p< .05; ??p< .01; ???p< .001; two-tailed tests.
*Standard errors are in parentheses.
?Other functions and non-managerial are the omitted categories.
17/ASQ, March 2007
coefficient of structural holes for the job satisfaction model is
in the right direction, though not significant. H1 is supported
based on the two key career-performance outcomes of
bonus amount and salary level, controlling for many other fac-
tors that may influence these outcomes. The total model
accounts for 65 percent of the variance in salary and 34 per-
cent of the variance in bonus.
We tested H2 in three different ways. First, we combined
the two companies with higher commitment level (Hardware
and Telecom) as the high-commitment group and the two
low-commitment companies (Software and Mobile) as the
low-commitment group and applied the subgroup analysis.
Table 5shows the results. In the high-commitment compa-
nies, structural holes are strongly and negatively associated
with salary in model 1 and with bonus in model 2. In compar-
ison, in the low-commitment companies, the association of
structural holes with salary and bonus is not significant. The
subgroup analysis hence supports H2 as far as salary and
bonus are concerned.
Table 5
Subsample Analysis of Career Performance in Low- vs. High-Commitment Organizations*
High Commitment (N = 231)Low Commitment (N = 186)
Job Job
Salary Bonus satisfaction Salary Bonus satisfaction Predictor Model 1Model 2Model 3Model 4 Model 5Model 6 Constant–1.123? 1.323? 4.787???–1.839???–.049 5.972???
(.466)(.591)(.907)(.419)(.671)(.809) Age.010–.049?–.029.016.004.020
(.018)(.023)(.035)(.012)(.019)(.022) Gender.044–.067.125.193?.162.225
(.082)(.104)(.160)(.088)(.140)(.169) Education.398???.287???.089.248???–.070–.333?
(.067)(.085)(.130)(.069)(.110)(.133) No. of companies worked for.025.036.024.081??.025–.020
(.045)(.057)(.087)(.028)(.045)(.054) Company tenure.100??.082?.075.064??.051–.103?
(.031)(.039)(.060)(.024)(.038)(.045) Job tenure.045.116?–.145–.022.062–.049
(.042)(.053)(.082)(.029)(.047)(.056) Technical?–.423?–.218.372.237.189–.353
(.191)(.243)(.372)(.154)(.246)(.297) Sales–.438–.107.407.126–.103–.095
(.244)(.309)(.474)(.167)(.268)(.323) Administrative–.243.119.578–.119–.441.172
(.220)(.287)(.426)(.213)(.346)(.417) Manager 1?.750???.119.634.707???.380.490
(.176)(.223)(.342)(.132)(.211)(.254) Manager 2 2.335??? 2.382??? 1.091?? 2.980??? 1.824???.269
(.207)(.263)(.403)(.243)(.390)(.470) Manager 3 2.331??? 1.949???.297 4.183??? 3.394??? 1.346?
(.281)(.356)(.547)(.324)(.519)(.625) Structural holes–1.223???–2.090???–.372–.468–.759–.493
(.351)(.446)(.684)(.370)(.592)(.714)
F30.48???13.10??? 1.93?40.73???7.18??? 1.82
R2.646.440.104.755.370.121 Adjusted R2.625.406.050.736.319.054
?p < .05; ??p < .01; ???p < .001; two-tailed tests.
*Standard errors are in parentheses.
?Other functions and non-managerial are the omitted categories.
18/ASQ, March 2007
The second and third ways of testing H2 are to use the inter-
action of structural holes and high commitment, at the com-
pany and at the individual level, respectively. In both cases,
we mean-centered the two component measures before
entering the interaction term to control for multicollinearity
(Aiken and West, 1991). Further, we obtained the variance
inflation factors (VIF) for all the variables in the models. All of
them were less than 5.0, the accepted cutoff value (Neter,
Wasserman, and Kutner, 1990), suggesting that multi-
collinearity is not a serious concern.2
At the company level, we used the aggregated commitment scores of the four organizations (Hardware: 4.55, Software:3.65, Mobile: 3.95, and Telecom: 4.20). The results in table 62
The VIF values are not shown in tables
4–6 to conserve space but are available
through the authors.19/ASQ, March 2007Social Capital in Chinese Firms Table 6
Interaction Effects of Commitment and Structural Holes on Career Performance (N = 417)*Salary
Bonus Job Satisfaction Predictor
Model 1Model 2Model 3Model 4Model 5Model 6Constant
–.918–1.420??? 1.213.359 5.614???.756(.528)(.355)(.730)(.494)(.999)(.512)Age
.016.021?–.010–.008.005–.016(.010)(.010)(.014)(.014)(.019)(.015)Gender
.116.131.030.046.181.072(.061)(.061)(.085)(.085)(.116)(.088)Education
.357???.342???.132?.127?–.099.052(.046)(.046)(.064)(.064)(.087)(.067)No. of companies worked for
.057?.064?.020.026–.012.038(.026)(.025)(.036)(.035)(.049)(.036)Company tenure
.072???.064??.044.040–.023–.027(.019)(.019)(.027)(.027)(.037)(.028)Job tenure
–.007–.006.067.075?–.085.020(.025)(.025)(.034)(.035)(.047)(.036)Technical ?
–.095–.086–.028–.039.067–.159(.123)(.123)(.170)(.171)(.232)(.177)Sales
–.188–.149–.143–.117.211–.070(.143)(.143)(.198)(.199)(.271)(.206)Administrative
–.157–.154–.033–.077.307–.206(.154)(.155)(.213)(.215)(.292)(.223)Manager 1?
.693???.727???.291.296.493?.194(.110)(.111).152(.154)(.209)(.160)Manager 2
2.459??? 2.448??? 2.085??? 2.048???.842??.455?(.159)(.159)(.219)(.221)(.300)(.229)Manager 3
2.981??? 2.949??? 2.464??? 2.388???.709.050(.217)(.217)(.300)(.302)(.411)(.313)Affective commitment
–.078?.010.714???(.038)(.053)(.055)Structural holes
–.975???–1.027??–1.482???–1.555???–.447–.628(.256)(.252)(.354)(.351)(.484)(.364)High commitment ?
–.142.038–.196.000–.138.174??(.095)(.041)(.131)(.053)(.179)(.055)Structural holes ?
High commitment (H2)–1.607?
–.794??–2.034?–.828?–.202–.596(.751)(.304)(1.038)(.423)(1.419)
(.439)F 53.22???50.59???15.52???14.33??? 2.18??21.85???R 2.666.669.367.364.075.466Adjusted R 2.653.656.344.339.041.445?p < .05; ??p < .01; ???p < .001; two-tailed tests.
*Standardized errors are in parentheses.
?Other functions and non-managerial are the omitted categories.
?High commitment is the organizational score in models 1, 3, and 5 and the individual score in models 2, 4, and 6.
for salary (model 1) and bonus (model 3) show a significant interaction effect of structural holes with commitment. The sign of the coefficient on the interaction term suggests that the relationship is more negative in companies with a high-commitment culture.
Thus far, we have discussed culture differences at the organi-zational level, i.e., whether a firm is a high-commitment orga-nization and the implications for the employee’s social capital, but within the same organization, owing to different function-al backgrounds or product portfolios, there can be significant interdepartmental differences (Schein, 1985; Martin, 1992; Trice and Beyer, 1993). Even in the same department, because of different management styles, there can be impor-tant interpersonal differences. Acknowledging lower-level dif-ferences, scholars have conducted organizational studies at the job or the individual level (Tsui et al., 1997; Lepak and Snell, 1999). Individuals’ descriptions of the commitment level of the organization will reflect the culture of the immedi-ate neighborhood of the employees. Because the personal bias or affect of the employees may taint such evaluations, we controlled for the affective commitment of the employ-ees in this analysis. The test on the interaction of structural holes and high commitment at the individual level also serves as a robustness check on the tests at the company level. Models 2, 4, and 6 in table 6 show the results. The organiza-tion’s commitment to employees, measured at the individual level, has a negative interaction with structural holes for salary in model 2 and for bonus in model 4. Hence, H2 also receives support at the individual level. These results are con-sistent with those in models 1, 3, and 5 performed at the company level.
Qualitative Data: From Brokers to Integrators
Our quantitative results for H2 were corroborated and enriched by the qualitative data we collected from our inter-views. The qualitative data suggest that, in high-commitment organizations, the comparable role to that of the broker is what may be called the integrator. In network terms, integra-tors are defined as those having large and relatively dense ego-centered networks, with few structural holes. As do bro-kers, integrators bring disconnected parties together. But they do it with a different agenda, in a different way, and with different ramifications. Brokers seek, protect, and pre-serve their position as the tertius—sometimes even creating such positions through deliberate actions, e.g., “divide and conquer”—to profit from their colleagues’ disconnection. Integrators, in contrast, do not hesitate to pull divided col-leagues together and, by doing so, in the interest of the com-pany, fill in the holes the first time they see them. While bro-kers seek to generate profits in which they will “have a hand in distribution,” integrators bear in mind the interests of the organization as a collective rather than their own interests as individual agents. They are the real bridges that make com-munication faster and more fluent across boundaries inside an organization. As a result, information and resources can arrive at the part of the organization that needs them most at the right time or without delay. Integrators in this sense take 20/ASQ, March 2007
课程设计报告 学院: 课程: 班级: 学号: 姓名: 指导教师: 实习时间：
第一部分:课程设计内容： 一、课题名称：小型公司客户订单管理系统 二、成员： XXXX 三、使用软件：Microsoft Access 2010, Microsoft Word 2010 四、设计内容 1．系统概述： 随着经济的发展，社会信息化程度越来越高，中小企业在信息化的过程中担任了很重要的角色，其信息化的速度也较快。另外随着企业的发展，其对信息化的要求也越来越高，而靠人工处理企业的客户订单即费力又容易出错。企业的客户订单管理是涉及企业生产、企业资金流和企业的经营风险的关键环节。客户订单管理是企业管理中的源头管理。实施了客户订单管理信息系统后,企业的管理将迈上一个新的台阶。 客户订单管理系统的主要目的是实现对客户，商品，订单信息的管理。使用ACCESS开发设计，投资少,数据和系统安全性好,准确、及时、便利,减少了大量的简单重复劳动,节约了纸张、人力、通讯费用和时间。通过客户的信息表和订单信息表,各级管理者可随时掌握全国客户的情况。避免业务人员的"暗箱操作"以及由于业务人员的流失造成公司客户流失现象的发生。 规范的客户订单信息管理必然会涉及下订单的客户以及订单中所涉及的商品，因此在系统中需要添加客户信息管理和商品信息 -1-
管理的功能。一个信息管理系统必然有一定的用户来操作，因此添加了用户管理系统。为了在日后能够对信息系统中的信息进行浏览、查询和输出，在系统中添加了信息浏览功能。 1.2 系统目标： 本系统面向中小企业，为其处理相关数据及业务提供便利。其功能体现如下：通过系统员工（管理员）的登陆，使他们能够随时查询每一个客户，每一笔订单，每一件商品的详细情况，并且对这些信息做出及时准确的修改与维护。其目的在于建立便捷实用的集信息查询与信息维护为一体的管理平台，从而大大地节约人力资源，提高整个公司的工作效率。 2、系统分析： 2.1 需求分析： 中小企业日常业务数据量巨大，其中客户订单信息是联系客户信息与商品信息的关键，这些信息需要大量的编排与整理，但是它们的分析收集过程全部依赖工作人员的手工操作，工作人员的绝大多数精力投入到浩繁的数据整理中，这样的情况不仅仅大大加剧了工作难度，而且无形中加大了信息处理的错误概率。本系统的建立能够将客户于商品的关系明显的联系起来，并且生成订单信息，使用它大大的简化了数据的录入，计算，修改的工作量，而且极大程度的提高了信息处理效率，因此，该系统的需求十分迫切，功能十分实用。 2.2 业务流程图： 本系统的使用者是公式工作人员。通过商品信息，客户信息，员
企业基本信息情况登记表
填制说明： 一、企业性质：根据企业编码第六位生成：“1”为国有企业、“2”为中外合作企业、“3”为中外合资企业、“4”为外商独资企业、“5”为集体企业、“6”为私营企业、“7”为个体工商户、“8”为报关企业、“9”为其他。海关注册登记编码中第
五、六位为英文字母的：国有为“加工A”、集体为“加工B”、私营或个体工商户为“加工C”。 二、企业类别：海关对企业实施的分类管理类别，如A/B/C/D. 三、保证金额：可暂时不报。 四、销比例：三资企业按外经部门批准文件填报。来料加工企业无销权限，可填报为“0”或“无”。 五、备案（批准）机关：三资企业填批准成立的机关，民营企业和个体工商户填对外贸易经营者备案登记机关（以上一般为“市外经贸局”）。来料加工企业（海关注册登记编码中第五、六位为英文字母）填批准来料加工协议的机关，经营进料加工的国企业（海关注册登记编码中第五、六位为英文字母）填批准进料加工合同的机关。报关企业填准予报关企业注册登记许可机关。 六、生产类型：技术先进、产品出口、服务、其他。 七、行业种类：从以下方式中选择：1、电子信息2、机械设备3、服装纺织4、鞋类5、旅行箱包6、玩具7、家具8、塑料制品9、金属制品10、化工产品11、医药12、木制品13、报关行14、食品15、轻工16、水产17、纸制品18、皮革19、印刷20、石材21、钟表22、家用电器。 八、报关类别：无报关权、自理报关、专业报关、代理报关。 九、开户银行：人民币基本 十、报关有效期：《报关注册登记证书》的有效期；通过2005年年审的《注册登记证明书》自动延至2008年，具体日前对应注册日前。来料加工企业无报关权，不用填。 十一、主要产品：进出口量较大的前1－5项。 十二、备注信息：有则填，无则不填。 十三、投资方式：“产权”、“现汇”、“实物”，一种或多种。 十四、生产品牌：产品的品牌，可填1－5项。 十五、报关业务（财务）负责人：可以是报关员（会计员），也可以是该部门的负责人。 十六、上市公司：可以是本企业或投资方。 十七、联网企业：指是否与海关联网监管。 十八、生产车间面积、仓库面积：指实用面积。 十九、厂区面积：指占地面积，包括宿舍在。一般指围墙的占地面积。 二十、银行信贷等级：注册登记企业在银行的信贷级别。 二十一、报关方式：企业日常的实际报关方式，自理报关或委托报关。 二十二、软件管理模式：指财务软件名称。 二十三、认证标准类型：指ISO认证名称。 二十四、照片要求：规格为4R′彩色照片，存储格式为.JPG格式。
关于做家务的小学英语作文 小学英语写作是衡量小学生英语学习能力的一个重要指标,通过 小学英语作文的写作,可以培养学生的逻辑思维能力,语言表达能力, 语言组织能力等。平时在家要多帮父母做家务，这样才是好孩子哦。下面是橙子为你整理的关于做家务的小学英语作文，希望对你有帮助! 关于做家务的小学英语作文篇1 Some day, our teacher tells me that we should help our parents with the housework, so I decide to help my mother. After school, I ran to home, saying to mom that I want to share housework, she is very happy, she gives me the job to clean the window. I think it will be easy, but when I do it, I find it hard. I know I should help my mother. 一天，我的老师告诉我我们要帮助我们的父母做家务，所以我决 定帮助妈妈。下课后，我奔回家，对妈妈说我想要分担家务，她很高兴，给我清理窗户的任务。我以为这会很简单，但是我做的时候，我 发现很难。我知道我应该要帮助妈妈。 关于做家务的小学英语作文篇2 After dinner, my first job was to get the dirty dishes to the kitchen. Then I began to wash them. I turned on the tap and water covered all the dishes in the sink. Then I added some 1 / 4
项目进度管理 摘要 2008年12月，我以项目经理的身份参与到某省水运海事综合业务信息系统项目的开发中，在该项目中我主要负责组织规划实施开发和项目管理的工作。该项目主要包括：OA协同办公系统、电子邮件系统、水运海事行政管理信息系统三个部分。其中，水运海事行政管理信息系统是整个系统的核心，采用了Silverlight+DLinq+https://www.doczj.com/doc/bd14119420.html,相结合的主流Web应用框架。 该项目工期180天，工期比较紧张，涉及项目干系人较多，项目进度问题是我们面临的最大考验，为了保证项目能如期高质量地交付，我们采用分期建设，使用基于RUP软件工程模型的方法对项目进行科学管理，在项目的计划阶段我们依据项目章程、项目范围说明书、组织过程资产对项目的范围进行分解，制定WBS，估算工作量，制定详细的项目进度计划。在实施过程中对进度进行跟踪和监控，关注项目的薄弱环节，实现资源动态平衡。目前系统已开发完毕，上线运行一年有余，运行状况良好，受好客户一致好评，但是也存在一些问题和教训。 正文 2008年12月，我以项目经理的身份参与到某省水运海事综合业务信息系统项目的开发中，在项目中我主要负责组织规划实施开发和项目管理的工作。水运海事综合业务信息系统采用先进的富客户端（RIA）技术，充分利用互联网（Internet）信息化手段实现全省水运海事行业数据库的建立和电子化办公的目标，达到规范业务流程、强化内部管理、提高全省水运海事业务的办理效率。水运海事综合业务信息系统主要包括：OA协同办公系统、电子邮件系统、水运海事行政管理信息系统三个部分。其中，水运海事行政管理信息系统是整个系统的核心，在本项目中我们把它作为整个项目的重点来实施的，因此，下面我主要以水运海事行政管理信息系统为中心进行论述。 水运海事行政管理信息系统采用Silverlight+DLinq+https://www.doczj.com/doc/bd14119420.html,相结合的主流Web应用框架，开发工具采用https://www.doczj.com/doc/bd14119420.html,、编程语言是C#、JavaScript、Sql。在硬件环境方面：IBM RS6000小型机用于部署Oracle10g数据库系统，HP服务器用于部署Web应用。系统总体框架是：三层架构（MVC），用https://www.doczj.com/doc/bd14119420.html,搭建整个系统模块，用DLinq替代原来的ODBC，并进行数据持久化管理，用Silverlight技术替代原有的Ajax技术，实现无刷新页。在系统的模型层（M）是DLinq和https://www.doczj.com/doc/bd14119420.html,相结合，通过DLinq实现对象与关系数据之间的映射，然后将映射结果通过https://www.doczj.com/doc/bd14119420.html,进行执行，最终实现数据持久化和查询操作；控制层（C）是业务逻辑的封装层，通过https://www.doczj.com/doc/bd14119420.html,反转技术实现业务逻辑的动态加载；视图层（V）是利用Web页面与Silverlight富客户端相结合的技术，给最终用户提供业务操作和数据查询的界面，提高用户使用体验，另外，在系统中我们还采用了Single Sign On（SSO）单点登录技术，把OA协同办公系统、电子邮件系统、水运海事行政管理信息系统三个系统从安全认证这方面有机的结合在一起，实现统一认证、统一登录，给客户提供了极大地方便。 水运海事综合信息管理系统项目依据合同项目工期为180天，工期紧、任务重，项目涉及干系人较多，项目进度问题是我们面临的最大考验，为了确保项目能如期高质量交付，我们经过仔细分析后决定采用分期建设，将项目分为两期进行实施，运用RUP软件工程模型方法进行科学管理，使用Microsoft Project 2007作为辅助工具，在项目的计划阶段我们依据项目章程、项目范围说明书、组织过程资产对项目的范围进行分解，制定WBS，估算工作量，制定详细的项目进度计划。在项目实施过程中对项目进度和成本进行跟踪和监控，及时发现纠正偏差，关注项目关键路径上的薄弱环节，实现项目资源整体的动态平衡，有效地管理和控制项目的进度。 一、计划阶段对项目进行合理分解，正确估算所有任务的工作量，制定详细的项目进度计划。 在计划阶段，我们经过仔细分析后决定采用分期建设，将项目分为两期进行实施，第一期主要完成需求调研、需求分析、系统设计与实现、测试、试运行、全省部分功能推广六项任务；第二期主要完成系统设计与实现、测试、试运行、全面推广四项任务。在制定完项目分期建设计划后，项目团队在我的带领下，
做家务的英语作文 1 Is it good for students to do some housework Secondly, to do some housework can keep you healthy and strong ,some hard housework can be regarded as a kind of physical exercise. Finally, to do some housework can share your parents’ work .They must be happy if you say” Have a rest ,and I will do the housework” So I think it is good for students to do some housework. 这是好学生做一些家务 其次，做一些家务能够让你保持健康和强壮，一些硬家务可以看作是一种体育锻炼。 最后，做一些家务可以分享您的父母的工作。他们必须高兴，如果你说“休息一下，我会做家务” 因此，我认为这是为学生好做一些家务。 2 Is it good for students to do some housework. Some people think studengts need not do any housework.They think the only thing students need do is to study well. I don’t thi nk so. It is good for students to do some housework for three reason. Firstly,to do some housework can make you independent.You can’t depend on others all your life.So,you should learn to do some housework now. Secondly, to do some housework can keep you healthy and strong ,some hard housework can be regarded as a kind of physical exercise. Finally, to do some housework can share your parents’ work .They must be happy if you say” Have a rest ,and I will do the housework” So I think it is good for students to do some housework. 3 Help mum to do the housework
附件32：企业基本信息情况登记表
填制说明： 一、企业性质：根据企业编码第六位生成：“1”为国有企业、“2”为中外合作企业、“3”为中外合资企业、“4”为外商独资企业、“5”为集体企业、“6”为私营企业、“7”为个体工商户、“8”为报关企业、“9”为其他。海关注册登记编码中第五、六位为英文字母的：国有为“加工A”、集体为“加工B”、私营或个体工商户为“加工C”。 二、企业类别：海关对企业实施的分类管理类别，如A/B/C/D. 三、保证金额：可暂时不报。 四、内销比例：三资企业按外经部门批准文件填报。来料加工企业无内销权限，可填报为“0”或“无”。 五、备案（批准）机关：三资企业填批准成立的机关，民营企业和个体工商户填对外贸易经营者备案登记机关（以上一般为“东莞市外经贸局”）。来料加工企业（海关注册登记编码中第五、六位为英文字母）填批准来料加工协议的机关，经营进料加工的国内企业（海关注册登记编码中第五、六位为英文字母）填批准进料加工合同的机关。报关企业填准予报关企业注册登记许可机关。 六、生产类型：技术先进、产品出口、服务、其他。 七、行业种类：从以下方式中选择：1、电子信息2、机械设备3、服装纺织4、鞋类5、旅行箱包 6、玩具 7、家具 8、塑料制品 9、金属制品10、化工产品11、医药12、木制品13、报关行14、食品15、轻工16、水产17、纸制品18、皮革19、印刷20、石材21、钟表22、家用电器。 八、报关类别：无报关权、自理报关、专业报关、代理报关。 九、开户银行：人民币基本帐户 十、报关有效期：《报关注册登记证书》的有效期；通过2005年年审的《注册登记证明书》自动延至2008年，具体日前对应注册日前。来料加工企业无报关权，不用填。 十一、主要产品：进出口量较大的前1－5项。 十二、备注信息：有则填，无则不填。 十三、投资方式：“产权”、“现汇”、“实物”，一种或多种。 十四、生产品牌：产品的品牌，可填1－5项。 十五、报关业务（财务）负责人：可以是报关员（会计员），也可以是该部门的负责人。 十六、上市公司：可以是本企业或投资方。 十七、联网企业：指是否与海关联网监管。 十八、生产车间面积、仓库面积：指实用面积。
帮父母做家务的满分英语作文 帮父母做家务的英语作文篇【1】help my mother with the housework. Today is Sunday. I got up very early, because I wanted to help my mother with the housework. She worked vey hard on weekdys, but she still have to do many houseworks after work. So I decided to help her. When my mum went to the market, I began to clean the house. I swept the floor, washed the dishes, dusted the tables. When my came back home, I was still washing my coat. My mum was very happy. 帮父母做家务的英语作文篇【2】 For parents with household chores Another Sunday, my mother worked at home, I answered the post-operation, not to play the moment,quickly, and at this time, I saw my mother in the work, suddenly, I came up with idea to help stem mother more household chores. I do Laundry Mom has to wash. Vegetables, my mother has been finished yesterday. Clean up the house, by the
企业客户信息管理系统需求分析 一.系统开发目的 现如今，企业客户信息管理系统整合利用信息技术优势，适应现代数据库营销理念。结合中小企业管理现状，可以帮助中小企业将分散的客户信息集中管理、规范管理、长期维护，进行客户基本信息、经营信息动态分析，帮助企业负责人和经营主管随时掌握相关管理信息。有助于企业更好了客户信息，以便于在企业活动等事情上，有更好更有效的操作。 二．系统分析 1.总体分析 针对企业客户信息管理系统的需求，通过对客户信息处理过程的内容和数据流程的分析。为本系统设计如下的数据项和数据结构，包括维护客户信息：?电话、传真、电子邮件、所在省份、客户状态、客户级别、客户备注等等。 ?在登录界面菜单中设置用户名和密码，以提高数据的安全性。 ?实现添加，修改，删除，查找，数据统计功能，为客户举行年末抽奖活动。 2.需求分析 经过对系统的业务流程和系统数据流程的调查，系统的功能需求如下： a.此管理系统将对企业客户进行资料管理和统计，对客户的基本信息进行录 入管理和统计； b.此管理系统将根据企业的需要对客户进行查询 c.此管理系统提供数据信息的备份和还原功能。 d.此管理系统可以为客户举行年末抽奖活动。 除上述功能外，系统还需要有以下功能： 有美观的界面
三．系统角色及功能 系统分为管理员，客户 1、管理员： 系统设置：查看系统运行环境，添加企业类型，企业性质，客户级别，客户来源等信息 企业信息：对企业，企业类型，企业性质进行查看，增加，删除，修改。 客户信息：对客户级别，客户类型，客户进行增加，删除，修改，查看。对客户投诉，客户合作进行查看。 抽奖页面：进行年末抽奖活动 员工信息管理：对企业员工进行增加，删除，查看，修改。 系统退出：退出系统后台。 2、客户： 修改密码：对自身进行密码修改。 个人信息查看：查看和修改个人基本资料。 客户投诉：对企业所提供的服务进行投诉，还可以查看投诉历史记录 安全退出：客户退出系统，返回登录页面。 四．设计目标 根据系统实施后，应达到以下目标： 支持多行输入，自动生成编号。 界面美观友好、信息查询灵活、方便、快捷、准确。 强大的库存预警功能，在意外中将损失降到最低。 提高工作效率，降低成本。 图形化数据分析。 对用户输入的数据进行过滤，当输入有误时提示用户。 数据保密性强，用户对应不同的操作级别。 系统最大限度地实现了易安装性、易维护性和易操作性。 系统运行稳定、安全可靠。
做家务英语作文范文 做家务英语作文 在学习、工作或生活中，大家都有写作文的经历，对作文很是熟悉吧，作文是一种言语活动，具有高度的综合性和创造性。作文的`注意事项有许多，你确定会写吗？下面是收集的做家务英语作文，仅供参考，欢迎大家阅读。 is it good for students to do some housework。 some people think studengts need not do any housework。they think the only thing students need do is to study well。 i don’t think so。 it is good for students to do some housework for three reason。 firstly，to do some housework can make you independent。you can’t depend on others all your life。so，you should learn to do some housework now。 secondly， to do some housework can keep you healthy and strong ，some hard housework can be regarded as a kind of physical exercise。
finally， to do some housework can share your parents’work 。they must be happy if you say” have a rest ，and i will do the housework” so i think it is good for students to do some housework。模板,内容仅供参考
房地产客户信息管理系统 建设方案 目录 第一章文档说明 第一节文档目标 第二节文档范围 第三节读者对象 第四节参考文档 第五节术语与缩写解释 第二章项目介绍 第三章项目范围 第一节本项目适用的范围 3.1.1.功能模块 3.1.2.系统适用范围 第二节网站和系统不适用的范围 3.2.1.地产公司下属部门机构 3.2.2.数据迁移 3.2.3.项目实施范围 第四章总体设计 第一节设计原则 第二节网络架构 第三节技术架构 https://www.doczj.com/doc/bd14119420.html,开发技术 3.4.2.MVC开发模式 第四节建设标准 第五节应用架构 第五章项目中的角色 第六章项目的功能性需求
第七章项目的非功能性需求 第一节用户界面需求 第二节软硬件环境需求 第三节项目质量要求 第四节其他需求 第八章项目预算 第一节销售信息管理系统报价 第二节客户信息管理系统报价 第三节配套软件报价 第一章文档说明 第一节文档目标 本文房地产客户信息管理系统(以下简称“系统”)进行规划叙述，明确用户对系统的需求，为系统构建提出要求。本文档根据调研结果整理，将汇总用户的功能需求与非功能需求，以达到明确用户需求指导开发，加强开发人员对需求的理解，促进项目相关人员沟通。本文档尽可能详尽地描述并分析的需求，得到用户和软件开发方的确认后方可生效。文档生效后，未在描述范围内的需求变动以需求变更单的形式处理。 第二节文档范围 本项目为用户定制项目，所包含的内容为用户提出的对本项目的需求。明确需求的范围有助于用户和开发方共同顺利完成共同的目标，有助于用户和开发方控制以后的需求变更。 此文档主要内容包括：项目介绍、项目范围、系统架构、业务流程、项目中的角色、项目的功能性需求、项目的非功能性需求、项目依赖的条件、需求确认、附件等内容。 本《房地产客户信息管理系统建设方案》是对用户方系统业务需求的全部反映，并由开发方需求调研人员加以整理，不包含对此需求的系统设计及具体技术细节。 第三节读者对象
Should students do housework? Some parents think that it is necessary and sometimes important for students to do some housework. Housework is a kind of physical exercise necessary for mental development. Other parents, however, think that it is study that is of extreme importance to students. Priority shou first and foremost be given to study both at school and at home. Hence students should be exempt from any tedious and time-consuming housework. I think students should share some housework with their parents. The reasons are as follows. First, doing some housework can enable the students to have some sense of responsibility. There is a lot of housework in each family. As a member of the family, each one should do his or her share. Since a student is a member of the family, undoubtedly, he is of no exception. In the second place, doing some housework can give the student opportunities to get to know his parents better. By doing housework, a student will know how hard it is for his parents to go to work every day while raising a family. He will make even greater efforts in his study later on. Finally, doing some housework can give the student a chance to do some physical exercises. Since the student has to sit studying most of the time, this is certainly beneficial to his health. In light of the above, I strongly recommend that those who are not in the habit of doing housework start doing some right now. Your parents will be pleased and you will learn something from it. 学生应做家务吗？ 一些家长认为是必要的有时重要的学生做一些家务。家务劳动是一种体育锻炼心理发展所必需的。其他家长，然而，认为这是对学生极端重要的研究。优先寿[d 首先和最重要的是给研究在学校和在家里。因此学生应获豁免任何繁琐和耗时的家务劳动。 我认为学生应与他们的父母分担一些家务。原因是，如下所示。第一，做一些家务可以使学生有一些责任感。有很多的家务劳动中每个家庭。作为家庭的成员，每个人应该做他或她共享。因为学生是成员的家庭，毫无疑问，他也不例外。在第二个地方，做一些家务可以给学生机会去了解他的父母更好。做家务，一个学生会知道他的父母去上班每天都同时提高一个家庭有多难。他稍后将会在他的研究中作出更大努力。最后，做一些家务可以给学生一个机会做一些physical exercises。由于学生坐学习的大部分时间，这是必然有利于他的健康状况。 鉴于上述，我强烈建议那些人不是在做家务的习惯开始现在做一些。你的父母会高兴，你能学到东西从它。
信息系统项目管理案例分析 王先生刚出任项目经理，并承接了一个中型软件项目。上任时公司高层再三叮咛他一定要尊重客户，充分满足客户需求。项目开始比较顺利，但进入到后期，客户频繁的需求变更带来很多额外工作。王先生动员大家加班，保持了项目的正常进度，客户相当满意。 但需求变更却越来越多。为了节省时间，客户的业务人员不再向王先生申请变更，而是直接找程序员商量。程序员疲于应付，往往直接改程序而不做任何记录，很多相关文档也忘记修改。很快王先生就发现：需求、设计和代码无法保持一致，甚至没有人能说清楚现在系统“到底改成什么样了”。版本管理也出现了混乱，很多人违反配置管理规定，直接在测试环境中修改和编译程序。但在进度压力下，他也只能佯装不知此事。但因频繁出现“改好的错误又重新出现”的问题，客户已经明确表示“失去了耐心”。 而这还只是噩梦的开始。一个程序员未经许可擅自修改了核心模块，造成系统运行异常缓慢，大量应用程序超时退出。虽然最终花费了整整3天的时间解决了这个问题，但客户却投诉了，表示“无法容忍这种低下的项目管理水平”。更糟糕的是，因为担心系统中还隐含着其他类似的错误，客户高层对项目的质量也疑虑重重。 随后发生的事情让王先生更加为难：客户的两个负责人对界面风格的看法不一致，并为此发生了激烈争执。王先生知道如果发表意见可能会得罪其中一方，于是保持了沉默。最终客户决定调整所有界面，王先生只好立刻动员大家抓紧时间修改。可后来当听说因修改界面而造成了项目一周的延误后，客户方原来发生争执的两人这次却非常一致，同时气愤地质问王先生：“为什么你不早点告诉我们要延期！早知这样才不会让你改呢！”王先生委屈极了，
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资料内容仅供参考，如有不当或者侵权，请联系本人改正或者删除。 企业基本信息情况登记表（二） 图片信息1企业外观（含厂牌、大门）照片 企业厂房照片（东立面）企业 厂房照片（西立面）企业厂房 照片（北立面）企业厂房照片 （南立面） 企业厂房照片（屋面）
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权，请联系本人改正或者删除。梳棉车间设备照片（正面） 梳棉车间设备照片（侧面） 梳棉车间除尘照片（正面） 梳棉车间除尘照片（侧面） 梳棉车间空调照片（操作间） 梳棉车间空调照片（主风机） 梳棉车间空调照片（喷淋室） 梳棉车间空调照片（室外立面） 精梳车间设备照片（正面） 精梳车间设备照片（侧面） 精梳车间除尘照片（正面） 精梳车间除尘照片（侧面） 精梳车间空调照片（操作间） 精梳车间空调照片（主风机） 精梳车间空调照片（喷淋室） 精梳车间空调照片（室外立面） 并粗车间设备照片（正面）并粗车 间设备照片（侧面）并粗车间空调 照片（操作间）并粗车间空调照片 （主风机）并粗车间空调照片（喷 淋室）并粗车间空调照片（室外立 面）
关于做家务的小学生英语作文（三篇） This is my summer vacation. I intend to finish the operation. Then, take a look at China's famous novel. Look at some day. Of course, also want to play with the computer, watch TV. Early every morning to get up and running to run, do other sports. But it is conducive to our body! But one thing should not be forgotten. must help parents do the housework! My holiday arrangements like? something good? give suggestions? 【篇二】 Today,I still went to my mother's office.My mother was very busy as well as my father.They always live in Beijing.They must get up early.Because they will manage the factory.So I know they are very laborious.I should save my money.Although I cant do something useful,but I think I should share the work with them.I am one of my family member.In the future,I will take a job and work.It's time for me to begin to learn how to work. 【篇三】 When I was very young ,the sky in my hometown was nice and beautiful, the sky was very blue,and the air was fresh. There were some birds singing ,and there were many trees in the fields. I often played with my friends in the open air.I liked it. Now the people are rich ,but the sky in my homerown isn't blue .the trees were cut down , and there aren't many birds. And the air isn't fresher than before. The rubbish is put
企业客户关系管理信息系统的需求分析 客户资源是制约企业竞争力的一个重要因素。CRM是一种新型的客户资源管理模式，旨在改善企业与客户之间的关系。本文对CRM存在的必要性进行了阐述，并对其从应用角度进行了充分的需求分析，用以指导系统的开发。 标签：客户资源CRM 需求分析 随着社会的不断进步和人们需求的多元化，现在企业生存面临着越来越多的困难和挑战，企业的发展不但要关注自己的产品质量、员工素质、企业文化，更要关心和关注他们所面对的消费群，消费者需要什么样的产品，客户有着怎么样的喜好、想法，他们的购买目的是什么，掌握的客户相关信息越多，越有助于企业稳固和改善与客户之间的关系，越有助于提高企业的市场竞争力。 1 CRM的必要性 随着商业的不断发展，各种企业数目不断增多，如何提高企业的市场竞争力成为企业管理者关注的问题之一。对于一个成熟的产品生产企业来说，提高产品质量在一定程度上很难再有突破，要想占领市场，就要不断地提高客户的满意度和信赖感，稳定老客户，发展新客户，从而在激烈的市场竞争中立于不败之地。科学有效的客户关系管理就显得尤为重要，主要体现在以下几个方面：首先，企业的发展伴随着客户信息量的不断增长，企业对客户信息关系管理若仍然停滞在用纸、笔工具的阶段中，那将与现代化企业信息化管理脱节，既费时费力，又无法科学有效的进行数据分析，影响企业的现代化进程。其次，大企业的客户量庞大，经常会遇到营销人员遍地撒网而销售人员无法识别真正的客户资源、一个企业的若干销售人员对同一个客户有着不同的产品报价、产品的售后服务人员找不到客户的购买信息等问题，这些现象表明企业在市场营销、产品销售、售后服务等领域应该有一套一致完整的客户资料，每一位客户的喜好、需求、问题及处理进度等资料可以共享，这样既可以避免工作的重复性，又能增强各部门之间的配合度，能够快速发掘潜在客户和及时处理售后问题。再次，对于企业来说，人员的流动是不可避免的，如果没有有效的管理，销售人员的离职将带走重要的客户资料，新上任的销售经理的工作就很难迅速展开。现代化的管理系统可以有效避免上述问题，为企业保存详细完整的客户资料。最后，客户需要及时了解企业的活动安排，与企业进行有效沟通，这就需要一个良好的沟通交流平台，让企业能第一时间获得客户信息和最新需求，也让客户能够及时了解企业动态、发表言论和寻求帮助。 綜上，将信息、电子计算机技术应用于对现代企业客户关系信息的管理中，不但使得企业在客户资料完整性方面有了一定的积累，增加企业和客户之间的有效交流和沟通，而且可以解放沉积的劳动力，在加快企业综合化、现代化的建设步伐时大大降低企业的成本。这样不但为企业减少了不必要的开支，更重要的是能提高企业的工作效率。
关于做家务的英语作文【关于做家务的五年级作文】 许多朋友都觉得家务活很难、很繁琐，其实只要用心做，就会发现家务劳动也会变得轻松简单，今天，为大家了关于做家务的五年级作文，大家一起来看看吧! 今天又是无聊的一天，我躺在床上，无所事事的。心想:唉，如果有点有意义的事做该多好啊!突然，一个念头在我心中蠢蠢欲动，那就是帮妈妈做家务。首先，我帮妈妈扫地。我拿起扫把，把一楼扫了一遍，再拿起拖把，把一楼拖了一遍。这两件简单的事就花了我半天功夫，让我满头大汗。可是我刚要收拾时，又把水桶踢翻了，地上满是脏水。我拿起拖把，慢慢地吸光了所有的脏水，可是我又不小心踩到了拖把，把一半的脏水挤了出来。没办法，只好重新再吸一遍了。接下来，我就帮妈妈擦玻璃。我拿起抹布，花了九牛二虎之力，才擦好一面玻璃。可是一块地方怎么也擦不掉，仔细的看一下，原来是水泥，我用尽全力，才擦掉了这一小片水泥。突然，脚下一打滑，我从椅子上摔了下来，可真够疼的!等我擦好了所有玻璃，都已经中午了。在又饿又累中，我开始做下一个家务。那就是:叠被子。这是最简单的一项，也是最顺利的一项。我把被子甩平，再把被子的两角对折，把对折的两角跟另外一边的两角对折。然后再把被子对折一次，就完成了。这个 __上午使我懂得:妈妈日日都是很辛苦的。我暗暗发誓，以后一定要多孝顺妈妈。
今天我回来了，我回到家里看见家里没有人，衣服还挂在外面，我放下书包准备去把衣服收起来，我先摸了摸衣服有没有干，我把干了的收了起来，再把湿的衣服挂到衣架上，因为妈妈说：“今天可能要下雨，我怕衣服会越来越湿。” 天快黑了，全家除了我一个都没回来，我就想：“如果我把晚 饭做好了，爷爷和奶奶一定很高兴，先要主放进锅里把它洗干净，然后把水方放到锅里后把手擦干了插上电源，过了一会爷爷奶奶回来了，他们看见衣服被收起来了、晚饭做好了，他们疑惑不解，今天是谁把衣服收起来了，饭也做好了。就问我今天谁做了，做了家务我得意洋洋的话是我。爷爷奶奶很高兴。过了一会爸爸和妈妈回来了。 吃完饭，我就说我来洗碗，爸爸说今天太阳从西边出来的。我说：“我帮爷爷做一点家务不行吗?”爸爸说：“行行”。以后我一 定要多多帮家人做家务。 今天，我看见地面很脏，就决定帮妈妈扫地。 扫地，是最简单不过的事了，谁都会，我拿来一把扫帚、一只 簸箕，开始扫地。
题目：客户信息管理系统专业：网页1班 学号：1303110112 姓名：刘冰涛 指导教师：胡迎久
客户类型 类型名称上级类型 客户类型信息实体图 客户 客户名称 客户性别 客户E-mail 客户电话 …… 客户信息实体图 3.3逻辑设计 （1）模式转换（ ) 表： 表：
表： 表： 表： （2）模式规范化 表、表、表、表、表均已经为范式 （3）完整性约束设计 实体完整性约束：表主键为 表主键为 表主键为 表主键为 表主键为 参照完整性约束：表的参照表主键 表的参照表主键 （4）外模式设计 建立了一张视图，用于显示每位客户的合作、提醒信息，语句如下： ，，，，， ，，，
（5）典型应用设计 客户类型管理模块：添加客户类型，修改客户类型，删除客户类型客户管理模块：客户信息管理，客户评价管理，客户合作管理 提醒管理模块：查看今日提醒，提醒设置管理 3.4物理设计 内模式设计：主要包括索引、散列、簇集设计 表：索引字段为，索引表达式为，索引类型为主索引 表：索引字段为，索引表达式为，索引类型为主索引 表：索引字段为，索引表达式为，索引类型为主索引 表：索引字段为，索引表达式为，索引类型为主索引 表：索引字段为，索引表达式为，索引类型为主索引 3.5系统实现 主要模块及其核心代码如下： （1）客户类型管理模块： 添加客户类型界面： 核心代码： ( = "", _ = -1) ("", "", ) = <> 0 ("", "", ) = = <> "" = <> -1 = ' = " (, ) " = & " (" & = & ",'" & & "'"