外文翻译--资本结构影响因素的分析研究

本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文：Optimal Capital StructureReflections on Economic and Other ValuesOver the last few decades studies have been produced on the effect of other stake holders’ interests on capital structure. Well-known examples are the interests of customers who receive product or service guarantees from the company. Another area that has received considerable attention is the relation between managerial incentives and capital structure (Ibid.). Furthermore, the issue of corporate control 1 and, related, the issue of corporate governance , receive a lion’s part of the more recent academic attention for capital structure decisions.From all these studies, one thing is clear: The capital structure decision (or rather ,the management of the capital structure over time) involves more issues than the maximization of the firm’s market value alone. In this paper, we give an overview of the different objectives and considerations that have been proposed in the literature. We make a distinction between two bro adly defined situations. The first is the traditional case of the firm that strives for the maximization of the value of the shares for the current shareholders. Whenever other considerations than value maximization enter capital structure decisions, these considerations have to be instrumental to the goal of value maximization. The second case concerns the firm that explicitly chooses for more objectives than value maximization alone. This may be because the shareholders adopt a multiple stakeholders approach or because of a different ownership structure than the usual corporate structure dominating finance literature. An example of the latter is the cooperation, a legal entity which can be found, in among others, many European countries. For a discussion on why firms are facingmultiple goals, we refer to Hallerbach and Spronk 。

浙江万里学院商学院毕业论文文献综述 论文题目周斌 学生姓名08012670 学生学号会计学专业，2008级6班 专业班级有色金属行业资本结构 影响因素实证研究 施建华 指导教师 会计系系 别文献综述资本结构理论一直是学术界研究的热点和实务界关注的焦点。

真正意义上对资本结构的研究开始于二十世纪五十年代。

七八十年代以后，随着产业组织理论与现代博弈论的发展，对企业资本结构问题的研究越来越深入，这和该问题在企业中所占的重要位置是分不开的。

企业无法回避的一个问题就是资本结构的问题，即企业的资金来源和其构成问题，企业的生存和发展要求以收抵支，清偿债务，筹集资金，这都离不开资本结构问题，这是一个重要的理论问题，也是一个实践问题。

理论上来说，企业最优资本结构是存在的，但因为企业内外环境处于不断变化之中，确定最优资本结构相当困难，这就要综合考虑资本结构的各方面影响因素，以此确定企业的最优资本结构。

所以研究企业的资本结构，主要是研究资本结构的各个影响因素，目的就是要发现企业资本结构中存在的不合理因素，以便在经营过程中加以改善，使其趋于合理化，最终达到企业价值的最大化。

1 资本结构概念的界定对于资本结构概念的界定，学术界一直存在着分歧。

分歧主要是在资本结构中负债含义的界定上。

一种观点认为资本结构中的负债是企业资产负债表右方列示的所有负债。

另一种观点认为资本结构中的负债是指企业的长期负债，短期负债不在资本结构的研究范围。

基于对负债不同的认识，资本结构的界定也存在许多争议，形成了负债公益组合说和长期资本组合说两种观点。

资本结构概念两种不同的界定方法体现了资本结构不同的研究重点。

前者认为资本结构反映的是企业全部资金来源的构成和其比例关系，反映了总负债和总资产、总负债和总权益之间的相互关系，称之为广义的资本结构；后者则认为资本结构是企业取得长期资金项目的组合和其相互关系，反映长期负债资本与权益资本之间的关系，称之为狭义的资本结构。

我国商业银行资本结构影响因素分析作者：陈志红来源：《价值工程》2012年第27期摘要：以14家上市商业银行为研究对象，通过多元线性回归实证分析了影响银行资本结构的因素。

研究结果表明：银行规模和盈利能力对资产负债率的影响是正相关的，资产担保能力和成长性对资产负债率的影响呈负相关关系。

Abstract： 14 listed commercial banks as the research object， this paper analyses the influence factors of bank's capital structure by multiple linear regression. The results of the study show that：the asset—liability ratio of the commercial banks is positive correlation with the bank size and profitability， and is negatively influenced by the guarantee ability and growth of assets.关键词：商业银行；资本结构；影响因素；实证分析Key words： commercial banks；capital structure；influencing factors；empirical study中图分类号：F83 文献标识码：A 文章编号：1006—4311（2012）27—0175—020 引言公司资本结构理论指出健全合理的资本结构是一个公司实现自身价值最大化的基础，是维系一个公司生存与发展的保障。

商业银行为客户提供综合性金融服务，它不同于一般的企业，其主要经营金融资产和负债，但是商业银行同样受《公司法》的约束，即也以追求自身价值最大化为目标。

影响资本结构决策的因素分析一、财务因素：1.利息率：利息率是企业融资成本的重要组成部分，企业需要考虑市场利率的高低，以确定债务和股权的比例。

2.税率：税率的高低会影响企业的税收成本，高税率会倾向于选择债务融资，因为利息支出可以抵扣，减少纳税额。

而低税率则倾向于选择股权融资。

3.盈利能力：企业的盈利能力对资本结构决策有着重要影响。

高盈利能力意味着企业可以自行获得更多的内部资金，减少对外融资的需求。

4.赢利稳定性：赢利稳定性是衡量企业经营风险的指标，稳定的赢利能力可以降低债务融资的风险，提高债务融资的可行性。

二、非财务因素：1.产业特点：不同行业有不同的特点，如行业周期性、行业前景等，这些特点会直接影响到融资的可行性和方式选择。

高度周期性的行业更适合债务融资。

2.公司规模：公司规模不同，对资本结构的要求也不同。

大型企业可能更容易获得银行贷款或发行债券，小型企业可能更倾向于股权融资。

3.公司治理结构：公司治理结构会影响融资途径和成本。

良好的公司治理结构能够增强投资者信心，降低融资成本。

4.股权市场条件：股权市场的发展程度和活跃程度对资本结构选择也有一定影响。

发达的股权市场能够提供更多的股权融资机会和更好的估值水平。

5.政策环境：政策的稳定性和支持程度会影响企业的融资成本和方式。

政府的财税政策、金融监管政策等都会影响资本结构的决策。

以上是一些影响资本结构决策的主要因素分析，企业在决策时需要综合考虑这些因素，以达到资本结构的最优化。

同时，不同行业、企业的情况也存在差异，因此具体的资本结构决策还需要结合实际情况进行分析和评估。

浅谈资本结构及其影响因素资本结构是公司财务结构的核心内容之一，是指公司财务资产中长期融资的比例，是公司债务资本与所有者权益资本之间的比例关系。

资本结构的好坏对公司的经营状况、融资成本、企业价值等方面都有着重要的影响。

资本结构的构建需要考虑多种因素的影响，包括公司规模、盈利能力、经营风险等。

下面就围绕资本结构及其影响因素展开一番探讨。

资本结构是根据公司自身的经营状况、发展阶段、融资需求等因素确定的，它主要由债务和所有者权益两部分组成。

债务部分是公司通过发行债券、贷款等形式筹集的资金，所有者权益部分则是公司通过发行股票、留存盈余等形式筹集的资金。

资本结构的构建要综合考虑公司的经营状况、融资需求和风险承受能力等因素，实现资本结构的合理配置是公司稳健发展的重要保障。

资本结构的构建要考虑公司的规模和经营状况。

公司规模的大小会直接影响到其资本结构的构建，一般来说，规模较大的公司可以更容易通过发债和股权融资来满足其资金需求，从而形成相对复杂的资本结构；而规模较小的公司则相对依赖于银行贷款等债务融资，其资本结构相对简单。

公司的盈利水平和盈利能力也会对其资本结构产生重要影响，盈利水平较高的公司可以更容易通过自有资金满足其经营需求，从而减少债务融资的比例；而盈利水平较低的公司则更依赖于债务融资来满足其融资需求，其资本结构比例中债务部分相对较高。

公司的发展阶段也是影响资本结构的重要因素。

一般来说，初创期的公司为了迅速扩大规模和市场份额往往需要大量的资金支持，因此其债务融资比例相对较高；而成熟期的公司则有着更为稳定的收入和现金流，因此其债务融资比例相对较低。

公司的成长阶段也经常需要通过股权融资来支持其快速扩张，所以其资本结构中股权部分也会相对较高。

资本市场的环境和政策也是影响资本结构的重要因素。

不同国家和地区的资本市场环境和政策有着不同的特点，这也会对公司的资本结构产生影响。

一些国家和地区对债务融资提供了更加便利的政策和税收优惠，这会导致公司在融资选择上更倾向于债务融资，从而影响其资本结构的构建。

影响资本结构决策的因素分析(可编辑1.财务机会成本：财务机会成本是指企业在使用不同融资工具时所面临的成本差异。

债务融资一般会比股权融资的成本低，因为股权融资会导致股东权益的稀释，对于股东来说是一种机会成本。

因此，企业面临的财务机会成本越高，倾向于选择债务融资，以减少融资成本。

2.资本市场条件：资本市场的状况对企业的资本结构决策有着重要的影响。

如果债务市场条件良好，企业可以通过发行债券来融资，并且可能获得低利率和灵活的融资条件。

相反，如果股权市场活跃，企业可以通过发行股票来融资，并且可能获得更高的融资额度和更多的资源。

3.盈利能力和稳定性：企业的盈利能力和稳定性也会对资本结构决策产生重要影响。

盈利能力高的企业更容易获得债务融资，因为债权人更愿意贷款给具有较好还款能力的企业。

稳定性高的企业一般更适合选择债务融资，因为债务有明确的还款期限和利率，可以更好地规划和管理企业的财务。

4.成长阶段和规模：企业的成长阶段和规模也会影响资本结构的选择。

成长阶段较早的企业一般会选择通过股权融资来获得更多的资金，并且吸引更多的战略合作伙伴。

规模较小的企业可能更倾向于选择债务融资，因为融资额度相对较小，并且可以更好地控制自己的股东结构。

5.税务政策：税务政策也是影响资本结构决策的一个重要因素。

在一些国家和地区，债务利息的支付可以享受一定的税收减免，这会增加企业选择债务融资的动力，从而降低融资成本。

而股权融资则往往不享受这种税收优惠。

综上所述，影响资本结构决策的因素有很多，包括财务机会成本、资本市场条件、盈利能力和稳定性、成长阶段和规模以及税务政策等等。

企业在进行资本结构决策时，需要综合考虑这些因素，并根据自身情况做出最合适的选择。

上市公司资本结构影响因素研究内容摘要:本文选取在深、沪证券交易所A股股票市场上市的北京地区制造业上市公司2000-2007年的样本数据,运用逐步线性回归方法,分析资本结构影响因素:规模、成长性、获利能力、风险因素、非负债税盾、资产担保价值和股权集中度对北京地区制造业上市公司资本结构的影响。

实证结果表明,获利能力、成长性、非负债类税盾、经营风险与资产负债率负相关,规模、股权集中度、资产担保价值与资产负债率正相关。

关键词:上市公司资本结构影响因素企业资本结构理论研究概述企业资本结构,是指企业取得长期资金的各项来源、组成以及相互关系。

对资本结构影响因素的实证研究起源于Bradley(1984),其研究发现,同行业企业具有相似的资本结构,不同行业的资本结构则有差异,并且具有时间上的稳定性。

Titman和Wessels(1988)提出,影响企业资本结构的因素包括8个方面,即抵押资产价值比例、非负债类税盾、企业的成长性、独特性、行业因素、企业规模、盈利的波动性、盈利性。

Harris和Raviv(1991)总结了相关资本结构影响因素的实证研究后指出,杠杆随着固定资产、非债务税盾、成长机会和公司规模的增加而增加,随着波动性、广告费用、研究开发费用、盈利性和产品独特性的增加而减少。

近年来,国内研究渐多,陆正飞、辛宇(1998)认为,企业获利能力与资本结构显著负相关,但企业规模、企业抵押价值、成长性对企业资本结构影响并不显著,不同行业的资本结构有显著差异。

洪锡熙、沈艺峰(2000)以1995-1997年期间在上海证券交易所上市的221家工业类公司为样本数据,对影响我国上市公司资本结构的主要因素进行实证分析,结果表明企业规模和盈利能力两个因素对企业资本结构的选择有显著的影响,而公司权益、成长性和行业因素对企业资本结构没有显著的作用。

之后,李善民和刘智(2003)、肖作平(2004)、童勇(2004)等对之进行了深入探讨,但结论上各个因素对资本结构的影响仍有着很大的分歧。

资本结构动态调整行为及影响因素研究
随着经济的发展，企业越来越强烈地感觉到了资本结构的重要性。

企业资本结构不仅
影响到企业的财务状况，也影响到企业的经营效益、风险抵御能力和市场竞争力等方面。

因此，资本结构动态调整行为及影响因素的研究对企业经营决策具有重要意义。

资本结构动态调整行为一般表现在企业债务与股权之间的调整。

从债务方面，企业发
行债券、借款、债务重组等手段，增加融资方式的多元化，降低财务成本，提高杠杆比率，使得企业更具有盈利能力。

从股权方面，企业可以增发新股、配股、股权激励等，吸引外
部资本，加强公司治理，提高透明度，增加公司的价值。

然而，资本结构动态调整行为面临的影响因素较为复杂。

首先，资本市场的变化会直
接影响企业的融资渠道和财务成本，使得企业调整债务与股权的优先级发生变化。

其次，
公司规模、行业属性、资产质量等因素会影响企业的财务风险水平和盈利能力，进一步影
响资本结构调整行为的选择和程度。

最后，公司管理层对于资本结构调整的理解和运用能力，也对动态调整行为产生直接影响。

因此，在制定资本结构动态调整策略时，企业需要综合考虑上述影响因素，及时跟进
市场变化，及时了解公司内部财务情况，加强公司管理与治理，提高公司对于资本结构调
整的理解和运用能力，以便更好地应对经济的波动和市场的竞争，实现企业的可持续发
展。

资本结构影响因素分析王巍摘要:企业的资本结构对企业有着重要影响,合理资本结构有助于企业价值最大化。

随着现代公司制度的建立,代理成本已经成为影响企业资本结构的决定因素,公司治理问题也通过代理成本对企业的资本结构产生了影响,适当的债务性融资可以降低企业代理成本,改善企业治理结构,从而对企业底本结构产生积极的影响。

关键词:资本结构代理成本治理结构债务融资一、资本结构理论的概述企业的资本结构是指企业内部权益性质资本与债务性资本的构成比例。

自二十世纪五十年代以来,国外有许多专家学者开展对资本结构理论的研究,资本结构理论的研究在西方已趋于成熟阶段,但是随着我国社会经济的高速发展,经济体制的不断健全,越来越多的企业参与了市场竞争,资本结构的选择已经关系着企业的发展乃至生死存亡。

我国已经步入了需要优化融资决策和管理资本结构的时代。

资本结构理论是企业财务理论的重要内容,并经历了一个逐步形成不断发展和完善的过程:MM理论,权衡理论,ROSS信号理论,控制权转移理论等,那么究竟哪些因素影响企业的资本结构?这一问题的解决,对于公司的经营者以及投资者都具有重要的现实意义。

二、资本结构影响因素的探讨(一)代理成本对资本结构的影响资本结构的代理成本理论是由詹森(Jensen)和麦克林(Meckling)于1976年提出的。

他们认为“代理成本”是企业资本结构的决定因素。

但是对于理论成本怎么影响资本结构却未做出详细地分析。

随着现在公司制度的建立,代理成本问题已经成为现代企业资本结构决策必须考虑的问题,对于代理成本是怎么影响资本结构,首先要从代理成本的产生入手。

代理成本的产生通常是由股东和管理者的利益冲突;股东和债权人的利益冲突引起的。

在现在公司之下,企业的所有者与经营者分离,企业的经营者一般不是企业的完全所有者,经理们在承担了全部责任和风险后,所获得的只是全部利润的一部分,所以管理者的利益冲突主要表现为:1.经理偏好更多的额外收入和更低的努力程度,因为经营不佳,他们付出的成本只是较低的工资和较低的个人持有股票的市场价值。

1外文资料翻译译文欧盟国内外银行盈利能力影响因素分析摘要：本文使用银行级数据，通过1995 - 2001年期间国内和外国银行在15个欧盟国家的商业运营情况来了解银行的具体特点和整体银行业环境对影响盈利能力。

结果表明, 国内和外国银行的盈利能力不仅受银行具体特点的影响，也受金融市场结构和宏观经济条件的影响。

除了在集中情况下国内银行利润, 所有的变量都是有重大意义的，尽管它们的影响和关系对国内和国外银行并不总是相同。

1 介绍在过去的几年许多的因素造成了欧盟银行业竞争日益激烈。

最重要的因素之一是针对服务、建立、运行和监督信贷机构的第二个欧洲指令出台，在银行和金融领域放松管制。

这个指令为所有欧洲银行机构在单一欧洲金融市场和提供了平等的竞争条件，因此银行正在先前无法预料的国内外竞争之中。

另外, 最近一些的技术进步对规模经济和范围提供了更多的机会，而采用欧元也加速了行业的变化。

此外,宏观经济政策后大多数国家通货膨胀率和利率逐步降低。

最后,在越来越多的欧洲国家非金融公司被允许提供传统的银行服务,并且在竞争中进一步提高，银行被迫产生新的产品和寻找新客户。

许多银行为了参加欧洲市场和银行业扩大被迫增加规模，通过合并和收购的方式进行了前所未有的整合。

在环境快速变化的情况下，这些变化给在欧盟的银行带来很大的挑战，因此影响了他们的效能。

格林指出，充足的收益是必要的条件让银行保持偿付能力,在一个合适的环境生存、发展和繁荣。

考虑到银行业的健康发展和经济知识增长，影响银行的盈利能力的潜在因素不仅和管理者有关，而且和众多利益相关者如中央银行,银行家协会、政府以及其他金融当局有关。

2 文献综述参考文献与本文可分为三大类。

第一部分是研究集中于银行的盈利能力的决定因素。

第二部分包括研究欧洲银行的利润和成本效率。

第三由研究比较国内外银行。

在下面几个部分中,我们讨论这些类别中的每一个。

3 决定因素和变量选择3．1 因变量本研究使用平均资产回报率(ROAA)来评估银行的性能。

本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文：Capital Structure Decisions During a Firm’s Life Cycle In one of the most interesting studies on the capital structure of small business, Berger and Udell (1998) asserted that general financial theory is not applicable to all businesses. Instead, the particular phase of a business’s life cycle determines the nature of its financial needs, the availability of financial resources, and the related cost of capital. This approach supports financial behaviors that are life-cycle-specific. As argued by Kaplan and Stromberg (2003), the changing degree of informational opacity that a firm faces drives its financial life cycle. From its inception to maturity, the financial needs of a firm change according to its ability to generate cash, its growth opportunities, and the risk in realizing them. This will be reflected by evolving financing preferences and the nature of the specific financial choices that a firm makes during its life cycle. As a consequence, firms at the earlier stages of their life cycles, which arguably tend to have larger levels of asymmetric information, more growth opportunities, and reduced size, should have specific capital structure drivers and should apply specific financing strategies as they advance through the different phases of their life cycles.Despite recent attention to this topic, data on the financing structure of firms during the course of their life cycles is rather limited, and results are inconclusive (Gregory et al. 2005). Thus, we still need to extend ou r understanding of firms’ financial choices in this area, verifying, in particular, the existence of a pro-tempore optimal capital structure and the drivers that are potentially relevant to explain capital structure decisions as the firms progress along the different phases of their life cycle. In some contexts, equity (specifically, venture capital) has been shown to play a role in the early stages, while debt becomes relevant only in the late stages. In othercontexts, the support of a financial intermediary (bank) is fundamental in the early stages, whereas the capital structure is rebalanced in later stages. There is common consensus regarding the importance of the institutional environment in which a small firm is based (Beck et al. 2002, 2005). To operate in the USA or in Italy, small businesses must have access to a different variety of financial solutions in order to sustain their business in the light of asymmetric information. Thus, the financing preferences of these firms are complex, and the appropriateness of the available options deserves further research.The study reported here contributes to this area of research in that it seeks to verify whether the life cycle is a relevant factor in a firm’s financing behavior. Empirical analysis is used to evaluate the role of the life cycle and the differences in the determinants of the debt/equity ratio throughout the life cycles of Italian small businesses. Specifically, the following questions are addressed: Do Italian firms have different financial structures during different stages of their life cycles? How do Italian capital structure determinants change in the course of a firm’s life cycle?The paper is structured as follows. The first part examines the strategic financing choices of firms through a formal research hypothesis. In the second part, the sample is introduced, the variables and the model are applied, and the results are shown. The third part presents the conclusions and a discussion of the implications for management and for future research.2 Capital structure and financial life cycleThe concept that firms evolve through a financial life cycle is well established in the literature. There is, however, disagreement regarding sequential financing choices and the debt/equity ratio. Moreover, the lifecycle paradigm does not fit all small businesses (Berger and Udell 1998), and differences exist not only in terms of management determination but also in terms of different industry affiliations and institutional environments in which firms operate (Harris and Raviv 1991; Beck et al. 2002; Rajan and Zingales 2004; Utrero-Gonza´lez 2007). In their review of the capital structure literature, Harris and Raviv (1991) note that it is generally accepted that firms in a given industry will have similar leverage ratios, which are relatively stableover time, while leverage ratios vary across industries. Specifically, the industry is a significant determinant of leverage, which alone has been found to explain up to 25% of within-country leverage variation (Bradley et al. 1984). Moreover, the institutional environment also has a crucial influence on capital structure decisions, as recently documented by Titman et al. (2003) for large companies, and by Gaud et al. (2005) for small firms. More than the type of financial system (market-based or bank-based), it is the efficiency of the financial system (Rajan and Zingales 1995; Wald 1999; Booth et al. 2001) and of the general institutional context (Petersen and Rajan 1994, 1995; Berger and Udell 1995) that determines the financial growth of firms affecting capital structure decisions. Therefore, hypotheses on capital structure determinants must take industry affiliation and the institutional environment into account. This is very much the case for firms that are particularly opaque and affected by asymmetric information.2.1 Financial life cycle: theory and hypothesisSeveral hypotheses, as synthesized in Table 1, can be proposed for the consideration of the life cycle in explaining firms’ financing behavior.The use of internal resources as a substitute for external finance must be acknowledged, as in the pecking-order theory, because these reflect the severity of asymmetric information problems. Accordingly, in this study, Hypothesis 1 deals with the role of profitability and the preferences regarding internal resources versus debt. Hypotheses 2 and 3, each of which is further divided into two formulations, address the different theoretical financial preferences during the life cycle of a firm. Hypothesis 2a attempts to describe the financial life cycle with respect to the age of a firm, while Hypothesis 3a is the reverse formulation. Hypothesis 2b attempts to describe the financial life cycle with respect to the role of a firm’s reputation, while Hypothesis 3b is the reverse formulation. Finally, due to the fact that the previously mentioned effects can be heterogeneous for different industries and for firms operating in different institutional contexts, we explicitly take industry affiliation and the context of analysis into account.Hypothesis 1: pecking-order theory. The main approach to interpreting capitalstructure choices from the asymmetric information point of view is the pecking-order hypothesis (Myers 1984), which suggests that firms finance their needs in a hierarchical fashion. Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) have pointed out the role of managerial preferences in the choice of financing resources. These choices are made by considering the relative costs of the various sources of finance due to information asymmetries and transaction costs. The pecking-order theory proposes that firms prefer to use internal sources of capital, relying on external sources only when the internal ones are exhausted. As a result, firms prefer to use less information-sensitive securities, with retained earnings being the most preferred financing source, followed by debt, and then equity capital. This implies that more-profitable firms will retain earnings and become less leveraged, while less-profitable firms will become more leveraged, thus demonstrating an inverse relation between profitability and financial leverage. The pecking-order theory seems particularly relevant for small and medium-sized firms due to their typical features and limited access to external finance (Holmes and Kent 1991). In particular, the pecking-order hypothesis provides an instrumental tool for the analysis of the strategic financing problem of firms along the life cycle (Rocha Teixeira and dos Santos 2005). It states that no optimal level of debt becomes ‘‘objectively’’ evident; rather, it becomes apparent as a firm’s situation changes over time. Thus, the proportion of debt in a firm’s capital structure is adjusted in response to the impending financial needs of the firm over its life cycle. Empirical evidence from previous studies that have examined small and medium-sized firms (Chittenden et al. 1996; Michaelas et al. 1999) was consistent with the pecking-order argument, since leverage was found to be negatively related to profitability. Therefore, the empirical model employed here included profitability, defined as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (Ebitda) to capital (Michaelas et al. 1999; Fama and French 2002; Sogorb-Mira 2005).Hypothesis 2a: financial life cycle. For start-ups, which are ‘‘the most informationally opaque’’ type of business, it is difficult to obtain external funding (Berger and Udell 1998). Information opacity prevents investors in small firms fromdistinguishing between high-quality and low-quality companies. Consequently, Berger and Udell (1998) argued that debt, due to the higher interest rate applied by lenders to hedge against the higher default probability, is costly for young firms. Due to asymmetric information, young, informationally opaque firms are less leveraged. This phenomenon can inhibit small firms from using external funding at all (Weinberg 1994), in addition to the fact that cash-flows are needed to service interest payments, and small and young businesses are typically not able to generate positive cash-flows in the early stages. Consequently, according to Fluck (2000) and to the empirical results of Carey et al. (1993) and Helwege and Liang (1996), young firms are financed mainly by insiders, business angels, and venture capital. Equity as a source of funds allows the soundness of an investment to be monitored, while ‘‘patient’’capital can wait for long-term economic returns on investments and thereby meet the long-term financial needs of a young firm. Especially given an imperfect market, the venture capitalist professionally supports a young firm with his or her financial resources and skills (Kaplan and Stromberg 2003). In this context, Carey et al. (1993) and Helwege and Liang (1996) showed that small entrepreneurial firms frequently issue outside equity before they issue debt. Bank debt is typically more readily available after a firm has achieved significant tangible assets that might be collateralized. The use of debt increases over time and becomes particularly important in the maturity stage of a business (Berger and Udell 1998). As a firm goes through its life cycle, becoming mature and less informationally opaque, its financing choices change, including better access to the debt market (Chittenden et al. 1996). Therefore, leverage increases with age, as young firms are financially constrained while old firms have convenient access to external finance. Therefore, this life-cycle pattern of firm financing assumes that small firms will use outside equity first (such as venture capital finance) and retained earnings, issuing debt at last to satisfy their subsequent financing needs. This approach contrasts with that described in the pecking-order model mainly with respect to the financing choices of start-up firms.Hypothesis 2b: reputational effect. A reputation argument also supports the convenient use of debt only in the maturity stage. Young firms, without pastexperience and a track record, have a low debt capacity. Vice versa, firms that have consolidated their business, with a past history, past profitability, track record, and credibility and reliability in the product market, are not constrained in the credit market and can obtain finance under good economic terms. These firms can have developed a positive reputation to be spent on the financial market (Diamond 1989). Therefore, early in the life cycle, small businesses have little repayment history or record of profitability upon which external suppliers of funds can rely. For such firms, internal resources (from entrepreneurs or their families) are fundamental, and when these are exhausted, venture capital becomes the primary choice. After a period of sufficient profits as well as of reliability and credibility in the market, firms can gain a positive reputation and are thus able to readily obtain the required financing, including debt (Hirshleifer and Thakor 1992). As the firm matures, outside stakeholders can examine the firm’s track record and its creditworthiness over time. A firm’s reputation can mitigate the problem of asymmetric information and improve its access to external sources of funding, such as trade credit and bank debt (Diamond 1989). Thus, gaining a reputation in the market over time and reducing moral hazard problems provide older firms with better conditions for using debt as a source of finance. As stated by Diamond (1989), older firms will be able to increase their use of debt. Empirically, Fluck et al. (1998) find that the proportion of funds from insiders increases during the early stages of a firm’s life cycle, while the proportion of outsider finance declines. However, at some point this relationship reverses. They interpret this result as a consequence of the development of a positive reputation in credit markets that allows the firm to obtain cheaper sources of external financing.Source: Maurizio La Rocca, Tiziana La Rocca and Alfio Cariola; “Capital Structure Decision s During a Firm’s Life Cycle”,Small Business Economics, Online First™, 24 August 2009:Pages 1-24.译文：基于企业生命周期的资本结构决策在小企业资本结构的研究中，伯格和德尔（1998）有趣地发现，普遍的财务理论并不适用于所有交易。

Capital Structure and Firm Performance1. IntroductionAgency costs represent important problems in corporate governance in both financial and nonfinancialindustries. The separation of ownership and control in a professionally managed firm may result in managersexerting insufficient work effort, indulging in perquisites, choosing inputs or outputs that suit their ownpreferences, or otherwise failing to maximize firm value. In effect, the agency costs of outside ownership equalthe lost value from professional managers maximizing their own utility, rather than the value of the firm. Theory suggests that the choice of capital structure may help mitigate these agency costs. Under theagency costs hypothesis, high leverage or a low equity/asset ratio reduces the agency costs of outside equity andincreases firm value by constraining or encouraging managers to act more in the interests of shareholders. Sincethe seminal paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976), a vast literature on such agency-theoretic explanations ofcapital structure has developed (see Harris and Raviv 1991 and Myers 2001 for reviews). Greater financialleverage may affect managers and reduce agency costs through the threat of liquidation, which causes personallosses to managers of salaries, reputation, perquisites, etc. (e.g., Grossman and Hart 1982, Williams 1987), andthrough pressure to generate cash flow to pay interest expenses (e.g., Jensen 1986). Higher leverage canmitigate conflicts between shareholders and managers concerning the choice of investment (e.g., Myers 1977), the amount of risk to undertake (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976, Williams 1987), the conditions under which thefirm is liquidated (e.g., Harris and Raviv 1990), and dividend policy (e.g., Stulz 1990).A testable prediction of this class of models is that increasing the leverage ratio should result in loweragency costs of outside equity and improved firm performance, all else held equal. However, when leveragebecomes relatively high, further increases generate significant agency costs of outside debt –including higherexpected costs of bankruptcy or financial distress –arising from conflicts between bondholders andshareholders.1 Because it is difficult to distinguish empirically between the two sources of agency costs, wefollow the literature and allow the relationship between total agency costs and leverage to be nonmonotonic.Despite the importance of this theory, there is at best mixed empirical evidence in the extant literature(see Harris and Raviv 1991, Titman 2000, and Myers 2001 for reviews). Tests of the agency costs hypothesistypically regress measures of firm performance on the equity capital ratio or other indicator of leverage plussome control variables. At least three problems appear in the prior studies that we address in our application.In the case of the banking industry studied here, there are also regulatorycosts associated with very high leverage.First, the measures of firm performance are usually ratios fashioned from financial statements or stockmarket prices, such as industry-adjusted operating margins or stock market returns. These measures do not netout the effects of differences in exogenous market factors that affect firm value, but are beyon d management’scontrol and therefore cannot reflect agency costs. Thus, the tests may be confounded by factors that areunrelated to agency costs. As well, these studies generally do not set a separate benchmark for each firm’sperformance that would be reali zed if agency costs were minimized.We address the measurement problem by using profit efficiency as our indicator of firm performance.The link between productive efficiency and agency costs was first suggested by Stigler (1976), and profitefficiency represents a refinement of the efficiency concept developed since that time.2 Profit efficiencyevaluates how close a firm is to earning the profit that a best-practice firm would earn facing the sameexogenous conditions. This has the benefit of controlling for factors outside the control of management that arenot part of agency costs. In contrast, comparisons of standard financial ratios, stock market returns, and similarmeasures typically do not control for these exogenous factors. Even when the measures used in the literature areindustry adjusted, they may not account for important differences across firms within an industry – such as localmarket conditions – as we are able to do with profit efficiency. In addition, the performance of a best-practicefirm under the same exogenous conditions is a reasonable benchmark for how the firm would be expected toperform if agency costs were minimized.Second, the prior research generally does not take into account the possibility of reverse causation fromperformance to capital structure. If firm performance affects the choice of capital structure, then failure to takethis reverse causality into account may result in simultaneous-equations bias. That is, regressions of firmperformance on a measure of leverage may confound the effects of capital structure on performance with theeffects of performance on capital structure.We address this problem by allowing for reverse causality from performance to capital structure. Wediscuss below two hypotheses for why firm performance may affect the choice of capital structure, theefficiency-risk hypothesis and the franchise-value hypothesis. We construct a two-equation structural model andestimate it using two-stage least squares (2SLS). An equation specifying profit efficiency as a functi on of the2 Stigler’s argument was part of a broader exchange over whether productive efficiency (or X-efficiency) primarily reflectsdifficulties in reconciling the preferences of multiple optimizing agents –what is today called agency costs –versus “true” inefficiency, or failure to optimize (e.g., Stigler 1976, Leibenstein 1978). firm’s equity capital ratio and other variables is used to test the agency costs hypothesis, and an equationspecifying the equity capital ratio as a function of the firm’s profi tefficiency and other variables is used to testthe net effects of the efficiency-risk and franchise-value hypotheses. Both equations are econometricallyidentified through exclusion restrictions that are consistent with the theories.Third, some, but not all of the prior studies did not take ownership structure into account. Undervirtually any theory of agency costs, ownership structure is important, since it is the separation of ownership andcontrol that creates agency costs (e.g., Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet 1985). Greater insider shares may reduceagency costs, although the effect may be reversed at very high levels of insider holdings (e.g., Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988). As well, outside block ownership or institutional holdings tend to mitigate agency costs bycreating a relatively efficient monitor of the managers (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1986). Exclusion of theownership variables may bias the test results because the ownership variables may be correlated with thedependent variable in the agency cost equation (performance) and with the key exogenous variable (leverage)through the reverse causality hypotheses noted aboveTo address this third problem, we include ownership structure variables in the agency cost equationexplaining profit efficiency. We include insider ownership, outside block holdings, and institutional holdings.Our application to data from the banking industry is advantageous because of the abundance of qualitydata available on firms in this industry. In particular, we have detailed financial data for a large number of firmsproducing comparable products with similar technologies, and information on market prices and otherexogenous conditions in the local markets in which they operate. In addition, some studies in this literature findevidence of the link between the efficiency of firms and variables that are recognized to affect agency costs,including leverage and ownership structure (see Berger and Mester 1997 for a review).Although banking is a regulated industry, banks are subject to the same type of agency costs and otherinfluences on behavior as other industries. The banks in the sample are subject to essentially equal regulatoryconstraints, and we focus on differences across banks, not between banks and other firms. Most banks are wellabove the regulatory capital minimums, and our results are based primarily on differences at the mar2. Theories of reverse causality from performance to capital structureAs noted, prior research on agency costs generally does not take into account the possibility of reversecausation from performance to capital structure, which may result in simultaneous-equations bias. We offer twohypotheses of reverse causation based on violations of the Modigliani-Millerperfect-markets assumption. It isassumed that various market imperfections (e.g., taxes, bankruptcy costs, asymmetric information) result in abalance between those favoring more versus less equity capital, and that differences in profit efficiency move theoptimal equity capital ratio marginally up or down.Under the efficiency-risk hypothesis, more efficient firms choose lower equity ratios than other firms, allelse equal, because higher efficiency reduces the expected costs of bankruptcy and financial distress. Under thishypothesis, higher profit efficiency generates a higher expected return for a given capital structure, and thehigher efficiency substitutes to some degree for equity capital in protecting the firm against future crises. This isa joint hypothesis that i) profit efficiency is strongly positively associated with expected returns, and ii) thehigher expected returns from high efficiency are substituted for equity capital to manage risks.The evidence is consistent with the first part of the hypothesis, i.e., that profit efficiency is stronglypositively associated with expected returns in banking. Profit efficiency has been found to be significantlypositively correlated with returns on equity and returns on assets (e.g., Berger and Mester 1997) and otherevidence suggests that profit efficiency is relatively stable over time (e.g., DeYoung 1997), so that a finding ofhigh current profit efficiency tends to yield high future expected returns.The second part of the hypothesis –that higher expected returns for more efficient banks are substitutedfor equity capital –follows from a standard Altman z-score analysis of firm insolvency (Altman 1968). Highexpected returns and high equity capital ratio can each serve as a buffer against portfolio risks to reduce theprobabilities of incurring the costs of financialdistressbankruptcy, so firms with high expected returns owing tohigh profit efficiency can hold lower equity ratios. The z-score is the number of standard deviations below theexpected return that the actual return can go before equity is depleted and the firm is insolvent, zi = (μi +ECAPi)/σi, where μi and σi are the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of the rate of return on assets, andratios for those that were fully owned by a single owner-manager. This may be an improvement in the analysis of agencycosts for small firms, but it does not address our main issues of controlling for differences in exogenous conditions and insetting up individualized firm benchmarks for performance.ECAPi is the ratio of equity to assets. Based on the first part of the efficiency-risk hypothesis, firms with higherefficiency will have higher μi. Based on the second part of the hypothesis, a higher μi allows the firm to have alower ECAPi for a ven z-score, so that more efficient firms may choose lower equity capital ratios.文章出处：Raposo Clara C. Capital Structure and Firm Performance .Journal ofFinance.Blackwell publishing.2005, (6): 2701-2727.资本结构与企业绩效1.概述代理费用不管在金融还是在非金融行业，都是非常重要的企业治理问题。

资本结构分析研究资本结构是指一个企业在筹资时所选择的不同融资方式和融资比例，今天我们将探讨资本结构的分析研究。

一、资本结构的定义及重要性资本结构是指企业筹集资本的各种方式及其相对比重，包括债务、股权等。

资本结构的分析十分重要，因为资本结构直接影响企业的经营效益、偿债能力和综合风险水平。

正确的资本结构可以提高企业的资本报酬率，减少融资成本和税负率，优化企业效益。

二、资本结构的影响因素1、行业因素不同行业所需的资本结构往往不同。

例如，高科技企业一般依赖股权融资，而工业企业通常采用债务融资。

2、企业规模企业规模越大，其融资能力越强，因此其资本结构可能会更倾向于债务融资。

3、企业盈利能力企业的盈利能力决定了其偿债能力，越盈利的企业越有能力承担债务融资。

4、经济形势经济低迷时，企业的融资难度加大，此时企业会更倾向于资本重组和减少债务融资。

三、资本结构分析方法1、杠杆比率分析利用杠杆比率（债务资产比率、债务权益比率等）反映企业的财务风险水平。

当债务资产比率高于50%时，企业的盈利能力需要承担高昂的利息负担，会导致企业的财务风险增加。

2、利息保障倍数分析利息保障倍数越高，企业偿债能力越强。

利息保障倍数=EBIT/利息支出。

3、股本资本回报率分析利用股本资本回报率（ROE）反映企业股本的盈利能力。

四、资本结构优化策略1、提高股权融资比例股权融资可以降低资本成本，优化资本结构。

2、降低债务融资比例当债务融资比例过高时，企业的财务风险增加。

降低债务融资比例有助于优化资本结构。

3、提高资产质量提高资产质量可以增加企业的盈利水平，降低金融风险，从而优化资本结构。

五、结论资本结构的优化是企业发展的关键问题，正确的资本结构策略可以提高企业的市场竞争力和长期经营效益。

通过合理的资本结构分析和优化策略，企业可以减少融资成本，提高盈利能力和经营效益。

资本结构影响因素研究综述资本结构影响因素研究综述1. 引言资本结构是指公司在筹集资金时，通过股权和债权之间的比例决定资金来源的组织形式。

在企业的经营决策中，资本结构是一个重要的考量因素，对企业的经营绩效和价值创造具有重要的影响。

研究资本结构的影响因素对于企业的融资决策和经营管理具有重要的实践意义。

本文将就资本结构的影响因素进行全面评估和探讨。

2. 资本结构的定义和意义资本结构是公司对资金筹措方式的选择，涉及股本和债务的比例，对公司的经营决策具有重要的影响。

资本结构的优化可以提高企业的经营效率和风险管理能力，从而增加企业的价值。

研究资本结构的影响因素可以帮助企业更好地优化其资本结构，提高企业的竞争力和盈利能力。

3. 资本结构的影响因素3.1 公司特征公司特征是影响资本结构的重要因素。

包括公司规模、成长性、盈利能力和风险承受能力等方面。

规模较大的公司通常更容易获得债务融资，而盈利能力较高的公司通常更倾向于使用股权融资。

不同行业的公司也会因为行业特性而选择不同类型的资金筹措方式。

3.2 税收政策税收政策对资本结构也具有重要的影响。

不同类型的融资方式受到不同税收政策的影响，债务融资可以享受利息税收抵免，而股权融资则不享受此项税收优惠。

税收政策对企业在选择资金筹措方式时产生重要影响。

3.3 法律和监管环境法律和监管环境对企业的资本结构选择也具有重要的影响。

金融监管对债务融资的限制会影响企业债务的规模和成本。

一些国家和地区对股权融资有特殊的限制和规定，这也会影响企业的资本结构选择。

3.4 市场条件市场条件是影响资本结构的另一个关键因素。

市场情况的变化会影响企业融资的成本和可行性。

金融市场的波动和利率的变化会直接影响企业债务融资的成本和可行性。

市场对公司价值的认可程度也会影响企业股权融资的可行性。

4. 个人观点和理解资本结构是企业经营决策的重要方面，对企业的经营状况和价值创造具有重要的影响。

个人认为，公司特征、税收政策、法律和监管环境以及市场条件是影响资本结构的主要因素。

浅谈资本结构及其影响因素
资本结构是指企业长期资本的组成方式，包括股权和债务资本的比例。

资本结构的决定涉及到企业筹资的策略问题，对企业的长期发展和盈利能力有着重要的影响。

资本结构的重要性在于它不仅直接影响企业的财务状况，而且会对企业的股东价值产生深远的影响。

此外，资本结构也会对企业的经营风险和抗风险能力产生影响。

影响资本结构的因素有多个，以下就是其中的几个关键因素：
1. 经营风险
企业所处的行业和竞争状况、产品、市场的变化等因素会影响其经营风险。

风险性大的企业会更倾向于使用较少的债务，而相对地使用较多的股权，以减少债务带来的财务风险。

2. 税负
企业的税负越高，使用债务筹资的成本越低，因为债务利息可以抵扣企业的税负。

因此，高税负的企业会倾向于使用更多的债务资本。

3. 市场条件
市场的利率和股价，对企业的筹资选择具有重要的影响。

当利率较低或股价较高时，企业更倾向于使用债务资本；反之，当利率较高或股价较低时，企业更倾向于使用股权资本。

4. 盈利状况
企业是否有足够的盈利来偿还债务，会影响企业使用债务的能力。

当企业盈利状况良好时，它会倾向于使用较多的债务资本，以提高股东价值。

相反地，盈利不佳的企业可能会使用更多的股权资本以弥补债务成本。

总之，资本结构是企业财务决策中的重要问题，需要综合考虑多种因素，包括经营风险、税负、市场条件和盈利状况等。

在决策时，企业需要根据其自身的情况，选择最为适合自己的资本结构，以提高股东价值和抗风险能力。

资本结构的影响因素资本结构是企业发展的重要方面，合理的资本结构能够帮助企业降低成本，增强竞争力。

那么，资本结构受哪些因素的影响呢？一、公司规模公司规模是资本结构的一个重要影响因素。

通常来说，规模较大的公司相对规模较小的公司更容易获取资本，特别是能够通过公开市场融资的企业。

相反，在规模较小的公司，融资难度和获得债务资本的成本通常较高。

因此，规模较大的公司更容易采用杠杆结构。

二、企业的行业属性企业的行业属性也是导致企业资本结构不同的原因。

通常来讲，行业性质不同所要面对的风险和竞争环境不一样，这使得企业在融资过程中制定的资本结构也随之发生变化。

例如，通信公司和科技公司通常采用更低的负债率，因为它们的行业经常受到快速变化的技术和市场需求的影响。

相反，房地产业和基础设施行业则在融资时更多地依赖债务资本。

三、经济周期经济周期还会影响企业资本结构的选择。

在经济衰退期间，本来就脆弱的企业更难以获得外部资本，这迫使它们更依赖于债务资本。

另一方面，企业在经济复苏期间能够获得更多的外部股权资本。

因此，在经济周期的不同阶段，企业资本结构的比例也会有所变化。

四、股东偏好股东偏好也是影响企业资本结构的重要因素。

这些偏好由股东的目标和价值观所决定，以及股东的风险承受能力。

例如，一些股东可能更倾向于企业的较高杠杆率，因为这种融资方式可以增加公司的收益并降低税费。

相反，有些股东可能更喜欢企业较低的债务水平，因为它们更看重公司的稳定性和风险控制。

五、政府政策政府政策也在一定程度上影响企业的资本结构。

特别是当政府推出支持中小企业融资的政策时，这可能会降低企业融资难度，并促进利用股权资本的需求。

此外，政府监管机构可以通过限制某些高风险融资策略的使用，来影响企业的资本结构。

例如，监管机构可以限制企业的杠杆率，以避免过度借债和相关风险。

综上所述，资本结构的制定与多个因素有关。

因此，企业确定资本结构时应综合考虑这些因素，合理平衡各种利益，以获得最佳的融资策略。

管理纵横 Sw eeping over the manag ement资本结构的影响因素马海青(四川大学 610064)摘 要资本结构作为企业权益资本和债务资本的比例关系,是企业相关利益者权利义务的集中反映,是企业财务管理和资本运营中的一个重要的内容,它反映企业筹资状况、生产运营状况、资金运动状况等方面的情况。

资本结构的合理与否对企业的发展至关重要。

本文主要从微观方面说明企业资本结构的主要影响因素。

关键词资本结构;影响因素资本结构(capital structure)又称财务杠杆,是一个企业的自有资本与债务资本的比例以及债务资本中各种债务的不同比例关系,简言之,资本结构即企业的负债程度及在负债中流动负债与长期负债的比例关系,研究的核心问题是如何确定最优资本结构。

从M M理论诞生以来,国内外学者对公司资本结构的影响因素进行了大量理论研究和实证研究,提出影响资本结构的主要有以下几个因素。

1 资产结构。

主要是指固定资产占总资产的比率。

企业以有形资产担保举债经营,可以减少债权人因信息不对称所产生的监督成本,特别是信用不良的企业,在有形资产担保的情况下,债权人提供贷款的可能性较大。

企业的有形资产越多,不仅可以使企业通过资产的担保,筹集更多的负债资金,而且还可以使企业以优惠的价格举债,所以负债率就会较高。

固定资产和存货通常被视为可抵押资产,其价值越大,企业可获得的负债应越多,呈现出正的相关关系。

2 盈利能力。

尽管自M M理论以来有大量的理论研究,但是迄今为止人们还是无法对公司的盈利能力同财务杠杆的关系达成一致看法。

基于税收的理论模型认为,假如其他条件不变,高盈利能力的企业应该会举债更多,因为它们有更强烈的动机利用债务合法避税。

但是根据优序融资理论,企业融资的一般顺序是:先使用盈余收益,然后选择发行债券,最后考虑发行股票。

因此,高盈利能力的公司通常会选择较少的债务。

信号传递模型指出,内源融资成本最低,外源融资成本较高,这是因为外源融资的成本主要来自信息不对称引起的交易成本,而内源融资没有此成本。